■I 


ii 


HARPER'S  CLASSICAL  LIBRARY. 


THUCYDJDES'  HISTORY 


THE   PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 


\j••     y  »^P  τ   •'         κ  f       y,^ 


TUG    HISTORY 


or 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR, 


THUCYDIDES. 


I# 


A   NEW    ΛΝΡ   LITERAL   VERSIOK, 

FROM   TUB   TEXT   OF   ARNOLD, 
OOUATEP    WITH    BCKSER,   OULLEfi,   AND    POPPO, 


REV.  HENRY  DALE,  M.  Α.. 

KABTti  or  tni  new  γκογκιετακτ  school,  βμι'κπβατβ,  aud  iatc  mwt 
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•••••i'SVli;•'• 


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HARPER'S 


V 


NEW    CLASSICAL   LIBRARY• 

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HERODOTUS. 
DEMOSTHENES.    2  VoU, 
TUUCYDIDES. 
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Μ 


PREFACE. 


ΤπΕ  object  of  this  volnino  is  to  give  a  version  of  tlio  original  bo 
Ptrictly  faithful  as  to  be  of  service  to  the  classical  student ;  -while 
the  style,  though  perfectly  simple  and  unpretending,  mny  contain 
nothing  so  opposed  to  the  idiom  of  onr  own  language  as  to  deter 
the  general  reader  who  may  Λvish  to  know  exactly  >vhat  the  Greek 
historian  wrote.  To  gain  both  these  ends,  hoAvever,  except  in  α 
limited  degree,  is  perhaps  scarcely  possible  in  translating  an  author 
like  Thucydides ;  whose  style  is  frequently  eo  very  obscure,  as 
regards  tho  meaning,  and  so  totally  different,  as  regards  the  form 
and  arrangement  of  his  narrative,  from  >vhat  Λνο  are  accustomed 
to  in  our  own  >vriters  of  history.  It  may  be  well  therefore  to  say, 
tliat  wherever  the  two  parts  of  the  object  I  have  mentioned  seemed 
incompatible,  the  latter,  as  the  less  important,  has  been  sacrificed 
to  tho  former;  particularly  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  work,  where 
the  student  naturally  stands  most  in  need  of  every  help  that  can 
be  given  him.  With  this  explanation,  I  venture  to  hope  that  tho 
present  version  may  be  found,  in  not  a  few  passages,  to  answer  tho 
end  proposed  better  than  any  of  those  which  preceded  it.  Tlio 
very  great  additions  which  within  the  Inst  few  years  have  been 
made  to  our  knowledge  of  the  original,  mny  reasonably  exempt 
the  expression  of  such  a  hope  from  the  charge  of  arrogance.  And 
though  want  of  leisure,  arising  from  more  pressing  occupations, 
has  prevented  my  deriving  all  the  benefit  I  might  have  done  from 
the  worke  of  more  learned  laborers  in  the  same  field,  yet  even  an 
imperfect  acquaintance  with  the  annotations  of  such  scholars  at 


Ο  Q     lo    99 


Vl  PREFACE. 

have  recently  edited  Thucydides,  could  scarcely  fail  to  give  me  & 
decided  advantage  over  earlier  tranBlators.  To  one  of  those 
bchohtrs,  especially,  I  am  bound  most  thankfully  to  acknowledge 
my  very  great  obligations;  though  his  eye  is,  alas!  closed  to  such 
expressions  of  gratitude.  It  was  under  the  personal  instruction  of 
Dr.  Arnold  that  I  had  the  happiness  to  make  my  first  acquaintance 
with  the  language  of  his  favorite  author ;  and  his  annotations  upon 
the  work  have  never  long  been  out  of  my  hands,  t;ince  they  were 
first  published.  The  test  of  his  last  edition  is  what  I  have  adopted 
for  this  translation;  and  I  have  sometimes  felt  compelled  to  bor- 
row the  very  Avords  with  which  ho  rendered  α  diflicult  passage ; 
for  when  his  version  was  meant  to  be  literal,  it  eecmed  almost  ini> 
possible  to  chauge  it Avithout  sacrificing  some  part  of  iho  sense. 
The  very  few  notes,  too,  Avhich  were  compatible  witli  the  form 
and  design  of  the  volume,  are  in  many  cases  only  extracts  from, 
or  references  to,  his  more  copious  illustrations  of  the  text :  though 
the  views  of  other  editors,  i)articularly  of  Ilaack,  Bekkcr,  Culler, 
Poppo,  and  Bloomficld,  are  also  quoted  on  doubtful  passages, 
Avhcro  my  mind  was  not  quite  made  up,  with  respect  either  to  the 
best  reading,  or  the  most  probable  ititerpretation.  AVilh  such 
valuable  aids  at  my  command,  my  tusk  might  well  have  been  exe- 
euted  far  better  than  it  is.  13ut  such  as  it  is,  I  commit  it  very 
humbly  to  the  judgment  of  the  public ;  more  particularly  of  those 
who  are  acquainted  λυΙιΙι  the  original,  and  will  therefore  bo  best 
.iblo  to  appreciate  the  difliculties  which  α  translator  of  Thucydidui 
has  to  encounter. 


TIIUC  YDIDES. 


BOOK  I. 

TnccYDiDES,  jxn  Athenian,  wroto  the  history  of  tho  war 
between  tho  Peloponnesians  nnd  the  Athenians,  how  they 
warred  against  each  other  ;  having  begun  from  its  very  outset, 
with  tho  expectation  that  it  would  prove  a  groat  one,  and 
moro  worthy'  of  relation  tlian  ail  that  had  been  before  it ;  in- 
ferring 80  much,  as  well  from  the  fact  that  both  sides  were  at 
tho  height  of  all  kinds  of  preparation  for  it,  as  also  because 
ho  saw  tho  rest  of  Greece  joining  with  tho  one  side  or  tho 
other,  Bomo  immediately,  and  eomo  intending,  bo  to  do.  For 
this  was  certainly  the  greatest  movement  that  over  happened 
among  tho  Greeks,  and  some  part  of  tho  barbarians,  and  ex- 
tending, as  ono  may  Bay,  even  to  most  nations  of  tho  world. 
For  tho  events  that  preceded  this,  and  those  again  that  are  yet 
moro  ancient,'  it  was  impossible,  through  length  of  time,  to 
ascertain  Avith  certainty ;  but'  from  such  evidence  as  I  am  led 

'  Literally,  "  iwoii  worthy— of  all,"  etc. ;  but  this  use  of  tho  miporlative, 
though  one  of  tho  most  common  idioms  of  tho  Greek  langiiap^o,  has  not 
boon  naturalized  in  our  own ;  notwithstanding  Milton's  well-known  imi- 
tation of  it,  in  which  ho  makes  Adam  tho  '•  goodliest  of  all  his  sons  sinco 
barn,  Tbo  inirost  of  her  daughters  Eve." 

*  As  ho  roforf!,  i  think,  to  his  own  actual  investigations  on  tho  subject, 
thoro  scorns  no  reason  for  giving  to  yv  tho  hypothetical  Ibrco,  as  trans- 
lators have  generally  done.  The  same  remark  applies  to  tho  uso  of  tho 
sarao  verb  la  tho  first  scntcncoofchap.  22,  χηλεττόν  Τ7)ν  άκρίβειαν  αντην 
τών  λεχθέντων Ίίιαμνημονενσαι  ην,  and  tho  truth  of  it  appears  to  bo  con• 
firmed  by  the  expression  iiriirovuc  όί  ευρίσκετο  in  tho  samo  chapter. 

•  Tho  relative  ώι>  is  referred  by  somo  to  σκυηηύνη,  by  others  to 
'ίποτεϋσαι ;  and  in  either  case  it  would  flcom  but  an  ordinary  Instance  of 
ftttraction;  though  Arnold  thinks  that  "  neither  of  those  expressions  can 
Ijo  admitted."  I  have  preferred  tho  latter,  both  because  the  participial 
clause  might  very  naturally  be  inserted  in  this  parenthetical  way ;  and 
from  roforonco  to  α  very  similar  passage  in  the  beginning  of  chap.  20,  Ta 
fth  ούν  ηαλαιά  τοιαύτα  tvpav^  χαλεπά  υντα  ιτηντί  ^ξής  τεκμηρίω  τηϋτεύσηι. 
Scblfor,  as  quoted  by  Oullor,  supplies  ίξ  from  tho  antocodont  clause.— 


2  TnUOYDIDES.   I.  [ii,  iiL 

to  trust,  on  looking^  back  as  far  as  ))ossil>lo,  I  do  not  tbink  tbey 
were  great,  citlior  witb  respect  to  tue  wars  or  otberwise. 

2,  For  it  is  cvideut,  tliat  wbat  is  now  called  Hellas,  was  not 
of  old  inbabited  in  a  settled  manner ;  but  tbat  formerly  tbero 
were  frequent  removals,  and  tbat  cacdi  tribo  readily  left  tbo 
place  of  tbeir  abode,  being  forced  by  sucb  as  were  from  timo 
to  time  more  numerous.  For  as  tbero  wf\&  no  traffic,  and  tbey 
did  not  mix  witb  one  anotber  witbout  fear,  eitber  by  sea  or 
land;  and  tbey  eacb  so  used  wbat  tbey  bad  as  but  biU'ely  to 
live  on  it,  witbout  bavinii^  any  superlluity  of  ricbes,  or  plant- 
ing tbeir  laud  (because  it  Avas  uncertain  wben  anotber  sbouM 
invade  tbem,  and  carry  all  away,  especially  as  tbey  bad  not 
tbe  defense  of  walls) ;  and  ;is  tbey  tbougbt  tbat  tbey  might 
any  wbero  obtain  their  necessary  daily  sustenance,  they  made 
little  difficulty  in  removing  :  and  for  this  cause  tbey  were  not 
strong,  eitber  in  greatness  of  cities,  or  other  resources.  And 
the  best  of  the  land  was  always  the  most  subject  to  these 
changes  of  inhabitants  ;  as  that  whieb  is  now  called  Tbessaly, 
and  Hoiotia,  and  the  greatest  part  of  tbe  l*elopouucse  (excx-pt 
Arcadia),  and  of  the  rest  of  Greece  Avbatsoever  was  most 
fertile.  For  tbrougli  tbe  goodness  of  the  land,  botb  tbe  power 
of  some  particular  men  growing  greater  caused  factions  among 
tbem,  whereby  they  Λvcre  ruined ;  an<l  withal  tbey  were  more 
cxpose<l  to  the  j)lots  of  strangers.  Attica,  at  any  rate,  having 
througb  tbe  poverty  of  tbe  soil  been  (or  tbe  longest  peri^xl 
free  from  factions,  Λvas  always  inbabited  by  tbe  same  peoph'. 
And  this  which  follows  is  not  tbe  least  cvitlence  of  my  asser- 
tion, tbat  it  was  owing  to  its  migrations  tbat  Greece  did  not 
C(pially  increase  in  other  parts.  For  sucb  as  by  Avar  or  sedi- 
tion were  driven  out  of  tlie  rest  of  Greece,  the  most  j)ower- 
ful  of  tlicni,  retired  to  Athens,  as  to  a  ]»lace  of  security; 
and  becoming  citizens  at  a  very  early  period,  made  tbe  city 
still  greater  in  tbe  number  of  inhabitants;  so  tbat  after- 
ward they  even  sent  out  colonics  into  Ionia,  as  Attica  itself 
Avas  not  able  to  contain  thenj.  3.  And  to  me  the  wcakne>s 
of  ancient  times  is  not  a  little  demonstrated  by  this  too.  lie- 
fore  tbe  Trojan  war,  (ireece  appciai^s  to  have  done  nothing  in 
common ;  and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  th(i  whohi  of  it  bad  not  as 
yet  even  this  nann• ;  nay,  lu'lOre  the  time  of  llelh-n,  the  son  of 

^viiiaiiTi  8001113  hero  to  ολ-ρΓΟΗ*?  simply  a  r^viit,  without  implying  any 
Wiing  of  it3  fortuitous  nature,  us  it  muro  comuiouly  docs. 


IV,  v.]    ^  TIIUCYDTDES.  I.  jj'.i 

Deucalion,  it  does  not  appear  that  this  appellation  existed  at  all  ;i• 
hut  that  in  their  different  tribes,  and  the  Pclasgian  to  tho 
iireatest  extent,  they  furnished  from  themselves  tho  namo  [of 
their  j>eoj>l('].'  But  when  llellcn  and  his  sons  had  grown 
strong  in  Phthiotis,  and  men  in>'itod  them  for  their  aid  into  tho 
other  cities ;  from  a^^sociating  with  them,  separate  communities 
>vero  now  more  cominojily  called  Hellenes  :  and  yet  not  for  α 
long  time  after  could  that  namo  prevail  among  them  all.  And 
Homer  provi's  this  most  fully  ;  for,  though  born  long  after  tho 
Trojan  war,  ho  has  nowhere  called  them  all  by  that  name,  nor 
indeed  any  others  but  those  that  camo  Avith  Achilles  out  of 
rhthiotis ;  who  wero  tho  very  original  Hellenes ;  but  in  his 
]>o(^ms  lio  mentions  Danaans,  Argives,  and  Achaians.  Nor  again 
does  he  sp<'ak  of  barbarians  ;  because  neither  were  the  Hellenes, 
ill  my  opinion,  as  yet  distinguished  by  one  common  term  in  op- 
position to  that.  Tho  several  Hellenic  communities,  then,  who 
in  tho  ditierent  cities  understood  each  other's  language,  and 
were'  afterward  all  so  called,  did  nothing  in  a  body  before  tho 
Trojan  war,  through  want  of  strength  and  mutual  intercourse. 
Nay,  even  for  this  expedition  they  united  [only]  because  they 
now  made  more  use  of  tho  sea.  4.  For  Minos  was  the  most 
ancient  cf  all  with  whom  wo  arc  acquainted  by  report,  that  ac- 
quired a  navy  :  and  ho  made  himself  master  of  the  greater  part 
«»f  what  is  now  the  (irecian  sea;  and  both  ruled  over  the  islands 
«•ailed  Cyclades,  and  was  the  first  that  colonized  most  of  them, 
having  expelled  tho  Carians,  and  established  his  own  sons  in 
them  as  governors;  and,  as  was  natural,  ho  swept  piracy 
from  tho  sea  as  much  as  lio  could,  for  tho  better  coming  in  to 
him  of  his  revenues.  5.  For  tho  Grecians  m  old  time,  and  of 
the  barbarians  both  those  on  tho  continent  who  lived  near  tho 
sea,  and  all  who  inhabited  islands,  after  they  bciran  to  crosa 
over  more  commonly  to  one  another  in  ships,  turned  to  piracy, 

•  i,  e.,  thero  wcro  difTercnt  tribes,  of  which  tho  Pclaspian  was  tho  prc- 
flominant  ono,  called  by  their  difTercnt  names,  instead  of  beinp:  all  com- 
prclicndpd  under  ono,  as  they  wero  afterward.  Or  it  may  refer  to  tho 
LTfadual  formation  of  such  general  names  evon  at  that  early  period,  bv 
ono  tribe  extending  its  own  appellation  to  others. 

•  For  ft  striking  instance  of  such  a  change  in  the  language  of  a  bar- 
barian peoflo  at  a  much  later  period,  I  may  refer  to  tho  inhabitants  of 
tno  Ampliilochian  Argos,  of  whom  Thucydides  pays,  II.  68,  έλληνίσβηβαν 
7r)v  vi'V  γΤίώαηαν  τότε  ηρώτον  «τό  τών  Αμηρηκιυτών  ξννοικηοάντων  *  οΐ 
ι'ί  Η?.9.οι  *Αμψί?ηχοί  ftap;inpni  riniv,  ^ 

•  Seo  Arnold's  nolo  on  this  diflficuU  passage. 


4  THUCYDlDEa  I.  [vL 

under  the  conduct  of  their  most  powerful  men,  with  α  view  both 
to  their  own  gain,  and  to  maintenance  for  tlio  needy  ;  and  fall• 
ing  upon  towns  that  were  unfortifiixl,  and  inhabited  Hke  villages,* 
they  rined  them,  and  made  most  of  their  livelihood  by  this 
means ;  as  this  employment  did  not  yet  involve  any  disgrace, 
but  rather  brought  with  it  even  somewhat  of  glory.    This  is 
shown  by  some  that  dwell  on  the  continent  even  at  the  pres- 
ent day,  with  whom  it  is  an  honor  to  jKjrform  this  cleverly  ; 
and  by  the  ancient  poets  who  introduce  men  asking  the  ques- 
tion of  such  as  sail  to  their  coasts,  in  all  cases  alike,  whether 
they  are  pirates :  as  thoui,di  neither  those  of  whom  tliev  in- 
quire, disowned  the  employment;  nor  those  who  were  inter- 
ested in  knowing,  reproached  them  with  it.      They  also  robl»ed 
one  another  on  the  continent ;  and  to  this  day  many  parts  of 
Greece  live  after  the  old  fashion;    as   the   Locri  Ozolae,  tho 
^tolians,  and  Acarnnnians,  and  those  in  that  part  of  tho  con- 
tinent.    And  the  fashion  of  Λvearing  arms  has  continued  among 
these  continental  states  from  their  old  trade  of  piracy.     6.  For 
tho  whole  of  Greece  used  to  >vear  arms,  owing  to  their  habita- 
tions being  unprotected,  and  their  communication  with  each 
other  insecure ;  and  they  passed  their  ordinary  lite  with  weapons, 
like  the  barbarians.     And  those  parts  of  Greece  >viiich  still  live 
,  in  this  Λvay,  are  a  proof  of  the  same  mode  of  life  having  also 
^  formerly  extended  to  all.     Now   the  Athenians  Λvero  tho  first 
who  laid  down  their  armor,  and  by  a  more  easy  style  of  life 
*  changed  to  greater  luxury.     And  the  elders  of  their  rich  men 
no  long  time  ago  ceased  wearing  from  delicacy  linen  tunics, 
and  binding  up  a  knot  of  the  hair  on  their  heads  with  a  tie  of 
golden  grasshoppers.     AVhenco  also  this  fashion  prevailed  for  a 
long  time  with  the  elders  of  the  lonians,  from  their  ailinity  to 
them.     But  on  the  contrary  a  moderate  style  of  dressing,  and 
according  to  the  ])resent  mode,  was  first  used  by  the  Lacedai- 
monians ;  and  in  other  res|x;ct3  their  >vealtliier  men  most  con- 
formed tliemselves  in  their  living  to  the  common  j)eople.     And 
they  were  the  first  who  stripped  themselves,  and  undressing  in 
public,  smeared  themselves  with  grease,'  in  their  gymnastic  ex- 
ercises.    And  formerly  even  at  tho  01ynij)ic  games  the  com- 
batants contended  with  girdles  round  their  middle ;  nnd  it  is 

*  t.  «.,  in  an  open  and  stragglinf»  manner.     Compare  his  description  of 
Ppi^ta,  to  whicli  tlio  term  wan  Btill  applicublo,  cliap.  10.  * 

'  J?uo  rudo  origiaul  of  tho  κηΐ)ωμα  in  later  times. 


vii-ix.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  ft 

not  many  years  since  it  (:oaso<l  to  l>o  so.  Nay  even  now  among 
some  of  the  barbarians,  and  especially  those  of  Asia,  prizes  for 
boxint^  and  wrestling  arc  given,  and  they  wear  girdles  when  they 
contend  for  them.  And  in  many  other  respects  also  one  might 
show  that  tlic  ancient  Greeks  lived  in  a  manner  similar  to  the 
barbaria!<s  of  the  present  age. 

1.  Of  the  cities,  again,  such  as  were  founded  most  recently, 
and  Λν1)οη  there  ΛveΓe  now  greater  facilities  of  navigation,  having 
iXroater  abundance  of  wealth,  they  were  built  with  walls  on  the 
very  shores ;  and  occupied  isthmuses,  with  a  view  both  to  com- 
merce and  to  security  against  their  several  neighbors :  whereas 
the  old  ones,  owing  to  the'  long  continuance  of  piracy,  were 
built  further  off  from  the  sea,  both  those  in  the  islands  and  those 
on  the  mainlands ;  (for  they  used  to  j)lunder  one  another,  and 
all  the  rest  who  lived  by  the  sea  without  being  seamen)  ;  and 
even  to  the  present  day  they  arc  built  inland. 

8.  And  the  islanders  especially  were  T)i rates,  being  Carians 
and  riifenicians.     For  it  was  these  that  had  colonized  most  of 
the  islands.      And  this  is  a  proof  of  it : — AVhen  Delos  >va9 
j)urifii'd  by  the  Athenians  in  the  course  of  this  war,  and  all  the 
sepulchers  of  those  who  had  died  in  the  island  were  taken  up, 
iibovo  half  Avere  found  to  be  Carians ;  being  known  by  the 
fashion  of  the  arms  buried  Avith  them,  and  by  the  manner  in 
Avhich  they  still  bury.     l>ut  when  the  navy  of  Minos  Λvas  estab- 
lished, there  >vere  greater  facilities  of  sailing  to  each  other.   For 
the  malefactors  in  the  islands  \sqtq  cxpi'llcd  by  him,  at  the  same 
time  that  he  was  colonizing  most  of  them.     And  the  men  on 
the  Roa-coast,  now  making  greater  acquisition  of  wealth,  led  a 
more  settled  life ;  and  some  of  them  even  surrounded  them- 
selves with  Avails,  on  tha  strength  of  growing  richer  than  they 
had  before  been.     For  through  desire  of  gain,  the  lower  orders  ^\ 
submitted  to  bo  slaves  to  their  betters ;  and  the  more  powerful,!  | 
liaving  a  superabundance  of  money,  brought  the  smaller  cities  ( j 
into  subjection.    And  being  now  more  in  this  state  of  things,  ^ 
some  time  after  they  made  the  expedition  against  Troy. 

0.  And  Agamemnon  appears  to  me  to  have  assembled  the 
:  rmanjent  because  he  eurpjtssed  the  men  of  that  day  in  powor^ 
.'.n<l  not  so  much  because  he  took  the  suitors  of  Helen  bound 

'  Giillcr  reads  άντιηχούααι  Instead  of  αντισχονοαν,  which  ho  pro• 
fioiincc»  inexplicable,  end  intorprete  it  thus,  "  Voterea  urbcs  ob  latro- 
cinlo,  pcetquam  diu  et  reslltcrunt  et  pcrduraverunt,  longius  α  mari  con• 
alias  sunt." 


t  THUCTDIDEa  I.  [x. 

by  their  oftthe  to  Tyndarus.     It  is  said  too  by  those  of  the 
Peloponncsians  who  havo  received  the  inoet  cerbiin  accounts' 
by  tradition  from  their  forefatiiers,  tliat  Pelops  first  acquired 
power  by  tho  abuudauco  of  riches  with  which  he  came  from 
Asia  to  men  who  were  in  needy  circumstances  ;  and  although 
a  new-comer,  yet  gave  Ids  name  to  the  country ; '  and   that 
afterward  still  greater  power  fell  to  the  lot  of  his  descendants, 
as  Eurystlieus  was  killed  in  Attica  by  tho  Ileraclidai,  and  At  reus 
Avas  his  mother's  brother,  and  Eurysthous,  when  goinfj  on  tho 
expedition,  intrusted  Mycenai  and  tho  government  to  Atreus,  on 
tho  ground  of  their  connection;  (ho  liapi)ened  to  bo  flying  frcm 
his  father  on  account  of  tho  death  of  Chrysippus)  :  and  when 
Eurystheus  did  not  return  again,  they  say  that  at  the  wisli  of 
tho  Mycena'ans  themselves,  through  their  fear  of  the  lleraclida', 
and  also  because  he  appeared  to  bo  jtowcrful,  and  had  court(  d 
tho  commons,  Atreus  received  tho  kingdom  of  tiie  Mycena'aiis 
and  all  that  Eurystheus  ruled  over ;  and  that  so  the  descend- 
ants of  IV'lops  became  greater  than  those  of  l\'rseus.     And  1 
think  that  Agamemnon,  from  liaving  received  this  in!u;ritance, 
and  from  being  strong  in  his  navy  also  at  the  same   lime  to 
a  greater  extent  than  others,  assembled  and  made  the  expedi- 
tion not  so  nmch  by  favor  as  by  fear.     For  lio  appears  to  have 
both  come  himself  with  most  ships,  and  to  havo  furnished  them 
for  the  Arcadians  besides  ;  as  Homer  lias  also  shown,  if  he  is 
BuflBcient  authority  for  any  one,"  and  also,  in  [his  account  of) 
the  transmission  of  tho  scepter,  he  has  mentioneil  that  ho  "  O'er 
numerous  islands  and  all  Argos  ruled."   Now,  as  he  lived  on  the 
mainland,  ho  would  not  have  been  master  of  islands,  except 
those  that  were  adjacent  (and  those  would  not  bo  numerous),  if 
ho  had  not  also  had  some  naval  force.   And  wo  nmst  conjecture 
by  this  expedition,  what  was  the  character  of  those  before  it. 

10.  And  as  to  Mycenie  having  been  a  small  place,  or  if  any 
town  in  thoso  times  appear  now  to  bo  inconsiderable,  this 
Avould  bo  no  certain  ])roof  to  rest  upon,  for  disbelieving  that 
the  armament  Λvas  as  large  as  the  poi'ts  have  said,  and  as  report 
prevails.  For  if  tho  city  of  the  I^acedx'monians  were  laid  des- 
olate, and  the  temj)les  and  foundations  of  the  public  build- 
ings were  left,  I  think  that  when  α  long  time  had  passed  by, 

*  Ormoro  literally,  **  gave  occasion  to  tho  naming  of  tho  country  after 
him." 

*  Literally,  "  suiHcicnt  to  provo  it  to  any  one." 


XL] 


inUCYDIDES,  I. 


posterity  would  liavo  prcat  disbelief  of  tlieir  power  in  propor- 
tion to  tlieir  fame.  (And  yet  they  occupy  two  of  the  five 
divisions  of  the  Pcloponnoso,  nnd  take  the  lead  of  the  whole  of 
it,  and  of  their  allies  out  of  it  in  great  numbers.  Still,  as  the 
citv  is  ucitlaT  built  closelv,  nor  has  sumptuous  temples  and 
pul>lic  buildings,  but  is  built  in  villages,  after  the  old  fiishion 
of  (rreece,  it  would  have  an  inferior  appearance)  Whereas 
if  the  Athenians  were  to  suffer  the  same  fate,  I  think  their 
powor  >vould  bo  coniectured,  from  the  appearance  of  tho  city 
tr»  the  eye,  to  have  been  double  what  it  is.  It  is  not  there- 
fore right  to  bo  incredulous,  nor  to  look  at  the  appearance  of 
cities  rather  than  their  power ;  but  to  think  that  that  expedi- 
tion was  greater  indeed  than  any  that  were  before  it,  but  in- 
ferior to  those  of  the  present  day ;  if  on  this  point  again  we 
must  U'lieve  the  poetry  of  Homer,  Avhicli  it  is  natural  that  lie, 
as  a  poet,  set  otf  on  the  sido  of  exaggeration ;  but,  ncv<'rthc- 
les..,  oven  on  this  view  it  appears  inferior.  For  he  has  mado 
it  to  consist  of  twelve  hundred  ships,  those  of  the  liocotians 
carrving  120  men,  and  thoso  of  IMiiloctetos  50;  meaning  to 
show,  as  I  tliitik,  the  largest  and  the  least;  at  any  rato  he  has 
mailo  no  mention  of  the  size  of  any  others  in  tho  catalogue  of 
the  ships.  And  that  they  all  were  themselves  ΓOΛvers  and 
fighting  men,  ho  has  shown  in  the  case  of  the  ships  of  Philoc- 
tetes.  For  ho  has  represented  all  the  men  at  tho  oar  as  bow- 
men. And  it  is  not  probable  that  many  supernumeraries  wouM 
sail  with  them,  except  the  kings  and  highest  ofllcers ;  especially 
a^  they  were  going  to  cross  tho  oj)en  sea  with  munitions  of 
war;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  liad  not  their  vessels  decked,  but 
cijuipped,  after  the  old  fashion,  more  liko  privateers.  Looking 
then  at  tho  mean  .of  the  largest  and  tho  smallest  ships,  they  do 
not  appear  to  have  gone  in  any  great  number,  considering  that 
they  were  sent  by  tho  whole  of  Greece  in  common. 

11.  And  tho  reason  was  not  so  much  scarcity  of  men  as 
want  of  money.  For  owing  to  difficulty  of  subsistence,  they 
look  their  army  tho  smaller,  and  such  only  as  they  hoped 
would  livo  on  tho  country  itself  Λνΐήΐο  carrying  on  tho  war ; 
and  when  on  their  arrival  they  were  8U]>eri or  in  battlo  (and 
that'  they  wero  so  is  evident,  for  they  would  not  else  havo 
built  tho  fortifications  for  their  camp),  they  appear  not  even 
then  to  have  employed  all  their  force,  but  to  have  turnc<l  to 
tho  cultivation  of  tho  Chersonese,  and  to  piracy,  for  want  of 


8  THUCYDIDEa  I.  {ni 

food.  And  ia  this  way  the  Trojans,  oiung  to  their  being 
scatterod,  the  more  easily  held  out*  by  open  force  those  ton 
years ;  being  a  match  for  those  who  successively  were  left 
Ixihind.  l^ut  if  they  had  gone  >vith  abundance  of  food,  and  in 
a  body  hud  continuously  carried  through  the  war,  without 
foraging  and  agriculture,  they  Avould  easily  have  conauered 
them  in  battle,  and  taken  the  place ;  since  even  though  not 
united,  but  only  with  the  part  that  was  successively  present, 
they  held  out  against   them.     Now   by  pressing  the   siege, 

II  say],  they  would  have  taken  Troy  both  in  less  time  and  with 
ess  trouble ;  but  through  want  of  money  both  the  undertakings 
before  this'  were  weak,  and  this  itself,  though  more  famous 
than  the  former,  is  shown  by  facts*  to  have  been  inferior  to  its 
fame,  and  to  the  present  rei)ort  of  it,  which  has  prevailed  by 
means  of  the  poets. 

12.  For  even  after  the  Trojan  war  Grcoeo  Λvas  still  moving 
about,  and  settling  itself;*  so  that  it  could  not?  ineretiso  its 
power  by  remaining  at  rest.  For  the  return  of  tlie  (ί reeks 
irom  Troy,  having  taken  place  so  late,  caused  many  revolu- 
tions ;  and  factions,  generally  speaking,  aroso  in  the  states ;  in 
consequence  of  which  men  were  expelled,  and  founded  cities. 
For  those  who  are  now  called  Boeotians,  being  driven  out  of 
Arne  by  the  Thessalians  in  the  sixtieth  year  after  the  taking 
of  Troy,  settled  in  what  is  now  called  liceotia,  but  was  before 
called  the  Cad  mean  country.  (Tliough  there  was  a  division 
of  them  in  this  country  before,  soniC  of  Λν1κ)ΐη  also  joined  the 
expedition  against  Troy.)  And  the  Diuians  in  the  eightieth 
year  took  possession  of  the  Peloponmso  with  the  Ileraclidn;. 
And  (Jreece  having  with  dilticulty,  after  a  long  time,  enjoyed 
settled  peace,  and  being  no  longer  subject  to  migrations,  U'gan 
to  send  out  colonies ;  and  the  Athenians  colonized  Ionia,  and 
most  of  the  islands ;  and  the  iVloponnesians,  the  greater  part 
of  Italy  and  Sicily,  and  some  jdaces  in  the  rest  of  Greece.'  But 
nil  these  places  were  founde<l  after  the  Trojan  war. 

>  t.  i.,  keeping  tlio  field,  nntl  not  merely  fightini?  from  their  walls. 

2  Ί\ιο  plural  pronoim  in  Iho  (Hreok  is  used  with  refcreuco  to  rfiT/xjuu, 
the  common  term  to  sijinify  tlio  Trojuu  war. 

3  Or,  "  iuCerior  in  Iho  facts." 

*  i.  e.,  it  was  not  yet  settled. — Arnold,  Tlio  old  reading',  μετωκίζετο, 
would  mean,  '•  was  changing  it3  place  of  abode." 

5  Tho  term  "Oreeco"  is  horo  used  in  its  widest  sense,  as  including  all 
countries  that  had  a  Greek  population. 


χπι.,  XIV.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  9 

13.  Now  when  Greece  was  becoinincf  more  poworful,  and 
acquiring  possession  of  money  still  more  than  before,  tyran- 
nies, generally  speaking,  Λvero  established  in  the  cities,  from 
the  revenues  becoming  greater;  Λvhereas  before  there  had 
\>QQii  liercditary  kingly  governments  with  definite  privileges; 
and  Greece  began  to  fit  out  navies,  and  they  paid  more  at- 
tention to  the  sea.  Now  the  Corinthians  arc  said  first 
to  liavo  managed  naval  matters  most  nearly  to  tlio  present 
fashion,  and  triremes  to  have  been  built  at  Corinth  first  in 
Greece.  And  Aminoclcs,  a  Corinthian  shipwright,  appears  to 
have  built  four  sliips  for  the  Samians  also.  Now  it  is  about 
three  hundred  years  to  tlie  end  of  this  war  from  the  time  that 
Aminoclcs  went  to  the  Samians ;  and  the  most  ancient  sea- 
fight  with  which  we  are  acquainted  was  fought  between  the 
Corinthians  and  the  Corcyncans.  And  from  that  too  it  is 
about  two  hundred  and  sixty  years  to  the  same  period.  For 
the  Corinthians,  having  their  city  situated  on  the  isthmus,  had 
always  possessed  an  emporium ;  μ  the  Greeks  of  old,  both 
those  within  the  Peloponnese  and  those  ivithout,  liad  inter- 
course with  each  other  by  land  more  than  by  sea,  through 
their  country :  and  they  were  very  rich,  as  is  shown  even  by 
the  old  poets;  for  they  gave  the  title  of  "wealthy"  to  the  place. 
And  when  the  Greeks  began  to  make  more  voyages,  liaving  got 
their  ships  they  put  down  piracy;  and  rendered  their  city  rich 
in  income  of  money,  as  they  aftordcd  an  emporium  both  ways. 
And  the  lonians  afterward  had  a  large  navy  in  the  time  of 
Cyrus,  the  first  king  of  the  Persians,  and  Cambyses  his  son ; 
and  while  at  war  with  Cyrus,  commanded  the  sea  along  their 
coast  for  some  time.  Polycratcs  also,  tyrant  of  Samos,  in  tho 
time  of  Cambyses,  having  a  strong  fleet,  both  made  some  other 
of  the  islands  subject  to  him,  and  took  Rhenea  and  dedicated 
it  to  the  Delian  Apollo.  And  tho  Phocaians,  whilo  founding 
Massalia,  conquered  tho  Carthaginians  in  a  sea-fight 

14.  These  were  tho  strongest  of  their  navies.  But  even 
these,  though  many  generations  after  tho  Trojan  war,  appear 
to  have  used  but  few  triremes,  and  to  have  been  still  fitted 
out  with  fifty-oared  vessels,  and  long  boats,  as  that  fleet  was. 
And  ii  was  but  a  short  time  before  tho  Median  war,  and  tho 
d^^'ath  of  Darius,  who  was  king  of  the  Persians  after  Cambyses, 
that  triremes  were  possessed  m  any  number  by  tho  tyrants  of 
Sicily  and  tho  Corey raians.     For  these  were  the  last  navies 


10  TUUOYDIDES.  L  [xr.-xvii. 

worth  mentionlDg  established  in  Greeco  beforo  the  expedition 
of  Xerxes:  as  the  jt/^inetans  and  Athenians,  and  whoever 
else  luid  any,  possessed  but  small  ones,  nn«i  of  those  the  greater 
part  fifty-oared  vessels ;  and  it  Avas  only  latoly  that  Thcmis- 
tocles  persuaded  the  Allieniana,  >vhen  at  war  with  the  -/iCi^inc- 
tans,  and  when  the  barbarian  was  also  expected,  to  build  those 
very  ships  with  which  they  fought  him  by  sea;  and  these  were 
not  yet  decked  throuirhout. 

15.  Of  such  a  [deficient]  character  then  were  the  navies  of 
the  Greeks,  both  the  ancient  ones  and  those  which  were  built 
afterward.  And  yet  those  who  paid  attention  to  them  obtained 
the  greatest  power,  lioth  by  income  of  money  and  dominion  over 
others :  for  they  sailed  against  the  islands,  and  subdued  them ; 
especially  those  who  had  not  a  sufficient  extent  of  country.  But 
as  for  war  by  land,  from  which  any  power '  was  acquired,  thero 
was  none.  Such  as  did  arist»,  wore  all  against  their  several 
neighbors ;  and  the  Greeks  did  not  go  out  in  any  foreign  ex- 
peditions far  from  their  country  for  the  subjugation  of  others. 
For  they  had  not  ranged  themselves  Λνΐΐΐι  the  chief  states  as 
subjects ;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  did  they  of  their  own  ac- 
cord, on  fair  and  equal  terms,  make  common  ex|K-ditioiis ;  but 
it  was  rather  neighboring  stites  that  separately  waged  war 
upon  each  other.  But  it  was  for  the  war  carried  on  at  an 
early  period  between  the  Chalcidians  and  Eretrians,  that  tho 
rest  of  Greece  also  was  most  generally  divided  in  alliance  with 
one  side  or  the  other. 

16.  Now  to  others  thero  arose  in  other  ways  obstacles  to 
their  increase ;  and  in  the  case  of  the  lonians,  when  their 
power  had  advanced  to  a  high  pitch,  Cyrus  and  the  Persian 
liingdom,  having  subdued  Croesus  and  all  within  the  Ilalys  to 
tho  sea,  marched  against  them,  and  reduced  to  bondage  their 
cities  on  tho  mainland,  as  Darius  afterward  did  even  the  islands, 
conquering  them  by  means  of  tho  fleet  of  the  l^hoinicians. 

17.  As  for  tho  tyrants,  such  as  thero  were  in  tho  Grecian 
cities,  since  they  provided  only  for  what  concerned  themselves, 
with  a  view  to  the  safety  of  their  own  pei-sons,  and  tho  ag- 
grandizement of  their  own  family,  they  governed  their  cities 
with  caution,  as  far  as  they  possibly  could ;  and  nothing  me- 

*  From  tho  position  of  tho  καΐ  hero,  it  seems  intonded  ouly  to  make  the 
following  word  more  emphatic;  as  it  is  often  used,  before  vert*  especially,• 
an  instauco  of  which  occurs  iu  tho  very  next  eeutcnco,  oaoi  καΐ  iyivuvro. 


XVIII.]  TnUCTDIDES.  I.  Π 

raorablo  wns  arJiicvcJ  by  ibcm ;   [indeed  notbing],  except  it 
might  bo  against  their  own  several  border  states,     [ί  speak  of 
those  in  old  Greece],  for  those  in  Sicil•/  advanced  to  a  very 
great  degree  of  power.   Thus  on  a\\  sides  Greece  for  a  long  tinio  , 
>vas  kept  in  check ;  so  that  it  both  performed  nothing  illustrious 
in  common,  and  >vas  less  daring  as  regards  indi'  Niual  states. 
18.  But  after  the  tyrants  of  tho  Athenians   and   those  iu 
tho  rest  of  Greece  (which  even  at  an  earlier  period*  was  for 
a  long  time  subject  to  tyrant*),  the  most  and  last,  excepting 
those  in  Sicily,  had  been  deposed  by  tjio  Lacedajmonians ;  (for 
Lacedicmon,  aifter  the  settlement  of  the  Dorians,  who  now  in- 
habit it,  though  torn  by  factions  for  the  longest  time  of  any 
country  that  Λνο  arc   acquainted  with,  yet  from   tho   earliest 
period  enjoyed  good  laws,  and  was  always  free  from  tyrants; 
for  it  is  about  four  hundred  years,  or  a  little  more,  to  the  end 
of  this  war,  that  the  Lace(la;monians  have  been  in  possession 
of  the  same  form  of  government;   and  being  for  this  reason 
powerful,  they  settled  matters  in  the  other  states  also;)  after,* 
I  say,  tho  deposition  of  the  tyrants  in  the   rest  of  Greece, 
not   many   years   subse(juently   tho   battle   of  Marathon    was 
fought  between  the  Modes  and  Athenian^.     And  in  tho  tenth 
year  after  it,  the  barbarians  came  again  with  the  great  arma• 
ment  against  Greece  to  enslave  it.     And   when   great  dan- 
ger was  impending,  tho  Lacedaiinonians  took  tlio  lead  of  tho 
confederate   Greeks,   as   being  tho   most  powerful ;   and   tho 
Athenians,  on  the  approach  of  the  Medes,  determined  to  leave 
their  citv,  and  having  broken  up  their  establishments,•  went 
on  board  their  ships,  and  l)ecamo  a  naval  people.    And  having 
togeth.er  repulsed  the  barbarian,  no  long  time  after,  both  those 
Greeks  who  liad  revolted  from  tho  king,  and  thoso  who  had 
joiced  in  tho  war  [against  him],  were   divided   between   tha 
Athenians  and  Laceonimonians.     For  these  states  respectivelv 
rippcared  tho  most  powerful ;  for  tho  ono  was  strong  by  land, 
and  tho  other  by  sea.    And  for  a  short  time  tho  confederacy 
held  together ;   but.  aftenvar<l  tho  I^cedncmonians  and  Athe- 
nians, having  q^rreled,  Vaged  war  against  earh  other  with 
their  allies :   and  of  the  rest  of  tho  Greeks,  whoever  in  any 

*  i.  e.,  than  tbo  Athenians. 
'  A  common  force  of  Λέ  after  a  long  parenthesis. 
'  Or,  '•  having  removed  their  furniture,"  tho  word  meaning  Just  tho  ro• 
verse  of  κατασκινάζομαι,     Bloomfleld  connocta  it  with  Ις  της  νανς. 


12  THUOYDIDKa  L  [πχ^  χχ 

quarter  were  at  variance,  now  betook  themselvee  to  these. 
»o  that,  from  the  Persian  war  all  the  time  to  this,  makincf 
peace  at  one  time,  and  at  another  war,  either  with  each  other 
or  with  their  own  revolting  allies,  they  prepared  themselves 
well  in  military  matters,  una  became  more  experienced  from 
going  through  their  training  in  scenes  of  danger/ 

19.  Now  the  Laceda?moniaus  did  not  treat*  as  tributariis 
the  allies  whom  they  led,  but  only  took  care  that  they  should 
be  governed  by  an  oligarchy,  in  accordance  with  their  own 
interest;  whereas  the  Athenians  had  in  course  of  time  taken 
ships  from  the  states  [in  their  league],  except  the  Chians  anil 
Lesbians,  and  had  commanded  all  to  pay  a  tribute  in  money. 
And  their  own  separate  resources  for  this  war  were  greater 
than  when  before  they  had  been  in  their  fullest  bloom  with 
their  entire  alliance. 

20.  Such  then  I  found  to  be  the  early  state  of  things, 
though  it  is  difficult  to  trust  every  proof  of  it  in  succession. 
For  men  receive  alike  without  examination  from  each  other 
the  reports  of  past  events,  even  though  they  may  have  ha|>- 
pened  in  their  own  country.  For  instance,  the  mass  of  the 
Athenians  think  that  llipparchus  was  tyrant  when  he  was 
slain  by  Ilarmodius  and  Aristogiton ;  and  do  not  know  that 

*  *'  Their  field  of  cxorciao  was  not  the  parade,  but  tho  field  of  battle." 
—Arnold. 

*  Tho  full  force  of  tho  Greek  could  not  I  think  bo  expressed  hero  (or 
in  tho  next  chapter,  τνραννυν  ΰντα  ΰττυΟανεΐν),  without  this  change  of  tho 
participle  into  tho  verb,  tho  original  verb  of  tho  sentence  following  in  α 
Bubordinato  clause.  This  is  by  no  means  an  uncommon  construction, 
and  Kiihikcr  might  havo  added  moro  numerous,  and  perhaps  more  appo- 
site examples  to  tho  singlo  one  by  which  ho  illustrates  it,  viz.  Soph.  Kl. 
3-15,  i/Mv  γε  Ούτεμ\  η  ^μονεϊν  κακώς,  τ)  τών  φί?.υν  ^/)οΐΌίσα  μη  μνι'ιμην 
Ιχειν,  ι.  e.,  j)  τών  ρίΤ,ων  μη  μνήμην  Ιχονσα  {εν)  ffyoviiv.  llig  rule  is  03 
follows:  ''Although  tho  Greeks  make  great  uso  of  tho  participle  to  ex- 
press tho  accidental  accompaniments  of  an  action,  and  thus  distinguish  it 
from  that  action  itself  yet  this  is  sometimes  reversed ;  tho  principle  ac- 
tion is  expressed  in  tho  participle  as  a  mere  accompaniment,  while  tho 
accompaniment  assumes  tho  character  of  tho  principal  verb  of  tho  sen- 
tence." Gr.  Gr.  Jelf.  705.  2.  In  Matthiaj  there  is  no#any  notice  of  tho 
construction  that  I  am  awaro  of.  TiiO  same  participle  Ιχοντες,  is  used  in 
jirecisely  a  similar  manner,  chap.  144,  τάς  όί  πόλεις  ότι  αντονήμηνς  α'ο/,- 
αομει;  ιί  και  (ΐίτοιήμυνς  ΐχυιτις  ίσ-χ(ΐηύμεΟα  :  '*  if  W0  treated  them  a3 
independent  when  wo  made  tho  treaty:"  and  by  Xenophon,  Anab.  I.  8. 
22,  καΐ  πάντες  ok  ol  τών  βαρδύρυν  άρχοντες  μίσον  Ιχοντες  τύ  αντώ» 
ijYovvTo :  ♦'  occupied  tho  center — when  they  led  them  on." 


XXL,  χχπ.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  13 

Ilippiiis  held  tho  ijovcrnment  ns  being  tho  eldest  of  tho  sotift  of 
Pisistratus,  and  Hipparchus  and  Thessalus  were  his  brothers. 
But  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton  having  suspected  tliat  on  that 
day,  and  at  tho  very  moment,  some  infonnation  had  l>een  given 
to  llippias  by  their  accomplices,  abstained  from  attacking  him, 
as  being  forewarned  ;  but  as  they  >vished  iK'forc  they  wero 
seized  to  do  something  even  at  all  hazards,  having  fallen  in  with 
Hipparchus  near  tho  Leocorium,  as  it  is  called,  while  arranging 
the  Panathenaic  procession,  they  slew  liim.  And  there  aro 
many  other  things  also,  even  at  the  present  day,  and  not  such 
as  are  thrown  into  oblivion  by  time,  of  which  tho  rest  of  tho 
(rireeks  too  havo  not  correct  notions ;  ns,  that  the  kings  of  tho 
Laccdaimonians  do  not  voto  with  ono  vote  each,  but  with  two ; 
and  that  they  havo  a  Pit-inensian  Lochus ;  Λvhich  never  yet  ex- 
isted. With  so  little  pains  is  the  investigation  of  tnith  pursued 
by  most  men ;  and  they  rather  turn  to  views  already  formed. 

21.  If,  however,  from  tho  proofs  which  havo  been  men- 
tioned any  ono  should  suppose  that  things  were,  on  the  whole, 
such  as  I  huvo  described  them;  instead  of  rather  believing 
what  cither  poets  havo  sung  of  them,  setting  them  off  in 
terms  of  exaggeration,  or  liistorians  liavo  composed,  in  lan- 
guage more  attractive '  to  the  ear  than  truthful,  their  subjects 
.'idmitting  of  no  ])ro()f,  and  most  of  them,  through  length  of 
time,'  having  come  to  be  regarded  as  fabulous — and  if  ho 
should  consider  that,  allowing  for  their  antiquity,  they  have 
been  sufficiently  ascertnined  from  the  most  certain  data ;  ho 
would  not  bo  mistaken  in  his  opinion.  And  though  men  al- 
ways think  the  war  of  their  own  times  to  be  the  greatest 
while  they  are  engaged  in  it,  but  Λνΐιοη  they  liave  ceased  from 
it,  regard  earlier  events  Λvith  more  admiration ;  yet,  to  such  as 
look  at  it  from  the  facts  themselves,  this  Avar  will  evidently 
appear  to  be  greater  than  those. 

22.  And  as  for  what  they  severally  advanced  in  speaking, 
cither  when  about  to  go  to  war,  or  when  already  in  it,  it  was 
hard  to  remember  tho  exact  words  of  what  was  said  ;  both  for 
myself,  witb  regard  to  what  I  heard  in  person,  and  for  thoso 
who  reported  it  to  me  from  any  other  quarters :  but  as  I  thought 
that  they  would  severally  havo  spoken  most  to  tho  purpose  on 

*  Literally,  "for  listcninf?  to;"  in  fcforonco  to  tho  public  recitation 
which,  In  ancient  times,  was  the  ordinary  modo  of  publishing  works  of 
literature. 

'  Literallj,  "  having  won  their  way  to  tho  fabulous." 


14  THUCTDIDE3.  I.  [xxiii. 

the  BubjecU  from  iimo  to  time  before  them,  while  I  adhered  as 
cloeely  ae  possible  to  the  general  sense  of  what  was  really  said, 
fio  have  I  recorded  it.  But  with  regard  to  the  facit  of  what 
was  done  in  the  Avar,  I  did  not  presume  to  state  them  on  hear- 
say from  any  chance  informant,  nor  as  I  thought  probable 
myself;  but  those  at  which  I  waa  personally  present,  and, 
when  informed  by  others,  only  after  investigating  them  ac- 
curately in  every  particular,  as  far  as  was  possible.  And  it 
was  with  labor  that  they  were  ascertained  ;  because  those  who 
were  present  in  the  several  affairs  did  not  give  the  same  ac- 
count of  the  same  things,  but  as  each  was  well  inclined  to 
cither  party,  or  remembered  [the  circumstances.]  Now,  for 
hearing  it  recited,  perhaps  the  unfabulous  character  of  my 
Avork  will  aj)pear  less  agreeable  :  but  as  many  as  shall  wish  to 
see  the  truth  of  Avliat  both  has  happened,  and  will  hereafter 
hnj)pen  again,  according  to  human  nature — the  same  or  pretty 
nearly  so — for  such  to  tliink  it  useful  will  bo  suilicient.  And 
it  is  composed  as  a  possession  forever,  rather  than  as  a  j)rizc- 
task  to  listen  to  at  the  present  moment. 

23.  Now,  of  former  achievements,  the  greatest  that  was  per- 
formed was  the  Median  ;  and  yet  that  ha^l  its  decision  quickly, 
in  two  battles  by  sea  and  two  by  laud.  But  of  this  war  botli 
the  duration  Avas  very  long,  and  sufferings  befell  Greece  in  the 
course  of  it,  such  of  it  as  were  never  matched  in  the  same  time. 
For  neither  Avero  so  many  cities  ever  taken  and  laid  desolate, 
some  by  barbarians,  and  some  by  the  parties  themselves  oj)- 
posed  in  the  war  ;  (some,  too,  changed  their  inhabitants  when 
taken ;)  nor  was  there  so  much  banishing  of  men  and  blootl- 
shed,  ])artly  in  the  war  itself,  and  partly  through  sedition. 
And  things  >vhich  were  before  spoken  of  from  hearsay,  but 
scantily  confirmed  by  fact,  were  rendered  not  incredible  ;  both 
about  earthquakes,  \\\\\Λ\  at  once  extended  over  the  greatest 
part  of  the  world,  and  most  violent  at  the  same  time,  and 
eclipses  of  the  sun,  which  happened  more  frequently  than  was 
on  record  of  former  times ;  and  great  droughts  in  some  parts, 
and  from  them  famines  also  ;  and  what  hurt  them  most,  and 
destroyed  a  considerable  part — tl»e  plague.  For  all  theso 
things  fell  upon  them  at  once  along  Avith  this  war:  which  the 
Athenians  and  iV'loponnesians  began  by  breaking  the  thirty 
years*  tru(;e  after  the  taking  of  Euboea.  As  for  the  reason  why 
they  broke  it,  I  have  first  narrated  their  grounds  of  complaint 


ΣΧίν.,  XXV.)  TIIUCYDIDE&   I.  15 

and  their  differences,  that  no  ono  might  ever  have  to  inquire 
from  what  origin  so  great  a  war  broke  out  among  the  Greeks. 
For  the  truest  reason,  though  leai^t  brought  forward  in  words, 
I  consider  to  liavo  been,  that  the  Athenians,  by  becoming 
great,  and  causing  alarm  to  tlio  Laccdicmonians,  comjKjlled 
them  to  ]>rocied  to  liostilities.  But  tlio  following  were  tho 
jrrounds  of  conij>laints  ojwnly  alleged  on  cither  side,  from  which 
they  broke  tho  truce,  and  set  to  tho  war. 

24.  Epidanmus  is  a  city  situated  on  tho  right  hand  as  you 
rail  into  tho  Ionian  Gulf;  bordering  upon  it  aro  tho  Taulantii, 
a  barbarian   peoplo  of  Illyria.     It  was  planted  by  tho  Cor- 
cyrarans,  but  the  leader  of  tho  colony  was  ono  Phallus,  tho 
sou  of  lIerato<'-lidas,  a  Corinthian  of  tho  lineage  of  Hercules, 
Avho,*  according  to  tho  ancient  custom,  λ\αΆ  invited  for  this 
object  from  tho  mother  city.     There  Avero  also  somo  of  tho 
Corinthians,  and  of  the  rest  of  tho  Doric  nation,  who  joined  in 
the  colony.     In  process  of  time,  tho  city  of  Epidamnus  became 
great  and  populous ;  but  having  for  many  years  together,  as  is 
reported,  been  torn  by  factions  arising  from  a  war  made  upon 
them  by  tho  neighboring  barbarians,  they  were  brought  low, 
and  deprived  of  the  greatest  part  of  their  power.     But  tho 
last  thing  Λvhich  had  taken  place  before  this  war  was,  that  tho 
commons  had  driven  out  the  nobles,  who,  having  retired,  were 
plundering  those  in  the  city  both  by  land  and  sea,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  tho  barbarians.     The  Epidamnians  that  were  in  tho 
town,  being   hard  pressed,  sent  embassadors   to  Corcyra,  r.s 
being  their  mother-city,  praying  the  Corcyrreans  not  to  stand 
by  and  see  them  perish,  but  to  reconcile  their  exiles  to  them, 
and  to  put  an  end  to  the  barbarian  Avar.     And  this  they  en- 
treated m  tho  character  of  suppliants,  sitting   down  in   tho 
temple  of  Juno.     But  tho  Corcjraians,  not   admitting  their 
supplication,  sent  them   away  again  without  effect.     25.    So 
the  Epidamnians,  finding  that  there  waa  no  relief  for  them 
from  the  Corcyrjrans,  were  at  a  loss  how  to  settle  the.  present 
alTair;  and  een<ling  to  Delphi,  inquired  of  the  god  whether 
they  should  deliver  up  their  city  to  the  Corinthians,  as  their 
founders,  and  try  to  obtain  some  aid  from  them.     He  answered, 
that  they  should  deliver  it  to  them,  and  make   them  their 
I<';ulers.     So  the. Epidamnians  went  to  Corinth,  and  according 

'  Tho  conjunction  Λι/'  in  this  nnd  similar  passages  merely  serves  to  call 
f  )Γ  tho  reader's  attention.  "  In  complianco,  you  must  knoto,  with  the 
ancient  custom."— -4 rnoW. 


1β  THUCYDIDEa  I.  [txyl 

to  the  advice  of  the  oracle,  gave  up  their  city,  declaring  how 
the  first  founder  of  it  was  a  Corinthian,  and  what  answer  the 
oracle  had  given  them ;  and  entreated  that  they  would  not 
stand  b^  and  see  them  destroyed,  but  help  them.  And  the 
Corinthians  undertook  their  defense,  both  on  the  ground  of 
equity  (as  thinking  the  polony  no  less  their  own  than  the 
Corcyraians*),  and  also  for  liatred  of  the  Corcyraeans ;  because, 
although  they  were  their  colony,  they  sliglited  them.  For  they 
neither  gave '  to  them  the  customary  privileges  in  their  general 
religious  assemblies,  nor  to  any  individual  Corintldan,'  Avheu 
performing  the  initiatory  rites  of  sacrifice,  as  their  other  colo- 
nies did  ;  but  despised  them,  as  they  were  both  equal  in  wealth 
to  the  very  richest  of  the  Greeks  at  that  time,  and  more  power- 
ful in  resources  for  war,  and  sometimes  prided  themselves  on 
being  even  veri/  far  superior  iu  their  fleet;  and  on  the 
ground  of  the  Plueacians,  who  were  famous  in  naval  mattei-s, 
having  before  livetl  in  Corcyra.  And  on  this  account  too  they 
prepared  their  navy  with  the  greater  spirit,  and  were  not  (.le- 
iicient  in  power;  for  they  had  120  triremes  when  they  began 
the  Avar.  20.  The  Corinthians  therefore,  ha\ing  complaints 
against  them  for  all  those  things,  gladly  proceeded  to  send  the 
aid  to  Epidanmus,  not  only  telling  whosoever  would  to  go  and 
dwell  there,  but  also  sending  a  garrison  of  Ambraeiots,  Leu- 
cadians,  and  their  own  citizens ;  wliieh  Buccors  marched  by 
land  to  Apollonia,  a  colony  of  the  Corinthians,  for  fear  of  the 

'  The  verbs  in  this  and  tlio  two  following  sentences  are  in  the  original 
participles,  depending  on  τταμημίλυνι•,  to  bo  understood  from  the  preced- 
ing sentence.     Literally,  "  for  they  did  so  by  neither  giving,"  etc. 

■•'  I  havo  followed  the  interpretation  which  GoUcr  and  Arnold  give  to 
this  disputed  passage,  viz.,  that  the  words  KnpivOiu  dit^pi  depend  upon 
όιόήνΓες  ;  and  that  the  singular  number  is  introduced  with  refercuco  to 
any  single  Corinthian  who  might  bo  present  at  a  sacrifice  in  Corcyra,  and 
ought  therefore,  according  to  the  usual  practice  of  Greek  colonies,  to  bo 
selected  for  tho  honorablo  ofiico  of  perfurming  tho  introductory  core- 
monies;  in  contradistinction  to• tho  marks  of  respect  that  should  havo 
been  shown  to  tho  citizens  of  tho  mother-country  in  a  more  general  man- 
ner, when  tho  colonists  met  them  at  any  of  their  public  festivals.  Bloom- 
field  makes  tho  dativo  depend  upon  πμοκαταμχήμενοι,  and  explains  it  as 
signifying  "in  tho  person  of"  or  '*by  tho  agency  of,"  but  does  not  givo 
any  instanco  of  its  being  so  used  elsewhere.  His  objection  to  Goller's  in- 
terpretation, as  dropping  tho  force  of  tho  πρή,  has  no  weight,  as  is  proved 
by  Arnold's  quotation  from  Diodorus,  ':τΐ}οκητ('φχεαθαι  πολίμον,  and 
Gyllor's  reference  to  tho  amhifjuom  uso  of  tho  more  common  form  κατι'φ. 
Xradiu  ;  which  might  havo  led  Thucydides  to  prefix  tho  r/»('/  for  tho 
sako  of  clearness.     For  a  later  opinion  on  this  passage,  sco  note  p.  540. 


xxTii.]  TnUOTDIDES.  Γ.  1Ϋ ' 

Corcyweans,  lest  tliey  sliould  bo  liindorcil  by  tlicm  in  llieir  pas»- 
ni^o  by  eea.  The  Corcyrrpana,  on  finding  that  tho  eettlers* 
and  the  garrisons  wore  como  to  Epidamnus,  and  that  the  colony 
was  delivered  up  to  the  Corinthians,  wore  very  angry;  and 
palling  immediately  thither  with  twenty-five  ships,  and  after- 
ward with  another  fleet,  commanded  them,  by  way  of  insult, 
both  to  recall  those  whom  they  had  banished  (for  the  exiles 
of  the  Epidamnians  had  como  to  Corcyra,  pointing  out  tho 
sepulchers  of  their  ancestors  and  their  kindred  to  them,  on 
the  plea  of  which  they  begged  that  they  ΛνουΜ  restore  them), 
and  to  dismiss  the  g.'irrison  sent  tliither  by  the  Corinthians 
and  tho  settlers.  ]5ut  the  Epidamnians  gave  no  ear  to  them. 
AVhereupon  the  Corryr.Tans  went  against  them  Avith  forty 
ships,  together  >vith  the  banished  men,  with  a  \new  to  restore 
them  ;  taking  ΛνίίΙι  them  the  Illyrians  also.  And  sitting  doAvn 
U'fore  tho  city,  they  made  proclamation,  that  such  of  the  Epi- 
<lnmnians  as  >vould,  and  all  strangers,  might  depart  safely ; 
otherwise  they  would  treat  them  as  enemies.  P»ut  when  they 
did  not  obey  them,  tho  Corcyra;ans  proceeded  (tho  placo 
l»eing  an  isthmus)  to  besiege  the  city. 

27.  Now  the  Corinthians,  when  news  was  brought  from 
f^pidamnus  of  its  being  besieged,  immediately  began  to  pre- 
pare an  army ;  and  at  the  same  time  prepared  a  colony  to 
itlpidamnus,  and  that  any  one  who  would  might  go  on  a  fair 
and  equal  footing ;  and  that  if  any  ono  should  not  bo  Λvilling 
to  join  the  exixidition  immediately,  but  still  Avished  to  havo 
a  share  in  tho  colony,  ho  might  stay  behind  on  depositing 
fifty  Corinthian  drachmas.  And  there  were  many  both  that 
went,  and  that  paid  down  tho  money.  Moreover,  they  begged 
the  Aiegareans  to  convoy  them  Λvith  some  ships,  in  caso  they 
might  l>o  stopped  in  their  passage  by  tho  Corey neans ;  and 
they  prepared  to  sail  with  them  with  eight,  and  tho  citizens 
of  Pale,  in  Cephalonia,  with  four.  Tirey  also  begged  tho 
Epidaurians,  who  furnished  five,  tho  citizens  of  Hermiono 
one,  the  TrsBzenians  two,  tho  Lcucadians  ten,  and  tho  Am- 
braciots  eight  Tho  Thebans  and  Phliasians  they  asked  for 
money ;  and  tho  Eleans  both  for  money  and  empty  ehms : 
while  of  tho  Corintliians  themselves  there  wero  getting  reaily 
thirty  ships,  and  three  thousand  heavy  armed. 

*  Properly,  "  tho  inhabitants,"  i  e.,  those  who  wero  jont  to  Inhabit 
the  town* 


18  TntJOYDIDEa  I.  [χχτπι.,  xnx. 

28.  Now  when  llio  CorcynBana  heard  of  this  preparation, 
they  went  to  Corinth  in  company  >vith  souio  La^'ilft^monian 
and  Sicyonian  embasBadors,  whoni  they  took  with  them,  and 
required  the  Conuthians  to  recall  the  garrison  and  Bettk^is 
that  were  in  Emdaninus,  as  they  hail  nothing  to  do  with  the 
place.  But  if  they  laid  any  claim  to  it,  they  were  willing  to 
submit  to  trial '  in  the  Peloponnesus  before  such  cities  as  they 
bhould  both  agree  on ;  and  to  whichever  of  the  two  parties 
it  should  be  decided  that  the  colony  belongcnJ,  they  sliould 
retain  it.  They  were  willing  also  to  refer  their  cause  to  the 
oracle  of  Delphi.  But  they  told  them  not  to  proceed  to  war  ; 
else  they  would  themselves  also,  they  said,  bo  forced  by  their 
violenco  to  make  very  diti'erent  friends  from  those  they  already 
had,  for  the  sake  of  gaining  assistance.  The  Corinthians  «n- 
Rwered  them,  that  if  they  would  withdraw  their  fleet  and  tin; 
barbarians  from  before  Epidamnus,  they  would  consult  on  tlui 
matl^^r;  but  till  that  was  done,  it  Λνίΐ8  not  right  that  the  Epiilnni- 
nians  should  be  besieged,  while  theij  were  appealing  to  justice. 
The  Corcyra'ans  replied,  that  if  the  Corinthians  too  would  with- 
draw the  men  tlu-y  had  in  Epidamnus,  they  would  do  so ;  or 
they  were  also  coutunt  to  let  the  nien  on  both  sides  stay  where 
they  were,  and  to  make  a  treaty  till  the  cause  should  be  decideil. 

29.  The  Corinthians  did  not  listen  to  any  of  these  pro- 
posals ;  but  when  their  ships  were  manneil,  and  their  con- 
federates had  come,  having  lirst  sent  a  herald  to  declare  war 
upon  the  Corcyneans,  they  weighed  anchor  with  seventy-five 
ships  and  two  thousand  lieavy-armed,  and  set  sail  for  Epidam- 
nus to  wage  war  against  the  Corcyneans.  Their  fleet  was 
commanded  by  Aristeus  the  son  of  I'ellichas,  Callicrates  the 
son  of  Callias,  and  Timanor  the  son  of  Timanthes ;  tho 
land  forces  by  Arehetimus,  tho  son  of  Eurytimus,  and  Isar- 
chidas  the  son  of  Isarchus.  After  they  Λvere  come  to  Actium 
in  the  territory  of  Anactorium,  where  is  tho  temple  of  Apollo, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  (Julf  of  Ambracia,  the  Corey raians  sent 
forward  a  herald  to  them  to  forbid  their  sidling  against  them  ; 
and  at  tho  same  time  were  manning  their  ships  ;  having  both 

>  •'  To  submit  tlie  quarrel  to  a  fair  diseussiou  ;"  "  to  oflVr  Fatisfaction  hy 
ne^'fitiation."  "In  tlicir  disputes  with  out;  anotlitr  tho  several  (Jreek  states 
neknowlcd}?ed  ono  common  public  law,  like  our  law  of  nations,  to  which 
tlMjy  held  themselves  amenable ;  and  before  they  appealed  to  arms,  it  was 
considorod  duo  to  their  common  blood  and  common  religion,  to  try  to  settlu 
their  differences  by  α  rcfcreuco  to  the  principles  of  this  law."— ^rnoW. 


χ  τ  χ.,  XXXI.]  TnUCYDIDES.  Ι.  10 

ii.ulori^irJoil  tlic  old  ones,  so  aa  to  mako  them  pca-wortliy,  and 
(s|ui|)pcd  tlic  rest.  Wlicn  tlio  herald  broui^ht  back  from  tho 
Corinthians  no  peaceable  answer,  and  their  ships  λ\χ^γο  manned, 
to  the  number  of  eighty  sail  (for  forty  were  besieging  Epidam- 
nus),  they  put  out  against  them,  and  formed  their  line,  and  en- 
gaged them  :  an<l  tho  CorcynOans  Λνοη  a  decided  victor)',  and 
(iestroyed  fifteen  ships  of  the  Corinthians.  It  happened  likewise 
tho  samo  day,  that  those  too  who  were  besieging  Epidamnus 
reduced  it  to  surrender,  on  condition  that  they  sliould  sell  tho 
strangers,  and  keep  tlio  Corinthians  in  bonds,  till  something  clso  ' 
should  be  determined. 

30.  AfttT  tho  battle,  tho  Corcyrncans  liaving  set  up  a  trophy 
on  Leucimna,  a  promontory  of  Corcyra,  slew  the  other  piis- 
onors  they  hatl   taken,  but  kept  the   Corinthians  in   bonds. 
Subsequently,  when    tho   Corinthians   and   their  allies,  after 
being  vanrjuishcd  at  sea,  >vere  gone  home,  tho  Corcyrneans  were 
masters  of  tho  whole  sea  in  those  parts,  and  sailed  to  Leucas,  a 
Corinthian  colony,  and  wasted  part  of  tho  territory ;  and  burned 
Cyllene,  tho  arsenal  of  tho  Eleans,  because  they  had  funiished 
both  money  and  shipping  to  tho  Corinthians.  And  most  of  tho 
time  after  tho  battle  they  were  masters  of  the  sea,  and  continued 
sailing  against  and  ravaging  tho  allies  of  the  Corinthians  ;  until,* 
on  the  return  of  summer,  tho  Corinthians  sent  ships  and  an 
army,  in  consequence  of  tho  distress  of  their  allies,  and  formed 
an  encampment  oh  Actium,  and  about  Chimerium  in  Thesprotis, 
for  tho  protection  of  Ijcucas  and  such  other  states  as  were  friendly 
to  them.     Tho  Corcyraians  also  formed  an  encampment  in  op- 
position to  them,  on  Leucimna,  both  for  their  ships  and  land- 
forces.    And  neither  pari  ν  sailed  against  tho  other ;  but  remain- 
ing in  opposite  stations  this  summer,  at  tho  approach  of  winter 
they  then  each  retired  homeward. 

31.  Now  tho  whole  of  tho  year  after  the  sea-fight,  and  tho 
succeeding  one,  tho  Corinthians,  being  indignant  about  tho 
war  with  tho  CorcjTacans,  were  building  ships,  and  preparing 
with  all  their  might  a  naval  armament,  drawing  together 
rowers  both  from  tho  Peloponneso  itself  and  the  rest  of  Greece, 
by  the  inducement  of  tho  pay  they  gave.     And  tho  Corcy- 

'  Tho  reading  retained  by  Bekkcr,  Goller,  and  others,  rrtptovrt  τύ 
Ορη,  13  supposed  to  signify,  "during  tho  remainder  of  tho  eummcr." 
ν*)Τ  the  arginnents  in  favor  of  each  reading,  Beo  tho  DOtoa  of  Ooller,  Ar- 
uold,  and  Dloomfleld. 


20  THUCYDIDES.  L  [χχχιΐ. 

neans,  on  hearing  of  their  preparations,  were  alarmed ;  and  be- 
ing in  alliance  with  none  of  the  Greeks,  and  not  having  enrolled 
themselves  in  the  league  either  of  the  Athenians  or  of  the  Lacc- 
da^monians,  they  determined  to  go  to  the  Athenians,  and  make 
alliance  with  them,  and  endeavor  to  obtain  some  assistance  from 
them.  And  the  Coiinthians,  on  hearing  this,  went  themselves 
also  to  Athens  on  an  embassy,  to  prevent  the  addition  of  the 
Athenian  navy  to  that  of  the  Corcyraians  being  an  impediment 
to  their  concluding  tho  war  as  they  wished.  And  an  assembly 
having  been  convened,  they  came  to  controversy ;  and  tho  Cor- 
ey rieaus  spoke  as  follows : — 

32.  "It  is  but  just,  Athenians,  that  those  Λvho  without  any 
previous  obligation,  either  of  great  benefit  or  alliance,  como 
to   their   neighbors,  as   we   now  do,  to  beg  their  assistance, 
should  convince  them  in  tho  first  place,*  if  possible,  that  they 
ask  what  is  even  expedient ;  but  it  not  that,  at  any  rate  what 
is  not  injurious ;  and  in  tho  second  place,  that  they  will  also 
retain  a  lasting  sense  of  the  favor  :  and  if  they  establish  nono 
of  these  points  clearly,  they  should  not  be  angry  if  they  do 
not  succeed.     But  tho  Corcyricans  have  sent  us  \vith  a  con- 
viction  that,  together    with   their   request   for   alliance,  they 
will  show  that  these  points  may  bo  relied  on  by  you.     Now 
the  same  policy  has  happened"  to  prove  inconsistent  in  your 
eyes,  with  regard  to  our  request,  and  inexpedient,  with  regard 
to  our  own  interest  at  the  present  time.     For  having  never 
yet  in  time  past  voluntarily  become  tho  allies  of  any  party, 
we  are  now  como  to  beg  this  of  others  ;  and  at  the  same  time 
we  have,  owing  to  it,  l)een  left  destitute  with  regard  to  the  ]>res- 
ent  war  with  the   Corinthians;  and  what  before  seemed  our 
prudence,  viz.  not  to  join  in  tlie  peril  of  our  neighbor's  views 
by  being  in  allianeo  Λvith  others,  has  turned  out  now  to  bo 
evident  folly  and  weakness.     In  tho  lato  sea-fight,  indeed,  by 
ourselves   and   single-handed    Λνο    repulsed    the    Corinthians. 
But  since  they  have  set  out  against  us  with  a  larger  force  from 

'  This  is  perhaps  tho  most  convenient  way  of  rendering  tho  phraso 
ιιύλιστα  μ^ν,  when  used,  as  it  so  often  is,  to  draw  attention  to  what  ap- 
pears tho  best  thing  of  all,  with  ei  ό^  μη  following  for  tho  second  best, 
and  answering  to  ti  όννατόν,  sometimes  expressed,  but  much  more  gen- 
erally implied,  in  tho  former  part  of  tho  alternative.  Latin  writers  trans- 
late them  by  •'  maximo  quidem"  and  "  sin  minus." 

8  Tho  participle  υν  is  understood  hero,  just  as  όντων  is,  1. 120.  T•  Sea 
Jel£  Gr.  Gr.  094,  obs.  1. 


xxxni.]  TUUCYDIDES.  L  21 

tlio  Peloponncse  nnd  the  rest  of  Greece,  nnd  wc  sec  ourselves  un- 
able to  cscaiK)  by  our  own  power  alone ;  and  at  the  same  time 
our  peril  is  great,  if  wo  are  subjugated  by  them ;  wo  must  beg 
assistance  both  from  you  and  every  one  else :  and  it  is  pardon- 
able, if  wo  venture  on  η  course  contrary  to  our  former  non-inter- 
ference, [which  was  practicx^d]  not  from  any  evil  intention,  but 
rather  from  an  error  of  judgment. 

33.  "  Now  if  you  are  persuaded  by  us,  the  occurrence  of  our 
rcijuest  will  bo  honorablo  to  you  in  many  respects ;  first,  be- 
cause you  Λνϋΐ  be  granting  the  assistance  to  men  Avho  are  in- 
jured, and  not  injuring  others:  in  the  next  place,  by  receiving 
men  who  have  their  highest  interests  at  stake,  you  would  bestow 
the  obligation  with  testimony  [to  tho  fact]'  that  would,  as  far 
as  possible,  be  always  remembered  ;  and  [lastly],  λυο  are  in  pos- 
session of  a  navy  tho  largest  except  yours.  And  consider  what 
good  fortune  is  more  rare,  or  what  more  annoying  to  the  enemy, 
than  if  that  power,  tho  mldition  of  which  to  yours  you  would 
havo  valued  above  much  money  and  favor,  come  of  its  own 
accord,  oftering  itself  without  dangers  and  expense ;  and  more- 
over afl'ording,  in  tho  eyes  of  tho  world  at  large,  a  character  for 
goodness,  and  to  those  whom  you  will  assist,  obligation ;  and 
to  yourselves,  strength ;  all  of  which  advantages  together  havo 
fallen  to  tho  lot  of  few  indeed  in  tho  Λνΐιοΐο  course  of  time : 
and  few  are  there  who,  when  begging  alliance,  go  conferring 
safely  and  honor  on  tho  men  whoso  aid  they  invoke,  no  less 
than  to  receive  them.  And  as  for  tho  war  in  which  we  should 
Ihj  useful,  if  any  of  you  do  not  think  that  it  λυΙΙΙ  arise,  he  is 
deceived  in  his  opinion ;  and  does  not  observe  that  the  Lace- 
dicmoniars,  through  their  fear  of  you,  are  longing  for  war; 
and  that  the  Corinthians  have  power  with  them,  and  aro  hos- 
tile to  you,  and  are  now  first  subduing  us  with  a  view  to  at- 
tacking yow,  that  wo  may  not  stand  with  each  other  in  com- 
mon hostility  to  them ;  and  that  they  may  not  fail  to  gain  ono 
of  two  advantages,  either  to  injure  us,  or  to  strengthen  them- 
selves. But  it  is  our  business,  on  tho  contrary,  to  be  before- 
hand with  them,  by  our  offering  and  your  accepting  tho  alli- 

'  <  β.,  "  Tho  fact  of  their  having  boon  preserved  from  such  imminent 
peril  will  bo  tho  most  enduring  record  of  tho  obligation  under  which  you 
havo  thereby  laid  them."  Ooller  explains  καταΟεΙαθε  as  being  "a  meta- 
phor taken  from  laying  tip  money  in  α  bank,  that  it  may  bo  drawn  out 
JifVorward  with  interest."  • 


22  THUCYDIDES.  L  [χχχιτ.,  χχχτ. 

anco ;  and  to  plot  against  them  first,  rather  than  to  meet  their 
plots  against  us. 

34.  *'liut  should  they  say  that  it  is  not  just  for  you  to  receive 
their  colonists,  let  them  learn  that  every  colony,  if  well  treated, 
honors  its  mother-country;  but  if  wronj^ed,  is  estranged 
from  it ;  for  they  are  not  sent  out  to  be  slaves,  but  to  be  on 
the  same  footing  with  those  who  are  left  at  home.  And  that, 
they  wronged  us,  is  evident;  for  when  challenged'  to  a  judicial 
decision  respecting  Epidamnus,  they  chose  to  prosecute  the 
charges  by  war  rather  than  by  equity.  And  let  what  they 
are  doing  to  us,  their  kinsmen,  bo  a  warning  to  yoM,  that  you 
may  both  avoid  being  seduced  by  them,  through  any  false 
pretense  ;  and  may  refuse  to  assist  them,  if  they  ask  you  in  a 
straightforward  manner :  for  he  λυΙιο  incurs  the  fewest  regrets 
from  gratifying  his  enemies  would  continue  in  the  greatest 
safety. 

35.  "Lut  neither  will  you  break  the  treaty  with  the  I^ice- 
dsemoniaus  by  receiving  us,  who  are  allies  of  neither  party. 
For  it  is  mentioned  in  it  that  Λvhichover  of  the  Grecian  states 
is  in  alliance  with  no  other,  it  has  permission  to  go  to  which- 
ever side  it  may  please.  And  it  is  hard  if  these  shall  bo 
allowed  to  man  their  ships  both  from  the  confederates,  and 
moreover  from  the  rest  of  (jrcece  also,  and  especially  from 
your  subjects,  while  they  will  exclude  us  both  from  our  pro- 
posed alliance,  and  from  assistance  from  any  other  qiiarter; 
and  then  consider  it  an  injustice  if  you  are  p(!rsuaded  to 
what  we  request.  But  much  greater  fault  shall  wc  hiid  with 
you,  if  wo  do  not  persuade  you.  For  us  who  are  in  peril, 
and  not  actuated  by  any  hostile  feeling,  you  will  reject;  whilo 
these  men  who  are  thus  actuated,  and  have  made  the  attack, 
you  will  be  so  far  from  restraining  that  you  will  even  overlook 
their  gaining  additional  power  from  your  dominions;  which 
you  should  not  do ;  but  should  either  stop  their  mercenaries 
drawn  from  your  country,  or  send  succor  to  us  also,  in  what- 
ever way  you  may  be  peasuaded ;  but  it  were  best  of  all  to 
receive  us  openly,  and  assist  us.  And  many,  as  Λνο  hinted  at 
the  beginning,  are  the  advantages  we  hold  forth  to  you ;  but 
the  greatest  of  them  is,  that  we  both  have  the  same  enemies'' 

>  Soo  nolo  on  I.  21.  2. 

2  Giiller  observes  that  wo  should  have  expected  elaiv  lioro,  ratlier  that» 
Ισαν:  but  tlio  coastructiou  is  coiifusod,  uud  tho  imperfect  ήσαι>  ia  to  bo 


xxxvi.]  TnUCYDIDES.  I.  23 

(which  is  tho  surest  bond),  and  thoso  not  weak,  Imt  able  tobann 
such  as  liave  stood  aloof  from  them.  And  as  it  is  a  naval,  and 
not  a  land  alliance  that  is  offered  to  you,  the  loss  of  it  is  not  tho 
eame  ;  but  it  λυογο  best,  if  possible,'  to  allow  no  one  else  to  pos* 
sess  ships ;  but  if  not,  whoever  is  strongest  in  them,  to  have  hira 
for  your  friend. 

30,  *'And  wlioever  thinks  that  these  thinp^s  Λνΐύΰΐι  wo  have 
urired  arc  indeed  expedient,  but  is  afraid  that  throucfh  bcinjj 
persuaded  by  them  ho  would  break  the  treaty ;  let  him  know 
that  his  fear,  W\nff  att^'nded  by  strength,  ΛνϋΙ  cause  fp-eator 
alarm  to  his  enemies ;  but  that  his  confidence  in  not  havinjr 
received  us,  being  powerless,  will  bo  less  formidable  to  his  foes 
who  iro  stroni; ;  and  also,  that  it  is  not  about  Corcyra  more 
than  about  Atliens  too  that  lie  is  deliberating;  and  that 
ho  is  not  providing  the  best  for  her,  when  for  tho  war  that  is 
coniing,  and  all  but  here,  ho  hesitates,  from  present  consider- 
ations, ίο  receive  a  country  which  is  made  either  a  friend  or  a 
foe,  with  the  greatest  opportunities  [for  good  or  evil].  For 
it  lies  well  for  tho  voyage  along  shore  to  Italy  and  Sicily, 
80  PS  both  to  prevent  a  navy  from  coming  thence  to  the  Pelo- 
]>onaesians,  and  to  help  on  its  Avay  a  fleet  from  these  parts  to 
thoso ;  and  in  other  respects  it  is  most  advantageous.  But  tho 
shortest  summary,'  both  for  general  and  particular  statements, 
from  which  you  may  learn  not  to  givo  us  up,  is  the  following: 
There  being*  but  three  navies  worth  mentioning  among  tho 
Greeks,  yours,  ours,  and  that  of  tho  Corinthians,  if  you  allow 

rcforrod  to  rnrtTn/irv,  rather  than  to  n7rn(hikrv/irv,  "  "Wo  say,  what  wo 
Baid  before,  namely,  that  wo  had  both  tho  samo  enemies." — Arnold. 

>  Arnold  says  tliat  "  lljo  inflnitivo  moods  tuv  ηηάί,χειν  depend  upon  a 
verb  understood,  which  is  to  bo  borrowed  from  tho  preccdiiip:  clause :  for 
"  oi'K  όμοια  Is  tho  samo  thing  in  sense  as  ουκ  ομοίως  ξνμφίρει ;  from  Λvhenco 
tho  verb  ζνμι^{ρη  is  to  bo  tacitly  repeated  with  what  follows."  That 
pomo  such  impersonal  verb  is  understood  is  very  probable ;  but  is  not 
oxjK  όμοια  rather  cqtiivalent  to  ονκ  ομοίως  ΰξνμφηρί^ν  έση  ?  '•  Not  merely 
the  same  as  it  would  bo  in  tho  caao  of  a  land  alliance,  but  mueh  greater." 
Compare  two  expressions  in  I.  143.  3,  4,  καΐ  ύλλα  ονκ  und  τοϋ  toov 
μεγάλα  (χειν — κηΐ  ovKrn  (κ  τον  όμοιου  Ιαται  Μΐλοποννήοου  μίρος  η 
τμηθηναι  καΐ  τήν  '\ττικτίι>  urrnnnv  κ.  r  λ. 

'  This  is  Ρορρο'β  interpretation  of  tho  passape,  and  it  is  perhaps  Im- 
possible to  express  its  full  meaning  more  literally.  lie  considore  τοις 
ζίμπασι  and  ίκαστον  as  neuters. 

•  I  have  followed  tho  explanation  of  thoso  who  suppose  tho  conjunc- 
tion Λέ  to  bo  placed  in  the  apodosis  of  tho  sentence.  Gollcr  and  Poppo 
supply  lore  from  tho  preceding  μάΟοιτε. 


24  THUOYDIDEa  L  [xxxTU.,  xxxTui. 

two  of  tlicso  to  come  together,  and  the  Oonnthians  bring  us 
under  their  power  first,  you  will  have  to  fight  at  sea  with  both 
Corcyraeanfc  ajid  Peloponnesians ;  but  if  you  receive  us  you  will 
i)Q  able  to  contend  against  them  with  the  greater  number  of 
ships  on  your  side."  *  Thus  spoke  the  Corcyrajans ;  and  the  Co- 
riutliiaus  after  them  as  follows. 

37.  "Since  these  Corcyraeans  have  made  tlieir  harangue,  not 
only  about  receiving  them,  but  also  to  show  that  we  are  acting 
unjustly,  and  they  are  unfairly  attacked ;  it  is  necessary  that 
we  too  should  first  touch  on  both  these  points,  and  so  procee<l 
to  the  rest  of  our  speech  ;  that  you  may  know  more  certainly 
beforehand  the  ground  of  our  request,  and  may  with  gooil 
reason  reject  their  petition.  Now  they  say  that  it  wa•  from 
regard  to  prudence  that  hitherto  they  accepted  the  alliance  of 
no  party :  whereas  they  adopted  this  practice  for  villainy,  and 
not  for  virtue ;  but  from  wishing  to  have  no  ally  or  Avitness 
in  their  unjust  deeds,  nor  to  be  put  to  the  blush  by  cidliiig 
him  to  their  aid.  And  their  city  also,  lying  in  a  self-suiHcient 
position,  makes  thorn  jud^'s  of  the  injuries  they  inflict  on  any 
one,  rather  than  that  there  should  be  judges  appointed  by 
agreement ;  because,  >vhilo  they  very  seldom  sail  from  homo 
to  their  neighbors,  they  very  frecjuently  receive  others,  who  of 
necessity  touch  there.  And  herein  consists  the  specious  shun- 
ning of  confederacies,  which  they  have  put  forward  ;  not  that 
they  may  avoid  committing  injustice  with  others,  but  that 
they  may  commit  them  by  tliemselves;  and  that  wherever  they 
have  the  power,  they  may  act  Avith  violence ;  and  where  they 
escape  observation,  they  may  take  urifair  advantage ;  and  if 
in  any  case  they  have  seized  on  something,  they  may  not  be  put 
to  the  blush.  And  yet,  if  they  were,  as  they  say,  honest  men, 
the  more  imj)regnal)le  they  Avero  to  their  neighbors,  the  moro 
manifestly  might  they  have  shown  their  virtue,  by  giving  and 
taking  what  vfm  just. 

38.  "But  neither  to  others  nor  to  us  are  they  of  such  a  char- 
acter; but  although  our  colonists,  tliey  have  all  along  revoIte<l 
from  us,  and  are  now  making  war  upon  ils  ;  saying  that  they 
were  not  sent  out  to  bo  ill-treated.  ]iut  we  say  that  neither 
did  wo  settle   them  there  to  be  insulted  by  them,  but  to  be 

*  Gtiller  roads  ημετίραις,  makinf?  it  depend  upon  πλείοαι,  like  iro/.}.<:> 
In  the  phrase  τυλλω  TrAf/orff,  "  with  njoro  ships  by  ours" — i.  f.,  with  all 
iho  advantaijro  in  point  of  number  that  our  ships  would  give  you.  Ar- 
liol'l  l!iink.j  ii.'kkiT  rijjht  in  relainini,'  thu  old  ifudin;^'. 


Iixix.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  25 

their  leaden»,  and  to  be  properly  respected  by  them.  Our  other 
colonics,  at  least,  honor  us,  and  ν,ο  aro  very  much  beloved  by 
our  colonists ;  and  it  is  evident,  that  if  wo  arc  j)k'asing  to  tho 
p^reater  part,  wo  shonld  not,  on  a  right  view  of  tho  case,  bo 
displeasiog  to  these  alone ;  nor  do  wo  attack  them  unbecom- 
ingly,* \»ithout  b(!ing  also  signally  injured  by  them.  Even  ii 
we  were  in  tho  w'rong,  it  had  been  honorable  for  them  to  havo 
yielded  to  our  hum(ir;  but  disgraceful  for  us  to  havo  dono 
violenco  to  their  moderation :  but  through  pride,  and  power 
of  wealth,  they  havo  both  acted  Avrongly  toward  us  in  many 
other  things,  and  with  regard  to  Epi<himnus,  which  belong  <l 
to  us,  when  it  was  ill-troated  they  did  not  claim  it;  but  w:!  :. 
wo  went  to  its  assistance,  they  took  it  by  force,  ami  kct  ρ  it. 

39.  "And  they  say,  f)rsooth,  that  they  were  before  wii;i..g 
to  havo  it  judiciously  decided:  but  with  regard  to  this,  it  is  not 
the  man  who  proposes  it  >vith  superiority,''  and  in  safety,  that 
sliould  bo  considered  to  say  any  thing;  but  that  man,  who 
]>uts  aliko  his  .actions  and  w^ids  on  tho  same  footing,'  beforo 
lie  enters  on  tho  struggle,  liut  as  for  these  men,  it  was  not 
K'foro  they  besieged  tho  place,  but  when  they  thought  that 
we  should  not  put  up  w'\U\  it,  that  they  also  advanced  tho 
specioiis  plea  of  a  judicial  decision.  And  they  aro  coino  hither, 
not  only  having  themselves  dono  wrong  there,  but  now  re• 
ijuesting  you  also  to  join  them,  not  in  alliance,  but  in  injury ; 
ami  to  receive  them,  when  they  aro  at  variance  with  us.  But 
then  ought  they  to  havo  applied  to  you,  when  they  were  most 
secure ;  and  not  at  a  time  when  wc  have  been  injured  and 
they  aro  in  peril ;  nor  at  a  timo  when  you,  though  you  did 
not  share  their  power  then,  will  now  givo  them  a  sharo  of 
your  aid ;  and .  though  you  stood  aloof  from  their  misdeeds, 
will  incur  equal  bhuno  from  us ;  but  they  ought  long  ago  to 
havo  communicated  their  power  to  you,  and  so  to  havo  tho 

'  t.  β.,  aa  wo  sTiotdd  do,  if  wo  wero  not  signally  injured  by  them. 
Oollcr  takes  tho  lirinrparcvoutv  in  a  more  general  sense,  as  expressing 
(lio  habitual  policy  of  tho  Corinthians.  "Nequo  solemus  bellum  inferra 
indigno  majoris  patria)  modo,  nisi  insigni  injuria  cogimur." 

*  A  secondary  meaning  of  ηροκαλύββαι,  very  common  when  it  is  not 
followed  by  an  accusative  of  tho  person  with  ic.  Soo  II.  72.  3.  6 :  73. 
1 ;  74.  1,  2.  '     ' 

3  i  β.,  who  does  not  say  ono  thing  and  do  another.  Poppo  takes  \<tov 
In  the  ecnso  of  ••equity:"  "cum,  qui  foctis  paritcr  atnue  oratlono  icqui- 
titom  rotinot"  ^ 


26  THuOYDIDm  I.  .[XL.,  XU. 

results  also  in  common.  [As,*  however,  you  have  had  no  share 
only  in  the  accusations  brought  against  them,  so  you  should 
not  participate  in  the  consequences  of  their  actions.] 

40.  '*That  viQ  oursi'lves,  then,  come  with  accusations  on 
|)ro|)er  grounds,  and  that  these  are  violent  and  rapacious,  has 
Loen  proved :  and  that  you  could  not  with  justice  receive  thenif 
you  nmst  now  learn.  For  if  it  is  said  in  the  treaty  that  any 
of  the  states  not  registered  in  it  may  go  to  whichever  side  it 
please,  the  agreement  was  not  meant  for  those  who  go  to  the 
detriment  of  others ;  but  to  any  one  who,  without  withdraw- 
ing himself  from  another,  is  in  need  of  protection;  and  who 
will  not  cause  war  instead  of'|xiace  to  those  who  receive  him, 
([as  they  will  not  do"]  if  they  are  wise ;)  which  would  now  ha 
your  case»,  if  not  persuaded  by  us.  For  you  would  not  only 
become  auxiliaries  to  these,  but  also  enemies  to  us,  instead  of 
being  connected  by  treaty ;  fi>r  if  you  come  witli  them,  we 
must  defend  ourselves  against  them  without  excepting  you. 
And  yet  vou  ought,  if  possible,  tt^tand  aloof  from  both  par- 
ties; or  if  not  that,  on  the  contrary,  to  go  with  us  against 
them ;  (with  the  Corinthians,  at  any  rate,  you  are  connected 
by  treaty ;  while  with  the  Corcyraeans  you  were  never  yet  so 
nmch  as  in  truce;)  and  not  to  establish  the  hiw,  that  we  should 
receive  those  who  are  revolting  from  others.  For  neither  did 
we,  when  the  Samians  had  revolted,  give  our  vote  agjijnst 
yoUy  when  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnesians  >vere  divided  in 
their  votes,  as  to  whether  they  should  assist  them;  but  wo 
openly  maintained  the  contrary,  that  each  one  should  punish 
Ins  own  allies.  For  if  you  receive  and  assist  those  Λνηο  aro 
doing  wrong,  there  will  be  found  no  fewer  of  your  allies  also 
who  will  come  over  to  us;  and  you  will  make  the  law  against 
yourselves,  rather  than  against  us. 

41."  These,  then,  are  the  pleas  of  right  which  Ave  have  to  urge 

*  "  Thcso  words,  which  aro  wanting  in  tho  text  of  most  of  the  bcsl 
MSS.,  have  been  omitted  by  Uekkcr,  and  inclosed  in  brackets  by  Grtillcr. 
Dr.  Bloomfield  defends  them,  except  tho  siogio  word  μόνων,  wliich  ho 
gives  up  as  unintelHgible." — Arnold. 

'  Thero  is  a  confusion  in  tho  expression,  and  tho  words  ei  autppovovni 
have  really  nothing  to  do  with  the  sentence  as  it  is  actually  expressed, 
which  is  suggested  as  it  were  parenthetically  to  tho  writer's  miiid,  but 
which  ho  did  not  set  down  in  words ;  if  written  at  length  it  would  run 
thus  :  "  Tho  bcneiit  of  the  treaty  was  intended  for  such  only  as  should 
not  iuvolvo  thoso  who  received  them  in  war  (as,  if  you  are  wise,  you 
Will  tuko  caro  that  these  men  do  not  iuvolvo  you)." — ArnoUl. 


XLii.,  XLiii.]  THUCYDIDEa  I.  27 

to  you,  sufficiently  Rtronjnf  nccordin)^  to  the  laws  of  tbo  Greeks ; 
and  we  have  the  following  advice,  and  claim  on  you  for  favor, 
which,  beincf  not  enemies  so  as  to  hurt  you,  nor  on  tho  other 
hand,  such  friends  as  to  be  very  intimate  Avith  you,  we  say  ought 
to  be  repaid  to  us  at  the  present  time.  For  once,  when  you  were 
in  want  of  long  ships  for  the  war  with  tho  yEginetans,  before 
that  with  the  Modes,  you  received  from  tho  Corinthians 
twenty  ships.  And  this  service,  and  that  with  regard  to  tho 
Siimians,  namely,  that  it  was  through  us  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  did  not  assist  them,  gave  you  the  mastery  of  tho  .^!φ- 
netans,  and  tho  chastisement  of  the  Samians:  and  it  took 
placo  in  those  critical  times  in  which  men,  when  proceeding 
against  their  enemies,  aro  most  regardless  of  every  thing  be- 
sides victory.'  For  they  esteem  him  a  friend  who  assists 
thom,  even  though  he  may  before  have  been  an  enemy ;  and 
him  a  foe  who  opposes  them,  though  ho  may  have  liappened 
to  bo  a  friend ;  nay  they  even  mismanage  their  own  aflfairs  for 
the  sake  of  their  animosity  at  the  moment. 

42.  "Thinking  then  of  these  things,  and  each  younger  man 
having  learned  them  from  some  one  older,  let  him  resolve  to 
requite  us  with  the  like,  and  not  deem  that  these  things  aro 
justly  urged,  but  that  others  are  expedient  in  case  of  his  going 
to  war.  For  expediency  most  attends  that  lino  of  conduct  in 
which  one  does  least  wrong.  And  as  for  the'  coming  of  tho 
Λvar,  frightening  you  witli  Λνΐήοΐι  the  Corcyrieans  bid  you 
iommit  injustice,  it  lies  as  yet  in  uncertainty ;  and  it  is  not 
worth  while,  through  being  excited  by  it,  to  incur  a  certain 
enmity  with  tho  Corinthians,  immediate,  and  not  coming; 
but  rather  it  were  pnident  to  remove  somewhat  of  our  before 
existing  suspicion  on  account  of  the  Megareans.  For  the  latest 
obligation,  %vhen  ΛνβΙΙ  timed,  even  though  it  may  bo  compara- 
tively email,  has  power  to  wipe  out  a  greater  subject  of  com- 
plaint. And  bo  not  induced  by  the  fact  that  it  is  a  great 
naval  alliance  that  they  offer  you.  For  not  to  injure  your 
equals  is  a  power  more  to  bo  relied  on,  than,  through  being 
buoyed  up  by  momentary  appearances,  to  gaiii  an  unfair  advan- 
tage by  a  perilous  course. 

43.  **Wo  then,  having  fallen  under  tho  rule  which  wo  pro- 

*  Or,  "  in  comparison  with  victory." 

.  »  Uoforring  to  those  words  of  tho  CorcyraBans,  όταν  ίς  τυν  μέλλοντα 
κηΐ  o/rnv  οϋ  ιτ/φήντα  irn?.r/tnv  rd  αντίκα  η(ρισκοπων  ένδοιάζη  χυρί(}Ψ 
ηροαλαβύν  κ.  τ.  λ.     Chap.  36.  1. 


28  THUOYDIDKa  L  [xut.,  xtr. 

pounded  oureelves  at  Lacedosmonf  that  every  ouo  eliould 
punish  his  own  allies,  now  claim  to  receive  the  same  from  you ; 
and  not  that  you,  after  being  benefited  by  our  vote,  should 
liarm  us  by  yours,  ^iako  us  then  u  fair  return;  knowing 
that  this  is  that  very  crisis  in  which  ho  that  helps  is  most  a 
friend,  and  lie  that  opposes,  α  foe.  And  for  these  Corey  neons, 
neither  receive  them  as  allies  in  spite  of  us,  nor  help  them  in 
doing  wrong.  By  thus  acting,  you  will  both  do  what  becomes 
you,  and  advise  the  best  for  yourselves."  To  this  effect  then 
did  the  Corinthians  also  speak. 

44.  Now  the  Athenians,  after  hearing  both  sides,  when  an 
assembly  had  been*  even  twice  held,  in  the  former  rather 
admitted  the  arguments  of  the  Corinthians;  but  in  the  one 
held  tho  next  day  they  changed  their  minds,  and  determined, 
not  indeed  to  make  an  allianeo  >vith  the  Corcyneans,  so  as  to 
have  the  same  enemies  and  friends  (for  if  tho  Corcyneans  had 
desired  them  to  sail  against  Corinth,  tho  treaty  with  tho  l*e- 
loponnesians  Λvou]d  have  been  broken  by  them);  but  they 
made  a  defensive  alliance,  to  Ruccor  each  other's  country, 
should  any  one  go  against  Corcyra,  or  Athens,  or  their  allies. 
For  they  thouglit  that,  even  as  it  wa<i,  they  should  have  tho 
Avar  Λνΐΐΐι  tho  Peloponnesians ;  and  they  wished  not  to  givo 
up  Corcyra  to  tho  Corinthians,  with  so  largo  a  navy  as  it  had, 
but  to  wear  them  out  as  much  as  possible  against  each  other; 
that  both  tho  Corinthians  and  tho  rest  who  had  navies  might 
bo  in  α  Aveaker  condition  when  they  went  to  Avar  with  them, 
if  it  should  bo  necessary  to  do  so.  And  at  tho  same  time  tho 
island  appeared  to  them  to  lio  well  in  tho  line  of  voyage  along 
shore  to  Italy  and  Sicily. 

45.  ΛVith  such  α  view  of  the  ca^e,  tho  Athenians  admitted 
tho  Corcyneans  into  alliance ;  and  when  tho  Corinthians  had 
departed,  tht^y  sent  ten  ships  to  assist  them.  Tho  commanders 
of  them  Avero  Lao'djennjnius,  tho  son  of  Cimon,  Diotimus, 
tho  son  of  Strombichus,  and  Proteas,  tho  son  of  Epielees.  They 
charged  them  not  to  engage  with  the  Corinthians,  unless  they 
should  sail  against  Corcyra,  and  threaten  to  land,  or  against 
any  of  tho  places  belonging  to  them;  but  in  that  case  to 
prevent  them  to  their  utmost :  and  this  charge  they  gave  them 
svith  α  view  to  not  breaking  the  truaty.  So  tho  Khips  arrive  at 
Corcyra. 

•  Tho  groat  hnportanco  of  tbo  subject  provontod  tlieir  deciding  iu  α 
riiiigle  day. 


I 


χτ  vr.-XLViii.].  TIIUCVDIDES.   I.  29 

40.  But  the  Corinthians,  when  they  had  made  their  prop- 
nrations,  set  sail  against  Corcyra  with  a  hundred  and  fifty 
ships.  There  were  ten  of  the  Eleans,  of  the  Megareans  twelve, 
of  the  Ijcucadians  ten,  of  the  Ambraciots  seven  and  twenty, 
of  tho  Anactoriana  one,  and  of  the  Corinthians  themselves 
ninety.  In  command  of  these  there  were  different  men  for  tho 
different  forces  according  to  their  states,  and  of  tlio  Co^ 
rinthians,  Xenoclides,  tlio  son  of  Euthycles,  with  four  others. 
And  when,  in  tlieir  course  from  Leucas,  they  made  land  on 
tho  continent  opposite  Corcyra,  they  came  to  anchor  at  Chi- 
raeriutu  in  tho  territory  of  Thesprotis.  It'  is  a  harbor,  and  a 
city  named  Ephyro  lies  beyond  it,  away  from  the  sea,  in  tho 
Elean  district  of  Thesprotis.  By  it  the  Acheru^an  lake  empties 
itself  into  the  soa;  and  into  this  lako  the  river  Acheron,  which 
Hows  through  Thesprotis,  empties  itself;  from  Avhich  also  it 
takes  its  name.  Tho  river  Thyamis  also  flows  there,  bounding 
Thesprotis  and  Cestrine ;  and  between  these  rivers  the  promon- 
tory of  Ghimerium  rises.  Tho  Corinthians  then  came  to  anchor 
at  that  part  of  tho  continent,  and  formed  their  encampment. 

47.  But  the  Corcyraians,  when  they  perceived  them  sailing 
up,  manned  a  hundred  and  ten  ships,  which  were  commanded 
by  Miciades,  Qisimides,  and  Eurybates  ;  and  encamped  on  one 
of  tho  islands  which  are  called  8ybota ;  and  tho  ten  Athenian 
ships  Λvere  with  them.  And  on  tho  promontory  of  I^ucimna 
was  their  land  force,  and  a  thousand  heavy-armed  of  tho 
Zacynthiana,  >vho  had  como  to  their  assistance.  Tho  Co- 
rinthians also  liad  on  tho  mainland  many  of  tho  barbarians,  who 
had  joined  them  to  give  assistance  ;  for  tho  people  in  that  part 
of  the  continent  have  always*  been  friendly  Λvith  them. 

48.  Λνΐιοη  tho  preparations  of  tho  Corinthians  wero  made, 
taking  threo  days'  provision,  thev  put  out  from  Chimerium  by 
night,  with  the  purpose  of  engaging;  and  in  the  morning,  while 
on  their  course,  they  observed  tho  ships  of  tho  Corcyrosans  out 

'  Bloomflcld,  in  his  how  edition,  haa  a  long  noto  to  prove  that  it  ouglit 
to  bo  translated  "  there  is  a  harbor,"  instead  of  '•  it  is ;"  but  I  can  not  sco 
tho  forco  of  hie  argument;  as  tho  quotation  fVom  Colonel  Lcakc,  on 
Avl)ieh  ho  chiefly  rolioe,  establishes  no  more  than  what  Arnold  had  al- 
ready observed,  that  in  sect,  β,  "  tho  point  of  Chimorium  seeras  to  bo 
tlistinguiahca  by  Thucydides  from  tho  port  of  Cbimeriam;"  of  which  ho 
clearly  is  «peaking  in  this  section. 

«  Literally,  " always  in  former  times ;"  liko  tho  ©xprosslon  "over  of 
old,"  in  tho  Psalms. 


30  THUCYDIDEa  I.  (xtix- 

at  Bea,  and  sailing  against  them.  And  when  they  saw  each 
other,  they  drew  up  in  opposite  lines  of  battle.  On  the  right 
wing  of  the  Corcyrjeaus  were  the  Athenian  ships,  but  the  rest  of 
the  lino  they  themselves  occupied,  having  formed  three  squad- 
rons of  their  ships,  which  were  coinnianded  each  by  one  of  the 
three  generals  In  this  way  did  the  Coreyra^aus  form  their  line. 
On  the  side  of  tlio  Corinthians,  the  Megareau  and  Ambruciot 
tihips  occupied  the  right  wing ;  in  the  center  were  the  rest  of 
the  allies  severally ;  while  tlie  left  wing  was  occupied  by  the 
Corinthians  themselves  with  their  best  sailing  ships,  opposed  to 
the  Athenians  and  the  right  of  the  Corcyra^ans. 

49.  As  soon  as  the  signals  on  eiuh  side  wore  raised,  they 
closed,  and  fought ;  both  sides  having  many  heavy-armed  on 
the  decks,  and  many  bowmen  and  dartmen ;  as  they  were  still 
rudely  equipped  in  the  old  fashion.  And  the  battle  was  well 
contested  ;  not  so  nmch  in  point  of  skill,  but  more  like  a  land 
fight.  For  Avhcnever  thoy  happened  to  run  on  board  one  an- 
other, thoy  did  not  easily  gt't  cU-ar  again,  owing  to  the  num- 
bers and  confusion  of  the  ships;  antl  because  they  ί rusted  for 
victory  in  a  greater  measure,  to  the  heavy-armed  on  deck, 
Λνΐίο  set  to  and  fought,  while  the  ships  remained  stationary. 
There  av.'us  no  breaking  through  the  line,  but  they  fought  with 
fierceness  and  strengtli,  more  than  >vith  science.  On  all  sides 
then  there  >vas  much  contusion,  and  the  battle  >vas  a  disor- 
derly one ;  and  during  it  the  Athenian  vessels  coming  up  to 
the  Corcyrieans,  if  they  were  pressed  at  any  j)oint,  struck  fear 
into  the  enemy,  but  did  not  Wgin  fighting,  as  the  conmianders 
were  afraid  of  the  charge  given  by  the  Athenians.  It  Λva3 
the  right  wing  of  the  Corinthians  Λvn^ch  w  as  most  distressed ; 
for  the  Corcyneans  with  twenty  ships  having  routed  and  pur- 
sued them  m  a  scattered  condition  to  the  cotinent,  sailed  up 
to  their  encampment,  and  having  made  a  descent  upon  then», 
burnt  the  deserted  tents,  and  j)lundered  their  goods.  On  that 
side  then  the  Corinthians  and  their  allies  were  worsted,  and 
the  Corcyraans  ΛveΓe  victorious :  but  where  the  Corinthians 
theryselves  ΛveΓe,  on  the  left,  they  had  a  deciiled  victory ;  as 

*  Bloomfleld  says  that  *'  κητηητύντις  denotes  inaintaining  tlio  'pugna 
Ktataria,'  ligbtinfj  liand  to  band."  Such  α  meaning  may  perhaps  bo  in- 
lerred  from  tho  following  words,  ί/σνχαζονσώΐ'  τών  νιων  ,  but  1  think 
nothing  moro  is  intended  than  might  bo  otherwise  expressed  by  Ις  αύχην 
κατίστησαν.  Compare  tbo  expression  καταστύντ^ς  ϊ-χολίμονν,  II.  1  ,• 
and  V.  4,  5. 


u]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  81 

twenty  ships  of  the  Corcyraeans,  from  a  number  [ori)2:lnally] 
pmallcr,  liail  not  returned  from  tlio  pursuit.  But  the  Athenians, 
sceiui;  the  Corcyncans  hard  pressed,  assisted  them  now  moro 
unequivoeally ;  thouiili  at  first  tlicy  refrained  from  charginf^  any 
vessel ;  hut  when  the  rout  liad  clearly  taken  j)lace,  and  tlio 
Corinthians  were  lyini;  close  on  them,  then  indeed  every  one  at 
lenirth  set  to  work,  and  there  was  no  louijer  any  distinction, 
hut 'it  had  come  to  su(;h  urcfent  necessity,  that  the  Corinthiann 
and  Athenians  attacked  each  other. 

δΟ.  Now  wlien  the  rout  had  tiiken  place,  the  Corinthians  did 
not  take  in  tow  and  haul  otf  the  hulls  of  the  vessels  which  they 
might  happen  to  liavc  sunk,'  but  turned  their  attention  to  the 
men,  sailing  throughout  to  butcher,  rather  tlian  to  make  prison- 
ers ;  and  some  of  their  own  friends,  not  being  aware  that  thoso 
in  the  right  wing  had  l>een  worsted,  they  unwittingly  killed. 
For  as  both  fleets  >vero  nutnerous,  an<l  extended  over  η  wide 
spacx;  of  the  sea;  when  they  closed  \vith  each  other,  they  di•] 
not  easily  distinguish,  Λνΐιο  were  conquering,  or  being  con- 
quere<l ;  for  this  engagement,  for  one  of  (ireeks  against 
(ireek•*,  was  greater  in  the  number  of  vessels  tlian  any  of 
ihose  before  it.  After  the  Corinthians  had  pursued  the  Cor- 
cyr.Tans  to  land,  they  turned  their  attention  to  the  wrecks, 
find  their  own  dead,  and  got  ]>ossession  of  most  of  them,  so  as 
to  take  them  to  Sybota,  Avhere  their  land  force  composed  of 
tlic  barb/irians  had  come  to  their  assistance.  ΝοΛν  Sybota  is  a 
desert  p<»rt  of  Thesprotis.  Having  done  this,  they  mustered 
again,  and  sailed  against  the  Corcyr.Tans,  who  with  their  sea- 
worthy ships,  an<l  such  as  were  left,'  in  conjunction  with  tlioso 
of  the  Athenians,  on  their  rftlo  also  sailed  out  to  meet  them, 
fearing  lest  they  should  attempt  to  land  on  their  territory.  U 
\v!i9  now  late,  and  the  Pa»an  had  Iwen  sung  by  them  for  tho 
advance,  when  tho  Corinthians  suddenly  l)egan  to  row  stcrh- 
ward,  on  ob8er\nng  twenty  ships  of  tho  Athenians  sailing  up ; 

*  "  ΚαταΛνρίν  vavv  docs  not  moan  to  sink  a  ship  to  tho  bottom,  but  to 
make  hor  wator-lof^gcd,  bo  thnt  sho  was  useless,  althotiph  slm  did  not 
absolutely  ro  down.  Tho  Greek  triremes  wcro  so  liffht  and  so  Rhallow 
that  they  wotild  float  in  a  manner  under  water,  or  rather  with  parts  οΓ 
tho  vessel  still  out  of  water,  on  which  tho  crew  used  to  take  refuge," — 
Arnold. 

*  "Probabilis  est  opinio  Popponia,  τάς  λοιπής  Intolligl  decern  lllos 
navoa,  quaa  ox  120  navibus  Corcyrrcorum  superabant;  nam  pugnam  in- 
grossl  erant  cum  navibus  110  (vid.  cap.  47.  1)  habcbant  autem  univoraaa 
120.    Vid.  cap.  25.  b.^GOUer. 


a2  THUOTDIDES.  I.  [u.-un. 

which  the  Atheuiana  hod  eont  after  the  ten  to  help  them; 
feerinpf  (as  was  the  case),  that  the  Corcvrseans  mxfrht  be  con• 
querod,  and  their  own  ten  ships  bo'  too  few  to  aid  them. 

61.  These,  then,  the  Corinthians  having  first  seen,  and  sus- 
IMictiug  that  they  were  from  Athens,  [and  were]  not  merely  aa 
many  as  they  saw,  but  njore,  k'gan  to  retreat,  lint  by  tlio 
Corcyraians  they  were  not  seen  (tor  they  Λvero  advancing  more 
out  of  their  view),  and  they  >vondered  at  tlie  Corinthians  row- 
ing astern,  till  some  saw  them  and  said,  "There  are  ships 
yonder  saihng  toward  us."  Then  ihejj  also  withdrew ;  for  it 
was  now  growing  dark,  and  the  Corinthians  l)y  tuniing  back 
had  occasioned  the  sus|)en-sion  of  hostilities.  In  this  way  they 
parted  from  each  other,  and  the  battle  ceased  at  night.  And 
Avhen  the  Corcyraians  Avero  en('aiii|Xid  on  Lc*uciinna,  these 
twenty  ships  from  Athens,  which  were  cominan<led  by  (ilauco, 
the  son  of  Leager,  and  Andocides,  the  sou  of  lA^ogonis,  com- 
ing on  through  the  dead  bodies  and  the  wrecks,  sailed  up  to 
the  camp  not  long  after  tliey  had  In^en  descried.  Now  the 
Corcyneans  (it  being  night)  were  afraid  they  might  be  ene- 
mies ;  but  afterward  they  recognized  them,  and  they  came  to 
anchor. 

52.  The  next  day  the  thirty  Athenian  ships,  and  as  many 
of  the  Corcyricau  as  were  sea-worthy,  ]»ut  out  and  sailed 
to  the  hariior  ut  Sybota,  in  which  the  Corinthians  were  an- 
chorcil,  wishing  to  know  whether  they  would  engage.  But 
they,  having  |)Ut  out  with  their  ships  from  the  land,  and 
formed  them  in  lino  at  sea,  remained  quiet ;  not  intending 
voluntarily  to  begin  a  battle,  since  they  saw  that  fresh  shijis 
from  Athens  had  joined  theni ;  and  that  they  themselves  were 
involved  in  many  diiliculties,  with  regard  to  the  safe  keeping 
of  the  prisoners  they  ha<l  on  board,  and  because  there  were  no 
uleans  of  retitting  their  ships  in  so  deserted  a  place.  Nay,  they 
were  ^thinking  of  their  voyage  liome,  liow  they  should  return; 
being  afraid  that  the  Athenians  might  consider  the  treaty  to 
hive  been  bn»ken,  because  they  hai  voiu^  to  blows,  and  not 
allow  them  to  sail  away. 

53.  They  determined  therefore  to  ]iut  some  men  on  board 
a  skiff  and  send  tlu'm  without  a  heraM's  wan»!  to  the  Athe- 

'  nians,  and   make   an   experiment.      And   having   sent   them, 

'  Arnold  compares  IT.  01,  ταπεινί)  ίμών  η  Aiuvma  Lyxcprene'v  Ί  Ιγνωτε* 
and  lierodotus  VI.  10"J.  όλίγονς  yujt  lU'ut  ar/}artg  τί)  M//iiw>  ovuiiu?.teiv. 


LIT.]  THUCYDIDES.  L  33 

they  ppoko  as  follows :  "  You  do  wron^,  Athenians,  in  be- 
ginning >var,  and  breaking  treaty :  for  while  wo  are  avenging 
ourselves  on  our  enemies,  you  stand  in  our  way,  and  raiso 
arms  against  us.  Now  if  your  purpose  is  to  stop  our  sail- 
ing to  Corcyra,  or  wherever  else  we  wish,  and  if  you  mean 
to  break  the  treaty,'  then  seize  us  liero  in  the  first  place, 
and  treat  us  as  enemies."  They  spoke  to  this  effect,  and 
all  the  army  of  the  Corcyrseans  that  heard  them  imme-  ' 
diateiy  ^ricd  out,  "  Seize  them  and  put  them  to  death  !"  l^ut 
the  Athenians  answered  as  follows:  "We  are  noitlier  com- 
mencing war,  Peloponnesians,  nor  breaking  the  treaty ;  but 
we  have  come  to  assist  the  Corcyrajans  here,  >vho  are  our 
allies.  If  therefore  you  wish  to  sail  any  where  else,  we  do  not 
stop  you ;  but  if  you  sail  against  Corcyra,  or  to  any  of  the 
plr.ces  belonging  to  them,  we  shall,  to  the  best  of  our  power, 
not  permit  it." 

54.  The  Athenians  having  made  this  reply,  the  Corinthians 
began  to  prepare  for  their  voyage  homeward,  and  erected  a 
trophy  at  Sybota  on  the  continent :  while  the  Corcyricans  took 
up  the  Λvreck8  and  dead  Iwdies  which  had  been  carried  to  them 
by  the  current  and  the  wind,  >vhich  had  risen  in  the  night, 
and  scattered  them  in  all  directions;  and  erected  a  counter- 
trophy  at  Sybota  on  the  island,  considering  that  they  liad  been 
victorious.  It  was  on  the  following  view  of  the  case  that  each 
side  claimed  the  victory. — The  Corinthians  erected  a  trophy, 
as  having  had  the  advantage  in  the  battle  until  night,  so  that 
thev  got  possession  of  most  wrecks  and  dead  bodies ;  as  having 
no  less  than  a  thousand  prisoners ;  and  as  having  sunk  more 
than  seventy  ships.  The  Corcyraians  erected  a  trophy  for  there 
reasons  ; — because  they  liad  destroyed  about  thirty  ships ;  and 
after  the  Athenians  Avcro  come,  had  taken  up  the  wrecks 
and  dead  on  their  side ;  and  because  the  Corinthians  the  day 
before  had  rowed  sternward  and  retreated  from  them,  on  see• 
ing  the  Athenian  ships ;  and  after  they  were  come,'  did  not 
sail  out  from  Sybota  to  oppose  them.  Thus  each  side  claimed 
to  bo  victorious. 

*  Avere  is  the  present  tenso  with  α  kind  of  futuro  eigniflcatiop,  aa  it 
oilon  has.     •'  If  you  aro  for  breaking,"  etc. 

•  Arnold  repeats  the  ol  'Αθηναίοι  with  ^λθον,  and  refers  to  chap.  52.  2, 
which,  he  thinks,  "  decides  that  the  words  aro  rightly  inserttfd,  and  that 
tho  Athenians  are  the  real  subject  of  the  verb  ^λβον.^^  Poppo  puts  tho 
words  in  brackets,  and  Goller  omits  them  altogether. 


94  THUOYDIDKS.  I.  («-v-^^tt 

55,  As  tho  Corinthians  were  sailing  away  homeward,  they 
took  by  treachery  Anactorium,  which  is  eituatod  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Ambracian  Gulf,  and  was  possessed  in  common  by  tho 
Corcyraiaus  and  tliem ;  and  after  establisliing  in  it  a  Corinthian 
population  [only],'  they  retired  homeward ;  and  of  tho  Corcy- 
rieans,  eight  hundred  who  were  slaves  they  sold,  but  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  they  kept  in  custody,  and  treated  with  great  atten- 
tion, that  on  their  return  they  might  win  over  Corcyra  to  them. 
For  most  of  them  happened  to  be  tho  first  men  of  the  city  in 
power.  Corcyra  then  in  this  way  outlived  tho  war*  with  tho 
Corinthians ;  and  the  shifts  of  tho  Athenians  returned  from  it. 
'4'his  >vas  tho  first  ground  tho  Corinthians  had  for  their  war. 
against  tho  Athenians,  namely,  that  in  time  of  peace  they  liad 
fought  with  them  by  sea  in  conjunction  with  the  Corcyra^ans. 

50.  Immediately  after  this  the  following  disagreements  arose 
between  the  Athenians  and  iVloponnesians,  to  lead  them  to 
war.  Whilo  tho  Corinthians  were  contriving  how  to  avenge 
themselves  on  them,  the  Athenians,  suspecting  their  hostility, 
ordered  tho  Potidaians,  who  live  on  the  istlunus  of  Pallene, 
being  colonists  of  the  Corinthians,  but  their  own  subjects  and 
tributaries,  to  throw  tlown  tho  wall  toward  Pallcne,  and  give 
hostages ;  and  to  dismiss,  and  not  receive  in  future,  the  magis- 
trates' Avhom  the  Corinthians  used  to  send  every  year ;  being 
afraid  that  they  might  revolt  at  the  instigation  of  l*erdiccas 
and  tho  Corinthians,  and  lead  tho  rest  of  their  allies  Thrace- 
Λvard*  to  revolt  with  them. 

57.  These  precautionary  measures  with  regard  to  the  Po- 
tidicans  the  Athenians  began  to  adopt  innnediately  after  tho 
Bea-fight  at  Corcyra.  For  the  Corinthians  Avere  now  ojienly 
at  variance  with  them ;  and  Perdiccas  tho  son  of  Alexander, 
king  of  tho  Macedonians,  had  been  made  their  enemy,  though 
ho  was  before  an  ally  and  a  friend.     lie  became  such,  Ικϊ- 

*  i.  e.,  to  tho  exclusion  of  tho  Corey rseans,  who  had  beforo  had  joint 
possession  of  tho  town  with  thorn. 

"  Or,  as  Gollor  interprets  it,  "  had  tho  better  of  tho  war." 

*  "  The  term  Αημίυνμγοϊ,  or  ιίημιονμγοί,  was  a  title  applied  to  tho  chief 
mai^istratcs  of  tho  Pclopounesians,  expressive  of  their  doing  *  tho  sorvieo 
of  the  people.'  Aselepiade.<i,  as  <iuoted  by  tho  Scholiast,  considers  tho 
proposition  trr/  superfluous.  (r(>ller  understands  it  to  express  an  atldi• 
tional  or  extra  nianjistrato,  sent  by  tho  mother  country  to  act  as  α  col- 
Icajjuo  to  tho  deniiurgi  appointed  by  tho  colonists  thcmsolves." — Arnold. 

*  "  A  general  term  applied  to  tho  Greek  states  which  lined  tho  north- 
ern coast  of  tho  ^Jgean  from  Thessaly  to  the  llollespont." — Arnold. 


Lvni.,ux.]-  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  35 

cause  tlio  Athenians  had  made  an  allianco  with  his  brother 
l*hilip  and  Derdaa,  wlicn  octinij  toiyether  against  Inm.  And 
iKiing  alarmed,  !ic  both  sent  to  Laccdicmon,  and  tried  to  con- 
trivo  tliat  they  might  bo  involved  in  >var  with  tlic  Peloponne- 
sians,  ard  endeavored  to  Λvin  over  the  Corinthians,  with  a 
view  lo  Potidipa's  revolting ;  and  made  proposals  also  to  tho 
Thraceward  Chalcidians  and  the  Bottiicans  to  join  in  the  re- 
volt, thinking  that  if  ho  Iiad  in  alliance  with  liim  these  places 
on  his  borders,  lie  should  more  easily  carry  on  tho  war  in  con- 
junction with  them.  Tho  Athenians  perceiving  these  things, 
and  wishing  to  anticipate  tho  revolt  of  tho  cities,  a«  they  hap- 
pened to  Ih3  sending  out  thirty  ships  and  a  thousand  lieavy- 
armed  against  liis  country,  with  Archestratus,  the  son  of  Ly- 
comedes,  as  general  with  ten  others,  gave  orders  to  tho 
commanders  of  the  fleet  to  take  hostages  of  tho  Potida^ans,  and 
throw  down  tho  wall,  and  keep  a  watchful  eye  over  tho  neigh- 
boring cities,  to  prevent  their  revolting. 

58.  Now  tho  Potid.'cans  sent  cmb:issaxlors  to  tho  Athenians, 
to  try  if  by  any  means  they  might  persuade  them  to  adopt  no  new 
measures  against  them  ;  and  ΛνοηΙ  also  to  Lacedicmon  in  compa- 
ny Avith  the  Corinthians,  to  provide  themselves  with  assistance, 
should  it  be  necessary  ;  and  when,  after  long  negotiating,  they 
ol/tained  no  favorable  answer  from  the  Athenians,  but  tho 
ships  commissioned  against  Macedonia  were  sailing  just  as 
nmch  against  them  ;  and  when  tho  authorities  at  Lacedanmon 
]>romised  them,  that  should  the  Athenians  go  against  Potidnca, 
they  Avould  mako  an  incursion  into  Attica;  tlien  indeed,  at 
that  fovorable  moment,  they  revolted  with  tho  Chalcidians 
and  Bottiaiaris,  liaving  entered  into  a  league  together.  And 
Perdiccas  persuaded  tho  Chalcidians  to  abandon  and  throw 
down  their  cities  on  tho  sea,  and  remove  inland  to  Olynthus 
and  mako  that  one  city  a  place  of  strength  for  themselves. 
And  to  those  who  abandoned  them  ho  gave  a  part  of  Jiis  own 
territory  in  Mygdonia,  roimd  lake  Bolbe,  to  enjoy  as  long  as 
tho  war  with  the  Athenians  lasted.  And  so,  throwing  down 
tiieir  cities,  they  removed  inland,  and  prepared  for  war. 

69.  The  thirty  ships  of  tho  Athenians  arrived  at  tho  Thrace- 
ward towns,  and  found  Potidrca  and  the  rest  in  revolt :  and  tho 
generals  thinking  it  im|)ossiblo  with  their  present  force  to  carry 
on  war  both  with  PWlip  and  tho  revolted  towns,  turned  their 
attention  lo  Macedonia,  tho  object  for  which  they  wore  fint• 


96  THUOYDIDES.  L  [ix*-Lzn. 

sent  out ;  and  having  established  thenoselvce  there/  carried  on 
the  war  in  conjunction  with  Philip  and  the  brothers  of  Derdas, 
who  had  invaded  the  country  with  an  army  from  the  interior. 

00.  And  at  this  time,  when  Potidaja  had  revolted  and  the 
Athenian  ships  ΛΥβΓβ  cruising»  about  Macedonia,  the  Corinthi- 
ans, being  alarmed  for  the  place,  and  considering  the  danger 
to  affect  themselves,  sent  volunteers  of  their  own  people  and 
mercenaries  of  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnesians,  sixteen  hun- 
dred heavy-armed  in  all  and  four  hundred  light-armed.  Their 
general  was  Aristeus,  the  son  of  Adimantus ;  and  it  was 
from  friendship  for  liim  especially  that  most  of  the  soldiern 
from  Corinth  joined  the  expedition  as  volunteers ;  for  he  was 
idways  favorably  disjiosed  toward  the  Potidwans.  And  they 
arrived  in  Thrace  the  fortieth  day  after  Potidaea  liad  revolted. 

CI.  To  the  Athenians  too  came  immediately  the  tidings  of 
the  cities  having  revolted ;  and  when  they  found  that  the 
forces  Λvith  Aristeus  had  gone  there  besides,  they  sent  two 
thousand  heavy-armed  of  their  own  men  and  forty  ships  to 
the  revolted  towns,  with  Callias,  the  son  of  Calliades,  as 
general  with  four  others ;  who,  on  arriving  in  Macedonia  first, 
found  that  the  former  thousand  had  just  taken  Thenne,  and 
were  besieging  Py<lna.  So  thc-y  also  sat  down  before  I*ydna, 
and  besieged  it;  but  afterward,  having  made  tenns  and  a 
compulsory  alliance*  with  Perdiccas,  as  they  Λvere  hurried  on 
by  Potidaea  and  the  arrival  of  Aristeus  there,  they  withdrew 
from  Macedonia;  and  having  gone  to  lkir»a,  and  thence 
turned  again  [to  the  coast]  (after  first  attempting  the  place 
without  taking  it),  they  continued  their  march  by  land  to 
Potidaia,  with  three  thousand  lieavy-armed  of  their  own, 
and  many  of  the  allies  besides,  and  six  hundred  horse  of  the 
Macedonians  Avith  Philip  and  Pausanias.  At  the  same  time 
seventy  ships  were  sailing  in  a  lino  with  them.  And  ad- 
vancing by  short  marches,  they  arrived  at  Gigonus,  and  i)itched 
their  camp. 

"02.  Now  the  Potidaians  and  the  Peloponnesians  with  Aris- 
teus, in  expectation  of  the  Athenians,  were  encamjKid  toward 

'  i.  β.,  "  Quum  00  vonissont,  caatra  poauissont." — Bauer,  as  quoted  by 
CiiUer.  Or  it  may  mean  no  more  than  "  having  sot  to,"  as  in  tho  passages 
(inoted  in  tho  note  on  chap.  49.  3. 

2  t.  i.,  "  wliich  they  only  made  because  they  could  not  help  it."  Com- 
pare II.  70,  1,  ϋρώσεως  ττίρι  αναγκαίας,  "  Food  which  none  but  α  starv- 
ing man  would  oat." — Arnold. 


Lxm]  TIIUCYDIDES,  I.  37 

Olyntbufl,  on  the  isthmus,  nnd  lia<l  cstnblishcd  thoir  mark<^l 
outside  the  city.  Λλ  /rcnoral  of  all  the  infantry  the  allies  Imd 
chosen  Aristcus ;  of  the  cavalry,  Terdiccas ;  for  ho  had  broken 
terms  ajjain  immediately  >vith  the  Athenians,  and  was  in  alli- 
ance with  the  Potidaeans,  haviiiji  appointed  lolaua  to  repre- 
sent liim  as  commander.  The  plan  of  Aristeus  was  to  keep 
his  own  force*  on  the  isthmus,  and  watch  thg  Athenians,  in 
case  of  their  coming  ajjainst  them ;  while  the  Chalcidians,  and 
the  allies  beyond  the  isthmus,  and  the  two  liundred  cavalry 
with  Perdiccas,  should  remain  at  Olynthus;  and  when  the 
Athenians  advanced  acfainst  liis  force,  they  should  come  up  in 
tlioir  rear  to  assist  him,  and  inclose  the  enemy  between  them, 
liut  on  the  other  hand,  Callias,  the  general  of  the  Athenians, 
and  his  fellow-commanders,  dispatch  the  cavalrj"  of  the  Ma- 
cedonians and  a  few  of  the  allies  toward  Olynthus,  to  prevent 
the  troops  there  from  giving  any  assistance  ;  while  they  them^ 
Reives  broke  up  their  camp,  and  proceeded  to  Potidaia.  And 
Avhen  they  were  at  the  isthmus,  and  saw  the  enemy  preparing 
for  battle,  they  also  took  an  opposite  position;  and  not  long 
after  they  began  the  engagement.  And  just  the  wing  of 
Aristeus,  and  such  picked  troope  of  the  Corinthians  and  the 
rest  as  were  around  him,  routed  the  wing  opposed  to  them, 
and  advanced  in  pursuit  a  considerable  distance;  but  the  re- 
maining force  of  tlie  Potidaians  and  Peloponnesians  was  beaten 
]>y  tho  Athenians,  and  fled  within  the  wall  for  refuge. 

63.  When  Aristeus  was  returning  from  tho  pursuit,  seeing 
the  rest  of  tho  army  conquered,  ho  was  at  a  loss  which  place 
he  should  risk  going  to,  whether  toward  Olynthus,  or  to 
Potidaia,  lie  determmed,  liowever,  to  draw  liis  men  into  as 
small  a  space  as  possible,  and  at  a  running  pace  force  his  way 
into  Potidaea :  and  he  passed  along  the  breakwater  through  tho 
sea,  annoyed  by  missiles  [from  the  Athenian  ships],  and  with 
difficulty ;  having  lost  a  few  men,  but  saved  tho  rest.  Now 
the  auxiliaries  of  the  Potidaians  from  Olynthus  (tho  town  is 
alx)ut  sixty  stadcs  off,  and  within  sight),  when  the  battle  was 
l)eginning,  and  the  signals  had  been  hoisted,  advanced  a  short 
distance  to  give  succor,  and  tho  Macedonian  horse  drew  up 
against  them  to  prevent  it;  but  when  tho  ^^ctory  soon  de- 
clared  for    tho   Athenians,  and  tho  signals   liad  been   taken 

*  txtivrtA  Conatructio  ad  eonsum  ftcta :  nam  verborum  τοϋ  *KptoT(t^ 
}ρύμη  ηρ  idom  eonsus,  oc  si  dixiBSct  τψ  Άριοτιϊ  Wofr.— (Toifer. 


38  THUCYDIDES.  I.  [lxxv^  ix^, 

down,  they  retired  again  within  the  wall,  and  the  Macedoni- 
ans to  the  Athenians.  Ro  neither  side  had  any  cavalry  pres- 
ent [in  the  engagement].  After  the  battle  the  Athenians 
erected  a  trophy,  and  gave  back  their  dead  to  the  Potidieans 
under  truce.  There  were  killed  of  the  Potidaeans  and  their 
allies  a  little  less  than  three  hundred,  and  of  the  Athenians 
themselves  on(^  hundred  and  fifty,  and  Calliaa  their  general. 

64.  Now  against  the  wall  on'  the  side  of  the  isthmus  the 
Athenians  immediately  raised  Avorks,  and  manned  them.  But 
that  toward  Pidleno  had  no  works  raised  against  it ;  for  they 
did  not  think  themselves  strong  enough  both  to  keep  a  garrison 
on  the  isthmus,  and  to  cross  over  the  Palleno  and  raise  works 
there;  fearing  that  the  Potidieans  and  their  allies  might  at- 
tack them  when  divided.  And  the  Athenians  in  the  city, 
liearing  that  Palleno  had  no  works  on  it,  some  time  aftc-r 
send  sixteen  hundred  heavyrarmed  of  their  own,  and  Phor- 
mio,  the  son  of  Asopius,  as  general ;  who  reached  Palleno, 
and  setting  out  from  Aphytis,'  led  his  army  to  Potidaia, 
advancing  by  short  marches,  and  ravaging  the  country  at  the 
same  time :  and  when  no  one  came  out  to  otier  him  battle,  ho 
threw  up  \vorks  against  the  wall  on  the  side  of  Palleno.  And 
thus  Potidaia  was  now  besieged  with  all  their  power,  on  b<»th 
sides,  and  from  the  sea  at  the  same  time  by  shi[>s  that  λυογο 
blockading  it. 

65.  Now  Aristous,  when  it  was  surrounded  with  works, 
and  he  had  no  hope  of  its  escape,  unless  some  movement 
from  the  Peloponneso,  or  something  else  beyond  their  calcula- 
tions should  occur,  advised  all,  except  five  hundred,  to  watch 
for  a  wind  and  sail  out  of  it,  that  their  provisions  miglit  hold 
out  the  longer;  and  he  was  Avilling  himself  to  bo  one  of  those 
who  remained.  Put  Λνΐιοη  ho  did  not  persuade  them,  from  a 
wish  to  provide  >vhat  was  tlie  next  best  thing  to  bo  done,  and 
in  order  that  aflfairs  out  of  tho  place  might  proceed  in  the 
best  way  j)ossible,   he   sailed  out,  Avithout  being  observed  by 

*  Litorally,  "having  walked  of,"  i.  e.,  cut  οίΤ  by  a,tranavcrso  wall 
from  coiumunication  Λνΐΐΐι  tho  country.  Tho  abscuco  of  any  eiuh  wall 
on  tho  opposite  sido  of  tho  city  id  afterward  expressed  by  r//y  ΙΙα'/.λ/μην 
UTeixiaroD  oivnv. 

•  I  do  not  think  that  more  ia  meant  by  ΐψιιύμη'ος  in  this  passage  than 
that  ho  set  out  by  land  from  Aphytis,  having  come  with  his  ahips  to  tha., 
place,  a.s  being  tho  most  convenient  for  his  plan  of  advancing  to  Potida.'i. 
through  Pullouo. 


I 


,χνι.,  Lxvii.]  THUCYDIDES.   I.  39 

the  guard-ships  of  the  Athenians.  And  remaining  among 
the  Chalcidians,  ho  joined  in  the  other  measures  of  the  war; 
and  laid  an  ambuscade  near  the  city  of  the  Sermylians,  ^nd 
cut  off  many  of  them ;  and  sending  to  the  Peloponncse,'  en- 
deavored to  contrive  η  Avay  in  >vhich  some  assistance  miglit 
be  brought.  After  the  works  round  Potidaca  were  finished, 
riiomiio  >vith  liis  sixteen  Imndred  men  proceeded  to  ravage 
Chalcidico  and  Bottice,  and  took  some  of  tlie  toAvns  also. 

CO.  The  Athenians  then  and  Peloponnesians  had  had 
these  previous  grounds  of  complaint  against  each  other;  the 
Corinthians,  because  Potidaia,  Λνΐήοΐι  was  a  colony  of  their 
own,  and  men  of  Corinth  and  from  the  Peloponncse  in  it, 
wefo  being  besieged ;  the  Athenians  against  the  Peloponne- 
Plans,  because  they  had  caused  the  revolt  of  a  city  wliich  waR 
their  ally  and  tributary,  and  liad  come  and  openly  fought 
with  them  in  conjunction  with  the  Potidjeans.  The  war 
however  had  not  yet  positively  broken  out,  but  at  present 
there  Λ\\α8  a  suspension  of  hostilities;  for  the  Corinthians  had 
done  these  things  on  their  own  responsibility  alone. 

C7.  When,  however,  Potidica  was  being  besieged,  they  did 
not  remain  quiet,  as  they  had  men  in  it,  and  were  alarmed  for 
the  place.  And  immediately  they  summoned  the  allies  to 
Lacedicmon,  and  came  and  cried  out  against  the  Athenians, 
as  having  broken  the  treaty,  and  as  injuring  the  Peloponncse, 
And  the  ^ginetans,  though  they  did  not  openly  send  embas- 
sadors, for  fear  of  the  Athenians,  yet  in  secret  most  of  all 
urged  on  the  war  in  conjunction  with  them,  saying  that  they 
were  not  independent  according  to  the  treaty.  So  the  Lace- 
dajmonians,  after  summoning  any  one  of  the  allies  besides, 
who  said  that  in  any  otlier  respect  ho  had  been  mjured  by  the 
Athenians,  held  their  ordinary  assembly,  and  told  them  to 
speak.  And  others  camo  forward  and  severally  madb  their 
complaints,  and  especially  the  Megareans,  who  urged  no  few 
ptber  grounds  of  quarrel,  but  most  of  all  their  being  excluded 
from  tho  ports  in  tho  Athenian  dominions,  and  from  the  Attic 
market,  contrary  to  tho  treaty.  And  the  Corinthians  came 
forward  Inst;  after  permitting  the  others  first  to  exasperate  tho 
Lacedairnonipns ;  and  they  spoke  after  them  as  follows. 

»  The  original  is  a  condensed  oxprossion,  the  partioiplo  πεμηων  being 
understood,  a•  is  evident  from  chap.  67  3,  where  it  is  expressed,  Μιώς 
Tc  inoaoatv  (ς  re  τήν  ΑακεδαΙμονα  ηίμηων  δηως^  κ.  τ.  λ. 


40  THUCYDIDKS.  I.  [lxtui^  υαχ. 

68.  **  The  trustinoss  of  your  policy  nnd  intercourse  among 
yourselves,  Lacedoimonians,  renders  you  the  more  distrustful 
with  regard  to  others^  if  we  say  any  thing  [against  theinl;  and 
from  this  you  have  a  eharocter  fur  seber-uiindedness,  but  Dctray 
too  great  ignorance  with  regard  to  foreign  affairs.    For  though 
we  often  forewarned  you  what  injuries  we  were  going  to  re- 
ceive   from    the  Athenians,    you   did   not    gain  information 
respecting  what  we  told  you  from  time  to  time,  but  rather  sus- 
pected the  speakers  of  speaking  for  their  own  pnvate  interests. 
And  for  this  reason  it  was  not  before  we  sutlered,  but  when 
we  are  in  the  very  act  of  suffering,  that  you  have  summoned 
the  allies  hero ;  among  whom  we  may  speak  with  the  great- 
est  propriety,  inadmuch   as  we  have  also  the   greatest   coin- 
plaints  to    make,  being  insulted  by  the   Athenians,  and    ne- 
glected  by  you.     And  if  they  >vere   an  obscure   people  any 
where'  who  were  injuring  Greece,  you  might  have  required 
additional  warning,  as  not  being  acquainted  with  them ;  but 
as  it  is,  Λνΐιν  need  we  speak  at  any  great  length,  when  you  see 
that  some  of  us  are  already  enslaved,  and  that  they  are  plot- 
ting against  others  and  esj)ecially  against  our  allies,  and  have 
been  for  a  long  time  prepared  beforohand,  in  case  they  shouhl 
ever  go  to  war.     Fur  they  would  not  else  have  stolen  Corcyra 
from  us,  and  kept  it  in  spito  of  us,  and  besieged  Potidaia;  of 
Avhich  places,  the  one  is  the  most  convenient  for  their  deriving 
the  full  benetitfioin  their  possession  Thrace  ward,'  and  the  other 
would  have  supplied  the  largest  navy  to  the  Pelopounesians. 

C9.  "And  for  these  things  it  is  you  who  are  to  blame, 
by  having  at  first  permitted  them  to  fortify  their  city  after 
the  Median  war,  and  subsequently  to  build  the  long  >valls; 
and  by  continually  up  to  the  j)resent  time  depriving  of  liberty, 
not  only  those  who  had  been  enslaved  by  them,  but  your  own 
allies  also  now.  For  it  is  not  ho  who  has  enslaved  them,  but 
lie  who  has  the  power  io  stop  it,  but  overlooks  it,  that  more 
truly  does  this ;  especially  if  ho  enjoys  the  reputation  for  vir- 

*  The  που  ia  tho  original  would  porhaj)»  bo  most  fully  expressed  by 
our  colloquial  phrase,  "  in  Roino  corner  or  other." 

2  Arnold  translates  it,  *'  so  ns  to  ^\\ο  ymi  tho  full  bencflt  of  your  do- 
minion in  Iho  ncif^hborhood  of  Thrace."  But  could  tho  Lacedaemonians 
bo  said  to  have  any  such  dominion,  at  any  rate  boforo  tho  expedition  of 
Brasidasf  and  does  not  tho  ΙΙελιητονίΊΐσίοις  in  tho  next  sontenco  sceiu 
to  bo  put  emphatically,  as  in  opposition  to  tho  Athenian  dominion  just 
alluded  to  7 


LXX.1  THUCYDIDES.  I,  4\ 

luc  as  bcinjf^  tho  liberator  of  Greece.     But  with  difficulty  havo 
we  assembled  now,  and  not  even  now  for  any  clearly  defined 
oi)ject     For  wo  ought  to  bo  considering   no  longer  whether 
Λνο  are  injured,  but  in  Λvhat  Λvay  wo  shall  defend  ourselves. 
For   tho   aggressors   come   with   their   plans   already  formed 
against  us  who  have  ni)t  made  up  our  minds ;  at  once,  and  not 
putting  it  oil'.*     And  we  know  in  what  way,  and  how  gradu- 
ally, tne   Athenians  encroach    upon   their  neighbors.      And 
whilo   they  think  that  they  arc  not  observed  through  your 
want  of  jKifception,"  they  feel  less  confident ;  but  when  they 
know  that  you  are  aware  of  their  designs,  but  overlook  them, 
they  will  press  on  you  with  all  their  power.    For  you  alono 
of  the  Greeks,  Lacedaemonians,  remain  quiet,  defending  your-  * 
selves  against  any  one,  not  by  exertion  of  your  power,  but  j/y 
mere  demonstration  of  it ;  and  you  alone  put  down  tho  power 
of  your  enemies,  not  Avhen  lx>ginning,  but  when  growing  twicer 
as  great  as  it  was.     And  yet  you  used  to  have  tho  namo  of 
cautious ;  but  In  your  case  the  name,  it  seems,  Avas  more  than 
the  reality.     For  Λνο  ourselves  know  that  tho  Medo  camo  from 
the  ends  of  tho  earth  to  the  Peloponnese,  before  your  forces 
Avent  out  to  meet  him  as  they  should  have  done  ;  and  now  the 
Athenians,  who  are  not  far  removed,  as  he  was,  but  closo  at 
hand,  you  overlook ;  and  instead  of  attacking  them,  prefer  to 
«lofend   yourselves   against  their  attack,  and  to  reduce  your- 
selves to  mere  chances  in  struggling  with  them  when  in  a 
much  more  powerful  condition :  though  you  know  that  even 
the  barbarian  was  chiefly  wrecked  upon  himself;'   and   that 
with  regard  to  these  very  Athenians,  we  have  often  cro  thi? 
escaped   more   by  their  errors   than   by  assistance  from   you. 
For  indeed  hopes  of  you  have  before  now  in  some  instances 
even   ruined   some,  whilo  unprepared   through   trusting  you. 
And  let   none  of  you  think   that  this  is  spoken  for  enmity, 
rather  than   for  expostulation ;   for    expostulation  is   duo   to 
friends  who  are  in  error,  but  accusation  to  enemies  Λνΐιο  havo 
cx)nimitt<Ml  injustice. 

70.  "  At  the  same  time  wo  consider  that  we,  if  anv,  have  a 
right  to  administer  rebuke  to  our  neighbors,  especially  as  tho 

*  Or,  "  not  merely  thrGatonihg  to  attrtck  us,''  as  μίλλησις  is  used  below. 

>  Or,  Λΐ(ΐ  TO  άναίηθητον  νμων  may  be  taken  with  Οαρουΰσι,  and  bo  ren- 
dered "through  your  not  perceiving  it." 

'  ».  β.,  ho  was  himself,  as  it  wore,  the  rock  on  which  hie  fortune  eplit, 
"  Perished  by  his  own  folly."— ilrnoid 


42  THUCYDIDEa  I.  [txx 

differences  [between  you  and  them]  are  great ;  of  which  you 
do  not  seem  to  us  to  have  any  perception,  nor  to  have  ever 
yet  considered  with  what  kind  of  people  you  will  have  to 
struggle  in  the  Athenians,  and  how  very,  nay,  how  entirely 
difterent  from  yourselves.  They,  for  instance,  are  innovating, 
and  quick  to  plan  and  accomplish  by  action  >vhat  they  have 
designed ;  >vhilo  you  are  disposed  to  keep  what  you  have,  and 
form  no  new  design,  and  by  action  not  even  to  carry  out  what 
is  necessiiry.  Again,  they  are  bold  even  beyond  their  power, 
and  adventurous  beyond  their  judgment,  and  sanguine  in  dan- 
gers; while  your  character  is  to  undertake  tilings  beneath 
your  power,  and  not  to  trust  even  the  sure  grounds  of  your 
judgment,  and  to  think  that  j'ou  will  never  escape  from  your 
dangers.  Moreover,  they  are  unhesitating,  in  opposition  to 
you  who  are  dilatory ;  and  fond  of  going  from  liome,  in  o| - 
]»osition  to  you  who  are  most  fond  of  staying  at  home:  fr 
they  think  that  by  their  absence  they  may  acquire  something; 
whereas  you  think  that  by  attempting  [morej  you  would  do 
harm  to  what  you  have.  When  they  conquer  their  enemies, 
they  carry  out  their  advantage  to  the  utmost ;  and  when  C(^n- 
quereil,  they  fall  baek  the  least.  Further,  they  use  their  bodies 
as  least  belonging  to  them,  for  the  good  of  their  countrj' ;'  but 
their  mind,  as  being  most  peeuliarly  their  own,  for  aehieving 
something  on  her  aceount.  And  what  they  have  j)lanned  but 
not  carried  out,  they  think  that  in  this  they  lose  somethini^ 
already  their  own ;  what  they  have  attempted  and  gained, 
that  in  this  they  have  achieved  but  little  in  comparison  >vith 
what  they  mean  to  do.  Then,  if  they  fail  in  an  attempt  at 
any  thing,  by  forming  fresh  hopes  in  its  stead,  they  supj)ly  the 
detieiency :  for  they  are  the  only  people  that'  succeed  to  the  full 
extent  of  their  hope  in  Avhat  they  have  planned,  because  they 
quickly  undertake  what  they  have  resolved.  And  in  this  way 
they  labor,  >vith  toils  and  dangers,  all  their  life  long;  and  least 
enjoy  >vhat  they  liave,  l>e(auso  they  are  always  getting,  and 
iliink  a  f-ast  to  bo  nothing  else  but  to  gain  their  ends,  and  in- 

'  For  this  uso  of  il/./.UTpior  compare  Homer,  Odyss.  20.  34.G. 
μΐΊ/ητϊ/ραι  ύέ  ΙΙα'λ'λύς  ΆΟ>}νη 
'λσΰεστύν  γίλον  ΰρσε  .  .  .  .  οι  ύ^  γναΟμυϊσι  γιλύων 
άλ/.οτρίοίβιν : — 
tnd  Uoraco's  imitation  of  it,  Sat.  2.  3.  12. 

"  Cum  rapiea  in  jus  malis  ridentem  alicnis." 
"  More  literally,  "  possess  iu  the  same  degree  na  they  hopo  for." 


LXXL,  Lxxii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  I.  43 

iictivo  quiot  to  bo  no  less  a  cnlnmity  tlmn  laborious  occupation. 
So  tbat  if  any  ono  sbould  sum  up  tbcir  cliaracter,  by  sayinj^ 
that  they  are  made  neither  to  bo  quiet  themsclvei»,  nor  let  tho 
rest  of  tho  world  bo  so,  ho  Avould  speak  correctly. 

71.  "And  yet  when  such  is  tho  character  of  this  state  that 
iu  opposed  to  you,  Lacedasmoniana,  you  go  on  delaying,  and 
think  that  peace  is  not  most  lasting  in  tho  case  of  those  men, 
who  with  their  resources  do  what  is  right,  whilo  as  regards 
their  feelings,  they  are  known  to  bo  determined  not  to  put  up 
with  it^  if  they  arc  injured  ;  but  you  practice  fair  dealing  on 
tho  principle  of  neither  annoying  others,  nor  being  hurt  your- 
solves   in   self-defense.      Scarcely,  however,  could    you   havo 
succeeded  in  this,  though  you  had  lived  by  a  stato  of  congenial 
views :  wliilo  as  it  is,  your  ways,  as  wo  just  now  showed  you, 
are  old-fjishioued  compared  with  them.     IJut,  as  in  tho  case  of 
art,  improvements  must  ever  prevail ;  and  though  for  a  stato 
that  enjoys  quiot,  unchanged  institutions  arc  best;  yet, for  thoso 
>vho  arc  compelled  to  apply  to  many  things,  many  a  new  de- 
vice is  also  necessary.     And  for  this  reason  tho  institutions  of 
tho   Athenians,  from   their    great  experience,  havo  been    re- 
modeled to  a  greater  extent  than  yours.     At  this  point  then 
let  your  dilatoriness  cease :   and  now  a-^sist  us,  and  especially 
the  Potidaians,  as  you  undertook,  by  making  with  all  s})eed  an 
incursion  into  Attica ;  that  you  may  not  give  up  men  who  are 
your  friends  and  kinsmen  to  their  bitterest  enemies,  and  turn 
tho  rest  of  us  in  do5<pair  to  some  other  alliance.     And  in  that 
wo  should  do  nothing  unjust,  in  the  sight  either  of  tho  gods 
who  received  our  oaths'  or  of  tho  men  who  Λvitness  [our  con- 
duct] :  for  tho  breakers  of  a  treaty  aro  not  thoso  λυΙιο  from 
destitution  apply  to  others,  but  thoso  who  do  not  assist  their 
confederates.     If,  however,  you  λ\ί11  bo  zealous,  wo  will  stand 
by  you ;  for  neither  should  wo  act  rightly  in  changing,  nor 
should  we  find  others  more  congenial.     Wherefore  deliberato 
well,  and  endeavor  to  keep  a  supremacy  in  tho  Pcloponnoso 
no  less  thati  your  fathers  bequeathed  to  you." 

72.  To  this  effect  spoko  tho  Corinthians.  And  tho  Athe- 
nians, happening  before  this  to  havo  an  embassy  at  Laccda;- 
mon,  and  hearing  what  was  said,  thought  that  they  ought  to 
corao  before  tho  Lacedaemonians,  not  to  make  any  defenso  on 

'  Or,  OB  Arnold,  afVcr  Roisko  and  others,  explains  it,  "  who  aro  capable 
of  feeling  and  observing." 


44  THUCYDIDEa  L  [Lxxn,  . 

tho  subject  of  tho  charges  which  the  Btaies  brought  against 
them,  but  to  prove,  on  a  general  view  of  tho  question,  tliat 
they  ought  not  to  deliberate  in  a  hurry,  but  take  more  time  to 
consider  it.  They  wislied  also  to  show  how  powerful  their 
city  was ;  and  to  remind  tho  older  men  of  what  they  knew, 
and  to  relate  to  the  younger  what  they  were  unacquainted 
with ;  thinking  that  in  consequence  of  what  they  said,  they 
would  be  more  disposed  to  remain  quiet  than  to  go  to  war. 
So  they  came  to  tho  Lacediemonians,*  and  said  that  they  also, 
[as  tho  Corinthians  had  done],  wished  to  speak  to  their  pet> 
ple,  if  nothing  prevented.  Tuey  told  them  to  come  fonvard ; 
and  the  Athenians  came  forward,  and  spoke  as  follows. 

73.  "  Our  embassy  was  not  sent  for  the  purpose  of  controversy 
Avith  your  allies,  but  on  tho  business  on  Λvhich  the  state  sent  υπ. 
Perceiving,  however,  that  there  is  no  small  outcry  against  us, 
we  have  come  forward,  not  to  answer  tho  charges  of  the  states 
(for  our  words  would  not  be  addressed  to  you  as  judges,  either 
of  us  or  of  them),  but  to  prevent  your  adopting  bad  counsel 
through  being  easily  persuaded  by  tho  allies  on  matters  of 
great  hnportance ;  and  at  tho  same  time  with  a  Avish  to  show, 
on  α  view  of  tho  general  argument  as  it  affects  us,  that  we 
do  not  improperly  hold  what  we  possess,  and  that  our  state  is 
worthy  of  consideration.  Now  as  to  things  of  very  ancient 
date,  why  need  wo  mention  them  ?  since  hearsay  must  attest 
them,  rather  than  the  eyes  of  those  who  will  bo  our  auditors. 
But  the  Median  war,  and  tho  deeds  with  which  you  yourselves 
are  acquainted,  Λνο  must  speak  of;  though  it  will  be  rather 
irksome  to  us  to  be  forever  bringing  them  forward  :  for  Λν1κ•η 
we  performed  them,  the  danger  was  run  for  a  benefit,  of  the 
reality  of  which  you  had  your  share ;  and  let  us  not  bo  de- 
prived of  the  whole  credit,  if  it  is  of  any  service  to  us.  Our 
words,  however,  will  be  spoken,  not  so  much  for  the  purpose 
of  exculpation,  as  of  testimony,  and  of  showing  with  what  kind 
of  α  state  you  ΛνϋΙ  have  to  contend,  if  you  do  not  take  good 
(iounsel.  For  we  say  that  at  Marathon  wo  alono  stood  in  tho 
van  of  danger  against  the  barbarian  ;  and  that  when  he  came 
a  second  time,  though  wo  >vere  not  able  to  defend  ourselves 
by  land,  Λνο  went  on  board  our  ships  with  all  our  people,  and 
joined  in  the  sea-fight  at  Salamis ;  which  prevented  his  sail- 

'  i.  e.^iQ  tho  government,  whoso  consent  was  required  beforo  they 
could  address  the  assembled  people. 


LMiv.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  45 

in^  ai^inFt  and  ravaging  the  Peloponncsc,  city  by  city,  while 
you  would  Imvo  been  unablo  to  assist  ono  another  against  his 
numerous  elnps.  And  he  himself  gave  the  gieatcst  proof  of 
tliis ;  for  when  conquered  by  sea,  thinking  that  his  power  was 
no  longer  what  it  had  been,  ho  retreated  as  quickly  as  ho 
could  with  tlio  greater  part  of  his  army. 

74.  "  Such  now  having  been  the  result,  and  it  having  been 
clearly  shown  that  it  was  on  the  fleet  of  tho  Greeks  that  their 
cause  depended,  wo  contributed  the  thrco  most  useful  things 
toward  it ;  viz.,  the  greatest  number  of  ships,  the  most 
able  man  as  a  general,  and  tho  most  unshrinking  zeal.  To- 
Λvard  tho  four  hundred  ships  wo  contributed  not  less  tlian 
two  parts  ;*  and  Themistocles  as  commander,  who  was  chiefly 
instrumental  of  their  fighting  in  tho  Strait,  which  most 
clearly  saved  their  cause  ;  and  you  yourselves  for  this  reaeon 
honored  him  most,  for  a  stranger,  of  all  that  have  ever  gono 
to  you.  And  a  zeal  by  far  tho  most  daring  wo  exhibited,  in- 
asmuch as  when  no  one  camo  to  assist  us  by  land,  tho  rest  as 
:Jar_as^tis  being  already  enslaved,  Λνο  determined,  though  wo 
had  left  our  city,  and  eacrificed  our  property,  not  even  in 
Ihoso  circumstances  to  abandon  tho  common  cause  of  tho  re- 
maining allies,  nor  to  becomo  useless  to  them  by  dispersing ; 
but  to  go  on  board  our  ships,  and  face  tho  danger ;  and  not  to 
l>o  angry  because  you  liad  not  previously  assisted  us.  So  then 
we  assert  that  Λνο  ourselves  no  less  conferred  a  benefit  upon 
you,  than  wo  obtained  one.  For  ?/om,  setting  out  from  cities 
that  were  inhabited,  and  with  a  view  to  enjoying  them  in  fu- 
ture, camo  to  our  assist,inco  [only]  after  you  >vero  afraid  for 
yourselves,  and  not  so  much  for  us  (at  any  rate,  when  wo 
^ere  still  in  safety,  you•  did  not  como  to  us) ;  but  we,  setting 

»  What  parts  wo  must  suppose  tlio  speaker  to  have  referred  to  in  this 
passapro,  whether  quarters  or  thirds,  is  much  disputed.  Didot  and  Giiller 
maintain  tho  formor,  as  being  in  strict  agreement  with  tho  statement  of 
Herodotus,  who  makes  tho  whole  fleet  to  have  consisted  of  three  hun- 
dred and  sovontj-cight  ships,  and  tho  Athenian  portion  of  one  hundred 
and  eighty.  Arnold,  after  Brodow  and  Poppo,  supports*  tho  other  inter- 
pretation, and  observes,  that  "  this  is  not  tho  statement  of  Thucydides, 
but  of  the  Athenian  orator,  who  is  made  very  characteristically  to  in- 
dulge in  gross  exaggerations."  Soo  his  wholo  note  on  the  passage. 
Bishop  Thirlwall,  however,  thinks  that  such  an  exaggeration  would  have 
been  in  very  bad  taste  on  such  an  occasion ;  and  that  Thucydides  meant 
to  state  the  true  numbers ;  "in  which,"  he  observes,  "if  wo  road  τριηκΐ.- 
(liar  for  TiTp.  ho  would  have  followed  iEechylus  instead  of  Herodotus, 
whom  indeed  it  ia  i^oasiblo  ho  line  not  read."    Vol.  ii.  Append.  4. 


46  THUOTDIDES.  I,  [lxxv.,  Lxxrt 

out  from  a  country  which  was  no  more,  and  running  the  risk 
for  what  existed  only  in  scanty  hope,  bore  our  full  share  in  the 
deliverance  both  of  you  and  of  ourselves.  But  if  we  had  be- 
fore joined  the  Mede  through  fear  for  our  country,  like  others, 
or  had  afterward  had  no  heart  to  go  on  board  our  shipj»,  con- 
sidering ourselves  as  ruined  men ;  there  would  have  been  no 
longer  any  need  of  your  fighting  by  sea  Avithout  a  sufficient 
number  of  ships,  but  things  would  have  quietly  progressed 
for  him  just  as  he  wished. 

75.  "  Do  we  not  then  deserve,  Lacedaemonians,  both  for  our 
zeal  at  that  time,  and  the  intelligence  of  our  counsel,  not  to  lie 
under  such  excessive  odium  >vith  the  Greeks,  at  least  for  the 
empire  we  possess  ?  For  this  very  empire  we  gained,  not 
by  acting  v/\i\\  violence,  but  through  your  having  been  un- 
willing to  stand  by  them  to  finish  the  business  Λvith  the  bar- 
barian and  through  the  allies  having  come  to  us,  and  of  their 
own  accord  iK'ggcd  us  to  become  their  leaders :  and  from 
this  very  fact  λνο  were  compelled  at  first  to  advance  it  to  its 
j)resent  height,  principally  from  motives  of  fear,  then  of  honor 
also,  and  afterward  of  advantiigo  too.  And  it  no  longt?r  ap- 
peared to  be  safe,  Λvhen  wo  were  hated  by  the  generality, 
and  when  some  who  had  already  revolted  had  been  sub- 
dued, and  you  wire  no  longer  friends  Λvith  us,  as  you  had 
been,  but  susi)icious  of  us,  and  at  variance  with  us,  to  run  the 
risk  of  giving  it  up ;  for  those  who  revolted  would  have  gone 
over  to  you.'  And  all  may  without  odium  secure  their  own 
interests  Avith  regard  to  the  greatest  perils.' 

76.  "You,  at  least,  Lacedicmonian^  have  setthnl  to  your 
own  advantage  the  government  of  the  states  in  the  Pelopon- 
nese  over  which  you  have  a  supremacy ;  and  if  at  that  time 
you  had  remained  through  the  whole  business,  and  l)een  dis- 
liked in  your  command,  as  we  were,  wo  know  full  well  that 
you  would  have  become  no  less  severe  to  the  allies,  and  would 
have  been  compelled  either  to  rule  with  a  strong  hand,  or 
yourselves  be  exposed  to  danger.  So  neither  have  we  done 
any.  thing  marvelous,  or  contrary  to  the  disposition  of  man, 
in  having  accepted  an  empire  that  was  oflfered  to  us,  and  not 
giving  it  up,  influenced  as  we  are  by  the  strongest  motives, 
honor,  and   fear,  aud  profit ;   and  when,  again,  wo  had  not 

*  Literally,  "tho  rovolta  ΛνουΜ  havo  been  to  you." 

•  Or,  •'  uone  aro  grudged  securing,"  etc. 


txxviu]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  47 

l>ccn  tho  first  to  set  such  a  precedent,  but  it  Imd  always  been 
a  settled  rule  that  tho  ΛνοακοΓ  should  bo  constrained  by  tho 
stronger ;  and  when  at  tho  samo  tiino  wo  thought  ourselves 
worthy  of  it,  and  wero  thought  so  by  you,  until,  from  calcu•» 
lations  of  expediency,  you  now  avail  yourselves  of  tho  appeal 
to  justice ;  which  no  one  ever  yet  brought  forward  when  ho 
had  a  chance  of  gaining  any  thing  by  might,  and  abstained 
from  taking  tho  advantage.  Nay,  all  are  worthy  of  praise, 
who,  after  acting  according  to  human  nature  in  ruling  others, 
have  been  more  just  than  their  actual  power  enabled  them  to 
1)0.  At  any  rate  wo  imagine  that  if  some  others  had  possessed 
our  means,  thoy  ΛνοηΚΙ  have  best  shown  whether  wo  aro  at  all 
moderate  or  not :  though  to  us  there  has  unfairly  resulted  from 
our  good  nature  disrepute  rather  than  commendation. 

77.  "For  froin  putting  up  with  less  than  wo  might  have  had 
in  contract-suiti  with  tho  allies,  and  from  liaving  made  our 
decisions  in  our  qwn  courts  on  tho  f(X)ting  of  equal  laws,  wo 
are  thought  to  bo  litigioufl.  And  none  of  them  considers  why 
this  reproach  is  not  brought  against  those  who  have  empire  in 
.liiy  otlior  quarter  also,  and  aro  less  moderate  toward  their 
.•uttjects  than  we  have  been :  for  those  λυΙιο  can  act  with  vio- 
Knee  have  no  need  l)esidcs  to  act  with  justice.  But  they, 
from  being  accustomed  to  have  intercourse  with  ns  on  a  fair 
footing,  if  contrary  to  their  notions  of  right  they  have  been 
Avorstod  in  any  thing,  either  by  a  legal  judgment  or  by  tho 
power  of  o\ir  empire,  even  in  any  degreo  whatever ;  they  feel 
no  gratitude  for  not  being  deprived  of  the  greater  part  [of 
their  possessions],  but  are  more  indignant  for  what  is  lost, 
than  if  from  tho  first  wc  had  laid  aside  law,  and  openly  taken 
advantage  of  them.  In  that  case  not  even  they  themselves 
would  have  denied  that  it  was  right  for  tho  weaker  to  yield  to 
the  stronger.  But  when  injured,  it  seems,  men  aro  more  an- 
gry than  when  treated  with  violence :  for  tho  ono  case  is  re- 
garded as  an  advantage  taken  by  their  equal ;  tho  other,  as 
compulsion  by  their  superior.  At  least  thoy  endured  much 
harder  treatment  than  this  at  tho  hand  of  tho  Medes ;  where- 
as our  ru!o  is  thought  to  bo  severe ;  and  naturally  so ;  for  their 
present  condition  is  always  irksome  to  subjects.  You,  at  any 
rato,  should  you  subduo  us  and  possess  an  empire,  would 
nuicklv  loso  tho  good-will  which  you  have  enjoyed  through 
their  (ear  of  us;  if  you  have  the  samo  views  now  as  yon  gavo 


48  THUCYDIDEa  L  [lzztul^lzzx. 

symptoms  of  then,  when  you  led  them  ogainst  the  Mcdo  for  η 
short  time.  For  you  have  iustitutions  by  yourselves,  distinct 
from  the  rest  of  the  world ;  and,  moreover,  each  individual  of 
you,  on  j?oing  abroad,  neither  acta  according  to  these,  nor  to 
those  which  the  rest  of  Greece  recognizes. 

78.  "Deliberate  therefore  slowly  ,a8  on  no  trifling  matters; 
and  do  not,  though  being  influenced  by  other  people's  views 
and  accusations,  bring  on  yourselves  trouble  of  your  own: 
but  consider  beforehand,  previously  to  your  being  engam?d  in 
it,  how  far  beyond  calculation  is  war ;  for  when  long  pro- 
tracted, it  generally  becomes  in  the  end  to  depend  on  chances  ; 
from  ΛνΙικΊι  wo  are  equally  removed,  and  run  the  lisk  in  un- 
certaiiity  as  to  Avhich  way  it  will  turn  out.  And  in  going  to 
war  men  generally  turn  to  deeds  first,  which  they  ought  to  do 
afterward ;  and  when  they  are  in  distress,  then  they  have  re- 
course to  words.  AVe,  liowever,  being  neither  ourselves  yet 
involved  in  such  an  error,  nor  seeing  you  in  it,  charge  you, 
while  good  council  is  still  eligible  to  both  sides,  not  to  break 
treaty  nor  ofiend  against  your  oaths,  but  to  let  our  ditferences 
be  judicially  settled  according  to  agreement.  Else  we  ΛνϋΙ 
call  to  witness  the  gods  who  received  our  oaths,  and  endeavor 
to  requite  you  for  commencing  hostilities,  in  such  a  way  as 
you  may  set  the  example." 

79.  Thus  spoke  the  Athenians.  After  the  Laccdiemonians 
had  heard  from  the  allies  their  charges  against  the  Athenians, 
and  from  the  Athenians  what  they  had  to  say,  they  made  them 
all  withdraw,  and  consulted  by  themselves  on  the  question  be- 
fore them.  And  the  opinions  of  the  majority  went  the  samo 
way  ;  viz,  that  the  Athenians  were  already  guilty  of  injustice, 
and  that  they  ought  to  go  to  war  >vith  all  speed.  ])ut  Archi- 
damus  their  king,  a  man  who  was  considered  both  intelligent 
and  prudent,  camci  forward  and  spoke  as  follows. 

80.  "  I  have  both  myself  already  had  experience  in  many 
wars,  Lacedajmonians,  and  see  that  those  of  you  who  are  of 
the  same  age  [have  had  it  also];  so  that  one  would  neither 
desire  the  business  from  inexperience,  as  might  be  the  caso 
with  most  men,  nor  from  thinking  it  a  good  and  safe  one. 
l^ut  this  war,  about  which  you  are  now  consulting,  you  would 
find  likely  to  be  none  of  the  least,  if  any  one  should  soberly 
consider  it.  For  against  the  Peloponnesians  and  our  neirh- 
bors  our   Btrcngth  is   of  the  snmo  description,  and   we   c:i!i 


ΐΛΧΧί.,  LXMii.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  49 

quickly  reach  our  destination  in  each  case.  I>ut  npjainst  men 
who  Hvo  in  a  country  far  away,  and  besides  arc  most  skillful  hy 
sea,  and  mo^t  excellently  provided  Avith  every  thintr  else,  wilh 
riches,  both  private  and  public,  and  ships,  a!»d  horses,  and 
heavy-armed,  and  a  crowd  of  irregulars,  such  as  there  is  not  in 
any  ono  Grecian  town  beside,  and  moreover,  Iiavo  many  allies 
under  payment  of  tribute ;  how  can  it  Ικ)  right  to  dcclaro  war 
rashly  against  these  men  ?  and  in  what  do  Λνο  trust,  that  \so 
should  hurry  on  to  it  unprepared  1  Is  it  in  our  ships  ?  Nay, 
wo  aro  inferior  to  them  :  but  if  Λνο  shall  practice  and  ])reparo 
airainst  them,  time  ΛνίΙΙ  pass  in  the  interval.  Well  then,  is  it  i:i 
our  money? .  Nay,  but  Λνο  arc  still  moro  deficient  in  tliis,  and 
neither  ]\Λνα  it  in  the  public  treasury,  nor  readily  contribute  it 
from  our  private  funds. 

81.  '*  Perhaps  some  one  might  feel  confident  because  we  cx- 
("l  them  in  heavy-ai7neaNtroo[i^  find  in  numbers,  so  that  Λνο 
might  invade  and  ravage  their  land.  But  they.  Ικίλο  other  land 
in  abundance  over  Λvhich  they  rule,  and  will  import  vfhiit  they 
want  by  sea.  If,  again,  Λνο  shall  attempt  to  make  their  allies 
revolt  from  them,  Λνο  shall  have  to  tussist  these  also  with  ships, 
as  they  aro  generally  islanders.  What  then  λυΙΙΙ  be  tho  charac- 
ter of  our  war  ?  For  if  Λνο  do  not  eithef  conquerthem  by  sea, 
or  take  aΛvay  the  reΛ'enues  with  Λνίποΐι  they  maintain  their  fleet,, 
Λνο  shall  receive  the  greater  damage  ;  and  at  such  α  time  it  will 
no  longer  even  bo  honorable  to  make  j)eace  ;  especially  if  λλό 
arc  thought  to  have  begun  tho  quarrel  moro  than  they.  For 
let  us  now.  not  bo  buoyed  up  with  this  hope,  at  any  rato,  that 
the  ΛvaΓ  ΛνίΙΙ  soon  Ixi  ended,  if  we  ravage  their  land.  Kathcr 
do  Ϊ  fear  that  Λνο  should  bequeath  it  ΟΛ'οη  to  our  children  :  so 
I-robablo  is  it  that  tho  Athenians  would  neither  be  cnslaΛτd'  in 
spirit  to  their  land,  nor,  liko  inexperienced  men,  be  panic- 
stricken  by  tho  war. 

82.  "I  do  not,  however,  on  the  other  handj  tell  you  to  permit 
them  without  noticing  it,  to.  harm  our  allies,  and  not  to  detect 
ihem  in  plotting  against  us  ;  but  I  tell  you  not  to  take  up  arms 
nt  nresent.  but  to  send  and  remonstrate ;  neither  showing  too 
violent  signs  of  war,  nor  yet  that  wo  will  put  up  with  their 
rondact ;  and  in  tho  mean  time  to  completo  our  own  prepara- 
tions also,  both  by  bringing  over  allies,  whether  Greeks  or  bar- 

*  Co*nparo  ΙΓ.  CI.  3.     ^ονλοί  γύο  φ(ϋ)νημα  τΰ  αίφνίύυην,  κ.  τ,  λ. 
3 


50  THUOYDIDEa  I.  [urzziii.,  Lzzzir. 

barinns,  from  whatever  sourco  wo  fihall  recoivo  mlditional 
Btrongth,  eitlior  in  ships  or  in  money ;  (for  all  who,  like  us,  arc 
plotted  against  bv  the  Athenians,  may  without  Oilium  save  them^ 
belves  by  accepting  tlie  aid  not  only  of  Oreeks,  but  of  barbari- 
ans also);  and  at  the  same  time  let  us  bring  out  our  own  re- 
Hources.  And  if  they  listen  at  all  to  our  embassadors,  this  is 
the  best  conclusion ;  b\it  if  not,  after  an  intcirval  of  two  or  three 
yeare,  we  shall  then  go  against  them,  if  we  think  fit,  in  a  better 
state  of  defense.  And  pi}rhaj)s  when  they  then  saw  our  ρπ'- 
paration,  and  our  language  s|K'aking  in  accordance  with  it,  they 
might  bo  more  disposed  to  yield,  while  they  had  their  land  as 
yet  unravaged,  and  >vere  deliberating  about  good  things  still 
enjoyed  by  them,  and  not  yet  sacrificed.  Vtw  in  their  land  con- 
Ficlcr  that  you  have  nothing  else  but  a  hostage  ;  and  the  moro 
tjo,  the  better  it  is  cultivate(l.  'You  should  therefore  spare  it  as 
long  as  jK)ssible,  and  not,  through  having  redu(;ed  them  to 
ilesperation,  find  them  the  more  diilicult  to  suIkIuc.  For  if  we  are 
hurried  on  by  the  complaints  of  our  allies,  and  ravage  it  while 
we  are  unprepared,  see  that  we  do  not  come  off  in  a  manner 
more  disgraceful  and  jierplexing  to  the  l*eloponnese  [than  λυο 
should  wish].'  For  complaints,  both  of  states  and  individuals, 
it  is Jiiipossible  to  settle  :  but  Avhen  all  together  have,  for  their 
,own  separate  interests,  undertaken  a  >var,  of  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  know  how  it  Λνίΐΐ  go  on,  it  is  not  easy  to  eftect  a  credit- 
:iblo  arrangement. 

83.  "And  let  no  one  think  it  shows  a  want  of  courage  for 
many  not  to  advance  at  once  against  one  state.  For  they  too 
have  no  fewer  allits  who  pay  them  tribute;'  and  war  is  not  so 
much  a  thing  of  arms  as  of  money,  by  means  of  >vhich  arnjs 
are  of  service ;  cs|x^cially  in  the  case  of  continental  against 
maritime  powers,  i^et  us  first  then  j»rovide  ourselves  with  this, 
ami  not  ho  excited  btiforehand  by  the  si>ceches  of  the  allies ; 
but  as  we  shall  have  the  greater  part  of  the  responsibility  for 
the  consequences  either  way,  so  also  let  us  quietly  take  a  view 
of  them  beforehand. 

84.  "  And  as  for  the  slowness  aad  dilatoriness  which  they 
most  blame  in  us,  be  not  ashamed  of  them.  For  by  hurrj-ing 
[to  Ix'gin  the  war]  you  would  be  the  moro  slow  in  finishing  it, 
because  you  took  itin.hand  when  unprepared  :  and  at  the  same 

•  Or  tho  cotnparativo  may  perhaps  bo  used  for  tlio  positive. 

a  These  words  are  unlij  apj[)licablu  iv  tlio  allies  of  tho  Atheniant. 


ΐΛΧχν.]  TIIUCTDIDES.  I.  51 

timo  we  always  enjoy  a  city  that  is  free  and  most  glorious ;  and 
it  is  ft  wiso  moderation  tliat  ran  best  constitute  this.  For  owing 
to  it  wc  alone  do  not  grow  insolent  in  suceess,  and  yield  less 
than  others  to  misfortunes.  Wo  are  not  excited  by  the  pleas- 
ure afforded  by  those  who  >vith  praise  stimulate  us  to  dangers 
contrary  to  our  conviction  ;  and  if  any  one  provoke  us  with  ac- 
<usati<>n,  wc  are  not  the  more  prevailed  on  through  being  thus 
nnnoycd.  AVe  are  both  warlike  and  wiso  through  our  orderly 
ttinpcr :  warlike,  because  shame  partakes  \cTy  largely  of  moder-  . 
at  ion,  and  courage  of  shamr ;  and  wise,  because  wo  aro  , . 
brought  up  with  no"  little  Ici^rning  to  despise  the  laws,  and  /  -b^ro 
with  too  severe  a  self-control  to  disobey  them  ;  and  aro  not 
i>v('r-clcver  in  useless  things,  so^thati^hilo  in  word  wo  might 
ably  find  fault  with  our  enemies'  resources,  we  should  not  go 
MLTainst  them  so  well  in  deed;*  but  aro  tiught  to  think  that 
our  neighbor's  j)lans,'  and  the  chances  which  befall  in  war, 
are  very  similar,  as  things  not  admitting  of  nice  distinction  in 
innirungo.  But  we  always  provide  in  deed  against  our  adver- 
saries with  the  expectation  of  their  planning  well  ;  and  must 
not  rest  our  hopes  on  the  probability  of  their  blundering,  but 
•  n  the  belief  of  our  own  taking  cautious  forethought.  Again, 
^vo  .«houM  not  think  that  one  man  differs  much  from  another, 
]^!t  that  ho  is  the  best  who  is  educated  in  the  most  necessary 
iMngs, 

85.  "These  practices  then,  which  our  fathers  bequeathed  to 
i:<,  and  which  Λνο  have  always  retained  with  benefit,  let  us  not 
:rivo  up,  nor  determine  hurriedly,  in  the  short  space  of  a  day,. 
about  maqy  lives,  and  riches,  and  states,  and  honors,  but  let 
us  do  it  calmly;  as  we  may  do  more  than  others,  on  account  of 
our  power.  And  send  to  the  Athenians  respecting  Potidaca, 
and  send  respecting  those  things  in  which  the  allies  say  they 
are  injured ;  especially  as  they  are  ready  to  submit  to  judicial 
decision ;  and  against  the  party  w  hich  offers  that,  it  is  not  right 
to  proceed  as  against  a  guilty  one.     But  prepare  for  war  at  tho 

»  Or,  "should  not  bo  well  follow  up  our  words  with  deeds."  Tho  fol- 
lowing inflnitlvo  νόμιζαν  depends  upon  ιταιΛ(νόμινοι  understood  Again. 

'  I  havo  followed  tho  punctuation  and  interpretation  of  Goller  and 
Arnold  in  their  last  edition  ;  though  not  with  ft  perfect  conviction  of  its 
'  orroctness,  as  I  doubt  whether  tho  rt  hna  any  place  before  τταρηττληηί^ς 
".•ί  taken  in  this  senso.  But  eco  OoUer's  note.  According  to  Haack 
;in(l  Poppo  it  would  bo,  "thnt  otir  neighbors'  plans  nro  very  Bimilar  to 
<' if  owu,  and  that  tho  chances  of  war,"  etc. 


62  TnucnrDIDES.  ι.  (Lixxn.,  Lxzxrii, 

same  time.  For  iu  this  you  will  determino  both  what  is  best, 
and  what  ie  most  formidablo  to  your  adversaries."  Archidamu» 
Bpoko  to  this  effect ;  but  Sthenelaidas,  who  was  one  of  tho 
cphors  at  that  time,  camo  forward  last,  and  ipoko  before  tho 
Laccdasmonians  as  follows. 

8β,  **  As  for  tho  lon<]f  speech  of  tho  Athenians,  I  do  not  un- 
derstand it ;  for  though  they  praised  themselves  a  great  deal, 
in  no  part  did  they  deny  that  they  aro  injuring  our  allies  and 
tho  Pelopounese.  And  yet  if  they  were  good  men  then  against 
tho  Medes,  but  are  bad  oncj*,  now  against  us,  they  deserve 
double  punishment  for  having  l)ecomc  bad  instead  of  good. 
But  we  are  the  same  both  then  and  now  ;  and  shall  not,  if  wo 
aro  wise,  overlook  our  allies'  being  injured,  nor  delay  to  assist 
them ;  for  there  is  no  longer  delay  in  their  being  ill-treatftl. 
Others  have  in  abundance  riches,  and  ships,  and  horses ;  but 
we  have  good  iillies,  whom  we  must  not  give  up  to  the  Atheni- 
ans, nor  decide  the  question  with  suits  and  Λvυrds,  while  it  is 
not  also  in  word  that  we  are  injured  ;  but  wo  must  assist  them 
with  speed  and  with  all  our  might.  And  let  no  ono  tell  m•• 
that  it  is  proper  for  us  to  deliberate  who  are  being  Avrongi'd. 
It  is  for  those  who  are  about  to  commit  tho  wrong  that  it  is 
much  moro  proper  to  deliborato  for  a  long  time.  Vote  then, 
Lacedaimonians,  for  war,  as  is  worthy  of  Sparta  ;  and  neith«T 
permit  tho  Athenians  to  beeonio  grcatiT,  nor  let  us  betray  our 
allies ;  but  with  tho  help  of  the  gods  let  us  proceed  against 
those  who  aro  wronging  them." 

87.  Having  spoken  to  this  effect  he  himself,  as  eplior,  put 
the  question  to  the  assembly  of  the  Licodajmonians.  As  they 
decide  by  acclamation  and  not  by  vote,  ho  said  that  he  did  not 
distinguish  on  which  side  the  acclamation  was  greater;  but 
wishing  to  instigate  them  the  moro  to  war'  by  their  openly  ex- 
pressing their  views,  he  said, ''  Whoever  of  you,  Lacedaemoni- 
ans, thinks  tho  treaty  to  have  been  broken,  and  tho  Athenians 
to  have  been  guilty,  let  liira  ''rise  and  go  yonder"  (pointing  out 
a  certain  place  to  tliem) ;  "and  whoever  does  not  think  so,  let 
him  go  to  tho  other  side."  They  arose  and  divided,  and  there 
was  a  large  majority  who  thought  that  tho  treaty  had  been 

*  Because  individuals  might  be  afraid  of  openly  opposing  tho  popular 
wish,  which  was  decidedly  for  tho  war. 

2  For  another  instance  of  a  compound  of  <orr//ii  used  in  the  saino  ρπ\ΐζ- 
naut  manner  as  άνιστητ^  is  here,  see  1.  101.  2.  ίς  ϊϋώμην  άπίστησαι: 


Lxxxvm.-xc.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  53 

hrokcn.  And  Imvincj  Rummoncd  the  allies,  they  told  them  that 
(heir  own  opinion  was  that  the  Athenians  were  in  the  wrong; 
but  that  they  wislied  to  summon  all  the  allies  also,  and  to  put 
it  to  the  vote ;  that  after  general  consultation  they  might  de- 
clare war,  if  they  thought  tit.  They  then,  after  having  settled 
this,  returned  home;  as  did  the  embassadors  of  the  Athenian» 
afterward,  >v]ien  they  liad  dispatched  the  business  they  had 
gone  on.  Tliis  decision  of  the  assembly,  that  the  treaty  had 
been  broken,  was  made  in  the  fourteenth  year  of  tho  continu- 
ance of  the  thirty  years*  truce,  which  had  been  concluded  after 
the  war  with  Eul  oea. 

88.  Now  the  Lacedaimonians  voted  that  (he  treaty  had  been 
l»rokcn,  and  that  war  should  bo  d^ared^  not  so  much  because 
tlii-y  were  convinced  by  tho  arguments  of  tho  allies,  as  becauso 
they.>*'ero  afraid  that  tlio  Athenians  might  attiin  to  greater 
]>ower,  socing  that  most  parta  of  Greece  wero  already  under 
their  hands, 

89.  For  it  was  in  tho  following  manner  that  the  Athoniann  / 
wero  brought  to  those  circumstances  under  which  they  increased  / 
their  power.  AVhen  the  Modes  had  retreated  from  Europe  after 
l)cing  con(|uered  both  by  sea  and  land  by  tho  Greeks,  and  thoso 
<»f  them  had  been  destroyed  Avho  had  fled  with  their  ships  to 
Mycale;  Leotychides,  king  of  the  Lacedaimonians,  who  was 
tho  leader  of  tho  Greeks  at  ^iycale,  returned  homo  with  tho 
allies  that  Λvero  with  tho  Pcloponnesc ;  while  the  Athenians^ 
and  tho  allies  from  Ionia  and  tho  Hellespont,  who  had  now  re- 
volted from  tho  king,  staid  behind,  and  laid  siogo  to  Scstos, 
of  which  tho  Modes  Λvero  in  possession.  Having  spent  tho 
winter  before  it,  they  took  it,  after  the  barbarians  had  evacu- 
ated it ;  and  then  sailed  away  from  the  Hellespont,  each  to  his . 
own  city.  And  tho  people  of  Athens,  Λvhen  they  found  tho 
barbarians  had  departed  from  their  country,  proceeded  immedi- 
ately to  carry  over  their  children  and  their  wives,  and  tho  rem- 
nant of  their  furniture,  from  Avhere  they  had  put  them  out  of 
the  way ;  and  wore  preparing  to  rebuild  their  city  and  their 
walls.  For  short  spaces  of  tho  inclosure  were  standing;  and 
though  tho  majority  of  the  houses  had  fallen,  a  few  remained; 
in  which  the  grandees  of  tho  Persians  had  themselves  taken  up 
their  quarters. 

90.  Tho  Lacedaimonians,  perceiving  what  they  were  about 
to  do,  sent  nn  embassy  [to  them]  ;  partly  because  they  them- 


54  THUOYDIDES.  I.  [xcu 

selves  would  have  been  more  ])len8cd  to  see  neither  them  nor  any 
one  else  in  poesession  of  a  wall ;  but  still  more  because  the  allies 
instigated  them,  and  were  afraid  of  their  numerous  fleet,  which 
before  they  had  not  had,  and  of  the  bravery  they  had  shown  in 
the  Median  war.  And  they  begged  them  not  to  build  their  walls, 
but  rather  to  join  them  in  throwing  down  those  of  the  citie» 
out  of  the  Peloponneso ;  not  betraying  their  real  wishes,  and 
their  suspicious  feelings  toward  the  Athenians ;  but  represeul-" 
iug  that  the  barbarian,  if  he  should  again  como  against  them, 
would  not  then  bo  able  to  make  his  advances  from  any  strong- 
hold, as  in  the  present  instance  he  hml  done  from  Thebes ;  and 
the  Peloponnese,  they  said,  >vas  sufficient  for  all,  as  a  place  to 
retreat  into  and  sally  forth  frum.     When  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  thus  spoken,  the  Athenians,  by  the  advice  of  ThendstocK  s, 
answered  that  they  would  send  embassadors  to  them  concerning 
what  they  sjM)ke  of;  and  immediattly  dismissed  them.     And 
Themistocles  advised  them  to  send  himself  as  quickly  as  po^^si- 
bie  to  Lacediemon,  and  having  chosen  other  embassadors  U•• 
sides  himself,  not  to  disj)atch  them  imuicdiately,  but  to  wait  till 
such  time  as  they  should  have  raised   their  Λναΐΐ  to  the  height 
most  absolutely  necessary  for  lighting  from  ;  and  that  the  whole 
population  in  the  city,  men,  women,  and  children,  should  buiiil 
it,  sparing  neither  private  nor  public  cditice,  from  which  any 
assistance  toward   the  work  would  be  gained,   but  throwing 
down  every  thing.     After  giving  these  instructions,  and  sug- 
gesting that  he  would  hiniself  manage  all  other  matters  there, 
he  took  his  departure.     On  his  arrival  at  Laceda'uion  he  did 
not  apply  to  the  authorities,  but  kept  putting  oft*  and  making  ex- 
cuses.  And  Avheuever  any  of  those  who  were  in  office  asked  him 
Λvhy  ho  did  not  come  before  the  assembly,'  he  said  that  he  was 
Availing  for  his  colleagues ;  that  owing  to  some  engagement  they 
had  been  left  behind  ;    he  expected,  however,  that  they  would 
shortly  come,  and  wondered  tliat  they  were  not  already  there. 
01.    When    they    heard   this,    they  believed    ThemistocKs 
through  their  friendship  for  him;  but  Avhen   every  one  els<•^ 

»  Or,  "about  his  not  coming,"  according  to  ArnoUl,  wlio  objects  to  tlu» 
eonunou  luodo  of  cxpluniitiou,  by  undcrstandinK  (hu  bdbro  art. 

"  t.  <'.,  thoso  who  camo  from  Athens,  and  could  thcrcforo  speak  to  tho 
fact.  Κατηγ()ΐ)υίη>τυι>  is  thought  by  sonic  to  Uican,  *'  charging  him  with 
tliofact;"  but  with  thai  signitication  it  would  require  a  genitive  ca.^o 
after  it  (e,  g.,  ch.  95.  7.),  and  oa  none  is  expressed,  I  havo  preferred  tjuiiug 
it  in  tho  more  general  sense. 


xcii.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  55 

came  and  distinctly  informed  them  that  the  walls  were  build- 
inaj,  and  already  advancing  to  some  height,  they  did  not  know 
hovr  to  discredit  it.     When  he  found  this,  he  told  them  not  to 
bo  ied  away  by  talcs,  but  rather  to  send  men  of  their  own 
body  who  were  of  good  character,  and  would  bring  back  a  cred- 
ible report   after   inspection.      They  dispatched   them   there- 
fore ;  and  Themistocles  secretly  sent  directions  about  them  to 
the  Athenians,  to  detain  thorn,  with  as  little  appearance  of  it 
;w  possible,  and  not  to  let  them  go  until  they  themselves  had 
rcturne  I  back;   (for  by  this  time  his  colleagues,  Abronychu», 
the  son  of  Lysicles,  and  Aristidcs,  the  son  of  Lysimachus,  had 
also  como  to  him  with  tlio  news  that  the  wall  was  sufficiently 
advanced) ;  for  ho  was  afraid  that  the  tacedaimonians,  when 
tlicy  heard  the  truth,  might  not  then  let  them  go.     So  tho 
Athenians  detained  tho  embassadors,  as  was  told  them ;   and 
Tliemistoeles,  having   come  to  an  audience   of  tho    Laeefla?.- 
monians,  then  indeed  told  them  plainly  that  their  city  wiw 
already  walled,  so  as  to  bo  capable  of  defending  its  inhabit• 
ants;  and  if  the  Lacedaimonians  or  tho  allies  wished  to  send 
any  embassy  to  them,  they  should  in  future  go  as  to  men  who 
could  discern  what  were  their  own  and  tho  general  interests. 
Foi  when  they  thought  it  bettor  to  abandon  their  city  and  to 
go  on  board  their  ships,  they  said  that  they  had  made  up  their 
minds,  and  had  tho  courage  to  do  it,  without  consulting  them ; 
and  again,  on  whatever  matters  they  liad  delilxirated  with  them, 
they  had  shown  themselves  inferior  to  none  in  judgment     And 
so  at  the  present  time,  likewise,  they  thought  it  was  better  that 
their  city  should  have  a  wall,  and  that  it  ΛνοηΗ  be  more  cxi>edi- 
ent  for  their  citizens  in  particular,  as  well  as  for  tho  allies  in 
general ;   for  it  was  not   possible  for  any  one  without  equal 
resources  to  give  any  equal  or  fair  advico  for  tho  common 
good.     Either  all  therefore,  he  said,  should  join- the  confe<^l- 
cracy  without  walls,  or  they  should  consider  that  the  present 
case  also  was  as  it  ought  to  be. 

92.  Tho  Lacedaimonians,  on  hearing  this,  did  not  let  their 
anger  appear  to  tho  Athenians;  (for  they  had  not  sent  their 
embassy  to  obstruct  their  designs,  but  to  offer  counsel,  they 
said,  to  their  state ;)'  and  besides,  they  were  'at  that  time  on 
very  friendly  terms  with  them  owing  to  their  zeal  against  tho 

I  Or,  as  tho  scholiast  explains  it,  "for  tho  good  of  tUoir  state ;**  which 
.is  adopted  by  Arnold. 


00  THUCYDiDKa  L  [xciii.,  XCTT. 

Mede) ;  in  secret,  however,  they  were  annoyed  at  failing  in  their 
wieh.  So  the  embassadors  of  each  state  returned  homo  without 
any  complaint  being  made. 

03.  In  tliis  way  the  Athenians  Availed  their  city  in  a  short 
time.  And  the  building  still  shows  even  now  that  it  was  exe- 
cuted in  haste;  for  the  fuundatious  are  laid  with  stones  of  all 
kinds,  and  in  some  places  not  wrought  together,  but  as  the 
several  parties  at  anytime  brought,  them  to  the  spot:  and 
many  columns  from  tombs,  and  wrought  stones,  were  workcil 
up  in  them.  For  the  inclosure  of  the  city  was  carried  out  to 
a  greater  extent  on  every  side ;  and  for  this  reason  they 
hurried  on  the  Avork,  removing  every  thing  alike.  Themis- 
tocles  also  j)ersuaded  them  to  build  the  remjuning  Avails  of  the 
PirjEus  (they  hiul  been  begun  by  him  before,  at  the  time  ot' 
his  office  as  archon,  wliich  ho  had  held  for  a  year  over  the 
Athenians),  thinking  that  the  site  was  a  fine  one,  as  it  con- 
tained three  natural  harbors ;  and  that  by  becoming  a  naval 
people  they  would  make  a  great  advance  toward  the  acqui- 
sition of  power.  For  he  was  tlie  first  who  ventured  to  tell  them 
that  they  nmst  apply  closely  to  the  sea ;  and  ho  began  inmie- 
diately  to  assist  in  paving  the  way  for  their  empire.  It  was 
by  his  alvice  that  they  built  the  walls  of  that  thickness  which 
is  still  seen  round  the  rineus ;  for  two  wagons  meeting 
each  other  brought  up  the  stones.  And  in  the  inside  there 
was  neither  rubble  nor  mortar,  but  large  and  square-cut  stones 
wrought  together,  clamped  on  the  outside  with  iron  and  lea•!. 
•Dut  only  about  half  of  the  height  he  intended  AViis  finislu'd. 
For  ho  wished  by  their  great  dimensions  and  thickness  to  keep 
olf  the  atUicks  of  their  enemies  ;  and  thought  that  the  protet  - 
tion  of  a  few,  antl  those  the  least  efficient  troops,  would  be 
sufficient,  Avhile  the  rest  would  go  on  l»oard  their  ships.  For 
to  the  navy  ho  paid  the  greatest  attention ;  seeing,  I  suppose, 
that  the  aj)proach  of  the  king's  forces  against  them  was  easier 
by  sea  than  by  land :  and  he  consitlered  the  I'iraius  more  serv- 
iiteable  than  the  upper  city,  an<l  often  advised  the  Athenians, 
in  case  of  their  ever  being  hard  jjiessed  by  land,  to  go  down 
into  it,  and  defy  the  world  with  their  navy.  Thus  then  the 
Athenians  were  inclosed  with  walls,  and  began  to  furnish 
themselves  wiih  other  buiKlings  immediately  alter  the  retreat 
of  the  Modes.  ' 

04.  Now  Pausaniiis,  the  sou  of  Cleombrotus,  was  sent  out 


scv.,  xcvi.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  67 

from  Lacodflpmon  as  general  of  tho  Greeks  with  twenty  sliipa 
from  the  Peloponnese ;  there  sailed  with  him  also  the  Athenians 
\vith  thirty  ships,  and  a  large  number  of  the  other  allies.  And 
they  made  an  expedition  against  Cyprus,  and  subdued  tho 
^rreater  part  of  it;  and  afterward  against  Byzantium,  of  which 
tlio  Medes  were  in  possession,  and  reduced  it  during  this  period 
of  his  command, 

95.  But  when  ho  was  now  acting  with  violen(!o,  tho  rest  οί 
the  Greeks  wcro  offended,  and  especially  tho  lonians,  and  such 
as  had  lately  been  liberatod  from  tho  kingj  and  going  to 
the  Athenians,  they  begged  them  to  become  their  leiiders,  o:. 
tho  ground  of  their  relationship ;  and  not  to  overlook  it  in 
Tausanias,  if  in  any  case  ho  should  treat  them  with  violence. 
Tho  Athenians  received  their  proposals,  and  attended  to  them 
with  a  determination  not  to  overlook  it,  and  to  settle  all  other 
matters  as  might  seem  best  to  them.  At  this  timo  th> 
Lacednemonians  sent  for  Pausanias,  to  bring  him  to  account 
for  what  they  had  heard  of  him;  for'  many  charges  were 
brought  against  him  by  the  Greeks  who  camo  to  them ;  and 
it  appeared  to  bo  an  imitation  of  a  tyranny,  rather  than  the 
command  of  a  general.  It  happened  that  ho  was  summoned 
at  tho  very  timo  tho  allies,  through  their  hatred  of  him,  went 
over  and  ranged  themselves  with  tho  Athenians,  except  tho 
soldiers  from  the  l*eloponncse.  So  when  ho  camo  to  Lacc- 
dcTBmon,  lio  was  censured  for  tho  >vrongs  ho  had  done  to  any 
one  individually ;  but  was  acquitted,  as  not  guilty,  on  tho  heav- 
iest charges.  (lie  was  especially  accused  of  medizing,  and 
it  appeared  to  bo  most  clearly  established).  Ilim  they  sent 
out  no  moro  as  commander,  but  Dorcis  and  some  othore  with 
him,  with  no  great  number  of  troops ;  but  the  allies  would  no 
longer  give  up  tho  command  to  them.  On  finding  this,  they 
returned ;  and  tho  Liced.Tmonians  sent  out  no  others  after 
them ;  fearing ,  that  they  might  find  thoso  who  went  abroad 
becoming  corrupted,  just  as  they  saw  in  tho  case  of  Pausanias ; 
and  also  because  they  wished  to  bo  rid  of  the  Median  war, 
and  considered  tho  Athenians  competent  *to  take  tho  lead,  and 
well  disposed  toward  themselves  at  that  time, 

96.  The  Athenians  having  in  this  way  succeeded  to  tho 
command  at  tho  wish  of  tho  allies,  owing  to  their  hatred  of 
Pausanias,  arranged  which  of  the  states  wero  to  furnish  money 

•  Lltorollj,  "much  guilt  wag  laid  to  hia  chargo." 
3* 


58  THUOYDIDES.  I.  (xcvii.,  xcviii. 

against  the  barbarian,  and  which  of  them  shipe:   for  their 

{)retext  was  to  avenge  themselves  for  what  they  had  euffere^I, 
)y  ravaging  the  king^s  country.  .  And  the  office  of  treasurers- 
of-Greece  was  then  ffrst  established  by  the  Athenians;  who 
received  the  tribute,  for  so  the  coutribution-moaey  was  called. 
The  first  tribute  that*  was  fixed  was  400  talents.  Their 
treasury  was  at  Delos,  and  their  meetings  were  held  in  the 
temple. 

07.  Now  they  led  the  allies  at  first  as  possessing  independ- 
ence, and  deliberating  in  common  councils ;  and  executed,  both 
in  the  field  and  in  their  administration  of  affairs,  between  this 
Avar  and  the  Median,  the  following  undertakings;  which  were 
achieved  by  them  against  the  barbarian,  and  against  their  own 
innovating  allies,  and  thoso  of  the  Peloponnesians  >vho  from 
time  to  time  camo  in  contact  with  them  in  each  matter.  I  have 
written  an  account  of  these  events,  and  made  this  digression 
from  my  history,  because  this  subject  was  omitted  by  all  before 
me;  who  either  wrote  the  history  of  Greece  before  the  Median 
war,  or  of  that  war  itself:  and  llellanicus,  >vho  did  touch  on 
them  in  his  Attic  history,  mentioned  them  but  brieily,  and 
not  accurately  with  regard  to  their  chronology.  Besides,  they 
also  afford  '  an  opportunity  of  showing  in  Avhat  manner  the 
empire  of  the  Athenians  was  establisheiJ. 

98.  In  the  first  place,  Kion  on  the  Strymon,  of  whieh  the 
Medes  were  in  possession,  was  taken  by  them  after  a  siege, 
and  reduced  to  slavery,  under  the  couimand  of  Cimon,  the  son 
of  Miltiades.  lu  the  next  place,  Scyros,  the  island  in  the 
^gean  Sea,  which  was  inhabited  by  Dolopes,  >vas  reduced  to 
slavery,  and  colonized  by  themselves.  They  had  a  war  also 
with  the  Carystians,  without  the  rest  of  the  Eubceans  joining 
in  it;  and  iu  the  course  of  time  they  surrendered  on  conditions. 
With  the  Naxiaiis,  who  had  revolted,'  they  afterwi.rd  waged 
war,  and  reduced  them  after  a  siege ;  and  this  was  the  first 

'  For  Qu  explanation  of  i,\ei,  in  tho  sense  which  I  havo  horo  given  to 
it,  SCO  Gbllor's  noto  on  I.  .9.  2. 

*  This  IS  perhaps  too  strong  a  term  to  use  with  reforonco  to  this  early 
period  of  tho  Athenian  sway,  in  which  ά<>ίαταβΟαι  more  properly  signi- 
lie3  "Etandinir  aloof "  (or  "retiring"),  "from  tho  confederacy."  1  hav.^ 
used  it,  however,  for  tlie  sako  of  uniformity;  and  especially  as  it  is  ini- 
possiblo  to  fix  on  any  particular  part  of  tho  history,  at  which  tho  original 
verb  and  its  cognato  substantive  began  to  bo  used  in  tho  more  defluito 
and  full  meaning  which  they  had  gradually  acquired. 


xcix.-ei]  TIIUCYDIDES.   I,  59 

allied  city  that  was  subjufiratcd  contrary  to  the   agreement; 
tlicn  the  rest,  as  each  hapjK'ncd. 

99.  Now  there  wore  oilier  reasons  for  the  revolts,  but  tho 
principal  >vero  arreai*s  of  trihutc  and  ships,  and  failinjnr  (if 
any  did  κο)  in  military  eervioe ;  for  tho  Athenians  strictly 
exacted  these  things,  and  were  offensive,  by  using  com- 
pulsion to  men  who  were  neither  accustomed  nor  willing 
to  do  hard  Λvork.  In  some  other  respects  also  they  were  no 
longer  liked  in  their  government,  as  they  had  been ;  and  while 
Ihoy  did  not  join  in  the  service  on  an  equal  footing,  at  the  same 
time  it  Avas  easy  for  them  to  bring  to  subjection  those  who  re- 
volted. And  for  this  the  allies  themselves  were  to  blame ;  for 
owing  to  this  aversion  to  expeditions,  the  greater  part  of  them, 
to  avoid  Ixiing  away  from  home,  agreed  to  contribute  money 
instead  of  ships  as  their  quota  of  the  expense  ;  and  so  the  fleet 
of  tho  Athenians  was  increased  from  tho  funds  whicli  they  con- 
tributed, while  they  themselves,  whenever  they  revolted,  found 
themselves  unprepared  and  inexperienced  for  war. 

100.  After  this  was  fought  tho  battle  at  the  river  Eurymedon 
in  Pamphylia,  both  by  land  and  sea,  between  tho  Athenians 
and  their  allies  and  tho  Modes;  and  the  Athenians  >vero  vic- 
torious in  both  engagements  on  the  same  day,  under  the  com- 
inand  of  Cimon,  the  son  of  ^iiltiades ;  and  took  and  destroyed 
in  all  two  hundred  triremes  of  tho  Phoenicians.  Some  time 
after  it  liap|>ened  that  the  Thasiana  revolted  from  them,  Iiaving 
quarreled  about  the  marts  on  the  opposite  coast  of  Thrace 
and  the  mine  of  Avhich  they  Avcro  in  possession.  And  tho 
Athenians,  liaving  sailed  w\t\\  their  fleet  to  Thasos,  gained 
tho  victory  in  a  Fca-fight,  and  made  a  des<'ent  on  their  land. 
About  the  same  time  they  sent  ten  thousand  settlers  of  their 
own  citizens  and  tlio  allies  to  the  Strymon,  to  colonize  what 
was  then  called  the  Nine  Ways,  but  now  Amphipolis ;  and  they 
made  themselves  masters  of  the  Nine  Ways,  which  was  held 
by  tho  Edones ;  but  liaving  advanced  into  the  interior  of  Thrace, 
were  cut  oft*  at  Drabescus,  a  town  of  the  Edones,  by  the  united 
Thracians.  by  whom  the  settlement  of  tho  town  of  Nine  Ways 
was  regarded  with  hostility. 

101.  Tho  Thasians,  liaving  been  conquered  in  some  engage- 
ments, and  being  invested,  called  tho  Lacedaemonians  to  their 
iiid,  and  desired  that  they  would  assist  them  by  invading  Attica. 
They  promised  to  do  so,  without  letting  tho  Athenians  know, 


00  THUOYDIDEa  I  [cil 

and  intended  it ;  but  were  prevented  by  the  earthquake  which  . 
took  place ;  on  which  occabion  also  they  saw  the  Helots,  and 
the  Thuriana  and  Guthioans  amon^  the  PmcrciV  establish  thein- 
selvcs  iu  revolt  at  Ithonic'     Most  of  the  Helota  were  the  de- 
eccndanta  of  the  old  McssenianS'Who  were  enslaved  at  that  time 

twith  which  all  aro  acauainted  *] :  and  for  this  reason  the  whole 
lody  of  them  were  called  Messenians.  Λ  war  then  was  com- 
menced by  the  Lacedaemonians  aj]fain8t  those  in  Ithomo :  and 
the  Thasians  in  the  third  year  of  the  siege  came  to  terms  with 
the  Athenians,  throwing  down  their  wall,  and  delivering  up 
their  ships,  and  agreeing  both  to  pay  immediately  the  sum  of 
money  required,  and  to  pay  tribute  in  future,  and  suiTcndering 
their  mainland  towns  and  the  mine. 

102.  The  Lacedaimoniuns,  when  they  found  the  war  against 
those  in  Ithome  prolonged,  called  their  allies  to  their  aid,  and 
the  Athenians  also ;  λυΙιο  went  under  the  command  of  Cimou 
with  no  small  force.  They  asked  their  aid,  because  they  were 
considered  to  bo  skillful  in  conducting  sieges :  whereas  in  them- 
selves, from  the  siege  having  been  so  protracted,  thero^  seemctl 
to  bo  adeticieney  of  this  skill ;  for  else  they  would  liave  taken 
the  place  by  assiiult.  It  vvas  from  this  ex|W'dition  that  the  first 
open  quarrel  arose  between  the  Lacedicmonians  and  Athenians. 
For  the  Lacedicmonians,  when  the  place  was  not  taken  by 
Gtorm,  fearing  the  boldness  and  innovating  spirit  of  the  Athe- 
nians—and moreover  considering  that  they  were  of  a  different 
race  from  themselves — lest,  if  thoy  remained,  they  might  at  tlu» 
persuasion  of  those  in  Ithomo  attempt  some  revolution,  dis- 
missed them  alone  of  all  the  allies;  not  letting  their  suspicion 
appear,  but  saying  that  they  were  no  longer  in  any  need  t)f 
them.  The  Athenians,  however,  knew  that  they  were  dismissed, 
not  on  the  more  CiCditable  reason  assigned,  but  from  somo 
suspicion  having  arisen :  and  considering  it  hard  usage,  and 
not  thinking  that  they  deserved  to  bo  so  treated  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, immediately  on  their  return  they  broke*  off  the 
alliance  which  they  had  made  with  them  against  the  Mede, 
and  became  allies  of  the  Argives,  their  enemies.  The  same 
oaths  also  were  taken,  and  the  same  alliance  made  by  both 
with  the  Thessalianii. 

*  i.  e.  the  inhabitants  of  tho  districts  adjacent  to  the  capital ;  or  the 
dependent  Achaiau  pupulution  of  Laconia  in  general,  as  distinct  from  thoir 
Dorian  conquerors,  tlie  Spartans.  For  α  fuller  account  of  thora  see  Anioljn 
note,  and  Appendix  2.  *  Seo  noto  on  ch.  87.  •'. 

•  Tbeso  words,  expluuulory  of  tho  τότε,  aro  adopted  from  (jollcr. 


c!n.-C7.]  TnUCYDIDEa  I.  61 

103.  Tlioso  in  Ithome,  in  the  tenth  year,  when  they  could 
liold   out  no   longer,  surrendered   to  the  Lacedaemonians  on 
condition  of  their  going  out  of  the  Peloponucse  under  truce, 
and  never  setting  loot  on  it  again ;  and  that  if  any  one  λυογο 
cauglit  doing  bo,  ho  should  be  the  filave  of  liini  λυΙιο  caught 
him.    TI»o  Lacedaemonians  had  also  before  this  η  Pythian  re- 
sponse mailo  to  them,  "to  let  go  the^uppliant  of  Jupiter  at 
Ithome."     So  they  went  out,  themselves  and  their  cnildren, 
and  their  wives;    and  the  Athenians  received  them,  on  the 
strength  of  the  hatred  they  now  felt  for  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  settled  them  at  Naupactus,  which  they  had  lately  taken 
frotn  the   Locri   Ozolae   who  held  it     The   Megareans  also 
came  over  into  alliance  with  the  Athenians,  having  revolted 
from  the  Lacedaemonians,  because  the  Corintliians  were  press- 
ing them  with   war  about  the  boundaries  of  their  terntor}'. 
And  the  Athenians  received  possession  of  Megara  and  Pegne, 
and  built  for  the  Mossenians  the  long  walls  from  the  city  to• 
Nisaea,  and   themselves   manned  them.     And   it  was   chiefly 
from  this  that  their  excessive  hatred  of  the  Athenians  first 
began  to  be  felt  by  the  Corinthians. 

104.  Now  Tnarus,  the  son  of  Psnmmetichus,  the  Libyan 
king  of  the  Lil)yans,  bordering  on  Egypt^  having  his  head- 
quarters at  Maracji,  the  city  above  Pharos,  caused  the  greater 
part  of  Egypt  to  revolt  from  king  Artaxerxes,  and  being 
iiimself  made  ruler  of  it,  invited  the  Athenians  to  his  aid. 
They,  happening  to  be  euiraged  in  an  exhibition  against  Cy- 
pnis  with  two  hundred  ships  of  their  own  and  of  the  allies, 
left  Cyprus  and  came  to  him  ;  and  having  sailed  up  from  the 
sea  into  the  Nile,  and  being  masters  of  the  river  and  two 
thirds  of  Memphis,  proceeded  to  liostilities  against  the  third 
division,  which  is  called  the  White-castle,  and  in  which  were 
those  of  the  Persians  and  Modes  who  had  flod  there  for  ref- 
uge, and  those  of  the  Egj'ptians  who  had  not  joined  in  the 
revolt. 

105.  The  Athenians,  having  with  their  fleet  made  a  descent 
on  llaliac,  had  η  battle  with  the  Corinthians  and  Epidaurians, 
and  the  Corinthians  gained  the  victory.  Afterward  the 
Athenians  hail  a  sea-fight  with  the  fleet  of  the  Peloponnesiane 
off  Cecryphalea,  and  the  Athenians  gained  the  victory.  After 
this,  war  having  been  commenced  bv  the  Athenians  on  the 
.-.'Eginotans,  α  great  sea-fight  took  place  off  .^E^na,  between 


02  THUCYDIDEa  L  [ovi.,ovii. 

tho  Atheniane  and  the  JB^netans,  and  the  allies  were  present 
on  both  sides;  and  the  Atlieniaus  gained  the  victory,  and 
having  taken  seventy  of  their  ships,  made  a  descent  on  the 
country,  and  besieged  them,  under  tlie  command  of  Leocrates, 
the  son  of  Stra^bus.  Then  the  Poloponnesians,  wishing  to  as- 
sist tlio  iEginetans,  sent  over  to  .^Egina  three  hundred  heavy- 
anned,  who  were  before  auxiliaries  of  the  Corinthians  and 
Epidauriaus.  And  the  Corinthians  with  their  allies  seized 
the  heights  of  Geranea,  and  inarched  down  into  the  Megari*!, 
thinking  that  the  Athenians  would  bo  unable  to  succor  the 
Megareans,  while  a  large  force  was  absent  at  ΛΙφηΛ  and  in 
Egypt ;  but  that  if  they  did  assist  them,  they  would  raise  tho 
siege  of  -^gina.  The  Athenians,  however,  did  not  remove 
the  army  that  was  at  -Ai^ina,  but  the  oldest  and  tho  youngest 
of  those  who  had  been  left  behind  in  the  city  came  to  Megara 
under  the  command  of  Myronides.  After  an  indecisive  bat- 
tle had  been  fought  with  the  Corinthiahs,  they  separated,  each 
bide  thinking  that  they  had  not  hiul  tho  >vorst  in  the  action. 
And  the  Athenians  (for  they  notwithstiinding,  had  tho  advan- 
tiige  rather  [than  their  oj»ponents])  on  the  departure  of  tin• 
Corinthians  erected  a  tropliy ;  but  tho  Corinthians,  King  re- 
proached by  the  elder  men  in  the  city,  made  preparations  for 
about  twelve  days  after,  and  Avent  out  and  j)roceeded  to  set  up 
a  counter-tropliy  on  their  side  also,  as  having  been  victorious. 
And  the  Athenians,  having  sullied  out  from  Megara,  cut  to 
jiieces  those  who  were  erecting  the  trophy,  and  engaged  and 
defeated  the  rest. 

106.  Tho  conquered  forces  commenced  a  retreat ;  and  a 
considerable  division  of  them  being  hard  pressed  and  having 
missed  their  way,  rushed  into  a  held  belonging  to  a  j)rivate 
person,  Λvhich  had  a  deep  trench  inclosing  it,  and  there  w.is 
no  road  out.  The  Athenians,  ])erceiving  this,  hemmed  them 
in  with  heavy-armed  in  front,  and  having  i)laced  their  light- 
armed  all  round,  stoned  to  death  all  who  had  gone  in  ;  and 
this  was  a  severe  blow  ^or  the  Corinthians.  The  main  body 
of  their  army  returned  liome. 

107.  About  this  time  the  Athenians  began -also  to  build 
their  long  walls  down  to  iho  sea,  both  that  to  Phalerus,  and 
that  to  riruius.     And  the  Phociuns  having  marched  against 

'  ».  β.  Notwithstanding  tho  claim  to  it  maJo  by  tho  Corintluana. 


cviii.]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  .  63 

tho    Dorians,  iho    mother-country    of    tho    Lacedremoninns, 
[whoRO  tJ5wns  were]  Boeum,  and  ('itiniura,  and  Erineum,  and 
having  t'ikcn  one  of  thtso  places,  tho   Lacedaemonians  under 
the  command  of  Nieoniedes,  tho  son  of  Cleombrotus,  in  tho 
stead  of  Pleistoanax,  son  of  Pausanias,  who  ΛVas  yet  a  minor, 
wont  to  the  aid  of  tlio  Dorians  with  fifteen  hundred  heavy- 
armed  of  their  own,  and  ten  thousand  of  tho  allies  ;  and  having 
(ompelled  the  Phocians  to  restore  tho  town  on  certain  condi- 
tions, they  proceeded  to  return  back.     Now  by  sea,  if  they 
should  wish  *o  cross  over  tho  Crissican  Gulf,  the  Athenians 
wero  ready  to  stop  them,  having  sailed  round  with  a  fleet : 
while  tho  march  over  Geranea  did  not  appear  safe  for  them, 
.'IS   the  Atheniai)8  wero  in  possession  of  Mogara  and  I'ega;. 
For  Geranea  was  both  [naturally]  difficult  to  cross,  and  was 
continually  guarded  by  the  Athenians  :  and  at  that  time  they 
knew  they  were  going  to  stop  them  that  May,  as  well   [as 
by  seaj.     So  they  determined  to  wait  in  lioeolia,  and  seo  in 
what  way  they  might  march  across  more  safely.     They  wero 
also  in  some  measure  urged  to  this  in  secret  by  certain  of 
the  Athenians,  who  hoped  to  put  a  stop  to  tho  democracy,  and 
to  the  long  walls  that  wero  building.     But  tho  Athenians  sal- 
lied out  against  them  Λvith  all  their  citizens,  and  a  thousand 
Argives,   and   the   several    contingents   of    tho    other    allies, 
amounting  in  all  to  fourteen  thousand.     They  marched  against 
them  because  they  thought  they  were  at  a  loss  how  to  effect 
a  passage,  and  in  some  measure  also  from  a  suspicion  of  tho 
democracy  being  put  down.     The  Athenians  Λvere  also  joined, 
in  accordance  with  tho  treaty,  by  a  thousand  liorso  of  tho 
Thessalians,  who  Avent  over  during  tho  action  to  tho  Lace- 
dicmonians. 

108.  A  battle  liaving  been  fought  at  Tanagra  in  Bocotia, 
tho  Lacedtcmonians  and  their  allies  were  victorious,  and  thero 
was  much  bloodshed  on  both  sides.  And  tho  Laccdrcmonians, 
after  going  into  tho  Megarid,  and  cutting  down  the  fruit  trees, 
returned  back  homo  across  Geranea  and  tho  isthmus:  whilo 
the  Athenians,  on  the  sixty-second  day  after  tho  battle,  march- 
ed, under  tl»o  command  of  Myronides,  against  tho  Boeotians, 
and  having  defeated  them  at  an  engagement  at  CEnophyta, 
made  themselves  masters  of  the  country  of  Bceotift  and 
I'hocis,  and  demolished  tho  wall  of  tho  Tanagrroans,  and 
took  from  tho  Opuntian  Locrians  their  richest  hundred  meo 


04  THUOYDIDKa  I.  [cir.,  ex. 

fi8  hostages,  and  finishod  their  own  lon|v  walls.  Tho  JSmnc- 
tiins  also  after  this  surrendered  on  condition  to  the  Athenians, 
demolishing  their  walls,  and  giving  up  their  ships,  and  agree- 
ing to  pay  tribute  in  future.  And  tho  Athenians  sailed  round 
tho  l*eloi)ouneso  under  tho  command  of  Tolmides,  tho  son  ot' 
Tolmaeus,  and  burned  tho  arsenal  of  tho  Lacedajmonians,  an»l 
took  Chalcis,  a  city  of  tho  Corinthians,  and  defeated  the 
Sicyonians  in  a  battle  during  a  descent  which  they  made  o:i 
their  land. 

109.  Tho  Athenians  in  Egypt  and  their  allies  were  still 
remaining  there,  and  hostilities  assumed  many  ditferent  phases 
with  them.  For  at  first  tho  Athenians  wero  masters  of 
Egypt ;  and  the  king  sent  Megabazus,  a  Persian,  to  Lacc- 
dajmon  with  a  sum  of  money,  that  he  might  causo  the  recoil! 
of  the  Athenians  from  Egypt  by  tho  Peloponnesians  being 
persuaded  to  invade  Attica.  But  Avhen  he  did  not  succeed, 
and  tho  money  was  being  spent  to  no  purpose,  Megabazus 
with  the  remainder  of  it  went  back  to  Asia;  and  ho  sent 
Megabyzus,  son  of  Zoj)yrus,  a  Persian,  with  a  largo  force; 
who,  having  arrived  by  Kind,  defeated  tho  Egyptians  and 
their  alHes  in  a  battle,  and  drove  tliO  Greeks  out  of  Mem- 
phis, and  at  last  shut  them  up  in  tho  island  of  Prosopis,  and 
besieged  them  in  it  a  year  and  six  months,  till  by  draining 
tho  canal  and  turning  olV  tho  water  by  another  course,  ho  left 
their  ships  on  dry  ground,  and  joined  most  of  the  island  to  the 
mainland,  and  crossed  over  and  took  it  on  foot.  * 

110.  Thus  tho  causo  of  the  (ireeks  was  ruined,  after  a 
Avar  of  six  years :  and  only  a  few  of  many  marched  through 
Libya  and  esiaped  to  Cyreno,  while  most  of  them  perished. 
So  Egypt  again  came  un<lcr  the  power  of  tho  king,  excepting 
Amyrtieus,  tho  king  in  the  marshes,  whom  they  could  not 
take  owing  to  the  extent  of  the  fen ;  and  besides,  tho  marsh- 
men  aro  tho  most  warlike  of  the  Egyptians.  As  for  Inarus, 
tho  king  of  tho  Libyans,  who  had  concocted  tho  whole 
business  respecting  Egypt,  he  was  taken  by  treachery  and 
crucified.  Moreover,  iilty  triremes  that  wero  sailing  to  Egypt 
from  Athens  luid  the  rest  of  tho  confederacy  to  relievo 
their  former  force,  put  in  to  shore  at  tho  Mendcsian  branch, 
knowing  nothing  of  what  ha<l  haj)penc<l :  and  tho  land  forces 
falling  on  them  from  the  shore,  and  the  fleet  of  tho  Pha?nicians 
by  sea,  destroyed  tho  greater  part  of  tho  ships :  tho  smaller 


ciL.cxiL]  TTIUCYDIDKS.  I..  05 

part  cwapod  back.    Thus  cndorl  the  great  expcilition  of  tlio 
Athenians  and  their  allies  to  Eirypt. 

111.  Now  Orestes,  son  of  E(^hecratidas,  kinjoj  of  the  Thcs- 
salianf^,  beincr  banished  from  Thessaly,  persuaded  tho  Athc- 
?iians  to  restore  him  :  and  takinp^  with  them  the  Boeotians  and 
Vhociaus,  >vho  were  their  allies,  tho  Athenians  marched 
ai^ainst  Pharsalus  in  Thessaly.  And  they  were  masters  of 
tiio  country,  as  far  as  they  could  bo  so  without  advancinnr  far 
from  their  camp'  (for  the  cavalry  of  tho  Thessalians  kept  them 
in  check),  but  did  not  take  tho  city,  nor  succeed  in  any  other 
of  tho  designs  witli  which  they  mndo  tho  expedition ;  but 
they  returned  with  Orestes  without  effecting  any  thing.  Not 
long  after  this,  one  thousand  Athenians  having  embarked  in 
tho  ships  that  were  at  Pegic  ^for  they  were  themselves  in 
possession  of  that  port),  coasted  along  to  Sicyon,  under  tho 
command  of  Pericles,  son  of  Xanthippus,  and  landed,  and  de- 
feated those  of  tho  Sicyonians  who  met  them  in  battle.  And 
immediately  taking  with  them  the  Aeha?ans,  and  sailing 
across,  they  turned  their  arms  against  OEniadai  in  Acarnania, 
and  besieged  it ;  they  did  not,  however,  take  it,  but  returned, 
home. 

112.  Subsequently,  after  an  inter\'al  of  three  years,  η  truco 
for  five  years  was  made  between  tho  Peloponnesians  and  Athe- 
nians. So  the  Athenians  ceased  from  prosecuting  the  war  in 
(ireece,  but  made  an  expedition  against  Cyprus  with  two  liun- 
dred  ships  of  their  own  and  of  the  allies,  under  tho  command 
i)f  Cimon ;  sixty  of  >vhicli  sailed  from  them  to  Egypt,  being 
sent  for  by  AmyrtiEUs,  tho  king  in  tho  marshes;  while  tho 
rest  luisieged  Citium,  Cimon  having  died,  and  there  being  a 
deartli  of  provisions,  they  retired  from  Citium  *,  and  while  sail- 
ing off  Salamis  in  Cyprus,  they  fought  both  by  sea  and  land  at 
the  same  timo  with  tho  Phoenicians  and  Siligians  ;  and  having 
ronqucred  in  botli  engagements,  returned  home,  and  with  them 
tho  ships  that  had  como  back  from  Egypt.  After  this,  tho 
Laceik'cmonians  waged  what  is  called  tho  sacred  war,  and 
having  taken  possession  of  tho  temple  at  Delphi,  gave  it  un  to 
tho  Delphians :  and  the  Athenians  again  afterward,  on  tlieir 

*  Literally,  "from  thcip  arms,''^  i,  «.,  tho  placo  whero  their  spears  and 
phielde  wero  piled. — Arnold  obsorvea  that  ό^τα  μή,  like  on  μί),  are,  ο/σ, 
etc.,  baa  grown  by  usage  into  α  complote  adverb,  so  as  to  have  lost  all 
tho  grammatical  oonstruction  which  6σα  would  require  αβ  an  adjective. 


■I  • 


60  ,  THUOYWDEa.  ί.  [cxia-cxv 

retinDg,  marched  nud  took  possession  of  it,  and  restored  it  to 
the  Phocians. 

113.  Some  time  having  elapsed  after  these  things,  tho 
Boeotian  exiles  being  in  possession  of  Orchomenus,  Cha^ronca, 
and  some  other  places  in  lUeotia,  the  Athenians,  under  the 
command  of  Tolmides,  son  of  Tolmajus,  marched  with  one 
thousand  heavy-armed  of  their  own  and  the  several  contin- 
gents of  the  allies,  against  these  places ;  for  (hey  were  hostile  to 
them.  Having  taken  Choerouea,  [and  reduced  it  to  elaverv/J 
they  >vero  retiring,  after  placing  a  garrison  in  it.  But  as  tluy 
were  on  their  march,  the  Boeotian  exiles  from  Orchomenus, 
and  with  them  some  Docrians  and  exiles  of  the  Eubceans, 
and  all  that  were  of  the  same  views,  attacked  them  at  Coro- 
naia,  and,  having  defeated  them  in  battle  slew  some  of  tlu» 
Athenians,  and  took  others  of  them  alive.  So  the  Atheni- 
ans evacuated  all  Boiotia,  having  made  jxiace  en  conditions  of 
recovering  their  men.  And  the  exiles  of  the  Baotians  were 
restored,  and  they  and  all  the  rest  became  indejMindent  «gain. 

114.  Not  long  after  this,  Eubtea  revolted  from  the  Athtr- 
liians ;  and  when  Pericles  had  already  crossed  over  to  it  with 
an  army  of  Athenians,  news  was  brought  him  that  Megarii 
had  revolted  ;  that  the  Peloponnesians  >vere  on  the  j)oint  of  in- 
vading Attica  ;  and  that  the  Athenian  garrison  had  been  put  to 
the  sword  by  the  Megareans,  except  as  many  as  had  esca|ied 
to  Nisa-'a.  Now  the  Megareans  had  revolted,  after  calling  to 
their  aid  the  Corinthians,  and  Sieyonians,  and  Kpidauriaiis. 
So  Pericles  took  the  army  back  from  Eubcea  as  quickly  as 
possible.  After  this  the  Pelopennesians  made  an  iiicui- 
ision  as  far  as  Eleusis  and  Thrium,  and  ravaged  the  country, 
under  the  command  of  IMeistoanax,  the  son  of  Pausanias,  king 
of  the  Lacedaimoniaus ;  and  without  advancing  any  further 
they  returned  homo.  And  the  Athenians  having  again  crossed 
over  to  Euboea  under  the  command  of  Pericles,  subdued  tin• 
Avhole  of  it,  and  settled  the  rest  of  the  island  by  treaty ;  but 
the  Ilistiaians  they  expelled  from  their  homes,  and  held  thv 
territory  themselves. 

115.  Having  returned  from  Euboea,  not  long  after  tluy 
made  a  truce  with  the  Lace<lienionians  and  their  allies  fur 
thirty    years,   giving    back    Nisaia,    IVga;,    Tra»zen,    Achaia  ; 

*  Γορρο  and  GuUcr  omit  tUeso  words ;  Bekkcr  and  Arnold  put  them 
in  brackets. 


cxvi.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  67 

f.»r  of  thcRO  places  in  tlio  reloponncso  the  Atlioniims  were 
ill  poseoRsion.  Now  in  tlio  sixth  year  a  Avar  broke  out  1)C- 
twcen  the  Samians  and  Milesians  about  Prieno;  and  the  Mi- 
K'sians  bein«i  worsted  in  the  war  went  to  the  Athenians,  and 
riiised  an  outcry  against  the  Samians;  some  private  individuals 
from  Sanios  itself  taking  part  with  them,  from  a  wis^h  to 
<  llV'ct  a  revolution  m  tiio  government.  The  Athenians  thcro- 
f>ro  sailed  to  Samos  with  forty  ships,  and  established  a  de- 
mocracy; and  taking  as  hostages  from  the  Samians  fifty  boys 
and  as  many  men,  deposited  them  in  Lemnos,  and  after  leaving 
a  garrison  in  the  island,  Svithdrew.  But  the  exiles  of  the  Sa- 
mians (for  there  were  some  who  did  not  remain  in  the  islanil, 
but  fled  t>  the  continent)  having  made  arrangements  with  the 
most  j)Owerful  of  those  in  the  city,  and  an  alliance  with 
I'isuthnos,  the  son  of  Ilystaspes,  who  hail  the  satrapy  of  Sardis, 
at  that  time,  and  having  collected  auxiliaries  to  the  numlKir 
of  seven  hundred,  crossed  over  to  Samos  toward  night,  and  in 
the  first  place  rose  up  against  the  commons,  and  secured 
most  of  them;  then,  having  secretly  removed  their  hostages 
from  Lemnos,  they  revolted,  and  gave  up  to  Pisuthnes  tlio 
garrison  and  its  commanders  that  were  with  them,  and  imme- 
diately prepared  to  go  against  Miletus.  TIjo  Byzantines  also 
revolted  with  them. 

110.  The  Athenians,  when  they  were  aware  of  it,  sailed 
with  sixty  ships  for  Samos,  but  did  not  use  sixteen  of  them 
(for  some  were  gone  toward  Caria  to  look  out  for  the  IMicc- 
nician  fleet;  others  toward  Chios  and  Lesbos,  carrying 
about  orilers  to  bring  reinforcements);  witli  forty-four,  how- 
ever, under  the  command  of  Pericles  and  nine  others,  they 
fought  a  battle  near  the  island  of  Tragia  with  seventy  ships 
of  the  Samians,  twenty  of  which  were  transports  (they  all 
happened  to  be  sailing  from  Miletus),  and  the  Athenians  were 
victorious.  Afterward  there  came  to  them  a  reinforcement 
of  forty  ships  from  Athens,  and  five  and  twenty  from  Chios 
and  Lesbos ;  and  when  they  had  disembarked,  and  had  the 
superiority  in  land  forces,  they  invested  the  city  with  three 
walls,  and  l)lockaded  it  by  sea  at  the  same  time.  Then 
Pericles  took  sixty  ships  of  tho  blockading  squadron,  and 
went  as  quickly  as  possible  in  tho  direction  of  Caunus  and 
Caria,  news  having  been  brought  that  tho  Phoenician  fleet  wae 
Bailing  against  them:  for  thcro  had  also  gono  from  Samoe 


68  THUOYDIDE&  I.  [cxvu.,  cxvni. 

Stesa^ras  and  somo  othors  with  five  ehips  to  fetch  thoso  of 
the  rhoeuicians. 

117.  At  this  time  the  Saraiaus,  having  suddenly  sallied  out, 
fell  on  the  unprotected  camp,  and  destroyed  the  guard-ships, 
and  in  a  sea-iight  defeated  those  that  put  out  against  them, 
and  were  «lastera  of  the  sea  along  their  coasts  about  fourteen 
days,  carrying  in  and  out  what  they  pleased.  But  on  the  ar- 
rival of  Pericles  they  were  again  closely  blockiulod  by  the 
fleet.  Afterward  there  came  reinforcements,  of  forty  ships 
with  Thucydides,  llagnon,  and  Thormio,  and  twenty  with 
Tlepolenms  and  Anticlos,  from  Athens,  and  of  thirty  from 
Chios  and  Lesbos.  Against  these  the  Samians  fought  a 
short  battle  by  sea,  but  being  unable  to  hold  out,  were  re- 
duced in  the  ninth  month,  and  surrendered  on  conditions; 
dismantling  their  wall,  and  giving  hostagt'S,  and  delivering 
up  their  ships,  and  agreeing  to  j»ay  back  by  installments  the 
expenses  of  the  war.  The  Jiyzantines  also  agreed  to  bo  suIh 
■ject  as  before. 

118.  After  these  things,  though  not  many  years  later,  what 
wo  have  U'fore  narrated  now  took  place,  namely,  the  ntfair  of 
(/or(;yra,  and  that  of  lN)tida!a,  and  whatever  was  made  a  jne• 
text  tor  this  war.  All  these  things  that  the  Greeks  jierformi'd 
against  one  another  and  the  barbarian,  occurred  in  about 
fifty  years,  between  the  retreat  of  Xerxes  and  the  beginning  of 
this  war :  in  the  course  of  which  the  Athenians  established  their 
empire  on  a  firmer  footing,  and  themselves  advanced  to  a  great 
pitch  of  power ;  while  the  Lacediemonians,  though  they  jkt- 
ceived  it,  did  not  try  to  stop  them,  except  for  a  short  time,  but 
remained  quiet  the  gn^ater  part  of  the  period.  For  even  before 
this  they  were  not  quick  in  proceeding  to  hostilities,  unless  they 
were  compelled ;  and  to  a  certain  extent  also  they  were  hin- 
dered by  intestine  wars ;'  until  the  ]>owcr  of  the  Athenians  was 
clearly  rising  to  a  dangerous  height,  and  they  Λvero  encroach- 
ing on  their  confederacy.  Then,  however,  they  considered  it 
no  longer  endurable,  but  were  of  opinion  that  they  ought  with 
the  greatest  resolution  to  attack  their  power,  and  overthrow  it, 
if  they  could,  by  commencing  this  war.  Now  the  Lacedaiino-• 
nians  themselves  had  decided  that  the  treaty  had  been  broken, 
and  that  the  Athenians  were  guilty ;  but  they  sent  to  Delphi 
and  inquired  of  the  god,  whether  it  would  bo  better  for  them 

*  Πο  Bcoms  to  refer  especially  to  tho  revolt  of  tho  llelots. 


rxix.,cxx.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  69 

if  they  went  to  war :  and  ho  answered  them,  as  it  is  reported, 
that  if  they  carried  on  the  war  with  all  tlioir  might,  they  would 
gain  the  victory ;  and  said  that  ho  would  himself  take  part  with 
them,  whether  called  upon  or  not. 

119.  Still  they  wished  to  summon  tho  allies  again,  and 
put  it  to  the  voto  whether  they  should  go  to  war.  When 
tiic  embassadors  had  como  from  tlio  confederates,  and  an  as- 
pomhly  had  been  held,  tho  others  paid  what  they  wished,  most 
of  them  accusing  tho  Athenians,  and  demanding  that  war 
should  bo  declared ;  and  tho  Corinthians,  who  had  even  be- 
fore begged  them  each  separately,  state  by  state,  to  vote  for 
tho  war — being  afraid  for  Potidica,  lest  it  should  bo  destroyed 
first — and  Avho  were  present  then  also,  camo  forward  last,  and 
s|)oko  as  follows : 

120,  "ΛΥο  can  no  longer,  allies,  find  fault  Λvith  the  Lace- 
d.Tmonians,  as  not  liaving  both  themselves  voted  for  war,  and 
now  brought  us  together  for  this  purpose :  *  [though  we  should 
have  blained  them  if  they  had  not  done  sol.  For  it  is  tho 
duty  of  leaders,  Λνΐιίΐο  they  conduct  their  pnviito  ajfairs  on  a 
f(X)ting  of  equality,  to  provide  for  tho  interests  of  all ;  as  they 
arc  also  in  other  respects  honored  above  all.  Now  as  many 
of  us  as  have  already  had  any  dealings  with  the  Atlienians 
require  no  Avarning  to  beware  of  them ;  but  those  >\ho  livo 
more  in  the  interior,  and  not  in  tho  highway  of  communica- 
tion, ought  to  know,  that  if  they  do  not  defend  those  on  tho 
coast,  they  will  find  tho  carr}'ing  down  of  their  produce  [for 
ox|)ortationl  more  difficult,  and  the  procuring  again  of  thoso 
things  whicti  the  sea  aflfords  to  tho  mainland ;  and  they  ought 
not  to  bo  indiflferent  judges  of  what  is  now  said,  as  though  it 
did  not  aflfect  them,  but  to  consider  that  some  time  or  other, 
if  tiiey  should  sacrifice  tho  towns  on  tho  coast,  tho  danger 
would  reach  even  to  them;  and  that  they  aro  now  consulting 
for  themselves  no  loss  [than  for  others].  And  for  this  reason 
they  ought  not  to  shrink  from  passing  to  war  instead  of  peace. 
For  it  is  the  part  of  pnident  men,  indeed,  to  remain  quiet, 
idiould  they  not  bo  injured;  but  of  bravo  men,  when  in- 
jured, to  go  from  peace  to  war ;  and  when  a  good  opportunity 

'  Tho  yap  in  tho  euccooding  words,  χρί)  γάρ  τους  ηγεμόνας,  refers  to  a 
Fiippreesed  sentence :  "  Wo  can  not  now  blame  them ;  but  had  they  acted 
«liflercntly,  wo  should  have  had  a  right  to  blame  them ;  for  those  who 
command  others  should  provide  for  the  welfare  of  others."— ilrnoid 


70  THUOYDIDEa  I.  [cxXL 

offers,  to  como  to  an  understandini^  again  from  hostilities ;  and 
neither  to  be  elated  by  their  sueeess  in  war,  nor  to  brook  in- 
jury through  being  charmed  with  the  quiet  of  peace.  For  ho 
who  shrinks  from  this  course  for  love  of  pleasure,  would  most 
quickly  be  deprived  of  the  delights  of  indolence,  for  Avhich  lie 
snrinks  from  it,  should  ho  remain  quiet ;  and  he  who  in  war 
becomes  grasping  through  success^  does  not  reflect  that  ho  is 
buoyed  up  by  a  confidenco  that  can  not  be  trusted.  For  many 
measures,  though  badly  planned,  have  yet  succeeded,  through' 
the  adversary  being  still  λυογβο  advised ;  and  still  more  have 
there  been  which,  though  seeming  to  bo  well  arranged,  liavo 
on  the  contrary  come  to  a  disgraceful  issue.  For  no  οη«' 
conceives  his  plans  with  [only]  the  same  degree  of  confidenco 
as  ho  ciuries  them  out  in  action ;  but  we  form  our  opinions  in 
security,  [and  therefore  with  itssunince ;]  whereas  we  fail  in 
action  through  fear. 

1-21.  "Now  as  for  ourselves,  we  are  at  the  present  time 
j)reparing  for  >var  because  we  are  injured,  and  have  sufficient 
grounds  of. complaint;  and  when  λυο  have  avenged  ourselves  on 
the  Athenians,  we  will  lay  it  down  again  in  good  time.  And 
for  many  reasons  it  is  likely  that  λυο  should  have  the  advantage ; 
first,  as  we  aro  superior  in  numbers  and  military  ex|>erience ;  and 
secondly  as  we  all  proceed  Avith  equal  obedience  to  do  what  we 
are  ordered.  Anil  for  a  fleet,  in  which  they  are  so  strong  wo  will 
equip  one  from  the  property  we  severally  po>sess,  and  from  the 
money  at  Delphi  and  Olynipia ;  for  by  contracting  a  loan  of  that 
Λνο  shall  be  able,  by  means  of  higher  pay,  to  rob  them  of  tluir 
foreign  sailors.  For  tho  power  of  the  Athenians  is  mercenary, 
rather  than  native :  but  ours  ΛνοηΜ  bo  less  exposed  to  this,  as 

'  Soo  noto  on  I.  32.  3. 

2  I  liavo  followed  Gollor's  reading  οι  ύμυία  ;  Arnold  prefers  όμυϊα,  con- 
sidering it  as  dependent  on  tho  two  verbs  έιθνμείτ^ιι  and  Ιζεξίρχεται. 
"  What  wo  speculate  on  in  our  expectations,  and  what  wo  accomplish  in 
our  practice,  aro  wholly  different  from  each  other."  My  chief  reason  for 
preferring  tho  former  interpretation  is,  that  tho  article  is  only  used*  with 
niarei,  and  not  with  both  nouns,  as  I  think  it  usually  is  in  other  pa.'^aui 
ges,  whero  there  is  so  marked  an  opposition  between  them:  e.  g.  I.  71.  1. 
oi  άν  Ty  μέν  τταμασκενί)  δίκαια  ηράσσωσι,  tPj  ύ^  γνύμψ  κ.  τ.  λ.  II.  11.  G. 
χμί)  ύέ  ΰεΐ  εν  τ/j  πο?,εμίά,  t7j  μ^ν  γΐ'ώμτ^  Οαρααλίονς  στρατενειν,  τώ  ό^ 
ίργω  ύεύιύτας  τταρασκενάζεσθαι.  Unless  it  is  omitted  in  both  cases,  as  I. 
85.  5.  τάς  των  πολεμίων  παρασκενάς  λόγω  καλώς  μεμφνμενοι  άνομυίως 
Ipyu  εττεξιεναι.  For  other  instances  of  όμοιος  with  tho  forco  hero  given 
to  it,  SCO  uoto  on  ch.  3&.  5. 


cxxti.]  THUCYDIDES,  I.  1\ 

it  ia  stroMj:^  in  mon  moro  than  in  money.  And  by  one  victory 
[trained  by  us]  in  α  Rca-fight,  in  nil  probability  they  nro  ruin- 
.m1  ;  but  should  they  hold  out,  wc  too -shall  have  more  time  for 
studyinpr  naval  mattorfl ;  and  >vhcn  wo  ha>o  put  our  skill 
on  an  equal  footing  with  theirs,  in  courage,  we  shall  most  cer- 
tainly excel  them.  For  the  advantago  which  wo  possess  by 
nature  can  not  bo  acquired  by  them  through  learning;  whereas 
the  superiority  which  they  ha vo  in  point  of  skill  may  be  at- 
tained by  us  tlirough  practice.  And  to  havo  money  for  this 
])nrpose,  wo  will  raiso  contributions;  or  strange  were  it,  if 
tlu'ir  allies  should  not  refuse  to  contribute  it  for  their  own 
slavery,  while  wo  would  not  spend  it  to  bo  avenged  on  our 
tnomies,  and  to  save  ourselves  at  the  same  time,  and  to  avoid 
sutroring  by  means  of  this  very  money,*  through  having  it  taken 
from  us  by  them. 

122.  "  AVo  havo  also  other  Λν ays  of  carrying  on  war,  such 
as  causing  their  allies  to  revolt  (which  is  the  most  effectual 
mode  of  taking  from  them  the  revenues  in  which  they  are  so 
strong),  and'  raiding  works  to  annoy  their  country ;  Avith  other 
things  which  one  could  not  now  foresee.  For  >var  least  of 
iill  things  proceeds  on  definite  principles,  but  adopts  most  of  its 
contrivances  from  itself  to  suit  the  occasion  :  in  the  course  of 
which  ho  that  deals  with  it  Λνί^ι  good.temper  is  moro  secure ; 
while  he  that  engages  in  it  with  passion  makes  the  greater  failure. 
ix!t  us  reflect  also,  that  if  λυο  were  severally  engaged  in  [only] 
<|uarrcls  with  our  equals  about  boundaries  of  territory,  it  might 
be  homa  :  but  as  it  is,  the  Athenians  are  a  match  for  us  all  to- 
gether, and  still  more  powerful  against  single  states ;  so  that 
unless  all  in  a  body,  and  nation  by  nation,  and  city  by  city, 
with  one  mind  we  defend  ourselves  against  them,  they  will 
iortainly  sulxlue  us  without  trouble,  w hen  divided.  And  as 
for  defeat,  though  it  may  bo  a  terrible  thing  for  any.  one  to  hear 
of,  let  him  know  that  it  brings  nothing  else  btit  downright 

'  <  e.,  ns  it  would  bo  mado  tho  instrument  of  Athenian  tyranny,  if  by 
submission  they  allowed  thorn  to  take  it  from  them.  Of,  "on  this  very 
point  of  money,"  as  Arnold  renders  it 

«  Seo  ch.  142.  3,  whero  Pericles  mentions  tho  two  diflcrent  methods 
(^ΐΐιτιτΐίχισις,  "tho  one,"  as  Arnold  explains  it,  "by  founding  a  city  in 
tho  neighborhood  of  Athens,  strong  enough  to  interfere  with  her  trade, 
:>tid  bo  a  check  upon  her  power,  ηόλιν  (Ιντίπαλον-,  tho  other  by  merely 
raising  ono  or  two  forts  In  Attica,  as  strongholds  for  plundering  parties 
tc  keep  tho  country  in  ά  constant  annoyance  and  alarm." ' 


t%  THUOYDIDBa  L  [cxxiit,  cxxir. 

slavery :  >vhich  is  disgraceful  fop  the  Peloponnese  to  bo  even 
mentioned  as  contingent,  and  for  so  many  cities  to  be  ill-treated 
by  one.  In  that  case  wo  should  appear  cither  to  be  justly 
treated,  or  to  put  up  with  it  through  cowardice,  and  to  show 
ourselves  infenor  to  our  fathers,  who  liberated  Greece ;  where- 
as we  do  not  even  secure  this  liberty  for  ourselves,  but  allow  a 
tyrant  state  to  set  itself  up  among  us,  though  we  think  it 
right  to  put  down  monarchs  in  any  one  state.  And  wo  do 
not  know  how  this  conduct  is  cleared  of  three  of  the  greatest 
evils,  folly,  or  cowardice,  or  carelessness.  For  you  certainly 
have  not  escaped*  these  by  betaking  yourselves  to  that  con- 
tempt of  your  loos,  which  has  injured  far  more  than  any 
thing  else  ;  and  which,  from  ruining  so  many,  has  been  called 
by  the  opposite  name  of  senselessness. 

123.  *' With  regard  then  to  what  has  l)een  done  ln^foro, 
why  need  wo  find  fault  with  it  at  greater  length  than  is  ex- 
|KMiient  for  what  is  doing  now  ?  But  with  respect  to  what 
will  bo  herejifter,  wo  must  labor  for  it  by  supporting  what  is 
present;  for  it  is  our  hereditary  custom  to  acquire  virtues  by 
labors ;  and  you  nmst  not  change  the  fashion,  if  you  have  a 
Blight  sujKTiurity  now  in  wealth  and  power  (for  it  is  not 
right  that  what  was  won  in  want  should  bo  lost  in  abundance) ; 
but  must  go  to  the  war  with  good  courage  on  many  grounds  ; 
since  the  god  has  commanded  it,  and  promist'd  to  take  part 
with  you  himself;  while  the  rest  of  Greece  will  all  join  you  in 
the  struggle,  some  for  fear,  and  some  for  interest.  Nor  will 
you  be  the  first  to  break  the  treaty ;  for  even  the  god  himself 
considers  it  to  have  been  violated,  since  he  orders  you  to  go  to 
war ;  but  you  will  rather  como  to  it^  sujjjwrt  after  it  has  been 
wronged :  for  the  breakers  of  it  are,  not  those  who  defend 
themselves,  but  those  who  were  the  first  aggressors. 

124.  "So  then,  since  on  every  ground  you  have  goo<l  reason 
for  going  to  Avar,  and  since  we  all  in  common  recommend  this, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  most  certain  that  this  is  expedient  both  for 
states  and  individuals  [in  our  league] ;  do  not  defer  to  assist 
the  Potidaians,  who  are  Dorians,  and  are  besieged  by  lonians, 

*  Or,  "  for  surely  yon  Imvo  not,  tlirou^h  a  wish  to  escape  thcso  impu* 
tations,  betaken  yourselves,"  etc.  "The  play  on  the  -vvonla  καταψμύιηηκ: 
and  αιρίχιυσνη,"  says  Arnold,  *'  ean  hardly  bo  preserved  in  English :  '  Λ 
i<ense  of  your  adversaries'  inferiority  is  so  fatal  a  feeling  to  those  who 
eutcrtaiu  it,  that  it  more  fitly  deserves  to  bo  called  nonstnse,^  " 


cxxv.,  cxxvi.]  TIIUCTDIDES.  I.  73 

(tlio .  contrary  of  Avhicli  used  formerly  to  bo  llio  case),  aiul  to 
vindicate  the  liberty  of  the  rest;  since  it  is  no  lonf^cr  pQssih!» 
for  them  to  Λv;ιit/  uhilo  some  arc  already  injured,  and  other; 
will  be  treated  in  tho  Fame  way  not  nitich  later,  if  Λνο  sliall  bo 
known  to  have  conio  together,  but  not  to  daro  to  avenjj^o  our- 
Bolvcs :  but  considerin^Df,  allies,  that  Λνο  Iiavo  reached  a  point  of 
necessity,  and,  moreover,  that  Avliat  is  nientioned  is  tho  best 
course,  vote  for  tho  war;  not  bein^j  afi'aid  of  tho  immediate 
danger,  but  setting  your  hearts  on  the  more  lasting  peace  thnt 
will  result  fiom  it.  For  it  is  by  war  that  peace  is  rendered  tho 
more  stable  ;  but  to  refuse  to  pass  from  a  state  of  quiet  to  one  f  f 
war  is  not  equally  free  from  danger.  Being  of  opinion  then 
that  tho  tyrant  state  which  lias  set  itself  up  in  Greece,  has  set 
itself  up  against  all  alike,  so  that  it  alrea«ly  rules  over  some, 
and  is  designing  to  rule  o\or  others,  let  us  go  against  it  and 
reduce  it ;  and  live  ourselves  free  from  danger  in  future,  and 
give  freedom  to  the  Greeks  Λνΐιο  are  now  enslaved."  To  this 
effect  spoke  the  Corinthians, 

125.  Tho  Lacedaemonians,  after  they  had  heard  from  all 
Avhat  they  thought,  put  the  question  to  the  vote  of  all  the  allies 
who  >vero  present  in  succes.sion,  lx)th  to  greater  and  smaller 
states  alike  :  and  the  majority  voted  for  war,  l>ut  though  they 
had  resolved  on  it,  it  was  impossible  to  take  it  in  hand  imme- 
diately, as  they  Λverc  nnprepared ;  but  it  was  determined  that 
Ruit^ible  means  should  be  provided  by  the  several  states,  and 
that  there  should  be  no  delay.  Λ  year,  however,  did  not 
pass  while  they  were  settling  all  that  was  necessary,  but  less, 
beforothey  invaded  Attica,  and  openly  proceeded  to  the  war. 

120.  During  this  time  they  Λvcrc  sending  embassadors  to 
tho  Athenians  with  complaints,  in  order  that  they  mijght 
have  as  good  a  pretext  as  possible  for  the  war,  in  case  they 
should  tiot  listen  to  them.  In  tho  first  place  the  Lacediemo* 
nians  sent  embassadors,  and  ordered  the  Athenians  to  drivo 
out  the  pollution  of  the  goddess  ;  which  pollution  was  of  tho 
following  nature.  There  was  one  Cylon,  a  man  who  liad 
conquered  at  the  Olympic  games,  an  Athenian  of  tho  olden 
time,  both  noble  and  powerful;  ho  had  married  a  daughter 
of  Theagenes,  α  Megarean,  who  at  that  timo  was  tyrant  of 

Tho  participle  ττεριμίνοντης  refers  to  tho  whole  body  of  tho  confede- 
rates, which  is  afterword  reprosontod  in  two  divisions  by  tho  use  of  the 
ttiticlo  with  ficv  and  6ί.  '     • 

4 


Yi  THUOYDIDEa  I.  [cxxvl 

Megara.  Now  when  Cylon  was  consulting  the  oracle  at 
Delphi,  the  god  told  him  to  seize  on  the  Acropolis  of  the 
Athenians  during  the  greatest  feiist  of  Jupiter.  So  having 
received  η  force  from  Thejigencs,  and  persuaded  his  friends  to 
it,  when  the  Olyuipic  festival  in  the  Peloponnese  came  on,  lie 
seized  the  Acropolis  with  a  view  to  establishing  a  tyranny; 
thinking  that  that  wjis  the  greatest  festival  of  Jupiter,  and 
that  it  Avas  a  very  proper  time  for  Aim,  as  he  had  conquered 
at  the  01ym]>ic  games,  15ut  whether  it  was  the  greatest  fes- 
tival in  Attica,  or  elsewhere,  that  ha<l  been  alluded  to,  he 
neither  stopped  to  consider,  nor  did  the  oracle  express.  For 
the  Athenians  also  have  a  Diasian  festival,  which  is  called  the 
greatest  festival  of  Jupiter  Milichius,  held  outside  the  city, 
in  which  all  tho  people  otler  [something,  though]  many  of 
them  not  victims,  but  country-otl'erings.*  Thinking,  however, 
that  ho  understood  it  rightly,  he  took  the  business  in  hand. 
The  Athenians,  on  perceiving  it,  ran  in  a  body  from  tho  fields 
to  resist  them,  and  sitting  down  before  the  place  besieged 
them.  But  as  time  Avent  on,  being  tired  out  l\v  tho  blockade, 
most  of  them  Avent  away,  having  commissioned  tho  nine 
Archons  to  keep  guard,  and  to  arrange  every  thing  with 
full  powers,  as  they  should  consider  best:  for  at  that  time 
the  nine  Archons  transa«!ted  most  of  the  state  affairs.  Now 
those  who  were  besieged  Avith  Cylon  >vere  in  a  wretched  con- 
dition for  Avant  of  food  and  water.  Cylon  therefore  and  his 
brother  made  their  escape,  but  when  the  rest  were  j»ress<'d 
hard,  and  some  >verc  even  dying  of  famine,  they  seated  them- 
selves as  suppliants  on  the  altar  of  the  Acropolis.  And  those 
of  the  Athenians  who  had  been  commissioned  to  keep  guard, 
when  they  saw  them  dying  in  the  tem})le,  raised  them  up  on 
condition  of  doing  them  no  liarm,  and  led  them  away  and 
killed  them  ;  while  some  who  >vero  seated  before  tho  Awful 
Goddesses'  they  dispatched  on  the  altars  at  the  side  entrance. 
And  from  this  both  they  and  their  descendants  after  them 
Avere  called  accursed  of,  and  offenders  against,  tho  goddess. 
The  Athenians  therefore  ex|>elled  these  accursed  ones,  and 
(^Meomenes  the  Lacediemonian  also  expelled  them  subsequently, 

'  i.  Λ,  littlo  figures  of  dough  or  paste  made  into  tlio  shape  of  tho  swiuo, 
or  other  aninjals,  which  they  were  too  poor  to  oiler. 

*  A  title  of  tho  Furies  pcoJiliarly  given  to  thorn  at  Athens,  aceordiug  to 
Tausauias,  us  that  of  Κΐμ'ΐιι^ς  was  at  Sicyon — each  *  per  euphemismuiu.' 


csxvii.,  cxxviii.]  THUCTDIDES.  I.  75 

in  conjunction  with  some  Athenian  partisans,  both  driving 
out  the  living,  and  taking  up  and  casting  out  the  bones  of  the 
dead.  They  returned,  however,  afterward,  and  their  descend- 
ants arc  still  in  the  city.         ■ 

127.  This  pollution  then  tlvc  Lacedaemonians  ordered  them 
to  drive  out;  principally,  as  they^ofessed,  to  avenge  the  hon- 
or of  the  gods ;  but  really,  because  they  know  that  Pericles, 
the  Bon  of  Xanthippus,  was  connected  with  it  on  his  mother's 
side,  and  thought  that  if  ho  were  banished,  their  business  with 
the  Athenians  would  more  easily  sucx^ecd.  They  did  not, 
however,  so  much  hope  that  lie  would  l>o  treated  in  that  way, 
as  that  it  would  cause  a  projudiro  against  him  in  the  city; 
from  an  idea  that  the  war  ΛνοηΜ  in  part  be  occasioned  by  his 
misfortune.  For  being  the  most  powerful  man  of  his  time,  and 
takiuij  the  lead  in  the  government,  he  opposed  the  Lacedaj^ 
monians  in  every  thing,  and  would  not  let  the  Athenian» 
make  concessions,  but  instigated  them  to  hostilities. 

i28.  The  Athenians  also,  in  return,  commanded  the  Lnce^ 
drcmonians  to  drive  out  the  pollution  of  Ticnarus.  For  the  Lace- 
dicmonians  having  formerly  raised  up  some  suppliants  of  tho 
Ib'lots  from  the  temple  of  Neptune  at  Tnnnarus,  led  them  away 
and  slow  them  :  and  for  this  they  think  they  were  themselves 
also  visited  with  tho  great  earthquake  at  Sparta.  They  like- 
wise ordered  them  to  drive  out  tho  curso  of  Minerva  of  the  Ura- 
7.en-Ilousc  ;  which  Λvas  of  the  following  kind.  AVhen  Pausanias 
the  Liicedaimonian,  after  being  sent  for  by  tho  Spartans  for 
the  first  time  from  his  command  in  the  Hellespont,  and  brought 
to  trial,  was  acquitted  by  them  as  not  guilty,  he  >vas  not  sent 
out  again  in  a  public  capacity ;  but  in  a  private  capacity,  of  hia 
own  accord,  he  took  a  trifomo  of  llermione,  without  the  au- 
thority of  tho  Lacedaemonians,  and  came  to  the  Hellespont; 
nominally,  to  join  in  the  war  of  the  Greeks ;  but  really,  to  cany 
out  his  measures  with  the  king ;  which  ho  had  undertaken,  in 
tho  first  instance,  from  a  desire  of  sovereignty  over  Greece. 
Now  it  was  from  tho  following  fact  that  ho  first  established  a 
claim  for  service  with  tho  king,  and  made  a  commencement  of 
the  whole  business.  Having  taken  Byzantium  when  ho  was 
there  before,  after  tho  return  from  Cypnis  (tho  Modes  were  in 
I>ossession  of  it,  and  some  connections  and  relations  of  the  king 
wore  taken  in  it),  on  that  occasion  ho  sent  back  to  the  king 
thovo  whom  ho  had  taken,  not  letting  the  other  allies  know; 


70  THUCYDIDE&  I.  [cixix.,  cixx. 

but  giving  out  that  they  had  escaped  from  him.  Tliie  he 
managed  in  concert  with  Gongylus  the  Eretrian,  to  whom 
he  haS  committed  Byzantium  and  the  prisoners,  lie  also  ecnt 
Gongylus  with  a  letter  to  him;  in  >vhicli,  as  was  afterward 
discovered,  the  following  >vas  written :  "  Pausanias,  the  gen- 
eral of  Sparta,  wishing  to  oblige  thee,  sends  these  men  back  to 
thee,  after  taking  them  in  war.  And  I  make  a  proposal,  if  thou 
also  art  pleased  with  it,  that  I  should  marry  thy  daughter,  and 
make  Sparta  and  tho  rest  of  Greece  subject  to  thee.  And  I 
think  that  I  am  able  to  do  this  in  concert  with  thee.  If 
then  any  of  these  proposals  please  thee,  si'nd  η  trustworthy 
man  to  tho  sea,  through  Avhom  in  future  we  will  confer." 

129.  Such  was  the  purport  of  the  writing ;  and  Xerxes  was 
pleased  with  tho  letter,  and  scut  Artiibazus,  the  turn  of  Phar- 
naces,  to  the  eea,  and  ordered  him  to  succeed  to  the  Fatra|»y 
of  Dascylium,  8U])erseding  Megabates,  Λνΐιο  Avas  governor  be- 
fore; and  gave  hiin  a  letter  in  answer,  to  send  over  as  (juickly 
ns  possible  to  Pausanias  at  Pyzantium,  and  to  show  Inm  tho 
Gcal ;  and  whatever  message  Pausanias  should  send  liim  on  his 
own  affairs,  to  execute  it  in  tho  best  and  most  faithful  manner 
possible.  On  his  arrival  he  did  every  thing  as  had  bem  told 
nini,  and  also  sent  over  tho  letter;  the  following  being  written 
in  rej)ly  to  him:  "Thus  saith  King  Xerxes  to  Pausanias. 
For  the  men  whom  thou  hast  saved  from  Byzantium,  and  sent 
over  the  sea  to  me,  there  is  laid  up  ΐοτ  thee  in  our  house'  [tho 
record  of  ]  a  benefit  registered  forever ;  and  I  am  also  pleased 
with  thy  proposals.  And  let  neither  niglit  nor  day  stop  thee, 
that  thou  shouklst  bo  remiss  in  doing  any  of  the  things  which 
thou  hast  promised  me  :  neither  let  them  be  impeded  by  out- 
Lay  of  gold  or  silver,  nor  by  number  of  troops,  >vhithereoever 
there  is  need  of  their  coining;  but  in  conjunction  with  Arta- 
bazus,  an  honorable  man,  whom  I  have  sent  to  thee,  fear 
not  to  promote  both  my  interest  and  thine  own,  as  shall  bo 
most  creditable  and  advantageous  for  both." 

130.  On  tho  receipt  of  this  letter,  Pausanias,  though  ho 
was  even  before  held  in  high  repute  by  the  (Jreeks  for  his 
generalship  at  Plat:ea,  was  then  much  more  exalted  ;  and  could 
no  longer  livo  in  tho  ordinary  style,  but  went  out  of  l^yzan- 

•  For  other  instances  of  this  custom,  sco  Herodotus  V.  Π.  ami  VI IT. 
85  and  the  book  of  Ksthor,  cl».  vi.  Aceordinp  to  Herodotus,  tho  name  by 
which  persona  bo  registered  wcro  called  was  "Orosangie,"'  or  "bene• 
fuGtora." 


ι 

I 


cxxxi.,  cxxxii.]  TllUCYDIDES.   L  77 

ihiin,  clothed  in  a  Median  dress ;  nnd  when  ho  went  through 
Thrace,  Medes  and  Egyptians  formed  his  body-guard ;  and  ho 
had  a  Persian  t'lble  laid  ft^r  hiui,  and  could  not  conceal  hi» 
purpose,  hut  betrayed  beforehand  by  triiling  actions  what  ho 
intended  to  practii-e  in  future  on  a  liirger  scale,  lie  also  niado 
liiinself  diiHcult  of  access,  and  indulged  such  a  violent  temper 
toward  all,  that  no  one  dared  to  approach  him ;  and  this  was 
none  of  the  least  reasons  wliy  Iho  confederates  went  over  from 
him  to  tho  Athenians. 

131.  Tho  Laoeda;monians,  on  becoming  acquainted  with 
it,  recalled  him  the  first  time  on  this  very  account;  and  when 
ho  went  out  the  second  time  in  tho  vessel  of  Ilermione,  without 
tlioir  orders,  and  appeared  to  be  acting  in  this  way,  and  did 
not  return  to  Sparta  when  forcibly  driven  out  from  By- 
zantium by  tho  Athenians  after  a  siege,  but  news  came  of  his 
being  settled  at  Colonaj  in  tho  Troad,  and  intriguing  with 
tho  barbarians,  and  making  his  stay  there  for  no  good ;  under 
theso  circumstances  they  waited  no  longer,  but  the  ephors 
Hcnt  a  herald  and  a  scytale^^  and  told  him  not  to  leave  tho 
herald,  else  that  they  declared  war  against  him.  AVisliing 
to  1)0  as  little  suspected  as  possible,  and  trusting  to  quash  tho 
charge  by  means  of  money,  he  proceeded  to  return  tho  second 
time  to  Sparta.  And  at  first  ho  was  thrown  into  prison  by  tho 
epiiors  (for  tho  ephors  have  power  to  do  this  to  tho  king),  but 
afterwartl,  having  settled  tho  business,  ho  subsequently  camo 
out,  and  oflfored  himself  for  trial  to  those  who  Avishcd  to  ex- 
amine into  his  case. 

132.  Now  the  Spartans  had  no  clear  proof,  neither  his  ene- 
mies nor  tho  state  at  large,  on  Avhich  they  could  eafely  rely 
in  punishing  a  man  Λνΐιο  was  of  tho  royal  family  and  at  present 
holding  an  honorable  office;  (for  as  his  cousin  and  guardian, 
he  was  regent  for  Pleistarchus,  tho  son  of  Ixjonidas,  ivho  Λvaft 
king  and  at  present  a  minor ;)  but  by  his  contempt  of  tho 
laws,  and  imitation  of  tho  barbarians,  ho  gavo  room  for  many 
euspicions  of  his  not  wishing  to  bo  content  with  things  as  they 
were.     And  they  reviewed  Tiis  other  acts,  in  whatever  on  any 

•  Tho  ecytalo  was  α  staff  used  nt  Sparta  as  a  cipher  for  writing  dis•      ^^ 
patches.    A  strip  of  paper  was  rolled  slantwiso  round  it,  on  which  tho       \  . 
dispatciiee  were  written  lengthwise,  so  that  when  unrolled  they  wero 
unintelligiblo ;  commanders  abroad  had  ono  of  liko  thickness,  round 
which  they  rolled  these  papers,  and  so  wero  able  to  read  tho  dispatches. 


V8  THUOYDIDEa  L  [cxxxiiL 

occasion  Le  Lad  lived  beyond  the  established  usages;  and 
especially,  that  on  the  tnpod  at  Delphi,  which  the  Greeks 
dedicated  as  the  ftrst-truits  of  the  spoil  of  the  Medea,  he  had 
formerly  on  his  own  individual  responsibility  presumed  to  have 
the  fullowinj^  distich  inscribed  : — 

•'  TliO  Oreek  Pausanias,  victor  o'er  the  Modo, 
To  Phoebus  this  memorial  decreed." 

This  distich  then  the  Laeeduimoniaus  at  the  very  time  erased 
from  the  tripod,  and  engraved  by  name  all  the  cities  that  ha^l 
joined  in  overthrowing  the  barbarian,  and  had  dedicated  the 
offering.  This,  however,  was  considered  to  be  an  act  of  guilt 
in  Pausanias  ;  and  since  he  had  put  himself  in  his  present  po- 
sition, it  appeared  to  have  been  done  in  nmch  closer  keepuig 
with  his  present  views.  Thoy  also  heard  that  he  was  tam- 
pering with  the  Helots;  and  it  Wiis  the  fact  too;  for  he  was 
promising  them  liberation  and  citizojiship,  if  thoy  would  join 
m  an  insurrection,  autl  in  carrying  out  the  whole  of  his  i)lan. 
But  not  even  then  did  they  think  right  to*  believe  ev.  :i  any  of 
the  Helots  [thcmselvcsj  as  infijrmera,  and  to  jiroct^e  1  to  any 
great  severity  against  him  ;  acting  according  to  the  custom  which 
they  Usually  observe  toward  their  own  citizens,  not  to  Ix;  hasty 
in  adoj>ting  any  extreme  measure  in  the  case  of  a  Spartan 
without  unquestionable  evidence ;  until  a  man  of  Argilus,  it 
is  said,  who  was  about  to  carry  to  Artabazus  the  last  letter 
for  the  king,  and  who  had  before  been  his  favorite  and  very 
much  trustt'd  by  him,  gave  infornnition  to  them;  having 
been  alanned  at  a  thtiUirht  which  struck  hini,  that  none  of  the 
messengers  l)efore  him  had  hitherto  come  back  again  ;  and  so, 
having  counttirfeite*!  the  seal,  in  order  that  if  he  were  mistaken 
in  his  Kurmise,  or  if  Pausanias  should  ask  to  make  sonio  alter- 
ation in  the  writing,  he  might  not  discover  it,  he  opened  th«> 
letter,  and  found  written  in  it — having  suspected''  some  addi- 
tional order  of  the  kind — directions  to  put  him  also  to  death. 

133.  Then,  however,  the  ephors,  on  his  showing  them  the 
letter,  gave  greater  credence  to  it ;  but  still  wished  to  bo  ear- 
witnesses   of  Pausanias'  saying   soniithing.     AVhen  therefore, 

*  Or,  "even  though  they  behoved  sonic  of  iho  Helots  who  had  inforru- 
cd  aKainat  him." 

>  \\f)oar-:TeaTa'kOai.  The  samo  verb  ooours  with  tlie  same  force  of  tho 
rpof,  II.  85.  G,  ru  όί  κομίζοντι  αντας  τροσεζίστιιλαν  ίς  Κ()ήτην  Γ/>ώΓυμ 
ά^ρικίσϋαι. 


cxxxiv.]  THUOYDIDES.  I.  19 

from  a  concerted  plan,  the  man  Lad  gone  to  Taenarus*  as  a  sup- 
pliant, and  had  built  himself  a  hut,  divided  into  two  by  a 
partition  wall,  in  which  ho  concealed  some  pf  the  cphors ;  and 
when  Pausanias  came  to  him,  and  asked  the  reivson  for  his  be- 
coming a  suppliant,  they  heard  all  distinctly  ;  while  the  man 
charged  him  Λvith  Mhat  had  been  written,  and  set  forth  tho 
other  particulars,  one  by  one,  saying  that  he  had  never  yet  en- 
dangered him  at  all  in  \m  services  with  respect  to  the  king, 
yet  had  been,  just  like  the  mass  of  his  servants,  preferred  to 
death;  and  l*ausanias  acknowledged  these  very  things,  and 
desired  him  not  to  be  angry  for  Λvhat  liad  happened,  but  gavo 
him  tho  security  of  raising  him  up  from  tlio  temple,  and 
l>egged  him  to  go  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  not  to  put  an  ob- 
stacle in  the  way  of  his  designs. 

134.  After  hearing  him  accuratfly^  the  ei)hors  then  Avont 
away,  and  having  now  certain  knowk'<1go  [of  his  guilt  J, 
were  preparing  to  arrest  him  in  the  city,  liut  it  is  said 
that  when  lie  was  just  going  to  be  arreste»!  in  the  street, 
from  seeing  tho  face  of  one  of  tho  ephors  as  ho  approache<l 
liim,  he  un<lcrstood  for  ΛνΙ^Ι  ])urpose  he  was  coming ;  and 
fin  another  of  them  making  a  secret  nod,  and  out  of  kind- 
ness showing  liim  [their  object],  ho  set  off  ninning  to  tho 
temple  of  Minerva  of  tho  Brazen-House,  and  reaclied  his 
place  of  refuge  first;  for  the  sacred  ground  Λvas  near  at  hand. 
To  avoid  sutfering  from  exposure  to  the  ojK'U  air,  ho  en- 
tered a  building  of  no  great  size,  which  formed  )>Mrt  of  tho 
temple,  and  remained  quiet  in  it.  Tho  ephors  were  at  tho 
moment  distanced  in  tho  pursuit;  but  afterward  they  took 
off  the  roof  of  tho  building  ;  and  having  watched  him  in,  and 
cut  liim  off  from  egress,  they  barricade<l  tho  doors;  and 
sitting  down  before  tlie  place,  reduced  him  by  starvation. 
When  Jio  was  on  tho  point  of  expiring  in  his  present, 
situation  in  tho  ouilding,  on  perceiving  it,  they  took  him  out 
of  the  temple  while  still  breathing ;  and  when  ho  wns  taken 
out,,  Iio  died  immediately.  They  were  going  therefore  to 
cast  him,  as  they  do  malefactors,  into  tho  Caiadas ;  but  after- 
warl  they  thought  it  best  to  burj'  him  somewhere  near, 
l>ut  the  god  at  Delphi  subsequently  ordered  the  Lacctlaemon- 
ians  to  romove  tho  tomb  to  where  ho  died  (and  ho  now  lie^ 

*  i.  e.,  to  tho  tomplo  of  Ncptuno  on  tho  promontory  of  Tccnanis,  which 
enjoyed  tho  privilcgea  of  an  asylum,  or  sanctuary. 


so  TUXJOYDIDEa  I.  [oxxxv.,  cxxxvi. 

in  tbe  entrance  to  tlio  eacred  ^ound,  as  monumontal  columns 
declare  in  writing) ;  and  as  what  had  been  done  was  a  pollution 
to  them,  he  ordered  them  to  ^ive  back  two  bodies  insti'ad  of  one 
to  the  goddess  of  the  Hruzen-IIouso.  Ho  they  had  two  brazen 
Ktatues  made,  and  dedicated  thcni  as  a  substitute  for  Pausanias. 

135.  The  Athenians,  then,  inasmuch  as  the  god  himself 
had  deeided  this  to  Ikj  a  jxillution,  returte»!  by  commanding 
the  Lacedicmoniuns  to  drive  it  out.  Now  the  Lacedaemonians 
sent  embassadors  to  the  Athenians,  and  charged  Tliemistocles 
also  as  an  aceomplice  in  the  jnedizing  of  PaUsanias,  as  they 
discovered  from  the  examinations  in  his  case ;  and  demanded 
that  he  should  be  i>unishe<l  with  the  same  penalties.  In  com- 
pliance with  this  (he  happened  to  liave  been  ostracised,  and 
though  he  had  a  residence  at  Argos,  used  to  travel  about  to 
the  rest  of  the  PelojMUinese),  they  sent  with  the  Laeediemon- 
ians,  who  who  Avero  very  ready  to  join  in  the  pursuit,  certain 
men  who  were  told  to  bring  him  wherever  they  might  fall  in 
with  him. 

136.  Themistoeles,  being  aware  of  this  biforehand,  fled  from 
the  Peloponnese  to  Corcyra ;  for  he  had  been  a  l>enefactt)r  to 
that  j)eople.  But  when  the  Corcyneans  alleged  that  they 
were  afraid  to  keep  him  at  the  risk  of  incurring  the  enmity 
of  the  LaeeduiUionians  and  Athenians,  ho  was  carried  over  by 
them  to  the  mainland  opposite.  And  being  pursued  by  those 
who  had  been  a|)j»ointed  to  the  work,  as  they  heard  on  in- 
quiry in  what  direction  he  was  going,  he  was  compelled  in 
a  strait  to  stop  at  the  house  of  Admetus,  the  king  of  tin• 
Molossians,  who  was  not  on  friendly  terms  with  him.  ibi 
happened  to  l>e  from  home;  but  Themistoeles,  aildressing 
Iiimself  as  a  suppliant  to  his  wife,  was  instructed  by  her  to 
take  their  child,  and  seat  himself  on  the  hearth.  And  when 
Admetus  came  not  long  after,  he  tU'elared  Λνΐιο  ho  was,  and 
begged  liim  not  to  avenge  himself  on  a  banished  man,  ft)r 
whatever  he  himself  might  have  urged  against  any  request  of 
his  to  the  Athenians ;  '•  for  in  that  case  he  wouM  receive  evil 
from  the  king,  when  he  was  far  his  inferior  in  j>ower ;  >vhere- 
;is  it  was  the  part  of  a  nohle  nature  to  avenu^e  itself  on  its 
'quals  [alone],  and  on  fair  t'rnis.  ] besides,  he  had  himself 
opposed  the  king  with  n-gard  to  some  request  merely,  and  not 
on  a  [)oint  of  bodily  safety :  whereas  he^  if  he  gave  him  up 
(he  mentioned  by  whom  and  for  wliat  he  was  being  pursued), 


cxxxvii.,  cxxxvni.]         TntJCYDIDES.  I.  81 

would  (Icprivo  him  of  security  of  life."  The  king,  after  hcar- 
\\\^  him,  raised  him  up  with  his  son  (for  po  ho  was  sittinnf  ΛνίΐΗ 
him,  and  this  was  the  most  prevailing  mode  of^  supplication). 

137.  And  when  the  Atheniiins  and  Lacedspmonians  came 
no  long  time  after,  he  did  not  give  him  up ;  hut  as  lie  wished 
to  go  to  the  king,  sent  liim  by  land  to  tlio  other  sea,  to  Pydna, 
Avhich  Avns  in  Alexander's  dominions.  There  ho  found  a  mer- 
chant vessel  putting  to  sea  for  Ionia,  and  having  gone  on 
hoard  Λva3  carried  by  a  stonn  to  the  armament  of  the  Athen- 
ians, that  w.'is  blocka<ling  Naxo».  In  his  fear  ho  told  the  mas- 
ter Λvho  he  was  (for  ho  was  unknown  to  those  in  the  vessel), 
and  on  what  account  ho  was  flying ;  and  said,  that  if  he  did 
not  save  liim,  ho  would  declare  that  he  was  taking  him  for  a 
IM?cuniary  consideration  ;  that  their  only  hope  of  safejy  lay  in 
no  one's  leaving  tlio  vessel  till  tho  voyage  could  he  continued ; 
and  that  if  ho  complied  with  his  request,  ho  would  remember 
him  with  becoming  gratitude.  Tho  master  did  so ;  and  after 
lying  out  at  sea  off  tho  naval  encampment  a  day  and  a  night, 
subsequently  arrived  at  Ephesus.  And  Themistocles  rewarded 
him  by  a  presi-nt  of  money  (for  there  came  to  him  afterward 
money  from  Athens,  sent  by  his  friends,  and  from  Argos  that 
whuch  had  been  secretly  laid  up  there) ;  and  having  gone  up 
the  country  with  one  of  the  Persians  on  the  coast,  he  sent  α 
letter  to  king  Artaxerxes,  tho  son  of  Xerxes,  who  wns  lately 
come  to  tho  throne.  Tho  purport  of  the  letter  was  this  :  "  I, 
Themistocles,  am  come  to  tliee,  who  have  done  most  harm  of  all 
the  Greeks  to  your  house,  as  long  as  I  Avas  compelled  to  defend 
myself  against  thy  father  who  had  attacked  me,  but  still  far  moro 
good,  Λνΐιΐ'η  he  was  retreating  in  circumstances  of  safety  to  me, 
but  of  peril  to  him.  And  return  for  a  benefit  is  owed  mc ;" 
(ho  mentioned  his  sending  to  liim  from  Salamis  previous  in- 
formation of  tho  retreat  of  the  Greeks,  and  tho  non-destruction 
of  tho  bridges  at  that  time  through  his  instrumentality,  to 
which  ho  falsely  laid  claim ;)  "  and  now  I  am  come  with  power 
to  do  thee  great  good,  being  persecuted  by  tho  Greeks  because 
of  my  friendship  for  thee.  But  I  wish  to  wait  a  year,  and  then 
explain  in  person  to  theo  tlic  objects  of  my  coming.'* 

138.  The*  king,  it  is  said,  approved  of  his  plan,  and  told 
him  to  do  so.  During  tho  timo  that  ho  waited  ho  learned  as 
nmch  as  he  could  of  tlio  Persian  language,  and  tho  institutions 
of  tho  country ;  and  having  gone- to  him  after  the  expiration 

4* 


82  THUCYDIDES,  i  [cxxiriii, 

of  the  year,  ho  became  an  influential  pereon  ^ith  him^  so  as 
none  of  the  Greeks  liad  hitherto  been,  both  on  account  of 
his  previous  reputation,  and  the  hope  >vhich  lie  su^^ested  whh 
regard  to  (Jreece,  namely,  tliat  1ι«  would  make  it  subject  to 
him;  but  most  of  all,  from  his  showing  himself  talented  by 
actual  proofs.  Fur  Thcmistocles  was  one  who  most  clearly 
displayed  the  strength  of  natural  genius,  and  was  particularly 
Avorthy  of  .admiration  in  this  respect,  more  than  any  other 
man ;  for  by  his  own  talent,  and  without  learning  any  thing 
toward  it  before,  or  in  addition  to  it,  ho  was  both  the  best 
judge  of  things  j)resent  with  the  least  deliberation,  and  the 
best  conjecturer  of  the  future,  to  the  most  remote  point  of 
what  was  likely  to  hap|X'n.  Moreover,  the  things  which  he 
took  in  hand  he  was  also  able  to  carry  out ;  and  in  those 
in  which  Jjo  had  no  experience  he  >vas  not  at  a  loss'  to  form 
a  competent  judgnient.  lie  had  too  the  greatest  foresight  of 
whixt  was  the  better  course  or  the  Λvorse  in  what  was  as  yet 
unseen.  In  a  wurtl,  by  strength  of  natural  talent,  and  short- 
ness of  study,  he  was  the  best  of  all  men  to  do"  oli'-hand  what 
was  necessary,  lie  ended  his  lite  by  disease;  though  some  say 
that  ho  j)urpusely  destroyed  himself  by  poison,  on  linding  that 
he  was  unable  to  jteiform  what  he  had  promised  to  the  king. 
Now  there  is  a  monument  to  him  iu  the  Asiatic  Magnesia,  in 
the  markei-j>lace  ;  for  he  was  governor  of  the  country,  the  king 
having   given    him  '  Magnesia,  which    brought    him    in    litty 

•  "  It  should  bo  rcinembored  that  re  K/«i<n>or  the  coinuion-scnse  jiulp- 
luciit  which  mau  may  i)as3  upon  subjects  which  aro  uot  within  tljcirowu 
])cculiar  study  or  j)Ossession,  was  constantly  distinj^uishcU  among  tho 
(J reeks  from  that  full  knowledge,  whether  theoretical  or  practical,  which 
enables  men  not  only  to  judge  of  things  when  done,  but  to  do  them  them- 
selves. See  II.  40.  3.  VI.  IJO.  1.  And  on  this  principle  tho  people  at  large 
were  considered  competent  judges  of  the  conduct  of  their  magistrates, 
though  they  might  bo  very  unlit  to  bo  magistrates  themselves." — Arnold. 

-  Or,  as  Arnold  renders  it,  "in  determining  on  a  moment's  notice." 
'*Jii3  wisdom  was  so  little  tho  result  of  study,  that  Ftiddcn  emergencies 
did  not  perplex  him,  as  they  would  thoso  who,  being  accustomed  to  trust 
wholly  to  it,  are  called  on  at  onoo  to  act  Avithout  it." 

'  i.  e.,  tho  land-tax  or  rent  which  was  j)aid  by  these  towns  to  the  king, 
and  which  amounted  generally  to  the  tenth  part  of  tho  produce,  was 
given  by  him  to  Τ hemistoclcs  to  furnish  him  with  these  articles  of  his 
establishment.  In  addition  to  similar  instances  mentioned  in  Arnold's 
note,  I  may  refer  to  Xonophon,  llellen.  III.  1.  6,  who  informs  us  that 
lOurysthenes  and  Procles,  descondants  of  tho  Spartan  king,  Demaratus, 
eontin'ied  to  possess  Pergamus,  Teuthraniu,  and  Ilalisama,  tho  gift  of 
tho  king  of  Persia  to  their  exiled  nnce«tors. 


cxxxuL]  TIIUCYDIDES.  I.  83 

talents  ft  year,  for  bread,  Lampaacus  for  wino  (for  it.  was 
considered  more  productive  of  Λνίηο  tlian  any  other  pla^^o 
at  that  time),  and  Myus  for  ]>roviaions'  in-goneral.  liut  liis 
relations  say  that  liis  hones  were  earned,  hy  his  own  eom- 
mand,  and  laid  in  Attica  witliout  thc^knowledirc;  of  the  Athe- 
nians;  for  it  \vas  not  hiwfiil  to  give  tlieni  !)unal,  as  thev  wero 
the  bones  of  a  man  Imnished  for  treason.  Such  Avas  the  end 
of  Pausanias  the  Lacedaimonian,  and  Themistocles  the  Athe- 
nian, who  liad  been  the  most  distinguished  of  all  the  Greeks  in  , 
their  day. 

139.  On  the  occasion  then  of  their  first  embassy  the  Laceda;- 
motiians  gave  orders  to  this  eftect,  and  received  commands  in 
return  alx)ut  driving  out  the  accursed.  But  on  going  subse- 
iiuently  to  the  Athenians,  thoy  commanded  them  to  raise  tlic 
fiego  of  Potidaia,  and  leave  yKgina  inde]>en(lent;  and  de- 
clared, most  especially  and  distinctly  of  all,  tliat  thefe  would  bo 
no  war,  if  they  rescinded  the  degree  respecting  the  Megareans, 
in  Avhi»rh  it  had  l>een  declrred  that  they  should  not  use  the 
jiorts  in  the  Athenian  empire,  or  the  Attic  market.  But  the 
Athenians  Avero  neither  disposed  to  obey  them  in  the  otlier 
jioints  nor  to  rescind  the  decree;  as  they  charged  the  Mega- 
reans with  an  encroaching  cultivation  of  the  consecrated  and 
uninclosed  land,  and  with  receiving  the  run-away  slaves, 
linally,  when  the  last  emba«5sadors  liad  come  from  Lacedaimon, 
namely,  Uamphias,  Melesipnus,  and  Agesander,  and  men- 
tioned none  of  the  things  wliich  they  usually  had  before,  but 
i'imply  this,  "The  Laceda;monians  are  desirous  that  there 
should  l>e  peace  ;  and  there  Avoidd  be,  if  you  wero  to  leave 
the  Greeks  independent ;"  the  Athenians  called  an  assembly, 
and  proposed  the  subject  for  their  consideration,  and  resolved, 
once  for  all,  to  deliberate  and  answer  respecting  all  their  de- 
mands. And  many  others  came  forward  and  spoke,  support- 
ing both  views  of  the  question  ;  both  that  they  should  go  to 
war,  and  that  the  decree  should  not  bo  an  obstacle  to  peace, 
but  that  they  should  rescind  it:  and  then  came  forward  Pe- 
ricles, the  son  of  Xanthippus,  the  first  man  of  tlio  Athenians 
at  that  time,  and  most  able  both  in  si)eaking  and  acting,  and 
advised  them  as  follows.  ' 

'  i.  A,  all  additional  ftrticlcs  of  food,  eucH  as  moat,  flah,  or  vegetables, 
which  were  called  by  tlio  common  name  of  b^ov^  in  opposition  to  bread 
imd  wino,  which  wero  considered  the  main  supports  of  human  life. 


84  THUCYDIDES.  I.  [cxL. 

140.  *^I  always  adhere  to  Uio  βαιηο  opinion,  Athenians, 
that  we  should  make  no  concessions  to  the  Lacedaemonians ; 
although  I  know  that  men  are  not  persuaded  to  go  to  war,  and 
act  when  engaged  in  it,  with  the  same  temper;  but  that, 
according  to  results,  they  also  diango  their  views.  Still  I  see 
that  the  same  advice,  or  nearly  the  same,  nmst  be  given  by 
1110  now  as  betoro  ;  and  I  claim  from  those' of  you  who  are  be- 
ing persuaded  to  war,  that  you  ΛνίΙΙ  support  the  common  res- 
olutions, should  Avo  ever  meet  with  any  reverse;  or  not,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  lay  any  claim  to  intelligence,  if  successful. 
For  it  frequently  happens  tliat  the  results  of  measures  proceed 
no  less  incomprehensibly  than  the  counsels  of  man  ;  and  there- 
fore we  are  accustomed  to  regard  fortune  as  the  author  of  all 
things  that  turn  out  contrary  to  our  expectation.  Now  tho 
Lacedaimonians  were  both  evidently  ] (lotting  against  us  before, 
and  now  especially  arc  doing  so.  For  whereas  it  Is  expressed 
in  tho  treaty  that  wo  should  give  .and  accept  judicial  decisions 
of  our  ditierences,  and  each  side  [in  the  mean  time]  keep  what 
ΛΥβ  have ;  tlu-y  liave  neither  themselves  hitherto  asked  for 
such  a  decision,  nor  do  they  accept  it  when  we  offer  it ;  but 
wish  our  complaints  to  be  settled  by  war  rather  than  by  words; 
and  are  now  come  dictating,  and  no  longer  expostulating. 
For  they  command  us  to  raistj  the  siege  of  Potidjca,  and  to 
leave  ^gina  independent,  and  to  rescind  the  decree  respecting 
the  Megareans  ;  while  these  last  envoys  that  have  como  charge 
us  also  to  leave  the  (i reeks  independent.'  ]>ut  let  none  of  you 
think  that  >vo  should  bo  going  to  war  fur  a  tritle,  if  we  did 
not  rescind  tho  decree  respecting  the  Megareans,  which  they 
])rincipally  put  forward,  [saying,]  that  if  it  were  rescinded, 
the  war  would  not  take  place:  nor  leave  in  your  minds  any 
room  for  self-accusation  liereafter,  as  though  y((U  had  gone  to 
war  for  a  trivial  thing.  For  this  trille'  involves  the  whole 
confirmation,  as  Avell  as  trial,  of  your  purpose.  If  you  yield 
to  these  demands,  you  will  soon  also  bo  ordered  to  do  some- 
thing greater,  as  having  in  this  instance  obeyed  through  fear: 

'  "Fiirnislies  you  with  an  opportunity  of  confirming  j'our  resolution, 
while  it  tries  it."  It  would  coufiria  their  resolution,  and  secure  it 
apfainst  future  attempts  of  tho  enemy,  for  tho  rea-son  given  two  linos 
afterward,  άι:ισχνΐ)ΐσύμ(νοι  ι^έ  σαφ^ς  uv  καταστί'/οαιτε,  κ.  τ,  λ.  *K\fi 
hero  exactly  agrees  with  ( riiUcr's  explanation  of  it  quoted  in  tho  note  to 
C.  i),  2.     "Ausum  dat  alicui  rei." — Arnohi 


cxu.]  •  TIIUCTDIDES.  I.  85 

]»ut  by  resolutely  refusing  you  would  prove^eleariylo  them  tliat 
they  must  treat  with  you  more  on  nn  cqum  footing. 

141.  *'  Henceforth  then  make  up  your  minds,  cither  to 
submit  before  you  are  hurt,  or,  if  we  go  to  war,  as  I  think  is 
better,  on  importniit  or  trivial  grounds  alike  to  make  no 
ooneession,  nor  to  keep  with  fear  what  Λνο  liavo  now  acquired ; 
for  both  the  greatest  and  the  least  demand  from  equals,  imperi- 
ously urged  on  their  neighbors  previous  to  a  judicial  decision, 
amounts  to  the  samo  degree  of  subjugation.  Now  with  regard 
to  the  war,  and  the  means  possessed  by  both  parties,  that  wc 
shall  not  be  the  weaker  side,  bo  convinced  by  hearing  the  par- 
ticulars. The  Peloponnesians  are  men  who'  cultivate  tneir 
lands  themselves ;  and  they  liavc  no  money  cither  in  private 
(»r  public  funds.  Then  they  arc  inexperienced  in  long  and 
transmarine  wars,  as  they  only  wage  them  with  each  other  for 
a  short  time,  owing  to  their  poverty.  And  men  of  this  de- 
scription can  neither'  man  fleets  nor  often  send  out  land  arma- 
ments ;  being  at  the  same  time  absent  from  their  private  busi-• 
ness,  and  spending  from  their  own  resources ;  and,  moreover, 
K'ing  also  shut  out  from  the  sea :  but  it  is  super-abundant 
revenues  that  support  wars,  rather  than  compulsory  contribu- 
tions. And  men  who  till  the  land  themselves  arc  more  ready 
to  wage  Avar  Avith  their  persons  than  with  their  money:  feel- 
ing confident,  with  regard  to  the  former,  that  they  will  escape 
from  dangers ;  but  not  being  sure,  with  regard  to  the  latter, 
that  they  will  not  spend  it  l>eforo  they  have  done  ;  especially 
should  the  war  be  prolonged  beyond  their  expectation,  as  [in 
this  case]  it  probably  may.  For  in  one  battle  the  Peloponne- 
sians and  their  allies  might  cope  with  all  the  Greeks  together;, 
but  they  could  not  carry  on  a  war  against  resources  of  a  dif- 
ferent description  to  their  own ;  since  they  have  no  one  board 
of  council,  so  as  to  execute  any  measure  with  vigor ;  and  all 
having  equal  votes,  and  hot  lx?ing  of  the  samo  races,  each  for- 
wards his  own  interest ;  for  which  reasons  nothing  generally 
is  brought  to  completion.  For  some  of  them  wish  to  avcngo 
themselves  as  much  as  possible  on  some  particular  party ; 
ΛνΙήΙο  others  wish  as  little  as  possible  to  waste  their  own  pro- 

'  Literally,  "  who  work  thcmsolvcs ;"  in  opposition  to  such  as  had  slavci 
to  work  for  them.  Tho  substantive  tpya,  and  Iho  verb  εργάζομαι,  aro 
frequontly  used  with  especial  refcrcnco  to  affticultural  work,  e.  g,  II.  72.  8. 

'  Oollcr  repeats  Ικπίμζριν  with  πληραικ'ΤΓς. 


66  THUCYDIDEa  I.  [czuL 

perty.  And  after  being  slow  in  coming  together,  it  is  but 
during  a  small  part  of  the  time  that  they  look  to  any  of  tlio 
general  interests,  while  during  the  greater  part  they  are  con- 
triving for  their  own.  And  each  individual  does  not  imagine 
that  ho  will  do  any  harm  by  his  own  neglect,  but  thinks  that 
it  is  the  business  of  every  oue  else  too  to  look  out  for  himself; 
so  that  through  the  same  idea  being  individually  entertained 
by  all,  the  common  cause  is  collectively  sacrifaced  without 
their  observing  it. 

142.  *'  Most  of  all  will  they  bo  impeded  by  scarcity  of 
money,  while,  through  their  slowness  in  providing  it,  they 
continue  to  delay  their  operations ;  whereas  the  opportunities 
of  war  wait  for  no  one.  Neither,  again,  U  their  raising  works 
against  us  worth  fearing,  or  their  lieet.  With  regard  to  tlm 
former,  it  were  difficult  even  in  time  of  peace  to  set  up  a  rival 
city ;  much  more  in  a  hostile  country,  and  when  we  should 
have  raised  works  no  le^s  against  them  :  and  if  they  build 
[only]  a  fort,  they  might  perhaj)s  hurt  some  part  of  our  land 
hy  incursions  and  desertions' ;  it  will  not,  however,  be  possible 
for  them  to  prevent  our  sailing  to  their  country  and  raising 
forts,  and  retaliating  with  our  ships,  in  which  we  are  so 
strong.  For  we  have  more  advantage  for  land-service  from 
our  naval  skill,  than  they  have  fi)r  naval  matters  from  their 
skill  by  land.  lUit  to  becouie  skillful  at  sea  will  not  easily  be 
acquired  by  them.  For  not  even  have  you,  though  practicing 
from  the  very  time  of  the  Median  war,  brought  it  to  perfec- 
tion as  yet ;  how  then  shall  men  who  are  agriculturalists 
and  not  mariners,  and,  moreover,  will  not  even  be  permitted 
to  practice,  from  being  always  observed'  by  us  with  many 
ships,  achieve  anything  worth  speaking  of?  Against  a  few 
ships  observing  them  they  might  run  the  risk,  encouraging 
their  ignorance  by  their  numlx^rs ;  but  when  kept  in  check  by 
many,  they  will  remain  quiet ;  and  through  not  practicing  will 
be  the  less  skillful,  and  therefore  the  more  afraid.  For  naval 
service  is  a  matter  of  art,  like  any  thing  else ;  and  does  not 
admit  of  being  practiced  just  wlun  it  may  ha}»jK'n,  as  a  b}- 
work;  but  rather  does  not  even  allow  of  any  thing  else  being  u 
by-work  to  it.  . 

*  i.  e.,  by  harboring  the  slaves  .and  olliera  who  miKht  po  over  to  ihcin. 

2  ίφομμειν  means  properly  "to  lie  at  anchor,  or  take  ui>  a  station,  with 
a  hostile  purpose ;"  henco,  **  to  observe  tlio  niovcincnts  of  an  enemy,  witli 
a  view  to  attack  him ;"  or,  frequently,  "  to  blockailo  hiiu." 


cxLiii.]  THUCYDIDKS.   I.  87 

143.  "  Even  if  they  should  lake  some  of  the  funds  at  Olym- 
j)ia  or  Delphi,  and  endeavor,  l)y  liigher  pay,  to  rob  us  of 
i)ur  foreign  sailors,  that  Avould  be  alarming,  if  >vo  wero 
not  a  inatcli  for  them,  by  going  on  board  ourselves  and  our 
resident  aliens ;  but  now  this  is  /tho  case ;  and,  what  is  best 
of  all,  Avo  have  native  steersmen,  and  crews  at  large,  more 
fiumerous  and  better  than  all  the  rest  of  Greece.  And 
Avitli  the  danger  before  them,  noho  of  the  foreigners  would 
fonsent  to  fly  his  country,  and  at  the  same  time  >vith  less  hojio 
of  success  to  join  them  in  the  struggle,  for  the  sake  of  a  few 
days*  higher  j)ay.  Tho  circumstances  of  the  Peloponnesians 
then  seem,  to  mo  at  least,  to  be  of  sucli  or  nearly  such  a 
<haract<}r ;  Λνΐιίΐο  ours  seem  botli  to  ha  free  from  tlie  faults  I 
have  found  in  theirs,  and  to  liavo  other  great  advantages  in 
liiOTo  than  an  equal  degree.  Again,  shouUl  (hey  como  by  land 
against  our  country,  wo  will  sail  against  theirs ;  and'  tho  losa 
will  be  greater  for  even  α  part  of  tho  IVloponneso  to  be  rav- 
aged, than  for  the  whole  of  Attica.  For  ihcf/  will  not  l>o  ablo 
to  obtain  any  land  in  its  stead  without  fighting  for  it ;  while  wc 
have  abundance,  both  in  islands  and  on  the  mainland.  More- 
over, consider  it  [in  this  point  of  view] :  if  wc  had  been 
islanders,  who  would  liave  been  more  impregnable  ?  And  wo 
ought,  as  it  is,  v>\{\i  views  as  near  as  possible  to  those  of 
islanders,  to  givo'  \ip  all  thought  of  our  land  and  houses,  and 
keep  watch  over  the  sea  and  the  city ;  and  not,  througli  being 
enraged  on  their  account,  to  come  to  an  engagement  with  tho 
1 'eloponnesians,  who  arc  much  more  numerous;  (for  if  wc  de- 
feat them,  wo  shall  have  to  fight  again  >vith  no  fewer  of  them ; 
and  if  wo  meet  Avith  a  reverse,  our  allies  are  lost  also ;  for  they 
will  not  remain  quiet  if  wo  are  not  ablo  to  lead  our  forces 
against  them ;)  and  Λνο  should  make  lamentation,  not  for  the 
houses  and  land,  but  for  tho  lives  [that  arc  lost]  ;  for  it  is  not 
these  things  that  gain  men,  but  men  that  gain  these  things. 
And  if  I  thought  that  I  should  persuade  you,  I  would  bid  you 
go  out  yourselves  and  ravage  them,  and  show  tho  Pcloponnc- 

•  Literally,  ••  it  will  no  longer  bo  tho  «amo  thing  for  pomo  part  of  tho 
reloponncso  to  bo  ravapod,  and  for  tho  whole  of  Attica." 
a  ύ^ίη/η  is  used  in  a  eimilar  scnso  by  Sophocles,  (Ed.  Col.  914. 

r»l  τηηΛί  ττ)ζ  γης  κνιη\  ώί'  Ιπηοπεοών, 
ύγ((ς  (f  α  χ^νί/ζίΐΓ^  κηι  παρίστασαι  dtg. 


88  TUUCYDiPES.  I.  [cxuv.,  cxlt. 

emns  thai  you  will  not  submit  to  them  for  theso  tbings,  at  any 
rate. 

144.  **  I  liavo  also  many  other  grounds  for  hoping  that  wo 
shall  conquer,  if  you  will  avoid  gaining  additional  dominion  at 
the  time  of  your  being  engaged  in  the  war,  and  bringing  on 
yourselves  dangers  of  your  own  choosing;  for  I  am  more 
afraid  of  our  own  mistakes  than  of  the  enemy's  plans.  But 
those  points  shall  bo  explained  in.  another  Bixech  at  the  time 
of  the  events.  At  the  present  timo  let  us  send  these  men 
away  Avith  this  answer :  that  with  regard  to  the  Megareans, 
we  will  allow  them  to  use  our  ports  and  market,  if  the  Lace- 
daemonians also  abstain  from  exj)elling  foreigners,  whether 
ourselves  or  our  allies' (for  it  forbids  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other  in  the  treaty) :  >vith  regard  to  the  states,  that  he  will 
leave  them  indo|HiKleiit,  if  wo  also  lield  them  as  independent 
when  wo  miule  the  treaty ;  and  when  ihey  too  restore  to  the 
states  a  permission  to  be  independent  suitably  to  the  interests,* 
not  of  the  Lacedienioiiians  themselves,  but  of  the  several  states, 
as  they  wish  :  that  we  are  willing  to  submit  to  judicial  decision, 
according  (o  the  treaty :  and  that  we  will  not  commence  hos- 
tilities, but  will  defend  ourselves  against  th<»so  who  do.  For 
this  is  both  a  right  answer  and  a  Weoniing  one  for  tho  state 
to  give,  hut  you  should  know  that  go  to  war  we  must;  and 
if  we  accept  it  Avillingly  rather  than  not,  we  shall  find  tho 
enemy  less  disposed  to  press  us  hard  ;  ami,  moreover,  that  it 
is  from  the  greatest  hazards  that  the  greatest  honors  also  arc 
gained,  both  by  state  and  by  individual.  Our  fathers,  at  any 
rate,  by  withstanding  the  Medes — though  they  did  not  begin 
Avith  such  resources  [us  Ave  have],  but  had  even  abandoned 
what  they  had — and  by  counsel,  more  than  by  fortune,  and  by 
daring,  more  than  by  strength,  beat  oil'  the  barbarian,  and 
advanced  those  nsources  to  tlieir  j»resent  height.  And  wo 
must  not  fall  short  of  them ;  but  muut  repel  our  enemies  in 
every  >vay,  and  endeavor  to  be<jueath  our  power  to  our  posterity 
no  less  [than  we  received  it]." 

145.  IVricles   spoke   to    this    elU.et ;    and    the   Athenians, 

•  ArnoUl,  after  Hermann,  understands  ΙκεΙνη  awd  rufV  as  nccuaativos, 
and  supplies  rt  as  tho  noniinativo  ease  to  κωλύει,  ijt)ller,  after  Haack, 
uaderstands  κωλνει  as  iuiporsonal,  ••  neither  tho  one  nor  tho  utlier  is  -Jk 
hindoranco  iu  tho  treaty." 

'  Coniparo  chap.  19.  1.  7G.  1. 


cxLTi]  THUCYDIDES.  I.  80 

thinking  that  ho  gavo  thorn  the  best  advice,  voted  as  ho  de- 
sired them,  and  answered  tho  Lacedaimonians  according  to 
liis  views,  both  on  tho  separate  points,  as  he  told  them,  and 
generally,  that  they  would  do  nothing  on  command,  but  wero 
ready  to  have  their  complaints  settled  by  judicial  decision,  ac- 
cording to  tho  treaty,  on  a  fair  and  equal  footing.  So  they 
went  back  home,  and  came  on  no  more  embassies  afterward. 

140.  These  were  tho  charges  and  differences  that  each  side 
had  before  tho  war,  beginning  from  the  Very  timo  of  tho  affairs 
at  Epidamnus  and  Corcyra.  Neverthclese  they  continued  to 
have  intercourse  during  them,  and  to  go  to  each  other's  coun- 
try without  any  herald,  though  not  without  suspicion;  fof 
what  was  taking  place  served  to  break  up  the  treaty,  and  waa 
β  pretext  for  war. 


BOOK  II. 


1.  The  war  betwocn  tlio  Athenians  and  Pcloponnoeians 
and  their  respective  allies  now  begins  from  this  period,  at 
which  they  ceased  from  further  intercourse  with  each  other 
without  a  herald,  and  having  once  proceeded  to  liostilities,  car- 
ried them  on  continuously  ;  and  the  liistory  of  it  is  written  itt 
order,  as  the  several  events  hap|)ened,  by  suinuiers  and  winters. 

2.  For  the  thirty  years'  truce  which  was  made  after  the  η  - 
duction  of  Euboea  lasted  fourteen  years;  but  in  the  fifteenth 
year,  when  Chrysis  was  in  the  forty-eighth  year  of  her  priest- 
hood at  Argos,  and  ^^nesias  vvjis  ejdior  of  Sparta,  and  Py- 
thodorus  had  sUll  two  months  to  l)e  archon  at  Athens;  in  the 
sixth  month  after  the  battle  at  Totida'Ji,  and  in  the  beginning 
of  8j)ring,  rather  more  than  three  hundred  men  of  the  Thebans 
(led  by  ]*ythangelus,  eon  of  riiyiidas,  and  l)iemj)orus,  son  of 
Onetorides,  lia'otarelis),  about  the  first'  vvateh  entere»!  witli 
their  arms  into  Plataia,  a  town  of  JioOlia,  >vhieh  vvas  in  alli- 
ance vvith  the  Athenians.  There  were  certain  men  of  the 
Platajans  wIjo  called  them  in,  and  o|K»ned  the  gatis  to  tluni, 
namely,  Nauclides  and  his  party,  who  wishe*l,  for  the  sake  oi* 
their  own  ]»ower,  ti>  put  to  death  those  of  the  citizens  wh«» 
^vere  opposed  to  tlu-m,  and  to  ]>ut  the  city  into  the  hands  ot* 
the  Thebans.  They  carried  on  these  negotiations  through 
Eurymachus,  the  son  ot^  Leonliades,  a  very  intluential  jxtsou 
at  Thelxis.  For  the  Thebans,  foreseeing  that  the  >var  would 
take  place,  Λvishe^l  to  surj)ris(^  Tlatiea,  which  had  always  Ik  en 
at  variance  with  them,  while  it  vvas  still  time  of  peace,  and  the 
war  had  not  openly  broken  out.  And  on  this  account,  t•"», 
they  entered  the  ηιοπ;  i-.isily  without  being  observed,  as  n•» 
guanl  had  been  set  bet\)re  [the  gates].  After  piling  thiir 
arms  in  the  market-j)la»e,  they  did  not  comply  with  the  wWa 
of  those  who  called  them  in  by  immediately  setting  to  vvork, 
and  going  to  the  houses  of  their  adversaries;  but  detennined 

'  Literally,  "  first  sleep.'* 


III.]  TIIUCYDIDES.   II.  91 

to  niako  a  proclamation  in  friondly  tormp,  and  to  bring  the 
city  to  an  agrofmeut  rdiher,^!  to  friendsliip ;  and  the  herald 
])roclaimod,  that  ΛνΙιοονοΓ  >vishc<l  to  make  nllianco  accorditicr 
to  tho  hereditary  principles  of  all  tho  l^ceotians,  should  come 
and  pile'  his  arms  with  them,  supposing  that  the  city  would 
easily  come  over  to  them  by  this  method. 

3.  The  riaffcans,  on  finding  that  the  Thebans  were  >vithin 
their  Λvail8,  and  that  their  city  Avas  unexpectedly  taken,  being 
Vi'iy  much  alarmed,  and  thinking  that  tar  more  had  entered 
than  really  had  (for  they  did  not  see  them  in  the  night),  came 
to  an  agreement,  and  having  accepted  tho  terms,  remained 
<iuiet;  especially  since  they  were  proceeding  to  no  violent 
measures  against  any  one.  But  by  some  means  or  other, 
while  making  these  negotiations,  they  observed  that  the  The- 
bans were  not  numerous,  and  thought  that  by  attacking  them 
they  might  easily  overpower  them  ;  for  it  was  not  the  wish  of 
the  great  bcwly  of  the  riata\'m»  to  revolt  from  the  Athenians. 
They  determined  therefore  to  make  tho  attempt;  and  pro- 
ceeded to  join  each  otluT  by  digging  through  the  partition- 
>valls  [of  their  liouses],  that  they  might  not  be  seen  goincr 
through  the  streets;  and  set  wagons,  without  the  cattle,  in 
the  streets,  to  serve  for  a  barricade ;  and  got  every  thing  else 
ready,  as  each  seemed  likely  to  be  of  service  for  the  business 
in  hand.  AVlien  things  Avere  in  readiness,  as  far  as  they  could 
make  them  so,  liaving  Avatched  for  the  time  when  it  was  still 
night  and  just  about  dav-break,  they  began  to  go  out  of  their 
houses  against  them;  that  tliey'  might  not  attack  them  by 
day-light,  when  they  ΛνοηΚΙ  l)C  more  bold,  and  on  equal  terms 
Avith  themselves,  but  in  tho  night,  when  they  >vould  be  more 
timid,  and  fight  at  a  disadvantage  through  their  own  acquaint- 
ance with  the  city.  So  they  assailed  them  immediately,  and 
came  to  close  quarters  with  them  as  quickly  as  tliey  could. 

'  "  The  Thcbiins,  ns  usual  on  a  lialt,  procccdc<l  to  pilo  their  nrms,  nnd 
by  inviting  tho  Tlaticans  to  pilo  theirs  with  thcm^  they  meant  that  they 
sliould  conic  in  nrnis  from  their  several  houses  to  join  them,  nnd  time 
naturally  pilo  their  spears  nnd  Bhiclda  with  those  of  their  friends,  to  bo 
taken  up  tOKethcr  Avilh  theirs,  whenover  they  should  bo  required  cither 
to  march  or  to  flpht."— ^rnoW.    Seo  his  whole  note. 

8  Tho  original  is  rendered  obscure  by  tho  singular  change  in  tho  sub- 
jects of  tho  two  verbs,  npontpipuvrai  end  γίγνυνται ;  tho  former  refer- 
ring to  tho  Platftans,  tho  latter  to  tho  Thebans.  I  have  allowed  ftiyeclf 
a  littlo  moro  license  than  usual  in  translating  tho  passage,  to  avoid  tho 
awkwardness  of  a  literal  version.    ' 


02  TnUCYDIDES.  ΙΓ.  (ir. 

4.  Tho  Thebans,  on  iiuding  themselves  outwitted,  prooeeiloil 
to  close  their  ranks,  aud  repel  their  attacks,  wherever  they 
might  fall  upon  theih.  And  twice  or  thrico  they  beat  them 
ofl*;  but  afterward,  when  the  men  were  assailing  them  witii 
a  great  clamor,  aud  tho  women  and  slaves  were  rai:iing  a 
loud  shouting  aud  screaming  from  the  houses,  and  pelting 
them  with  stones  and  tiles,  and  a  violent  rain  ndso  had  como 
oa  in  the  night,  they  were  frightened,  and  turned  and  lied 
through  tho  city,  the  greater  part  of  them,  through  the  dark 
and  dirt  (for  the  event  happened  at  tho  end  of  tho  month), 
being  unacquainted  with  the  ways  out,  by  which  they  \vere  to 
savo  themselves;  while  they  had  pursuers  who  were  acquainted 
Avith  them,'  to  prevent  their  escaping :  so  that  many  were  put 
to  death.  Moreover,  ono  of  tho  Plata;ans  had  shut  tho  gate  l»y 
which  they  had  entered,  aud  which  was  tlio  only  ono  opene«l, 
by  driving  tho  spike  of  a  spear  into  tho  bar,  instead  of  a  bolt"; 
so  that  there  >va3  no  longer  any  way  out  even  by  that.  As 
they  were  chased  up  and  down  tho  city,  some  of  them  mounti^'d 
tho  \vall  and  threw  themselves  over,  and  perished  most  ot' 
them  :  others  came  to  a  lone  gate,  anJ,  a  woman  having  given 
them  an  ax,  cut  through  tho  bar  without  being  observed,  and 
>vent  out,  but  in  no  great  numbers,  for  it  was  quickly  tlis- 
covered ;  while  others  met  their  fate  scattered  about  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  city.  But  the  largest  and  most  united  boily 
of  them  rushed  into  a  spacious  building  which  joined  on  to  tho 
wall,  and  the  near  door  of  which  happened  to  be  open,  think- 
ing that  the  door  of  the  building  was  a  gate  [of  the  city],  mu\ 
that  there  was  a  passage  straight  through  to  the  outside. 
AVhen  the  Tlataians  saw  them  cut  oft*,  they  consulted  whether 

*  "  Τον  μϊι  εκ(;>ίνγειν."  Poppo  obsorvos  that  tho  infinitivo  does  not  ex- 
press a  purpose,  as  it  does  elsewhere,  but  a  result.  Arnold  supposes  that 
"when  thus  added  to  sentences  in  tho  genitive  case,  it  denotes  properly 
neither  an  intended  nor  an  unintended  result,  but  simply  a  connection, 
or  belonging  to,  in  tlio  attached  idea  with  respect  to  that  which  had  pre• 
ceded  it.  'Having  their  pursuers  well  acquainted  with  tho  ways,  which 
thing  belonged  to,  or  was  connected  with,  their  not  escaping.' " 

3  "Tho  fiu?.avor  was  a  sort  of  pin  or  bolt  inserted  into  the  bar,  and 
going  through  it  into  tho  gates.  AVhen  driven  quite  homo,  it  could  of 
course  only  bo  extracted  by  a  key  whoso  i)ipo  exactly  corresponded  to 
it  in  size,  so  as  to  take  a  firm  hold  ort  it :  and  hence  the  key  was  calU'd 
βαλανάγμα,  or  catch-bolt,  from  its  catching  and  so  drawing  out  tho 
βάλανος.  Tho  effect  of  putting  in  this  spike  was  exactly  that  of  spiking 
a  cannon ;  it  could  not  again  bo  extracted,  as  there  was  no  proper  key 
to  fit  it.''— Arriohl. 


v.]  TnUCYDIDES.  II.  93 

Ihcy  should  burn  them  whero  iTiey^^re,  hy  Rctling  firo  to  tlio 
building,  or  treat  them  in  any  other  miy.  At  last,  both  tlioso 
and  all  tho  rest  of  the  Thebaus  that  >wre  yet  alive,  and  wan- 
dering; np  and  down  the  city,  agreed  to  deliver  up  themselves 
jind  their  arms  to  the  riata?ans,  to  do  >vith  them  as  they 
pleased.     Thus  then  fared  tho  party  who  wero  in  l*lata)a. 

5.  Tho  rest  of  tho  Thebans,  Λνΐιο  wore  to  have  joined  them 
with  all  their  forces  while  it  was  still  night,  in  caso  those 
who  had  entered  should  bo  «t  all  unsuccessful,  on  receiving 
on  their  march  tho  tidings  of  what  had  happened,  advancxid 
to  their  succor.  Now  IMatrca  is  seventy  stades  distant 
from  Thebes,  and  tho  rain  which  had  fallen  in  tho  night 
niado  them  proceed  tho  slower;  for  the  river  Asopus  was 
flowing  with  a  full  stream,  and  was  not  to  bo  crossed  easily. 
So  by  marching  through  the  rain,  and  having  passed  the  river 
witli  diiliculty,  they  arrived  too  late  ;  as  some  of  the  men  had 
been  by  this  time  slain,  and  others  of  them  wero  kept  alivo  as 
]>nsoners.  AVhcn  tho  Thebans  learned  what  had  happened, 
they  formed  α  design  against  thoso  of  the  Platncans  who  Avcro 
<>utsido  tho  city  (for  there  Averc  both  men  and  stock  in  tho 
fields,  inasmuch  as  the  evil  had  happened  unexpectedly  in 
time  of  peace),  for  they  wished  to  have  all  they  could  tako  to 
exchange  for  their  own  men  within,  should  any  happen  to 
have  been  taken  alivo,  Such  were  their  plans,  lint  tho 
riaticans,  while  they  Λvero  still  deliberating,  having  suspected 
that  there  would  bo  something  of  this  kind,  and  being  alarmed 
for  thoso  out-iiile,  sent  out  a  herald  to  tho  Thebans,  saying 
that  they  had  not  acted  justly  in  what  had  been  done,  by  en- 
deavoring to  seize  their  city  in  time  of  treaty ;  and  told  them 
not  to  injuro  what  was  without ;  else  ikci/  also  would  put  to 
<leath  the  men  whom  they  had  alivo  in  their  hands ;  but  if 
they  withdrew  again  from  tho  territory,  they  would  givo  tho 
men  back  to  them.  Tho  Tliebans  givo  this  account  of  tho 
TTiatter,  and  say  that  they  sworo  to  it.  But  the  Platseans  do 
not  acknowledge  that  they  prom'scd  to  givo  back  the  men 
immedmtchj^  but  when  proposals  had  first  been  made,  in  caso 
of  their  coming  to  any  agreement :  and  they  deny  that  they 
swore  to  it,     'At  any  rate  the  Thebans  retired  from  the  tcr- 

'  f.  i.,  whichever  of  tho  two  difTorcnt  statomonts  was  tho  moro  correct 
ono.  Sucli  I  think  is  generally  tho  meaning  of  fV  ovv ;  and  I  doubt 
whether  it  has  not  this  force,  T.  3.  6.  Oi  tV  ovv  ώς  ίκαητοι  Ύ.Αλτινΐς^ 
*.  r.  ;.     "Whatever  truth  there  may  bo  in  tho  theory• just  stated,  ccr- 


04  THUCTDIDES.  IL  [tl.til 

ritory  without  having  done  any  injury;  but  the  PlatsanR, 
after  getting  in  as  (juickly  as  possible  whatever  they  had  in 
the  country,  immediately  put  the  men  to  death.  Those  who 
had  been  taken  were  one  hundred  and  eighty,  and  Euryma- 
ehus,  witli  whom  the  traitors  had  negotiated,  was  one  cf  them. 

0.  When  they  had  done  this,  they  sent  a  messenger  to 
Athens,  and  gave  back  tlio  dead  to  the  Thebans  under  a 
truce,  and  arranged  matters  in  the  city  to  suit  their  present 
circumstances,  'as  seemed  best  to  them. — Now  news  liad  im- 
mediately been  taken  to  the  Athenians  of  what  had  been  done 
with  respect  to  the  Platicans ;  and  they  straightway  seized  as 
many  of  the  Ikeotians  as  were  in  Attica,  and  sent  a  herald  to 
Plataia,  with  orders  to  forbid  their  proceeding  to  extremities, 
in  the  case  of  the  Thebans  whom  they  liad  in  their  hands,  till 
they  also  should  take  counsel  about  them:  for  tidings  of  their 
being  dead  had  not  yet  reached  tliem.  For  the  first  iiiessenger 
[of  the  riaticans]  had  gone  out  at  the  verj'  time  of  the  cnter- 
mg  of  the  Thebans;  and  the  second,  when  they  had  just  been 
conquered  and  taken :  fo  that  of  the  subsequent  events  they 
knew  nothing.  Thus  then  the  Athenians  Avere  in  ignoranco 
when  they  sent  their  order ;  and  the  lierald,  on  Ids  arrival, 
found  the  men  slain.  After  this  the  Athenians  marched  to 
Platioa,  and  brought  in  ]»rovisions,  and  left  a  garrison  in  it, 
and  took  out  the  least  etiicient  of  the  men  with  the  women 
and  children. 

7.  When  the  business  at  I'lat.Ta  had  oc(;urre(l,  and  the 
treaty  had  been  clearly  broken,  the  Athenians  began  to  pre- 
pare for  going  to  war;  and  so  did  the  Laceda;monians  and 
their  allies,  both  intending  to  send  embassies  to  the  king,  and 
to  the  barbarians  in  other  ])arts,  from  whatever  (juarter  either 
party  lioped  to  gain  any  assistance,  and  bringing  into  alliance 
Avith  them  such  states  as  were  not  in  their  power.  And  on' 
the  side  of  the  Laceduimonians,  in  addition  to  the  ships  already 
on  the  spot  in  Sicily  and  Italy,  belonging  to  those  who  had 
espoused  their  cause,  they  were  ordered  t<j  build  more  accord- 
ing to  the  greatness  of  the  cities,  so  that  in  the  whole  number 

tainly  tlio  Greeks  did  nothing  in  ono  uiiitol  body,"  etc.  Thus  it  ap- 
proaches moro  nearly  in  signification  to  yovv  tlian  to  the  simplo  orr,  with 
wliich  it  ponerally  seems  to  bo  regarded  as  synonymous.  TI>o  tragedians 
very  frequently  use  it  in  this  manner.  In  other  passages,  however,  it 
has  the  proper  force  of  each  partiile,  "  and  aeeordingly." 

'  Fur  the  construction  of  this  obscure  sentence,  see  Arnold's  note. 


VIII.,  ΐϊ.]  THUCYDIDES.  ΙΓ.  05 

Ihoy  should  amount  to  five  hundred  ;  and  to  get  ready  a  cer- 
tain sum  of  money  whicli  was  mentioned,  while  they  remained 
(juict  in  other  respects,  ^ii4-recCived  the  Athenians  coming 
with  a  singlo  ship,  till  these  preparations  should  bo  made. 
Tiio  Athenians,  on  tho  other  hand,  were  inspecting  their  pres- 
ent confederacy,  and  sending  embassadors  to  the  countries 
more  immediately  around  tho  Peloponnesc,  as  Corcyra,  Cephal- 
lenia,  Acarnania,  and  Zacynthus ;  seeing  that  if  these  wero 
tirm  friends  to  them,  they  would  successfully  carry  on  tho 
war  round  the  Poloponneso. 

8.  Indeed  both  parties  had  no  small  designs,  but  put  forth 
their  strength  to  tho  war  :  and  not  unnaturally  ;  for  all  men  at 
the  beginning  apply  themselves  to  it  more  eagerly;  and  at  that 
time  tho  young  men,  bfing  numerous  in  the  Peloponnese,  and 
also  at  Athens,  were,  through  their  inexperience,  not  unΛvilling 
to  engage  in  tho  war.     And  the  rest  of  Greece  Avas  all  in  ex-    ,  . 
citement  at  tho   conflict  of  the   pnncipie'  states.     And  many //>(^ 
prophecies'  were  roneated,  and  reciters  ot  oracles  wero  singing' 
many  of  them,  botn   among  those   who   were  going  to  war 
and  in  tho  other  states.     Moreover,  Delos  liad  been  visited  by 
an  earthquake  a  short  time  before  this,  though  it  had  never 
had  a  shock  before  in  tho  memory  of  tho  Greeks;  and  it  was 
f>asd  and  thought  to  have  been  ominous  of  what  was  about  to 
take  place.     And  whatever  else  of  this  kind  had  happened  to 
occur  was  all  searched  up.     Tho  good  wishes  of  men  mado 
greatly  for  tho  Lacedaemonians,  especially  as  they  gave  out 
that  they  wero  tho  liberators  of  Greece.     And  every  individ- 
ual, as  well  as  state,  put  forth   his  strength  to  help  them  in 
whatever  lie  could,  both  by  word  and  deed ;  and  each  thought 
that  tho  cause  was  impeded  at  that  point  at  Λvhich  he  himself 
would  not  bo   present.     So   angrv  wero   tho  generality  Λvith 
tho  Athenians ;  some  from  a  wish  to  bo  released  from  their 
dominion,   others   from   a  fear   of  being    brought   under   it. 
With  such  preparations  and  feelings  then  did  they  enter  on  • 
the  contest. 

*  Poppo,  Bredow,  and  IToack  a^rco  In  considering  λόγια  as  a  moro 
general  ierm  for  any  prophetic  announcement  whatever,  in  opposition  to 
χρησμοί,  which  were  metrical  compositions,  generally  in  hexameters  or 
trimelcr  iambics,  delivefod  by  an  oracle,  and  recited  by  persons  who  col- 
lected thorn,  and  wero  called  χμησμηλογυι.  For  a  specimen  of  tho  class, 
pco  tuo  Birds  of  Aristophanes,  v.  060. 


06  THUOYDIDES.  Π.  [ix.,  χ.. 

• 
0.  Kacli  party  Iiod  tho  following  fitatcs  in  alliance  when 
they  set  to  tho  war.  Tho  allies  of  tho  Lacedsemonians  wero 
these :  all  tho  Peloponnesiaps  within  tho  Isthmus,  except  tho 
Argives  and  Achaeans  (theso  wero  in  friendship  with  both 
parties ;  and  the  Pellcnians  wero  tho  only  pooplo  of  the  Achic- 
ans  that  joined  in  tho  war  at  first,  though  afterward  all  of 
them  did);  and  without  tho  IVloponnese,  tho  Megareans, 
Locrians,  Boeotians,  Phocians,  Ambraciot^,  Lcucadians,  and 
Anactorians.  Of  these,  tho  states'  which  furnished  a  navy 
were  tho  Corinthians,  Megareana,  Sicyonians,  Pellenians, 
Eleans,  Ambraciots,  and  Leucadians.  Those  that  supplied 
cavalry  wero  the  Bautians,  Phocians,  and  Locrians.  Tho 
rest  of  them  scut  infantry.  This  then  was  tho  Laceda?mo- 
nian  confederacy.  That  of  tho  Athenians  comprehended  the 
Chians,  Lesbians,  Piaticans,  tlio  Mcssenians  at  Naupactus,  tho 
greater  part  of  tho  Acarnauians,  tho  Corcyreans,  tho  Zacyn- 
thians :  also  somo  other  states  which  wero  tributiiry  among 
the  following  nations ;  as  tho  maritime  parts  of  Caria,  and 
Doris  adjacent  to  it,  Ionia,  tho  Hellespont,  tho  Greek  towns 
Thrace  ward;  tho  islands,  >vhich  wero  situated  between  tho 
iVloponneso  and  Crete,  toward  the  east,*  and  all  tho  rest  of 
tho  Cyclades  except  Moles  and  Thera.  Of  these,  tho  Chians, 
Ix'sbiaas,  and  Corcyreans,  furnislied  a  naval  force,  tho  rest  of 
them  infantry  and  money.  Such  was  the  confederacy  on 
each  side,  and  their  resources  for  the  war. 

10.  The  Laceda;monians,  immediately  after  what  had  Iimj. 
pened  at  Plataa,  sent  round  orders  through  tho  Pelopunii^  s.; 
and  the  rest  of  their  confederacy,  for  tho  states  to  prepare  an 
army  and  such  provisions  as  it  was  proper  to  have  for  a  for- 
eign expedition,  with  a  view  to  invading  Attica.  AVhen 
they  had  each  got  ready  })y  the  ai)pointed  time,  two  thirds 
from  every  state  assembled  at  the  Isthmus.  And  nftcr  tho 
whole  army  >vas  mustered,  Archidamus,  tho  king  of  tho  La- 
cedaimonians,  λυΙιο  led  this  expedition,  summoned  to  his  pres- 


'  I  am  inclined  to  think  tliat  ai  a'/hn  Kix/.u'Vr  may  signify  tho  moro 
Λvesterly  part  of  tho  group,  in  oi)pcsitioii  to  ηυός  ήλιον  ιΐνίσχονσα.  Olher- 
wiso  Blooratic'ld's  must  be  tho  only  correct  version ;  ^^nainelj/y  all  the  Cy- 
clados,"  etc.  Tho  faf;t  of  both  MeU)3  and  Thora  beinj,'  among  tho  iKo^t 
*!outherly  of  all  tho  «slunds  seem»  entirely  to  overthrow  Guller's  interpn- 
tution  of  tlio  Dussage,  which  would  refer  al  ύ?.?.ηι  Κνκ'λύόις  to  tho  islundi 
<.aot  of  Cruxc  ΓιοχχΓ.^  lu  coiitradistiuction  to  tho  i'eloponucae  and  Crete. 


XI.]  TnUCTDIDES.  Π.  07 

cnro  the  generals  of  all  Yk^^talc^^  nnd  tliosc»  hicrhest  m  office 
and  of  most  importance,  and  spoKe  to  the  foUowitig  ]>ιιτ}  or-t  t 

11.  "Men  of  the   Peloponnese  and  allies,  both  i-ui    f:•;!;,  r•; 
ma<lc  many  expeditions,  as  well  in  the  iNloponnesc  j.s mt    ιλ 
it,  and  the  elder  part  of  ourselves  aro  not  without  ex)  eri<  ικ^• 
in  wars.     Never  yet,  however,  liave  Λνο  nnirehed  cut   with   a 
j:;reater  force  than  this;  but  we  are. now  poinj!^  against  a  nmsi 
]iowerful  state,  and  with  a  moi^t  numerous  and  most  excellently 
equipped  army  on  our  own  side.     AVe  ought  then  to  show  i)ur- 
selves  neither  inferior  to  our  fatluTs,   nor  degenerated  from 
our  own  eliaractcr.     For  the  whole  of  Greece  hits  its  ex]t' 
ation  raised,  and  is  ]»aying  attention  to  this  attack,  with  gooi; 
Λνί»1κ'8  that  wc  may  succeed   in  our  designs,  through  their 
Jiatred   of  the   Athenians.      Though,   then,  some   may  think 
that  wc  aro  making   the  attack  with   superior  numbers,  and 
that  it  is  very  certain  our  adversaries  will  not  meet  us  in 
battle,  Λνο  nuist  not,  for  this  reason,  go  at  all   less  carefully 
prepared;   but   both   the   general    and    Foldier   of  each    state 
should,  as  far  as  concerns  himself,  bo    always   expecting   to 
come  into  danger.     For  the  events  of  Avar  are  uncertain,  and 
attacks  are  generally  made  in  it  with  short  notice,  and  under 
the  impulse  of  passion ;  frequently,  too,  has  the  less  number, 
through   being    afraid,   more   successfully    repelled    the  •  more 
numerous  forces,  through  their  being   unprepared   in   conse- 
quence of  their  contenmt.     In  the  enemy's  country  indce(Vmen 
ought  always  to  mardi  with  boldness  of  feeling,  but  at  tho 
same   time   to   make  their  actual    preparations    with    a  <1c- 
grco  of  fear ;  for  in  this  way  they  would  bo  at  once  most  full 
of  courage  for  atticking  their  adversaries,  and  most  secure 
against  being  attacked.     15ut  in   our  own   case,  wo  aro  not 
going  against  a  state  that  is  so  powerless  to  'defend  itself, 
but  against  one  most  excellently  provided  with  every  thing ; 
so  that  wo  must  fully  expect  that  they  will  meet  us  in  battle ; 
and  if  they  have   not  already  set  out  before  wo  are  there, 
yet  [that  tliey  will  do  so],  ΛνΙιοη  they  see  us  in  their  terri- 
tory  wasting   and   destroying   their  property.      For   all   aro 
angry,  when  suffering  any  unwonted  evil,  to  see  it  done  be* 
foro  their  eyes,  and  in  their  very  presence :   and  those  wrho 
[on   such   provocation]    reflect  tho   least,   set  to  -Avork   with 
the  greatest  passion  [to  avenge  themselves].    And  it  is  nat? 
nral  that  tho  Athenians  should  do  bo  even  to  a  greater  ex- 

5 


08  THUCYDIDES,  Π.  [xn.,  xiiL 

teDt  than  others,  since  they  presume  to  rule  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  to  go  against  and  ravage  their  neighbors*  land, 
rather  than  see  their  own  ravaged.  As  then  wo  are  march- 
ing against  a  state  of  this  description,  and  shall  gain  for  our 
forefathers,  as  well  as  for  ourselves,  the  most  decided  charat^- 
ter,  one  way  or  the  other,  from  the  results ;  follow  where  any 
one  may  lead  you,  valuing  order  and  caution  above  every 
thing,  and  with  quickness  receiving  your,  commands.  For' 
iliis  is  the  finest  and  the  safest  thing  that  can  be  seen,  for  a 
large  body  of  men  to  show  themselves  maintaining  unifonn 
discii)Une.'* 

12.  Having  thus  spoken,  and  dismissed  the  assembly,  Λγ- 
chidanms  first  sent  Melesippus  sou  of  Diaeritus,  a  Spartan, 
to  Athens;  in  case  the  Athenians  might  be  moro  disposed  to 
submit,  when  they  saw  that  the  IVloponnesians  were  now  on 
tlieir  march.  Kut  they  did  not  admit  him  into  the  city,  nor  to 
their  assembly ;  for  the  opinion  of  I'erieles  had  previously 
been  adopted,  nnt  to  admit  any  herald  with  an  embassy  from 
the  Lacedaiinonians,  when  they  had  once  mart-hed  out  from 
tlieir  frontiers.  They  sent  liim  back  therefore  before  hearinii^ 
him,  and  ordered  him  beyond  the  borders  that  same  day, 
and  [to  tell  those  who  sent  himj  that  in  future,  if  they  wished 
to  propose  any  thini^,  they  should  send  embassadors  after 
they  had  retired  to  their  own  territories.  And  they  sent  an 
escort  with  Melesippus,  to  prevent  his  liolding  communica- 
tion with  any  one.  AVhen  he  was  on  the  frontiers,  and  Λvas 
about  to  be  dismissed,  ho  spoke  these  words  and  departed  : 
"This  day  will  be  the  beginning  of  great  evils  to  Greece." 
AVhiiU  he  arrived  at  the  camp,  and  Archidamus  found  that  the 
Athenians  would  not  yet  submit  at  all,  he  then  set  out  and 
advanced  with  his  army  into  their  territory.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Haitians,  while  they  furnished  their  contingent  and  their 
cavalry  to  join  the  Peloponnesians  iu  their  expedition,  went  to 
Plataia  with  the  remainder  of  their  force,  and  laid  waste  their 
land. 

13.  While  the  IVloponnesians  were  still  assembling  at  tho 
Isthmus,  and  >vbro  on  their  march,  before  they  invaded  Attica, 
I'erieles,  son  of  Xanthippus,  who  was  general  of  the  Athe- 
nians with  nine  colleagues,  \\\nn  lui  found  that  the  invasion 
would  take  place,  8us[)eeted  that  either  Archidamus,  becausi^ 
ho  haj)peued  to  be  his  friend,  might  frequently  pass  over  his 


1111]  \    THUOTDIliES.  Π.  99 

lands,  and  not  ravage  tiienvfrom  a  personal  wisli  to  oblige 
liiin ;  or  that  tbis  migbt  be  done  at  tbc  command  of  tbe  Lace- 
dicmoniaiis  for  the  j>urpose  of  raising  a  slander  against  him 
— as  it  was  also  with  reference  to  him  that  they  had  cbargcd 
them  to  drive  out  the  accursed ;  and  therefore  ho  publicly 
declared  to  the  Athenians  in  the  assembly,  that  though  Ar- 
rhidamus  λ\\ι8  his  friend,  he  had  not  been  admitted  into 
his  friendship  for  any  harm  to  the  state ;  should,  then,  the 
«•nemy  not  lay  waste  his  lands  and  houses,  like  those  of  the 
rest,  he  gave  them  up  to  be  public  property,  and  that  no 
suspicion  might  arise  against  them  on  these  grounds,  lie 
gave  them  advice  also  on  their  present  affairs,  the  same  as  he 
had  before  given ;  namely,  to  ])r(']»aro  for  the  war,  and  bring 
in  tlR'ir  property  from  the  country,  and  not  go  out  against 
them  to  battle,  but  to  come  in  and  guard  tlio  city,  and  get 
ready  their  fleet,  in  which  they  were  so  strong,  and  keep  tho 
allies  tight  in  hand ;  reminding  them  that  their  main  strength 
was  tlerived  from  tho  returns  of  tho  money  paid  by  these,  and 
that  most  of  the  advantages  in  war  wore  giiincd  by  counsel 
and  abundance  of  money.  And  [on  this  head]  ho  told  them 
to  Ikj  of  good  courage,  as  tho  state  ha<l,  ou  an  average,  six  hun- 
dred talents  coming  in  yearly  as  tribute  from  the  allies,  not 
reckoning  its  other  sources  of  inc^omc ;  while  there  were  still 
?it  that  time  in  tho  Acroj^olis  0000  talents  of  coined  silver ; 
(tor  tho  greatest  sum  there  had  ever  been  was  9700  talents, 
from  which  had  been  taken  what  Avas  spent  on  the  propylica 
"f  tho  citadel,  and  the  other  buildings,  and  on  Potida^a;)  and 
besides,  of  uncoined  gold  and  silver  in  private  and  public  offer- 
ings, and  all  the  sacred  utensils  for  tho  j)rocessions  and  games, 
and  tho  Median  spoils,  and  cverj-  thing  else  of  tho  kind,  thero 
Avas  not  less  than  500  talents.  Moreover,  ho  added  tho  treas- 
ures in  tho  other  temples,'  to  no  small  amount,  which  they 
would  use ;  and,  in  ca.so  of  their  being  absolutely  excluded 
from  all  resources,  even  the  golden  appendages  of  tho  goddess 
herself;  explaining  to  them  that  the  statue  contained  40 
talents  of  pure  gold,  and  that  it  was  all  removable;  and  after 
using  it  for  their  preservation  they  must,  he  eaid,  restore,  it  to 
the  same  amount  ΛVith  regard  to  money,  then,  he  thus  en- 
couraged them.  And  as  for  hea\y-armed  troops,  he  told 
them  that  they  had  thirteen  thousand,  besides  those  in  gar- 
'  i.  r.,  besides  tho  tcmplo  of  Mincrvn,  which  was  tho  ptibHc  treasury. 


100  THUCYDIDEa  II.  [χιν,,χγ. 

risons  and*  on  tlie  ramparts  to  the  number  of  sixteen  thousand. 
For  this  was  the  number  that  kept  guard  at  first,  whenever 
the  enemy  made  an  incursion,  drawn  from  tlio  oldest  and  the 
youngest,  and  such  of  the  resident  aliens  as  were  heav}'- 
armed.  For  of  the  Phaleric  wall  there  were  five  and  thirty 
8tades  to  the  circuit  of  the  city  wall ;  and  of  that  circuit  itself 
the  guarded  part  was  three  and  forty  stades;  a  certain  part  of 
it  being  unguarded,  viz.  that  between'  the  long  wall  and  the 
Phaleric.  There  wore  also  the  long  walls  to  the  I*iraius,  a 
distance  of  forty  stades,  of  which  the  outer  one  was  manned  ; 
while  the  λν^ιοΙο  circumference  of  Piraius  with  Muuychia  was 
sixty  stades,  though  the  guarded  part  was  only  half  that  ex- 
tent. Of  cavalry,  again,  he  showed  them  that  they  luwl  twelve 
hundred,  including  mounted  bowmen ;  with  sixteen  hundred 
bowmen  [ou  foot],  and  three  hundred  triremes  fit  for  service. 
.  These  resources,  and  no  fewer  than  these  in  their  several 
kinds,  had  the  Athenians,  when  the  invasion  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesiaus  wjis  first  going  to  be  made,  niu\  when  they  were  setting 
to  the  war.  Other  statements  also  diil  IVricles  make  to  them, 
as  lie  was  accustomed,  to  prove  that  they  would  have  the  supe- 
riority in  the  war. 

14.  The  Athenians  were  persua^led  by  what  they  heard  fn^m 
him ;  and  proctH*ded  to  bring  in  from  the  country  their  chiUhvn 
and  >vives,  and  all  the  furniture  which  they  usi'd  in  thnr 
houses,  pulling  dt>wn  even  the  wood-work  of  their  residences ; 
while  they  sent  their  sheep  and  cattle  over  to  Euboea  and  the 
acljaitent  islands.  But  the  removal  was  made  by  them  with 
reluctance,  from  the  greater  part  ha\ing  alwjiys  been  aecus- 
tomed  to  live  in  the  country. 

15.  This  had,  from  tlie  very  earliest  times,  been  the  case 
with  the  Athenians  more  than  >vith  others.  For  under 
Cecrops,  and  the  first  kings,  <lown  to  the  reign  of  Theseus,* 
the  population  of  Athens  had  always  inhabited  independent 
cities,   with    their   own   guild-halls    and    magistrates;    and    at 

'  Literally,  "soldiers  to  lino  a  parapet,"  t".  c,  "for  i,'arrisoii  duty." — 
Arnold. 

*  t.  c,  tho  Piraic  wall,  in  opposition  to  the  riialcric.  It  is  somctimos 
spoken  of  in  tho  plural  number,  τα  /m/c/xi  τείχη,  bocauso  nn  inner,  or 
Bouthom,  wall  was  added  to  the  original  oao  by  Purielc:*.  See  Arnold's 
*  uud  Goller's  notes. 

'  Or,  "  Attica  had  always  boon  inhabited  by  a  number  of  indepeudera 
communities,"  or  "civil  societies,"  as  Arnold  renders  it. 


XVI.]  THUbYBIBES.  IT.  101 

such  times  as  they  were  not  in  fear  of  any  danger,  they  did 
not  meet  the  kin^  to  consult  with  him,  but  themselves  sev- 
erally conducted  their  own  government,  and  took  their  own 
oouuscl;    and   there  were  instimces  in  which  ^^omo  of  them 
even    waged    war   [against    him],   as    tlio    Elousinians    with 
Euniolpus  did  against   Krectheus.      But   when   Theseus   had 
como  to  tlio  throne,  who  along  >vith  wisdom  had  power  also, 
lie  both  regulated  the  country  in  other  res|)oct8,  and  having 
abolished   the  council-houses   and   magistracies  of  tho  other 
cities,  ho  brought  them  all  into  union  with  the  present  city, 
assigning  them  one   guild-hall   and  one  council-house;    and 
compelled  them  all,  while  they  enjoyed  each  their  own  prop- 
erty as   l)cfore,  to  use  this   one   city  only ;   which,  since   nil 
were  counted  as  belonging   to  it,  became  great,  and  was  so 
licqueatlied  by  Theseus  to  those  who  came  after  him.     And 
from  that  time  even  to  this  the  Athenians  keep,  at  the  public 
expense,  a  festival   to  tho  goddess,  called    Si/nach.^     ]kforo 
that  time,  what  is  now  tho  citadel  >va8  the  city,  with  the  dis- 
trict which  lies  under  it,  looking   chiefly  toward  tho   south. 
And  this  is  a  proof  of  it ;    tho  temples  of  tho  other  gods  ai 
well  [as  of  Minerva]  arc  in  the  citadel  itself,  and  thoso  that 
arc  out  of  it  are  situated  chiefly  in  this  part   of  tho   city;   as 
that  of  tho  Olympian  Jupiter,  of  the  l*ythian  Apollo,  of  Terra, 
and  of  Ikcehus  in   Limna»,  in  whose  honor  the  more  ancient 
festival  of  Bacchus  is  lield  on  tho  twelfth  d.iy  of  the  month 
Anthesterion ;   as  the  loniaus  also,  >vho  arc  descended  from 
tho  Athenians,  even  to  this  day  observe  jt.     And  there  arc 
other  ancient  temples  also  situated  in  this  quarter.     Tho  con- 
duit too,  which  is  now  called  Knneacrunus,  [or,  nine-pipes,] 
from  tho  tyrants  having  so  constituted  it,  but  which  had  form- 
erly tho  tiamc  of  Calirrlioe,  when  tho  springs  wero  open,  tho 
men  of  that  day  used,  i\a  it  was  near,  on  tho  most  important 
occasions ;  and  even  at  tho  present  time  they  arc  accustomed, 
from  tho  old  fashion,  to  use  tho  water  before  marriages,  and  for 
other  sacred  purposes.     Moreover,  from  their  living  of  old  in 
this  quarter,  the  citadel  even  to  this  day  is  called  by  tho  Athe- 
nians tho  city. 

10.  For  a  long  timo  then  the  Athenians  enjoyed  their  inde- 
I>endent  life  in  tho  country ;  and  after  they  were  united,  still, 
from  tho  force  of  habit,  tho  generality  of  them  at  that  early 
'  «.  i.,  tho  feast  of  the  union 


102  THUOYDIDEa  IL  [χτιι.,  xviii. 

period,  and  even  aftcnvord,  down  to  the  time  of  this  war,  liavinf* 
ΛγίΐΗ  all  their  families  settled  and  lived  in  the  country,  did  not 
remove,  without  reluctance  (os|>ecially  as  they  had  but  latily 
recovered  their  establishments  after  the  Median  war),  but  wero 
distressed  and  grieved  to  leave  their  houses,  and  the  t^inples 
which,  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  ancient  constitution,  had 
always  been  regarded  by  them  as  the  places*  of  their  hereditary 
Λvorship ;  going,  as  they  now  were,  to  change  their  mode  of  lite, 
and  each"  of  them  doing  what  was  equivalent  to  leaving  his 
native  city. 

17.  AVhen  they  came  into  the  city,  some  few  indeed  had 
residences,  and  a  i)lace  of  refuge  with  some  of  their  friends  or 
relations ;  but  the  great  bulk  of  them  dwelt  in  the  unoccupied 
parts  of  the  city,  and  in  all  the  temples  and  hero-chapel•*, 
except  the  Acropolis,  and  the  temple  of  the  Kleusinian  Ceres, 
and  any  other  that  Λvas  k<'pt  constantly  locked  up.  The  Te- 
lasgium  also,  as  it  is  called,  under  the  Acropolis,  which  it  wa  ι 
even  forbidden  by  a  curse  to  inhabit,  and  prohibited  by  the  end 
of  a  Pythian  oracK»,  t»)  this  etl'ect,  ''  the  IVlasgiraii  is  bettii* 
unoccupied,"  was  neverlhehss,  built  over,  from  the  iinmediatti 
necessity  of  the  case.  And,  in  my  opinion,  the  oracle  }>roveJ 
true  in  the  contrary  way  to  what  was  ex}R*eted.  For  it  wjis 
not,  I  think,  because  of  their  unlawfully  inhabiting  this  spot, 
that  such  misfortunes  bef»ll  the  city  ;  but  it  was  owing  to  tli<< 
war  that  the  necessity  of  inhabiting  it  arose ;  which  war  though 
the  god  did  not  mention,  he  fort-knew  that  [owing  to  it]  the 
rdasgium  would  hereafter  l»e  inhabited  tor  no  good.  Many, 
too,  quartered  themselves  in  the  towers  of  the  walls,  and  in 
whatever  way  each  couhl :  lor  llie  city  did  not  hold  them  when 
they  were  come  all  together;  but  subsequently  they  occupiitl 
the  long  walls,  partitioning  them  out  among  them,  and  th^ 
greater  part  of  the  I'irieus.  At  the  same  time  they  also  applied 
themselves  to  matters  connected  with  the  war;  mustering  th»ir 
allies,  and  equipping  an  armament  of  a  hundred  ships  for  the 
I'eloponnese.  The  Athenians  then  were  in  this  state  of  pnp- 
aration. 

18.  As  for  the   iirmy  of  the   IVlopannesiajis,  on  the   other 

*  And  ihereforo  tho  only  ones  iu  which  they  thou^'ht  tlio  gods  would 
reeoivo  their  pruyors  and  sacrifices.     Sec  Arnold's  note. 

'*'  Literally,  ''doing  nothing  cl.so  but  leaving,"  etc.  Coniparo  III.  3i). 
2.  τί  άλλο  οντοι,  η  tKtiiov'Mvaav  \  and  IV.  Μ.  ΰ.  ovotv  άλλο  ι/  ίκ  }/^f 
ίνανμάχουν.     Sec  Jelfd  Cir.  dr.  805,  c. 


XIX  ]  TIIuCYDIDES>flV^^  103 

liaml,  tlio  first  town  it  camo  to  in  Attica  was  CEnoc,  at  which 
]>oiiit  thoy  intended  to  make  tlieir  inroad.  And  having  pnt 
down  bcforo  it,  they  prepared  to  make  csraults  on  the  wjill, 
l>oth  with  ens^nes  and  in  every  otlier  way.  For  Qinoe,  as  lyinij; 
on  the  frontiers  of  Attica  and  Boeotia,  liad  been  surrounded 
witli  a  wall,  and  the  Athenians  used  it  as  a  garrisoned  fort, 
whenever  any  ΛvaΓ  befell  them.  They  prepared  then  for 
iissaulting  it,  and  wasted  their  time  about  it  to  no  pur|x>se. 
And  from  this  delay,  Archidamus  incurred  the  greatest  cen- 
sure: though  ho  had,  even  while'  the  war  was  gathering, 
been  thought  to  show  a  want  of  spirit,  and  to  favor  tlio 
Athenians,  by  not  lieartily  recommending  hostilities.  And 
airain,  after  the  army  was  nmstenKl,  the  stay  that  was  made  fit 
tlie  Isthmus,  and  his  slowness  on  the  rest  of  the  march,  gnvo 
occasion  for  charges  against  him,  but  most  of  all  his  stopping 
at  (Enoo.  For  tlio  Athenians  during  this  time  were  carrying 
in  their  proporty,  and  the  IVloponnesians  thought  that  by  ad- 
vancing against  them  quickly  they  Avould  liavo  found  every 
thing  still  out,  but  for  his  dilatoriness.  Such  resentment  did 
the  army  feel  toward  Archidanuis  during  the  siege.  •  liut  lie,  it 
is  saiil,  was  waiting  in  expectation  that  tho  Athenians  ΛνοηΜ 
give  in,  while  their  land  was  still  unravagcd,  and  would  shrink 
from  enduring  to  see  it  wasted. 

10.  When,  however,  afler  assaulting  (Enoe,  and  trying 
every  metlnxl,  they  wore  unable  to  tako  the  j)ln<e,  and  tho 
Ai'n'nians  sent  no  herald  to  them,  then  indeed  they  set  out 
from  before  it,  an«l  about  eighty  days  after  the  events  at  PlatoDa, 
( ausod  by  tho  Thebans  who  had  entered  it,  Λvhcn  tho  summer 
was  at  its  height  and  tho  corn  ripe,  «they  made  their  incursion 
into  Attica ;  Archidamus  son  of  Zciuxidamus,  king  of  the  L'l- 

*  By  tho  expression,  it»  τ;)  ξννηγοηι)  την  7:o}.i/iov,ho  refers  to  tho 
praduai  m.ilurini?  of  their  hostile  intentions,  and  especially  to  iho  efforts 
of  tho  Corinthians  to  iuduco  a  positive  declaration  of  hostilities,  as  nar- 
rated in  tho  flrst  book ;  and  so  to  precipitate  that  **  storm  of  war"  (to  use 
ft  common  metaphor)  which  had  long  been  "  patherinf?."  Bloomfield  is 
correct  in  sayinj?  that  "it  can  not  signify,  as  tho  translators  render,  'in 
gathering  tho  forces  together,'  which  would  bo  a  strange  Jlysteron  pro* 
f'Ton."  But  I  do  not  think  that  either  of  tho  passages  he  quotes  cap 
warrant  hia  rendering  ξυναγω)?)  by  •'congress;"  for  in  one  of  them 
ξννύγειν  is  followed  by  its  proper  occusativo  case,  and  in  tho  other 
iiv(i)uy^  has  its  proper  genitive,  as  it  evidently  has  here;  though,  wero 
it  othorwie©,iuch  an  absoluto  use  of  tho  word  by  Tolyblua  would  by  itwlf 
bo  no  authority  for  supposing  that  Thucydidea  used  it  .in  tho  same  way. 


104  THUCYDIDEa  Π.  [xx^  xxl 

cedasmonians,  being  their  commander.  After  pitching  their 
camp  there,  they  first  ravaged  £leu&is  and  the  Thriasian  plain, 
and  put  to  flight  some  Atlieuiati  cavalry  near  a  place  called 
Hheiti  [or  "the  brooks"].  Afterward  they  continued  their 
inarch,  keeping  Mount  -^ijaleos  on  th|'ir  right  through  Cri)- 
poia,  till  they  came  to  Aeharnu;,  a  place  which  is  the  largest, 
of  the  denies^  [or  townships,]  as  they  are  called,  of  Attica. 
And  sitting  down  before  it  they  formed  an  encampment,  and 
staid  a  long  time  in  the  place,  and  continued  ravaging  it. 

20.  It  was  with  the  following  views  that  Archidamus  is 
said  to  have  remained  in  order  of  battle  at  Acharnai,  and  not 
to  have  gone  down  to  the  plain  durnig  that  incursion.  Ho 
hoped  that  the  Athenians,  abounding  as  they  were  in  num- 
bers of  young  men,  aiid  prepared  for  war  as  they  had  never 
before  been,  would  perhaps  conic  out  agaii:st  him,  and  not 
stand  still  and  see  their  lainl  ravaged.  Since,  then,  they  liad 
not  met  him  at  Kleusis  and  the  ThriaNian  plain,  ho  )>it('lied  hi  > 
camp  at  Acharnie,  and  tried  whether  they  wouKl  now  march 
out  against  him.  For  ho  thought  the  post  a  favorable  one  fur 
cncaniping  in,  and  moreover  that  the  Acharnians  forming  as 
they  did  a  largo  i)art  of  the  state,  (for  they  amounted  to  threo 
thousand  heavy-armed,)  would  not  overlook  the  destruction 
of  what  bclongi'd.  to  them,  but  would  stir  up  the  whole  army 
also  to  an  engagement.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Atheniain 
idiould  n(>t  con»e  out  against  him  during  that  incursion,  h<• 
would  then  lay  waste  the  plain  with  less  fear  in  future,  and 
advance  to  the  city  itself;  for  the  Acharnians,  after  losing  their 
«)wn  property,  would  not  bo  so  forward  to  run  into  danger  for 
that  of  other  |)eople,  but  there  would  bo  a  division  in  their 
ί  ounsels.  It  was  with  this  view  of  the  case  that  Archidamus 
remaineil  at  Acharnui. 

21.  As  for  the  Athenians,  so  long  as  the  army  was  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Eleusis  and  the  Thriiisian  plain,  they  hjul 
some  ho})e  of  its  not  lulvauiing  nearer;  rememhering  tho  caso 
οΓ  l*leistoana.\,  tho  son  of  Pausanias  the  king  of  tho  Laceda*- 
ijionians,  when  with  α  reloponnesian  army  he  math;  an  in- 
ΐοα•1  into  Attica,  as  far  as  Elen>is  and  Thria,  fourteen  year-, 
before  this  Avar,  and  retired  again  without  a<lvancing  any  fur- 
ther (lor  which  reason  indeed  he  wiis  banished  from  Sparta, 
a*;  he  was  thought  to  have  been  brilxid  to  make  the  retreat). 
When,  however,  they  saw  tho  army  at  Acharn»,  only  sixty 


xxiLj  THUCYDIDES.  II.  V^_^-^-^  105 

Kiadcs  from  tlio  city,  they  considered  it  no  longer  bearable, 
and,  as  was  natural,  when  their  land  was  being  ravaged  before 
rtieir  eyes — a  thing  >vhich  the  yonnger  men  had  never  yet  seen, 
nor  even  the  elder,  except  in  the  Persian  wars — it  Λvas  thought 
a  great  indignity,  and  all  of  them,  csj>ecially  the  young  men, 
determined  to  go  out  against  them,  and  not  to  put  up  \vith  it. 
They  met  therefore  in  knots  and  were  in  a  state  of  great 
dissension,  some  urging  thefn  to  go  out,  others  dissuading 
them  from  it.  Prophets  too  were  repeating  all  kinds  of 
oracles,  to  which  they'  eagerly  listened,  as  they  Λverc  severally 
disposed.  The  Acharnians  especially,  thinking  that  no  con- 
{ iderablo  part  of  the  Athenian  forces  was  in  their  ranks,  urged 
tliem  to  march  out,  Λνΐιϋο  their  land  was  being  ravaged.  Nay, 
in  every  way  the  city  was  excited ;  and  thoy  were  angry  Λvi^h 
Pericles,  and  remembered  none  (*f  the  advice  which  ho  had 
befoio  given  them,  hut  abused  him  for  not  leading  them  out 
as  (heir  general ;  and  they  regarded  him  as  the  author  of  all 
that  they  Λverc  sulTering. 

22.  lie,  in  the  mean  time,  seing  (hem  angry  at  the  present 
state  of  things  and  not  in  (ho  best  mind ;  and  being  confident 
(hat  ho  took  a  right  view  in  not  wishing  to  march  out  against 
the  enemy,  did  not  call  them  to  an  assembly,  or  any  other 
meeting  (that  they  might  not  commit  themselves  by  coming 
together  >vith  more  anger  than  judgment) ;  but  looked  to  the 
defense  of  the  city  and  kept  it  quiet,  as  far  as  possible.  IIo 
was,  however,  continually  wnding  out  cavalry,  to  prevent  (ho 
a<lvanced  guard  of  (ho  army  from  falling  on  tho  estates  near  the 
eity  and  ravaging  them.  Tliero  Avas  also  a  skirmish  of  cavalry 
at  Phr\gia,  between  one  sijuadron  of  tho  Athenian  horse, 
joined  l>y  Bome  Tlicssalians,  and  tho  cavalry  of  tho  Boeotians, 
in  which  tho  Athenians  and  Tlicssalians  liad  rather  tho  advan- 
tagc<  until,  on  tho  heavy-armed  coming  to  tho  succor  of  tho 
PoDotians,  they  Avero  routed.,  and  some  few  of  them  killed: 
they  took  up  their  bodies,  however,  on  the  same  day  without  a 
(ruco;  and  tho  Peloponnesians  erected  a  trophy  tho  day  after. 
This  assistance  on  tho  part  of  tho  Tlicssalians  was  given  to  tho 
Athenians  on  tho  ground  of  their  ancient  alliance ;  and  those 

'  "Th<^  construction  soems  to  bo,  that  tho  finito  verb  ύργήντο  is  In 
ienso  repeated:  *  which  they  wcro  eager  to  hstcn  to,  ns  each  was  eager: 
which  they  wcro  severally  eager  to  listen  to.'  IIo  adds  ώς  (καοτης 
ύιηρτο^  bc-oauso  different  persons  ran  to  listen  to  different  prophosice,  each 
choosing  thoso  which  cncouraj^d  his  own  opinions  or  rocling8."—jl mo/d 


100  THUGTDIDES.  U.  [xzui.-ur. 

who  caino  to  them  consisted  of  Larissxana,  Pharsaliane,  [Pa• 
rasians,]  Cranonians,  Pyrasians,  Gyrtouians,  auil  Phcrseans. 
Their  commanders  were  Polymcdes  and  Aiistonus,  each  from 
his  own  faction,  and  Menon  from  Pharsulus.  Tlic  rest  also  had 
their  commanders  according  to  their  respective  cities. 

23.  The•  Peloponnesiaus,  when  tho  Atheii'uus  did  not  como 
out  against  them  to  battle,  broke  up  frum  before  Acharna•, 
and  proceeded  to  ravage  some  others  of  the  townships  be- 
tween Mount  Parnes  and  lirilessus.  AVhile  tliey  were  m  the 
country,  tho  Athenians  dispatched  round  the  l*eloponnese 
the  Imndred  ships  they  were  preparing,  [when  I  last  men- 
tioned them,]  with  a  thousand  heavy-armed  on  board,  and  four 
hundred  bowmen  under  the  command  of  Caranus  son  of  Xeno- 
timus,  Protcas  son  of  Kpicles,  and  Socrates  son  of  Antigenes. 
So  they  AveiglieJ  anchor,  and  were  cruising  round  with  this 
armament;  while  tho  Peloponnesiaus,  after  staving  in  Atlica 
the  time  for  which  they  had  j>rovis.ions,  retired  tfirough  Paotia 
(not  by  the  same  way  they  had  made  their  inroad),  and  plU'^s- 
ing  by  Oropus  ravaged  the  IMraic  tcnitory,  as  it  is  called, 
>vliich  the  Oropians  inhabit  as  subjects  to  tho  Athenians.  On 
arriving  at  the  Peloponnese,  they  were  disbanded,  and  returned 
to  their  several  cities. 

24.  When  they  had  retired,  the  Athenians  set  guards  by' 
land  and  by  sea,  as  they  intended  to  keep  them  through  tlu». 
Λvhole  Avar.  And  they  resolved  to  take  out  and  set  apart  a 
thousand  talents  from  the  money  in  the  Acropolis,  and  not  to 
spend  them,  but  to  carry  on  the  war  with  their  other  re- 
sources ;  and  if  any  one  should  move  or  put  to  the  vote  a  propo- 
sition for  applying  that  money  to  any  other  purpose,  except  in 
case  of  the  eneniy  sailing  against  the  city  with  a  naval  arma- 
ment, and  its  l>eing  necessary  to  defend  themselves,  they  de- 
clared it  a  capital  otlense.  Together  Avith  this  sum  of  money, 
they  also  laid  by  a  hundred  triremes,  the  best  they  had  each 
year,  and  trierarchs  for  them ;  none  of  which  were  they  to 
use  except  with  the  money,  and  in  the  same  peril  [as  that  w  as 
reserved  for],  should  any  such  necessity  arise. 

25.  The  Athenians  on  board  the  hundred  sliips  around  Pelo- 
]K)nnese,  and  tho  Corcyra'ans  with  them,  who  had    come   to 

'  their  jiid  with  fifty  ships,  and  s<jme  others  of  the  allies  in  th«)sti 
parts,  ravaged  other  places  as  they  cruised  round,  and  landed 
at  Methone  in  Laconia,  and  assaulted   tho  wall,  which  ν,αα 


xivi.,  XXVII.]  THUCYDIDES.  Π.        X._^-^        107 

weak  and  had  no  mon'  witlun  it.  Now  Brasidas,  son  of  Tellis, 
a  Spartan,  happened  to  be  in  command  of  a  guard  for  the  de- 
fense of  those  parts  ;  and,  on  hearing  of  tho  attack,  lie  came  to 
the  assistance  of  tlioso  in  the  place  with  a  hundred  heavy- 
armed.  Dashing,  therefore,  through  the  anny  of  tlio  Atheni- 
ans, which  was  scattered  over  tlie  country,  and  had  its  attention 
directed  toward  tlie  Λvall,  lie  threw  himself  into  Methone ;  and 
having  lost  a  few  of  his  own  men  in  entering  it,  both  saved  tho 
city,  and  from  this  daring  deed  was  the  first  that  received 
]>raiso  at  Sparta  in  tho  course  of  tho  war.  Upon  this  tho 
Athenians  Aveighed  anchor,  and  coasted  along;  and  landing  at 
rheia  in  Elis,  they  ravaged  tho  territory  for  two  days,  and  con- 
quered in  bat^e  three  hundred  jncked  men,  >vho  had  come  to 
tho  rescue  from  tho  inhabitants  of  tho  Vale  of  Klis,'  and  from 
the  Eleans  in  the  immediate  neighborhood.  liut  a  violent 
wind  coming  down  upon  them,  being  exposed  to  the  storm  in 
a  harborless  place,  the  greater  ])art  of  them  went  on  board 
their  ships,  and  sailed  round  tho  promontory  called  Ichthys, 
into  tho  port  at  IMioia ;  but  tho  Mess(inians,  and  some  others 
who  would  not  go  oji  board,  Aven  tin  the  mean  time  by  land, 
and  took  l*hcia.  Afterward  the  fleet  sailed  round  and  picked 
them  up,  and  they  evacuated  the  place  and  put  out  to  sea ;  tho 
main  army  of  the  Eleans  Jiaving  by  this  time  come  to  its  res- 
riie.  Tho  Athenians  then  coasted  along  to  other  places  and 
ravaged  them.  ^ ' 

26.  About  tho  same  time  they  sent  out  thirty  ships  to  cruiso 
about  Locris,  and  also  to  serve  as  a  guard  for  Eubcca.  Their 
commander  was  Cleopompus,  son  of  Clinius,  who,  making  de- 
scents, ravaged  certain  places  on  the  sea-coast,  and  captured 
Thronium,  and  took  hostages  from  them ;  defeating  also  in  a  bat- 
tle at  Alopo,  those  of  the  Locrians  Λvho  liad  como  to  the  Rescue. 

21,  This  summer  tho  Athenians  also  expelled  tho  -^gine- 
tans  from  their  island,  themselves,  their  children,  and  wives,• 
charging  them  with  being  the  chief  authors  of  tho  war  they 

'  «.  e.,  no  garrison  for  its  tlofonso.  , 

'  "  Or  tho  valley  of  tho  Pcncus,  in  which  Elis  itself  was  situated. 
This,  as  tho  richest  of  tho  whole  territory,  was  naturally  occupied  by  tho 
conquoring  ^^toliana,  when  they  camo  in  with  tho  Dorians  at  what  is 
railed  tho  return  of  tho  ITcraclidic.  Tho  neighborhood  of  Phcia,  on  tho 
otlior  hand,  was  inhabited  by  tho  descendants  of  tho  older  people,  who 
woro  conquorod  by  tho  itltolians,  and  now  formed,  as  in  so  many  Polo- 
(•onnesian  elates,  tho  eubordinato  class  called  ntpiniKoU'-^Arnotd. 


108  THUCTDIDES.  II.  [zxtul.xxix. 

were  engaged  in  ;  besides  which,  it  appeared  safer  to  send  set- 
tlers of  their  own  to  hold  -^i?ina,  lying  so  near  as  it  does  to 
the  Peloponnese.  No  long  tiino  after  therefore  they  sent  the 
eolouists  to  it ;  while  to  the  ^^ginctans  who  were  expelled  the 
LaccdiEinoniaus  gave  Thyrea  to  live  in,  and  the  territory  to  oc- 
cupy, as  Avell  on  the  ground  of  their  quarrel  with  the  Atheni- 
ans, as  because  tlu'y  had  been  benefactors  to  themselves  at  the 
time  of  the  earthquake  and  the  insurrection  of  the  Helots. 
The  territory  of  Thyroa  is  on  the  frontier  of  Argolis  and 
Laconia,  stretching  down  to  the  sea.  So  some  of  them  dwelled 
there,  >vhilo  others  were  scattered  througli  the  rest  of  Greece. 

28.  The  same  summer,  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  lunar  month 
(the  only  time  at  which  it  appears  possible),  the  sun  was  eclipsed 
after  mid-day,  and  became  full  again  after  it  had  assumed  a 
crescent  fonn,  and  after  some  of  the  stars  had  shone  out. 

29.  It  was  also  in  the  course  of  the  same  summer  that 
Nymphodorus  son  of  Tythes,  a  man  of  Abdera,  whoso  sister 
was  the  wife  of  Sitalces,  anil  who  had  great  influence  with 
that  monarch,  was  made  their  proxenuH^  by  the  Athenians, 
Avho  had  before  considered  him  hostile  to  them,  and  was  sent 
for  by  them,  because  they  wished  Sitalces,  ί^οη  of  Teres,  king 
of  the  Thracians,  to  become  their  ally.  Now  this  Teres,  the 
father  of  Sitalces,  was  the  lirst  who  founded  the  great  king- 
dom of  the  Odrysic  on  a  larger  scale  than  those  in  the  rest  of 
Thrace;  for  indeed  a  large  j»art  of  the  Thracians  arc  inde- 
pendent. This  Teres  is  not  at  all  connected  with  Tereus  who 
married  from  Athens  Procne,  tb(5  daughter  of  I'andion ;  nor 
were  they  of  the  same  j>art  of  Thrace.  The  latter  lived  in 
liaulis,  a  j>art  of  what  is  now  called  l^hoeis,  which  was  then 
inhabited  by  Thracians.  It  was  in  this  land  that  the  women 
perjHitrated  the  [cruel]  deed  to  Itys,  and  by  uiany  of  the  poets, 
when  they  mention  the  nightingale,  it  U  called  the  Daulian 
bird.  Besides,  it  is  probable  that  Tandion  should  have  formed 
the  connection  for  his  daughter  [with  one  who  lived]  at  that 
distance,  with  a  view  to  nmtual  succor,  rather  than  at  the  <lis- 
tance  of  several  days'  journey  [as  it  is]  to  the  Odrysai,  On 
the  other  haml,  Teres,  besi<lt.'S  not  having  the  same  name,  wa; 
tlie  first  king  of  I'le    Odrt/.-iic   tiiat   attained   to   any  powei•. 

'  t.  e.,  was  publicly  appointed  by  thorn  to  show  hospitality  to  any  of 
their  citizens  poing  to  tliat  country,  and  to  look  after  their  intereata  there ; 
very  nearly  like  a  consul  of  modern  Europe.     See  note,  III.  70.  5. 


τχχ.,υαα.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  11.  lOd 

Sitalces  then,  l>oing  this  man's  pon,  tlio  Athenians  mndo 
their  ally,  wishing  liim  to  join  them  in  conquering  the 
Thrarewanl  toW|is  and  rerdiccas.  80  Nymphodorus  camo 
to  Athens  and  conehid^d  the  alliance  uith  Sitalces,  and 
made  his  own  son  Sadocus  a  citizen  of  Athens,  and  under- 
took to  hrlujT  to  a  close  the  war  on  the  side  of  Thrace? 
for  ho  said  ho  wouM  persuade  Sitalces  to  sentl  the  Athe- 
nians a  Thracian  force  of  cavalry  and  targeteers.  More- 
over, lie  reconciled  Terdiccas  to  the  Athenians,  and  also 
persuaded  them  to  restore  Therme  to  him  ;  and  Perdic* 
vixi  immediately  joined  in  an  expedition  against  the  Chalci- 
dians  >vith  the  Athenians  and  Phormio.  Thus  Sitalces  son  of 
Teres,  king  of  tho  Thracians,  became  an  ally  of  the  Athenians, 
iis  also  did  IVrdiccas  son  of  Alexander,  king  of  tho  Mace- 
donians. 

30.  Meanwhilo  tho  Athenians  in  the  hundred  vessels,  still 
cruising  around  the  Peloponnese,  took  Sollium,  a  town  belong- 
ing to  the  Corinthians,  and  gave  it  up  to  the  Palicrean»  alono 
of  the  Acarnanians,  to  enjoy  the  territory  and  city  ;  and  having 
stormed  Astacus,  of  which  Evarchus  Avas  tyrant,  they  expelled 
him,  arid  won  the  j)lace  for  their  confederacy.  They  then  sailed 
to  tho  island  of  Cephnllenia,  and  brought  it  over  to  their  side 
without  fighting.  Ccphallenia  lies  opposite  Acarnania  and 
Leucas,  and  consists  of  four  states,  the  Palcans,  C»anians, 
Sama'ans,  and  l*ronicans.  Not  long  after,  tho  ships  returned 
to  Athens. 

31.  About  tho  autumn  of  (his  summer,  tho  Athenians 
invailed  the  Megarid  with  all  their  forces,  themselves  and  tho 
resilient  aliens,  under  the  commatul  of  Pericles  son  of  Xan-' 
thippus.  And  the  Athenians  in  the  hundred  ships  around  tlio 
Peloponnese  (for  they  happened  at  'this  time  to  be  at  -^Egina 
on  tneir  return  home),  finding  that  tho  men  of  the  city  wcro 
in  full  force  at  Megara,  sailed  and  joined  them.  And  this  was 
certainly  tho  largest  army  of  tho  Athenians  that  ever  ns- 
semblod  together ;  as  tho  city  was  at  tho  lieight  of  its  strength, 
and  not  yet  afflicted  with  tho  plague;  for  of  tlio  Athenians 
themselves  thero  were  not  fewer  than  ten  thousand  heavy- 
armed  (besides  which  they  had  the  three  thousand  at  Potida?a), 
and  of  resident  aliens  who  joined  them  in  the  inctirsion  not 
fewer  than  three  thousand  heavy-armed ;  and  added  to  these, 
Ihcrc  was  nil   tho  crowd   of  light-armed    in  great  numbers. 


110  THUCYDIDES.  IL  [xxxiL-xxxir. 

After  ravaging  the  greater  part  of  the  territory,  they  returned. 
Other  incursions  into  the  Megarid  were  also  afterward  inad^? 
annually  by  the  Athenians  iu  the  course  of  the  war,  both  with 
their  cavalry  and  Avith  all  their  force,  until  Nisaia  was  taken  by 
them. 

32.  Moreover  Atalanta,  the  island  near  the  Opuntian  Locrians, 
which  had  previously  been  unoccupied,  was  fortified  by  the 
Athenians  as  a  stronghold  at  the  close  of  this  summer,  to  pre• 
vent  privateers  from  sailing  out  from  Opus  and  the  rest  of 
Locris,  and  plundering  Euboea.  These  were  the  events  which 
occurred  in  the  course  of  this  summer,  after  the  return  of  the 
Peloponnesians  from  Atticiu 

33.  The  following  winter  Evarchus  the  Acarnanian,  wishing 
to  return  to  Astacus,  persuaded  the  Corinthians  to  sail  with 
forty  ships  and  fifteen  hundred  lieavy-armed  and  restore  liim, 
lie  himself  hiring  some  auxiliaries  besides :  the  commanders  of 
the  army  were  Euphamidas  son  of  Aristonymus,  Timoxemus  son 
of  Timocrates,  and  Eumachus  son  of  Chrysis.  So  they  sailed 
and  restored  him  ;  and  wishing  to  gain  certain  places  in  the 
rest  of  Acarnania,  along  the  coast,  and  having  made  an  attempt 
without  being  able  to  succeed,  they  sailed  back  homeward, 
llaving  landed,  as  they  coasted  along,  on  Cephallenia,  and 
made  a  descent  on  the  territory  of  the  Cranians,  they  wern 
deceived  by  them  alter  an  arrangement  that  tliey  had  come  t»», 
and  lost  bomo  of  their  men  in  an  unexpected  attack  of  tho 
Cranians ;  then,  having  put  out  to  sea  witli  some  precipitation, 
they  returned  home. 

34.  In  the  course  of  tliis  winter  the  Athenians,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  custom  of  their  forefathers,  buried  at  the  public 
expense  those  who  had  first  fallen  in  tho  war,  after  the  follow- 
ing manner,  llaving  ereeted  a  tent,  they  lay  out  the  bones 
of  the  dead  three  days  before,  and  each  one  brings  to  his  own 
relative  whatever  [funeral  oUcring]  he  pleases.  When  tho 
funeral  procession  takes  j)la('e,  (!ars  convey  coffins  of  cypress 
wood,  one  for  each  tril>e  ;  in  wliich  are  laid  the  bones  of  every 
man,  a(!cording  to  the  tribe  to  which  lie  belonged ;  atid  ono 
empty  bier  is  carried,  sj)read  in  honor  of  the  missing,  whose 
bodies  could  not  be  found  to  bo  t.tken  up.  AVhoin-cr  wishes, 
both  of  citizens  and  strangers,  joins  in  the  procession;  and 
their  female  relatives  attend  at  the  burial  to  make  the  wail- 
ings.    They  lay  them  then  in  the  public  sepulchei•,  which  ie 


ixxv.l  TIIUCYDIDES.  II.  ,        HI 

in  the  fairest  suburb  of  the  city,  and  in  which  thoy  always  bury 
those  who  have  fallen  in  the  wars  (except,  at  least,  those  who 
fell  at  Marathon  ;  but  to  th(^in,  as  they  considered  their  valor 
distinguished  above  that^^U  others,  they  gave  a  burial  on  tho 
very  spot).  Aft<>r  they  had  laid  them  in  the  ground,  a  ninn 
tliosen  by  the  state — one  who  in  point  of  intellect  is  considered  , 
talented,  and  in  dignity  is  pre-eminent — speaks  over  them 
such  a  panegyric  as  may  l>e  appropriate  ;  after  >vhich  they  all 
retire.  In  this  way  they  bury  them  :  and  through  the  whole 
of  tho  war,  whenever  they  had  occasion,  they  observcil  the  es- 
tablished custom.  Over  these  >vho  were  first  buried'  at  any 
rate,  Pericles  son  of  Xanthippus  was  chosen  to  speak.  And 
when  the  time  for  doing  so  came,  advancing  from  the  sepulcher 
on  to  a  platform,  which  had  been  raised  to  some  height,  that 
he  might  bo  heard  over  as  great  a  part  of  the  crowd  as  possible, 
he  spoke  to  the  following  effect : 

35.  "  Tho  greater  part  of  those  who  ere  now  have  spoken 
in  this  j)laco,  have  been  accustomed  to  praise  the  man  who 
introduced  this  oration  into  tho  law ;  consideiing  it  a  right 
thing  that  it  should  be  delivered  over  those  Λνΐιο  are  buried 
nller  falling   in    battle.     To  me,  however,  it  ΛνοηΜ  have  ap- 
peared suflicient,  that  when  men  had  shown   themselves  bravo 
by  deeds,  their  honors  also  should  bo  displayed  by  deeds — 
as  you  now  see  in  the    case  of   this  burial,  prepared  at  tho 
public  expense — and  not  t!iat  tho  ^^Γtues  of  many  should  bo 
periled  in  one  imlividual,  for  <'redit  to  be  given  him  according 
as  hqjixpresses  himself  well  or  ill.     For  it  is  diflicult  to  speak 
with  propriety  on  a  subject  on  which  even  the  impression  of 
one's   truthfulness   is   Avith   dilhculty   established.       For    tho 
hearer  who  is  acmiainted  [with  the  facts],  and  kindly  disposed 
[toward  those  who   performed   them],  might    perhaps   think 
them  8ome>yhat  imperfectly  set  forth,  compared  with  what  ho 
both  wishes  an<l  knows;  while  he  who  is  unacquainted  with 
tlu}m  might  think  that  some  points  wcro  even  exaggerated, 
being  led  to  this  conclusion  by  envy,  should  he  hear  any  thing 
surpassing  his  own  natural  powers.      For  praises  spoken  of 
others  are  only  endured  so  far  as  each  one  tliinks  that  he  is 
himself  also  capable  of  doing  any  of  tho   things  ho  hears; 
but  that  which  exceeds  their  own  capacity  men  at  once  envy 
nnd  disbelieve.    Since,  however,  our  ancestors  judged  this  to 
*  Or,  "  ticcordlncrly  over  these,"  eta    Seo  note,  II.  B.  8. 


112        ^  THUCYDIDES.  11  [xxxvL,xxxva 

bo  a  right  custom,  I  too,  in  obedionco  to  tho  law,  must  en- 
deavor to  meet  tho  wishes  and  views  of  every  one,  as  far  as 
possible. 

36.  ''  I  will  begin  then  with  our  ancestors  first :  for  it  is  just, 
and  becuniing  too  at  the  same  time,  that  on  such  an  occasion 
tho  honor  of  being  thus  mentioned  should  bo  paid  them. 
For  always  inhabiting  tho  country  without  change,  through  a 
long  succession  of  posterity,  by  their  valor  tliey  transmitted 
it  free  to  this  very  time.  Justly  then  may  they  claim  to  bo 
commended ;  and  more  justly  still  may  our  own  fathers.  For 
in  addition  to  what  they  inherited,  they  acquired  the  great 
empire  which  we  possess,  and  by  |>ainful  exertions  bequeathed 
it  to  us  of  tho  i)resent  day ;  thougli  to  most  part  of  it  nave  ad- 
ditions been  made  by  ourselves  here,  who  are  still,  generally 
speaking  in  the  vigor  of  life  ;  and  wo  have  furnished  our  city 
with  every  thing,  so  as  to  be  most  self-suiliiient  both  for  peace 
and  for  war.  Now  with  regard  to  our  military  achievements, 
by  which  each  j)os.sossii>u  wiis  gained,  whether  in  any  case  it 
were  ourselviS,  or  our  fathers,  that  repelled  with  spirit  hostilities 
brought  against  us  by  baharian  or  Cireek;  as  1  do  not  wish 
to  enlarge  on  the  subject  before  you  who  are  well  acquainted 
Λvith  it,  I  Λνϋΐ  pass  them  over,  liut  by  what  mode  of  life  we 
attained  to  our  ])Ower,  and  l»y  what  form  of  gi>vernment  aiul 
owing  to  what  habits  it  Lecame  so  great,  I  will  explain 
these  })oints  first,  and  then  procee^l  to  tho  eulogy  of  these 
men ;  as  I  consider  that  </n  the  jircsent  occasion  they  will  not 
be  inappropriately  mentioned,  and  that  it  is  profitable  for  the 
whole  assouibly,  both  citizens  and  strangers,  to  listen  to 
them. 

•  37.  "  For  we  enjoy  a  form  of  government  which  does  not 
copy  tho  laws  of  our  neighbors ;  but  we  are  ourselves  rather 
a  pattern  to  others  than  imitators  of  them.  In  name,  from  its 
not  being  administere«l  for  the  benefit  of  the  few  but  of  the 
many,  it  is  called  a  democracy  ;  but  with  regard  to  its  laws,  all 
enjoy  equality,  as  concerns  tlieir  private  difi'erences ;  while 
wTth  regard  to  public  rank,  accortling  as  each  man  has  rep- 
utation for  any  thing,  he  is  ])reforred  for  public  honors,  not  fo 
nmch  from  consideration  of  ])arty,  as  of  merit;  nor,  again,  on 
the  ground  of  poverty,  while  he  is  able  to  do  the  state  any  good 
service,  is  he  prevented  by  th<!  obscurity  of  his  position.  ΛΥο 
are   liberal   then  in  our  }>ublic  administration  ;  {.nd  with  re' 


iixvm.,  XXXIX.]  THUCYDIDES.  II.  113 

pard  to  mutual  jealousy  of  our  daily  pursuits,  wo  are  not 
anijry  with  our  neighbor,  if  ho  docs  any  thing  to  plcaso  him• 
SL^lf;  nor  wear  on  our  countenance;  oflensivo  looks,  >vhich 
though  harmless,  arc  yet  unpleasant.  While,  however,  in  pri- 
vate matters  we  live  togethentgieeably,  in  i)ublic  matters, 
un<ler  the  inlluenec  of  fear,  we  most  carefully  abstain  from 
transgression,  through  our  obedience  to  those  who  arc  from 
time  to  time  in  oilice,  and  to  the  laws ;  especially  such  of  them 
as  are  enacted  for  the  benefit  of  the  injured,  and  euch  as, 
though  unwritten,  bring  acknowledged  disgrace  [on  those  >vho 
break  them], 

38.  "  Moreover,  wo  liavo  provided  for  our  spirits  the  most 
numerous  recreations  from  lal>ors,  by  celebrating  games  and 
sacritices  through  the  whole  year,  and  by  maintaining  elegant 
private  establisliments,  of  which  the  daily  gratification  drive.i 
away  sarlness.  Owing  to  the  greatness  too  of  our  city,  every 
thing  from  every  land  is  imported  into  it ;  and  it  is  our  lot  to 
reap  with  no  more  peculiar  enjoyment  the  good  things  which 
are  produced  here,  than  those  of  the  rest  of  the  world  like- 
wise. 

.Ί9.  "  In  the  studies  of  war  also  wo  diff*er-  from  our  enemies 
in  the  following  respects.  Wc  throw  our  city  open  to  all,  and 
never,  by  the  expulsion  of  st rangers, "lixcTiuIc~l«i}^^  from 

rither  learning  or  observing  things,  by  seeing  which  uncon- 
cealed any  of  our  enemies  might  gain  an  advantage ;  for  we 
tra^t  not  so  much  to  preparations  and  stratagems,  as  to  our 
own  valor  for  daring  deeds.  Again,  as  to  our  modes  of 
e  luoation,  thefj  aim  at  the  acquisition  of  a  maidy  character,  by 
hib(»rious  training  from  their  very  youth  ;  whilo  we,  though 
living  nt  our  ease,  no  less  b<jldly  advance  to  inect  equal  dan- 
g«»rs.  As  ft  proof  of  this,  the  Lacodromonmns  neVer  marcli 
agauififc  our  country  singly,  but  with  all  |  their  confodoratoR] 
togiithcr :  whilo  wo,  generally  speaking,  have  no  difficulty 
in  conquering  in  battle  upon  hostilo  ground  those  who  aro 
Stan  ling  up  in  defense  of  tlieir  own.  And  no  enemy  ever  yet 
encount<»ro  I  our  whole  united  force,  through  our  attending  r,t 
the  same  time  to  our  navy,  and  Roninng  our  troops  by  land  on 
80  many  ditferent  servicesr  but  wherever  they  Iiavo  engaged 
with  any  part  of  it,  if  they  conquer  only  some  of  us,  they 
boast  that  wo  were  all  routed  by  (hem ;  and  if  they  nro 
conquered,  they  say  it  wa•   by  all  that  they  were   beaten- 


114  THUOYDIDES.  Π.  [xL.XU. 

And  yet  if  with  careless  ease  rather  than  with  laborious  prac- 
tice, and  with  a  courage  which  is  the  result  not  so  mucn  of 
laws  «s  of  natural  disj>osition,  we  are  willinfy  to  face  danger, 
Λνβ  have  the  advantage  of  not  suifering  heforchand  from  com- 
iug  troubles,  and  of  proving  ourselves,  \vheu  wo  are  involved 
in  them,  no  loss  bold  than  those  who  are  always  toiling;  so 
that  our  country  is  >vorthy  of  admiration  iu  these  resiKiCts, 
and  in  others  besides. 

40.  "  For  we  study  taste  >vith  economy,  and  philosophy  with- 
out eifemiuacy  ;  and  employ  Wealth  rather  for  opjK^rtunity  of 
action  tlkim  for  boastfuluess  o(  talking ;  while  poverty  is 
nothing  disgraceful  for  a  man  to  confess,  but  not  to  escape  it 
by  exertion  is  more  disgraceful.  Again,  the  same  men  can 
attend  at  the  same  time  to  domestic  as  well  as  to  public  af- 
fairs; and  others,  who  are  engaged  with  business,  can  still 
form  a  sulHcient  judgment  on  puliiical  (piestions.  For  we  arc 
the  only  peoj>le  that  consider  the  man  who  takes  no  part  iu 
these  tilings,  not  as  unoilicious,  but  as  useless ;  and  we  our- 
selves judge  rightly  of  measures,  at  any  rate,  if  wo  do  not 
originate  them ;  while  we  do  not  regard  words  as  any  hin- 
deranco  to  deeds,  but  rather  [consider  it  a  hinderance]  not  to 
liave  been  previously  instructed  by  wortl,  before  underUiking 
in  deed  what  λυο  have  to  do.  For  we  have  this  charaeteristic 
also  in  a  remarkahle  degree,  that  we  are  at  the  same  time 
most  daring  and  most  calculating  in  what  we  take  in  hand  ; 
ΛvheΓeas  to  other  men  it  is  ignorancti  that  brings  daring,  whil•? 
calculation  brings  fear.  Th<'se,  however,^  would  deservedly 
be  deemed  most  courageous,  who  know  most  fully  what  is  tii- 
rible  and  ΛνΙυιΙ  is  jdeasant,  and  yet  do  not  on  this  account 
shiink  from  dangirs.  As  regards  beneficence  also  Λνο  ditKr 
from  the  generality  of  men ;  for  wa  make  friends,  not  by  ro- 
ceiving,  but  by  conferring  kindness.  Now  he  who  has  con- 
ferred the  favor  is  the  firmer  friend,  in  order  that  he  may 
keep  alive  the  obligation  by  good  will  toward  the  man  on 
whom  he  has  conferred  it;  whereas  he  who  owes  it  in  return 
fi-'L'ls  less  keenly,  knowing  that  it  is  not  as  a  favor,  hut  as  a 
debt,  that  he  will  repay  the  kindness.  Nay,  we  are  the  only 
men  who  fearlessly  benefit  any  one,  not  so  nmch  from  calcu- 
lations of  expediency,  as  with  the  confidence  of  liberality. 

41.  *'  In  snort,  I  say  that  both  the  whole  city  is  a  school  for 
Greece,  and  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  same  individual   would 


XLii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  ΙΓ.  115 

ηιηοηί^  ua  provo  liimself  qualifie«l  for  the  most  varied  kinds 
<•(*  «ction,  nnd  >vith  llio  most  ί;πΐ(•οΓιιΙ  versatility.  And  that 
tills  is  not  moTo  vauntin/iif  lanjyua.iro  ibr  the  occasion,  so  much 
as  actual  truth,  the  very  power  of  the  state,  Avliich  wo  liavo 
won  by  such  liabits,  atfords  a  ])rooT.  For  it  is  the  only  coun- 
try at  the  present  time  that,  Avheiiimnin^ht  to  the  test,  proves 
su|)erior  to  its  faino  ;  and  the  only  one  that  neither  gives  to 
the  enemy  who  has  attacked  us  any  cause  for  indignation  at 
being  worsted  by  such  opponents,  nor  to  liim  Λνΐιο  is  subject  to 
us  room  for  finding  fault,  as  not  being  ruled  by  men  who  are 
worthy  of  empire.  lUit  ν,ο  shall  be  admired  both  by  present 
and  future  generations  as  having  exhibited  our  power  Avith 
gre.it  proofs,  and  by  no  means  without  evidence  >  and  as  hav- 
ing no  further  need,  either  of  Homer  to  praise  us,  or  any  ono 
elsi;  who  might  charm  for  the  moment-  by  Ids  verses,  w  Idle  ifio 
truth  of  the  facts  would  mar  the  idea  formed  of  them  ;  but  as 
having  compelled  every  sea  an<l  land  to  become  acicessible  to 
our  (iaring,  and  every  where  established  everlasting  records, 
whether  of  evil  or  of  good.  It  was  for  such  a  count ly  then 
that  these  men,  nobly  resolving  not  to  liave  it  taken  Trom 
them,  fell  fighting;  and  every  ono  of  their  survivors  may  well 
be  willing  to  sutler  in  its  behalf. 

42.  "For  this  reason,  indeed,  it  is  that  I  have  enlarged  on 
the  characteristics  of  the  state;  both  to  provo  that  the  strug- 
gle is  not  for  the  same  object  in  our  case  as  in  that  of  men 
who  have'  none  of  these  advantages  in  an  Cipial  degree  ;  and  at 
th(i  same  time  dearly  to  establisli  by  proofs  [the  truth  of]  tho 
eulogy  of  those  men  over  whom  I  am  now  speaking.  And 
now  the  chief  points  of  it  h.ivc  been  mentioned  ;  for  with  re- 
ganl  to  the  things  for  which  ί  have  commended  the  city,  it 
AViis  the  virtues  of  these  men,  and  such  as  these,  that  adorned 
her  Λvith  them  ;  and  few  of  the  (ί reeks  arc  there  Avliose  fame, 
like  these  men's,  Avould  appear  but  tho  just  counterpoise  of 
their  deeds.  Again,  tho  closing  Bcenc  of  these  men  appears 
to  mc  to  su[)ply  an  illustration  of  human  worth,  whether  as 
affording  us  the  first  information  respecting  it,  or  its  final  con- 
firmation. For  even  in  the  case  of  men  who  have  been  in 
other  respects  of  an  inferior  character,  it  is  but  fair  for 
them  to  hold  forth  as  a  screen  their  military  courage  in  their 
country's  l>ehcif;  for,  having  wiped  out  their  evil  by  tbeir 
gow!,  tiioy  did  more  scrvico  collectively,  than  barm  by  their 


no  THUCYDIDE^.  H.  [xun; 

individual  oifcnses.  But  of  theso  men  there  was  no&o  that 
either  was  made  α  coward  by  his  wealth,  from  preferring  the 
continued  .enjoyment  of  it;  or  shrank  from  danger  through  a 
liope  suggested  by  poverty,  namely,  that  ho  might  yet  escapo 
it,  and  grow  rich  ;  but  conceiving  that  vengeance  on  their 
foes  was  more  to  bo  desired  than  theso  objects,  and  at  the  same 
time  regarding  this  as  the  most  glorious  of  hazards,  they  wished 
by  risking  it  to  bo  avenged  on  their  enemies,  and  so  to  aim 
at  procuring  those  advantages ;  committing  to  hope  tho  un- 
certainty of  success,  but  resolving  to  trust  to  action,  with 
regard  to  what  was  visible  to  tljcmsclvos ;  and  in  that  action, 
being  minded  rather  to  resist  and  die,  than  by  Burrendering  t<i 
escapo,  they  fled  from  the  shame  of  [a  discreditable]  report, 
while  they  endured  tho  brunt  of  tho  battle  with  their  bodies ; 
and  after  the  shortest  crisis,  when  at  the  very  height  of  their 
fortune,  were  taken  away  from  their  glory  rather  than  their  fear. 
43.  "  Such  did  these  men  prove  themselves,  as  became  tho 
character  of  their  country.  For  you  that  remain,  you  must 
pray  that  you  may  liavo  a  more  successful  resolution,  but 
must  determine  not  to  have  one  less  bokl  against  your  enemic;} ; 
not  in  word  alono  considering  the  benefit  [of  such  a  spirit] 
(on  which  one  might  descant  to  you  at  great  length — though 
you  know  it  yourselves  quite  as  well — telling  yuu  how  many 
advantages  are  contained  in  repelling  your  foes) ;  but  rather 
<lay  by  day  beholding  tho  j»ower  of  tho  city  as  it  a])pears  in 
fact,  and  growing  enamored  of  it,  and  rellecting,  when  vou 
think  it  great,  that  it  Avas  by  being  bold,  and  knowing  their 
duty,  iind  being  alive  to  shame  in  action,  that  men  acquired 
these  things ;  and  because,  if  they  ever  failed  in  their  attempt 
at  any  thing,  they  did  not  on  that  account  think  it  right  to 
deprive  their  country  also  of  their  valor,  but  conferred  upon 
her  a  most  glorious  joint-otiering.  For  Avhile  collectively 
they  gave  her  their  live-»,  individually  they  received  that 
renown  >vhich  never  grows  old,  and  the  nn)st  distinguish- 
ed tomb  they  could  have;  not  so  much  that  in  which 
they  are  laid,  as  that  in  which  their  glory  is  left  behind 
them,  to  bo  everlastingly  recorded  on'  every  occasion  for 
doing  so,  either  by  word  or  deed,  that  may  from  time  to 
time  present  itself.      For  of  illustrious  men  the  whole  earth 

'  Literally,  "  on  every  occasion,  either  of  word  or  deed,  that  may  from 
tiiQO  to  timo  present  itself." 


XLir.]  TnUCYDIDES.   II.  117 

U  tho  gcpulcher;  and  not  only  does  the  inscription  upon 
rolumns  in  Ihcir  own  land  point  it  out,  but  in  that  also  which 
is  not  their  own  there  dwells  \^ith  every  one  an  unwritten 
memorial  of  the  lieart,  rather  than  of  a  material  monument. 
Vicing  then  Λvith  these  men  in  your  tuni,  and  deeming  hap- 
piness to  consist  in  freedom,  and  Ifreetlom  in  valor,  do  not 
tliink  lightly  of  the  hazards  of  war.  For  it  is  not  tho  unfor- 
tunate [and  thos(0  wlio  have  no  hope  of  any  good,  that  \vould 
with  most  reason  l)e  unsparing  of  their  lives  ;  but  those  who, 
while  they  live,  still  incur  the  risk  of  a  chango  to  the  opposite 
condition,  and  to  whom  tho  diti'erencc  would  bo  the  greatest, 
sliould  they  med  with  any  reverse.  Fer  more  grievous,  to  a 
man  of  high  spirit  at  least,  is  tho  misery  which  accompanies 
cowardiiic,  than  tho  unfelt  death  which  comes  upon  liim  at 
once,  in  tho  time  of  his  strength  and  of  his  Impo  for  the  com- 
mon welfare. 

44.  "  Wherefore  to  the  parents  of  the  dead — as  many  of  them 
as  are  liere  among  you — I  λυϊΙΙ  not  offer  condolence,  so  much 
as  consolation.  For  they  know  that  they  have  been  brought 
lip  subject  to  manifold  misfortunes ;  but  that  happy  is  their 
lot  who  have  gained  tho  most  glorious— <leath,  as  these  liavc, 
— sorrow,  as  you  have ;  and  to  whom  life  has  been  so  exactly 
measured,  that  they  were  both  happy  in  it,  and  died  in  [that 
happines*;].  Ditlicult,  indeed,  I  know  it  is  to  persuade  you 
of  this,  with  regard  to  those  of  whom  you  will  often  bo  re- 
minded by  the  good  fortune  of  othors,  in  which  you  your- 
selves also  onco  rejoiced  ;  and  sorrow  is  felt,  not  for  the  bless- 
ings of  which  one  is  bereft  without  full  oxperienco  of  them, 
but  of  that  which  one  loses  after  becoming  accustomed  to  it. 
Vtui  yoi!  must  bear  up  in  the  hope  of  other  children,  those  of 
you  whoso  ago  yet  allows  vou  to  have  them.  For  to  your- 
selves individually  those  λυΙιο  are  subsequently  born  will  bo 
a  reason  for  your  forgetting  those  who  aro  np  raoro ;  and  to 
the  stato  it  will  bo  beneficial  in  two  ways,  by  its  not  being 
depopulated,  and  by  the  enjoyment  of  security ;  for  it  is  not 
possible  that  those  should  offer  any  fair  and  just  advice,  who 
do  not  incur  equal  risk  with  their  neighbors  by  having  chil- 
dren at  stake.  Those  of  you,  however,  who  aro  past  that  age, 
must  consider  that  tho  longer  period  of  your  life  during  which 
you  have  been  prosperous  is  so  much  gain,  and  that  what 
remains  will  bo  but  a  short  one ;  and  you  must  cheer  your- 


118  THUOYDIDEa  Π.  [xLf.-iLYi. 

selves  ^ith  tbo  fair  fame  of  theeo  [your  lost  ones].  For  the 
love  of  honor  is  tho  only  feeling  that  never  grows  oM  ;  and 
in  tho  helplessness  of  ago  it  is  not  tho  acquisition  of  gain,  as 
some  assert,  that  gives  greatest  pleasure,  but  tho  enjoyment 
of  honor. 

45.  '*  For  those  of  you,  on  tho  other  hand,  who  aro  sons  or 
brothers  of  tho  dead,  great,  I  see,  will  be  the  strutrglo  of  com- 
petition. For  every  one  is  accustomed  to  praiso  tho  man  who 
,  is  no  more ;  and  scarcely,  though  even  for  an  excess  of  worth, 
would  you  bo  esteemed,  I  do  not  say  equztl  to  them,  but  only 
slightly  inferior.  For'  tho  living  aro  exposed  to  envy  in  their 
rivalry ;  but  thoso  who  are  in  no  one's  way  are  honored 
with  a  good  will  free  from  all  oj)positioii.  If,  ngain,  I  must 
say  any  thing  on  tho  subject  of  Avonian's  excellence  also,  with 
reference  to  those  of  you  λυΙιο  will  now  be  in  widowhood,  I 
ΛνίΙΙ  express  it  all  in  a  brief  exhurtatioii.  (Jreat  will  be  your 
glory  in  not  falling  short  of  tho  natural  character  that  belongs 
to  you ;  and  great  is  hers,  who  is  least  talked  of  among  tho 
men,  either  for  good  or  evil. 

40.  "  I  have  now  expressed  in  wordy  as  the  law  re(|uired, 
Avhat  I  had  to  say  befitting  the  occasion;  and,  m  dced^  those 
ΛγΙιο  aro  hero  interred,  have  already  received  ]>art  of  their 
honors;  while,  for  the  remaining  part,  the  state  will  bring 
up  their  sons  at  the  public  expense,  from  this  time  to  their 
nianhood ;  thus  otlering  both  to  tlieso  and  to  their  posterity 
a  beneiicial  reward  for  such  contests ;  for  where  the  greatest 
prizes  for  virtue  are  given,  there  also  tho  most  virtuous  men 
are  found  among  the  citizens.  And  now,  having  tinished 
your  lamentiitions  for  your  several  relatives,  depart." 

47.  Such  was  tho  funeral  that  took  j»lace  this  winter,  at 
the  close  of  Λvhich  the  first  year  of  this  war  ended.  At  the 
very  beginning  of  the  n<'xt  summer  tho  reloponnesians  and 
their  allies,  with  two  thirds  of  their  forces,  as  on  the  first 
occasion,  invaded  Attica,  under  the  command  of  Archidamus, 

•  Or,  as  Oollor  explains  it,  *'  tho  living  feel  envy  toward  their  rivale.'' 
" T(i  uVtiTraXoi/ intclligendos  esse  amiihs,  non  amulationem,  ca  quoquo 
indicant  quic  contrarie  ponuntur:  το  μη  {μ:τοόωι\  j.  e.,  ii,  qui  non  im- 
pcdimcnto,  non  cemuli  sunt  (utpote  mortui)."  But  is  not  tho  oppoBition 
really  between  τοΙς  ζώσι  and  τύ  μι)  Ιμπυόύν '(  liko  tho  eentiinent  of 
Uoraco : 

•'  Urit  cnim  fulgoro  suo,  qui  prrppravat  nrtcs 
i  Infra  se  positaa :  extinctu-s  araabitur  idem." 


I 


χίΛΊΐι.,  XLix.]  TUUCYDlDEa  II.  119 

the  son  of  ZouxiJamiis,  king  of  the  Laced.Tmonians  ;  nnd  after 
encamping,  tliey  laid  waste  the  country.  AVheu  (hey  had 
not  yet  been  many  days  in  Atticn,  the  plague  first  began  to 
phow  itself  among  the  Athenians;  though  it  was  said  to 
have  previously  lighted  on  many  ^aces,  about  Lemnos  and 
elsewhere.  Such  α  pestilence,  howeVcr,  and  loss  of  life  as 
this  was  nowhere  remembered  to  have  happened.  For  nei- 
ther were  ])hysicians  of  any  avail  at  first,  treating  it  as  tliey 
<lid,  in  ignorance  of  its  nature — nay,  tliey  themselves  died 
most  of  all,  inasmuch  as  they  most  visited  the  sick — nor  any 
other  art  of  man.  And  as  to  the  supplications  that  they 
olTered  in  their  (em]>les  or  the  divinations',  and  similar  means, 
that  they  had  ro(!oursG  to,  they  were  all  unavailing ;  and  at 
last  they  ceased  from  them,  being  overcome  by  the  pressure  oi 
the  calamity. 

48.  It  is  said  to  have  first  begun  in  the  part  of  Ethiopia 
above  £gypt^  and  then  to  have  come  down  into  Egypt,  and 
Libya,  πηΓ)  th<?  greatest  part  of  the  king's  territory.  On  tho 
city  of  Athens  it  fell  suddenly,  and  first  attacked  tho  men  in 
the  rirncus;  so  that  it  was  even  reported  by  them  that  tho 
JVloponnesians  Iiad  thrown  poison  into  tho  cisterns;  for  as 
yet  there  were  no  fountains  there.  Afterward  it  reached  (ho 
upper  city  also ;  and  then  they  died  much  more  generally. 
Now  let  every  one,  whether  physician  or  tini)rofessional  man, 
speak  on  the  subject  according  to  his  views  ;  from  what  source^ 
it  was  likely  to  havo  arisen,  and  tho  causes  >vhich  ho  thinks 
were  suflicient  to  liavc  produced  so  great  a  change  [from  health 
to  universal  sickness].  I,  however,  shall  only  describe  what 
was  its  character;  and  explain  (hose  symptoms  by  refercnco 
to  Avhich  one  might  best  be  enabled  to  recognizo  it  through 
this  previous  accjuaintance,  if  it  should  ever  break  out  again  ; 
for  I  was  both  attacked  by  it  myself,  and  had  personal  observ- 
ation of  others  who  were  sufTering  with  it. 

49.  That  year  then,  as  was  generally  allowed,  happened  io 
bo  of  all  years  tho  most  free  fiOm  disease,  so  far  as  regards 
other  disorders ;  and  if  any  one  had  any  previous  sickness,  all 
terminated  in  this.  Others,  without  any  ostensible  cause, 
but  suddenly,  while  in  the  enjoyment  of  health,  were  seized  at 
first  with  violent  heats  in  the  head,  and  redness  and  inflamma- 
tion of  the  eyes;  and  the  internal  parts,  both  tho  throat  and 
(ho  tongue,  immediately  assumed  a  bloody  tinge,  and  emitted 


120  THUCYDIDEa  II.  [l. 

an  unnatural  and  futid  breath.     Next  afler  theso  syinptonis, 
enoczing  and  hoarseness  came  on  ;  and  in  a  short  time  the  pain 
descended  to  the  chest,  with  a  violent  cough.     When  it  settled 
in  the  stomach,  it  caused  vomiting ;  and  all  the  discharges  of 
bile  that  have  been  mentioned  by  physicians  succeeded,  and 
those  accompanied  >vith  great  suifering.     An  ineireetual  retch- 
ing also  followed  in  most  cases,  producing  a  violent  spasm, 
which  in  some  cases  ceased  soon  afterward,  in  others  much 
later.     Externally  the  body  was  not  very  hot  to  the  touch,  nor 
was  it  pale ;  but  reddish,  livid,  and  broken  out  in  small  pim- 
jiles  and  s^res.     Hut  the  internal  parts  were  burnt  to  such  α 
degree  that  they  could  not  boar  clothing  or  linon  of  the  very 
lightest  kind  to  be  laid  U]>on  theiu,  nor  to  be  any  thing  elso 
but  stark  nuked ;  but  would  most  gladly  have  thrown  them- 
selves into  cold  water  if  they  could,     liuleed  many  of  thoso 
who  were  not  taken  care  of  did  so,  plunging  into  cisterns  in 
the  agony  of  their  unquenchable  thirst :  and  it  was  all  the  same 
whether  they  drank  nmcli  or  little.     Mt)reover,  the  misery  of 
restlessness     and    Avakefulness    continually    oi>pressed    them. 
'I'he  body  did  not  waste  away  so  long  as  tho  disease  >vas  at  its 
height,  but  resisted  it  beyond  all  expectation  :  so  that  they 
cither  died  in  most  cases  on  the  ninth  or  tho  seventh  day, 
through  the  internal  burning,  while  they  had  still  some  degreo 
of  strength ;  or  if  they  escaped  [that  stage  of  the  disorder], 
then,  after  it  had  further  descended  into  tho  bowels,  and  vio- 
'  lent  ulceration  was  produced  in  them,  and  inti»nse  diarrhoea  had 
come  on,  tho  greater  part  were  afterward  carried  οίΓ  through 
the  weakness  occasioned  by  it.     For  the  discitse,  which  was 
originally  seated  in  the  head,  beginning  from  above,  passed 
throughout  the  whole  boily  :  and  if  any  one  survived  its  most 
fatal  consequences,  yet  it  marke-d  him  by  laying  hold  of  his 
extremities ;  for  it  settled  on  the  j»udenda,  and  fingers,  and  toes, 
and  many  cscapetl  with  the  loss  of  these,  while  some  also  lost 
their  eyes.     Others,  again,  were  seized  on  their  first  recovery 
with   forgetfulness  of  eveiy  thing   alike,  and   did   not   know 
either  themselves  or  their  friends. 

50.  For  tho  character  of  the  disorder  surpassed  descrip- 
tion ;  and  while  in  other  respcits  also  it  attacked  every  one 
in  a  degree  more  grievous  than  human  nature  could  endure, 
in  the  following  way,  especially,  it  ]>rt»ved  itself  to  be  some- 
thing dillerent  from  any  of  the  tliseases  fauiiliar  to  man.     All 


Li.j  THUCYDIDES.  II.  12 1 

fho  birds  and  boasts  that  prcv  on  human  l^olies,  either  did 
not  conio  near  them,  though  there  wore  many  lying  unburicMl, 
or  died  after  they  had  t.'isted  them.  As  a  proof  of  tins,  there 
was  a  marked  disappearance  of  birds  of  this  kind,  and  they 
were  not  Keen  either  ongaqod  in  this  way,  or  in  any  other ; 
while  the  dogs,  from  their  domestic  habits^'  more  clefirly  afford- 
ed opportunity  of  marking  the  result  I  l>ave  mentioned. 

51.  The  disease,  then,  to  pass  Dvef  many  various  points  of 
peculiarity,  as  it  liappened  to  be  different  in  one  case  from 
another,  was  in  its  general  natufo  such  as  I  have  described. 
And  no  other  of  those  to  Avhich  they  were  accustomed  af- 
flicted them  besides  this  at  that  tima;  or  whatever  there  was, 
it  ended  in  tliis.  And  [of  those  who  were  seized  bv  it]  somo 
died  in  neglect,  others  in  the  midst  of  every  attention.  And 
there  was  no  one  settled  remedy,  so  to  speak,  by  applying 
which  they  were  to  give  them  relief;  for  what  did  good  to 
one,  did  Ihirm  to  another.  And  no  constitution  showed  it- 
self fortified  against  it,  in  point  either  of  strength  or  weak- 
ness ;  but  it  seized  on  all  alike,  even  those  that  were  treated 
with  all  possible  regard  to  di«'t.  lint  the  most  dreadful  part 
of  the  whole  calamity  Avas  the  dejection  felt  whenever  any 
one  found  himself  sickening  (for  by  immediately  falling  into 
a  f'cling  of  despair,  they  abandoned  themselves  much  more  cer- 
tainly to  the  disease,  and  did  not  resist  il),  and  the  fact  of  their 
I'cing  charged  with  infection  from  attenrling  on  one  another, 
and  so  <lying  like  sheep.  And  it  Avas  this  that  caused  the  great- 
est mortality  among  tliem  ;  for  if  through  fear  they  were  un- 
willing to  visit  each  other,  tluy  perished  from  being  deserted, 
and  many  houses  were  emptied  for  want  of  some  one  to  attend 
to  the  sufferers ;  or  if  they  did  visit  them,  they  met  their  death, 
and  especially  such  as  made  any  pretensions  to  goodness ;  for 
through  a  feeling  of  shame  they  were  unsparing  to  themselves, 
in  going  into  their  friends'  houses  [when  deserted  by  all 
others] ;  since  even  the  members  of  the  family  wens  at  length 
wora  out  by  the  very  moanings  of  the  dying,'  and  were  over- 
«ntno  by  their  excessive  misery,  8tiU  more,  however,  than 
«ven  these,  did  such  as  had  escaped  from  the  disorder  show  pity 
for  the  dying  and  the  suffering,  both  from  their  previous  knowl- 
'  lijo  of  what  it  was,  and  from  their  being  now  in  no  fear  of 
iL  themselves;  for  it  never  seized  the  same  person  twice,  so  as 

'  Or,  "by  lamenting  for  tho  dying."    Sco  Arnold's  nolo. 
6 


122  XnUCYDIDES.  IL  [ul.uil 

♦ 
to  prove  Actually  fatal.     And  such  persons  were  felicitated  by 
others ;  and  themselves,  in  the  excess  of  their  present  joy,  en- 
tertained for  the  future  also,  to  a  certain  dej^ree,  a  vain  hope  that 
they  would  never  now  bo  carried  oft*  even  by  any  other  disease. 

62.  In  addition  to  the  original  calamity,  what  oppressed 
them  still•  more  was  the  crowding  into  the  city  from  the 
country,  especially  the  new  comers.  For  as  they  had  no 
houses,  but  lived  in  stifling  cabins  at  the  hot  se:ison  of  the 
year,  the  mortality  among  them  spread  without  restraint; 
bodies  lying  on  one  another  in  the  death-agony,  and  half-dead 
creatures  rolling  about  the  streets  and  round  all  the  fount- 
ains, in  their  longing  fey  Avaler.  The  sacred  places  also  in 
which  they  had  quartered  themselvos,  >vere  full  of  the  eoq)ses 
i»f  those  that  died  there  in  them :  for  in  the  surpassing  violence 
of  the  calamity,  men  not  knowing  what  was  to  become  oi 
them,  came  to  dis^regard  every  thing,  both  sacred  and  profane, 
alike.  And  all  the  laws  were  violated  Avhieh  they  before  ob- 
served respecting  burials;  and  they  buried  them  as  each  one 
could.  And  nuuiy  from  want  of  j)roper  means,  in  consequence 
of  so  many  of  their  friends  having  already  died,  had  recourse 
to  shameless  modes  of  sepulture  ;  for  on  the  piles  prepared  for 
others,  some,  anticipating  those  ΛνΙιο  had  raised  them,  would  lay 
their  own  dead  relative  and  set  fire  to  them  ;  and  others,  whilo 
the  body  of  a  stranger  λ\\ι8  burning,  would  throw  on  the  top 
of  it  the  one  they  were  carrying,  and  go  away. 

53.  In  other  resj)ects  also  the  plague  was  the  origin  of  law- 
less conduct  in  the  city,  to  a  greater  extent  [than  it  had  be- 
fore existed].  For  deeds  which  fonuerly  men  hid  from  view,  so 
as  not  to  do  them  just  as  they  pleased,  they  now  more  readily 
ventured  on  ;  since  they  sitw  the  change  so  sudden  in  the  case 
of  those  who  were  prosperous  and  quickly  perished,  and  of 
those  who  before  had  had  nothing,  and  at  i)nco  came  into  pos- 
session of  the  proj)erly  of  the  dead.  So  they  resolved  to  tako 
their  enjoyment  quickly,  and  with  a  sole  view  to  gratification ; 
regarding  their  lives  and  their  riches  alike  as  things  of  a  day. 
As  for  taking  trouble  about  what  was  thought  honorable,  no 
one  was  forward  to  do  it ;  deeming  it  uncertain  whether,  be- 
fore he  had  attained  to  it,  he  would  not  be  cut  off;  but  every 
thing  that  was  immediately  pleasant,  and  that  which  was  con- 
ducive to  it  hy  any  means  whatever,  this  was  laid  down  to  bo 
both   honorable  and  expedient.     And   fear  of  god-,  or  law  of 


Lir.,LT.J  TnUCYDIDES.  Π.  123 

men,  there  was  none  to  stop  them ;  for  with  regard  to  tho 
former  they  esteemed  it  nil  tho  same  whether  they  worshiped 
them  or  not,  from  seeing  all  alike  perishing ;  and  with  regard 
to  their  offenses  [asjainst  tho  latter],  no  one  expected  to  live 
till  judgment  should  bo  passed  on  him,  and  so  to  pay  tho 
penalty  of  tliem  ;  but  they  thought  a  far  heavier  sentence  was 
impending  in  that  which  had  already  been  passed  upon  them  ; 
and  that  l>eforo  it  fell  on  them,  it  was  riglit  to  have  somo  en- 
joyment of  life, 

54.  Such  was  tho  calamity  which  the  Athenians  had  met 
with,  and  by  which  they  were  afflicted,  their  men  dying  within 
tho  city,  and  their  land  l)oing  wasted  withou^^  In  their 
misery  they  remembered  this  verso  among  other  things,  as 
was  natural  they  should  ;  the  old  men  saying  that  it  liad  been 
uttered  long  ago : 

"  A  Dorian  war  shall  come,  and  plapuo  with  it." 

\ow  there  Λvas  a  dispute  among  them,  [and  somo  asserted] 
that  it  was  not  "a  plague"  [loiinos]  that  had  been  mentioned 
ill  tho  verso  by  the  men  of  former  times,  but  "  a  famine," 
\limos]'.  tho  opinion,  however,  at  tho  present  time  naturally 
j)revailed  that  "  a  plague"  liad  been  mentioned :  for  men 
adapted  their  recollections  to  what  they  were  suffering.  But, 
I  suppose,  in  case  of  another  Dorian  war  ever  befalling  them 
.ifter  this,  and  a  famine  happening  to  exist,  in  all  probability 
(hoy  will  recite  tho  verso  accordingly.  Those  who  wero  ac- 
•juainted  with  it  recollected  also  the  oracle  given  to  tho  Lace- 
(ijrmonians  when  on  their  inipiiring  of  tho  god  whether  they 
f  hould  go  to  war,  ho  answered,  "  that  if  tl\ey  carried  it  on 
with  all  their  might,  they  would  gain  tho  victory ;  and  that  ho 
would  himself  take  part  with  them  in  it."  AVith  regard  to 
the  oracle  then,  they  supposed  that  Λνΐ^ηί  wa.s  happening  an- 
swered to  it.  For  the  disease  had  begun  immediately  after  tho 
Lacedaimonians  had  made  their  incursion ;  and  it  did  not  gr» 
into  the  Peloponnese,  worth  even  speaking  of,  but  ravaged 
Athens  most  of  all,  and  next  to  it  tne  most  populous  of  tho 
other  towns.  Such  were  the  circumstances  that  occurred  in 
connection  with  the  plague. 

5ft.  Tlio  Peloponnesian»,  after  ravacnng  the  plain,  passed 
into  tho  Paralian  territory,  as  it  is  cΛlled,  as  far  as  Ijaurium, 
^^herc  the  gold  mines  of  tho  Athenians  are  nituated.    And  first 


124  THUCYDIDES.  Π.  (lti.-ltih, 

they  ravaged  tbo  side  which  looks  toward  Peloponnese; 
afterward,  that  which  lies  toward  £uboea  and  Andrus.  Now 
Pericles  being  general  at  that  time  as  well  as  before,  main- 
tained the  same  opinion  as  he  had  in  the  former  invasion, 
about  the  Athenians  not  marching  out  against  them. 

60.  While  they  Avere  still  in  the  plain,  before  they  went  to 
the  Paralian  territory,  he  was  preparing  an  annaraent  of  a 
hundred  ships  to  sail  against  the  Peloponnese ;  and  when  all 
was  ready,  ho  put  out  to  sea.  On  board  the  hhips  lie  took 
four  thousand  heavy-armed  of  the  Athenians,  and  three  hun- 
dred cavalry  in  horse-transports,  then  for  the  first  time  made 
out  of  old  vessels:  a  Chiau  and  Lesbian  force  also  joined  tho 
expedition  with  fifty  ships.  AVlien  this  armament  of  tho 
Athenians  put  oul  to  sea,  they  left  tho  Peloponuesians  in 
the  Paralian  territory  of  Attica.  On  arriving  at  Epidaurus, 
in  the  Peloponnese,  they  rav.'iged  the  greater  part  of  tho 
bind,  and  having  made  an  assault  on  tho  city,  entertained  sonjo 
hope  of  tiiking  it ;  but  did  not,  however,  succeed.  After  sailing 
from  Epidaurus,  they  ravaged  the  land  belonging  to  Trcezen, 
Ilalioe,  and  llermione ;  all  Λνΐιίοΐι  places  arc  on  the  coast 
of  the  Peloponnese.  lYoceeding  thence  they  came  to  Prasiie, 
a  maritime  town  of  Lacoiiia,  and  ravaged  some  of  the  land, 
and  took  tho  town  itself,  and  sacked  it.  After  performing 
these  achievements,  they  returned  home;  and  found  the  Pe- 
loponuesians no  longer  in  Attica,  but  returned. 

57.  Now  all  the  time  that  the  Peloj)onnesians  wero  in  tho 
Athenian  territory,  and  tho  Athenians  were  engaged  in  tho 
exj^editiou  on  bomd  their  ships,  the  plaguo  was  carrying  them 
off  both  in  the  armament  and  in  tho  city,  so  that  it  was  even 
said  that  the  Peloponnesians,  for  fear  of  the  disorder,  when 
they  heard  from  the  deserters  that  it  Avas  in  tho  city,  and  also 
perceived  them  ixTforming  tho  funeral  rites,  retired  tho 
quicker  from  tho  country.  Yet  in  this  invasion  they  staid 
the  longest  time,  and  ravaged  tho  whole  country  :  for  they 
were  about  forty  days  in  the  Athenian  territory. 

68.  The  same  summer  llagnon  son  of  Nicias,  and  Cleo- 
pompus  son  of  Ciinias,  who  wero  colleagues  Avith  Pericles, 
took  tho  army  which  he  liad  employed,  and  went  straightway 
on  an  expedition  against  the  Chalcidians  Thraceward,  and 
l*otid;ea,  which  Λvas  still  being  besieged  ;  ami  on  their  arrival 
they  brought  up  their  engines  against  Potidica,  and  endeav- 


Lix,  LX.]  TnUCYDIDES.  II.  125 

vourcJ  to  tako  it  by  every  meaiifl.  But  they  neither  euc- 
cuodcd  ill  capturing  tlie  city,  nor  in  their  other  measures,  to 
any  extent  wortliy  of  tlicir  preparations;  for  tho  plague  at- 
tacked them,  and  tliis  indeed  utterly  ovcrpo\vered  them  there, 
w.'isting  their  force  to  euch  a  degree  that  even  the  soldiers  of 
tho  Atlienians  λυΙιο  were  there  before  were  infected  with  it 
by  tho  troops  Avhich  camo  with  lla^non,  though  previously 
they  had  been  iu  good  health.  Phormio,  however,  and  hia 
sixteen  hundred,  were  no  longer  in  tho  neighborhood  of  tho 
(ylialcidians,  [and  so  escaped  its  ravages],  llagnon  thereforo 
returned  with  his  ships  to  Athens,  having  lost  by ^ho  plague 
fifteen  hundred  out  of  four  thousand  heavy-armed,  in  about 
forty  days.  Tho  soldiers  who  wctq  thero  beforo  etill  ro- 
nnincd  in  tho  country,  and  continued  tho  siege  of  Potidaja. 

50.  After  tho  second  invasion  of  tho  Lacedajmonians,  tho 
Athenians,  when  their  land  had  been  again  ravaged,  and  tho 
disease  and  tho  war  were  afflicting  them  at  tho  same  time, 
rhangod  their  views,  and  found  fault  with  rericles,  thinking 
that  ho  had  persuaded  them  to  go  to  war,  and  tliat  it  was 
through  him  tliat  they  had  met  with  their  misfortunes;  and 
they  were  eager  to  como  to  terms  ivith  tho  Laccdajraonians. 
Indeed  they  sent  embassadors  to  them,  but  did  not  succeed 
in  their  object.  And  their  minds  being  on  all  sides  reduced  to 
despair,  they  were  violent  against  Pericles.  lie  thereforo  pee- 
ing them  irritated  by  their  present  circumstances,  and  doin<j 
every  thing  that  ho  liad  himself  expected  them  to  do,  called 
an  assembly  (for  he  was  still  general),  %vishing  to  cheer  them, 
and  by  drawing  off  the  irritation  of  tneir  feelings  to  lead  them 
to  a  calmer  and  more  confident  etato  of  mind.  Bo  he  camo 
forward  and  spoko  as  follows : 

00,  "  I  had  both  expected  tlio  proofs  of  your  anger  against 
mo,  which  havo  been  exhibited  (for  I  am  awaro  of  tho  causes 
of  it),  and  havo  now  convened  an  assembly  for  this  purpose, 
that  I  may  remind  you  [of  what  you  havo  forgotten],  and  re- 
prove you  if  in  any.  respect  you  aro  wrong,  either  in  being 
irritated  against  mo  or  in  succumbing  to  your  misfortunes. 
For  I  consider  ihat  a  state  which  in  its  public  capacity  is  suc- 
ciossful  confers  mo:O  benefit  on  individuals  than  ono  which 
U  prosperous  as  regards  its  particular  citizens,  while  collect- 
ively it  comes  to  ruin.  For  though  a  man  is  individually 
prosperous,  yet  if  his  country  is  ruined,  he  nono  tho  less  shaves 


12β  THUGTDIDES.  It  [lzu 

in  iU  destruction ;  \vbereas,  if  he  is  unfortunate  ito  a  country 
tbat  is  fdrtunate,  ho  bas  α  mucb  better  bope  of  escaping  bis 
daugei's.  Since  tben  a  state  is  able  to  bear  tbe  misfortunes 
of  individuals,  while  each  individual  is  unable  to  bear  hers, 
bow  can  it  fail  to  be  the  duty  of  all  to  support  her,  and  not  to 
act  as  you  aro  now  doing,  wlio,  being  panic-stricken  by  your 
domestic  afflictions,  give  up  all  thouglit  of  the  public  safety, 
and  are  blaming  both  me  who  advised  you  to  go  to  war,  and 
yourselves  who  joined  in  voting  for  it.  And  vet  I,  with 
whom  you  are  angry,  am  a  man  who  deem  myself  second  to 
none  in  at  once  knowing  what  measures  are  required,  and 
explaining  them  to  others.;  a  lover  too  of  my  country,  and 
superior  to  the  influence  of  money.  For  lie  who  knows  a 
thmg  that  is  right,  but  does  not  explain  it  with  clearness,  i\ 
no  better  than  if  he  hml  never  had  a  conception  of  it ;  and  he, 
again,  λυΙιο  has  both  these  requisites,  but  is  ill-aflected  to- 
>vard  bis  country,  would  not  so  well  speak  for  her  interest. 
And  even  if  this  (jualitication  be  added  to  the  others,  Avhile  ho 
is  influenced  by  regard  for  money,  all  of  them  together  ΛνοηΚΙ 
be  sacrificed  for  this  one  consideration.  So  that  if  vou  were 
persuaded  by  me  to  go  to  war,  becauso  you  thought  that  I 
possessed  these  qualities  even  in  a  moderate  degree  more  than 
other  men,  I  can  not  now  fairly  bo  charged  with  injuring  you, 
at  any  rate. 

CI.  "  For  those  indeed  to  go  to  war,  >vho,  while  Ruc>cessful  in 
other  things,  have  had  a  choice  in  the  matter  allowed  them,  it 
is  great  folly.  ]5ut  if  [in  our  case]  it  were  necessary,  either 
immediately  to  submit  to  our  neighbors,  if  wo  made  conces- 
sions, or  to  preserve  our  independence  by  running  a  great 
risk ;  then  ho  who  slirank  from  the  risk  is  more  rej)re}iensiblu 
than  he  who  faced  it.  For  my  part  then,  I  am  the  same  that 
I  ever  Λvas,  and  do  not  depart  from  my  opinion ;  but  you  aro 
changing,  since  it  happens  that  you  were  persuaded  [to  go  to 
war]  while  unscathed,  but  repent  of  it  now  you  are  suftering : 
and  that  my  advice  appears  Avrong  through  the  weakness  of 
your  resolution;  because  pain  is  now  in  possession  of  eachman\s 
feeling,  while  the  certainty  of  the  benefit  is  jis  yet  hidden 
from  all :  and  a  great  reverse  having  befallen  you,  and 
tiiat  suddenly,  your  mind  is  too  prostrated  to  persevere  in 
your  determinations.  For  the  spirit  is  enslaved  by  what  is 
sudden  and  unlooked  for,  and  most  beyond  our  calculation ; 


LXii.]  TIIUCYDIDBS.  Ιί.  127 

which  has  been  your  case,  ia  addition  to  every  thin^  else» 
more  es|Xicially  with  regard  to  the  plague.  LivinjOf,  however, 
as  you  do  in  a  great  city,  and  brought  up  Λvith  habits  corre- 
Fponding  to  it.,  you  ought  to  be  willing  to  encounter  the  great- 
est niisfbrtuiiea,  and  not  to  sully  your  reputation ;  (for  men 
think  it  equally  just  to  find  fault  Avith  him  who  weakly  falls 
hhort  of  his  proper  character,  and  to  hato  him  who  rashly 
grasps  at  that  which  does  not  belong  to  him ;)  and  you  ought 
to  ceaso  grieving  for  your  private  Bufferings,  and  to  devoto 
yourselves  to  the  safety  of  the  commonwealth. 

02.  "  But  w  ith  regard  to  your  trouble  in  tho  war,  lest  you 
should  fear  that  it  may  prove  great,  and  wo  may  still  bo  nono 
the  more  successful,  let  those  arguments  suffico'  you,  with 
which  on  many  other  occasions  I  have  ]>roved  the  error  of 
your  stispicions  respecting  it.  At  tho  same  time,  I  will  also 
lay  before  you  the  following  advantage,  which  yourselves  do 
not  a])]K'ar  ever  yet  to  have  thought  of  as  l>elonging  to  you, 
rcs]>ecting  tho  greatness  of  your  empire,  and  which  I  never 
urged  in  my  former  sj)eechea ;  nor  woul«l  I  even  now,  as  it  ha» 
rather  too  boastful  an  air,  if  I  did  not  see  you  unreasonably 
cast  down.  You  think  then  that  you  only  bear  rule  over 
your  own  subject  alttes ;  but  I  declare  to  you  that  of  tho  two 
parts  of  tho  world  open  for  man's  use,  tho  land  and  tho 
sea,  of  the  Avhole  of  the  ojio  you  are  most  absolute  ihasters, 
both  as  far  as  you  avail  yourselves  of  it  now,  and  if  you  shoul•! 
wish  to  do  so  still  further  ;  and  there  is  no  power,  neither  tho 
king  ncr  any  nation  besides  at  thoj>resent  day,  that  can  pre- 
vent your  sailing  [where  you  pleas(^  |  with  your  present  naval 
resources.  This  power  then  evidently  is  far  from  being 
merely  on  a  level  Avith  tho  benefits  of  your  houses  and  lands, 
which  you  think  so  much  to  bo  deprived  of;  nor  is  is  right 
for  you  to  grieve  al)OUt  them,  but  rather  to  liold  them  cheap, 
considering  them,  in  comparison  with  this,  as  a  mere  garden• 
plot  and  embellishment  of  a  rich  man's  estate.  You  should 
know,  too,  that  liberty,  provided  wo. devoto  ourselves  to  tha% 
and  preserve  it,  will  easily  recover  these  losses  ;  whereas  thoso 
who  have  onco  8ubmitte<i  to  others  find  even  their  greatest 
gains  diminish.  Nor  should  yoii  show  yourselves  inferior  in 
both  respects  to  your  fathers,  who  with  labor,  and  not.  by  in-;, 
heritanco  from  others,  acquired  theso  possessions,  and  more- 
over kept  them,  and  bequeathed  them  to  us ;  for  it  is  more• 

\ 


128  THUOYDIDEa  Π.  [Lxjn.,LxiT. 

disgraceful  to  be  deprived  of  a  thing  when  we  have  got  it, 
than  to  fail  in  getting  it  On  the  contrary,  you  should  meet 
your  eaemies,  not  only  with  spirit,  but  also  with  a  Bpirit  of 
contempt.  For  confidence  is  produced  even  by  lucky  ignorance, 
ay,  even  in  a  coward ;  but  contempt  is  the  feeling  of  tho  man 
who  trusts  that  ho  is  &ui)erior  Jo  his  adversaries  in  counsel 
also,  which  is  our  case.  And  ability,  with  a  high  spirit,  ren- 
ders more  sure  the  daring  which  arises  from  equal  fortune ; 
and  does  not  so  much  trust  to  mere  hope,  whose  strength 
mainly  displays  itself  in  dilHculties ;  but  rather  to  a  judgment 
grounded  upon  present  realities,  whoso  anticipations  may  bu 
more  relied  upon. 

C3.  "It  is  but  fair,  too,  that  you  should  sustain  tho  dignity 
of  the  state  derived  from  its  sovereignty,  on  which  you  all 
pride  yourselves ;  and  that  either  you  should  not  shrink  from 
Its  labors,  or  else  hIkjuKI  lay  no  claim  to  its  honors  either. 
Nor  should  you  suppose  that  yon  aro  Btru^'i(ling  to  eseajKi  oiio 
evil  only,  slavery  instead  of  freedom  ;  but  to  avoid  loss  of  do- 
minion also,  and  danger  from  tho  animosities  which  you  have 
incurred  in  your  exercise  of  that  dominion.  And  from  this  it 
is  no  longer  possible  for  you  to  retire ;  if  through  fear  at  tho 

Ϊ resent  time  any  on<i  is  for  so  playing  the  honest  man  in  quiet, 
"or  you  now  hold  it  as  a  tyranny,  Avhich  it  seems  wrong  to 
have  assumed,  but  dangerous  to  give  up.  And  men  with 
these  views  would  very  quickly  ruin  the  state,  whether  they 
persuaded  others  [to  adopt  tho  same],  or  even  lived  any  where 
independently  by  themselves;  for  quietness  is  not  a  safe  prin- 
ciple, unless  ranged  witli  activity ;  nor  is  it  for  the  interest  of 
a  sovereign  state,  but  of  a  subject  one,  that  it  may  live  in 
safe  slavery. 

04.  "  Do  you  then  n(iither  be  seduced  by  such  citizens,  nor 
bo  angry  with  me,  whom  yourselves  also  joined  in  voting  for 
war,  though  tho  enemy  has  invaded  our  country,  iuid  done 
wliat  it  was  natural  that  ho  should  do,  if  you  would  not  sub- 
mit ;  and  thou'^di,  besides  what  we  looked  for,  this  disease  also 
has  come  upon  us — the  only  thing,  ind«'e<l,  of  all  that  has  hap- 
pened beyond  our  ex])eclalions.  And  it  is  through  this,  I 
well  know,  that  in  some  degree  I  am  still  more  tho  object  of 
your  displeasure;  yet  not  with  justice,  uidess  you  ΛνϊΙΙ  also 
give  me  tho  credit  when  you  meet  with  any  success  beyond 
your  calculation.    Tho  evils  then  which  aro  sent  by  lieaven, 


ixv.]  THUCTDIDES.  ΙΓ.  129 

j'ou  must  bear  perforce;  those  which  are  inflicted  by  your 
enemies,  with  courage ;  for  such  was  formerly  the  custom  of 
this  country,  and  let  it  not  now  meet  with  a  check  in  your 
case.  But  consider  that  it  has  the  greatest  iiamo  in  all  tlio 
world  from  not  yielding  to  misfortunes,  and  from  expending 
in  war  more  lives  and  labor  than  any  other  state ;  and  that 
it  has  now  the  greatest  power  that  ever  existed  up  to  the  pres- 
ent time;  the  memory  of  which,  even  should  wo  now  at 
length  give  way  (for  every  thing  is  naturally  Hablo  to  do- 
crease),  will  be  left  to  posterity  forever,  namely,  that  wo  had 
<lominion  over  more  Greeks  than  any  other  Greek  stito  ever 
had  ;  and  held  out  in  the  greatest  Avars  against  them,  ^oth  col- 
lectively and  singly;  and  inhabited  a  city  better  provided 
with  all  things  than  any  other,  and  greater.  And  yet  your 
quiet  man  would  find  fault  with  these  things;  but  the  man 
who  has  himsolf  a  wish  to  achieve  something,  will  emulate 
them  ;  Avhilo  whoever  does  not  possess  them  will  envy  them. 
Ihit  to  bo  hated  and  oiTensivo  for  the  time  present  has  been 
the  lot  of  all  who  have  ever  presumed  to  rule  over  others; 
that  man,  however,  takes  wise  counsel  who  incurs  envy  for 
the  greatest  things.  For  odiimi  does  not  last  long ;  but  pres- 
<nt  splendor  and  future  glory  are  handed  down  to  perpetual 
memory.  Do  you  then,  providing  both  for  your  future 
honor,  and  for  your  immediate  escape  from  disgiace,'  secure 
l)oth  objects  by  your  present  spirit;  and  neither  send  any 
heralds  to  tho  Laceda?monians,  nor  show  that  you  are  weighed 
down  by  your  present  troubles  ;  for  such  as  in  feeling  are  least 
annoyed  at  their  misfortunes,  while  in  action  they  most  cour- 
ageously resist  them,  these,  both  of  stites  and  of  individuals, 
^re  tho  best." 

05.  By  speaking  to  this  eflect  rericlos  endeavored  both  to 
divert  the  Athenians  from  their  anger  toward  himsolf,  and  to 
lead  away  their  thoughts  from  their  present  hardships.  And 
in  a  public  point  of  view  they  were  persuarled  by  his  8j)eech, 
and  were  no  longer  for  sending  to  tho   IjacedsBmonians,  but 

*  "Kocto  Dukas  rd  μέ?νλον  Kah)v  ad  r;/v  l:reiTa  Λήξαν,  r»)  αντίκα  μί^ 
ηιηχρόν  ad  τήν  τταραντίκα  λαμιτρότητα  rcspiccro  adnotat." — GiUler,  whoso 
interpretation  is  adopted  by  Arnold.  By  others  «αλόν  nnd  μτ)  αίσχρόν 
nro  taken  as  dependent  on  ηρόγνοντες;  "providing  what  is  honorablo 
for  tho  future  and  not  disgracelid  for  tho  present"  Tiio  rhythm  of  tho 
Bcntenco  is,  I  think,  in  favor  of  tho  latter  interpretation ;  tho  absence  of 
iho  article  from  tho  noutef  singular  adjectives,  in  favor  of  tho  former. 

0* 


130  THUCYDIDES.  IL  [lit. 

were  more  resolute  for  the  war;  though  in  their  private  feel• 
iogQ  they  were  distressed  by  their  sufferings;  the  commons, 
because,  having  set  out  with  less  resources,  they  had  been  de• 
jirived  of  even  those;  the  liigher  orders,  because  they  had 
lost  fine  possessions  in  the  country,  both  in  buildings  and  ex- 
pensive establishments,  and,  what  was.  the  greatest  evil  of  all, 
had  war  instead  of  peace.  They  did  not,  however,  cease  from 
their  public  displeasure  toward  him,  till  they  had  lined  him 
in  a  sum  of  money.  But  no  long  time  after,  as  tho  multitude 
is  wont  to  act,  they  again  elected  him  general,  and  committed 
every  thing  to  him  ;  for  on  the  points  in  which  each  man  was 
vexed  about  his  domestic  affairs,  they  now  felt  less  keenly ; 
but  with  regard  to  what  the  whole  state  needed,  they  thought 
that  ho  was  most  valuable.  For  as  long  as  ho  was  at  the  head 
of  the  state  in  time  of  peace,  ho  governed  it  with  moderation, 
and  kept  it  in  safety,  and  it  was  at  its  height  of  greatness  in 
his  time ;  and  >vhen  the  war  broke  out,  he  apj>i*ars  to  havo 
foreknown  its  power  in  this  respect  also,  lie  survived  its 
commencement  two  years  and  six  months ;  and  when  he  was 
dead,  his  foresight  with  regard  to  its  course  was  appreciated 
to  a  still  greater  degree.  For  he  said  that  if  they  kept  ouiet, 
and  attended  to  their  navy,  and  did  not  gain  additional  do- 
minion during  the  war,  nor  expose  the  city  to  hazard,  they 
would  have  the  advantage  in  the  struggle.  '  But  they  did  the 
very  contrary  of  all  this,  and  in  other  things  which  seemed  to 
havo  nothing  to  do  with  the  war,  through  their  pnvate  ambi- 
tion and  private  gain,  they  ado])ted  evil  measures  both  toward 
themselves  and  their  allies;  which,  if  successful,  conduced  to 
the  honor  and  benefit  of  individuals ;  but  if  they  failed,  proved 
detrimental  to  the  state  with  regard  to  the  Λvar.  And  the  reason 
was,  that  he,  being  ])owerlul  by  means  of  his  high  rank  and 
talents,  and  manifestly  proof  against  bribery,  controlled  the  mul- 
titude with  an  independent  spirit,  and  was  not  led  by  them  so 
much  as  ho  himself  led  them  ;  for  ho  did  not  say  any  thing  to 
liunior  them,  for  the  acquisition  of  j)ower  by  improper  means  ; 
but  was  able  on  the  strength  of  his  character  to  contradict  them 
even  at  the  risk  of  their  displeasure.  Whenever,  for  instance, 
he  i>erceived  them  unseasonably  and  insolently  confident,  by 
his  language,  he  Avould  dash  them  down  to  alarm ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  when  they  were  unreasonably  alarmed,  he 
would  raise   them  again  to   confidence.     And  so,  though  in 


ΛΧ7Ι.,  Lxvii.j  inUCYDIDES.  II.  131 

name  it  was  a  democracy,  in  fact  it  was  a  government  ad- 
ministered by  the  first  man.  Wliereas  those  who  camo  after, 
Iniing  more  on  a  level  with  each  other,  and  each  cfrasping  to 
bocomo  first,  had  recourse  to  devoting  [not  only  their  speeches, 
but]  even  their  measures,  to  the  humors  of  the  people.  In 
consequence  of  this  both  many  other  blunders  were  committed, 
as  was  likely  in  a  great  and  sovereign  state,  and  especially  tho 
expedition  to  Sicily;  which  was  not  so  much  an  error  of 
judgment  with  respect  to  the  people  they  Λvent  against,  as 
that  those  who  ha<l  sent  them  out,  by  not  afterward  voting 
supplies  required  by  tho  armament,  but  proceeding  >vith  their 
private  criminations,  to  gain  tho  leadership  of  tho  conrtmons, 
l)oth  blunted  the  spirit  of  measures  in  tho  camp,  and  for  tho 
first  time  were  embroiled  with  one  another  in  tho  affairs  of 
the  city.  But  even  when  they  had  sutlored  in  Siinly  tho  loss 
of  other  forces,  and  of  tho  greater  part  of  their  fleet,  and  were 
now  involved  in  sedition  at  home,  they  nevertheless  held  out 
three  years,  both  against  their  former  enemies,  and  those  from 
Sicily  with  them,  and  moreover  against  the  greater  part  of 
their  allies  who  ha  I  revolted,  and  Cyrus,  tho  king's  son,  who 
afterward  joined  them,  and  who  supplied  the  Peloponnesians 
with  money  for  their  fleet :  nor  did  they  succumb,  l>efore  they 
Avero  overthrown  and  ruined  by  themselves,  through  their  pri- 
vate quarrels.  Such  a  superabundance  of  means  had  Pericles 
at  that  time,  by  which  he  himself  foresaw  that  with  tho  great- 
est ease  ho  could  gain  tho  mlvantage  in  the  Avar  over  tho  JVlo- 
ponnesians  by  themselves. 

GO.  The  Lacedajmonians  and  their  allies  the  same  summer 
made  an  expedition  Avith  a  Imndred  ships  against  tho  island 
of  Zacynthus,  which  lies  over  against  Elis.  Tho  inhabitants 
are  a  colony  of  tho  Achaians  of  the  Peloponnesus  and  were  in 
allianco  with  tho  Athenians.  On  Iward  tno  floet  were  a  thou- 
sand hea\7-armed  of  tho  Laced a»monians,  and  Cnemus,  a  Spar- 
tan as  admiral.  Having  made  a  descent  on  tho  country,  they 
ravaged  tho  greater  part  of  it ;  and  when  they  did  not  sur- 
render, they  sailed  back  home. 

07.  At  tho  end  of  the  same  summer,  Aristeus,  h  Corinthian, 
Ancristus,  Nicolaus,  and  Stratodemus,  embassadors  of  tho 
LafMidsemonians,  Timagoras,  a  Tegean,  and  Pollis,  an  Argivo 
in  a  private  capacity,  being  on  their  way  to  Asia,  to  obtain 
an  interview  with   tho   king,  if  by  any   means  they   might 


182  THUCYDIDEa  II.  [Lzna 

prevail  on  him  to  Mipply  moucy  and  join  in  the  war,  went 
first  to  Thrace,  to  Sitalces  the  son  of  Teres,  wishing  to  per- 
suade him,  if  they  could,  to  withdraw  from  his  alliance  with  the 
Athenians,  and  make  an  expedition  against  Potidaca,  where  was 
an  armament  of  the  Athenians  besieging  the  place  ;  and  then, 
to  proceed  by  his  assistance  to  their  destination  across  the  Hel- 
lespont, to  Pharuaces  the  son  of  Pharuabazus,  who  was  to  send 
them  up  the  country  to  the  king.  But  some  Athenian  em- 
bassadors, Learchus  son  of  Callimachus,  and  Aminiades  son  of 
Philemon,  happening  to  be  with  Sitalces,  persuaded  Sadocus 
his  son,  who  iiad  l>een  made  an  Athenian  citizen,  to  put  the 
men  into  their  hands,  that  they  may  not,  by  passing  over  to 
the  king,  do  their  best  to  injure  [what  was  now]  his  own 
country.  lie,  in  compliance  with  their  request,  having  sent 
some  other  men  with  Learchus  and  Aniinia<^les,  seized  them  a» 
they  were  traveling  through  Tliraco  to  the  vessc'l  in  >vhich  they 
were  to  cross  the  Helles}>out,  before  they  went  on  board,  and 
gave  orders  to  deliver  thom  up  to  the  Athenian  embassadors ; 
who,  having  received  them,  took  them  to  Athens.  On  their 
arrival  the  Athenians,  being  afraid  that  if  Aristeus  escaped  ho 
might  do  them  still  more  mischief  (for  even  before  this  ho  had 
evidently  conducted  all  the  measures  in  Potida;a  and  their  pos- 
sessions Thraceward),  without  giving  them  a  trial,  though  they 
requested  to  say  something  [in  their  own  defense],  put  them  to 
death  that  same  day,  and  threw  them  into  pits ;  thinking  it  but 
just  to  requite  them  in  the  same  way  a^  the  Laced aiuionians 
had  begun  with  ;  for  they  had  killed  and  thrown  into  j)its  the 
merchants  both  of  the  Athenians  and  their  allies,  whom  they 
had  taken  on  board  trading  vessels  about  the  coast  of  the 
Peloponnese.  Indeed  all  that  the  Liicediumonians  took  on  the 
sea  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  they  butx^hered  as  enemies, 
both  those  >vho  >vero  confederates  of  the  Athenians  and  those 
who  were  neutral. 

C8.  About  the  same  time,  when  the-  summer  was  drawing 
to  a  close,  the  Ambraciots,  with  their  own  forces  and  many 
of  the  barbarians  whom  they  had  raised,  made  an  expedition 
a^•:ιinst  Argos  in  Aniphilochia,  and  the  rest  of  that  country. 
Now  their  enmity  against  tlie  Argives  first  arose  from  the 
folhiwing  circumstances.  Argos  in  Amphilochia  and  the  rest 
of  the  country  was  colonized  by  Amplnlochus  the  son  of  Ain- 
phiaraus,  when  he  returned  liomo  after  the  Trojau  Λvar,  and 


i.xix.,wx.]  THUCTDIDFA  Π.  13.1 

was  not  pleased  with  the  state  of  thin^  nt  Arcjos;  [and  ho 
huilt  it]  on  the  Ambracian  Gulf,  and  called  it  Argos,  after  the 
name  of  his  own  coimtr}\  'J'his  was  the  largest  city  of  Am- 
philochia,  and  had  tlio  most  powerful  inhabitants.  But  many 
ironerations  afterward,  being  pressed  by  misfortunes,  they 
called  in  the  Ambraciots,  who  bordered  on  Ampliilorhia,  as 
joint-inhabitants;  and  from  the  Ambracnots  who  joined  them 
they  were  taught  the  Greek  language  which  they  now  speak, 
the  rest  of  the  Amphilochians  being  barbarians.  Now  the 
Ambraciots  in  process  of  time  drove  out  tho  Argives,  and  held 
the  city  by  themselves.  Upon  this  tho  Amphilochiana  gave 
themselves  up  to  the  Acamanians ;  and  both  together  having 
tailed  in  tho  Athenians,  who  sent  them  Phormio  for  a  general 
and  thirty  ships,  on  the  arrival  of  Thormio  they  took  Argos 
by  storm,  and  niade  slaves  of  tho  Ambraciots  ;  Λνΐιϋο  tho  Am- 
jthiiochians  and  Aearnanians  occupied  tho  town  in  common. 
And  it  was  after  tliis  event  that  the  alliance  between  tho 
Athenians  and  Acamanians  was  first  made.  The  Ambraciots 
then  first  conceived  th<Mr  enmity  to  the  Argives  from  this  en- 
elavement  of  their  ])eople ;  and  afterward,  during  tho  war,  form- 
ed this  annament  from  themselves  and  the  Chaonians,  and  somo 
other  of  the  neighboring  barbarians.  Having  come  to  Argos, 
thoy  obtained  command  of  the  country;  but  being  unable  to 
t^iko  the  city  by  assault,  they  retired  homeward,  and  disbanding 
returned  to  their  different  nations.  Thcso  were  tlio  events  of 
the  summer. 

C9.  Tho  following  winter,. tho  Athenians  sent  twenty  ships 
round  tho  IVloponnese,  with  Phormio  as  commander,  who, 
making  Naupectus  liis  station,  kept  watch  that  no  one  cither 
sailed  out  from  Corinth  and  the  Orisican  Bay,  or  in  to  it.  An- 
other squadron  of  six  they  sent  toward  Caria  and  Lycia,  with 
^Iclesander  as  commander,  to  raise  money  from  those  parts,  and 
to  hinder  the  privateers  of  tho  Peloponnesiane  from  making 
that  their  rendezvous,  and  interfering  with  tho  navigation  of 
the  merchantmen  from  Phasclis  and  Phcenice,  and  tho  conti- 
nent in  that  direction.  But  Mclcsander,  having  gono  up  tho 
f'ountry  into•  Lycia  with  a  forco  composed  of  the  Athenians 
from  tho  ships  and  tho  allies,  and  being  defeated  in  a  battle, 
was  killed,  and  lost  a  considerable  part  of  tho  army. 

70.  The  same  winter,'  when  tho  Polidaiana  could  no  longer 
•  hold  out  against  their  besiegers,  iho  inrond»  of  the  Pelopon- 


134  THUCYDIDES.  II.  [lxxu 

nesians  into  Attica  having  had  no  more  effect  toward  causing 
the  Athenians  to  withdraw,  and  their  provisions  being  ex• 
hausted)  and  many  other  liorrors  having  befallen  them  in 
their  straits  for  food,  and  some  having  even  eaten  one  an- 
other; under  these  circumstance,. I  says,  they  make  proposals 
for  a  capitulation  to  the  generals  of  the  Athenians  who  wero 
in  command  against  them,  Xenophon  son  of  Kuripides,  liis- 
tiodorus  son  of  Aristoclides,  the  son  of  Plianomachus  son  of  Cal- 
limachus ;  who  accepted  them,  seeing  the  distress  of  their 
army  in  so  exposed  a  position,  and  the  state  having  already 
expended  2000  talents  on  the  siege.  On  these  terms  there- 
fore they  came  to  an  agreement;  that  themselves,  their  chil- 
dren, wives,  and  auxiliaries,  should  go  out  of  the  place  with 
one  dress  each— but  the  womeu  with  two—and  with  a  fixed 
sum  of  money  for  their  journey.  According  to  this  treaty, 
they  went  out  to  Chalcidico,  or  where  each  could :  but  tho 
Athenians  bhuned  the  generals  for  having  come  to  an  agree- 
ment without  consulting  them ;  for  they  thought  they  might, 
liave  got  possession  of  the  phu;o  on  their  own  terms;  and 
afterward  they  sent  settlers  of  their  own  to  l*otida'a  and 
colonized  it.  These  were  tho  transactions  of  the  winter;  and 
80  ended  tho  second  year  of  this  war  of  which  Thucydide* 
wrote  tho  history. 

71.  The  following  summer  the  Peloponnesians  and  their 
allies  did  not  make  an  incursion  into  Attica,  but  marche<i 
agamst  riaUea,  being  led  by  Archidamus,  the  son  of  Zeuxi- 
damus,  king  of  the  Lacedairnonians.  Having  encamped  his 
army,  he  was  going  to  ravage  the  land ;  but  the  Plataans 
immediately  sent  embassadors  to  bin),  and  spoke  as  follows: 
*'Archi(lamus  and  Lacedicmonians,  you  are  not  doing  >vhat  is 
right,  or  worthy  either  of  yourselves  or  of  the  fathers  from  whom 
you  are  sprung,  in  marcliing  against  the  territory  of  the  Pla- 
toians.  For  Pausanias  son  of  Cleombrotus,  the  Lacedaimonian, 
when  lie  had  liberated  Greece  from  the  Medes,  in  conjunction 
with  those  Greeks  who  bad  been  willing  to  incur  with  him 
tho  peril  of  tho  battle  that  was  fought  near  our  city,  after 
sacrificing  in  tho  market-place  of  Plata^a  to  Jupiter  tho  De- 
liverer, and  iissembling  all  the  allies,  proceeded  to  grant  to  tho 
Platuians  to  live  in  inde|)endent  j)ossession  of  their  land  and 
city,  and  that  no  ono  should  ever  make  war  upon  them  un- 
justly, or  to  enslave  them ;  else  that  the   allies  then  present 


Lixii.,  Lxxiii.]  .   THUCTDIDES.  1Γ.  135 

should  assist  them  to  their  utmost.  These  rewards  your  fathers 
^ave  us  for  our  valor  and  zeal,  shown  in  those  scenes  of  danger ; 
hut  jfou  arc  doing  the  very  contrary ;  for  in  conjunction  with 
the  Thcbans,  our  bitterest  enemies,  you  arc  come  to  enslave  us. 
Calling  the  gods  then  to  witness,  both  those  who  at  that  time 
received  the  oaths,  and  those  of  your  own  fathers,  and  those  of 
our  country,  we  (thargo  you  not  to  injure  the  Platacan  territory, 
nor  break  the  oaths,  but  to  let  us  live  independent,  as  Pnusauias 
thought  riglit  to  grant  us." 

72.  When  the  Platicans  luid  spoken  thus  much,  Archidrtmus 
took  them  up  and  said :  "  You  speak  what  is  just,  Plataeans,  if 
you  act  in  accordance  with  your  speech.  As  then  Pausanias 
bequeathed  to  you,  &o  both  enjoy  independence  yourselves,  and 
assist  in  liberating  the  rest,  as  many  as  shared  the  dangers  of 
that  day,  and  are  now  under  the  rule  of  the  Athenians;  and  for 
whose  liberation,  nn<l  that  of  the  rest  [of  their  subjects],  all  this 
provision  and  war  has  been  undertaken.  Do  you  then  your- 
Folves  abide  by  the  oaths,  by  taking  your  ])art  in  this  liberation, 
if  possible ;  but  if  not,  then,  as  we  before  proposed,  keep  quiet 
in  the  enjoyment  of  your  own  ])osscssions,  and  do  not  join  cither 
Fide,  but  receive  both  as  friends,  and  for  warhke  ])urposes  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other.  And  this  will  satisfy  us."  Thus  much 
^aid  Archidamus.  The  Platicans  having  heard  it  went  into  the 
city,  and  after  commnnicatmg  to  the  whole  people  what  ha<l 
l>een  said,  answered  him  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  do 
what  ho  proposed  without  consulting  the  Athenians;  for  their 
children  and  wives  were  with  them;  and  that  they  had  also 
fears  for  the  whole  city,  lest  when  the  Lacedaemonians  had  re- 
tired, the  Athenians  should  come  and  not  leave  it  in  their 
liands ;  or  the  Thebans,  as  l)cing  included  in  the  treaty,  on  the 
strength  of  their  "  receiving  both  parties,"  should  again  endeavor 
to  seize  on  it.  To  encourage  them  on  thfeso  points  ho  said,  "  Do 
you  then  give  up  your  city  and  houses  to  U8  Lacedaemonians, 
and  point  out  the  boundaries  of- your  territory,  and  your  trees 
in  number,  and  whatever  else  can  be  reduced  to  number;  and 
yourselves  remove  wherever  you  please  for  as  long  as  the  war 
may  last.  When  it  is  over,  wo  will  restore  to  you  whatever  wo 
may  have  received.  Till  then  we  will  hold  it  in  tnist,  cultivatinff 
it,  and  bringing  to  you  such  of  the  produce  as  will  bo  sufficient 
for  you." 

1Z,  When  they  had  heard  his  proposal,  they  went  again  into 


13β  THUCYDIDES.  Π.  [lxxiv.,  lxxv. 

the  city,  and  afler  consuUiDg  with  the  people,  eaid  that  they 
wished  first  to  communicate  to  the  Athenians  what  he  proposed, 
and  should  they  gain  their  consent,  then  to  do  so ;  but  till  that 
time  they  begged  him  to  grant  them  α  truce,  and  not  to  lay 
waste  the  land.  So  he  granted  thorn  a  truce  for  the  number  of 
days  within  which  it  was  likely  they  would  return  home,  and  in 
the  mean  time  did  not  begin  to  ravage  the  land.  The  Plataan 
embassadors  having  come  to  the  Atlienians  and  consulted  with 
them,  returned  with  the  following  message  to  those  in  the  city : 
*'  Men  of  IMata'a,  the  Athenians  say,  that  never  in  times  past, 
since  we  became  their  allies,  have  they  on  any  occasion  deserted 
us  when  injured;  nor  ΛνϋΙ  they  neglect  us  now,  but  will  succor 
us  to  the  best  of  their  power.  And  they  charge  you  by  the  oath.s 
which  your  fathers  sworo,  to  make  no  innovation  in  the  t^-rnia 
of  the  alliance." 

74.  The  embassadors  having  delivered  thin  message,  thev 
resolved  not  to  prove  falso  to  the  Athenians,  but  to  endure,  if 
necessary,  both  to  see  their  land  ravaged,  and  to  sufter  whatever 
else  might  befall  them.  They  resolved  also  that  no  one  should 
go  out  a^^ain,  but  that  they  should  re])ly  from  the  walls,  that  it 
was  impossililo  fur  them  to  do  as  the;  Laci'ihemonians  proposed. 
AVhen  they  had  given  this  answer,  king  Arehidanms  proceeded 
in  the  first  plaee  to  eail  to  >vitneHS  the  gods  and  heroes  of  the 
country,  in  these  words:  "Ye  gods  and  heroes  that  dwell  in 
the  land  of  I'latjua,  bear  witness  that  it  was  neither  unjustly  in 
the  first  instance,  but  when  these  men  had  first  broken  the 
agreement  they  liad  sworn  to,  that  we  came  against  this  land, 
in  which  our  fathers  prayed  to  you  before  they  coiKjuered  tin» 
Meih'H,  and  which  you  reiidercil  an  ausj)iciouH  one  for  the  (ireeks 
t'>  contA-nd  in;  n«ir  shall  w»*  act  unjustly  now,  whateviT  we  nniy 
do;  for  though  we  hav(^  made  many  lair  ])roposals,  we  have  not 
succeeded  in  gaining  their  a-^sent.  Grant  then  that  those  may 
be  punished  for  the  wrong  who  were  the  first  to  begin  it,  and 
that  those  may  obtain  their  revengi)  who  are  lawfully  trying  to 
infiict  it." 

75.  Having  thus  ajipealed  to  the  gods,  he  set  his  army  to 
the  war.  In  the  first  place  he  inclosed  them  with  η  jtalisade, 
made  of  the  trees  Avhich  they  cut  tlown,  that  no  one  might  go 
out  of  the  town  any  longer.  Next  they  began  to  throw  up  a 
mouuil  against  the  city,  hoping  that  the  reduction  of  it  ΛνοηΜ 
bo   very  R|>eedily  cilected    with  so   largo    an    army  at  ΛνοΓίί. 


LXXTi.]  THUCTDIDES.   I  Γ.  137 

Cutting  down  timber  tlicrcforo  from  Citliacron,  tliey  built  it 
\ψ  on  each  side,  laying  it  like  lattice-work,  to  servo  as  walls, 
that  the  mound  might  not  spread  over  a  wide  space ;  and  they 
carried  to  it  brushwood,  and  stone,  and  soil,  and  Avhatcver  elso 
Avould  help  to  complete  it  >vhen  thrown  on.  Seventy  days  and 
nights  continuously  they  Averc  throwing  it  up,  being  divided 
into  relief-parties,  so  th.at  some  should  be  carrying,  while  others 
were  taking  sleep  and  refreshment ;  the  Laceda;monian  officers  * 
who  shared  tho  command  over  the  contingents  of  each  sUito 
urmng  thera  to  the  Λvork.  But  tho  Plataians,  seeing  tho  mound 
rismg,  put  together  a  wooden  wall,  and  ])laced  it  on  the  wall 
of  their  city,  where  tho  mound  was  being  m«ado;  and  built 
bricks  inside  it,  which  they  took  from  tho  neighboring  liouse•^.. 
The  timbers  served  as  a  frame  for  them,  to  prevent  the  buiM- 
ing  from  being  weak  as  it  became  hi<rh ;  and  for  curtains  it 
had  skins  and  hides,  so  that  tho  Λvorkmen  and  tho  timbers 
wero  not  exposed  to  fiery  missiles,  but  were  in  safety.  So  tho 
wall  was  raised  to  a  great  height,  and  tho  mound  roso  op- 
posite to  it  no  less  quickly.  The  l*lata\ins  also  adopted  somo 
such  device  as  follows:  they  took  down  a  part  of  tho  wall, 
wiiero  tho  mound  lay  against  it,  and  carried  tho  earth  into  tho 
city. 

70.  Πιο  Peloponneslans,  on  perceiving  this,  rammed  down 
clay  in  wattles  of  reed,  and  threw  it  into  the  breach,  that  it 
migiit  not  bo  loose,  and  so  carried  away  like  the  soil.  Being 
thus  baffled,  the  I'lataians  ceased  from  this  attempt ;  but  hnv- 
iiig  dug  a  passago  under  ground  from  the  city,  and  having 
guessed  their  way  under  tho  mound,  they  began  again  to  cany 
the  soil  in  to  them.  And  for  a  long  time  they  escaped  the  oIh 
servaiion  of  tho  enemy  outside;  so  that  though  the  ν  continued 
to  throw  on  materials,  they  Λvero  further  from  finishing  it ;  aa 
their  mound  was  carried  away  from  beneath,  and  continually 
sinking  down  into  tho  vacuum.  Fearing,  however,  that  they 
might  not  oven  by  this  means  bo  able  to  hold  out,  so  few  in 
numbers  against  so  many,  they  adopted  the  following  addi- 
iion.d  contrivance.  They  ceased  to  work  at  the  great  build- 
ing opj^osito  to  tho  mound;  but  beginning  at  either  end  of  it, 
where  tho  wall  was  of  ita  original  height,  they  built  another  in 
tho  form  of  a  crescent,  running  inward  into  tho  city ;  that  if 
1Ι1Θ  great  wall  wero  taken,  this  might  hold  out,  and  their  op- 
j)oaeut3  might  have  lo  throw  up  a  second  mound  Against  it, 


138  THU0YDIDE8,  Π.  (lxxtii. 

and  as  they  advanced  within,  might  havo  douhlo  trouble,  and 
bo  more  exposed  to  missiles  on  both  their  flanks.  At  the  same 
time  that  they  were  raising  tlio  mound,  tho  Pelopounosians 
brought  engines  also  to  play  upon  tho  city ;  one  of  which,  being 
brought  up  closu  to  the  wall,  shook  down  a  considerable  part  oi* 
the  great  building,  and  terrified  the  IMatuians.  Others  were 
advanced  against  ditleront  parts  of  the  w  all ;  but  the  Platiean;^ 
broke  them  oft*  by  throwing  nooses  around  them.  They  also 
suspended  great  beams  by  long  iron  chains  from  tho  extremity 
of  two  levers,  >vhich  >vero  laid  upon  tho  wall,  and  stretched  out 
beyond  it ;  and  having  drawn  them  up  at  an  angle,  whenever 
tho  engine  yvas  going  to  fall  on  any  point,  by  loosing  tho  chains 
and  not  holding  them  tight  in  hand,  they  let  tho  beam  drop; 
which,  falling  on  it  with  great  impetus,  broke  off  the  head  oi 
tho  battering-ram.* 

77.  After  this,  when  their  engines  were  of  no  avail,  and  the 
building  of  tho  wall  was  going  on  in  opposition  to  the  mound, 
the  Peloponnesians,  thinking  it  impossible  to  take  tho  city  by 
their  present  means  of  oliense,  j)repared  for  circumvallating  it. 
First,  however,  they  tletermined  to  make  an  attempt  upon  it  by 
fire,  [and  seej  whether  with  the  help  of  a  favorable  wiml  they 
could  burn  the  town,  as  it  was  not  a  large  one  :  for  they 
thought  of  every  possible  device,  if  by  any  means  it  might  bo 
reduced  by  them  without  the  expense  of  a  siege.  They  took 
therefore  faggots  of  brushwoo»!,  and  threw  them  from  tlu; 
mound  ;  at  first  into  the  space  between  it  and  the  wall,  and 
when  that  had  soon  been  filled  by  the  many  )iands  at  work, 
they  piled  them  up  also  as  far  into  the  town  as  they  could 
reach  from  the  height ;  and  then  lighted  the  wood  by  thr^Av- 
ing  on  it  fire  with  sulphur  and  piteh.  liy  this  means  such  a 
llamo  Avas  raised  as  no  one  had  ever  yet  seen  produced  by  tho 
hand  of  man ;  [though  natural  conllagrations  might  have  ex- 
ceeded it;]  for  ere  now  the  wood  of  a  mountain  forest  has  been 
known  to  Uike  fire  of  itself,  and  to  emit  a  fiame  in  conscipience, 
through  the  mutual  attrition  of  the  boughs  by  high  Avinds. 
'J'his  fire,  however,  was  a  great  one,  and  was  within  very  litthi 
t;f  destroying  the  I'lataians,  after  they  had  escaped  all  their 

'  Arnold  thinks  that  tho  battering:  engine  ended  in  a  point,  to  forco 
its  wuy  into  tho  wall,  rather  than  with  α  thick  solid  end,  merely  to  bat- 
ter it ;  and  bo  that  to  ttjuuxov  της  Ιμίολης  answers  exaetly  to  ra  r/itn-aiOy 
in  α  parallel  passage  quoted  by  liini  from  ^iluoaa  Tacticua. 

s 


I.XXVIIT.,  Lxxix.J  THUCYDIDES.  II.  139 

other  danfyers ;  for  tlioro  was  n  considcrablo  part  of  the  tovrn 
within  wliich  it  was  not  possible  to  approach ;  and  if  a  wind 
had  risen  to  blow  upon  it,  as  their  enemy  hoped,  they  would 
not  have  escaped.  As  it  was,  however,  the  following  occurrence 
is  also  said  to  have  favored  them;  a  heavy  rain  and  thunder- 
fitorm  camo  on,  and  quenched  the  flame ;  and  so  the  danger 
ceased.  , 

78.  When  the  Peloponnesians  lia<l  failed  in  this  attempt  alRO, 
they  loft  l)ehind  them  a  certain  part  of  their  force,  [having  dis- 
banded the  rest,]  and  proceeded  to  raise  a  wail  of  circucivalla- 
tion  round  the  town,  dividing  the  Avholo  extent  among  tho 
contingents  of  the  ditferent  states.  There  was  a  ditch,  too,  both 
inside  and  outside  of  tho  lines,  from  wliich  they  made  their 
bricks.  All  beii.g  finished  by  about  the  rising  of  Arcturus,' 
liicy  left  troops  to  man  half  the  extent  of  tho  wall  (tho  other 
half  lK?iiig  manned  by  tho  r>ceotians),  and  retired  with  their 
army,  and  disj>ersed  to  their ditlerent  cities.  Now  tho  Plataeans 
had  previously  carried  out  of  tho  town  to  Athens  their  children, 
and  wives,  and  oldest  men,  and  tho  mass  of  tho  inhabitants  that 
Avould  bo  of  no  service ;  but  tho  men  themselves  who  were  left 
in  the  place  and  stood  tho  siege,  amounted  to  four  hundred, 
Λνίΐΐι  eighty  Athenians,  and  one  hundred  and  ton  >vomen  to 
make  breatl  for  them.  This  was  the  total  number  of  them 
Avhen  they  began  to  \)Q  besieged,  and  there  was  no  one  elsu 
Avithin  tho  >valls,  either  bond  or  free.  Such  was  tho  provision 
made  for  the  siege  of  Plata'a. 

Id.  The  same  summer,  and  at  tho  same  time  as  tlio  cxi>e<li- 
tion  was  made  against  tho  Tlatipans,  tho  Athenians  marched 
Avith  two  thousand  heavy-armed  of  their  own,  and  two  hun- 
dred horse,  against  tho  Thraceward  Chalcidians,  and  tho 
l^ottiaeans,  when  the  corn  was  ripe,  under  tho  command  of 
Xenophon  son  of  Euripides,  and  two  colleagues.  On  arriving 
under  tho  walls  of  Spartolus  in  Bottiaia,  thev  destroyed  tlio 
corn;  and  expected  that  the  town  would  also  purrender  to 
them,  throiigh  tho  intrigues  of  a  party  witliin.  Those,  how- 
ever, who  did  not  wish  this,  liaving  Bowt  to  Olynthus,  a  body 
of  heavy-armed  and  other  troops  camo  as  a  garrison  for  tho 
]>lace ;  and  on  their  making  a  sally  from  it,  tho  Athenians  met 
them  in  battle  close  to  tho  town,    Tho  heavy-armed  of  the 

'  i  e.,  its  morning  rising,  nearly  coincident  with  tho  autumnal  cqu!• 

nox. 


140  TnUCYDIDE8.  IL  [u\    s. 

Chalcidiana,  and  somo  auxiliaries  with  them,  were  defeato^l 
by  the  Atheuiane,  and  retired  into  Spartolus ;  but  the  Chal- 
cidian  liorso  and  light-armod  defeated  the  horse  and  light- 
armed  of  the  Athenians.  They  had  [from  the  first]  some 
few  targeteera  from  the  district  of  Crusis,  as  it  is  called ; 
and  when  the  battle  hml  just  been  fought,  others' joined  them 
from  Olynthus.  When  ψο  light-armed  from  Spartolus  saw 
these,  being  encouraged  by  the  accession  to  their  force,  and 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  not  Avorsted  before,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Chalcidian  hoi-se  and  the  late  reinforcement  they 
attacked  the  Athenians  again;  who  retired  to  the  two  di- 
visions they  had  left  with  the  baggage.  AVhenever  the  Athe- 
nians advanced  against  them,  they  gave  way ;  but  on  their 
beginning  to  retreat,  they  pressed  them  close,  and  h.'irassed 
them  with  their  darts.  The  cavalry  of  the  Chalcidians  also 
rode  up  and  charged  them  wherever  they  pleased ;  and  ha\ang 
struck  the  greatest  panic  into  them,  routed  and  pursued  them 
to  a  great  distiince.  The  Athenians  fled  for  refuge  to  Potidiea, 
and  having  subsequently  recovered  their  dead  by  truce,  re- 
turned to  Athens  with  the  remnant  of  the  army;  four  hun- 
dred and  thirty  of  them  liaving  been  killed,  and  all  tho 
generals.  The  Chalcidians  and  Bottiaians  erected  a  trophy, 
and  after  taking  up  their  dead,  separated  to  their  ditierent 
cities. 

80.  The  same  summer,  not  long  after  these  events  tho 
Ambraciots  and  Chaonians  Avishing  to  subdue  the  whole  of 
Acarnania,  and  to  separate  it  from  its  connection  with  Athens, 
persuaded  tho  Lacedaimouians  to  equip  a  fleet  from  their  con- 
federacy, and  to  send  one  thousan(l  heavy-armed  to  Acar- 
nania ;  saying  that  if  they  were  to  join  them  with  both  a  naval 
and  land  force,  while  tho  Acarnanians  on  the  coast  were  un- 
able to  succor  [their  countrymen],  after  gaining  possession 
of  Acarnania,  they  would  easily  make  themselves  masters  of 
Zacynthus  and  Cephallenia;  and  so  tho  Athenians  would  no 
longer  find  tho  circumnavigation  of  the  Peloponnese  what  it 
had  hitherto  been.  They  suggested  too  that  there  was  a  hope 
of  taking  Naupactus  also,  jieing  thus  persuaded,  the  Lace- 
daemonians dispatched  immediately  Cnenms,  who  was  still 
high-admiral,  and  tho  heavy-armed  on  board  a  few  vessels; 
while  they  sent  round  orders  for  the  fleet  to  prepare  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  sail  to  Leucas.     Now  tho  Corinthians  wero 


Lxxxi.]  TnUCYDlDES.  II.  141 

most  hearty  in  ilio  cause  of  the  Ambracioti',  who  wcro  a  colony 
of  theirs;  and  the  squadrons  from  Corinth  and  Sicyon,  and 
those  parts  wcro  in  preparation;  >vhilu  those  from  Lcucas, 
Anactoiium,  and  Ambracia  had  arrived  before,  and  were  wait- 
ing for  tliem  at  Leucas.  In  the  mean  time  Cnemus  and  tho 
one  thousand  heavy-armed  with  him  liad  effected  a  passage 
unobserved  by  l^hormio,  who  commanded  tho  twenty  Athe- 
nian ships  tliat  kept  guard  off  Naupactus ;  and  they  im- 
mediately prepared  for  tho  cx])cdition  by  land.  There  wcro 
with  him,  of  tho  Greeks,  tho  Ambraciots,  I^uoadians,  -Anac- 
corians,  and  his  own  force  of  one  thousimd  rdoponnesians ; 
of  tho  barbarians,  one  thousand  Ch.ionians,  Λνΐιο  wcro  not 
under  kingly  government,  but  who  Avcro  led  by  Photys  and 
Nieanor,  of  the  family  to  which  tho  chieft'iinship  was  con- 
fined, with  a  yearly  exercise  of  that  power.  AVith  the  Cha- 
onians  some  Thesprotians  also  joined  tho  expedition,  being  [like 
Ihem]  not  under  kingly  government.  Somo  Molossians  and 
Atintanians  were  led  by  Sabylintlms,  as  guardian  of  Tharypus, 
their  king,  who  was  yet  a  minor;  and  somo  Paravaians  by 
Orcedus  their  king.  Ono  thousand  of  the  Orcstiana,  of  whom 
Antipchus  was  king,  accompanied  tho  Paravrcans,  Oroedus 
being  intrusted  with  tho  command  of  them  by  that  monarch, 
Perdiccas  also,  Avithout  tho  knowledge  of  the  Athenians,  sent 
one  thousand  Macedonians,  who  arrived  too  late.  With  this 
fqrcc  Cnemus  commenced  his  march,  without  waiting  tho  ar- 
rival of  tho  fleet  from  Corinth :  and  in  their  passage  through 
tlie  Argivo  country  they  sacked  Limnnea,  an  unfortified  village ; 
and  then  went  against  Stratus,  tho  capital  city  of  Acarnania, 
thinking  that  if  they  took  that  first,  the  other  towns  would 
readily  surrender  to  them. 

81.  Tho  Acarnanians,  finding  that  a  largo  array  had  in- 
vaded them  by  land,  and  that  the  enemy  would  also  be  upon 
them  with  a  fleet  by  sea,  did  not  prepare  to  make  any  united 
resistance,  but  to  defend  theii  own  separato  possesvsions  ;  while 
thoy  sent  to  Phormio,  and  desired  him  to  succor  them  ;  who, 
however,  «aid  that  it  was  impossible  for  liim  to  leave  Nau- 
pactus unprotected,  while  a  fleet  was  on  tho  point  qf  Bailing 
out  from  Corinth.  So  tho  Peloponnesiana  and  their  allies, 
having  formed  themselves  into  three  di\nsion8,  were  advancing 
to  the  city  of  Stratus ;  that  after  encamping  near  to  it, 
they  might  attempt  the  wall  by  force,  if  they  could  not  prevail 


142  THUCYDIDEa  II.  [lxzzil 

on  them  [to  surrender]  by  words.  As  they  advanced,  the 
Chaon'ians  and  the  rest  of  tiie  barbarians  occupied  the  center ; 
tlie  Leucadians  and  Anactorians,  and  those  with  them,  were 
on  their  right ;  and  Gnemus  with  the  Peloponnesians  and  Am- 
braciots  on  their  left ;  but  they  >vere  at  a  considerable  distance 
from  each  other,  and  sometimes  not  even  within  sight.  The 
Greeks  advanced  in  good  order,  and  keeping  a  look-out,  until 
they  had  encamped  in  a  convenient  position ;  but  the  Chao- 
nians,  confident  in  themselves,  and  being  reputed  by  the  in- 
habitants of  those  parts  of  the  continent  to  be  the  most  war- 
like tribe,  did  not  wait  to  tike  up  their  position,  but  rushing 
on  >vith  the  rest  of  the  barbarians  tlioui^ht  they  should  take  the 
town  at  the  first  assault,  and  so  the  achievement  would  be  all 
their  own.  The  Stratians,  infonned  of  this  while  they  ΛvcΓo 
yet  coming  on,  and  tlnnking  that  if  they  could  defeat  them 
Avhilo  thus  by  themselves,  the  Greeks  would  not  att.ack  them 
with  the  same  eagerness,  laid  an  ambush  near  the  walls ;  and 
when  they  had  come  near,  attacked  them  in  close  combat,  both 
from  the  town  and  from  the  ambuscade.  Being  thrown  into 
consternation,  great  numl)ers  of  the  Chaonians  were  slain; 
and  when  the  rest  of  the  barbarians  saw  them  giving  way, 
they  no  longer  stood  their  ground,  but  took  to  flight.  Now 
neither  of  the  (Jreek  divisions'  was  aware  of  the  battle,  as 
their  confederates  had  proceeded  far  in  a<lvance,  and  had  been 
supposed  to  bo  hurrying  on  to  occupy  their  oncnmpment. 
But  when  the  biirbarians  broke  in  upon  them  in  their  flight, 
they  rallied  them ;  and  after  uniting  their  separate  divisions, 
remained  there  quiet  during  the  day ;  as  the  Stratians  did  not 
come  to  close  quarters  with  them  because  the  rest  of  the  Acar- 
nauians  had  not  arrived  to  help  them  ;  but  annoyed  them  with 
their  slings  from  a  distance,  and  distressed  them,  (for  it  was 
impossible  for  them  to  stir  without  their  armor),  the  Acar- 
nanians  being  considered  to  excel  very  much  in  this  mode  of 
warfare. 

82.  When  night  came  on,  Cnemus  retired  as  quickly  as 
ho  could  with  his  army  to  the  river  Anapus,  \vhich  is  eighty 
stades  distant  from  Stratus,  and  the  next  day  recovered  his 
dead  by  truce ;  and  the  (Eniada)  having  joined  him,  on  tho 
ground  of  a  friendly  connection,  he  fell  back  upon  that  city 
before  the  reinforcements  of  tho  enemy  had  arrived.  Thence 
•  Or,  '•  catni»9,"  tho  word  being  frequently  used  in  both  sense•, 


LXJUcui.,  LXJcxiv.]  THUCYDIDES.  II.  143 

ihcy  departed  to  their  respective  homes ;  while  the  Stratinns 
erected  a  trophy  for  the  result  of  their  engagement  with  tho 
barbarians. 

83.  Now  tho  fleet  from  Corintli  and  the  rest  of  tho  con- 
federates coming  from  the  Crisacau  Bay,  which  ought  to  have 
joined  Cnemus,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Acarnanians  on  tho 
coast  from  succoring  their  countrymen  in  the  interior,  did  not 
do  so;  but  they  were  compelled,  about  tho  same  time  aa  tho 
battle  was  fouglit  at  Stratus,  to  come  to  an  engagement  with 
Phormio  .and  tho  twenty  Athenian  vessels  that  kept  guard  at 
Naupactus.  For  Phormio  kept  watching  them  as  they  coasted 
along  out  of  the  gulf,  Avishing  to  attack  them  in  the  open  sea, 
But  the  Corinthians  and  the  allies  were  not  sailing  to  Acar- 
nania  with  any  intention  to  fight  by  sea,  but  were  equipped 
more  for  land  Rcrvice.  AVhen,  however,  they  saw  them  sailing 
along  opposite  to  them,  as  they  themselves  proceeded  along 
their  own  coast;  and  on  attempting  to  cross  over  from  Patrro 
in  Achaia  to  tho  mainland  opposite,  on  llicir  Λvay  to  Acarnania, 
observed  tho  Athenians  sailing  against  them  from  Chalcis  and 
the  river  Evenus ;  (for  they  had  not  escaped  their  observation 
when  they  liad  endeavored  to  bring  to  secretly  during  tho 
night;)  under  these  circumstances  they  wqtg  compelled  to 
engage  in  tho  mid  passage.  They  had  separate  commanders 
for  the  contingents  of  the  ditferent  states  that  joined  tlic  arma- 
ment, but  those  of  the  Corinthians  were  Machaon,  loscratcs, 
and  Agathareidas.  And  now  the  Peloponnesians  rnnged  their 
ships  in  a  circle,  as  largo  as  they  could  without  leaving  any 
opening,  with  their  prows  turned  outward  and  their  sterns 
inward  ;  and  ])laced  insido  all  tho  small  crnft  that  accompanied 
them,  and  their  five  best  sailers,  to  advance  out  quickly 
and  strengthen  any  point  on  which  tho  enemy  might  make  his 
attack. 

84.  On  tho  other  hand,  tho  Athenians,  ranged  in  a  single 
line,  kept  sailing  round  them,  and  reducing  them  into  a  smaller 
<  ompass ;  continually  brushing  past  them,  and  making  demon- 
strations of  an  immediate  onset ;  though  they  had  previously 
been  commanded  by  Phormio  not  to  attack  them  till  he  him- 
self gave  the  signal.  For  ho  hoped  that  their  order  would 
not  be  maintained  like  that  of  a  land-forco  on  shore,  but  that 
the  ships  would  fall  foul  of  each  other,  and  that  tho  other  craft 
would  cause  confusion  ;  and  if  the  wind  should  blow  from  tho 


144  THUCYDIDES.  Π.  (υαχν. 

gulf,  in  expectation  of  which  ho  was  sailing  round  them,  and 
which  usually  rose  coward  morning,  that  they  would  not  re- 
main steady  an  instant,  lie  thought  too  that  it  rested  with 
Am  to  make,  the  attack,  whenever  ho  pleased,  as  his  ships 
were  better  sailers  [than  those  opposed  to  him];  and  that 
then  would  bo  the  best  time  for  making  it.  So  when  tho 
wind  camo  down  upon  them,  and  their  ships  being  now 
iirought  into  a  narrow  compass,  λυογο  thrown  into  confusion 
by  tho  operation  of  both  causes — the  violence  of  tho  wind,  and 
the  small  craft  dashing  against  them — and  when  ship  λ\\ί» 
falling  foul  of  ship,  and  tho  crews  were  pushing  them  oil* 
with  poles,  and  in  their  shouting,  and  tryuig  to  keep  clear, 
and  abusing  each  othe.r,  did  not  hear  a  word  either  of  their 
orders  or  tlio  boatswains'  directions ;  while,  through  inexiK?ri- 
ciice,  they  could  not  lift  their  oai*s  in  tho  bwc41  of  tho  sea,  and 
Fo  rendered  the  vessels  less  obedient  to  tho  hehnsmeu ;  just 
then,  at  that  favorable  moment,  ho  gave  tho  signal.  And 
the  Athenians  atUicked  them,  and  lirst  of  all  sunk  one  of  tho 
adniiral-ships,  then  destroyed  all  wherever  they  went,  and  re- 
duced them  to  such  a  condition,  tluit  owing  to  their  confusion 
none  of  them  thought  of  resistance,  but  they  lied  to  Tatne 
and  Dyme,  in  Aehaia.  Tho  Athenians  having  close'ly  pur- 
sued them,  and  taken  twelve  ships,  picking  u|)  most  of  tho 
men  from  them,  and  putting  them  on  boar<l  their  own  ves- 
cels,  sailed  olf  to  Molycrium ;  and  «fter  erecting  a  trophy 
at  llhium,  and  dedicating  a  ship  to  Neptune,  they  returned  to 
Naupactus.  Tho  Peloponnesians  also  innncdiately  coasted 
along  with  their  remaining  ships  from  Dymo  and  I'atrai  to 
Cyllene,  tho  arsenal  of  the  Eleans ;  and  Cnonms  and  tho  ships 
that  >vere  at  Leucas,  which  were  to  have  formed  a  junctiou 
with  these,  came  thence,  after  tho  battle  at  Stratus,  to  tho  samo 
port. 

85.  Th(;n  tho  Lucedaimonians  sent  to  tho  fleet,  as  counsel- 
ors to  Cnemus,  Timocrates,  lirasidjis,  and  Lycophron ;  com- 
manding him  to  make  preparations  for  a  second  engagement 
more  successful  than  the  former,  and  not  to  be  driven  off  tho 
sea  by  a  few  ships.  For  the  result  appeared  very  diti'erent  from 
what  they  might  have  expected ;  (particularly  as  it  was  tho 
first  sca-iight  they  had  attemj)ted  ;)  and  they  thought  that  it 
was  not  so  much  their  fleet  that  was  inferior,  but  that  there 
had  bi'cn  some  cowardice  [on  the  part  of  tho  admiral];  for 


izxxth]  THUCYDIDES.  IT.  146 

thev  did  not  weigh  the  long  experience  of  the  Athenians  ag/iinst 
their  own  short  practice  of  naval  matters.  They  dispaiche<l 
them  therefore  in  anger;  and  on  their  arrival  they  sent  round, 
in  conjunction  with  Onemus,  orders  for  .ships  to  be  furnisliid  by 
tho  ditferent  states,  while  they  refitted  tliose  they  already  Imd, 
with  a  view  to  an  engagement  Phorniio  too,  on  \hv  other  hand, 
sent  messengers  to  Athens  to  acquaint  them  with  their  prepara- 
tions, and  to  tell  them  of  the  victory  they  had  [themselves]  gained ; 
at  the  same  time  desiring  thcin  to  setid  him  quickly  the  largest 
possible  number  of  ships,  for  ho  was  iti  daily  expectation  of  an 
immediate  engagemont.  They  dispatched  to  him  twenty ;  but 
gave  additional  orders  to  tho  commander  of  them  to  go  first  to 
Crete.  For  Nicias,  a  Cretan  of  Gortys,  Λνΐιο  was  their  proxcnns^ 
persuaded  them  to  sijil  against  Cydonia,  telling  them  that  ho 
would  reduce  it  under  their  power;  for  it  was  at  present  hosiilo 
to  them.  His  object,  however,  in  calling  them  in  was,  that  ho 
might  oblige  tho  l\>lichnit.T,  λυΙιο  bordered  on  the  Cvdonians, 
Tho  commander  therefore  of  tho  Sipiadron  went  with  it  to 
Crete,  and  in  conjunction  with  tho  Polichnitic  laid  M/isto  tho 
territory  of  tho  Cydonians;  and  wasted  no  little  time  in  tho 
country,  owing  to  adverse  winds  and  tho  impossibility  of  put- 
ting to  sea, 

80.  During  tho  timo  that  tho  Athenians  were  thus  «Ictained 
on  tho  coast  of  Crete,  tho  Peloponnesians  at  Cyllene,  having 
made  their  preparations  for  an  engagement,  coasted  along  to 
J^anormus  in  Aehica,  Λvhero  tho  land-forco  of  tho  Peloponnesi- 
ans had  come  to  support  them.  Phormio,  too,  coasted  along  t• 
the  Rhium  near  Molycrium,  and  dropped  anchor. outside  of  it, 
with  twenty  ships,  tho  same  as  ho  nad  before  fought  with. 
Tills  Rhium  was  friendly  to  the  Athenians;  the  other,  namely, 
that  in  tho  Peloponnese,  is  opposite  to  it;  tho  distance  between 
the  two  being  al)out  seven  stades  of  sea,  which  forms  tho 
mouth  of  tho  Crisa^n  Gulf.  At  tho  Rhium  in  Achjca,  then, 
l>eing  not  far  from  Panormus,  where  their  land-forco  was,  tho 
Peloponnesians  also  camo  to  anchor  with  seventy-eeven  ships, 
when  they  saw  that  tho  Athenians  had  dono  the  same.  And 
hf  six  or  seven  days  they  lay  opposite  each  other,  practicing 
and  preparing  for  tho. battle;  tho  Peloponnesians  intending 
not  to  sail  beyon<1  tho  Rhia  into  tho  open  sea,  for  thoy  were 
:ifraid  of  α  disaster  like  tho  former ;  tho  Athenians,  not  to  sail 
into  tho  etraitfl,  for  they  thought  that  fighting  in  a  confinod 

7 


14β  THUOYDIDEa  IL  [lzxz7IL 

space  wa*  in  favor  of  tho  enemy.  Afterward  Cnemus,  and 
brasiilas,  and  tliu  otiior  Peloponnesian  commanderSf  wishing  to 
bring  an  the  tnj;agenient  as  quickly  as  they  could,  before  any 
reiniurceuient  came  from  Athens,  assembled  the  men  first ;  and 
seeing  the  greater  part  of  ihcni  frightened  in  consequence  of 
their  former  defeat,  and  not  eager  for  tho  battle,  they  cheered 
tliem  by  sneaking  as  follows : 

87.  **The  late  sea-fight,  reloponnesians,  if  owing  to  it  any 
one  bo  afraid  of  this  before  us,  alfords  no  just  grounds'  for  hin 
lilarm.  For  it  was  deficient,  as  you  know,  in  preparation; 
iind  wo  were  sailing  not  so  nmch  for  a  naval  engagement  as  for 
a  land  expedition.  It  happened  too  that  not  a  few  of  tho 
t'haiicea  of  war  were  against  us  ;  while  partly,  perhaps,  our  in- 
experience caused  our  failure,  as  it  was  our  first  battle  by  se;i. 
It  was  not  then  through  our  cowardice  that  wo  ex|>eneuced  tho 
defi'at ;  nor  is  it  right  that  our  R|>irits,  which  were  not 
crushed  by  force,  but  still  retain  a  measure  of  defiance'  to  tho 
enemy,  should  lose  their  edge  from  the  result  of  that  mishap. 
We  should  rather  think  that  men  may  indeed  bo  overthrown 
by  mere  chances,  but  that  in  spirit  the  same  men  ought  al- 
ways to  bo  brave ;  and  that  while  their  courage  remains,  they 
can  not  reasonably  on  any  occasion  act  like  cowards  under  the 
cloak  of  inexperience.  In  your  case,  however,  you  aro  not 
hO  far  inferiijr  to  tho  enemy,  even  through  your  mexperienco, 
as  you  arc  superior  to  him  in  daring.  As  for  their  skill,  of 
Avhich  }ou  are  most  afraid,  if  indeed  it  bo  joined  with  courage, 
it  will  also  bo  accompanied  with  presence  of  mind  in  danger 
to  execute  what  it  has  learned  ;  but  without  gallantry  no  art 
Λvhatever  is  of  any  avail  in  the  face  of  perils.  For  fear  ban- 
ishes presence  of  mind ;  and  art  without  bravery  is  good  for 
nothing.  Against  their  greater  experience  then  put  your  own 
greater  daring;  against  your  fear  in  consequence  of  your  de- 
feat put  tho  fact  of  your  having  then  been  unprepared ;  and 

'  Literally,  "  no  ground  for  drawing  this  conclusion,  so  aa  to  alarm 
him;"  tho  infinitive  το  iK<pOfitjaai  heing  explanatory  οΐ τέκμαρσιν. 

«  ^ΚνηΤίογίαν  is  opposed  to  tho  "acknowledgment  of  our  own  defeat," 
and  signifies  literally  "making  answer;    maintaining  the  quarrel." — 
Arnold.     Compare  tho  use  of  our  word  *•  controversy,"  by  which  it  may 
generally  bo  rendered,  in  Shakespeare's  Julius  Cesar. 
*'  Tho  torrent  roar'd,  and  we  did  buflet  it 
With  lusty  sinews;  throwing  it  aside. 
And  alcmming  it  with  hmrte  o/ controversy.^* 


ί,ΧΜΤίΠ.,  Lxjcxix.]  TnUCTDIDES.  IL  .147 

flioro  is  in  your  favor  a  clear  balance  of  superior  numbers, 
and  of  cngaginof  off  your  own  coast  in  the  presence  of  your 
licavy-armed ;  anil  victory,  generally  speaking,  declares  for 
those  who  arc  the  more  numerous  and  better  appointed.  On 
no  one  single  ground  then  do  wo  find  it  probable  that  wo 
should  bo  defeated.  As  for  the  blunders  we  committed  before, 
the  very  fact  of  their  having  been  committed  will  now  teach 
us  a  lesson.  AVith  good  courage,  therefore,  both  steersmen 
and  sailors,  do  every  man  your  own  duty,  without  leaving  tho 
post  assigned  to  each.  And  wc  will  prepare  for  tho  engage^ 
nient  not  Avorso  than  your  former  commanders;  and  will 
give  no  one  any  cxcuso  for  Iwing  a  coward:  but  if  anyone 
should  wish  to  bo  one,  ho  shall  Im)  visited  with  tho  punish- 
ment ho  deserves ;  while  the  bravo  shall  bo  honored  with  tho 
rewards  befitting  their  bravery." 

88.  Such  >vas  tho  exhortation  given  to  tho  Pcloponnesians 
by  their  commanders.  Phormio,  on  the  other  liand,  being 
also  alarmed  at  tho  apprehensions  of  his  men,  and  perceiving 
lliat  they  formed  in  groups  among  themselves,  and  showed 
their  fears  of  tho  superior  numbers  of  tho  ships  opposed  to 
them,  wished  to  assemble  and  cheer  them,  and  ofi'er  them 
some  ailvice  «t  the  present  juncture.  For  before  this  ho 
always  used  to  tell  them,  and  prepare  their  minds  for  the  con- 
viction, that  there  was  no  number  of  ships  whatever  so  great 
that  they  ought  not  to  faeo  it,  if  it  sailed  against  them;  and 
liis  men  had  for  a  long  timo  entertained  this  resolution,  that 
from  no  multitude  of  Teloponnesian  ships  ivhatevcr  would 
tliey,  Athenians  as  they  were,  retire.  Seeing  them,  however, 
at  that  timo  out  of  spirits,  ho  wished  to  remind  them  of  their 
former  confidence,  and  therefore  called  them  together,  and 
addressed  them  as  follows  : 

89.  "Seeing  you,  my  men,  alarmed  at  the  numbers  of 
your  opponents,  I  have  called  you  together ;  and  I  do  not  wish 
you  to  bo  in  dread  of  what  is  not  really  to  bo  feared.  For 
these  men,  in  tho  first  place,  because  they  have  been  pre- 
viously conquered  by  us,  and  do  not  even  tliemselres  think 
that  they  are  a  match  for  us,  have  equipped  this  great  num- 
l>er  of  ships,  and  not  such  as  would  l>e  merely  equal  to  ours. 
Then,  for  the  fact  on  which  they  chiefly  rely  in  coming  against 
m — that  it  is  their  natural  character  to  1>o  courageous — they 
feel  this  confidence  for  no  other  reason  than  because  they  aro 


148  .  THUCYDIDES.  IL  [Lxxxii. 

generally  euccessful  owing  to  their  experience  in  land-service*, 
and  they  think'  it  'will  do  the   eamo  for  them  at  eea.     But 
this,  in  all  reason,  will  rather  bo  our  advantage  now,  as  it  is 
theirs  in  that  case :  for  in  valor  they  are  not  at  all  superior 
to  us;  but  from  our  being  respectively  more  experienced  in 
one  particular  service,  we  are  also  more  confident  respecting 
it.    Moreover,   the  Lacedromonians  lead  their  allies  from  re- 
gai-d  to  their  own  glory,  and   brinu•  the  greater  part  of  them 
into  dangers  against   their   will ;  else  [without   such  compul- 
sion], they  would  have  never  dared  to  tight  again  by  sea,  after 
being  so  decidedly  beaten.     Do  not   then  be   afraid  of  their 
boldness.     It  is  you  that  cause  them  a  much  greater  and  bet. 
ter-founded  alann,  both  on  the  ground  of  your  having  previ- 
ously conquered  them,  and  because  they  think  we  should  not 
have  faced  them  it*  wo  did  not  mean  to  do  something  worthy 
our  decisive  victory.     For  when  ocjual  to  their  opponents,  men 
generally  como  against   them,  as  these   do,  trusting  to  their 
power  rather  than  to  their  sjtirit;  but  those  who  dare  to  meet 
them  with  far  inferior  resources,  and  yet  without  being  com- 
jK'lled,  do  so  because  they  have  the  strong  assurance  of  tlieir 
own  resolution.     From  this  consideration  these  men  fear  us 
more  for  the  inequality  of  our  [(reparations,  than  they  would 
have  done  for  more  jjroportionate    ones,     ^iany  armies,    too, 
have  ere  now  been  overthrown   by  an  inferior  force  through 
want   of  skill,    and    others     through    want    of  daring;    with 
neither  of  Avhich   have  wo   now  any  thing  to  do.     As  for  the 
battle,  I  Λν  ill   not,  if  I  can  help,  fight  it  in  the  strait;  nor  λ\  ill 
I  sail   in  there  at  all ;  being  aware  that  for  a  few  skillfully 
managed  and  fast-saiiing  vessels,  against  a  large  number  un- 
fikillfully  managed,  want  of  sea-room  is  a  disadvantage.     For 
one  could   neitlier  sail  up  as    he  ought  to  the  charge,  without 
having  α  view  of  the  enemy  from  a  distance  ;  nor  retire  at  tho 
proper  time,  if  hard-pressed ;  and  there  is  no  breaking  through 
the  line,   nor  returning   to  a  second  charge — which   are   the 
maneuvres  of    tho    better-sailing    vessels — but    the   sea-fight 
nmst  in  that  case  l)ecomo  η  laml-fight;  and  then  the  greater 
number  of  ships  gain  the   su[)eriority.     On  these  points  then 
I  will  exercise  as  much  forethought  as  possible ;  and  do  you, 
remaining  in  good  order  in  your  ships,  be  quick  in  receiving 

'  For  an  explanation  of  tho  confusod  construction  in  this  passage,  eco 
AraoUl'a  notf.. 


xc]  THUCYDIDES.    Π.  140 

tho  ν,'ονά  of  command ;  especially  ns  our  post  of  observation 
is  at  so  short  a  distance;  and  during  the  action  attach  tho 
frroatest  importance  to  order  and  silence,  which  is  of  service 
ior  operations  of  war  in  general,  and  for  a  naval  engagement 
more  particularly ;  and  repel  these  your  enemies  in  a  manner 
worthy  of  your  former  achievements.  Great  indeed  is  tho 
struggle  in  Avhich  you  are  engaged,  cither  to  destroy  tho  hopo 
of  the  Pelopoimesians  as  regards  their  navy,  or  to  bring 
nfiarer  'nomc  to  tho  Athenians  apprehensions  for  tho  command 
of  the  sen.  Again  I  remind  you  that  you  have  already  con- 
ijuerod  (ho  greater  part  of  them ;  and  the  spirits  of  defeated 
men  will  not  be  what  they  were,  in  the  face  of  tho  samo 
dangers." 

00.  Su(!h  was  tho  exhortation  that  Phormio,  on  his  side, 
addressed  to  his  Tuen.  Now  when  the  Athenians  did  not  sail 
into  tho  narrow  part  of  the  gulf  to  meet  them,  the  l*elopon- 
nesians,  wishing  to  lead  them  on  eve?i  against  their  >viil, 
weighed  in  the  morning,  an<l  having  formed  their  ships  in  a 
column  four  abreast,  sailed  to  their  own  land  toward  the  in- 
ner ])art  of  tho  gulf,  with  tho  right  wing  taking  tho  lead, 
in  which  position  also  they  lay  at  anchor.  In  this  Λving  they 
had  placed  their  twenty  best  sailers ;  that  if  Phormio,  sup- 
posing them  to  be  sailing  against  Naupactus,  should  himself 
also  coast  along  in  that  direction  to  relieve  tho.  place,  tho 
Athenians  might  not,  by  getting  outside  their  wing,  escape 
their  advance  against  them,  but  that  these  ships  might  shut 
them  in.  As  tliey  expected,  ho  was  alarmed  for  the  place  in 
its  unprotected  state ;  and  when  ho  saw  them  under  weigh, 
against  his  will,  and  in  great  hasto  too,  ho  embarked  his  crews 
and  sailed  along  shore;  wlnlc  tho  land-forcea  of  tho  Messe- 
nians  at  tho  same  timo  camo  to  support  him,  AVlicn  tho  Pe- 
loponnesians  saw  them  coasting  along  in  a  single  file,  and 
already  within  tho  gulf  and  near  tho  shore  (which  Λvas  just 
what  they  wished),  at  one  signal  they  suddenly  brought  their 
ships  round  and  sailed  in  μ  line,  as  fast  as  each  could,  against 
tho  Athenians,  lioping  to  cut  off  all  their  ships.  Eleven  of 
them,  however,  which  wero  taking  the  lead,  escaped  tho  wing 
of  tho  Peloponnesians  and  their  sudden  turn  into  tho  open 
gulf;  but  tho  rest  they  surprised,  and  drove  tliem  on  ehoro, 
in  their  attempt  to  escape,  and  destroyed  them,  killing  such, 
of  the  crews  as  had  not  Bwum  out  of  them.    Some  of  tho  ships 


160  THUCYDIDES.  Π.  [xci.,xcn. 

they  lashed  to  theiir  own  and  began  to  tow  off  empty,  and  one 
they  took  men  and  all ;  whiio  iu  the  case  of  some  others,  the 
Messeuians,  coming  to  their  succor,  and  dashing  into  the  sea 
with  their  armor,  and  boarding  them,  fought  from  the  decks, 
and  rescued  them  when  they  were  already  being  towed  off. 

01.  To  this  extent  then  the  Peloponnesiuns  had  the  advan- 
tage, and  destroyed  the  Atlicnian  shi|)s;  while  their  twenty 
vessels  in  the  right  wing  were  in  pursuit  of  those  eleven  of 
the  enemy  that  had  just  escaped  their  turn  into  the  open  gulf. 
They,  with  the  exception  of  one  ship,  got  the  start  of  them 
and  fled  for  refuge  to  Naupactus;  and  facing  about,  opposite 
the  temple  of  Apollo,  prepared  to  defend  themselves,  iu  case 
they  should  sail  to  shore  against  them.  Presently  they  came 
up,  and  were  singing  the  pa*an  as  they  s;iileil,  coiisuleriug  that 
they  had  gained  the  victory;  and  the  one  Athenian  vessel 
that  had  been  left  behind  was  chased  by  a  single  Leucadiau 
far  in  advance  of  the  rest.  Now  there  happened  to  be  a  mer- 
chant-vessel moored  out  at  sea,  which  the  Athenian  ship  had 
time  to  sail  round,  and  struek  the  Ix'ucadian  in  pui:  .lit  of  her 
amid-ship,  and  sunk  her.  The  I'eloponnesians  theι^  lore  were 
panic-stricken  by  this  sudden  and  unlooked  for  achievement ; 
and  moreover,  as  they  were  ])ursuing  in  disorder,  on  account 
of  the  advantage  they  hiid  gained,  some  of  the  ships  drop|K*d 
their  oars,  and  stopped  in  their  eourse,  from  a  wish  to  wait  for 
the  rest— iloing  what  w.as  uuadvisable,  considering  that  they 
were  observing  each  otlior  at  so  short  a  distance — while  others 
even  ran  on  tlie  shoals,  through  their  ignorance  of  the  localities. 

92.  The  Athenians,  on  seeing  this,  took  courage,  and  at 
one  word  shouted  for  battle,  and  rushed  upon  them.  In  con- 
sequence of  their  previous  blunders  and  their  present  con- 
fusion, they  Avithstootl  them  but  a  short  time,  and  then  lied 
to  Panormus,  whence  they  had  put  out.  The  Athenians  pur- 
sued them  closely,  and  took  six  of  the  ships  nearest  to  them, 
and  recovered  tJieir  own,  which  the  enemy  had  disabled  near 
the  shore  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement,  and  had 
taken  in  tow.  Of  the  men,  they  ])Ut  some  to  death,  and  madu 
others  j)risoners.  Now  on  board  the  Leucadian  ship,  which 
went  down  otf  the  merdiaiit-vessel,  Avas  Tiniocrates  the  Laco- 
diemonian ;  who,  when  the  ship  was  destroyed,  killed  himself, 
and  falling  overboard  >vas  floated  into  the  harbor  of  Naupa»•- 
tus.     On  their  return,  the  Athenians  erected  a  trophy  at  the 


xciii.]  TnUCYDIDES,    11.  151 

spot  from  which  they  put  out  Ix'foro  paining  the  victory ;  and 
nil  tho  dead  and  tho  wrecks  that  were  near  their  coast  they 
took  up,  and  gave  hack  to  tho  enemy  theirs  under  truce.  Tho 
IVlopontK'sians  also  erected  a  trophy,  as  victors,  for  the  defeat, 
of  the  ships  they  had  disabled  near  tho  shore ;  and  the  ship 
they  had  taken  they  dedicated  at  Rhium,  in  Achjca,  by  tho 
side  of  the  tropliy.  Afterward,  l)eing  afraid  of  tho  reini'orcc- 
niont  from  Athens,  all  but  tho  Ivcucadians  sailed  at  tho  ap- 
j)roach  of  night  into  the  Crisaian  Bay  and  tho  port  of  Cor- 
inth. Not  long  after  their  retreat,  tho  Athenians  from  Oreto 
arrived  at  Naupactus,  Avith  tho  twenty  ships  that  were  to  havo 
joined  Phormio  before  tho  cngngemcnt.  And  thus  ended  tho 
summer. 

'  93.  Before,  however,  tlio  fleet  dispersed  which  liad  retired 
to  Corinth  and  the  Crisaian  Bay,  Crieinus,  Brasidas,  and  tho 
rest  of  tho  Peloponnesian  commanders  wished,  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  ^iegareans,  to  make  an  attempt  upon  Tir.TUs,  tho 
]>ort  of  Athens;  which,  as  was  natural  from  their  deciiled 
superiority  at  sea,  was  loft  unguarded  and  open.  It  >vas  dc- 
t(>rmined,  therefore,  that  each  mati  should  takii  liis  oar,  and 
cu>hion,  and  tropotcr^^  and  go  by  land  from  Corinth  to  the  sea 
on  tho  side  of  Athens ;  and  that  after  proceeding  as  quickly 
as  ]>ossible  to  Megara,  they  should  launch  from  its  port,  Niswa, 
forty  vessels  that  hapj)ened  to  be  there,  and  sail  straightway 
to  riraius.  For  there  Λvas  neither  any  fleet  keeping  guard 
l)eforc  it,  nor  any  thought  of  tho  enemy  over  sailing  against  it 
in  so  sudden  a  manner;  and  as  for  their  venturing  to  doit 
openly  and  deliberately,  they  supposed  that  either  they  would 
not  think  of  it,  or  themselves  ΛνοηΚΙ  not  fail  to  bo  aware  be- 
forehand, if  thev  shouM.  Having  adopted  this  resolution, 
ihoy  proceeded  immediately  [to  execute  it] ;  and  >vhcn  they 
had  arrived  by  night,  and  launched  tho  vessels  from  Nisaen, 
they  sailed,  not  against.  Athens  as  they  had  iritcnded,  for  they 
were  afraid  of  tho  risk  (some  wind  or  other  was  also  said  to 
have  prevented  them'),  but  to  the  headland  of  Salann's  looking 
toward  Megara ;  where  thee  was  a  fort,  and  a  guard  of  three 

^  Supposed  to  havo  been  η  tbonir,  or  rope,  woiind  rounrl  tho  loom  of 
a  portlock  oar,  nnd  serving  the  triple  pnrposo  of  a  conntorpoiso,  a  nut, 
and  α  loop.     Soo  Arnold,  vol.  i.  Appendix  3. 

*  Ttf  is  hero  used,  I  think,  with  that  signification  o{  contempt  which  It 
pomotimes  convoys ;  to  mark  the  writer's  utter  disbelief  of  tho  report 
alluded  to. 


152  THUCYDIDES.    II.  [χοιν,,χοτ. 

sUips  to  prevent  any  thing  from  being  taken  in  or  out  of 
Mc'gara.  So  they  asftulted  the  fort,  and  towed  off  the  triremes 
I'Mipty  ;  and  making  a  sudden  attack  on  t!io  rest  of  Salamis, 
tliey  hiid  it  waste. 

94.  Now    fire-signals  of  an  enemy's   approach    were  raised 
toward   Athens,  and  a  consternation  was  caused  by  them  not 
exceeded  by  any  during  the  whole  war.     For  those  in  the  city 
imagined  that  the  enemy  had  already  sailed  into  Pincus ;  while 
those  in    IHraiUS  thought   that  Salamis   had  been  taken,    and 
that   they  were   all  but   saiUng  into  their  harbors :  which  in- 
deed, if  they  would   but   l»ave    not  been  afraid  of  it,  might 
easily  have  been  done ;  and  it  was  not  a  wind  that  would  have 
prevente»!  it.     15ut  at  day-break  the  Athenians  Λvent  all  in  a 
boJy  to  rira?us  to  resist  the  enemy;  and  hiunchetl  their  ships, 
and  going  on   bo:ird  with  liaste   and  much  uproar,  sailed  with 
the  licet  to  Salamis,  while  with  tlicir  land-forces  they  mounted 
guard   at  Piiieus.     AVhen  the  IVloponuesians  Faw  them  com- 
ing   to    the    rescue,    after    overrunning   the    greater    part   of 
Salamis,  and   taking  both  nien  and  booty,  and  the  three  ships 
from  the  port  of  Ikulorum,  they  .sail<*d  for  Nisiea  as  quickly  as 
they  Could;  for  their  vessels  too  caused  them  somo  alarm,  as 
they  had  been  launched   after  lying  idle  α  long  time,  and  Λvere 
not  at  all   watrrthight.     On  their  arrival   at  Megora  they•  re- 
turned   again    to    Corinth  'by    land.      AVhen    the    Athenians 
found  them   no  longer  on   the  coast  of  Salamis,  they  also  sailed 
back;  an  Infer  tiiis  alarm  tliey  paid  more  attention  in  future 
to  thti  safety  of  Tiraus,  both  hy  closing  the  harbors,  and  by  all 
other  precautions. 

95.  About  the  same  i)eriod,  in  the  beginning  of  this  winter, 
Sitalces  son  of  Teres,  the  king  of  the  Odrysian  Thraciaus, 
made  an  expedition  against  l*erdi(icas,  son  of  Alexander,  king 
of  Macedonia,  and  the  Thraceward  (.'halcidians  ;  of  two  prom- 
ises wishing  to  enforce  the  one,  and  himself  to  ])erform  the 
.  other.  For  iVnliccas  liad  made  him  certain  ]»roniises  if  ho 
woul  I  elf.'ct  a  reconciliation  between  him  and  the  Athenians, 
when  he  was  har.l  pressed  by  the  war  at  its  coinmencenicnt,  and 
if  he  would  not  restore  his  br(»tlu'r  Γΐιϋίρ,  who  was  at  enmity 
with  him,  to  place  him  on  the  throne  ;  but,  he  was  not  disj)osed 
to  perform  >vhat  he  had  i)romise<l.  On  the  other  hand,  Sitalces 
liad  pledged  himself  to  the  Athenians,  Avhen  lie  entered  into 
alliance  with  them,   to  bring  the  Chalcidian   >var  in  Thrace  to 


xcvi.,  xcvii.]  TnUCYDIDES.    II.  153 

a  successful  issue.  It  was  with  botli  these  objects  then  that 
ho  made  the  invasion  ;  in  wliicl»  lie  took  ν,'ιύχ  liiin  Philip's  son 
Amyntas,  to  set  liim  on  the  throne  of  Macedonia,  and  some 
envoys  from  Atliens,  wlio  happened  to  he  at  his  court  on  this 
husinoss,  and  Ilagnon  as  commander^  for  the  Athenians  also 
were  to  join  him  against  tlio  Chalcidians  with  a  fleet,  and  as 
large  an  army  as  they  could  raise. 

90.  Setting  out  then  from  the  Odrysians,  ho  summoned  to 
his  standard,  first   the  Thracians  within  Mount   llicmus  and 
llhodope,  as  many  as  were  subject  to  Idm,  as  far  as  the  coast 
of  tliO  Kuxino  and  the  Hellespont ;   next   tlio  Getic  beyond 
Ilirmus,  and  all  the  other  hordes  that  were  settled  south  of  tlio 
Danube,'  more  toward  the  sea-board  of  the  Euxiiie ;  the  Getai 
and   the  tribes  in   this  part  being  both  borderers  on  the  Scy- 
thians, and  e«|uij>ped  in  the  same  manner,  for  they  arc  all 
mounted   bowmen.      He  also  invited  many  of  the  Highland 
Thracians,  who    are    independent,    and   armed   with   swords; 
they  are  called-  the  Dii,  and  arc  mostly  inhabitants  [of  the 
valleys]  of  Hirmus  :  some  of  these  he  engaged  as  mercenaries,  < 
v,\\\\q  others  followed  him  as  volunteers.     Moreover,  ho  sum- 
moned the  Agrianians  and  Laijeans  and  all  the  other  Poionian 
tril>es  that  acknowledged  liis  sway.     And  these  were  the  last 
people  in  his  dominion,  for  at  the  Graicans  and  Licneans,  both 
of  them   Paionian  tribes,  and  at   the   river  Strymon,  which 
flows  from  Mount  Sconnus  through  their  country,  his  empire 
terminated  on  the  side  of  the  P.Tonians,  who  from  this  point 
were  independent.      On   the  Kide   of  the   lYiballi,  Avho  were 
also    independent    the   border    tribes    were    the   Trercs    and  . 
Tilataians,  who   live  to   the   north   of    Mount  Scombrus,  and 
stretch  toward  the  west  as  far  as  the  river  Oscius.     This  river 
flows  from  the  same  mountain   as  the  Nestus  and  the  Hebnis, 
and  uninhabited  and  extensive  range,  joining  on  to  Rhodopc. 

07.  Tho  extent  then  of  the  Odrj'sian  dominion,  taking  the 
lino  of  its  sea-coast,  was  from  tho  city  of  Abdera  to  tho 
Euxinc,  up  to  tho  mouth  of  tho  Danube.  This  tract  is  by  tho 
shortest  way  a  voyage  of  four  days  and  nights  for  a  merchant- 
vessel,  supposing  tho  wind  to  be  ahvays  steady  astern.  By 
land,  taking  tho  shortest  way  from  Abdera  to  tho  [mouth  of] 
tho  Danube,  a'  quick  traveler  performs  tho  jouniey  in  eleven 
days.  Such  was  the  extent  of  its  sea-board.  As  for  the  in- 
«  Litorallr,  "  wltlun  the  Dmuibc." 


154  THUOYDIDEa    11.  [xcvul 

terior,  from  Byzantium  to  the  Lseseans  and  tho  Stiymon  (for 
at  thb  point  it  reached  its  greatest  extent  up  ilte  country 
from  the  sea),  for  a  quick  traveler  it  was  a  journey  of  thir- 
teen days.  Tlio  tribute  raised  from  all  tho  barbarian  do- 
minions and  tho  Grecian  cities,  taking  tho  sum  which  they 
paid  under  Seuthes,  whu  was  successor  of  Sitahes,  and  raised 
it  to  its  greatest  amount,  was  about  400  talents  in  gold  and 
,  silver.  Presents  Λvero  also  made  to  no  less  an  amount  in  gold 
.'  and  silver ;  and  besides  theso  there  was  all  tho  clothing,  both 
figured  and  plain,  and  other  articles  for  use ;  and  that  not  only 
for  himself,  but  for  those  of  the  Odrysians  also  who  were  his 
lords  and  nobles.  For  they  established  their  custom  tho  very 
reverse  of  that  in  tho  Persian  kingdom  (though  it  prevails 
among  tho  rest  of  tho  Thracians  also),  namely,  to  receive 
rather  than  to  give ;  and  it  was  considered  more  disgraceful 
not  to  give  when  asked,  than  not  to  succeed  by  asking.  But 
[though  the  other  Thracians  practiced  the  same  thing],  still 
tho  Odrysians,  owing  to  their  greater  power,  practiced  it  to 
a  greater  extent ;  for  it  was  impossible  to  get  any  thing  done 
without  making  presents.  The  kinn;dom  then  had  reached  a 
liigh  pitch  of  ])ower.  For  of  all  those  in  Europe  between 
the  Ionian  (iulf  and  tho  Euxine  Sea,  it  was  the  greatest  in 
amount  of  revenue  and  general  prosperity ;  while  in  military 
power  and  number  of  troops  it  was  decidedly  next  to  that  of 
the  Scythians.  But  with  this  not  only  is  it  impossible  for 
those  in  Europe  to  vie,  but  even  in  Asia,  putting  one  nation 
/^against  another,  there  is  none  that  can  stand  up  against  tho 
^j^  Thracians,  if  they  are  all  unanimous.  Not,  however,  that 
— ^/Ihey  are  on  a  level  with  other  men  in  general  good  manage- 
ment and  understanding  in  the  things  of  common  life. 

98.  Sitalces,  then,  being  king  over  all  this  extent  of  coun- 
try, prepared  his  army  to  take  the  field.  And  when  all  \yas 
ready  for  him,  he  set  out  and  marched  against  ^iacedonia  ;  at 
first  through  his  own  dominions,  then  over  Cercine,  a  desert 
mountain,  which  forms  the  boundary  between  the  Sintians 
and  l*aionians,  crossing  it  by  a  road  >vhich  he  had  himself 
before  made,  by  felling  tho  timber,  when  he  turned  liis  arms 
against  the  PaOnians.  In  crossing  this  mountain  irom  tho 
Odrysians,  they  had  the  Piconians  on  their  right,  and  op  their 
loft  the  Sintians  and  Medians;  and  after  crossing  it  they 
arrived  at  Doberus  in  Paionia.     While  he  Avas  on  the  march, 


xcix.]  THUCYDIDES.  ΙΓ.  155 

there  was  no  diminution  of  biis  nnny  (except  by  disease), 
but  accessions  to  it ;  for  many  of  tlie  independent  Tbracians, 
though  unin\'ited,  followed  him  for  plunder;  so  that  the  >vholo 
number  is  snid  to  liave  been  not  less  than  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand,  of  which  the  t^rcater  part  was  infantry,  but 
about  a  third  cavalry.  Of  the  cavalry  the  Odrysians  them- 
selves furnished  the  largest  portion ;  next  to  them,  the  Geta». 
Of  the  infantry,  the  most  warlike  >vero  those  armed  with 
swords,  tho  independent  tribo  that  camo  down  from  Rhodopo  ; 
the  rest  of  tho  mixed  multitude  that  followed  him  was  far 
more  formidable  for  its  numbers  than  any  thing  else. 

09.  They  mustered,  then,  at  Dolxirus,  and  made  their  prep* 
arations  for  bursting  from  tho  highland  down  upon  tlio  lower 
Macedonia,  which  formed  tho  dominion  of  Penliccas.  For 
under  tho  name  of  Macedonians  are  included  also  tho  Lyn- 
cesta?  and  Elemiota^,  and  other  highland  tribes,  which  arc  in 
alliance  with  the  lowlanders  and  subject  to  them,  but  have 
separate  kingdoms  of  their  own.  But  tho  Macedonia  along 
the  coast,  now  properly  so  called,  was  first  acquired  and  gov- 
erned by  Alexander,  the  father  of  Perdicras,  and  his  ances- 
tors, who  were  originally  of  tho  family  of  Temenus  of  Argos. 
These  expelled  by  force  of  arms  the  IMerians  from  Pieria,  Λνΐιο 
afterward  lived  under  Mount  Panga;us,  Wyond  the  8trymon, 
in  Phagres  and  some  other  places  (and  even  now  the  country 
under  Pangreus  down  to  tho  sea  contiinies  to  bo  called  the 
Pierian  Gulf).  They  also  drove  out  of  tho  country  called 
liottia,  tho  Pottiaians,  Avho  now  hve  on  tho  confines  of  tho 
(■halcidians ;  while  in  Pa;onia  they  acquired  a  narrow  strip  of 
territory  along  the  river  Axius,  st*retching  down  to  Pella  and 
tlio  sea-coast ;  and  beyond  tho  Axius,  as  far  as  tho  Strj-mon, 
they  occupy  what  is  callc4  Mygdonia,  having  expelled  tho 
Edonians  from  it.  Again,  they  drove  out  tho  Eordians  from 
what  is  now  called  Eordia  (of  wliom  the  greater  part  perished, 
though  a  small  division  of  them  is  settled  about  Physca),  as 
also  tho  Almopians  from  Almopia.  Those  Macedonians, 
moreover,  subdued  [the  places  belonging  to]  the  other  tribes, 
which  they  still  continue  to  hold,  such  as  Anthemus,  Cresto- 
nia,  Bisaltia,  and  much  of  tho  country  that  belonged  to  tho 
original  Macedonians.  The  whole  of  it  is  called  Macedonia, 
and  Perdiccas,  son  of  Alexander,  was  king  of  the  country 
when  Sitalcea  invaded  it. 


150  THUOYDIDES.  II.  [α,α. 

100.  Theso  Macedonians,  then,  on  tho  approach  of  so  largo 
an  enemy,  not  being  able  to  offer  any  resistance,  betook  them• 
eelves  to  their  strougholda  and  fortifications,  such  as  they 
had  in  the  country.  These,  however,  were  not  numerous; 
but  it  was  at  a  later  j)eriod  that  Archelaus  son  of  Perdic-» 
cas,  when  he  came  to  the  throne,  built  those  wiiich  are  now 
in  the  country,  and  cut  straight  roads,  and  made  other  ar- 
rangements, both  for  its  liaving  horses  and  arms  for  war,  and 
resources  of  all  other  kinds,  better  than  had  been  provided  by 
all  tho  rest  of  the  kings,  eight  in  number,  who  had  preceded 
him.  Now  tho  army  of  the  Thracians,  advancing  from  Do- 
boras,  overran  first  of  all  what  had  once  been  the  government 
of  Philip ;  and  took  Idomene  by  storm,  and  Gortynia,  Ati- 
lunta,  and  some  other  places  by  capitulation,  as  they  camo 
over  to  him  from  their  friendship  fi)r  Aniyntas,  Philip's  son, 
who  was  with  him.  'Jo  Kuropus  they  laid  siege,  but  could 
not  reduce  it.  Afterward  he  advanced  into  tho  rest  of  Mace- 
donia, on  the  left  of  IVlla  and  C'yrrhus.  Ik^yond  these  they 
did  not  inarch,  namely,  into  l^ottia?a  and  Pieria,  but  staid  to 
lay  waste  Mygdonia,  Crestonia,  and  Anthemus.  Tho  Mace- 
donians, meanwhile,  liad  not  even  a  thought  of  resisting  them 
with  their  infantry ;  but  having  sent  for  an  additional  supply 
of  horse  from  their  allies  in  the  interior,  attacked  the  Thracian 
liost,  few  as  they  were  against  so  many,  Λvherevor  an  oppor- 
tunity ofi*ered.  And  wherever  they  charged  them,  no  ono 
stood  his  ground  against  troops  who  were  exet*llent  horsemen 
and  anned  with  breastjilates ;  but  surrounded  as  they  were 
by  su|>erior  numbers,  they  exposed  themselves  to  ]K*ril  by 
lighting  against  that  crowd  of  many  times  their  own  number: 
so  that  at  length  they  kept  quiet,  not  thinking  themselves  able 
to  run  such  hazards  against  a  force  so  far  superior. 

101.  In  the  mean  time,  Sitalces  conferred  Avith  Perdiccas 
on  the  objects  of  his  expedition  ;  and  since  tho  Athenians  hatl 
not  joined  him  with  their  fieet  (not  believing  that  ho  would 
come),  but  had  sent  presents  and  envoys  to  him,  lie  sent  a 
piirt  of  his  forces  against  the  Chalcidians  and  Bottiicans,  and 
atter  shutting  them  up  Avithin  their  walls,  laid  Avaste  their 
country.  While  he  was  staying  in  tlieso  j)arts,  the  people  to- 
ward tho  south,  as  tho  Thessalians,  the  Magnesiaus,  with 
others  who  were  subject  to  the  Thessalians,  and  the  Greeks 
as  far  as  Thermopylai,  were  afraid  that  the  army  might  ad- 


cii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.   II.  Ιβ•; 

vancc  ajopiinst  tbcm,  nud  were  preparing^  [for  such  nn  event]. 
The  northward  Thracians,  too,  beyond  the  Strymon  were 
alarmed,  as  hiany  as  lived  in  a  cbampaipjn  country,  namely, 
llio  Panaii,  tbo  Odomanti,  tbc  Droi,  and  tbc  Dersaii ;  wlio  arc 
all  independent.  Nay,  it  afforded  Bubject  of  discussion  even 
witb  tbo  Greeks  >vbo  Averc  enemies  of  tbc  Athenians,  Avbetber 
they  were  not  led  on  by  that  people  on  the  strenpth  of  their 
alliance,  and  might  not  come  against  them  also,  Sitalces  then  . 
Avas  commanding  at  once  Cbalcidice,  Bottica,  and  Macedo- 
nia, and  was  ravaging  them  all.  liut  >vhen  none  of  the  ob- 
jects for  which  he  made  the  expedition  was  being  gained  by 
him,  and  lie  found  his  army  without  provisions  and  suffering 
from  the  severity  of  the  weather,  ho  was  persuaded  by  Seuthes 
ibo  son  of  8pardacus,  who  was  the  nephew  and  next  in  au- 
thority to  himself,  to  return  with  all  speed.  For  Seuthes  had 
been  secretly  Λνοη  over  by  l*erdiccas,  who  promised  to  give 
liim  his  sister,  and  a  sum  of  money  with  her.  Thus  persuaded 
then,  after  remaining  [in  the  enemy's  country]  thirty  days  in 
all,  and  eight  of  them  in  ('halcidice,  ho  retired  homo  with  his 
army  as  quickly  as  he  could :  and  Perdiccas  subsequently 
gave  his  sister  Stratonico  t<i  Seuthes,  as  ho  4iad  promised. 
Such  were  the  events  that  liapp<^ncd  in  the  expedition  of 
Sitalces. 

102.  During  this  Λviuter,  after  the  fleet  of  the  Peloponnc- 
sians  had  dispersed,  the  Athenians  at  Naupactus  under  the 
command  of  Phormio,  after  coasting  along  to  Astacus,  and 
there  disembarking,  marched  into  the  interior  of  Acamania, 
vi\{\\  four  hundred  heavy-armed  of  tbc  Athenians  from  tbo 
ships  and  four  hundred  of  the  Mess^'uians.  From  Stratus, 
Coronta,  and  some  other  places,  they  expelled  certain  indi- 
viduals Λνΐιο  were  not  thought  to  be  true  to  them  ;  and  having 
restoretl  Cynes  son  of  Theolytus  to  Coronta,  returned  again  to  ^ 
their  vessels.  For  against  the  ^niadic,  who  alono  of  the  Ql-- 
Acarnanians  had  always  been  hostile  to  them,  they  did  not 
think  it  possible  to  march  during  the  winter,  as  the  river 
Achelous,  which  flows  from  Mount  Pindus  through  Dolopia 
and  the  country  of  the  Agraans  and  Amphilochians  and  the 
plain  of  Acarnania,  passing  by  the  town  of  Stratus  in  the 
upper  part  of  its  course,  and  by  ^^niadas  near  its  mouth,  forms 
lakes  round  their  city,  and  so  makes  it  impracticable  to  lend  an 
army  against  it  in  the  winter  on  account  of  the  water.    Op* 


158  THUOYDIDES.  IL  (cm. 

posite  to  Mma»  lie  most  of  the  islands  called  Ecliinadee, 
close  to  the  mouths  of  the  Achelous ;  so  that  the  river,  being 
so  large  as   it  is,  continually  forms  depositions  round  them, 
and  some  of  the  islands  have  been  joined  to  the  continent,  as 
I  expect  will  bo  the  ca^ic  with  all  of  them  iu  no  long  period 
of  tim3.     For  the  stream  is  strong,  and  deep,  and  turbid,  and 
the  islands  are  thick  together,  and  mutually  servo  to  connect 
the  alluvium  so  as  to  prevent  its  being  dispersed ;  as  they  lie 
iu  alternaUng  rows,  not  in  one  lino,  and  have  no  free  passages 
for  the  water  into  the  o{>on  sea.     They  are  uninhabited,  and  of 
no  great  extent.     There*  is  α  report  which  I  may  also  mention, 
that  when  Alcmaeon,  son  of  Amphiaraus,  was  wandering  about 
after  the  murder  of  his  mother,  Apollo  directed  him  by  an 
oracle  to  inhabit   this  rep^ion,  by  suggesting  to  him  that  he 
would  have  no  release  from  his  terrors  till  ho  should  discover 
and  inhabit  a  country  which  had  not  yet  been  seen  by  the  sun, 
nor  existed  as  land,  at  the  time  ho  slew  his  mother ;  since  all 
the  rest  of  the  earth  was  polluted  to  liim.     IIo  Avas  perplexed, 
they  say  [by  such  a  command]  ;  but  at  length  observed  this 
alluvial  deposition  of  the  Achelous,  and  thought  that  enough 
might  have  b«en  thrown  up  to  support  life  during  the  long 
period  that  ho  had  been  a  wanderer  since  killing  his  mother. 
Accordingly  ho  settled  in  the  parts  about  yKniadae,  and  be- 
came powerful,  and  left  the  name  to  the  country  from  his  son 
Acarnan.     Such  is  tho  account  wo  have  received   respecting 
Alcmaion. 

103.  The  Athenians  then,  and  Phormio,  having  departed 
from  Acarnania  and  arrived  at  Naupactus,  sailed  homo  to 
Athens  at  the  return  of  spring,  taking  with  them  such  of  the 
prisoners  from  the  naval  battles  as  were  freemen  (who  were 
exchanged  man  for  man),  and  tho  8hi[)s  they  had  captured. 
And  so  ended  this  winter,  and  the  third  year  of  this  war  of 
which  Thucydides  Avroto  Iho  history. 

»  Such  appears  to  bo  the  forco  of  tho  conjunctions  Λί  και,  by  which 
tho  following  etoiy  is  introduced  in  councctloa  with  tho  proceding  ac* 
count  of  tho  islands. 


BOOK  III. 


1.  The  followincr  summer,  as  soon  as  the  com  was  ripe,  tho 
Peloponnesians  and  their  allies  invaded  Attica,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Archidamus,  son  of  Zcuxidamus,  king  of  tho  Lacc- 
dicmonians.  1  here  they  encamped,  and  laid  waste  tho  land ; 
while  charges  were  made  upon  them,  as  usual,  by  tho  Athe- 
nian cavalry  wherever  opportunity  oft'ored ;  and  they  pre- 
vented tho  main  host  of  the  light-armed  from  advancing  far 
from  their  camp,*  and  damaging  tho  property  near  tho  city. 
After  remaining  in  tho  country  tho  time  for  which  they  had 
taken  provisions,  they  returned  and  dispersed  to  their  re- 
Bpective  cities. 

2.  Immediately  after  the  invasion  of  the  Peloponnesians, 
all  Ivcsbos,  with  the  exception  of  Mcthymna,  revolted  from 
tho  Athenians ;  having  wished  indeed  to  do  so  before  tho 
commencement  of  tho  war  (iho  Laceda?monians,  however,  did 
not  accept  their  offers),  and  yet  compelled  even  now  to  execute 
their  purpose  sooner  than  they  intended.  For  they  wero  in- 
clined to  wait  the  completion  of  tho  moles  for  the  security  of 
their  harbors,  and  of  tho  building  of  their  walls  and  ships, 
and  tho  arrival  of  all  that  was  to  come  from  the  Pontus, 
namely,  bowmen  and  com,  and  whatever  they  liad  sent  for. 
[But  this  they  Λvero  prevented  doing;]  for'  tho  Tenedians, 
who  were  at  variance  with  them,  and  tno  Mcthymnaeans,  and 
even  some  private  individuals  of  tho  Mytilenaeans,  under  tho 
influence  of  party  spirit,  as  proreni  of  the  Athenians  informed 
that  people  that  tho  Mjrtilenccans  wero  forcibly  brincring  [tho 
rest  of  J  Lesbos  into  union  with  their  own  city,  and  liurrying 
all.  their  preparations  for  a  revolt,  in   conjunction  with  tho 

*  Literally,  "from  their  arms,"  i, «.,  tho  placo  in. which  tho  spcare  and 
shields  of  tho  hoavj-armed  soldiers  were  piled ;  and  eo,  in  a  more  gene- 
ral lense,  the  camp  whero  they  were  quartered. 

"  The  γάρ  in  this  sentenco  refers  io  αναγκαοθέντΐς  in  the  flnt  BO(Hion; 
Μ  ^hat  in  tho  preceding  one  does  to  dtevoovvro. 


ΙβΟ  THUOYDIDES.  IIL  [iiL 

Lacedaemonians  and  Boeotians,  who  wero  of  tho  same  race  as 
themselves,'  and  that  if  some  one  did  not  at  on  ceanticipato 
their  designs,  thoy  would  lose  Lesbos. 

3.  But  tho  Athenians  (being  distressed  by  the  plague  and 
the  war,  which  had  so  recently  broken  out  and  was  now  at  its 
height)  thought  it  a  serious  business  to  incur  tho  additional 
hostility  of  Lesbos,  Λvith  her  fleet  and  power  hitherto   unim- 
paired ;  and  were  not  at  first  disposed  to  listen  to  tho  charges, 
allowing  too  much  weight  to  their  wish  that  it  might  not  bo 
true.     When,  however,  they  had  even  sent  embassadors  with- 
out prevailing  on  tho  Mytilenaians  to  stop  their  measures  for 
the   union   and   their   preparations,  they   were   alarmed,  and 
>vished  to   reduce   them    by  surprise.     Accordingly  they  dis- 
patched \vith  all  haste  forty  ships  that  happened  to  have  been 
equipped  for  cruising  round  tlie  Peloponnese,  under  tho  com- 
mand of  Cleippides  son  of  Dinias,  and  two  colleagues.     For 
information  had  been  brought  them  that  there  was  a  festival 
in  honor  of  the  Malean  Apollo  outride  tho  city,  at  which  all 
tho  peo})lo  of  tho  Mytilenjeans  krpt  holiday :  and  there   wa:i 
reason  to  hope  that  by  coining  with  all  sjx'ed  they  would  thus 
fall  U}x)n  them  by  surprise.     If  then  tho  attempt  should  suc- 
ceed, [all   would   be   well] ;  if  not,  they   should   charge   tho 
Mytilenaians'   to   deliver   up   their   fleet   and   dismantle  their  , 
walls ;  and  if  they  did  not  obey,  should  make  war  upon  them. 
So  tho  ships  set  sail ;  but  the  ten  triremes  of  the  Mytilenicans, 
which  had  come  to  thoni  Jis  a  reinforcement,  according  to  tho 
terms  of  their  alliance,  were  detained  by  tho  Athenians,  and 
the   crews   of  theni   were  put  in  j>n.son.     The   Afytilenieans, 
however,  were  informed  of  the  expedition  against  them  by  a 
man   who  crosseil  over  from    Athens  to    Euboea,  and  having 
gone  by  land  to  (unestus,  there  found  a  merchant-vessel  get- 
ting under   weigh,  and  so  irnxMH-ded  by  sea,  and   arrived  at 
Mytilene    the    tliird   day  after   leaving   Athens.     Accordingly 
they  both  abstained  from  going  out  to  tho  temple  at  Malea, 
and,  for   the   rest,  barricadetl   and   kept   guard   around   their 
half-finished  walls. 

•  i.  e.,  of  tho  JEoVic  raco,  to  which  most  of  iho  nortlicrn  states  of  Grcoeo 
considered  themselves  to  bcloiif?,  ami  amonj<  iho  rest  tho  IJuiOtians,  who 
had  ehietly  composed  tho  colony  headed  by  Penthilua,  tho  sou  of  Orestes, 
CiOm  whieh  thu  Lehbiaus  derived  their  origin. 

*  i.  «.,  tlio  commanders.  Tho  intlnitivo  seems  to  depend  upon  ίκίλε^ν- 
uai-,  or  somo  such  word,  under.stood. 


IV.,  v.]  THUCYDIDES.  ΠΙ.  161 

4.  When  tlio  Atheniftns  sailed  up  soon  nfter  and  saw  tlii», 
tho  commanders  delivered  their  orders ;  and  as  the  Myti- 
)en<x*ans  did  not  obey  them,  they  commenced  hostilities.  Bo- 
\η<ζ  thus  comi>ellcd  to  go  to  war  while  unprepaie•!,  and  with- 
out any  notice,  the  Mytilenreans  sailed  out  with  their  fleet  to 
battle,  a  short  distance  from  their  harbor;  but  when  driven 
to  shore  by  tho  Athenian  ships,  they  then  j)roposed  tenns  to 
tho  commanders,  wishinor,  if  they  could,  to  get  the  squadron 
sent  back  for  tho  present  on  any  reasonable  conditions.  Tho 
Athenian  commanders  agreed  to  their  proposals,  liaving  fears 
on  their  side  also,  that  tliey  might  riot  bo  ablo  to  carry  on  war 
with  tho  whole  of  Lesbos.  Accordingly,  liaving  concluded 
an  armistice,  tho  Mytilena;ans  sont  to  Athens  one  of  their  ac- 
cusers, who  now  repented  [of  what  he  had  said],  and  somo 
others,  to  try  if  by  any  means  thov  might  persuade  them  to 
let  tho  squadron  return,  on  tho  belief  of  their  meditating  no 
iimovation.  In  the  mean  time  they  also  sent  embassadors  to 
LaccJajmon  in  a  trireme,  having  escaped  the  observation  of 
tho  Athenian  fleet,  which  Avas  anchored  at  Malea,  northward 
of  tho  city  ;  for  they  were  not  confident  of  tho  success  of  tho 
answer  from  Athens.  Theso  liaving  reached  Lacedajmon  with 
much  trouble  across  tho  open  sea,  negotiated  for  some  succors 
being  sent  to  them. 

•  5.  When  tho  embassadors  from  Athens  camo  back  without 
having  eflfocted  any  thing,  tho  Mytilenajans  commenced  hos- 
tilities, and  all  the  rest  of  Ix?sbos  excepting  [the  people  of  J 
Mothymna;  but  these  had  reinforced  tho  Athenians,  with 
tho  Imbrians,  Ix^sbians,  and  some  few  of  tho  rest  of  tho  allicM, 
Tho  Mytilcna^ans  than  made  a  sally  with  all  their  forces  against 
tho  camp  of  tho  Athenians ;  and  a  battle  was  fought,  in  which 
though  tho  former  had  tho  advantage,  they  neither  spent  tho 
night  on  the  field,  nor  felt  any  confidence  in  themselves,  but 
withdrew.  After  this  they  remained  quiet,  wishing  to  liazard 
a  battle  in  conjunction  with  additional  troops  from  the  Pclo- 
ponnose,  if  any  force  should  join  them ;  (for  there  liad  conio 
to  them  Meleas,  a  Lacoflaemonian,  and  Ilermieondas,  α  Theban, 
Λvho  had  been  dispatched  before  tho  revolt,  but  not  being  ablo 
to  anticipate  tho  expedition  of  tho  Athenians,  sailed  up  by 
Btealth  in  a  trireme  after  tho  battle,  and  advised  them  to  send 
another  triremo  and  embrissadors  in  company  with  themselves ; 
which  they  did.) 


162  THUCYDIDEa  III.  [vt-viii. 

6.  The  AtbeDiangf  on  the  other  haud,  being  much  assured 
by  the  quiet  of  the  Mytilenaians,  were  calling  allies  to  join  them, 
who  came  much  quicker  from  seeing  no  vigor  on  the  part  of 
the  Lesbians ;  and  bringing  round  their  ships^  to  a  new  station 
on  the  south  of  the  town,  they  fortified  two  camps,  one  on  each 
side  of  the  town,  and  established  their  blockades  at  both  the 
harbors.  Thus  they  excluded  the  Mytilenaians  from  the  use  of 
the  sea ;  but  of  the  whole  of  the  land  they  were  still  masters, 
Avith  the  rest  of  the  Lesbians  who  had  now  come  to  their  as- 
sistance ;  while  the  Athenians  commanded  only  the  small  ex- 
tent round  their  camps,  Malea  being  rather  a  station  for  their 
ships  and  a  market  [than  any  thing  else].  Such  were  the 
features  of  the  war  about  Mytilene. 

7.  About  the  same  period  of  this  summer  the  Athenians  also 
dispatched  thirty  ships  to  the  Peloponucso,  with  Asopius  son 
of  Phormio  as  conunander ;  the  Acarnanians  Iiaving  requested 
them  to  send  them  either  a  son  or  other  relative  of  his  to  take 
the  command.  The  ships,  as  they  cojusted  along,  ravaged  the 
maritime  towns  of  Laconia.  Afterward  Asopius  sent  back 
home  the  greater  part  of  them,  but  himself  went  to  Naupactus 
w  ith  twelve ;  and  subsequently,  having  raised  the  whole  popula- 
tion of  the  Acarnanians,  marched  against  GCniiulai ;  sailing  with 
his  fleet  by  the  Achelous,  and  his  army  by  land  laying  waste 
the  country.  When  it  did  not  surrender,  ho  dismissc'd  his  land- 
forces,  and  having  himself  saiUtl  to  Leueas,  and  made  a  descent 

'  upon  Nericus,  was  cut  olf  on  his  r>  turn,  and  sume  part  of  his 
army  Λvith  him,  by  the  people  of  the  neighborhooil  who  hail 
come  to  the  rescue,  and  some  few  guard-troojis.  The  Athenians, 
after  saihng  away,  subsequently  recovered  their  dead  from  the 
Leucadians  by  treaty. 

8.  Now  tho  embassjidors  of  the  Mytilena?ans  sent  out  in  the 
first  ship,  being  told  by  the  Laceda^nionians  to  come  to  Olym- 
pia,  in  order  that  the  rest  of  the  confederates  also  might  and 
consult  uj)on  their  case,  accordingly  went  thither.  It  wjis 
the  Olympiad  at  which  Dorious  the  Uhodian  gained  his  secoud 
victory.  And  when  after  the  festival  they  came  to  conference, 
the  envoys  spoke  as  follows  : 

*  Gijllcr  diiTera  from  Arnold's  interpretation  which  I  have  given,  and 
takes  TO  πμός  νΰτυν  \vith  iTeixiaau^  thinking  that  both  tho  camps  wero 
to  tlio  south  of  tho  city,  ono  on  the  east,  tho  otlier  on  tho  west  eido  of  iL 
Seo  their  notes,  and  uUo  that  of  Bialiop  Thirlwall,  vol.  iii.  p.  173. 


IX.,  χ.]  TnUCTDIDES.   III.  163 

0.  "  AVitli  Iho  settled  principle  of  the  Greeks  [with  regard 
to  a  case  like  ours],  Ijacedaemoiiians  and  allies,  wo  are  well 
acquainted;  for  when  men  revolt  in  war,  nnd  leave  their 
former  confederacy,  those  Λνΐιο  receive  them  are  pleased  with 
them  so  far  as  they  derive  benefit  from  them  ;  hut  inasmuch 
as  tbcy  consider  them  traitors  to  their  former  friends,  they 
have  a  meaner  opinion  of  them.  And  this  is  no  unfair  esti- 
mate of  their  conduct,  supposing  that  both  those  Avho  revolt, 
and  those  from  whom  they  separate,  agreed  in  their  views  and 
in  kindly  feeling,  and  were  equally  matched  in  resources  nnd 
power,  and  no  reasonable  'ground  for  the  revolt  previously 
existed.  But  this  was  not  the  case  with  us  and  the  Athen- 
ians ;  nor  ought  we  to  bo  worse  thought  of  by  any  one  for 
revolting  from  them  in  the  time  of  their  peril,  >vhen  we  wero 
honored  by  them  in  time  of  peace. 

10.  "For  it  is  on  the  justice  and  goo<lness  of  our  cause  that 
Λve  will  first  address  you,  especially  as  we  are  requesting  tho 
favor  of  your  alliance ;  knowing  that  neither  friendship  be- 
tween indinduals,  nor  league  i)etween  communities,  is  ever 
lasting,  unless  they  formed  the  connection'  >vith  an  appear- 
ance of  good  principle  toward  each  other,  and  were  of  con- 
genial dispositions  in  other  respects ;  for  from  tho  difference  of 
feelings  difference  of  conduct  also  arises.  Now  between  us  and 
the  Athenians  alliance  was  first  made  when  you  left  us,  and 
withdrcAv  from  tho  ^iedian  war,  Avhile  they  stood  by  us  to 
finish  tho  business.  We  became  allies,  however,  not  to  tho 
Athenians  for  the  enslaving  of  tho  Greeks,  but  to  tho  Greeks 
for  their  liberation  from  the  Mede.  And  so  long  as  they  led 
us  on  equal  ternjs,  wo  followed  them  heartily ;  but  when  wo 
saw  them  relaxing  in  their  hostility  to  tho  Mede,  and  under- 
taking to  enslave'  tho  Greeks,  wo  wero  no  longer  without 
alarm.  Being  incapable,  however,  through  tho  number  ot 
those  who  had  votes,  to  join  together  and  defend  themselves, 
tho  allies  wero  reduced  to  elavory,  except  ourselves  nnd  tho 
Ghians;  but  wc  joined  their  ontcrpHses  as  independent,  for- 
sooth, nnd  free — in  name.  And  now  wo  had  ho  longer  in 
tho  Athenians  such  leaders  ns  wo  could  trust,  having  before 
us  the  examples  that  wore  already  given :  for  it  was  not 

*  According  to  OoUor,  φίλοι  is  understood  after  γίγνοιτό  t  according  to 
Poppo,  φιλία  καΐ  κοινωνία  before  it.    I  prefer  the  former  construction. 
'  Or,  as  Poppo  takes  it,  "bringing  on  tho  subjugfttion." 


164  THUCYDIDEa   ίΠ.  ,   [χι^χπ. 

likely  that  thoy  aliould  reduce  to  Bubjection  those  whom  thoy 
had  taken  into  treaty  along  with  us,  and  not  do  the  eame  ttj 
the  rest,  if  over  they  had  the  power. 

11.  *^If  indeed  we  had  nil  been  still  independent,  they  might 
have  been  better  trusted  by  us  not  to  attempt  any  innovation  : 
but  having  the  majority  subject  to  them,  while  they  associated 
with  us  on  terms  of  equality ;  and  comparing  the  submission  of 
the  greater  part  with  our  alone  being  treated  as  equals,  they 
would  naturally  brook  it  the  worse ;  especially  as  they  were 
themselves   growing  more   powerful  than  ever,  and  wo  more 
destitute.     But  equality  of  fear  is  the  only  sure  basis  of  an 
alliance  ;  for  then  the  i)arty  that  Avishes  to  commit  any  offense 
is  deterred  by  the  knowledge  that  ho  would  not  attempt  it 
with   any  advantiigo  on  his  side.     Again,  wo  >vere  left  mdc- 
pendent  for  no  other  reason  than  inasmuch  as  their  schemes  of 
empiro   appeared   attainable   by   npocious   language,   and   en- 
croachment in  tho  way  of  policy  rather  than  of  force.     For 
at  tho  samo  time  they  used  us  as  evidence  that  such  as  liad 
equal  votes  with  themselves,  at  any  rate,  ΛνοηΜ  not  join  them  in 
their  enterprises  against  their  will  [and  therefore  not  at  all] ; 
unless  thoso  they  attacked  were  in  tho  wrong  :  and  by  tho  saiua 
system  they  also  led  tho  stronger  states  with  them  against  tho 
Aveaker  ones  first,  and  by  leaving  tho  more  powerful  until  tho 
last  they  wero  stiVo  to  tind  them  less  so,  when  all  the  rest  had 
been  stripped  away  from  them.     Hut  if  they  had  begun  with 
us,  while  all  of  them  still  had  their  power,  and  a  center  round 
which  to  take  their  stiiml,   they  would  not  have  subdued  them 
BO  easily.     Our  lleot,  too,  caused  them  u  degree  of  fear,  lest  by 
uniting  together,  and  joining  either  you  or  any  other  power, 
it  might  some  time  bring  them  into  danger.     And  again,  to  a 
certain  extent  we  i)rcserved  ourselves  by  paying  court   to  their 
commons,  and  to  thoso  who  from  time  to  time  took  tho  load 
of  them.     Wo  did  not,  however,  exiK'ct  to  bo  long  able  to  do 
so,  if  this  war  had  not  broken  out ;  looking  to  the  examples 
they  had  given  in  their  dealings  >vith  tho  rest. 

12.  "  AVhat  then  was  that  alliance  of  ours,  or  that  freedom  to 
bo  relied  on,  in  which  wo  received  each  otlier  contrary  to  our 
real  sentiments ;  and  they,  through  fear,  courted  us  in  war,  wliilo 
we  did  tho  samo  to  them  in  peace  ?  And  whereas  in  tho  case 
of  others  it  is  kindness  that  most  secures  faith,  in  our  case  it 
was  fear  that  gave  this  assurance;  and  wo  were  constrained  .to 


χίπ.]  THUCYDIDES.   ΠΓ.  165 

bo  allies  by  terror  more  th.in  by  nfiection ;  nnd  to  whichever 
paity  security  should  first  give  confidence,  that  party  was  sure 
to  bo  tho  first  also  to  violate  the  treaty  in  some  way  or  other. 
If  therefore  wo  are  thoui^ht  by  any  one  to  bo  wrong  in  first 
revolting,  because  they  deferred  tho  evils  wo  dreaded,  whilo 
we  did  not  wait  in  return  to  see  whether  any  of  them  would 
be  inflicted,  lie  docs  not  view  tho  caso  aright.  For  if  wo 
were  able  on  enual  terms  with  them  to  return  their  plots  ly^ainst 
us,  and  their  tlelay  in  tho  execution  of  them,  what  reason  was 
there,  that  being  [according  to  this  view  of  the  case],  on  au 
equal  f(X)ting,  wo  sliould  [really]  be  at  their  mercy?'  But  as 
it  was  always  in  their  power  to  make  tho  attempt,  it  ought  to 
be  in  ours  to  guard  against  it  beforehand. 

13.  "It  was  on  such  grounds  and  with  such  reasons,  Laco- 
dipmonians,  and  allies,  that  wc  revolted  ;  suflTiciently  clear  ones 
for  those  who  hear  them  to  judge  that  λυο  acted  rightly ;  and  sut- 
ficiently  strong  ones  to  alarm  us,  and  make  us  betake  ourselves 
to  some  means  of  safety :  which  indeed  wo  wished  to  do  long 
ago,  when  we  sent  to  you,  whilo  tho  peace  yet  lasted,  on  tho 
subject  of  our  revolting,  but  Λvero  ])revented  by  your  not  re- 
ceiving us  into  alliance.  lUit  now,  when  the  l^oeotians  invited 
us,  wo  immediately  listened  to  their  proposals ;  and  thought 
that  wp  should  withdraw  ourselves  in  a  twofold  manner;  from 
tho  Cireeks,  so  as  not  to  join  in  injuring  them  in  company 
with  tho  Athenians,  but  to  join  in  giving  them  lil)erty;  and 
from  tho  Athenians,  so  as  not  to  Iw  ruined  by  them  ourselves 
after  tho  rest,,  but  to  be  beforehand  in  acting  [against  them]. 
Our  revolt,  however,  has  taken  ]>lace  prematurely,  and  with- 
out duo  preparations;  for  λυΙιΙοΙι  reason  also  it  is  tho  more  in- 
cumbent on  you  to  recei\o  us  as  allies,  nnd  send  us  succor 
speedily;  that  you  may  bo  seen  both  assisting  those  whom  voti 
ought,  and  at  the  same  time  hurting  your  enemies.  And 
there  is  an  opportunity  for  doing  that,  such  as  there  never 
was  before  ;  for  tho  Athenians  havo  been  wasted  both  by  dis- 
ease and  pecuniary  expenditure;  and  their  ships  aro  cither 
cruising  round  your  coasts,  or  stationed  against  us ;  so  that  it 

'  In  other  words,  tho  fact  of  their  being  always  at  tho  mercy  of  tho 
Attionlane  proved  tho  falsity  of  tho  iiifpothMts  of  their  beinj?  on  equal  terms 
with  them,  and  therefore  tho  reaaonableness  of  their  anticipating  the  ottick 
which  might  at  any  time  bo  modo  upon  them,  instead  of  waiting  till  it 
hod  actually  boon  raado.  Such  I  think  is  tho  meaning  of  this  very  difil• 
cult  passage. 


166  TaUOYDIDES.  III.  [χιν.,χτ. 

is  not  likely  they  should  have  any  to  spare,  if  in  the  course  of 
this  summer  you  should  invade  them  α  second  time  both  by 
sea  and  land ;  but  they  ivill  cither  offer  no  resistance  to  your 
naval  attack,  or  withdraw  their  forces  from  both  our  shores. 
And  let  no  one  deem  that  he  would  thus  be  incurring  peril  to  him- 
self in  defense  of  another  man^s  country.  For  whoever  thinks 
Lesbos  fur  off,  will  find  it  close  at  hand  for  assisting  him. 
For  it  is  not  in  Attica  that  the  war  will  bo  decided,  as  men 
imagine,  but  in  that  quarter  from  >vhich  Attica  derives  its 
succors.  Now  their  revenue  is  drawn  from  their  allies ;  and 
it  will  bo  still  greater,  if  they  subdue  us  ;  for  no  one  else  will 
revolt,  and  our  resources  will  bo  mlded  to  theirs;  and  wo 
should  be  treated  worse  than  those  who  were  enslaved  before 
[they  revolted].  But  if  you  will  give  us  hearty  assistance, 
you  will  both  add  to  your  league  a  state  that  has  a  large  navy, 
of  which  you  especially  stand  in  need,  and  >vill  the  more 
easily  overthrow  the  Athenians,  by  depriving  them  of  their 
allies  (for  every  one  will  then  join  you  more  boldly),  and  will 
escape  the  charge  you  have  incurred  of  not  assisting  those 
who  revolt.  If,  however,  you  show  yourselves  as  liberators, 
you  will  find  your  advantage  in  the  war  more  certain. 

14.  "From  resjKiOt  then  for  the  hopes  of  the  Greeks  reposed 
in  you,  and  for  that  Olympian  Jupiter  in  whoso  temple  wo 
stand  in  the  character  of  suppliants,'  assist  the  Mytilena?ans 
by  l)ecoming  their  allies;  and  do  not  abandon  us  [to  destruc- 
tion], standing  as  wo  do  the  brunt  of  the  danger  in  our 
own  persons,  >vhile  Λνο  shall  confer  on  all  a  general  benefit 
from  our  success,  and  a  still  more  general  detriment,  if  wo 
are  ruined  through  your  not  being  prevailed  on  to  help  us. 
Show  yourselves  then  to  be  such  men  as  the  Greeks  esteem 
you,  and  as  our  fear  would  have  you  to  be." 

15.  To  this  effect  spoke  the  Mytilvmeans.  AVhen  the  Lace- 
daemonians and  the  confederates  had  lieard  them,  they  admitted 
the  force  of  their  arguments,  and  received  the  Lesbians  into 
alliance.  And  with  regard  to  the  invasion  of  Attica,  they  told 
the  confederates  who  were  present  to  go  with  all  speed  to  tho 
isthmus  with  two  tliird  of  their  forces,  to  put  it  into  execution, 
and  were  themsi-lves  the  first  to  arrive  there,  and  proceeded 
to  get  ready  at  the  isthmus  machines  for  hauling  their  ships, 
with  a  view   to  transporting   them  to  Corinth   to  the  sea  on 

*  Literally,  "like  as  Buppliauts." 


XVI,,  XVII.]  TnUCYDIDES.  III.  167 

the  sido  of  Athens,  and  makincf  an  attack  both  by  Boa  and 
land  at  tho  pamo  time.  They,  then,  >vcro  heartily  engaged  in 
those  operations ;  but  tho  rest  of  tho  confederates  were  slow 
in  assembling,  as  they  wero  occupied  in  gathering  in  their 
Imrvcst,  and  sick  of  making  expeditions. 

16.  The  Athenians  wero  awaro  that  they  wero  making 
these  preparations  from  a  conviction  of  their  weakness ;  and 
wishing  to  show  that  it  was  not  a  correct  opinion,  but  that 
they  wero  able,  Λvithout■  moving  the  squadron  stationed  against 
Lesbos,  at  the  same  time  to  repel  with  cn^a  that  which  λυα^ 
coming  against  them  from  the  Pelopoimese,  they  manned  a 
hundred  ships,  going  on  board  themselves  (with  tho  exception 
of  the  knights  an<l  the  pcntiicosio  mcdimni)^*  and  their  resident 
aliens ;  and  having  put  out  to  tho  isthmus,  they  made  both  a 
display  [of  their  power],  and  .descents  on  whatever  parts  of 
tho  Peloponneso  they  j)lcasod.  AVhen  tho  Lacedaemonians 
saw  things  so  contrary  to  their  expectation,  they  thought  that 
what  had  been  told  them  by  the  I^esbians  was  not  true  ;  and 
considering  themselves  in  a  strait,  as  their  allies  at  tho  samo 
time  had  not  joined  them,  and  tho  thirty  'Athenian  ships 
cruising  rounrl  tho  Peloponneso  wero  reported  to  bo  ravaging 
tho  land  near  their  city,  they  returned  home.  Afterward, 
liowevc-r,  they  prepared  a  fleet  to  send  to  Lesbos,  and  gavo 
orders  to  tho  difTerent  states  for  ships  to  tho  number  of  forty, 
and  appointed  Alcidas,'  who  Λvas  to  conduct  tho  cxi>edition,  their 
liigh-admiral.  Tho  Athenians,  too,  returned  with  their  hundred 
uhips,  when  they  saw  that  the  Laceda;monians  had  done  so. 

17.  'At  the.  time  that  this  squadron  was  at  sea,  they  had 

*  Tlicso  wero  tho  citizens  whoso  lands  brought  them  in  yearly  500 
mcdimni  (cqtial  to  about  94  English  quarters)  of  corn,  wino,  or  oil ;  and 
thoy  formed  tho  highest  of  tho  four  classes  into  which  Solon  divided  tho 
Athenian  people.  Tho  knights  formed  tho  second  class,  their  qualinca- 
tion  being  300  mcdimni ;  and  wero  so  called  from  being  obliged  to  Bervo 
in  war  on  horseback. 

*  I  am  far  from  certain  what  is  tho  exact  force  of  this  clause,  but  think 
it  may  possibly  refer  to  tho  fact  of  Alcidaa  having  been  fixed  upon  to 
command  this  expedition  be/ore  tho  οΙΏοο  of  high  admiral  was  conferred 
upon  him ;  and  that  his  subsequent  appointment  to  that  ofSco  is  olso  re- 
ferred to,  C  26.  1,  τύς — νανς  άττέστειλαν  Ιχοντα  ^Αλκί(^αν,  of  ^ν  αΐτοίς 
ναύΰψχος,  ηροστάξαντες:  in  which  case  ιτροστάξαντες  would  bo  far  from 
being  superfluous,  as  it  has  generally  been  supposed.  If,  however,  this 
interpretation  bo  thought  fiinciful,  tho  ίμελλνν  must  simply  moan  that  he 
"  was  to  conduct  tho  expedition"  in  his  capacity  as  admiral. 

*  "  The  object  of  this  chapter,"  as  Arnold  observes,  "  is  merely  to  bring 


168  THuOTDIDEa.IIL  [ζτηι. 

about  tho  larfi^et  number  of  ships  they  had  ever  poesoesod  at 
once,  in  eifoctivo  and  fine  condition  :^  ^though  they  had  as  many, 
or  even  more,  at  tho  beginning  of  tno  >var).  For  a  hundred 
kept  guard  round  Attica,  Eubcea,  and  Salamis,  while  another 
hundred  were  cruising  about  the  Peloponnese,  besides  thoeo 
at  Potidaea  and  in  other  phicos ;  so  that  altogether  there  were 
two  hundred  and  fifty  [iil  service]  in  tho  course  of  that  ono 
summer.  And  it  was  this,  in  conjunction  Λvith  Potidaea,  that 
most  exhausted  their  revenues.  For  at  Potidiea  tho  number  of 
lieavy-armcd  that  kept  guard  at  two  drachmas  a  day  (for  each 
man  received  ono  for  himself  and  another  for  his  servant),  wa•» 
at  first  three  thousand ;  and  not  fewer  than  these  remained  thero 
to  tho  end  of  the  siege,  besides  ono  thousand  six  Imndred  witli 
Phormio,  who  went  away  before  it  was  concluded  ;  while  all  tho 
ships,  too,  received  the  same  pay.  In  this  way  then  was  their 
money  lieedlesxly  lavished  at  first ;  and  such  was  tho  largest 
numl>er  of  ships  manned  by  them. 

18.  At  tho  same  time  that  tho  Lacedicmonians  were  in  tho 
neighborhood  of  tho  isthnms,  the  Mytilena;ans  marched  by  land, 
both  themselves  and  their  auxiliaries,  against  Methymna,  in 
hope  of  its  being  betrayed  to  them.  After  assaulting  the  city, 
when  they  did  not  succeed  as  they  had  expex-ted  to  do,  they 
withdrew  to  Antissa,  l*yr»ha,  and  Eresus,  and  having  rendered 
tho  condition  of  those  towns  more  secure,  an•!  strengthened  tho 
fortifications,  they  returned  homo.  AVhen  they  Iiad  retired,  tho 
Methymnamns  marched  against  Antissa ;  and  being  defeated  by 
tho  inhabitants  and  their  auxiliaries  in  a  sortie  that  Avas  made, 
many  of  them  were  slain,  and  tho  remainder  retreated  as  quickly 
as  possible.  Tho  Athenians,  on  receiving  this  intelligence  of  tho 
Mytilenieans*  commanding  the  country,  and  their  own  troops 
not  being  suflicient  to  keep  them  in  check,  sent,  about  tho 
beginning  of  autumn,  Paches  son  of  Epicurus  as  commander, 
with  a  thousand  heavy-anned  of  their  own  ;  who  having  them- 
selves rowed  their  ships,  arrived  at  Mytilene,  and  inclosed  it  all 
round  with  a  single  wall ;   forts  being  built  on  some  of  tho 

iQ  what  Thucydiiies  haii  forpottcn  to  mention  in  its  proper  place,  namely, 
tho  greatest  naval  force,  and  tho  greatest  war  expedition,  which  Athens 
had  ever  been  able  to  employ  and  support ;  just  as  lio  had  mentioned,  IJ. 
yi.  3,  the  greatest  land  army  which  sho  had  over  scntout  on  ono  service. 
'  Literally,  "efTuPtive,  in  fine  condition;"  "with  handsomeness,"  as 
liloomflcld  renders  it ;  whoso  interpretation  of  the  passago  I  prefer  to 
cither  (ioUor's  or  Poppo'a. 


XIX.-XXL]  TnUOYDIDES.  III.  169 

stroiijSfcst  points  of  it.  Thus  the  place  was  vigorously  blockaded 
on  both  sides,  by  land  and  by  sea ;  and  the  conimenccmcnt  of 
winter  wiis  near  at  hand. 

19.  The  Athenians,  beincf  in  want  of  money  for  the  siep^o, 
although  they  had  among  themselves  for  the  first  time  raised  α 
contribution  of  two  hundred  talents,  dispatche<i  to  their  allies 
also  twelve  ships  to  levy  subsidies,  and  Lysicles  with  five  others 
in  command  of  them.  Accordingly  he  levied  them  in  various 
places,  cruising  about ;  and  having  gone  up  the  country  from 
Myus  in  Caria.  across  the  plain  of  the  Maiander,  as  far  as  the  hill 
of  Sandius,  he  was  both  slain  himself  and  many  of  the  army  be- 
sides, in  Jin  attack  made  by  the  Caiiaas  and  the  people  of  Ana'a. 

20.  Tho  same  winter  the  Plata^ans  (for  Uiey  were  still  be- 
sieged by  the  Peloponnesians  and  l^oeotians),  when  distressed 
by  tho  failure  of  their  provisions,  and  when  there  was  no  hope 
of  aid  from  Attica,  and  no  other  means  of  safety  presented  its(»lf, 
both  themselves  and  tho  Athenians  who  were  besieged  with 
them  formed  a  design,  in  which  they  >vero  at  first  unanimous, 
for  all  to  sally  forth  and  pass  tho  walls  of  tho  enemy,  if  they 
could  force  their  way  over  them ;  the  attempt  having  been  sug- 
gested to  them  by  Thea^netus  son  of  Tolmidas,  a  soothsayer, 
and  Eupomidas  son  of  Daimachus,  Λνΐιο  was  also  one  of  their 
generals.  »Subsequently  half  of  them  shrank  from  it,  thinking 
it  a  great  risk;  but  about  two  hundred  and  twenty  voluntarily 
persevered  in  tho  attempt,  [which  they  effected]  in  the  following 
manner.  They  made  ladders  to  suit  the  height  of  tho  enemy's 
wall,  measuring  by  the  layers  of  bricks,  where  tho  wall  looking 
toward  them  happened  to  bo  imperfectly  whitewashed.  Now 
many  counted  the  layers  at  tho  same  time ;  and  though  some 
would  naturally  miss  tho  correct  calculation,  tho  majority  would 
attain  it ;  especially  as  they  counted  them  many  times  over,  and 
were  also  at  no  great  distance,  but  tho  wall  was  easily  observed 
by  them  as  far  as  they  wished.  In  this  way  they  ascertained 
the  proper  length  of  the  ladders,  guessing  the  measure  from  tho 
thickness  of  the  bricks. 

21.  Now  tho  wall  of  tho  Peloponnesians  was  of  the  following 
construction.  It  consisted  of  two  lines  round  the  place,  ono 
against  tho  PlattTan»,  and  another  in  case  any  one  should  attack 
them  on  tho  outeide  from  Athens ;  and  the  lines  were  about 
sixteen  feet  apart.  In  this  interval  then  of  the  sixteen  feet  tbero 
were  quarters  builtvand  partitioned  out  among  the  soldiers  thai 

8 


170  THUCYDIDEa  ΙΠ.  .      [απ. 

wore  on  guard ;  and  these  were  continuous,  eo  that  it  appeared 
but  one  thick  wall,  with  battlements  on  each  side.  Λt  tiie  dis- 
tance of  every  ten  battlements  there  were  towers,  of  consider- 
able size,  and  of  the  sumo  breadth  as  the  wall,  reaching  both  to 
its  inner  and  its  outer  front,  so  that  there  was  no  passage  by 
the  side  of  a  tower,  but  they  passed  through  the  middle  of 
them.  During  the  nights  therefore,  whenever  it  was  stormy 
and  wet  weather,  they  used  to  leave  the  battlements,  and  to 
keep  watch  from  the  towers,  as  they  were  only  at  a  short  dis- 
tunco  one  from  another,  and  were  covered  in  above.  Such  then 
was  the  nature  of  the  wall  by  which  the  Plataeans  were  inclosed. 
22.  When  they  had  made  their  preparations,  having  watched 
for  a  stormy  night  of  wind  and  rain,  and  at  the  same  time 
moonless,  they  went  forth  under  the  guidance  of  those  who  had 
been  the  authors  of  the  enterprise.  In  the  first  place  then  they 
crossed  the  ditch  which  ran  round  their  city,  and  then  camo 
up  to  the  enemy's  wall,  unperceived  by  the  s^^ntinels;  for  they 
did  not  see  before  them  in  the  dark,  and  did  not  hear  them 
owing  to  the  wind,  which  drowned  with  its  clatter  the  noise  of 
their  approach ;  iKisides,  they  went  far  apart  from  each  other, 
that  their  arms  might  not  clash  together  and  betray  them. 
They  were  also  lightly  armed,  and  had  only  the  left  foot  shod, 
for  security  against  slipping  in  the  mire.  So  they  camo  up  to 
the  battlements  at  one  of  the  spaces  between  the  towers,  know- 
ing that  they  were  deserted.  First  camo  those  who  carried  the 
ladders,  >vhich  they  planted ;  then  twelve  light-armed,  Λvith  only 
a  dagger  and  a  breastplate,  proceeded  to  mount,  Ammias  sou 
of  Coroelius  leading  them,  and  being  the  first  to  mount,  and 
after  him  his  followers,  six  going  t(j  each  of  the  towers.  Next 
after  them  came  another  party  of  light-anned,  with  darts, 
whoso  shields,  that  they  might  the  more  easily  advance,  others 
carried  in  the  rear,  and  were  ready  to  hand  them  to  them 
whenever  they  came  to  the  enemy.  AVhen  α  considerable 
number  had  got  up,  the  sentinels  in  the  towers  discovered  it ; 
for  one  of  the  Platajans,  in  laying  hold  of  the  battlements, 
threw  down  a  tile  from  them,  Λvhich  made  a  noise  as  it  fell. 
And  immediately  a  shout  was  raised,  and  the  troops  rushed  to 
the  wall,  for  they  did  not  know  >vhat  the  alarm  >vas,  the  night 
being  dark,  and  the  weather  stormy ;  and  l)esides,  those  of  tho 
Platieaus  who  had  been  left  Ixihind  in  the  town  sallied  forth, 
and  made  an  attack  on  tho  wall  of  the  Peloponnesians  on  tho 


miL]  THUCYDIDES.  III^  lYl 

opposite  pido  to  where  their  men  were  getting  over,  that  they 
might  pay  as  little  attention  aa  possible  to  them.  Thus,  though 
they  yvQTQ  alarmed,  and  stood  to  their  several  posts^  no  one 
ventured  to  go  to  the  rescue  beyond  his  own  station,  but  they 
were  at  a  loss  to  conjecture  what  was  going  on.  Meanwhilo 
their  three  hundred,  whoso  orders  were  to  give  aid  at  what- 
ever point  it  might  bo  necessary,  proceeded  outside  the  wall 
in  the  direction  of  the  shout.  Fire-signals  of  an  attack  from 
the  eneniy  were  likewise  raised  toward  Thebes ;  but  the  Plataj- 
ans  in  the  city  also  raised  many  others,, which  had  been  pre- 
pared beforehand  for  this  purpose,  that  the  indications  of  the 
enemy's  signals  might  be  indistinct,  and  so  [their  friends] 
miijht  not  come  to  their  aid,  thinking  the  business  something 
ditterent  from  what  it  really  Avas,  till  those  of  their  own  num- 
ber who  had  gone  out  should  have  escaped  and  gained  their 
safety. 

2.'].  In  the  mean  time,  with  regard  to  the  party  of  Plataians 
that  were  scaling  the  wall,  Avhen  the  first  of  them  had  mounted, 
and  after  putting  the  sentinels  to  the  sword,  had  taken  pos- 
session of  each  of  the  two  towers,  they  posted  themselves  in 
them,  and  kept  guard,  to  prevent  any  reinforcement  coming 
through  them ;  and  when  they  Iiad  raised  ladders  to  them  from 
the  wall,  and  sent  up  a  considerable  party  of  men,  those  at 
the  towers  kept  in  check  with  their  missiles,  both  from  alx>vo 
and  below,'  such  as  ΛveΓe  coming  to  the  rescue ;  while  the 
other  and  greater  part  of  them  had  in  the  mean  time  planted 
many  ladders,  and  thrown  down  the  battlements,  and  were 
passing  over  between  the  towers.  As  each  successively  cfTccted 
his  passage,  he  took  his  stand  on  the  edge  of  the  ditch ;  and 
thence  they  used  their  bows  and  darts  against  any  one  that 
came  to  the  rescue  along  the  wall,  and  tried  to  stop  the  passage 
[of  their  comrades].  When  all  were  over,  those  on  the  towers 
descended — the  last  of  them  with  great  difhculty — and  pro- 
ceeded to  the  ditch ;  and  in  the  mean  time  the  three  hundred 
were  coming  against  them  with  torches.  Now  the  Platicans, 
a»  they  stood  in  the  dark  on  the  edge  of  the  ditch,  had  a  better 
view  of  them,  and  discharged  their  arrows  and  darts  against 
the  exposed  parts  of  their  bodies;  while  they  themselves,  in 
the  obscurity  of  their  position,  were  the  less  seen  for  the 
torches ;  so  that  even  the  last  of  the  Platncans  got  clear  over 
'  t.  c,  from  th(J  top  oCtlio  lowcta  and  from  tho  wall  nt  their,  base. 


172  THUCTDIDEa  ΠΙ.  [χχιτ.,χχτ. 

the  ditch,  though  with  difficulty  and  hy  a  violent  effort ;  for 
ico  had  frozen  over  it,  not  strong  enough  to  allow  of  their 
walking  on  it,  hut  rather  watery,  as  it  usually  is  with  a  wind 
more  east  than  north  ;*  and  the  night  heing  somewhat  snowy 
in  consequence  of  such  a  wind,  had  swollen  the  Λvater  in  it, 
which  they  crossed  with  tlieir  heads  barely  above  it.  But  at 
the  same  time  their  escape  was  mainly  effected  through  tho 
violence  of  tho  stonn." 

24.  Starting  from  tho  ditch,  the  Platieans  went  in  a  body 
along  the  Toad  leading  to  Thebes,  keeping  tho  chapel  of  tho 
hero  Androcrates  on  their  right^  thinking  that  tho  Pelopon- 
nesians  would  least  suspect  their  taking  that  road,  toward  their 
enemies'  country;  and  in  tho  mean  time  they  saw  them  in 

{mrsuit  \vith  torches  along  tho  road  to  Cithiuron  and  the  Oak- 
leads,  in  tho  direction  of  Athens.  So  after  they  had  gone  six 
or  seven  stades  along  the  road  to  Thebes,  they  then  turned  off, 
and  took  that  which  leads  to  tho  mountain,  to  Erythra»,  and 
llysia} ;  and  having  reaehed  the  hills,  they  escaped  to  Athens, 
to  tho  number  of  two  hundred  and  twelvo  out  of  one  origin- 
ally greater ;  for  some  of  them  turned  back  again  into  the  city 
before  they  passed  over  tho  wall,  and  ono  bowman  was  taken 
prisoner  at  tho  outer  ditch.  So  tho  iVloponnesians  gave  up 
tho  pursuit  and  returned  to  their  posts;  whilo  tho  IMata'an» 
in  tho  town,  knowing  nothing  of  what  had  happened,  but  hav- 
ing been  informed  by  those  who  returned  that  not  a  man  had 
escaped,  sent  out  a  herald  as  soon  as  it  was  day,  and  wished 
to  make  a  truco  for  taking  up  their  doa<l ;  when,  however,  they 
knew  the  truth,  they  ceased  from  their  application.  In  this  way 
then  the  party  of  I'lataans  passed  over  tho  wall  and  were  saved. 
25.  At  tho  close  of  tho  samo  winter,  Salajthus  tho  Laceda;- 

*  Arnold  and  Bloonificld,  on  tho  authority  of  tho  Scholiast,  supply 
//άλλο»/  beforo  ;/.  Indeed,  if  both  tho  cast  and  north  Avind  were  rainy, 
from  what  quarter  could  a  clear  and  dry  frost  bo  expected  ?  For  tho 
character  hero  attributed  to  tho  east  >vind,  comparo  Horace,  Epod.  16. 
53,  '*  Ut  nequo  largis  Aquosus  Eurus  arva  radat  iiubribus."  In  tho  words 
that  follow,  if  tho  νττυ  in  υπονειόομίνη  has  tho  diminutive  force  w\uq\\  is 
generally  attributed  to  it,  tho  swelling  of  tho  water  in  the  ditch  must  bo 
referred  to  tho  general  character  of  tho  night,  as  beforo  described;  for 
without  tho  violent  storms  of  rain  it  is  evident  that  a  little  snow  could 
have  produced  no  such  efloct  in  so  short  a  time. 

'  The  force  of  tho  και  seems  to  be,  that  although  tho  storm  increased 
tho  difficulty  of  crossing  tho  ditch,  it  also  contributed  very  largely  to  the 
•uccess  of  their  plan  in  other  respects. 


XXVI..  xxm]  THUCYDIDES.  III.  1^3 

monian  was  sent  out  from  Lacedaimon  in  a  trireme  to  My- 
tileno ;  and  havincf  ijono  by  Foa  to  Pyrrha,  and  thence  by 
land,  ho  entered  Mytilonc  unobserved,  along  the  bed  of  a  tor- 
rent, where  the  lines  round  the  town  were  passable,  and  told 
the  magistrates  that  there  would  bo  an  invasion  of  Attica, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  ships  would  come  Avhich  were  to 
have  assisted  them  before ;  and  that  ho  himself  had  been  dis- 
patched in  advance  on  this  account,  and  to  attend  to  all  other 
matters.  The  Mytilenaians  therefore  took  fresh  courage,  and 
thought  less  of  coming  to  tenns  with  the  Athenians.  And 
RO  ended  this  >vinter,  and  the  fourth  year  of  the  war  of  which 
Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

26.  The  following  summer,  after  the  Peloponnesians  had 
dispatched  Alcidas,  Λν^ο  was  their  high-admiral  (for  they  had 
conferred  that  ofRco  upon  liim),  with  the  two  and  forty  *  ships 
to  Mitylene,  they  themselves  and  their  allies  made  an  irrup- 
tion into  Attica;  that  the  Athenians,  being  harassed  both 
ways,  might  be  the  less  able  to  send  succors  against  the 
ships  that  >vere  sailing  to  Mitylene.  The  commander  in  this 
irruption  was  Clcomenes,  as  representative  of  Pausaniaa,  the 
βοα  of  Pleistoanax,  >vho  was  king,  and  still  a  minor,  and  Cle- 
omenes  was  his  father's  brother.  They  ravaged  therefore 
l)oth  the  parts  which  had  been  devastated  before,  if  there 
were  any  thing  that  had  shot  up  again,  and  all  that  had 
been  passed  over  in  their  previous  irruptions.  And  this  in- 
vasion was  most  severely  felt  by  the  Athenians,  next  to  tho 
second ;  for  continually  expecting  to  hear  from  Lesbos  of  some 
achievement  perfonned  by  their  ships,  which  they  thought 
had  by  this  time  made  their  passage,  they  went  on  committing 
general  devastation.  When,  however,  none  of  the  results 
which  they  expected  was  obtained,  and  when  their  provisions 
had  failed,  they  returned,  and  were  dispersed  through  their 
several  countries. 

27.  Tho  MytileuiPans,  meanwhile,  as  tho  ships  from  the 
Peloponnese  had  not  come  to  them,  but  w«re  wasting  tho 
time,  and  as  their  provisions  had  failed,  were  compelled  to 

'  As  only  forty  are  mentioned  before,  c.  1β.  3,  and  25.  2,  Arnold  thinks 
it  poaaiblo  that  tho  additional  two  formed  tho  contingent  of  Laccda;mon 
itselH  They  aro  again  spoken  of  na  forty,  c.  29.  1,  and  69.  1  ;  in  which 
plaoee  ho  may  refer  to  them  merely  in  round  numbers.  Ια  the  words 
thht  follow,  Arnold  agrocs  with  Goller  that  either  ίχοντα  or  ττροστάξανπζ 
U  suporfluouS ;  but  βοβ  hoto  on  c.  16.  3. 


114  THUOYDIDES.  ΠΙ.  [xxviu^  xxix. 

come  to  terms  with  the  Athenians,  by  the  following  circum- 
stances. Since  even  Salsethus  himself  no  longer  expected  the 
arrival  of  the  fleet,  he  equipped  as  heavy-armed  soldiers  the 
commons  who  had  before  been  oi»ly  light-armed,  with  α  view 
to  sallying  out  against  the  Athenians;  but  as  soon  as  they 
were  iu  possession  of  arms,  they  no  longer  obeyed  their  com- 
manders, but  collecting  in  groups,  ordered  those  in  power  to 
bring  the  provision-stores  into  public  view,  and  divide  them 
among  all;  or  they  would  themselves  make  terms  with  the 
Athenians,  and  deliver  up  the  city» 

28.  The  members  of  the  government,  knowing  thi^t  they 
would  not  b(5  able  to  prevent  them,  and  tliat  they  >vould  them- 
selves bo  exposed  to  danger  if  excluded  from  the  arrangement, 
made  a  general  agreement  with  Paches  and  the  anny,  that  tho 
Athenians  should  bo  at  liberty  to  adopt  what  measures  they 
chose  respecting  tho  Mytilenaians ;  that  they  should  receive  tho 
anny  into  the  city,  and  send  embassadors  to  Athens  to  plead 
their  causi?;  and  that  until  they  returned,  Paches  should 
neither  throw  into  prison,  nor  reduce  to  slavery,  ncr  put  to 
death,  any  of  tho  Mytilenieans.  This  was  the  natir.e  of  tho 
agreement:  but  those  of  the  inhabitants  who  liad  been  most 
prominent  in  negotiating  with  the  Laeeduiinonians,  Avere  very 
much  alarmed  when  tho  army  entered  tho  city,  and  could  not 
restrain  themselves,  but  went  and  seated  themselves  by  tho 
altars,  notwithstanding  [the  assurances  that  had  been  given], 
l*aches,  however,  raised  them  up  with  a  promise  to  do  them 
no  luimi,  and  deposited  them  in  Tenedos  until  iho  Athenians 
should  have  come  to  some  determination  about  them,  llo 
also  sent  some  triremes  to  Antissa,  and  won  tho  place  over; 
and  arranged  all  other  matters  concerning  tho  forces  as  ho 
pleased. 

29.  Now  the  Peloponnesians  on  board  the  forty  ships,  who 
ought  Avith  all  speed  to  have  joined  tho  Mytilenaians,  both 
hjst  time  in  cruising  about  the  Peloponneso  itself,  and  pro- 
ceeded at  their  leisure  during  tho  rest  of  tho  voyage,  unob- 
served by  tho  Athenians  at  home,  until  they  touched  at  Delos ; 
after  leaving  which  island  they  came  to  land  at  Icarus  and 
Myconus,  and  there  received  the  first  titlings  of  tho  capture  of 
Mytilene.  Wishing,  however,  to  know  tho  exact  truth  of  tho 
matter,  they  put  into  Embatum  in  the  Erythrapan  territory ; 
seven  days  having  elapsed  from  the  taking  of  Mytilene  when 


3xx.,xxxi.]  TnUOTDIDES.  ΠΙ.  ΐΤδ 

they  did  so.  After  liearinpj  tho  exact  truth,  they  consulted 
on  the  present  state  of  affairs ;  and  Teutiaplus,  an  Elcan,  ad- 
dressed them  as  follows : 

30.  "  Alcidas,  and  tlio  rest  of  my  Peloponnesian  colleagues 
in  the  oominaud  of  the  forces,  my  opinion  is  that  we  should 
sail  8traijQ:ht\vay '  to  Mytilenc,  before  we  have  been  heard  of. 
For  in  all  probability  wo  shall  find  great  want  of  watchful- 
ness, as  is  usual  on  the  part  of  men  who  have  but  recently 
taken  possession  of  a  city,  hy  sea,  indeed,  where  they  havo 
no  thought  of  any  enemy  attacking  them,  and  Λvhero  our 
strength  mainly  lies,  this  will  bo  altogether  the  case;  and 
even  their  land-forces  are  likely  to  l»o  dispersed  through  tho 
houses  too  carelessly.  If  then  we  were  to  fall  upon  them 
suddenly  and  in  tho  night,  I  Iiojk)  that  with  the  aid  of  those 
in  the  city  (if,  indeed,  there  be  any  one  left  who  wishes  us 
well),  possession  of  tho  place  might  bo  gained.'  And  let  us 
not  shrink  from  the  danger,  but  consider  that  tho  proverbial 
"surprises  of  war"  are  nothing  else  than  chances  such  as 
this ;  which  if  any  one  should  guard  against  in  l^is  own  case, 
and  avail  himscilf  of  them,  >vhen  ho  saw  them  ίη  t|ie  caso  oi 
his  enemy,  ho  would  bo  a  most  successful  general.'* 

31,  Such  was  his  speech  ;  but  ho  did  not  persuade  Alcidas. 
On  tho  other  hand,  some  of  tho  exiles  from  Ionia  and  tho 
Lesbians  who  were  on  board  with  them,  advised,  that  since  ho 
was  afraid  of  that  danger,  ho  should  seizo  one  of  the  Ionian 
cities,  or  Cyemc  in  yEolia ;  so  that  having  a  city  as  tho  base  of 
their  operations  they  might  excite  Ionia  to  revolt :  (and  there 
was  reason  to  hope  this,  for  their  arrival  Avas  unwelcome  to 
no  one.)  If  then  they  sliould  take  away  from  tho  Athenians 
this  their  ciiief  source  of  revenue,  and*  if  ift  tho  same  tirao 

'  Literally,  "just  as  wo  arc." 

•  Or  more  literally,  "our  mcastirca  might  bo  achieved." 
3  Tho  difficutties  in  tho  construction  of  this  passage  are  too  numerous 
to  bo  even  poparatcly  mentioned  hero.  What  I  have  given  Is,  I  think, 
tho  most  probablo  meaning  of  tho  original,  according  to  Arnold's  text ; 
n»  tho  position  of  tho  σ<ρίοι  seems  absolutely  to  require  that  it  should  \m 
tdkon  after  γίιηται,  and  nor  after  ίφορ^οϋηιν.  IJoUer  and  Bloomfleld 
reject  it  altogotlier  as  η  moro  gloss;  and  according  to  that  reading  tho 
ίφορμοΰιν  would,  of  course,  refer  to  tho  Athenians.  For  my  own  part, 
1  am  fur  from  certain  that  Ιφηρμώηιν,  the  reading  Which  is  found  in  all 
tho  manuscripts,  has  not  unnocpssarily  boon  altered ;  whether  η{>τηνς  or 
niroif  bo  tho  gtnuino  form  of  tho  pronoun  governed  by  It.  In  tho  form- 
er  caeo  it  would  mean,  "  if  they  should  bo  put  to  expense  by  txeiHng 


176  THuOTDIBEa.  in  [zzziL,  zzzm. 

tbey  should  themielvee  incur  the  expense  of  koepinfi;  a  fleet 
of  obeonation,  they  thought  they  should  prevail  on  Pisuthnee 
also  to  take  part  in  the  war  with  them,  lie  did  not,  however, 
accede  to  this  proposal  cither;  but  was  most  strongly  in- 
clined, since  he  had  come  too  late  for  Mytilene,  to  reach  tlie 
Peloponnese  again  as  quickly  as  possible. 

32.  Weighing  therefore  from  Embatum,  he  coasted  alonaf, 
and  having  touched  at  Myonnesus,  a  place  belonging  to  the 
Teians,  he  butchered  most  of  the. prisoners  he  had  taken  on 
his  passage.  On  his  coming  to  anchor  at  Ephesus  embassa- 
dors came  from  the  Samians  of  Ληοϊα,  and  told  him  that  he 
\vas  not  Hberating  Greece  in  the  right  way,  by  destroying 
men  who  were  neither  raising  their  ha/nds  against  him,  nor 
were  hostile  to  him,  but  allies  of  the  Athenians  through  neces- 
sity ;  and  if  ho  did  not  cease,  he  would  bring  few  of  his  enemies 
into  friendship  with  Iiim,  but  would  find  many  more  of  his 
friends  become  his  enemies.  Ho  was  convinced  [by  these 
arguments],  and  net  at  liberty  all  the  Chians  ho  had  still  in 
his  hands,  and  some  of  tlie  others.  [And  there  had  been  very 
many  taken  by  him '] ;  for  at  the  sight  of  his  ships  tho  men 
did  not  lly,  but  rather  came  to  them,  thinking  they  were  from 
Athens  ;  and  they  had  not  even  the  slightest  expectation,  that 
Avhile  the  Athenians  had  command  of  the  sea,  Peloponnesian 
iihi]>s  would  dare  to  en)ss  over  to  Ionia. 

33.  From  Ejdasus  Aleitlas  sailed  as  (piiekly  as  possible, 
and  took  to  llight.  For  while  still  lying  at  anehor  otf  Cla- 
ms, ho  had  been  seen  by  tho  Salaminian  aiul  tho  Paralus 
shi[)S  (which  happened  to  be  sailing  from  Athens),  and  fear- 
ing ])ursuit,  he  took  his  course  across  tho  open  sea,  intending 
to  make  no  land  voluntarily  but  the  reloponnese.  Now 
tidings  of  him  had  bein  sent  to  IV'hes  and  tho  Athenians 
from  the  Erythraian  country,  and  indeed  from  every  quarter; 
for  as  Ionia  had  no  fortified  towns,  the  alarm  was*  great  lest  tho 
Pelo|>onnesians  in  coasting  idong,  even  though  they  did  not 
intend  to  stav,  might  at  the  sumo  time  assault  and  plunder  tho 

th^m  to  hostilities,^^  i.  e.,  tlio  loniana,  understood  from  rz/v  Ίωνίαν\  in  tho 
latter,  "by  attacking  theiu."  For  thon;;h  tho  midille  voico  of  tho  verb  ia 
nioro  generally  used  in  that  sense,  1  can  not  think  it  inipossiblo  that 
Tliucydides  might  sonietinies  uso  tho  active  also;  as  Kuri])ides  docs, 
Uippol.  1270. 

J  Somo  such  clauso  as  this  aecms  necessary,  as  tho  following  paragraph 
is  intended  to  account  for  his  having  mado  so  many  prisoners 


ixxir.,  Σχχτ.]  THϋCTDIDE^  TIL  177 

cities.  And  now  the  Paralus  and  ealaminian,  having  seen 
him  at  Clams,  themselves  brought  intelligence  of  the  fact. 
Accordingly  ho  made  chase  with  all  speed,  and  contiptied  in 

{)ursuit  oi'  him  as  far  as  the  isle  of  Tatmos,  but  returned  Λvhen 
10  found  that  ho  was  not  within  distance  to  bo  overtaken. 
Ho  considered  it,  however,  a  lucky  thing,  as  he  did  not  fall  in 
with  them  out  at  sea,  that  they  had  not  been  overtaken  any 
where  near  shore,  and  obliged  to  form  an  encampment,  and 
BO  give  his  forces  the  trouble  of  watching  and  blockading  them. 

34.  As  he  coasted  along  on  his  return,  lie  touched,  among 
other  places,  at  Notium,  [the  port]  of  the  Colophonians,  whero 
they  had  settled  after  the  capture  of  the  upper  city  by  Itame- 
nes  and  the  barbarians,  who  had  been  called  in  by  individuals 
on  the  ground  of  a  factious  quarrel.  The  city  was  taken 
about  the  time  that  the  second  irruption  of  the  Peloponnesians 
into  Attica  took  place.  Those  then  who  had  fled  for  refuge  to 
Kotium,  and  settled  there,  liaving  again  split  into  factions,  ono 
party  introduced  and  kept  in  the  fortified  quarter  of  the  town 
an  auxiliary  force  of  Arcailians  and  barbarians  sent  by  Pi- 
suthncs ;  and  those  of  the  Coloplionians  in  the  upper  city  who 
formed  the  Aiedian  party,  %vcnt  in  vfhh  them  and  joined  their 
community;  while  those  who  had  retired  from  them,  and 
were  now  in  exile,  introduced  Paches.  lie  invited  Ilippias, 
the  commander  of  the  Arcadians  in  the  fortified  quarter,*  to  a 
parley,  on  condition  that  if  he  ])roposed  nothing  to  meet  his 
wishes,  he  should  restore  him  safe  and  sound  to  the  fortress; 
but  >vhen  he  went  out  to  Jiim,  he  kept  him  in  hold,  though 
not  in  bonds ;  and  having  assaulted  tho  place  on  a  sudden 
and  when  they  were  not  oxiKicting  it,  he  took  it,  and  put  to 
tho  sword  the  Arcadians  and  all  tho  rest  that  were  in  it. 
Having  afterward  taking  Hippias  into  it,  as  he  had  agreed 
to  do,  ho  seized  him  when  lie  was  inside,  and  shot  hira 
through.  He  then  gave  up  Notium  to  the  Colophonians,  ex- 
cepting the  Median  party;  and  tho  Athenians  subsequently 
sent  our  colonists,  and  settled  the  place  according  to  their  own 
laws ;  having  collected  all  tho  Colophonians,  wherever  there 
was  ono  in  any  of  tho  cities. 

35.  On  his  arrival  at  Mytilene,  Paches  reduced  Pyrrha  and 
Eresus,  and  having  seized  Saliethus  tho  Lacedaemonian  in  the 

•  Properly,  "  the  croea-wall,"  which  divided  on©  part  of  the  town  flrom 
thereat; 

8» 


178  THUOYDIDEa  IIL  [^xxtl,  xxxva 

city,  wbero  he  was  hiding,  he  dispatched  him  to  Athene,  and 
with  him  tlio  Mytilenieans  at  Tenedos,  whom  ho  had  depoeited 
there,  and  whomever  else  ho  tlioupjht  implicated  in  the  revolt. 
He  also  sent  back  the  greater  part  of  his  forces.  With  the 
remainder  ho  staid  there,  and  settled  the  atfairs  of  Mjtilene 
and  the  rest  of  Lesbos,  as  ho  thought  proper. 

30.  On  the  arrival  of  the  men  >vith  Sala;thus,  the  Athe- 
nians immediately  put  the  latter  to  death,  thouiyh  he  held  out 
certain  promises,  and  among  others,  that  he  would  obtain  the 
retreat  of  the  Peloponnesians  from  Tlataia  (for  it  was  still 
being  besieged)  :  but  respecting  the  former  they  deliberated 
what  to  do ;  and  in  their  anger  they  determined  to  put  to 
death,  not  only  these  that  were  there,  but  all  the  Mytilenaiaus 
also  that  wqto  of  age  ;  and  to  make  slaves  of  the  women  and 
children.  For  they  both  urged  against  them  [the  aggravated 
character  of]  their  revolt  in  other  respects,  namely,  that  they 
had  executed  it  Avithout  being  subject  to  their  dominion,  liko 
the  rest;  and  the  fact  of  the  Peloponnesian  ships  having 
dared  to  venture  over  to  Ionia  to  iissist  them,  contributed  also 
no  little  to  their  wrath ;  for  they  thought  it  was  with  no  short 
premeditation  that  they  had  revolted.  They  sent  therefore  a 
trireme  to  Pachea  \ήύ\  intelligence  of  their  resolution,  and 
commanded  him  to  dispatch  the  Mytilenaeans  as  quickly  as 
possible.  The  next  day  they  felt  inmiediately  a  degree  of  re- 
jMintanco,  and  reflected  that  the  resolution  they  had  passed 
was  a  cruel  and  sweeping  one,  to  ]>ut  a  whole  city  to  the 
sword,  instead  of  those  λυΙιο  were  guilty.  AVhen  the  Mytile* 
na;au  embassadora  λυΙιο  were  present,  and  those  of  the  Atho* 
nians  who  co-OfKirated  with  them,  perceived  this,  they  got  the 
authorities  to  put  the  question  again  to  the  vote ;  and  the 
more  easily  prevailed  on  them  to  do  it,  because  they  also  saw 
l)lainly  that  the  majority  of  the  citizens  wished  some  one  to 
give  them  another  opportunity  of  deliberating.  An  assembly 
therefore  being  immediately  summoned,  ditterent  opinions 
were  expressed  on  both  sides;  and  Cleon,  son  of  Cleajnetus, 
who  had  carried  the  former  resolution,  to  put  them  to  death, 
being  on  other  subjects  also  the  most  violent  of  the  citizens, 
and  by  far  the  most  influential  with  the  commons,  at  that  timo 
came  forward  again,  and  spoke  as  follows  : 

37.  "On  many  other  occasions  before  this  have  I  been  con- 
vinced that  a  democracy  is  incapable  of  maintaining  dominion 


xxxTiiL]  THUCYDIDBS.  III.  170 

over  others,  and  I  am  so  more  th.in  ever  from  your  present 
change  of  purpose  respectinnj  the  Mytilenoeans.  For  owini»  to 
your  daily  freedom  from  fear,  and  plotting  against  each  other, 
you  entertain  the  same  views  toward  your  allies  also.  And 
you  do  not  reflect,  in  whatever  case  you  may  either  havo 
inado  a  mistnko  through  being  persuaded  by  their  words,  or 
miy  havo  given  way  to  pity,  that  you  show  such  weakness  to 
your  own  peril,  and  at  the  same  time  to  gain  no  gratitude  from 
your  allies ;  not  considering  that  it  is  a  tyrannical  dominion 
whicii  you  hold,  and  over  men  who  are  plotting  against  you, 
and  involuntarily  subject  to  you ;  and  who  obey  you  not  from 
any  favors  you  confer  on  them  to  your  own  hurt,  but  from 
the  fact  of  your  being  superior  to  them  through  your  power, 
rather  than  their  good  feeling.  But  of  all  things  it  is  tho 
most  fearful,  if  nothing  of  what  we  Jiavo  resolved  is  to  bo 
steadfast;  and  if  wo  are  not  convinced  that  a  state  with  in- 
ferior laws  which  are  unchanged  is  better  than  one  with  good 
ones  which  are  not  authoritative;  that  homely  wit  with  moder- 
ation is  more  useful  than  cleverness  with  intemperance ;  and 
that  tho  duller  classof  men,  compared  with  the  more  tilented, 
generally  8j)eaking,  manage  public  affairs  better.  For  the  latter 
wish  to  appear  wiser  than  the  laws,  and  to  overrule  what  is  evei: 
spoken  for  the  public  good — thinking  that  they  could  not  show 
their  wisdom  in  more  important  matters — and  by  such  means 
they  generally  ruin  their  country.  But  the  former,  distrusting 
their  own  talent,  deign  to  be  less  learned  than  the  laws,  and 
less  able  than  to  find  fault  with  the  Λvords  of  one  who  has 
spoken  well ;  and  being  judges  on  fair  terms,  rather  than  rivals 
for  a  prize,  they  are  more  commonly  right  in  their  views.  So 
then  ought  wc  also  (o  do,  and  not  to  advise  your  people  con- 
trary to  our  real  opinion,  urged  on  by  cleverness  and  rivalry  of 
talent. 

38.  "I,  then,  continue  of  tho  same  opinion;  and  am  aston- 
ished at  those  who  iiavo  proposed  to  discuss  a  second  time  tho 
ciiso  of  tho  Mytilenoeans,  and  caused  in  it  a  delay  of  time, 
which  is  all  for  tho  advantage  of  tho  guilty  (for  so  the  sufferer 
proceeds  against  tho  offender  with  his  anger  less  keen ;  whereas 
when  retribution  treads  most  closely  on  tho  heels  of  suffering, 
It  best  matches  it  in  wreaking  vengeance).  I  wonder,  too, 
who  will  bo  tho  man  to  maintain  the  opposite  opinion,  and  to 
pretend  to  show  that  tho  injuries  dono  by.  tho  Mytilenaians 


180  THUOYDIDKS.  IIL  [zzziz. 

are  beneficial  to  us,  and  that  our  misfortunes  are  losses  to  our 
allies.  It  is  evident  that  cither  trusting  to  his  eloquence  he 
would  strive  to  prove,  in  opposition  to  us,  that  what  we  oon- 
sider  most  certain  has  not  been  ascertained ;  or,  urged  on  by 
the  hope  of  gain,  will  endeavor  to  lead  us  away  by  an  elab• 
orate  display  of  specious  language.  But  in  such  contests  as 
these  the  state  gives  the  prizes  to  others,  and  takes  only  the 
dangers  itself.  And  it  is  you  who  are  to  blame  for  it,  through 
unwisely  instituting  those  contests ;  inasmuch  as  you  are  ac- 
customed to  attend  to  speeches  like  spectators  [in  a  theater], 
and  to  facts  like  mere  listeners  [to  what  others  tell  youj; 
with  regard  to  things  future,  judging  of  their  possibiUty  from 
those  who  have  8j>oken  cleverly  about  them ;  and  with  regard 
to  things  >vhich  have  already  occurred,  not  taking  what  has 
been  done  as  more  credible  from  your  having  seen  it,  than  what 
has  been  only  heard  from  those  wlio  in  words  have  delivered 
a  clever  invective.  And  so  you  are  the  best  men  to  be  im- 
posed on  with  novelty  of  arguuieiit,  and  to  be  uuwilling  to  fob 
low  up  what  has  been  apj)roved  by  you  ;  being  slaves  to  every 
new  paradox,  and  despisers  of  what  is  ordinary'.  Each  of  you 
wishes,  above  all,  to  bo  able  to  H|K*ak  himself;  but  if  that  is 
not  possible,  in  rivalry  of  those  who  so  sfK^ak,  you  strive  not 
to  appear  to  have  fallowed  his  senliments  at  second-hand  ;  but 
when  he  has  said  any  thing  cleverly,  you  would  fain  appear  to 
have  anticipated  its  exprei^sion  by  your  applause,  and  are  eager 
to  catch  beforehand  what  is  sjiid,  and  at  the  same  time  slow 
to  foresee  the  consequences  of  it.  Thus  you  look,  so  to  speak, 
for  something  difterent  from  the  circumstances  in  which  we  are 
actually  living ;  while  you  have  not  a  suiiieient  understimding 
of  even  that  which  is  before  you.  In  a  word,  you  are  over- 
powered by  the  pleasures  of  the  ear,  and  are  like  men  sitting 
to  be  amused'  by  rhetoricians  rather  than  deliberating  upon 
state  affairs. 

39.  "  Wishing  then  to  call  you  off  from  this  course,  I  declare 
{()  you  that  the  Mytilenicans  have  injured  you  more  than  &\\y 
one  state  ever  did.  For  I  can  make  allowance  for  men  who 
have  revolted  because  they  couKl  not  endure  your  government, 
or  Iwicause  they  were  comj)ell('d  by  their  enemies.  But  for 
(hose  who  inhabited  an  island  with  fortifications,  and  had  only 
to  fear  our  enemies  by  sea,  on  which  element,  too,  they  were 
>  Lilonilly,  "  as  Bpeetators"  of  them. 


XXI12.J  THUCYDIDES.  III.  161 

themselves  not  unprotected  against  them  by  λ  fleet  of  triremes, 
nnd  who  lived  independent^  and  were  honored  in  tho  highest 
degree  by  us,  and  then  treated  us  in  this  way ;  what  else  did 
those  men  do  than  deliberately  devise  our  ruin,  and  rise  up 
against  us,  rather  than  revolt  from  us  (revolt,  at  least,  is  tho 
part  of  those  who  arc  subject  to  somo  violent  treatment),  and 
seek  to  ruin  us  by  siding  Λvith  our  bitterest  enemies?  Yet 
surely  that  is  more  intolerable  than  if  they  waged  war  against 
you  by  themselves  for  the  acquisition  of  power.  Again,  nei- 
ther were  tho  calamities  of  their  neighbors,  who  had  already 
revolted  from  us  and  been  subdued,  a  warning  to  them ;  nor 
did  tho  good  fortune  they  enjoyed  mako  them  loathe  to  como 
into  trouble;  but  being  over-confident  with  regard  to  tho 
future,  and  having  formed  liopes  beyond  their  power,  though 
less  tlian  their  desire,  they  declared  war,  luwng  determined 
to  prefer  might  to  right ;  for  at  a  time  when  they  thought 
they  should  overcome  us,  they  attacked  us,  though  they  were 
not  being  Λvronged.  l>ut  success  is  >vont  to  mako  those  states 
insolent  to  >vhich  it  conies  most  unexpected  and  with  tho 
shortest  notice ;  whereas  the  good  fortune  Avhich  is  according 
to  men's  calculation  is  genemlly  more  steady  than  when  it 
comes  beyond  their  expeetation ;  and,  so  to  say,  they  more 
easily  drive  off  adversity  than  they  preserve  prosperity.  Tho 
Mytilen?eans,  then,  ought  all  along  to  have  been  honored  by 
us  on  the  same  footing  as  the  rest,  and  in  that  case  they  wouhl 
not  have  come  to  such  a  j)itch  of  insolence  ;  for  in  other  in- 
stances, as  \sq\\  as  theirs,  man  is  naturally  inclineil  to  despise 
those  who  court  him,  and  to  respect  those  who  do  not  stoop  to 
him.  But  let  them  even  now  be  punished  as  their  crime  de- 
serves ;  aii<l  let  not  the  guilt  attach  to  the  aristocracy,  while  you 
acquit  the  commons.  For  at  any  rate  they  all  alike  attacked  . 
you ;  since  they  might  liave  como  over  to  us,  and  bo  have 
been  now  in  possession  of  their  city  again.  Thinking,  how- 
ever, tho  chance  they  ran  with  the  aristocracy  to  be  the  safer, 
thev  joined  them  in  revolting.  And  nojnr  consider ;  if  you  at- 
tacli  tho  siime  penalties  to  those  of  the  allies  who  were  com* 
lulled  by  their  enemies  to  revolt,  and  to  those  who  did  il 
voluntarily,  Λvhich  of  them,  think  you,  will  not  revolt  on  any 
slight  pretext,  wh«n  he  either  gains  his  liberation,  if  ho  suc- 
ceed, or  incurs  no  extreme  suffering,  if  ho  fail  I  And  so  we 
shall  presently  have  to  risk  both  our  roonoy  nnd  otir^lives 


182  THUCYDIDES.  Ul  [xL. 

againfit  each  separate  state.  And  if  we  are  euocessful,  by  taking 
possession  of  a  ruined  city,  you  will  hereafter  be  deprived  of 
ail  future  revenue  from  it — in  whicli  our  strength  consists; 
while  if  wo  fail,  λυο  shall  have  fresh  enemies  in  addition  to 
those  we  have  already ;  and  during  the  time  that  we  ought  to 
be  opposing  our  present  foes,  wo  shall  be  engaged  in  hostilities 
with  our  own  allies. 

40.  "  You  ought  not  therefore  to  hold  out  any  hope,  either 
relying  on  oratory  or  purchased  with  money,  of  their  receiving 
allowance  for   having  erred   through  human   infirmity.     For 
they  did   not   involuntarily  Imrt   you,   but   wittingly  plotted 
against  you  ;  and  it  is  only  what  is  involuntary  that  can  claim 
allowance.     I,  then,  both  on  that   first  occasion  [so  advised 
you],  and   now  contend   that  you   should   not   rescind  your 
former  resolutions,  nor  err  through  three  things,  the  most  in- 
expedient for  empire,  namely,   pity,  delight    in   oratory,  and 
lenity.     For  pity  is  properly  ielt  toward  those  of  a  kindred 
temper,   and   not   toward    those    who  will   not  feel  it  in  re- 
turn, but   are   of  necessity   our  enemies   forever.      And  the 
orators  who  delight  us  with  their  language  will  have  a  field 
in  other  subjects  of  less  importance,  instead  of  one  in  which 
the  state,  after  being  a  little  jilcased,  will  ])ay  a  great  peniilty  ; 
while  they  themselves  I'rom  their  good  speaking  will  receive 
good    treatment   in   return.      And    lenity  is  shown   to   those 
who  will  be  well-disposed  in  future,  rather  than  to  those  who 
remain  just  >vhat  they  were,  and  not  at  all  less  hostile.     To 
sum  up  in  one  Avord,  if  you  are  persuaded  by  me,  you  will  do 
Avhat  is  just  toward  the  Mytilenieans,  and  at  the  same  time 
expedient ;  but  if  you  deeide  otherwise,  you  will  not  oblige 
theniy  but  will  rather  pass  sentence  upon  yourselves.     For  if 
they  were  right  in  revolting,  yuu  can  not  properly  maintain 
your  empire.      If,  however,   you   iletermino   to   do   so,   even 
though  it  is  not  proper,  you  must  also,  overlooking  what  is 
right,  punish   these  men  i'rom   regard  to  expediency,  or   else 
give  up  your  empire,  and  act  the  honest  man  without  danger. 
Uesolve,  then,  to  reouito  them  >vith  the  same  p<naity ;  and 
not  to  show  yourselves,  in  escaj)iiig  their   design,  more  in- 
sensible than  thoso  who  formed  them  against  you  ;  considering 
what  they  would  probably  have  done,  if  tliey  had  prevaile<l 
over   you ;    especially   as   they  were    the    first   to   begin    tho 
wrong.      For  it  is  thoso  who  do  ill  to  any  one  without  reason, 


XLL,XLii.]  THUCTDIDEa  III.  183 

that  pereccuto  him  most  bitterly,  nay,  even  to  the  death,• 
from  suspicion  of  the  danger  of  their  enemy's  being  spared ; 
since  He  who  has  suflbred  evil  without  <'iny  necessity,  [but  by 
provoking  it  himself],  is  more  bitter,  if  lie  escape,  than  ono 
who  was  an  enemy  on  equal  torms.  ^^Q  not  therefore  traitors 
to  your  own  cause ;  but  bringing  yourselves  in  feeling  as 
near  as  possible  to  the  actual  state  of  suflering,  and  reflecting 
how  you  would  in  that  case  have  valued  their  subjection 
above  every  thing,  now  pay  them  back  in  return,  not  indulg- 
ing in  >veakness  at  the  present  moment,  nor  forgetting  the 
danger  which  once  hung  over  you.  Punish  these  men,  I  say, 
as  they  deserve ;  and  give  a  striking  example  to  the  rest  of 
your  allies,  that  w  hoever  revolts  will  pay  the  penalty  for  it  witli 
his  life.  For  if  they  know  this,  you  Λνϋΐ  less  frequently  have 
to  neglect  your  enemies,  while  you  are  fighting  with  your  own 
confederates." 

41.  To  this  effect  spoke  Cleon.  After  him  Diodotus  son  of 
Eucrates,  who  in  the  former  assembly  spoke  most  strongly  against 
putting  the  Mytilenjcans  to  death,  came  forward  then  also,  and 
said  as  follows. 

42.  *'I  neither  blame  those  who  have  a  second  time  pro- 
posed the  discussion  of  the  case  of  the  Mytilena»ans,  nor  com- 
mend those  who  object  to  repeated  deliberation  on  the  most 
important  subjects;  but  I  think  that  the  two  things  most 
oppostMl  to  giK)d  counsel  are  ha-^te  and  passion,  ono  of  which 
is  generally  the  companion  of  folly,  and  the  other  of  coarse- 
ness and  narrowness  of  mind.  And  whoever  contends  that 
words  are  not  to  bo  the  exponents  of  measures,  is  either 
wanting  in  understanding,  or  self-interested :  wanting  in  un- 
derstanding, if  he  thinks  it  possible  to  express  himself  in  any 
other  way  on  what  is  future  and  not  certain ;  self-interesteil, 
if,  when  wishing  to  persuade  to  something  base,  he  thinks 
that  ho  could  not  s|M}ak  to  liis  credit  on  a  discreditable  sub- 
ject, but  that  by  clever  calumniation  lie  might  confound  both 
his  opponents  and  audience.  But  most  cruel  of  all  are  thoso 
w^ho  charge  us  besides  with  a  display  [of  rhetoric]  for  pecu- 
niar/ motives.  For  if  they  only  unputed  ignorance,  he  who  . 
failed  in  carrying  his  point  would  retire  with  a  character  for 
want  of  understanding,  rather  than  of  honesty :  but  when  a 

*  OoUer  and  Poppo  follow  nermann  in  taking  υπόλλννται  paesiTcly, 
'•  they  arc  killed  by  living  Irt  suspicion  of  danger,"  etc. 


184  THUOTDIDEa  TIL  [xtiiL 

charge  of  dishonesty  is  brought  against  him,  if  euccessfnl,  he 
is  suspect^ ;  and  if  unsuccessful,  together  >¥ith  his  inability, 
he  is  also  thought  dishonest.  And  the  state  is  not  beiieuted 
by  such  a  system  ;  for  through  fear  it  is  deprived  of  its  coun- 
selors. Most  prosperous  indeed  \sOuld  it  ne,  if  such  of  its 
citizens  were  incapable  of  speaking ;  for  then  they  would  be 
less  often  persuaded  to  do  >vrong.  But  the  good  citizen  ought 
to  show  himself  the  better  speaker  not  by  terrifying  his  op- 
ponent, but  by  meeting  him  on  equal  terms ;  and  the  state 
that  acts  wisely  should  not,  indeed,  confer  lionor  on  the  man  wlio 
most  frequently  gives  good  advice,  but  neither  should  it  detract 
from  what  he  enjoys  already ;  and  ^o  far  from  punishing  him 
who  is  wrong  in  his  judgment,  it  should  not  even  degrade  him. 
For  so  the  successful  counselor  would  be  least  tempted  to  speak 
any  thing  contrary  to  his  real  opinion,  in  order  to  gratify  liis 
hearers ;  and  the  unsuccessful  one  Avould  be  least  anxious,  by 
the  same  means  of  gratification,  to  bring  over  the  multitude  to 
his  side  also. 

43.  "  But  we  do  the  contrary  of  this ;  and  moreover,  if  any 
one  be  6us|K*(;ted  of  8j)e{iking  with  a  view  to  his  own  advan- 
tage, though  at  the  same  time  what  is  best,  through  grudging 
him  the  gain  of  which  we  have  but  an  uncertain  idea,  Λνβ  de- 
prive the  stiite  of  its  certain  benefit.  And  thus  good  advice, 
given  in  a  straightforward  manner,  has  come  to  bo  no  less 
suspected  than  ba<.l ;  so  that  it  is  equally  necessary  for  one  who 
wishes  to  carry  the  most  dreadful  measures  to  win  over  the 
multitude  by  trickery,  and  for  one  who  speaks  on  the  better 
side  to  gain  credit  by  falsehood.  And  the  sUite  alone  it  is 
impossible,  owing  to  these  over-wise  notions,  to  serve  in  an 
open  manner  and  >vithout  deceiving  it ;  for  he  who  openly 
confei-s  any  good  upon  it  is  sus|)ected  of  getting  secretly,  in 
some  way  or  other,  an  advantage  in  return.  ΝοΛν  on  subjecta 
of  the  greatest  inqK)rtan(e,  and  with  such  an  estimate  of  our 
conduct,  Λνο  [orators]  ought  to  speak  with  more  extensive 
forethought  than  you  who  take  but  an  oil-hand  vieΛV  of  meas- 
ures ;  especially  as  wo  are  responsible  for  the  advice  wo 
give,  Avhereas  you  are  irre§j)onsiblo  for  listening  to  it.'  For 
if  ho  who  offered  counsel,  and  he  who  followed  it,  suflfered 
alike,  you  would  judge  more  prudently.     But  as  it  is,  through 

•  Literally,  "have  our  advising  responsible,  in  opposition  to  (or  com- 
pared with)  your  irresponsiblu  listening." 


XLiv.,XLT.]  TnUCTDIDEa  ΠΙ.  185 

whatever  passion  you  may  at  nny  time  have  met  with  dish 
asters,  you  punish  the  single  judgment  of  the  man  wlio  per- 
suaded you,  and  not  your  own,  for  liaving  so  numerously 
joined  in  the  blunder. 

44.  "I  came  forward,  however,  neither  to  speak  against 
any  one  in  defense  of  the  Mytilenaeans,  nor  to  accuse  any  one. 
For  the  question  we  have  to  decide  is  not,  if  we  take  a  wise 
view  of  it,  respecting  their  guilt,  but  respecting  our  taking 
good  counsel.  For  though  I  should  prove  them  to  be  utterly 
guilty,  I  will  not  for  that  reason  also  bid  you  to  put  them  to 
death,  unless  it  were  expedient:  and  though  they  might  claim 
some  allowance  [I  would  not  bid  you  make  it],  unless  it 
should  appear  good  for  the  state.  But  lam  of  opinion  that 
we  are  deliberating  for  the  future,  rather  than  the  present; 
and  as  to  what  Cleon  most  positively  asserts,  that  it  will  bo 
mlvantageous  to  us  in  future,  with  a  view  to  less  frequent  re- 
volts, if  we  hold  out  death  as  the  penalty ;  I  too  as  positively 
contradict  him,  ν,Ίύι  regard  to  what  is  good  for  the  future,  and 
maintain  the  opposite  opinion.  And  I  beg  you  not  to  reject 
the  utility  of  my  advice  for  the  plausibility  of  his.     For  his 


words  might  perhaps  attract  you,  through  being  more  just  with 
regard  to  your  present  displeasure  against  the  Mytilenrcans : 
but  wo  are  not  holding  a  judicial  inquiry  in  their  case,  that 
we  should  want  what  is  just;  but  are  deliberating  respecting 
them,  how  they  may  be  of  service  to  us. 

45.  "Now  the  penalty  of  death  has  been  enacted  in  states 
for  many  oflenscs,  and  those  not  equal  to  this,  but  less 
heinous ;  and  yet,  urged  on  by  hope,  men  venture  to  commit 
them;  and  no  one  ever  yet  came  into  danger  with  a  convic- 
tion of  his  own  mind  that  ho  would  not  succeed  in  his  attempt.' 
What  city,  too,  when  bent  on  revolt,  ever  attempted  it  with 
deficient  resources — according  to  its  own  idea — eitner  internal, 
or  by  means  of  alliance  witli  others  ?  Indeed  all  men,  both 
in  a  pnvato  and  public  capacity,  are  naturally  disposed  to  do 
wrong,  and  there  is  no  law  that  will  keep  them  from  it;  at 
least  men  liavo  gone  through  all  kinds  of  punishments  in  their 
enactments,  to  try  if  by  any  means  they  might  bo  less  injured 
by  evil-doers,  and  it  is  probable  that  m  early  times  the  pun- 
ishments for  the  greatest  offenses  wero  more  lenient ;  but  as 
they  arc  disregarded,  they  generally,  in  the  course  of  time,  ex- 
*  Lltori^lly,  "having  passed  sentence  upon  himself." 


186  THUOYDIDES.  III.  [xitl 

tend  to  death ;  and  Btill  even  this  is  disregarded.  £^tber, 
tlien,  some  fear  more  dreadful  than  thie  must  be  discovered^ 
or  this,  at  any  rate,  does  not  restrain  men  :  but  poverty  inspir- 
ing boldness  through  necessity,  and  hirger  means  inspiring 
ambition  through  insolence  and  pride,  and  the  other  conditions 
of  life  through  some  human  passion  or  other,  according  as 
they  are  severally  enslaved  by  some  fatal  and  overpowering 
one,  lead  men  on  to  dangers.  Moreover,  hope  and  desire  for 
every  thing,  the  one  taking  the  lead,  and  the  other  following ; 
and  the  one  devising  the  attempt,  while  the  other  suggest:* . 
the  facility  of  succeeding  in  it;  cause  the  most  numerous 
disasters ;  and  though  unseen,  they  are  more  intluential  than 
the  dangers  that  are  seen.  Fortune,  too,  aids  theni  no  less 
in  urging  men  on;  for  by  sometimes  siding  with  them  unex- 
pectedly, she  induces  them  to  run  the  risk  evtn  with  inferior 
means ;  especially  in  the  case  of  states,  inasnnieh  as  the  venture 
is  for  the  greatest  objects,  namely,  freedom,  or  empire  ovi-r 
others ;  and  as  each  individual,  when  acting  in  concert  with 
all,  unreasonably  carries  his  ideas  to  an  extravagant  length 
concerning  them.  In  short,  it  is  iuij)ossil)le  [to  remedy  the  evilj, 
and  the  man  is  very  simple  who  thinks,  that  Λvhen  human  na- 
ture is  eagerly  set  on  doing  a  thing,  he  has  any  means  of  divert- 
ing it,  either  by  the  rigor  of  laws,  or  any  other  kind  of  terror. 
46.  "  AVe  nmst  not,  then,  either  take  bad  counsel  through 
trusting  to  the  punishment  of  death  as  a  thing  to  be  relied 
on,  or  leave  to  those  who  have  revolted  no  hoj>e  of  Inung  al- 
lowed to  change  their  mjnds,  and  wijkc  out  their  olVense  in  i;s 
short  a  time  as  j>ossible.  For  consider  that  at  j)resent,  if  any 
city,  even  after  rovolting,  iind  that  it  will  not  succeed,  it. 
would  come  to  terms  while  it  has  still  means  of  refunding  the 
expenses,  and  of  paying  tribute  in  future.  But  in  the  other 
case,  Λvhieh  of  them,  think  you,  would  iK)t  make  l>etter  prep 
arations  for  the  attempt  than  they  do  now,  and  hold  out 
against  its  besiegers  to  the  utmost,  if  it  is  all  one  whether  it 
surrender  slowly  or  (juickly  ?  And  how  can  it  fail  to  be  in- 
jurious for  us  to  be  put  to  exj)ense  by  sitting  <h)wn  before  it, 
because  it  will  not  smreiuler ;  and  if  we  take  the  city,  to  re- 
cover it  in  a  ruined  condition,  and  be  deprived  of  the  revenue 
from  it  in  future  ?  For  our  strength  against  the  enemy  lies 
in  this.  So  then  we  myst  not  hurt  ourselves,  by  being  strict 
judges  of  the  otlenders,  but  rather  see  how,  by  punishing  them 


XLVi!.,  XLViii.]  TllOVYDlOEB.  ΙΠ.  187 

inodcratoly,  wc  may  bo  al)lo  in  futnro  to  avail  ourselves  of  the 
cities  with  unimpaired  means  on  the  score  of  money ;  and  we 
must  resolve  to  derive  our  protection,  not  from  severity  of  laws, 
but  from  attention  to  deeds.  The  very  contrary  of  which  wo 
do  at  present;  and  if  wo  have  subdued  any  power  tliat  wnH 
[once]  free,  and,  when  Imi-shly  governed,  naturally  revolted 
lor  its  indej)endenoe,  we  fancy  that  wc  are  bound  to  avenge 
ourselves  mu\  severity,  liut  in  dealing  with  freemen,  we  must 
not  punish  them  rigorously  when  they  revolt,  but  watch  them 
rigorously  before  they  revolt,  and  prevent  their  even  coming 
to  the  thought  of  it :  and  when  we  have  got  the  mastery  o? 
them,  wo  should  attach  the  guilt  to  as  few  as  possible. 

47.  "  Now  consider  what  an  error  you  would  cnmmit  in 
this  also,  if  persuaded  by  Cleon.  For  at  present  tlie  commons 
in  all  the  states  are  Avell  diisposed  toward  you,  and  eitlier  do 
not  revolt  with  the  aristocratical  party,  or  if  compelled  to  do 
so,  are  straiirhtway  hostile  to  tho^e  who  made  them  ;  and  you 
liavo  the  ma«5s  of  the  city  opposed  to  you  on  your  side,  when 
you  proceed  to  war.  lUit  if  you  butcher  the  commons  of  My- 
tilenc,  ΛνΙιο  took  no  part  in  the  revolt,  and  when  they  had  goL 
possession  of  arms,  voluntarily  gave  up  the  city ;  in  the  first 
])laco  you  >vill  act  unjustly  by  slaying  your  benefactors ;  and  in 
the  next  you  will  ])roduce  for  the  liighor  classes  of  men  a  re- 
sult which  they  most  desire ;  for  when  they  lead  their  cities  to 
revolt,  they  will  immediately  have  tlio  commons  on  their  side, 
because  you  had  ρΙιοΛνη  them  Wforehand  that  the  same  penalty 
is  apjwinted  for  those  who  are  guilty  and  those  who  are  not. 
On  the  contrary,  even  if  ihoy- were  guilty,  you  ought  to  ])retcnd 
not  to  notice  it ;  that  the  only  class  still  allied  Λvith  us  may  not 
become  hostile  to  us.  And  this  I  consider  far  moro  beneficial 
toward  retaining  our  empire — that  wo  should  voluntarily  Ikj 
treated  with  injustice — than  that  with  justice  we  should  put 
to  the  sword  those  whom  Λνο  ought  not.  And  so  the  identity 
of  the  justice  and  expediency  of  the  punishment,  which  Cicou 
asserts,  is  found  impossible  to  exist  therein. 

48.  "  Being  convinced  then  that  this  is  the  l)ctter  course, 
and  not  allowing  too  much  weight  either  to  pity  or  to  lenity 
(for  neither  do/  [nny  moro  than  Cleon],  wish  you  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  these),  but  judging  from  the  advice  itself  which  is 
civen  you,  be  persuaded  by  mo  to  try  calmly  those  of  !ho 
Afytilcnsans  whom  Pishes  sent  off  as  guilty,  and  to  allow  the 


188  THUOYDIDEa  lit  [xlix.,1% 

rest  to  live  where  they  are.  For  this  is  both  profitable  for  the 
future,  aad  terrible  to  your  enemies  at  the  present  moment ; 
since  whoever  takes  good  advice  against  his  adversaries  is 
stronger  than  one  who  recklessly  proceeds  against  them  with 
violence  of  action." 

49.  To  this  effect  spoke  Diodotus.  These  being  the  views 
that  were  expressed  in  most  direct  opposition  to  one  another, 
the  Athenians,  notwithstanding  [their  wish  to  reconsider  the 
question],  came  to  a  conflict  of  opinion  respecting  them,  and 
were  nearly  matched  in  the  voting,  though  that  of  Diodotus 
prevailed.  And  they  immediately  dispatched  another  trireme 
with  all  speed,  that  they  might  not  find  the  city  destroyed 
through  the  previous  arrival  of  the  first ;'  Λvhich  had  the  start 
by  a  day  and  a  night.  The  Mytilena?an  embassadors  having 
provided  for  the  vessel  wine  and  bailey- cakes,  and  promising 
great  rewards  if  they  should  arrive  first,  there  was  such  hasto 
in  their  course,  that  at  the  same  time  as  they  rowed  they  ato 
cakes  kneaded  with  oil  and  wine ;  and  some  slept  in  turnn, 
while  others  rowed.  And  as  there  haj)pened  to  bo  no  wind 
agamst  them,  and  the  former  vessel  did  not  sail  in  any  haste 
ou  so  horrible*  a  business,  while  this  hurried  on  in  the  man- 
ner described ;  though  the  other  arrived  so  much  first  that 
Paches  had  read  the  decree,  and  was  on  the  point  of  executing 
the  sentence,  the  second  came  to  land  after  it,  and  j)reventAHl 
the  butchery.     Into  such  imminent  |)eril  did  Mytilene  come. 

50.  The  \)ther  party,  whom  Paches  luul  sent  olf  as  the  chief 
authors  of  the  revolt,  the  Athenians  put  to  death,  according 
to  the  .advice  of  Cleon,  amounting  to  rather  more  than  one 
thousand.  They  also  dismantled  the  walls  of  the  Mytilenaians, 
and  seized  their  ships.  After  this,  they  did  not  impose  any 
tribute  on  the  I^esbian^,  but  haNnng  divided  the  land,  except- 
ing that  of  the  Metliymnuians,  into  three  thousand  portions, 

'  Thi  common  readinj?  ό^ντίμας  is  abandoned  by  all  tho  best  editors; 
an  1  thorefore  it  is  not  without  great  diflideuco  that  I  confess  my  inabihty 
to  unJerstand  whyr  it  need  bo  so.  Tho  ecnso  of  tho  passages  would  bo 
equally  fj^ood  if  it  were  translated,  "that  by  tho  previous  arrival  of  tho 
second,  they  might  avoid  findinii  tho  city  rumed:"  and  I  can  not  but 
think  such  a  method  borno  out  by  many  other  passage  of  our  author; 
€.  g.,  II  3.  3,  Ζννίλέ^ονΓϋ-^ΰπως  μή  ^^tά  ruv  όόωί'  ({ιηνεμυΐ  ώσιν  ίόντις. 
And  again  in  tho  next  section,  Έχώμουν  U  τώι>  oUluv  in'  αϊτούς,  όπως 
μη  κατ)  0(.ι<•  βαρπαλίωτίροΐζ  οισι  ni)oa(pifiui>T<u,  «.  τ,  λ, 

*  Literally,  ''monstrous." 


Ll.,ui.]  TnUCYDIDES.  HL      .  189 

ihey  set  apart  three  hundred  of  them  as  consecrated  to  tho 
trods,  and  to  tho  rest  sent  out  as  sliarcholders  those  of  their 
own  citizens  to  whoso  lot  they  had  fallen ;  with  whom  tho 
Lesbians  havinjor  aijreed  to  pay  in  money  two  niinjc  a  year  for 
eacli  portion,  farmed  tho  land  themselves.  Tho  Athenians 
niso  took  possession  of  tho  towns  on  the  continent  of  Λvhich  tho 
Mytilenieans  were  masters,  and  they  Avero  afterward  subject  to 
Athens.     Such  then  was  tho  issue  of  aflairs  as  regarded  Lesbos. 

51.  In  tho  coarse  of  tho  same  summer,  after  tho  reduction 
of  Lesl)os,  tho  Athenians  made  an  expedition  under  the  com- 
mand of  Nicias,  son  of  Nieeratus,  against  tho  island  of  Minoa, 
wliich  lies  off  Meixara,  and  Λvhich  the  Megareans  used  as  a 
fortress,  having  built  a  tower  on  it.  From  this  spot,  being 
more  dose  at  hand,  Nicias  wished  tho  Athenians  to  keep 
their  guard  [over  Nisncal,  instead  of  from  l^udorum  and 
Salamis,  and  to  prevent  the  Peloponnesians  from  sailing  out 
thenco  unobserved,  as  was  formerly  tho  case,  with  trireniies 
and  privateers;  and  at  tho  samo  time  to  see  that  nothing 
was  imported  by  tho  Megareans.  Having  therefore  in  tho 
first  instance  taken  by  engines  from  tho  sea  two  towers  Avhicli 
projected  on  tho  side  of  Nisoia,  and  having  cleared  the  en- 
trance to  the  strait'  between  tho  island  [and  tho  continent], 
ho  proceeded  to  cut  off  all  communication  on  tho  side  of  tho 
mainland  also,  where  there  was  a  passage  by  a  bridge  over  a 
morass  for  succoring  tho  island,  which  lay  not  far  oil'  from  tho 
continent  This  having  been  accomplished  by  them  in  a  few 
days,  ho  afterwards  left  works  on  tho  island  also,  with  a  gar- 
rison, and  retired  with  his  forces. 

62.  It  was  also  about  tho  samo  period  of  this  summer  that 
the  riata;ans,  having  no  longer  any  provisions,  and  being  unable 
to  endure  tho  blockade,  surrendered  to  tho  Peloponnesians  in 
the  following  manner.  Tho  enemy  assaulted  their  wall  and 
they  wcro  incapable  of  defending  it  So  when  tho  Laceda;- 
monian  commander  was  awaro  of  their  powerless  condition,  he 
did  not  wish  to  take  it  by  storm  (for  such  were  his  instruc- 
tions from  Laccdaimon,  in  order  that  if  a  treaty  should  ever  bo 
made  with  tho  Athenians,  and  they  should  agree  to  restore  such 

'  Gollor  translates  this  expression  by  "  viam  in  portum  apeniit :"  but 
ihe  strict  meaning  of  tho  μιταξυ  must  bo,  I  think,  that  which  I  havo 
given  to  it,  and  which  it  has,  IV.  25.  1,  Έν  τοντφ  ούν  τφ  μεταξύ  οΐ 
i.vpQKOetoif  κ.  τ.  λ» 


190  ,     THUOYDIDES.  III.  [ua 

places  as  they  had  respectively  taken  in  the  war,  Plat^ea  might 
not  be  given  up,  on  the  strength  of  its  inhabitants  having  vol- 
untarily gone  over  to  them),  but  he  sent  to  lliem  a  herald 
with  Uiis  question,  "  Were  they  disposed  voluntarily  to  sur- 
render their  city  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  submit  to  them 
as  their  judges ;  and  that  they  should  punish  the  guilty,  but 
no  one  contrary  to  justice  ?"  Such  were  the  words  of  the  her•, 
aid ;  and  they,  being  now  in  a  state  of  extreme  weakness,  sur- 
rendered the  city.  The  Peloponnesians  then  fed  the  Plataians 
for  nine  days,  till  the  judges  from  Lacedaimon,  five  in  number, 
arrived.  When  they  were  come,  no  charge  was  preferred 
against  them  ;  but  they  called  them  forward,  and  merely  asked 
them  this  question,  "  Had  they  in  any  particular  done  the  La- 
cedaemonians and  the  allies  any  service  during  the  present 
war  ?"  They  made  a  speech  [in  rej)ly],  for  they  had  request- 
ed permission  to  s|>eak  at  greater  length,  and  had  deputed 
to  plead  their  cause  Astymachus  the  son  of  Asopolaus,  and 
Lacon  the  son  of  Aeimnostus,  who  came  forward  and  said  as 
follows : 

53.  "  The  surrender  of  our  city,  Lacedaemonians,  λυο  made 
with  full  confidence  in  you,  not  supposing  that  we  should  be 
subjected  to  such  a  trial  as  this,  but  that  it  would  l>o  one  more 
consistent  with  law ;  and  with  an  agreement  that  >ve  should 
not,  as  we  now  are,  be  at  the  mercy  of  any  other  judges  but 
yourselves ;  thinking  that  so  λυο  should  best  obtain  what  was 
fair.  But  as  things  are,  λυο  fear  that  wo  have  failed  at  once 
in  both  expectations.  For  λ\\Χ\\  reason  we  susjxict  that  our 
contest  is  for  life  or  death,*  and  that  you  ΛνϋΙ  not  prove  im- 
partial ;  inferring  this  from  the  fact  of  there  having  been  mmlo 
against  us  no  previous  charge  for  us  to  reply  to  (but  it  was 
ourselves  who  requested  i)ermission  to  speak),  and  from  the 
question  put  to  us  being  so  concise  ;  a  true  answer  to  which 
tells  against  us,  while  a  false  one  is  open  to  refutation.  Being 
involved,  however,  in  perplexity  on  all  sides,  we  are  compel- 
led, and  it  seems  the  safer  course,  to  say  something  at  all 
risks ;  for  the  words  that  had  been  left  unspoken  might  occa- 
sion to  men  in  our  situation  the  self-accusing  thought,  that  if 
they  had  been  spoken,  they  might  have  saved  us.  But  in  ad- 
dition to  our  other  disadvantages,  the  work  of  convincing  you 
is  also  surrounded  Avith  diiliculties.  Were  we  unacquainted 
*  Literally,  "  for  tho  most  fearful  things." 


U7.,LV.3  THUCTDIDES.  lit.  101 

with  CAch  other,  wo  might  derive  assistance  from  brinjCfing 
forward  fresh  proofs  of  what  you  did  not  know:  but  as  it  is, 
every  thing  will  bo  said  to  mou  who  know  it  already ;  and 
our  fear  is,  not  that  you  have  before  considered  our  services 
as  inferior  to  your  own,  and  now  make  that  fact  a  ground  of 
accusation  against  us;  but  that,  through  your  determination 
to  gratify  another  party,  Λνο  are  brought  to  a  trial  wliich  is 
already  decided  against  us. 

54.  "Nevertheless,  Λvhile  wo  nrgo  what  claims  of  justice  wo 
liave,  both  against  the  Thebans,  and  %vith  respect  to  you,  and 
the  rest  of  the  <i reeks,  >vo  will  remind  you  of  our  gooil  deeds, 
and  endeavor  to  ])ersuado  you  [to  havo  mercy  on  us],  AVith 
regard  then  to  your  brief  question,  '  whether  Λνο  havo  done 
any  service  to  tho  Laced rcmonians  and  the  allies  in  this  Avar,* 
Λνο  say,  that  if  you  ask  us  as  enemies,  you  arc  not  Avronged  by 
us,  though  you  should  havo  received  no  good  at  our  hands; 
and  that  if  you  consider  us  as  friends,  you  are  yourselves  moro 
in  the  >vrong,  for  having  marched  against  us.  AVith  respect, 
hoAvever,  to  Avhat  happened  during  tho  peace,  and  in  opposition 
to  tho  Mede,  Λνο  proved  ourselves  good  and  true  men ;  for  wo 
have  not  now  bc(!n  tho  first  to  break  tho  peace,  and  λλο  wgtq 
then  tlvo  oidy  part  of  tho  IJoRotians  λυΙιο  joined  in  attacking 
the  Medo  for  tho  liberty  of  (ireecc.  Even  though  wc  are  an 
inland  people,  Λνο  Avero  present  in  tho  sea-fight  at  Artomi- 
sium,  and  m  tho  battlo  fought  in  our  territory  Λνο  stood  by 
you  and  Pausanias ;  and  whatever  other  perilous  achievement 
Avas  performed  by  tho  Greeks,  λλο  took  part  in  every  thing 
beyond  our  strength.  And  to  you,  Laccdicmonians,  in  par- 
ticular, at  tho  very  time  Avhen,  after  tho  earthquake,  tho 
greatest  alarm  surrounded  Sparta,  because  of  tho  Helots  Λvho 
had  established  themseh^es  in  γολόΗ  nt  Ithome,  Λνο  sent  tho 
third  part  of  our  own  people  to  your  assistance :  and  you 
ought  no(f  to  forget  this. 

65.  "  With  regard  to  CA'cnts  of  early  date,  and  of  the  greatest 
importance,  such  was  tlio  part  Λνο  thought  right  to  act ;  though 
afterward  wo  became  your  enemies,  l^ut  it  is  you  that  aro 
to  blame  for  that ;  for  on  our  requesting  an  alliance  with  you, 
when  tho  Thebans  had  used  violence  toward  us,  you  rejected 
our  ftuit,  and  told  us  to  apply  to  tho  Athenians,  since  they 
were  near  to  us,  whereas  you  lived  far  away  from  us.  In  the 
war,  however,  you  neither  Buffered,  nor  would  havo  Buflfered, 


102  THUCYDIDES.  III.'  [LTt 

any  improper  treatment  from  us.  But  if  we  would  not  revolt 
from  the  Athenians  at  your  bidding,  wo  did  no  wrong  in  that ; 
for  it  was  thoy  who  assisted  us   against  the  Thebans,  when 

Jrou  refused ;  and  to  give  them  up  would  not  then  have  been 
lonorable— especially  as  wo  had  taken  them  for  allies  after 
receiving  good  from  them,  and  at  our  own  request,  and  had 
.shared  the  rights  of  citizenship  Λvith  them — ^but  it  was  only 
reasonable  that  we  should  heartily  obey  their  commands. 
And  as  to  the  measures  in  Avhich  either  of  you  take  the  lead 
of  your  allies,  it  is  not  those  who  follow  that  are  to  blame,  if 
you  have  ever  done  any  thing  Avrong,  but  thosif  who  lead  them 
on  to  what  is  not  right. 

50.  "  With  respect  to  the  Thebans,  they  had  on  fnany  other 
occasions  wronged  us ;  and  as  for  the  last  occitsion,  you  know 
yourselves  on  what  account  λυο  aro  in  our  present  condition, 
l^r  as  they  Avero  seizing  our  city  in  time  of  |>eaco,  and, 
inoreover,  at  a  holy  time  of  the  month,  wo  did  right  in  avenging 
ourst;lves  on  them,  according  to  the  principle  recognized  by 
all,  that  it  is  allowable  to  defend  onesself  against  the  attack  of 
an  enemy  ;  and  it  would  not  now  1)C  fair  that  we  should  eufter 
on  their  account.  For  if  you  take  your  views  of  iustico  from 
your  own  immediate  advantage  an<l  their  animosity,  you  will 
show  yourselves  no  true  judges  of  >vhat  is  right,  but  rather 
attentive  to  what  is  expedient.  And  yet  if  they  appear  to  bo 
serviceablo  to  you  now,  much  more  did  λυο  and  the  rest  of 
the  Greeks  then,  when  you  were  in  greater  danger.  For 
now  you  aro  yourselves  attacking  others,  and  tho  objects  of 
their  fear;  but  at  that  crisis,  when  tho  barbarian  was  bring- 
ing slavery  on  all,  these  Thebans  wero  on  his  side.  And  it 
is  but  just  that  against  our  present  misdeed — if  we  have 
really  done  amiss — you  should  set  the  zeal  wo  showed  then ; 
and  you  will  find  it  greater  than  the  fault  to  which  it  is 
opposed,'  and  exhibited  at  those  critical  times  when  it  was 
a  rare  thing  for  any  of  tho  (ireeks  to  oppose  his  courage  to 
the  power  of  Xerxes ;  and  thereforo  those  were  the  moro 
commended  who  did  not  in  safety  act  for  their  own  interest 
with  regard  to  his  invasion,  but  were  willing  to  dare  with 
dangers  the  better  part.  But  though  we  were  of  that  number, 
and  honored  by  you  in  the  highest  degree,  wo  are  now  afraid 
that  ΛΥΟ  havo  been  ruined  by  ai^ting  on  the  samo  principles, 
'  LitcraMy,  "  the  greator  opposed  to  tlio  less." 


Lvii.,Lvni.l  THUCYDIDES.  IIT.  103 

because  wo  chose  the  side  of  the  Athenians  from  regard  to  right, 
rather  than  yours  from  regard  to  interest.  And  yet  men  should 
consistently  take  the  same  view  of  the  same  case,  and  account 
expediency  to  bo  nothing  else  than  this — when  good  allies  n•- 
ceivc  everlasting  gratitude  for  their  services,  Λνΐύΐο  our  own 
immediate  interest  in  any  case  is  secured. 

δ7.  "  Consider,  too,  that  at  present  you  arc  esteemed  by  tho 
Greeks  in  general  a  pattern  of  lionor  and  virtue :  but  if  you 
jiass  an  unjust  sentence  on  us  (for  this  is  no  obscure  cause  that 
you  will  decide,  but  as  men  of  high  repute  yourselves,  you  will 
j>a«is  sentence  on  us  who  arc  also  not  contemptible),  beΛvaro  lest 
Ihey  may  not  approve  of  your  coming  to  any  im[>ro|>er  decision 
respecting  men  of  good  character,  though  you  are  yourselves 
of  still  better;  nor  of  spoils  which  were  taken  from  us,  tho 
]>cnefactors  of  Greece,  being  devoted  in  the  national  temples. 
For  it  will  seem  a  shocking  thing  that  Lacedaemonians  should 
liavo  destroyed  Platica ;  and  tl»at  your  fathers  should  havo 
inscribed  the  name  of  that  city  on  the  tripod  at  Delphi  for  its 
good  services,  Avhereas  you  utterly  obliterated  it  from  the  whole 
(irecian  name  for  tho  sake  of  Thebans.  For  to  such  a  degree 
of  misfortune  liave  we  been  brought :  if  the  Medes  had  been 
victorious,  Λνο  should  have  been  ruined ;  and  now  wo  are  sup- 

f>lanted  by  Thebans  in  your  good  opinion,  who  were  before  our 
>est  friends;  and  we  havo  been  subjected  to  two  dangers,  the 
greatest  that  can  be  imagined — then,  to  that  of  being  starved 
to  death,'  if  Λνο  had  not  surrendered  our  city ;  and  now,  to  that 
of  being  tried  for  our  lives.  And  thus  we  IMata?ans,  Λvho  Λverc 
zealous  beyond  our  power  in  the  cause  of  tho  Greeks,  aro 
rejected  by  all,  deserted  and  unassisted ;  for  of  those  who  wcro 
then  our  allies,  no  one  helps  us ;  and  ns  for  you,  Lacedemonians, 
our  only  hope,  We  fear  that  you  aro  not  to  bo  depended  upon. 
58.  "  And  yet,  for  tho  sako  of  tho  gods  who  onco  presided 
over  our  confederacy,  and  of  our  valor  in  tho  cause  of  tho 

'  Bloomfield,  in  his  last  edition,  riglitly  explains  αΐηχίστφ  (as  Giillcr 
had  already  done),  by  comparing  tho  words  of  Ammianua  Marcellinus, 
"fame,  ignavissimo  mortis  pcnoro,  tabescentcs;"  and  observes  that  "to 
bo  pined  to  death  was,  according  to  tho  idea  of  tho  ancients,  α  death,  as 
compared  with  that  of  dying  with  arms  in  one's  hands,  especially 
ignominious,  as  suggesting  tho  idea  of  a  snared  brute  boast."  Yet  ho 
inconsistently  retains  tho  part  of  his  original  noto,  in  which  he  objected 
to  ilobbcs  rendering  tho  word  by  •'  baee,"  α  term"  to  which  Ilobbee  him• 
self  doubtless  attached  tho  same  moaning. 

0 


104  THUOYDIDES.  III.  [ux. 

Greeks,  we  call  on  you  to  relent  and  chanpre  your  mind,  if  you 
have  been  persuaded  to  any  thin^jf  by  the  Thcbans;  and  to 
ask  as  a  boon  from  them  in  return  that  they  would  not  kill 
those  whoso  deatlt  is  not  honorable  to  you;  and  to  receive  nn 
honest  gratitude  [from  us],  instead  of  a  disgraceful  one  [from 
tbem] ;  and  not,  iUter  giving  jjlcasure  to  others,  to  incur  infamy 
for  it  yourselves.  For  it  is  an  easy  matter  to  take  away  our 
lives,  but  a  difficult  one  to  ν,'ψα  out  the  disgrace  of  it;  since 
we  are  not  enemies,  that  you  should  justly  take  vengeance  on 
us,  but  men  well  disposed  toward  you,  and  who  went  to  war 
with  you  only  on  compulsion.  You  would  judge  the  case  there- 
fore rightly,  if  you  both  granti'd  us  personal  security,  and  con• 
fiidcred  beforehand  that  you  recoivod  us  by  our  own  consent, 
and  while  holding  forth  our  hands  to  you — and  the  law  of  th(3 " 
Greeks  is  not  to  kill  such — and,  moreover,  after  our  being  ali 
along  your  benefactors.  For  look  to  the  sepulchers  of  your 
fathers,  whom,  after  being  slain  by  tlie  Medos,  and  buried  in 
our  country,  we  used  to  honor  every  year  at  the  public  exj>enso 
with  both  garments  and  other  things  tliat  are  usual,  and  by 
oiTering  first-fruits  of  all  tluit  our  land  proiluced  in  its  season ; 
as  friends  from  a  friendly  country,  and  as  allies  to  our  former 
companions  in  arms.  But  you  would  do  the  contrary  of  this, 
should  you  decide  unjustly.  For  consider:  Pausanias  buried 
them  with  a  conviction  that  he  was  laying  them  in  a  friendly 
land,  and  among  men  of  that  character ;  but  you,  if  you  kill 
us,  and  make  the  Platiean  territory  a  part  of  the  Theban,  whiii 
^hii  will  you  do  but  leave  your  fathers  and  kinsmen  in  a 
hostile  country,  and  among  tlu'ir  nmrderers,  unhonored  Avith 
the  gifts  which  they  now  receive  i  And  further,  you  will 
condemn  to  slavery  the  land  in  which  the  Greeks  Λνοη  their 
freedom  ;  will  desolate  the  temples  of  the  god's  to  whom  they 
prayed,  before  conquering  the  Medes ;  and  Λνϋΐ  take  away 
our  ancestral'  sacrifices  from  those  Λνΐιο  founded  and  instituted 
them. 

59.  "  This  were  not  to  your  credit,  Lacedemonians,  nor  to 
offend  against  the  general  principles  of  the  Greeks  and  your 
own  forefathers,  nor  to  destroy  us,  your  benefactors,  for  other 

*  Gottlober  and  Poppo  refer  ίση/ύνων  iw  well  as  κτισύντων  to  ΟυαΊης ; 
.,ιηΙ  tho  collocation  of  tlio  words  certainly  makes  this  tho  most  natural 
modo  of  explaining  them.  Bloomfield,  however,  denies  tl»at  ίω  is  over 
uii-d  ill  snoh  a  figiirativo  sense,  and  maintains  that  it  can  only  refer  hero 

to  Hi)  :. 


vx.]  THUCYDIDES.  IIL  '  195 

men's  hatred  of  us,  without  having  been  wronged  yourselves ; 
but  rather,  to  spare  u»,  and  relent  in  your  hearts,  having 
taken  a  rational  j)ity  on  us ;  reflecting  not  only  on  the  dread- 
ful nature  of  the  things  wo  should  suffer,  but  also  on  the  char- 
acter of  the  sufferers,  and  how  misfortune  admits  not  of 
calculating  on  whom  it  may  one  day  fall,  even  without  his 
ilesernng  it.  AVe  then,  as  is  suitable  for  us,  and  as  our  need 
induces  us  to  do,  entreat  you,  Λvith  invocations  to  tho  gods 
Avho  are  worshi|Hid  at  the  same  altar,  and  by  all  the  Greeks 
in  common,  that  wo  may  prevail  on  you  in  those  things ; 
pleading  tho  oaths  which  your  fathers  swore,  we  pray  that 
you  will  not  be  unmindful  of  them :  Λνο  bepeeoh  you  by  your 
fathers'  tombs,  and  appeal  for  aid  to  tltc  dead,  that  wo  may 
not  come  under  the  power  of  tho  Thebans,  nor  those  λυΙιο  aro 
dearest  to  them  bo  given  up  to  those  λυΙιο  arc  most  hateful. 
AVe  remind  you,  too,  of  that  day  on  which  wo  performed  tho 
most  glorious  tliings  in  their  company,  and  yet  now  on  this 
day  aro  in  danger  of  sufferiui;  tho  most  dreadful,  l^ut,  to 
bring  our  speech  to  a  close — a  thing  which  is  necessary,  and  at 
the  same  time  hard  for  men  so  circumstanced,  because  tho  peril 
of  our  life  approaches  with  it — wc  now  say,  in  conclusion,  that 
we  did  not  suiTcndcr  our  city  to  tho  Thebans  (for  before  that  wo 
would  have  prefetTed  to  die  tho  most  inglorious  death — that  of 
famine'),  but  confided  in  and  capitulated  to  i/ou.  And  it  woro 
but  fair  that,  if  wo  do  not  persuade  you,  you  should  restoro 
us  to  tho  same  position,  and  let  us  ourselves  take  tho  risk 
that  befalls  us.  At  tho  eanio  time  wc  solcnmly  beseech  you 
that  we  who  are  Platieans,  and  Avho  showe  1  the  greatest  zeal 
for  the  cause  of  the  Greeks,  may  not  bo  given  up,  suppliants 
as  wo  aro,  out  of  your  hands  and  your  good  faith,  Lacedaimo- 
nians,  to  Thebans,  who  are  our  bitterest  enemies;  but•,  that 
jou  would  become  our  preservers,  and  not,  while  you  aro  giv- 
mg  freedom  to  the  rest  of  .the  Greeks,  bring  utter  destruction 
upon  us." 

00.  To  this  effect  spoke  tho  Platanans.  Tho  Thebans,  fear- 
ing that  the  Lacedaimonians  might  somewhat  relent  in  conse- 
quence of  their  words,  came  forward,  and  said  that  they  also 
wished  to  address  them,  since,  contrary  to  their  cxjicctation, 
tho  IMaticans  liad  had  a  longer  speech  allowed  them  than  α 
Kimplo  answer  to  tho  question.  So  when  they  had  given  them 
leav(>,  thoy  spoke  as  follt)WS  :  ' 


tee  THUOYUIDES.  IIL  [lxi.,  LXit 

61.  ^  We  should  not  have  asked  permission  to  make  this  ad- 
dress/ if  the  Platffians,  on  their  part,  had  briefly  answered  the 
question  put  to  them,  and  had  not  turned  upon  us  and  dehvered 
an  invective ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  made  a  long  defense 
of  themselves,  beyond  the  limits  of  the  present  question,  and  on 
points  that  had  never  been  the  grounds  of  any  charge,  togeth- 
er with  a  panegjTic  for  things  which  no  one  found  fault  with. 
But  as  it  is,  ΛΥβ  must  answer  their  accusations,  nnd  refute  their 
self-praises ;  that  neither  our  disgrace  nor  their  reput^Uion  may 
assist  them,  but  that  you  may  hear  the  truth  on  both  points, 
and  so  decide.  AVe  quarreled  then  with  them  in  the  first  in- 
stance, because,  on  our  settling  Plataia  at  a  later  period  than 
the  rest  of  Boeotia,  and  some  other  })laces  w  ith  it,  of  which  wo 
took  possession  after  driving  out  their  mixed  population,  theso 
men  did  not  think  fit,  jis  had  been  first  arranged,  to  submit  to 
our  supremacy,  but,  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  Baotians,  of- 
fended against  the  princij)les  of  their  fathers,  and  when  they 
were  being  compelled  to  observe  them,  Avent  over  to  the  Athe- 
nians, in  conjunction  Avith  whom  they  did  us  many  injuries,  for 
which  they  also  suftered  in  return. 

02.  "  Again,  Avhen  the  barbarian  canie  against  Greece, 
they  say  that  they  were  the  only  i»art  of  the  Bcjeotians  that 
did  not  Medize ;  and  it  is  on  this  j»oint  that  they  most  prido 
themselves,  and  abuse  us.  But  we  say  that  they  did  not  Mc- 
dizey  because  the  Athenians  did  not  either ;  but  that  in  tho 
same  way,  when  the  Athenians  afterward  attiuked  the  Greeks, 
they  Avere  tho  only  peoj>lo  that  Attkizcd.  Yet  look  in  what 
jK>luical  condition  wo  respectively  did  this.  For  our  city  hap- 
IK'ued  at  that  time  to  be  governed  neither  by  an  oligarchy 
with  equal  laws,'  nor  by  a  democracy ;  but  wliat  is  most 
opposed  to  laws  anil  tho  Ixist  fi)rm  of  government,  and  comes 
nearest  to  [the  rule  of]  a  tyrant,  a  dominant  party  of  a  few 
individuals  had  tho  administration  of  atfairs.  And  so  they, 
hoping  to  hold  it  still  more  surely  if  the  cause  of  the  Medo 
were  triumphant,  kept  down  tho  populace  by  force,  and  in- 
troduced him ;   and  the  Avhole  city  was  not  its  own  master 

1  '*  Tho  term  Ισόνομος  relates  to  tho  equality  of  all  tho  citizens  with  ono 
another,  as  fur  as  related  to  their  private  disputes  and  private  injuries ; 
whereas  under  tho  Avorst  form  of  oligarehy,  which  was  called  ι^νιαστιία, 
those  who  were  possessed  of  political  power  were  also  above  tho  law  in 
private  matters,  and  could  oppress  their  fellow-citizens  at  their  pleasure. 
fcjoe  Aristotle,  Politics,  iv.  5,  2." — Artiokl. 


MiiL,  LXiv.]  THUCYDIDES.  III.  107 

when  it  so  acted;  nor  is  it  right  to  reproach  it  for  what 
it  did  amiss  when  not  in  tlie  enjoyment  of  its  laws.  At  any 
rate,  after  the  Medo  liad  retreated,  and  it  had  regained  its 
laws,  you  ought  to  consider,  tl»at  when  the  Athenians  subse- 
quently attacked  the  rest  of  Greece,  and  endeavored  to  brinaf 
our  country  under  (heir  power,  and  by  the  aid  of  faction  were 
already  in  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  it,  wo  fought  and 
conquered  them  at  Coronea,  and  liberated  Boeotia,  and  are 
now  heartily  joining  in  the  liberation  of  the  other  states,  by 
furnishing  horses,  and  such  a  force  as  no  other  of  the  allies 
do.  With  regard  then  to  our  Medizing,  such  is  the  defense  wo 
make. 

G3.  "  But  that  it  is  yo?i,  [Plataians,]  who  have  both  done  more 
injury  to  Greece,  and  are  ηκ/Γο  deserving  of  extreme  punish- 
ment, wo  will  now  attempt  to  prove.  It  was  for  vengeance 
against  us,  you  say,  that  you  became  allies  and  fellow-citizens 
of  the  Athenians.  Then  you  ought  to  have  introduced  them 
for  ai<l  against  us  alone,  and  not  to  have  joined  Avith  them  in 
attacking  others;  such  a  course  liaving  certainly  been  open  to 
you,  in  ca'^o  of  your  being  at  all  led  on  by  the  Athenians 
against  your  will,  since  the  confederacy  against  the  Medo  had• 
already  been  formed  by  these  Lacedaiinonians  here,  which  you 
yourselves  bring  forward  most  prominently  [in  your  own  do- ' 
fonse].  Surely  this  was  strong  enough  to  divert  us  from  attack- 
ing you,  and  what  is  the  greatest  advantage,  to  enable  you  to 
take  counsel  in  security.  But  of  your  own  accord,  and  not  by 
compulsion,  you  still  took  the  part  of  the  Athenians  by  pref- 
erence. And  you  say  that  it  had  been  base  for  you  to  Iwtray 
your  benefactors:  but  much  more  ba«^  and  criminal  was  it  so 
utterly  to  betray  the  whole  body  of  the  Greeks,  with  whom  you 
confederated,  than  to  give  up  the  Athenians  alone,  who  Λvero 
enslaving  Greece,  Λνΐηΐο  tho  others  were  its  liberators.  And  it 
Avas  no  equal  return  of  favor  that  you  made  them,  nor  ono  freo 
from  disgrace.  For  you  introduced  them,  as  you  say,  when  you 
were  being  injured;  but  you  became  co-operators  with  them  in 
injuring  others.  And  vet  not  to  return  equal  favors  is  more 
disgraceful  than  to  fail  m  those  which,  though  justly  duo,  will 
bo  returned  in  furtherance  of  injustice. 

04.  "You  showed  then  plainly,  that  not  even  at  that  time 
was  it  for  tho  sake  of  the  Greeks  that  you  alone  did  not  Medize, 


198  THUCYDIDEa  lit  [ucr. 

but  because  the  Athenians  did  not  either,  and  because  you 
iviehed  to  side  with  them,  and  ni^ainst  tlie  rest.  And  now  you 
claim  to  derive  assistance  from  the  circumstances  in  wliich  you 
acted  well  through  the  influence  of  others.  'Hiut  however  U 
not  reasonable ;  but  as  you  chose  the  Athenians,  stand  the  brunt 
of  the  struggle  with  then»,  and  ilo  not  bring  forward  the  leaguo 
that  was  then  maile,  as  though  you  ought  to  bo  spared  from 
regard  to  that,  ior  you  deserted  it,  and  in  violation  of  it  joined 
in  enslaving  the  yEginetans,  and  some  others  who  had  entered 
into  it,  rather  than  prevented  their  being  enslaved ;  and  that 
too  not  against  your  w  ill,  but  λυΙιιΙο  enjoying  the  same  laws  m 
you  have  to  the  present  time,  and  without  any  one's  compelling 
you,  as  they  did  us.  Besides,  the  last  ])roposal  made  to  you 
before  you  were  bloekudeil,  that  you  should  remain  unmolested 
on  condition  of  your  aiding  mitiier  siile,  you  did  not  ac<*ept. 
AVho,  then,  could  be  more  justly  hated  by  the  Oreeks  than 
you,  who  assumed  an  honorable  bearing  fi)r  their  injury  ?  And 
the  goodness  which  you  say  you  once  exhibited,  you  have  now 
shown  to  be  not  your  proper  character;  but  what  y<':a•  nature 
always  wished,  has  been  truly  proved  against  you ;  i'uv  you  ac- 
companied the  Athenians  when  they  were  ΛvalUing  in  the  path 
of  injustice.  AViih  regard  then  to  our  involuntary  Mediziuf/y 
and  your  voluntary  Atticiziuf/,  such  are  the  proofs  we  Inivo  to 
otier. 

C5.  "  As  for  the  last  injuries  which  you  say  that  you  receiv- 
ed, namely,  that  we  came  against  your  city  in  time  of  peace  and 
at  a  holy  time  of  the  month,  we  are  of  opinion  that  neither  in 
this  point  did  we  act  more  wrongly  than  you.  If,  indeed,  wo 
came  against  your  city  by  our  own  design,  and  fought,  and 
ravaged  the  land  as  enemies,  we  are  guilty.  Ihit  if  men  who 
were  the  first  among  you,  both  in  property  and  family,  wishing 
to  stop  you  from  your  foreign  connection,  and  rest«)ro  you  to 
your  hereditary  pnnciples  common  to  all  the  Ikeotians,  volun- 
tarily called  us  to  their  aid,  how  are  we  guilty  ?  For  it  U 
those  who  lead  that  are  the  transgressors,  rather  than  thoso 
who  follow  '  But  neither  did  they  do  wrong,  in  our  judgment, 
nor  did  we;  but  being  citizens,  like  yourselves,  and  having  more 
at  stake,  by  opening  their  walls  to  us  and  introducing  us  into 


*  Retortiiif?  tho  ronmrk  of  tho  Plutieaus,  ch.  G5.  5,  ονχ  ol  Ιπύμξνοι 


txvL,  ixvi!.]  XnuCYDIDES.   ΙΙΓ.  190 

their  city  in  a  friendly,  not  in  ft  liostile,  manner,  tliey  wished 
tlio  bad  anionj^  you  no  lonj^er  to  become  >vorse,*  and  the  good 
to  have  their  deserts;  beiii^  reformers  of  your  ]>rincii)](S, 
and  not  depriving  the  state  of  your  persons,  but  restoring  you 
to  your  kinsmen ;  making  you  foes  to  no  one,  but  friends 
alike  to  all. 

60.  '-  And  we  gave  you  a  proof  of  our  not  having  acted  in 
a  hostile  manner ;  for  wo  injured  no  one,  but  made  proclama- 
tion that  whoever  wished  to  be  governed  according  to  tho 
hereditary  principles  of  all  the  l^ceotians,  should  come  over  to 
us.  And  you  gladly  came,  and  maile  an  agn^ement  with  ua,  and 
remained  quiet  at  first;  but  afterward,  when  you  perceived 
that  wo  were  few  in  number,  even  supposing  that  we  might 
be  thought  to  liavo  acted  somewhat  unfairly  in  entering  your 
city  without  tho  consent  of  your  jmpulace,  you  did  not  rc' 
quite  us  in  the  same  manner — by  not  proeooding  to  cxtrtimo 
measures  in  action,  but  persuading  us  by  Λνοπΐ3  (ο  retire — but 
you  attacked  us  in  violatii)n  of  your  agreement.  And  as  for 
those  whom  you  slew  in  battle,  we  do  not  grieve  for  them  so 
much  (for  they  su(l<?red  according  to  law — i»f  a  certain  kind); 
but  in  the  case  of  those  Avhom  you  lawlessly  butchered  Λνΐύίο 
liolding  forth  their  liands,  and  when  you  hafl  given  them 
(juarter,  and  had  subsequently  promised  us  not  to  kill  them, 
liow  can  you  deny  that  you  «acted  atrociously?  And  now, 
after  having  perpetrated  in  a  short  time  these  three  crimes — 
the  breach  of  your  agreement,  tho  subsequent  nuir<ler  of  tho 
men,  and  the  falsification  of  your  promise  not  to  kill  them,  in 
case  wo  did  no  injury  to  your  property  in  the  country — you 
Btill  assert  that  it  is  wo  >vho  arc  tho  transgressors ;  and  your- 
selves claim  to  escape  paying  tho  penalty  for  your  crimes.  Ko, 
not  if  these  your  judges  come  to  a  right  decision  ;  but  for  all 
of  them  shall  you  bo  jmnished; 

07.  "And  now,  Lac^da?monians,  it  i;v  with  this  view  that 
wo  have  gone  so  far  into  these  subjects — both  with  referenc.o 
to  you  and  to  ourselves — that  you  may  know  that  you  will 
justly  pass  seutenco  on  them,  and  irc,  that  we  have  still  raoro 

*  »,  e,,  nndcrstandinpf  Χ^^ίρονς  again  after /ίαλλοι•,  as  Poppo  explains  It, 
Bloomflcld  eupposes  that  μάλλον  hero  assumes  tho  nature  of  an  adjec- 
tive; and  thus  μάλλον  γενέσθαι  will  moan,  "to  bo  uppermost,"  to  have 
tho  upper  hand—"  to  bo  [in  power]  rather  than  others."  But  tho  pass* 
π}ζβ  which  ho  quotes,  clu  82.  2,  as  an  instance  of  euch  α  usago,  is  not,  I 
think,  eufflclontly  parallel  to  justify  this  interpretation. 


200  THUOYDIDES.   ΠΙ  [Lxvnt 

righteously  been  avenged  oni  them ;  and  that  you  may  not  re- 
lent on  hearing  of  their  virtues  in  timoe  long  gone  by  iif,  in- 
deed, they  ever  had  any) ;  for  thouglj  these  ought  to  oe  of 
semce  to  the  injured,  to  such  as  are  doing  any  thing  base  they 
should  be  a  reason  for  double  punislunent,  because  they  do 
amiss  in  opposition  to  their  proper  character.     Nor  let  them 
derive   benefit  from   their  lamentations   and  pitiful   Availing, 
while  they  appeal  to  the  tombs  of  your  fathers  and  their  own 
destitution.     For  we  show  you,  on  the  other  hand,  that  our 
youth  who  were  butchered  by  them  received  far  more  dread- 
ful  treatment;    some   of  whoso   fathers   fell   at   Coronea,   in 
bringing  Buiotia  into  connection  with  you ;  while  others,  left 
lonely  in  their  old  age,  and  their  houses  desolate,  prefer  to  you 
a  far  more  just  request  for  vengeance  on  these  men.     And 
Avith  regard  to  pity,  it  is  those  men  who  sutKr  undeservedly 
that  better  deserve  to  receive  it;  but  those  who  suifor  justly, 
as  these  do,  deserve,  on   the    contrary,  to  be    rejoiced  over. 
Their  present  destitution,  then,  they  have  incuiTed  by  their 
own  couduct;  for  they  wilfully  rejected  the   better  alliance. 
Nor  did  they  thus  outrage  all  law  in  consequence  of  having 
first  sutiered  at  our  hands,  but  from  deciding  under  the  influ- 
ence of  hatred,  rather  than  of  justice.     And  they  have  not  now 
given  us  prt)porti»)nate  satisfaction  for  their  crimes;  for  they 
will  sutler  by  a  legal  sentence,  and  not  while  holding  forth 
their  hands  after  liattle,  as  they  say,  but  after  surrendering 
to  you  on  definite  terms  to  take  their  trial.     Avenge  therefore, 
Lacedaimonians,  the  law  of  the  (ireeks  which  has  been  violated 
by  these  men.     And  to  us  who  have  been  treated  in  cont<.*mpt 
of  all  law  return  a  due  gratitude  for  the  zeal  we  have  shown ; 
and  let  us  not  lose  our  place  in  your  favor  through  their  words, 
but  give  the  Greeks  a  j»roof  that  you  will  not  institute  contests 
of  words,  but  of  deeils;  for  which  a  short  statement  is  suf- 
ficient when  they  are  good ;  but  when  they  are  done  amiss, 
harangues  dressed  out  with  imposing  language  serve  as  vails  for 
them.     But  if  ruling  Htates  should,  like  you  in  the  present  in- 
stance, summarily  pronounce  their  decisions  on   all  otlenders, 
men  would  be  less  disposed  to  seek  fur  line  worils  as  a  screen 
for  unjust  actions." 

C8.  To  this  eli'ect  then  spoke  the  Thebans.  The  Lacedai- 
monian  judges,  thinking  that  the  question,  "  AVhether  they 
had  received  any  service  from  them,  during  the  war,"  would 


lxviil]  THUCYDIDE3.  III.  201 

be  a  fair  one  for  them  to  put,  because  they  had  all  along  re- 
quested them,  as  they  said,  to  remain  quiet  according  to  tho 
original   covenant  of    Pausani?is,   after   tho   [retreat   of   the] 
Mode ;  and  when  afterward  they  made  to  them  the  proposal 
Avhich  thoy  did  before  they  λυογο  besieged — to  be  neutral,, ac- 
cording to  tho  terms  of  Uiat  compact — in  consequence  of  their 
not  receiving  it,  they  considered  that  on  tlio  strength  of  their 
own  just  wish  they  Mere  now  released  from  covenant  with 
them,  and  had   received   evil   at  their  han<ls.     Accordingly, 
bringing  each  of  them  forward,  and  asking  tho  same  Question, 
"  Whether  th(»y  had  done  tho  Laceda?monians  and  allies  any 
Rervice  in  the  war,"  when  they  said  they  had  not,  they  led 
them  away  and  killed  them,  not  excepting  one.     Of  tho  Pla- 
trcans  themselves  they  slew  not  less  than  two  hundred,  and 
of  tho  Athenians  twenty-five,  who  were  besieged  with  them ; 
tho  women  they  sold  as  slaves.     As  for  the  city,  the  Tliebans 
gave  it  for  about  a  year  to  some  of  the  Megareans  to  inhabit, 
who  had  been  banished  by  party  influence,  and  to  such  of  tho 
IMaticans  on  their  own  side  as  still  survived.     Afterward  they 
razed  the  λυΙιοΙο  of  it  to  the  ground,  from  the  very  foundations, 
and  built  to  tho  sacred  precinct  of  Juno  an  inn  two  hundred 
feet  square,  with  rooms  all  round,  above  and  below,  making 
use  of  tho  roofs  and  doors  of  the  Plataians ;  and  with  the  rest 
of  tho  furniture,  in  brass  and  iron,  that  was  within  tho  Λvall,' 
they  made  couches  and  dedicated  them  to  Juno,  building  also 
in  her  honor  a  stone  chapel  of  one  hundred  feet  square.     Tho 
land  they  confiscated,  and  let  out  for  ten  years,  its  occupiers 
being  Thebans.     And  nearly  throughout  the  whole  business  it 

*  Or,  as  BloomQcld  and  Gollcr  render  it,  "  whatever  movablo  materials 
there  were  in  tho  wall ;"  referring  to  tho  metal  cramps  by  which  tho 
coping-atones  wore  fastened.  But  though  lead  and  iron  arc  montioncd 
as  having  boon  used  for  that  purpose  (sec  I.  p.  93.  6),  they  do  not  bring 
forward  any  instance  of  bras,9  having  been  used  with  them ;  nor  docs  it 
seem  prpbablo  that  such  would  bo  tho  case.  I  havo  therefore  followed 
Poppo,  Haack,  and  others,  in  supposing,  that  as  tho  wood-work  in  tho 
new  building  was  taken  from  tho  houses  in  tho  town,  a  similar  use  was 
made  cf  tho  iron  and  brass  implements,  which  must  also  Surely  havo 
been  found  tlicro.  At  least  it  is  very  difficuH  to  imagine,  with  Qollor, 
tliat  they  had  been  all  used  up  by  tho  garrison  during  tho  siege.  And 
instead  of  tho  omJoetYton  which  ho  says  is  intended  between  tho  wood  In 
the  houso  and  tno  metal  in  tho  wall,  tho  use  of  tho  Λλλοις  appears  rather 
to  imply  that  the  rafters,  doors,  and  mfttal  Implements,  woro  all  taken 
from  tho  same  quarter. 


202  TllUCYDIDEa   III.  [lxul.lxx. 

was  on  account  of  the  Thebans  that  the  Lacedfiemonians  were 
BO  averse  to  the  Plataeans ;  for  they  considered  them  to  be  of 
service  for  tlio  war  wliich  hsul  then  but  recently  broken  out. 
Such  then  was  the  end  of  Platiea,  in  the  ninety-third  year 
after  they  became  allies  of  the  Athenians^ 

<j9.  Now  the  forty  hhips  of  the  Polojionnesians  >vhich  had 
ffono  to  the  relief  of  the  Lesbians  (and  whioh  were  flying,  at 
the  time  wo  referred  to  them,  across  the  ojku  sea,  and  were 
pursued  by  the  Athenians,  mid  cauj^ht  in  a  storm  olf  Crete, 
and  from  that  jjoint  had  been  dispersed),  on  reaching  the 
Peloponnese,  found  at  Cyllene  thirteen  sliips  of  the  Leucadians 
and  Ambraciots,  with  lirasidas  son  of  Tellis,  who  had  lately 
arrived  as  counselor  to  Alcidas.  For  the  Lacedamouians 
Avished,  as  they  had  failed  in  saving  Ix'sbos,  to  make  tlieir  fleet 
more  numerous,  and  to  sail  to  Corcyra,  which Avas  in  a  state  of 
sedition ;  as  the  Athenians  Avero  stationed  at  Naupactus  with 
only  twelve  ships  ;  and  in  order  that  they  might  have  the  start 
of  them,  before  any  larger  fleet  reinforced  them  from  Athens. 
So  Brasidas  and  Alcidas  proceeded  to  make  preparations  for 
these  measures. 

70.  For  the  Corcyr«ans  began  their  sedition  on  the  return 
homo  of  the  prisoners  tiiken  in  the  sea-fights  otV  E])idamnus, 
who  had  been  sent  back  by  the  Corinthians,  nominally  on  tho 
security  of  eight  hundred  talents   given   for   them  by  their 
'^jroxenij  but  in  reality,  Ixicauso  they  had   consented   to  bring 
over  Corcyra  to  the  Corinthijuis.     These  men  then  were  in- 
triguing, by  visits  to  each  of  tho  citizens,  to  cause  the  revolt 
of  the  city  from  the  Athenians.     On  tho  arrival  of  a  ship  from 
Athens  and  another  from  Corinth,  wiih  envoys  on  board,  and 
on  their  meeting  for  a  conference,  tho  Corcyra^ans  voted  to 
continue  allies  of  the  Athenians  according  to  their  agreement, 
but  to  bo  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Pelo|)onnesian8,  as  they 
bad  formerly  been.     Now  there  was  one  Pithi.^s,  a  volunteer* 
jyroxenus  of  the  Athenians,  and   tho    leader   of  the  popular 
j»arty ;   him  these  men  brought  to  trial,  on  a  charge  of  en- 
slaving Corcyra   to  tho  Athenians.     Having  been   acquitted, 
1-e  brought  to  trial  in  return  tho  five  richest  individuals  of 
'  Ϊ.  (?.,  an  individual  whom  of  his  own  accord  took  upon  himself  to  look 
lifter  tho  interests  of  any  particular  foreign  nation,  without  being  recog. 
nizod  by  that  people,  and  having  his  appointment  entered  in  tho  public 
records.    Or  as  Hockh  thinks,  without  being  publicly  appointed  by  hia 
own  country.     See  nolo  on  II.  29.  1. 


Lxxi.-Lxxiii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  III.  203 

their  party,  charp^ng  them  with  cutting  Btikcs  in  the  ground 
sacred  to  Jupiter  and  to  [the  hero]  Alcinous ;  the  penalty 
affixed  being  a  stiter  for  cvciy  Btake.  AVhon  thoy  h.-id  been 
convicted,  and,  owing  to  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  wore  sit- 
ting as  suppHants  in  the  temples,  tliat  they  might  be  allowed 
to  pay  it  by  installments,  IMtiiiai*,  who  λυλη  a  member  of  tlio 
council  also,  persuades  that  body  to  enforce  to  law.  So  when 
they  were  excluded  from  all  hope  by  the  severity  of  the  law, 
and  at  the  same  timo  heard  that  Pithias  was  likely,  Λvhilo  he  was 
still  in  the  council,  to  persuade  the  populace  to  hold  as  friends 
and  foes  the  same  as  the  Athenians  did,  they  conspired  to- 
gether, and  took  dagc^ers,  and,  having  suddenly  entered  tho 
council,  ass.issinated  Pithias  and  others,  both  coimselors  and 
private  persons,  to  tho  number  of  sixty.  Some  few,  however, 
of  tho  same  party  as  Pithias,  took  refuge  on  board  the  Athe- 
nian trireme,  which  was  still  there. 

71.  Having  j)erpetrated  this  deed,  and  summoned  the  Cor- 
oyraians  to  an  assembly,  they  told  them  that  this  was  the  best 
thing  for  them,  and  that  so  they  would  be  least  in  danger  of 
being  enslaved  by  tho  Athenians;  and  they  moved,  that  in 
future  they  should  receive  neither  party,  except  coming  in  α 
quiet  manner  with  a  single  ship,  but  should  consider  a  larger 

.  force  as  hostile.  As  they  moved,  so  also  they  compelled  them 
to  arlopt  their  motion.  They  likewise  sent  immediately  em- 
bassadors to  Athens,  to  show,  respecting  what  had  been  done, 
that  it  was  for  their  best  interests,  and  to  prevail  on  the  refu- 
gees there  to  adopt  no  measure  prejudicial  to  them,  that  there 
might  not  be  any  reaction. 

72.  On  their  arrival,  tho  Athenians  arrested  na  revolution- 
ists both  tho  embassadors  and  all  who  wero  persuaded  by 
them,  and  lodged  them  in  custody  in  -iiigina  In  tho  mean 
time,  on  tho  arrival  of  a  Corinthian  ship  and  somo  Lacedai- 
monian  envoys,  tho  dominant  party  of  tho  Corcyraians  at- 
tacked tho  commonalty,  and  defeated  them  in  battle.  When 
night  camo  on,  tho  commons  took  refuge  in  tho  citadel,  and  on 
iho  eminences  in  tho  city,  and  there  established  themselves  in 
η  body,  having  possession  also  of  tho  Ilyllaic  harbor ;  whilo 
tho  other  party  occupied  tho  market-place,  where  most  of  them 
dwelt,  with  the  harbor  adjoining  it,  looking  toward  tho  mainland. 

73.  The  next  day  they  had  α  few  ekirmishes,  and  both 
parties  sent  about  into  the  country,  inviting  tho  slaves,  and 


204  THUOYDIDES.  IIL  [lxxit.,  lxxt. 

offering  thorn  freedom.  The  greater  part  of  them  joined  tho 
commous  as  allies ;  while  the  other  party  was  reinforced  by 
eight  hundred  auxiliaries  from  tho  continent. 

74.  After  the  interval  of  a  day,  a  battle  was  again  fought, 
and  tho  couiinons  gained  tho  vi(;tory,  having  the  advantage 
both  in  strength  of  position  and  in  numbers :  the  women  also 
boldly  assisted  them,  throwing  at  the  enemy  with  the  tiling 
from  the  houses,  and  st^inding  the  brunt  of  the  melee  beyond 
what  could  have  been  expected  from  their  nature.  About 
twilight  the  rout  of  tho  oligarchical  party  >vas  effected ;  and 
fearing  that  the  commons  might  carry  the  arsenal  at  the  first 
assault,  and  put  them  to  tho  sword,  they  tired  the  houses 
round  about  the  market-place,  and  tho  lodging-houses,  to  stop 
their  advance,  sparing  neither  their  own  nor  other  people*s ; 
so  that  much  property  belonging  to  tho  Uierchanis  was  con- 
sumed, and  tho  whole  city  was  in  danger  of  being  destroyed, 
if,  in  addition  to  the  fire,  there  had  been  a  wind  blowing  on  it. 
After  ceasing  from  the  engagement,  both  sides  remained  quiet, 
and  kept  guard  during  tho  night.  On  victory  declaring  for  the 
commons,  the  Corinthian  ship  stole  out  to  sea ;  while  the  greater 
part  of  tho  auxiliaries  passed  over  unobserved  to  tho  continent. 

75.  The  day  following,  Nicostratus  son  of  Diitrephes,  a 
general  of  the  Athenians,  came  to  their  assistance  from  Nau- 
pactus  with  twelve  ships,  and  five  hundred  heavy-armed,  and 
Avished  to  negotiate  a  settlement,  persuading  them  to  agree 
with  each  other  to  bring  to  trial  the  ten  chief  authors  of  tho 
sedition  (who  immediately  fled),  and  for  the  rest  to  dwell  in 
peace,  having  made  an  arrangement  with  each  other,  and  >vith 
the  Athenians,  to  have  tho  same  foes  and  friends.  After 
effecting  this  he  was  going  to  sail  away ;  but  the  leaders  of 
tho  commons  urged  him  to  leave  them  five  of  his  ships,  that 
their  adversaries  might  be  less  on  tho  move ;  and  they  would 
themselves  man  and  send  Λvith  him  an  equal  number  of  theirs. 
He  consented  to  do  so,  and  they  proceeded  to  enlist  their  ad- 
versaries for  the  ships.  They,  fearing  that  they  should  be  sent 
oir  to  Athens,  seated  themselves  [as  suppliants]  in  the  temple  of 
the  Dioscuri;  while  Nicostratus  Avas  trying  to  persuade  them 
to  rise,  and  to  ent  ouiage  them.  AVhen  he  did  not  prevail  on 
them,  the  commons,  having  armed  themselves  on  this  pretext, 
jdleged  that  they  had  no  good  intentions,  [as  Avas  evident]  from 
their  mistrust  in  not  sailing  with  them;  qdJ  removed  their  arms 


Lxxvi.— LiXTni.]  THUCYDIDES.  III.  20o 

from  their  houses,  and  would  have  dispatched  some  of  ihoiw 
whom  they  met  with,  if  Nicostratus  had  not  prevented  it. 
The  rest,  sccini^  what  yvns,  poing"  on,  seated  themselves  as  sup- 
pliants in  the  temple  of  Juno,  their  numher  amounting  to  not 
less  than  four  Imndred.  liut  the  commons  being  afraid  of  their 
malcing  some  new  attempt,  persumlcd  them  to  rise,  and  trans- 
ferred them  to  the  island  in  front  of  the  temple,  and  provisions 
were  sent  over  there  for  them. 

76.  When  the  sedition  was  at  this  point,  on  the  fourth  or 
fifth  day  after  the  transfer  of  tlio  men  to  the  island,  the  ships 
of  tho  l*eloponnosians,  three-and-fifty  in  number,  came  up  from 
('yllene,  having  been  stationed  there  since  their  return  from 
Ionia.  The  commander  of  them,  as  before,  was  Alcidas,  lirasidas 
sailing  with  liim  as  counselor.  After  coming  to  anchor  at 
Sybota,  a  port  on  tho  mainland,  as  soon  as  it  was  morning  they 
sailed  toward  Corcyra. 

11.  Tho  Corcyneans,  being  in  great  confusion,  and  alarmed 
both  at  tho  state  of  things  in  the  city  and  at  the  advance -of  the 
enemy,  at  once  proceeded  to  equip  sixty  vessels,  and  to  send 
them  out,  as  they  were  successively  manned,  against  tho  enemy ; 
though  tho  Athenians  advised  them  to  let  them  sail  out  first, 
and  afterward  to  follow  themselves  with  all  their  ships  together. 
On  tlieir  vessels  coming  up  to  the  enemy  in  this  si;attered  man- 
ner, two  immediately  >vent  over  to  them,  while  in  others  tho 
crews  were  fighting  among  themselves,  and  tliere  >vas  no  order 
in  their  measures.  The  Peloponnesians,  seeing  their  confusion, 
drew  up  twenty  of  their  ships  against  the  Corcyra[»ans, 
and  the  remainder  against  tho  twelve  of  the  Athenians, 
among  which  were  tho  two  celebrated  vessels,  Salaminia  and 
I'aralus. 

78.  Tho  Corcyra'ans,  coming  to  tho  attack  in  bad  order, 
and  by  few  ships  at  a  time,  were  distressed  through  their  own 
arrangements;  while  the  Athenians  fearing  the  cnemy'ii 
numbers  and  the  chance  of  their  surrounding  them,  did  not 
attack  their  whole  fleet,  or  even  tho  center  of  the  division 
opposed  to  themselves,  but  took  it  in  flank,  and  sunk  ono  ship. 
After  this,  >vhen  tho  Peloponnesians  had  formed  in  A  circle, 
they  began  to  sail  round  them,  and  endeavored  to  throw  them 
into  confusion.  The  division  which  was  opposed  to  tho  Corcy- 
neans perceiving  this,  and  fearing  that  ttio  same  thing  might 
happen  as  liad  at  Naupactus,  advanced  to  their  support.     Thus» 


20d  THUCYDIDES.  IIL  [lxxul-lxxxl 

the  whole  united  fleet  Bimultaneously  attacked  the  Athenians, 
who  now  began  to  retire,  rowing  astern ;  at  the  same  time  wish- 
ing the  vessels  of  the  CorcyraDans  to  retreat  first,  while  they 
themselves  drew  oil*  as  leisurely  as  |X)ssible,  and  while  the 
enemy  were  still  ranged  ngjiinst  them.  The  sea-fight  then,  hav- 
ing been  of  tins  character,  ended  at  sun-set. 

79.  The  Corcyraians,  fearing  that  the  enemy,  on  the  strength 
of  his  victor}',  might  sail  against  the  city,  and  either  rescue  the 
men  in  the  island,  or  proceed  to  some  other  violent  measures, 
carried  the  men  over  again  to  the  sanctuary  of  Juno,  and  kept 
the  city  under  guard.  The  Peloponnesians,  however,  though 
victorious  in  the  engagement,  did  not  dare  to  sail  ag-ainst  tho 
city,  but  withdrew  with  thirteeen  of  the  Corcyra^an  vessels  to 
the  continent,  whence  they  had  put  out.  The  next  day  they 
advanced  none  the  more  against  the  city,  though  the  inhabit- 
ants were  in  great  confusion,  and  though  Brasidas,  it  is  siiid, 
advised  Ak'idas  to  do  so,  but  was  not  equal  to  him  in  authority; 
but  tbey  landed  on  the  promontory  of  Leucinne,  and  ravaged 
tho  country. 

80.  Meanwhile,  the  conunons  of  the  Corcyricans,  being  very 
much  alanned  lost  the  fleet  should  sail  against  them,  entered 
into  negotiation  >vith  the  suppliants  and  the  rest  for  the  preserv- 
ation of  the  city.  And  i^ome  of  them  they  |>ersuaded  to  go 
on  board  the  ships  ;  for  [notwithstanding  the  general  dismay] 
they  still  manned  thirty  in  expectation  of  the  enemy's  advance 
against  them.  But  the  Peloponnesians,  after  ravaging  the  land 
till  mid-tlay,  sailed  away :  and  at  night-fall  the  approach 
of  sixty  Athenian  ships  from  Leucjis  was  signaled  to  them, 
Avhieh  the  Athenians  had  sent  with  Eurymedon  son  of  Thucles, 
as  commander,  on  hearing  of  the  sedition,  and  of  the  fleet 
about  to  go  to  Corcyra  with  Aleidas. 

81.  The  Peloponnesians  then  immediately  proceeded  home- 
ward by  night  with  all  luuste,  ]>assing  along  shore ;  and  hav- 
ing hauled  their  shij)S  over  the  isthmus  of  Leucas,  that  they 
might  not  bo  seen  doubling  it,  they  sailed  baek.  The  Corcy- 
rieans,  on  learning  tho  ap])roaeh  of  the  Athenian  fleet  and  the 
retreat  of  tho  enemy,  took  and  brought  into  the  city  the  Mes- 
henians,  who  before  liad  been  without  tho  walls :  and  having 
ordered  the  ships  they  had  manned  to  sail  round  into  tho 
Ilyllaic  harbor,  while  they  were  going  round,  they  put  to 
death  any  of  their  ojiponents  they  might  have  happened  to 


LXxxiL]  TIIUCYDIDES.  III.  207 

Bcizo  :  and  afterward  dispatched,  as  they  landed  them  from  the 
fihips,  all  that  they  had  persuaded  to  go  on  board.  They  also 
went  to  the  sanctuary  of  Juno,  and  persuaded  about  fifty  men 
to  take  their  trial,  and  condemned  them  all  to  death.  The 
majority  of  the  suppliants  who  ha<l  not  been  prevailed  on  by 
them,  when  they  saw  what  was  being  done,  slew  one  another 
there  on  the  sacred  ground;  Λνΐήΐο  some  hanged  themselves 
on  the  trees,  and  others  destroyed  themselves  as  they  severally 
could.  During  seven  days  that  Eurymedon  staid  after  hi» 
arrival  with  sixty  ships,  the  Corcyrajans  were  butchering  thoso 
of  their  countrymen  whom  they  thought  hostile  to  them ; 
bringing  lieir  accusations,  indeed,  against  those  only  v;ho  wero 
for  putting  down  the  democracy ;  but  some  wero  slain  for 
private  enmity  also,  and  others  for  money  owed  them  by 
thoso  who  had  borrowed  it.  Every  mode  of  death  Λvas  thus 
had  recourse  to ;  and  whatever  ordinarily  happens  in  such  a 
state  of  things,  all  happened  then,  and  still  more.  For  father 
murdered  son,  and  they  wore  dragged  out  of  the  sanctuaries,  or 
slain  in  them  ;  while  in  that  of  Bacchus  some  wero  walled  up 
and  perished.  So  savagely  did  the  sedition  proceed;  while  it  ap- 
peared to  do  so  all  the  more  from  its  being  among  the  earliest. 
82.  For  afterward,  even  the  Λνΐιοΐο  of  Greece,  so  to  say, 
was  convulsed ;  struggles  being  every  where  made  by  the 
popular  leaders  to  call  in  the  Athenians,  by  the  oligarchical 
jiarty,  tlio  LaceihTmonians.  Now  they  Avould  have  had  no 
pretext  for  calling  them  in,  nor  have  been  prepared  to  do  8<\ 
m  time  of  peace.'  But  when  pressed  by  war,  and  Avhon  an  al- 
liance also  was  maintained  by  both  parties  for  the  injury  of 
their  opponents  and  for  their  own  gain  therefrom,  occasions 
of  inviting  them  were  easily  supplied  to  such  as  wished  to 
effect  any  revolution.      And  many  dreadful  things  befell  tho 

*  "IToro,  as  in  I.  30.  3,  tho  participlo  and  tho  finito  verb  arc  made  to 
answer  to  each  other,  ουκ  uv  ίχόντων'^ίπορίζοντο,  whereas  it  should 
have  been  either  oi'ic  uv  είχον  ηρόφηηιν — εττορίζοντο,οτονκ  ύν  εχόντων'— 
των  επαγωγών  ττοριζομίνων'' — Arnold.  Tho  only  w.ay  to  avoid  this  eon- 
fusion  of  constructions  would  bo  to  understand  Ιχόντων  and  έτοιμων 
asfain  after  πηλ^ηηνμή<ων.  "  And  as  they  would  havo  had  no  pretext 
for  calling  them  in,  nor  havo  been  prepared  to  do  it,  in  time  of  peace,  but 
were  so  in  lime  of  war — occasions  of  inviting  them  wero  easily  supplied, 
when  this  war  had  broken  out."  But  from  the  fact  of  no  commentator 
(so  far  as  I  am  aware)  having  adopted  this  method,  there  are  probably 
greater  objections  to  it  than,  I  confess,  present  themselves  to  my  own 
mind. 


THUOYDIDEa  IIL  (Lxxm 

citiee  through  this  sedition,  which  occur,  and  will  alwa}^  do 
BO,  as  long  as  human  nature  is  the  same,  but^  in  a  more  violent 
or  milder  form,  and  varying  in  their  phenomena,  as  the  several 
variations  of  circumstances  may  in  each  case  present  them- 
selves. For  in  peace  and  prosperity  both  cuinmuuities  and 
individuals  have  better  feelings,  through  not  falling  into 
urgent'  needs ;  whereas  war  by  taking  away  the  free  supply 
of  daily  wants  is  a  violent  master,  and  assimilates  most  men's 
tempers  to  their  present  coudition.  The  states  then  were 
thus  torn  by  sedition,  and  the  later  instances  of  it  in  any  part, 
from  having  heard  what  had  been  done  before,  exhibited 
largely  an  excessive  refinement  of  ideas,  both  in  Ithe  emi- 
nent cunning  of  their  plans,  and  the  monstrous  cruelty  of 
their  vengeance.  The  ordinary  meaning  of  words  was  changed 
by  them  as  they  thought  proper.  For  reckless  daring  was  re- 
garded as  courage  that  is  true  to  its  friends ;  j)rudent  delay,  ω 
specious  cowardice  ;  moderation  as  a  cloak  for  unmanliness ; 
being  intelligent  in  every  thing,  as  being  useful  for  nothing. 
Frantic  violence  was  assigned  to  the  manly  char.icter ;  cautious 
j)lotting  wius  considered  a  s|>ecious  excuse  for  declining  the 
contest.  The  a<lvQcate  for  cruel  measures  was  always  trusted ;  \ 
while  his  opponent  was  suspected,  lie  that  plotted^agamst 
another,  if  successful,  was  reckoned  clever;  he  that  suspected 
a  plot,  still  cleverer;  but  ho  that  forecasted  for  escaping  the 
necessity  of  all  such  things,  wiis  regarded  as  one  who  broke 
up  his  party,  and  was  afraid  of  his  adversaries.  In  a  word, 
the  man  was  commended  who  anticipated  one  going  to  do  an 
evil  deed,  or  who  persuaded  it  to  one  who  had  no  thought  of 
it.  Moreover,  kindred  became  a  tie  less  close  than  party,  l>e- 
cause  tho  latter  was  more  ready  for  unscrupulous  audacity. 
For  such  associations  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  benefit 
from  established  laws,  but  are  formed  in  opposition  to  those 
institutions  by  a  spirit  of  rapacity.  Again,  their  nmtual  grounds 
of  confidence  they  confirmed  not  so  nmeh  by  any  reference  to 
the  divine  law  as  by  fellowship  in  some  act  of  lawlcvssness. 
The  fair  professions  of  their  adversaries  they  received  Λvith  a 
cautious  eye  to  their  actions,  if  they  were  stronger  than  them- 

*  For  a  similar  uao  of /ί(ίλ/οΐ',  ct;mj)ari}  IV.  19.  7,  elre  καϊ  έκκυλίομκη• 
βίντ(ς  μα/Λον  uv  χειρωΟιϊιν. 

'  Literally  "compulsury,"  i.  e.,  which  compel  a  man  to  do  Avhat  ho 
would  otherwiso  not  think  of. 


Lxxxin.]  THUCTDIDEg.   III.  200 

selves,  nnd  not  with  a  Rpirit  of  generosity.  To  bo  avenged 
on  another  was  deemeil  of  jc^reatcr  consequence  than  to  escape 
being  first  injured  one's  self.  As  for  oaths,  if  in  any  case  cx- 
clmngcd  Λvith  a  view  to  reconciliation,  being  taken  by  cither 
party  witli  regard  to  tlieir  immediate  necessity,  they  only  held 
good  so  long  as  they  liad  no  resources  from  any  other  quarter ; 
but  he  that  first,  Avhon  occasion  olfered,  took  courage  [to  break 
them],  if  he  saw  his  enemy  off  his  guard,  wreaked  his  ven- 
geance on  him  with  greater  pleasure  for  his  confidence,  than  he 
\vould  have  done  in  an  open  manner;  taking  into  account 
both  the  safety  of  the  plan,  and  the  fact  that  by  taking  a 
treacherous  advantage  of  him  he  also  won  a  prize  for  clever- 
ness. And  the  majority  of  men,  when  dishonest,  more  easily 
get  the  name  of  talented,  than,  when  simple,  that  of  goo<.l ; 
and  of  the  one  they  are  ashamed,  Avhile  of  the  other  they  arc 
])roud.  Now  the  cause  of  all  these  things  Λ\\α3  power  pursued 
for  the  gratTfrcation  of  covetousness  and  ambition,  and  the 
consequent  violence  of  parties  when  once  engaged  in  conten- 
tion. For  the  leaders  in  the  cities,  having  a  specious  profes- 
sion on  each  side,  putting  forward,  respectively,  the  political 
equality  of  the  people,  or  a  moderate  aristocracy,  while  in 
ν,οτά  they  served  the  common  interests,  in  truth  they  made 
them  their  prizes.  And  while  struge^ling  by  every  means  to 
obtain  an  a<ivantago  over  each  other,  they  dared  and  carried 
out  the  most  dreadful  deeds ;  heaping  on  still  greater  ven- 
geance, not  only  so  far  as  was  just  and  expedient  for  the  state, 
but  to  the  measure  of  what  λ\\ι3  pleasing  to  either  party  in 
each  successive  case :  and  whether  by  an  unjust  sentence  of 
condemnation,  or  on'  gaining  the  ascendency  by  the  strong  hand, 
they  were  ready  to  glut  the  animosity  they  felt  at  the  moment 
Thus  piety  was  in  fashion  with  neither  party ;  but  those  who 
had  the  luck  to  eflfect  some  odious  purpose  under  fjur  pretenses 
Λvero  the  more  highly  spoken  of.  The  neutrals  among  tho 
citizens  were  destroyed  by  both  parties ;  either  because  they 
did  not  join  them  in  their  quarrel,  or  for  envy  that  they  should 
60  escape. 

83.  Thus  every  kind  of  villainy  arose  in  Greece  from  these 
seditions.     Simplicity,  which  is  α  very  largo  ingrodiont  in  α 

*  Or,  xtipi  may  bo  taken  by  itself,  in  opposition  to  μετΛ  ψήφ^  <ί-**Λοϋ 
καταγνύηεως ;  but  tho  rhythm  of  tho  eentenco  appears  bolter  wl*f>  the 
other  construction. 


2^0  THUpYDIDES.  IIL  [lwiv.,  txxrr. 

noblo  nature,  was  laughed  down  and  disappeared ;  and  mutual 
•  opposition  of  feeliug,  with  a  want  of  confidence,  prevailed  to 
a  great  extent  For  there  was  neither  promise  that  could  bo 
.  depended  on,  nor  oath  that  struck  theiii  with  fear,  to  put  an 
end  to  their  strife ;  but  all  being  in  their  calculations  more 
strongly  inclined  to  despair  of  any  thing  pro\nng  trustworthy, 
thev  looked  forward  to  their  own  escape  from  suffering  more 
easily  than  they  could  j)laco  confidence  [in  arrangements  with 
others].  And  the  men  of  more  homely  wit,  generally  speaking, 
had  the  advantiige ;  for  through  fearing  tlieir  own  deficiency 
and  the  cleverness  of  their  opponents,  lest  they  might  be  worsted 
in  words,  and  be  first  i)lotted  against  by  means  of  the  versatility 
of  their  enemy's  genius,  they  proceeded  boldly  to  deed?. 
Whereas  their  opponents,  arrogantly  thinking  that  they  should 
be  aware  beforehand,  and  that  there  was  no  need  for  their  se- 
curing by  action  what  they  could  by  stratagem,  were  unguard- 
ed and  more  often  ruined. 

84.  It  was  in  Coreyra  then  that  most  of  these  things  were 
first  ventured  on  ;  both  the  deeds  which  men  who  were  gov- 
erned with  α  spirit  of  insolence,  rather  than  of  moderation,  by . 
those  who  afterward  afforded  them  an  opportunity  of  vengeance, 
would  do  as  the  retaliating  party  ;  or  which  those  \vho  wished 
to  rid  themselves  of  their  accustomed  poverty,  and  passionately 
desired  the  possession  of  their  neighbor's  goods,  migiit  unjustly 
resolve  on;  or  which  those  who  had  begun  the  struggle,  not  from 
covetousness,  but  on  a  more  equal  footing,  might  savagely  and 
ruthlessly  proceed  to,  chielly  through  being  carried  aw.'iy  by 
the  rudeness  of  their  anger.  Thus  the  course  of  life  being  at 
that  time  thrown  into  confusion  in  the  city,  human  nature, 
which  is  w(Jnt  to  do  wrong  even  in  spite  of  the  laws,  liaving 
then  got  the  mastery  of  the  law,  gladly  showed  itself  to  be  un- 
restrained in  passion,  above  regard  for  justice,  and  an  enemy  to 
all  superiority.  They  would  not  else  havi^  preferred  vengeance 
to  religion,  and  gain  to  innocence;  in  which  state  envy  would 
have  had  no  power  to  hurt  them.  And  so  men  j)resume  in  their 
acts  of  vengeance  to  be  the  first  to  violate  those  common  laws 
on  such  questions,  from  which  all  have  a  hope  secured  to  them 
of  being  themselves  rescued  from  misfortune ;  and  tliey  will  not 
allow  them  to  remain,  in  case  of  any  one's  ever  being  in  danger 
and  in  need  of  some  of  them. 

85.  Such  then  were   the    passions   which   the  Corcyrjeans 


ixxxvi.,  Lxxxvn.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  III.  211 

in  t]»o  city  indulged  toward  one  another,  beinjy  the  first  that 
did  80,  And  Eurymedon  and  the  Athenians  sailed  away  Λ\Ίί1ι 
their  ships;  after  which  the  Oorcyracaii  exiles  (for  five  hun- 
dred of  tlieni  had  escaped),  havini;;  taken  soino  forts  that  were 
on  the  mainland,  were  masters  of  their  own  territory  on  tho 
opposite  coast,  and  sallying  forth  from  it,  ]>lundered  those  in 
the  island,  and  did  them  nmch  damage,  a  violent  famine  being 
produced  in  tl»e  city.  They  also  sent  embassies  to  Lacedaimon 
and  Corinth  about  their  restoration.  When  they  met  with 
no  succxiss,  they  afterward  got  some  boats  and  auxiliaries  and 
crossed  over  to  tho  island,  to  the  number  of  six  hundred  in 
all ;  and  liaving  burnt  their  boats,  that  they  might  have  no 
liopo  from  any  thing  but  tho  command  of  tho  country,  they 
Λvent  up  to  the  hill  Istone,  and  after  building  a  fort  on  if, 
lM»gan  to  annoy  those  in  the  city,  and  were  in  Ihe  mean  timo 
masti'rs  of  the  country. 

80,  At  the  close  of  the  same  summer  the  Athonians  dis- 
patched twenty  ships  to  Sicily,  with  Laches  sou  of  Melano- 
pus,  and  Charccades  son  of  Euphiletus,  in  conmiand  of  them. 
For  tho  Syracusans  and  Ijcontines  hjul  gone  to  war  with  each 
other ;  tho  Syracusans  having,  Avith  the  exception  of  Camarina, 
all  tho  Dorian  cities  in  alliance  with  thein — for  indeed  these 
had  joined  the  Lacedicmonian  confederacy  at  tho  commence- 
ment of  the  war,  though  they  ha<l  not  taken  any  part  in  it  with 
them — while,  the  Leontines  had  tho  Chalcidian  cities,  an<l  Ca- 
marina. ^  In  Italy  tho  Locrians  wero  on  the  side  of  tho  Syra- 
cusans ;  the  llhegians,  on  that  of  tho  Ijoontines,  in  conscquenco 
of  their  aifinity  to  them.  So  tho  allies  of  tho  Leontines  sent 
to  Athens,  both  on  the  ground  of  their  former  confederacy 
with  them  and  In^cause  they  were  lonians,  and  urged  tho 
Athenians  to  send  them  a  fleet,  for  they  wero  excluded  by  tho 
Syracusans  from  tho  use  both  of  land  and  sea.  Accortlingly 
the  Athenians  sent  it,  on  the  pretense  of  their  relationship,  but 
really  from  a  wish  that  no  corn  might  Iw  brought  thenco  to 
tho  Peloponnese  ;  and  to  make  an  experiment  whether  it  wero 
possible  for  them  to  bring  Sicily  into  subjection  to  themselves. 
Ilaving  established  themselves  therefore  at  Uhegium  in  Italy, 
they  began  tho  operations  of  tho  war  in  concert  >vith  Iheip 
allies.  •  And  so  tlie  summer  ended. 

87.  Tho  following  winter  tho  plagtio  ft  second  tirao  nttacked 
tho  Athenians,  having  indeed  never  entirely  left  them,  though 


212  THUCYDIDES.  III.         [lxxxtiii.,  lxxxix 

there  had  been  eomo  abatement  of  it  '  It  lasted  the  second 
time  not  less  than  a  year — the  former  attack  having  lasted 
two— 80  tliat  nothinpf  roducod  the  power  of  the  Athenians 
more  than  this.  For  not  less  than  four  thousand  four  hun- 
dred heavy-armed  in  the  ranks  died  of  it,  and  three  hundred 
of  the  equestrian  order,  with  a  number  of  ^ho  multitude  that 
was  never  ascertained.  It  was  at  that  time  also  that  the 
numerous  earthquakes  happened  at  Athens,  £ubcea,  and  Boe- 
otia,  particularly  at  Orchomenos  in  the  last-named  country. 

88.  During  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  and 
the  Rhegiuns  made  an  expedition  with  thirty  ships  against  tho 
islands  of  .^lus ;  for  in  summer  it  was  impossible  to  invade 
them,  owing  to  their  want  of  Avater.  They  are  occupied 
by  tho  Liparaian  colony  from  Cuidos,  who  live  in  one  of  tho 
islands  which  is  of  no  great  extent,  called  Li  para,  and  pro- 
ceed from  that  to  cultivate  tho  rest,  namely,  l-)idyme,  Stron- 
gyie,  and  lliera.  Now  tho  people  in  those  parts  think  that  in 
lliera  Vulcan  works  as  a  smith ;  because  it  is  seen  to  emit 
abundance  of  fire  by  night,  and  of  smoke  by  day.  These  islands 
lie  opposite  the  coasts  of  the  Sicels  and  Messanians,  and  Avero 
in  alliance  with  i\iQ  Syracusans.  Tiio  Athenians  ravaged 
their  territory,  and  when  they  did  not  surrender,  sailed  biick 
to  llhegium.  And  so  the  winter  ended,  and  the  lifth  year  o/ 
this  war,  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  tlie  history. 

89.  Tho  following  summer  the  Peloponnesians  and  their 
allies  proceeded  as  far  as  tho  Isthmus  for  the  invasion  of  At- 
tica, under  the  command  of  Agis  son  of  Archidamus,  king 
of  tho  Laceda'moniaiis ;  but  on  the  occurrence  of  numerous 
earthquakes,  they  turned  back  again,  and  no  invasion  was 
made.  About  this  j)erioil,  when  tho  earth(juakes  were  so 
prevalent,  the  seat  at  Orobia)  in  Eubcea,  having  retired  from 
what  was  then  the  line  of  coast,  and  afterward  returned  with 
a  great  swell,  invaded  a  portion  of  tho  city,  and  partly  in- 
undated it,  though  it  also  partly  subs'ded ;  and  so  that  is  now 
sea  which  was  before  land.  It  also  destroyed  the  inhabitants, 
excepting  such  as  could  nm  up  first  to  the  higher  parts  of  tho 
city.  There  was  a  similar  inun«lation  too  at  Atalanta,  the 
island  off  tho  Opuntian  Locri,  which  carried  away  a  part  of 
the  fort  built  by  the  Athenians,  and  wrecked  one  of  two  ships 
that  were  drawn  up  on  the  beach.  At  Peparethus  too  there 
was  a  retreat  of  the  sea,  though  no  inundation  followed ;  and 


xc,  xci.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  III.  213 

nn  earthquako  threw  down  a  part  of  the  wall,  witli  tho  town- 
hall,  and  a  few  houses  besides.  Tho  cause  of  this,  in  my  own 
opinion,  is,  that  where  tho  shock  of  tho  earthquake  has  been 
most  violent,  there  it  drives  tho  sea  back,  and  this  suddenly 
coming  on  again  Λvith  a  violent  rush  causes  tho  inundation. 
But  without  an  earthquako  I  do  not  think  that  such  an  occur- 
rence would  ever  happen. 

90.  During  the  samo  summer  difforent  parties,  as  they 
might  severally  happen,  made  Avar  in  Sicily ;  both  tho  Siceliots 
themselves  against  each  other,  and  the  Athenians  in  concert 
with  their  allies  ;  but  I  shall  [only]  mention  the  most  memor- 
able actions  achieved  by  tho  Athenians  and  their  allies,  or 
against  tho  Athenians  by  tho  enemy.  Charjeades  then,  tho 
Athenian  commander,  having  already  been  killed  in  war  by 
the  Syracusans,  Laches,  Avho  was  now  in  solo  command  of 
tho  fleet,  turned  his  arms,  in  concert  with  his  allies,  against 
Mylaj,  a  town  belonging  to  tho  Messanians.  Νολυ  there  wero 
two  divisions  of  tho  Messanians  in  garrison  at  Myla;,  and 
they  had  lain  an  ambush  for  the  party  coming  from  their  ships. 
Hut  tho  Athenians  and  their  allies  routed  the  troops  in  am- 
bush, and  slew  many  of  them,  and  liaving  assaulted  tho  forti- 
fications, compelled  them  to  surrender  the  citadel,  and  to 
march  with  them  against  Messana,  Afterward,  on  tho  at- 
tack of  tho  Athenians  and  their  allies,  tho  Messanians  too 
capitulated,  giving  hostages  and  {ill  other  securities.' 

91.  The  same  summer  tho  Athenians  dispatched  thirty 
ships  to  cruise  about  tho  Peloponneso,  under  the  command  of 
Demosthenes  son  of  Alcisthenes,  and  Procles  son  of^Theodor 
nis,  and  sixty  ships  and  two  thousand  heavy-armed  against 
Melos,  under  tho  command  of  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  For 
as  the  Melians  were  islanders,  and  yet  would  not  submit  to 
them  nor  join  their  confederacy,  they  wished  to  reduce  them. 
When,  however,  they  did  not  surrender  to  them  on  tho 
wasting  of  their  territory,  they  sailed  to  Oropua,  on  tho  coast 
opposite  Attica;  and  having  landed  at  night,  the  heavy- 
anncd  immediately  marched  from  their  ships  to  Tanagra  m 
BoBOtia ;  while  the  Athenians  in  tho  city,  on  a  given  signal, 
met  them  at  tho  same  place  by  latid  in' full  force,  under  tho 
command  of  Ilipponicus  son  of  Callias,  and  Eurymodon  son 

*  "  Satisfying  the  Athenians  In  all  otlicr  polntK."  Lit.  "  presenting  all 
other  things  of  such  α  nature  as  to  bo  satisfarlory." — Arnold, 


214  THUOYDIDEa  III.  [xoil.xciil 

of  Thuclcs.  Having  pitched  their  oainp  for  that  day  in  the 
territory  of  Tanagra,  they  laid  it  waste,  and  passed  the  night 
there.  The  next  day,  after  defeating  in  battle  those  of  the 
Tanagneans  and  the  Thebans  who  had  come  out  against  theni, 
and  after  taking  some  arms,  and  erecting  a  trophy,  they  re- 
turned, one  party  to  the  city,  the  other  to  their  fleet.  And 
Nicias,  with  his  sixty  ships,  coasted  along  and  ravaged  the 
maritime  parts  of  Locris,  and  then  returned  home. 

92.  About  this  time  the  Lacedaimonians  prepared  to  found 
their  colony  of  Ileraclea,  in  Trachiniai,  with  the  following 
purpose.  The  Melians  form,  in  all,  three  tribes,  the  Para- 
lians,  lliereans,  and  Trachiuians.  Of  these,  the  Trachinians, 
having  been  reduced  to  great  weakness  by  the  yEtasans,  who 
border  on  them,  intended  at  first  to  give  themselves  up  to  the 
Athenians;  but  afterward,  fearing  that  they  could  not  bo 
trusted  by  them,  they  sent  to  Laeedicmon,  having  chosen 
Tisamenus  as  their  envoy.  They  Avere  joined  in  the  embassy 
by  the  Dorians  also,  the  mother-state  of  the  Lacediemonians, 
Avith  the  same  petition ;  for  they,  too,  were  much  injured  by 
the  -/Etaians.  On  hearing  their  roijuest,  the  Lacedaemonians 
determined  to  send  out  this  colony,  from  a  wish  to  assist  both 
the  Trachiuians  and  the  Dorians,  l^sidos,  t hoy  thought  tho 
town  Avould  bo  j)laeed  advantageously  for  them  Λvith  respect 
to  tho  war  with  the  Athenians ;  for  a  fleet  Ίΐ\'\φί  be  cqtiipped 
so  as  to  liave  a  short  piissago  to  Euboia,  ami  it  would  bo  use- 
ful for  marching  to  Thrace.  Indeed  on  all  accounts  they 
were  anxious  to  found  the  j)lace.  They  first  consulted  there- 
fore the  god  at  Del})hi;  and  on  liis  advising  them  to  do  it, 
they  dispatched  the  settlers,  taken  both  from  their  own 
citizens  •  and  from  the  Pcrhrci^  and  gave  permission  to  any  of 
the  rest  of  tho  Creeks  that  wished  to  accompany  them,  ex- 
cept lonians,  Acha'ans,  and  some  other  races.  Three  of  tho 
i^icedaimonians  led  them  as  founders  of  tho  colony,  Leon, 
Alcidas,  and  Damagon.  When  they  had  established  them- 
selves in  tho  country,  they  fortified  anew  tho  city  which  is  now 
called  Ileraclea,  distant  about  forty  stades  from  Therraopylie, 
and  twenty  from  the  sea.  They  also  provided  themselves  with 
docks,  beginning  to  build  them  at  Thermopylio,  just  by  tho 
l)uss,  that  they  might  the  more  easily  be  defended  by  them. 

0.;{.  When  this  town  was  being  thus  jointly  founded,  tho 
AtliL-niaus  were  at  first  alarmel,  thinking  tliat  it  was  being  sot 


xciv.]  THUCYDIDES.  ΠΓ.  215 

up  chiefly  for  tho  nnnoyanco  of  Eiibcca,  because  tlio  passage 
to  Cin.Tum  in  that  island  is  a  short  one,  Tho  event,  how- 
ever, afterward  proved  contrary  to  their  expectation,  for  no 
danger  arose  from  it.  And  tho  reason  Avas  this.  The  Thes- 
salians,  who  had  dominion  in  tliese  parts,  and  to  the  injury  of 
whoso  territory  tho  place  was  being  founded,  fearing  they 
might  prove  very  powerful  neighbors,  continually  harassed 
.ind  made  war  upon  tho  new  settlers,  till  they  λυογο  down 
their  strength,  though  at  first  they  had  been  very  numerous ; 
for  an  the  Lacedaimonians  were  tho  founders  of  the  town, 
every  one  went  to  it  with  confidence,  thinking  it  a  place  of 
security.  It  was,  however,  tho  Lacednemonian  officers  them- 
selves, who  went  to  it,  that  chiefly  contributed  to  ruining  its 
interest*»,  and  reducing  it  to  a  scanty  population,  by  frighten- 
ing away  tho  groalor  part,  and  governing  harshly,  and  in 
some  cases  not  fairly,  so  that  their  neighbors  then  pre- 
vailed over  thcin  more  easily. 

01.  The  same  summer,  and  about  tho  same  time  that  the 
Athenians  were  detained  at  Melos,  the  forces  on  board  the  thirty 
ships  that  were  cruising  about  tho  Pcloponncse  first  of  all  laid 
an  ambush  at  Ellomcnus  in  Leucadia,  and  cut  off  some  garrison 
troops ;  and  afterward  camn  against  Leucas  with  a  larger  force, 
and  with  all  the  Acarnanians,  who  accompanied  them  in  a 
body,  except  tho  ^niada>,  and  with  tho  Zucynthians  and 
Cephollenians,  and  fifteen  ships  of  tho  Corcynrans.  The  Lcu- 
cadians,  on  iho  wasting  of  their  territory,  both  without  and 
within  tho  isthmus,  on  which  stands  Ijcucas  and  the  temple  of 
Apollo,  being  oveq>owcred  by  such  numbers,  remained  quiet ; 
while  the  Acarnanians  requested  Demosthenes,  the  general  of 
tho  Athenians,  to  cut  them  ofT  by  a  λ\έ11,  thinking  that  they 
might  then  easily  take  them  by  storm,  and  so  be  rid  of  a  city 
which  was  always  hostile  to  them.  But  Demosthenes  was  per- 
suaded at  the  same  time  by  the  Messanians  that  it  was  a  fine 
opportunity  for  him,  with  so  large  an  army  collected  together, 
to  attack  the  ^tolians,  who  were  hostile  to  Naupactus,  and  by 
reducing  whom  he  would  easily  win  for  Athens  the  rest  of  the 
continent  in  these  parts.  For  they  represented  to  him  that  tho 
nation  of  the  ^tolians,  though  numerous  and  warlike,  were  yet 
not  difficult  to  subdue  before  succors  reached  them,  as  they 
lived  in  unfortified  villages,  and  those  far  apart,  and  used  but 
light  armor.    An<l  they  advised  him  to  attack  in  the  first  place 


21β  THUCYDIDEa  IIL  txov.,xoyL 

tho  Apodotians,  next  the  Ophioncans,  and  after  them  the 
Eury  tuuians,  which  are  the  largest  division  of  the  nation,  speak- 
ing,  it  is  said,  the  most  unintelligible  language,  and  being  canni- 
bals; for  if  these  were  subdued,  tho  rest  would  readily  surrender. 

95.  He  consented  to  do  so,  out  of  regard  for  the  Messauians, 
and  still  more  because  ho  thought,  that  without  employing  tho 
forces  of  Athens,  with  only  continental  tribes  as  his  allies,  and 
with  tho  -^tolians,  he  would  bo  able  to  go  by  land  against 
the  BiEotians,  through  the  Loeri  ΟζοΙίβ  to  Cytinium  in  Doris, 
keeping  Parnassus  on  his  right  hand  till  ho  reached  tho  Pho- 
cians,  who,  he  thought,  would  eagerly  join  him,  for  tho  fncnd- 
ship  th»*y  hatl  always  borno  tho  Athonijiiis,  or  might  bo 
brought  over  by  force  ;  and  to  Phocis  Ikeotia  is  at  once  tho 
bordering  state.  Starting  tlKreturo  with  all  his  armament 
from  Leucjw,  in  opposition  to  tho  wishes  of  the  Acarnanians, 
he  coasted  along  to  Sollium.  There  Jie  coninmnicated  his 
plan  to  tho  Acarnanians ;  and  Λνΐιοη  they  did  not  assent  to  it  in 
conseiiuence  of  his  refusal  to  invest  Leucas,  he  himself  Avith 
the  remainder  of  the  force,  tho  Cephallenians,  Messanians, 
Zacynthians,  and  the  three  hundred  epihatw^  from  his  own 
ships  (for  tho  fifteen  Corcyraiau  vessels  had  gone  away),  mado 
an  expedition  «gainst  tho  yEtolians,  having  his  head-quarters 
at  ^tieon  in  Loeris.  Now  the  Lo(ai  Ozolio  were  allies  of  tho 
Athenians,  and  Λvero  to  meet  them  in  full  force  in  the  hcju't  of 
the  country  :  for  as  they  bordered  on  the  ^Etolians,  and  Λvero 
similarly  equipped,  they  were  thought  likely  to  prove  of  great 
pervico  in  acting  with  them,  from  their  acquaintance  both  with 
the  MMixn  mode  of  fighting  and  with  the  localities. 

06.  At'tor  bivouacing  with  the  army  in  the  sacred  precinct 
of  the  Nemcan  Jnpiter,  in  >vhich  Hesiod  tho  poet  is  said  to  have 
been  kille<l  by  the  people  of  this  conntry,  an  oracle  having 
before  declare»!  that  lie  should  meet  >vith  this  fate  at  Nemea ; 
in  the  morning  he  set  out  and  marched  into  ^tolia.  On  tho 
first  day  ho  took  Potidanea ;  on  tho  second,  Crocyleum ;  and 
on  the  third,  Tichium,  Avhere  ho  halted,  and  sent  off  his 
booty  to  Eupalium  in  Loeris ;  for  ha  intended,  when  he  had 
subdued  the  other  parts,  to  make  a  subsequent  expedition 
against  tho  Ophionians,  if  they  would  not  surrender,  after  re- 
turning to  Naupactus.     But  the  ^Etolians  were  both  aware  of 

'  i.  β.,  tho  heavy-armed  soldiers  who  served  on  board  ship,  aii3werin;f 
to  uir  mannes. 


χοπι.,  xcviti.]  THUCTDIDES.  Ilf.  217 

thc80  preparations  ^hen  lio  first  formed  his  designs  fiirninsl 
them,  and  when  the  army  had  invaded  their  country  they 
camo  to  tho  rescue  with  a  fjrcat  force,  all  of  them,  bo  tliat  even 
the  most  distant  of  the  Ophionians,  who  stretch  toward  tho 
Median  Gulf,  tho  Bornicnsians .  and  Calliensians,  joined  m 
bringinfr  aid. 

07.  Now  tho  Messanians  pjavo  Demosthenes  tho  following 
advice,  as  they  also  did  at  first.  Assuring  him  that  tho  reduc- 
tion of  tlio  ^tolians  was  easy,  they  urged  him  to  go  a.s  quickly 
its  possible  against  their  villages,  and  not  wait  till  the  wholo 
people  should  unite  and  oppose  him,  but  to  endeavor  suc- 
cessively to  make  himself  master  of  each  village  boforo 
liim,'  Being  thus  persuaded  by  them,  and  relying  on  his  for- 
tune, because  nothing  ever  went  against  Inm,  without  waiting 
for  those  who  should  have  reinforced  him  (for  lie  was  most  in 
Avant  of  liglit-armed  dartmen)  he  ailvanced  for  ^gitium,  and 
took  it  by  assault,  tho  inhabitants  flying  beforo  him,  and  post- 
ing themselves  on  the  hills  round  tho  town ;  for  it  stood  on 
liigh  ground,  at  tho  distance  of  about  eighty  stades  from  tho 
sea.  The  -iEtolians  (for  thev  had  now  come  to  the  rescue  of 
-^gitium)  charged  tho  Athenians  and  their  allies,  running 
down  from  tho  hills  in  different  directions,  and  plied  them 
with  darts;  retreating  when  tho  Athenian  force  advanced 
against  them,  and  pressing  it  close  when  it  retired.  And  for 
a  long  time  this  was  tho  character  of  tho  engagement — re- 
peated pursuing  and  retreating — in  both  of  which  the  Athe- 
nians had  tho  worse. 

08.  Now  so  long  as  they  saw  that  their  archers  had  their 
arrows  and  were  able  to  uso  them,  they  continued  to  resist ; 
for,  when  harassed  by  the  bowmen,  tho  -^tolians,  being  a  light- 
armed  force,  retired.  But  when,  after  the  fall  of  their  Iciflcr, 
tho  archers  were  dispersed,  and  they  themselves  distressed  by 
enduring  for  a  long  timo  tho  samo  labor,  and  the  ^toliana 
were  pressing  hard  on  them,  and  pouring  their  darts  on  them ; 
then  indeed  they  turned  and  fled,  and  falling  into  pathless  rar 
vines  and  places  with  which  they  were  unacquainted,  were  cut 
off:  for  the  cuido  who  showed  them  the  way,  Chromon  the  Mes- 
Fanian,  bad  been  killed.  And  the  ^olians,  still  plying  them 
Avith  missiles,  by  their  rapid  movements  (for  they  are  swift  of 

•  Or,  "aa  it  camo  in  his  way."  Literally,  "at  hie  feet."  Compare 
Herodotus,  3.  70,  ττύντα  τινά  των  Μάγων  τόν  Ιν  ηοσΐ  γινόμΐνον, 

10 


218  THUOYDIDES.  IIL  [xciX-CL 

foot  nu(]  light-armed)  took  many  of  tbem  there  in  the  rout, 
and  put  them  to  tho  sword  ;  but  the  greater  part  missing  their 
way  and  rushing:  into  the  forest,  from  which  there  were  no  roads 
out,  they  brought  firo  and*  burnt  it  round  them.  Indeed  tho 
Athenian  forces  >vere  subjected  to  every  form  of  flight  and 
death,  and  it  was  with  ditfieulty  that  the  survivors  escaped  to 
the  sea  and  to  (Eueon  in  Locris,  tho  same  place  from  which 
they  liad  set  out.  Great  numbers  of  tho  allies  were  slain, 
and  of  tho  Athenians  themselves  about  a  hundred  and  twenty 
heavy-amiod — so  n^any  in  number,  and  all  in  the  prime  of 
their  youth.  Those  ΛveΓO  tlio  best  men  of  the  city  of  Athens 
that  fell  during  this  war.  One  of  the  generals  also,  namely, 
Procles,  was  slain.  Having  taken  up  their  dead  under  truce, 
and  retired  to  Xau})actus,  they  afterward  went  with  their 
ships  to  Athens.  But  Demosthenes  staid  behind  in  tho 
neighborhood  of  Xaupactus  and  those  parts,  being  afraid  of 
tho  Athenians  in  consequence  of  what  had  been  done. 

09.  About  the  same  period  the  Athenians  on  tho  coast  of 
Sicily  sailed  to  Locris,  and  in  a  descent  which  they  made  on 
tho  country,  defeated  those  of  tho  Locrians  who  came  against 
them,  and  took  a  guard-foit  which  stood  on  the  river  llalex. 

100.  The  same  summer  tho  -^tolians,  having  before  [tho 
invasion  of  their  country]  sent  as  envoys  to  Corinth  and 
Lacedaimon,  Tolophus  the  Ophionean,  lioriades  the  Eury- 
tanian,  and  Tisander  tho  A|)odotian,  jKirsuaded  them  to  send 
them  an  army  to  attack  Naupactus,  because  it  had  brought 
tho  Athenians  against  them.  And  the  Lacedaimonians  dis- 
patched about  autumn  threo  thousand  heavy-armed  of  tho 
allies ;  five  hundred  of  >vhom  were  from  Ileraclea,  their  newly 
founded  city  in  Trachis.  Eurylochus,  a  Spartan,  had  tho 
command  of  tho  force,  accompanied  by  Macarius  and  Mene- 
da;us,  who  were  also  Spartans. 

101.  \Vhen  the  army  had  assembled  at  Delphi,  Eurylochus 
sent  a  herald  to  tho  Locri  Ozolai ;  for  tho  route  to  Naupactus 
was  through  their  territory,  and  moreover  ho  wished  to  mako 
them  revolt  from  the  Athenians.  Those  among  the  Locri- 
ans who  most  forwarded  his  views  were  tho  Amphissians, 
who  were  alarmed  in  conseijuenco  of  tho  enmity  of  tho  Pho- 
cian».  These  lirst  gave  hostiiges  themselves,  and  persuaded 
tho  rest  to  do  so,  in  their  fear  of  the  invading  army ;  first  the 
Myonoaus,  who  were  their  neighbors  (for  on  this  side  Locrid 


cii.]  tnUCYDIDEa  III.  219 

19  moat  diiHcult  to  enter),  then  the  Ipneans,  Messapians,  Tri- 
iieaiis,  Chahcans,  Tolopbonians,  Hessians,  and  (Eantheans. 
All  tlioso  joined  the  expedition  also.  The  Olpneans  gavo 
hostai^s,  but  did  not  accompany  tlicm ;  while  tho  ll}'ajan8  re- 
fused to  pfivo  liostages,  till  they  took  a  village  belonging  to 
them,  called  Pol  is. 

102.  When  every  thing  was  prepared,  and  ho  had  placed 
the  hostages  at  Cytiniuni  in  Doris,  ho  advanced  with  his  army 
against  Naupaotus,  through  tlio  territory  of  tho  Iberians; 
and  on  his  march  took  Qilneon,  one  of  their  towns,  and  Eupa- 
lium ;  for  they  refused  to  surrender.  When  they  had  reached 
the  Naupactian  territory,  and  the  .rEtolians  also  had  now  como 
to  their  aid,  they  ravaged  the  country,  and  took  tho  suburb' 
of  tho  ca])ital,  Λνΐιίοΐι  was  unfortitied.  They  also  went  against 
and  took  Molyenium,  Avliich,  though  a  colony  from  Corinth, 
Λyas  subject  to  the  Athenians.  Now  Demosthenes,  tho  Athe- 
nian (for  after  Λvhat  had  happened  in  yKtolia,  ho  was  still  in 
tho  neighborhood  of  Naupactus)  having  previous  notice  of 
the  armament,  and  being  ahirmed  for  tho  town,  Λvent  and  per- 
puaded  the  Acarnanians  (though  vith  difficulty,  on  account  of 
his  retreat  from  Leuca««)  to  go  to  tho  relief  of  Naupactus. 
Accordingly  they  sent  with  him  on  board  liis  ships  a  thousand 
Jieavy-armcd,  who  threw  themselves  into  tlio  place  and  saved- 
it.  For  the  Avails  l>eing  extensive,  and  the  garrison  small, 
there  was  reason  to  fear  that  they  might  not  hold  out.  When 
Eurylochus  and  liis  colleagues  fouml  that  this  force  had  enter- 
ed tho  town,  and  that  it  Avas  impossible  to  take  it  by  storm, 
they  Avithdrew,  not  toward  tho  Peloponnese,  but  to  ^Eolis, 
Avhich  is  now  called  Calydon  and  Pleuron,'  with  the  places  in 
that  quarter,  and  to  Proschium  in  -/Etnlja.  For  the  Anibra- 
ciots  had  come  to  them,  and  urged  them  to  make,  in  concert 

*  Wo  havo  no  term  exactly  nnsworlnp:  to  the  Greek  -ιτροαστεϊον,  or, 
"approach  to  tlie  city ,"  for,  as  Arnold  .observes  on  IV.  G9.  5,  "  was  not 
what  wo  call  a  eubufb,  but  rather  an  open  space  like  tho  parks  in  Lon- 
don, partly  planted  with  trees,  and  containing  public  walks,  colonnades, 
tomplos,  and  the  houses  of  somo  of  the  principal  citizens.  It  was  used 
oj  a  ground  for  reviews  of  tho  army  and  for  public  pamc^  At  Romo 
the  Campus  Martius  was  exactly  what  tho  Greeks  call  ηροαοτείον.'* 

*  i.  e.  (aa  Arnold  explains  it,  aacr  Waaso.  Talmer,  and  Kruso),  tho 
•district  onco  calle<l  ^olis  was  now  called  by  tho  names  of  tho  two  prin- 
cipal towns  In  it,  Calydon  and  Pleiiron.  Γορρο  and  Gullcr  understand 
it  as  tho  ancient  namo  οΓ  Calvdon  alone. 


220  THUOYDIDES.  IIL  [ciii.,  CIY. 

with  themeelvcs,  ^n  attack  upon  tho  Aniphilocliian  Argos  and 
the  rest  of  that  country,  and  upon  Acaruuuia  at  tlie  eaiuo  time ; 
telling  them  that  if  they  inado  themselves  masters  of  theso 
countries,  tho.  whole  of  tho  continent  would  bo  united  in  alli- 
ance with  tho  Lacedaemonians.  So  Kur}'lochue  consented, 
and  having  dismissed  tho  yEtolians,  remained  quiet  >vith  his 
army  in  that  neighborhood,  till  ho  should  liavo  to  assist  iho 
Ambraciots,  on  their  taking  tlic  field  before  Argos.  And  so 
the  summer  ended. 

103.  Tho  following  Avinter,  tho  Athenians  in  Sicily  having 
marched  with  their  (irecian  allies,  and  as  many  of  tlio  Sieels 
as  joined  them  in  tho  war — being  either  subject  by  force  to 
tho  Syracusans  or  allies  who  liad  revolted  fn»m  tliem — 
against  Inessa,  tho  Sieel  town,  tho  ciUuk-l  of  which  was  held 
by  the  Syracusans,  attacked  it,  ami,  not  being  able  to  take  it, 
retired.  On  their  return,  the  Syracusans  from  tho  ciUidel 
fell  on  the  allies  as  they  λυιτο  retiring  somewhat  after  tho 
Athenians,  and  routed  a  division  of  their  army,  and  killed  no 
small  number.  After  this,  Laches  and  tho  Athenians,  Avith 
tho  fleet,  made  some  descents  upon  tho  Ix>crian  ti-rritory,  by 
tho  river  Coecinus,  and  defeated  in  battle  those  of  the  Locrians 
Λνΐιο  came  out  ngainst  them  with  Proxenus  the  son  of  Capjiton, 
about  three  hundred  in  number,  and  having  taken  some  arms, 
departed. 

104.  Tho  same  winter  also  the  Athenians  ]»urified  Delos,  in 
obedience,  as  they  j)rofessed,  to  a  certain  oracle.  For  I'isistra- 
tus  the  tyrant  had  also  j)urified  it  before ;  not  the  Λνΐιοΐο  of 
the  island,  but  as  much  of  it  iis  Λvas  >vithin  sight  of  tho  tem- 
ple. At  this  time,  however,  the  whole  of  it  was  purified  in 
the  following  manner.  All  the  sejiulchers  of  thoso  who  liad 
died  in  Delos  they  removed,  an<l  comman<led  that  in  future  no 
one  should  either  die  in  the  island  or  bear  a  child,  but  that 
[in  such  cases  all  should]  be  carried  across  to  lihenea.  (This 
llhenea  is  so  short  a  distance  from  Delos,  that  Tolycrates  tho 
tyrant  of  Samos,  after  being  powerful  at  sea  for  a  consider- 
ablo  time,  and  ruUng  over  the  rest  of  the  islands,  and  taking 
Jihenea,  dedicated  it  to  tho  Delian  Apollo,  by  connecting  it 
with  Delos  by  a  chain).  It  Avas  at  this  time,  too,  after  tho 
purification,  that  the  Athenians  first  celebrated  tho  qninquen- 
iiial  festival  of  the  Delian  games.  There  had  been,  however, 
even  in  very  early  times,  a  great  assembly  of  the  lonians  and 


CT.]  TnUCYDIDES.   III.  221 

tho  ncigMx)ring  islanders  licUl  at  Delos;  for  thev  used  to 
come  to  tlic  feast  Avitli  tlieir  Avives  and  children,  as  tno  lonians 
now  do  to  the  Ephesian  festivals,  and  gymnastic  and  musicaf 
contests  were  held,  and  the  different  cities  took  up  bands  of 
dancers.  Homer  shoAvs  most  clearly  that  such  was  the  case, 
in  Iho  following  verses,  t'lken  from  a  hymn  to  ΛροΙΙο. 

"  Ληοη  to  Dclo3,  Phoebus,  wouldst  thou  como, 

Still  most  delighting  in  thine  island-homo ; 
:  ΛνΠοΓο  tho  long-robed  lonians  thronging  meet, 

"With  wives  and  children,  at  thy  hallow'd  seat; 

With  buiTets,  dance,  and  song  extol  thy  namo, 

And  win  thy  smilo  upon  their  solemn  game." 

That  there  was  a  musical  contest  also,  and  that  they  went  to 
tiko  part  in  it,  ho  shows  ac^ain  in  the  following  verses,  taken 
from  tho  same  hymn.  For  after  mentioning  the  Delian  danco 
of  tho  women,  he  ends  Iiis  praise  of  tho  pod  with  these  verses, 
in  which  he  also  makes  mention  of  himself. 

"Now  bo  Apollo  kind,  and  Dian  too; 
And  ye,  fair  Delian  damsels,  all  adieu! 
liut  in  your  memory  grant  mo  still  a  homo ; 
And  oft  as  to  your  sacred  islo  may  como 
A  pilgrim  care-worn  denizen  of  earth, 
And  ask,  ΛνΙιϋο  joining  in  your  social  mirth, 
'  Maidens,  of  all  tho  bards  that  seek  your  coast, 
'  Wh.o  sings  tho  sweetest,  and  who  charms  you  most?* 
Then  answer  ono  and  all,  with  gracious  smilo, 
•A  blind  old  man  who  lives  in  Chios'  rocky  islo.'  " 

Such  evidence  does  Ilomcr  afford  of  there  liaving  been,  even 
in  early  times,  a  great  assembly  and  festival  at  Delos.  But 
afterward,  though  tho  islanders  and  tho  Athenians  sent  tho 
bands  of  dancers  with  sacrifices,  tho  games  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  observances  Averc  abolished — as  is  most  probable, 
through  .adversity — until  tho  Athenians  held  the  games  at  that 
time,  with  liorsc-races,  which  before  had  not  been  usual. 

105.  Tho  same  winter  tho  Ambraciots,  as  they  had  prom- 
ised Eurj'lochus  wlien  they  retained  liis  army,  marched  forth 
R;rainst  tho  Amphilochian  Argos  with  three  thousand  heavy- 
armed  ;  and  entering  tho  Argivo  territory,  occupied  Olpae,  a 
stronghold  on  η  hill  near  tho  sea,  which  the  Acamanians 
had  once  fortified,  and  used  as  their  common  place  of  meet- 
ing for  judicial  purposes;  its  distance  from  tho  city  of  Argos 
on  the  coast  being  about  twenty-five  stados.     Now  some  of 


222  THUCYPIDER  III.  [cvL.ovn. 

the  Acarnaniane  went  to  tho  relief  of  Argos,  while  others  en- 
camped ill  Amphilochio,  iu  tho  place  called  Crcno),*  being  on 
the  watch  to  prevent  tho  Peloponnesians  with  Enrylochua 
passing  through  unobserved  to  tho  Ambraeiots.  They  also 
eent  for  Demosthenes,  who.  had  comnumded  the  Athenian  ex- 
pedition against  yEtolia,  to  bo  their  leader ;  and  for•  tho  twenty 
Athenian  ships  that  happened  to  bo  cruising  about  tho  Pelo- 
ponnese,  under  tho  command  of  Aristotoles  son  of  Timocrates, 
and  Iliorophon  son  of  Antimnestus,  Tlio  Ambraciots  at  Olpas 
also  sent  a  messenger  to  their  city,  desiring  tliem  to  como  in 
full  forco  to  their  assistance,  fearing  that  the  troops  under 
Euryloehus  might  not  bo  able  to  etlcct  a  passage  through 
^ho  Acarnanians,  and  that  they  thems<'lves  might  either  have 
to  fight  unsupported,  or,  if  they  wished  to  retreat,  find  it  uii- 
Siifo  to  do  so. 

100.  Tho  Peloponnesians  Avith  Eurylochus,  therefore,  find- 
ing that  tho  Anibraciuts  at  Olpai  Avero  coine,  set  out  from  Pros- 
chium  and  went  as  quickly  as  possible  to  their  aiil ;  and  having 
crossed  tho  Achelous,  proceeded  through  Acarnat.i.i,  which 
was  left  deserted  in  consemienco  of  tho  reinforcemeht  sent  to 
Argos ;  keeping  on  their  nght  liand  tho  city  of  the  Stratians 
>vith  their  garrison,  and  on  tho  left  tho  rest  of  A<;arnania. 
After  pa-^sing  tho  territory  of  tho  Stratians,  they  proc^'tled 
through  Phytia,  and  again  through  Medeon,  along  the  bor- 
ders; then  through  Limnica;  and  so  they  entered  tho  territory 
of  tho  -t'Egraians,  which  forined  no  part  of  Aearnania,  but  was 
friendly  to  themselves.  Tht^n,  having  reached  Mount  Thy- 
amus,  which  is  uncultivated,  they  proceeded  across  it,  and  so 
camo  down  into  the  Argivo  country  by  night,  and  passing 
unobserved  between  the  city  of  Argos  and  tho  Acarnanian 
posts  at  Crenie,  joined  tho  Ambraciots  at  Olpae. 

107.  Having  thus  etl'ected  a  union  at  day-break,  they  sat 
down  at  tho  place  called  Metropolis,  and  formed  their  encamp- 
ment. Not  long  after,  tho  Athenians  camo  M'ith  their  twenty 
ships  into  tho  Ambracian  Gulf  to  assist  tho  Argives;  and 
Demosthenes  arrived  Avith  two  Imndnd  heavy-armed  of  tho 
Messenians,  and  sixty  Athenian  archer.-!.  Tiu^  lleot  therefore 
at  Olpai  blockaded  tho  hill  from  the  sea;  whilr  the  Acarnani- 
ans  and  a  few  of  tho  Amphilochians  (ior  liio  majority  were 
forcibly  detained  by  tho  Ambraciots)  hat  I  by  this  timo  met  at 
*  Corresponding  exactly  to  our  "  WoUa." 


evil]  TIIUCTDIDES.  Uf,  223 

Argos,  and  were  preparing  to  cnga^  with  the  enemy,  having 
appointed  Demosthenes  as  commander  of  the  whole  army  in 
concei-t  with  their  own  generals.  He,  having  led  them  near 
to  Olpai,  encamj)cd  there;  a  great  ravine  separating  their 
annies.  For  five  days  they  remained  still,  but  on  the  sixth 
both  mdes  drew  up  lor  battle.  And  as  the  force  of  the  Po• 
loponnesians  was  the  larger,  and  outflanked  his,  Demosthenes, 
O'aring  that  ho  might  bo  surrounded,  placed  in  ambush  in  a 
hollow  way  covered  Avith  a  thicket,  a  body  of  lieavy  and  light- 
arnicd  troops,  four  liundred  in  all,  that  on  the  ilank  of  tho 
enemy  which  reached  beyond  his  own,  theso  troops  might  rise 
up  in  the  very  midst  of  the  conflict  and  take  them  in  their 
rear.  When  tho  preparations  were  completed  on  both  sides, 
they  ch^ed  in  battle.  l)em(>sthenes  occupied  tho  right  wing  with 
tho  Messanians  and  the  few  Athenians;  whii'e  the  remainder 
of  tho  lino  vvas  formed  by  the  Acarnaiiians  in  their  several 
divisions,  and  the  Amphilochian  dartmen  tha^.  were  jiresent. 
The  iVloponnesians  and  Ambraciots  were  drnwn  up  without 
distinction,  excepting  tho  Mantineans,  who  kept  together 
more  on  the  left,  though  not  in  tho  extremity  of  the  flank,  for 
the  extreme  left  vvas  held  by  Eurylochus  and  ma  men,  opposed 
to  tho  MesFAuians  and  Demosthenes. 

108.  When  the  reloponnesians,  being  ni>M  engaged,  out- 
fl:»nked  ihcir  oj)poncnts,  and  were  surroundini»  their  right, 
the  Acarnanians,  rising  from  the  ambuscade,  ί,ΊΙ  on  thoni  iu 
Iho  rear,  and  broke  them  ;  so  that  they  did  not  fitand  to  mako 
any  resistance,  and,  moreover,  by  their  panic  threw  their 
main  army  into  flight;  for  when  they  saw  tlio  division  of 
lOurylochuA,  and  the  bravest  of  their  forces  being  cut  to  pieces, 
tliey  were  far  more  alarm(Hl.  It  was  tho  Mossanians,  posted 
in  that  part  of  tho  field  with  Demosthenes,  that  f  orformed  tho 
chief  part  of  tho  vvork.  But  tho  Aml>raciot8  and  those  in  tho 
right  wing  defeate<l  tho  division  opposed  to  them,  and  pur- 
sued it  back  t^  Argos;  for  they  arc  tno  most  wr.iiiko  of  all  in 
(hoso  parts.  AVhen,  however,  on  their  return  ih^y  saw  their 
main  army  defeated,  and  tho  rest  of  tho  Acanimians  wero 
pressing  them  closely,  they  escaped  with  difliciiltpnto  Olpic; 
an«l  many  of  them  were  killed,  while  they  hurried  on  without 
any  order,  excepting  the  Mantineans,  wlio  kept  their  ranka 
l)est  of  all  tho  army  during  the  retreat  And  so  tho  battlo 
ended,  after  lasting  till  evening. 


224  THUOYDIDES.  ΙΠ.  [cix-cxi. 

109.  The  next  day  Menedaeus,  who  on  the  death  of  Eury- 
lochus  and  Macariua  had  euccecded  to  the  sole  command, 
Avaa  at  a  loss,  eiuco  so  great  a  defeat  had  been  experienced, 
to  SCO  in  what  way  ho  sliould  either  remain  and  sufitain  a 
siege — cut  oiF  as  ho  wan  by  land,  and  at  the  same  time, 
through  the  presence  of  the  Athenian  fleet,  by  sea — or  should 
escape  if  he  retreated.  Ho  therefore  made  proposals  to  De- 
mosthenes and  the  Acarnani;ins  for  a  truce,  and  permission  to 
retire,  as  well  as  for  the  recovery  of  his  dead.  They  re- 
stored him  his  dead,  and  themselves  erected  a  trophy,  and 
took  up  their  own  dead,  about  three  hundred  in  number ;  but 
for  permission  to  retire  they  did  not  ojx'nly  grant  any  tiuco 
to  the  whole  army;  but  bemoslheiies  and  his  Acarnanian 
colleagues  secretly  granted  one  to  the  Mantineans,  and  Me- 
nedyeus  and  the  other  IVloponnesiau  commanders,  to  retreat 
Λvith  all  speed ;  wishing  to  strip  of  their  supporters  the  Am- 
braciota  «nd  the  mercenary  host  of  foreigners ;  but  most  of  all 
desiring  to  raise  a  prejudice  against  the  Lacedicmonians  «nd 
Peloponnehians  among  the  (ireeks  in  those  parts,  from  the 
impression  of  tlnnr  having  betrayed  their  friends,  and  deemed 
their  own  interest  of  more  importance.  They,  then,  took  up 
their  dead,  and  were  burying  them  with  all  speed,  as  circum- 
statices  allowed ;  while  those  who  IkuI  received  jKTmission 
were  planning  their  retreat. 

110.  Now  ti< lings  were  brought  to  Demosthenes  and  the 
Acarnanians,  that  the  Andiraciots  at  home,  in  comj)lianeo 
with  the  first  message  from  Olpa',  were  marching  in  full  force 
with  succors  through  Amphilochia,  Avith  a  wish  to  join  iheir 
countrymen  at  Olpa•,  and  knowing  nothing  of  what  hail  liap- 
pened.  A(!Cordingly  lie"  straightway  sent  a  division  to  lay 
ambushes  beforehand  in  the  roads,  an<l  to  preoccupy  the 
strong  positions  ;  while  with  the  rest  of  his  army  he  prepared 
to  march  against  them. 

111.  Meanwhile  the  Mantineans,  and  those  to  whom  the 
Iruco  hatl  been  granted,  going  out  under  the  pretext  of 
«(alliering  herbs  and  fire-wood,  secretly  went  away  in  small 
jariies,  picking  up  at  the  same  time  the  things  for  which  they 
professed  to  have  left  the  cauip :  but  when  they  had  now  pro- 
ceeded some  distance  from  Olpu;,  they  bi'gan  to  retreat  at  a 
quicker  pace.     The  Auibraciots  and  the  rest,  as  many  as  hap- 


cxii.]  THUCYDIDES.  III.  225 

pcncd  thus  to  havo  pjono  out  with  tliem  in  a  body,*  when  they 
found  that  they  wcro  p^ono  away,  themselves  also  pushed  for- 
ward, and  bep^an  running,  on  purpose  to  overtake  them.  But 
tiio  Acarnaniana  at  first  thoui^ht  tliat  all  alike  Avcrc  flying 
without  permission,  and  l>egan  to  pursue  the  Peloponnesians ; 
and  when  some  even  of  their  generals  tried  to  stop  them,  and 
said  that  permission  liad  been  granted  to  the  Peloponncsians, 
one  or  two  men  threw  their  darts  at  them,  believing  that 
they  were  being  betrayed.  Afterward,  however,  they  let  the 
Mantineans  and  Peloponnesians  go  away,  but  killed  the  Am- 
braciots.  And  there  was  much  contention  and  diificulty  in 
distinguishing  whether  a  man  was  an  Ambraciot  or  a  IVlo- 
ponncsian.  They  killed  some  two  hundred  of  them ;  the  rest 
escaped  into  Agra^a,  a  bordering  territory,  and  Salajthus, 
king  of  the  Agraians,  being  their  fiiend,  received  them. 

112.  The  Ambraeiots  from  the  city  arrived  at  Idomene. 
This  town  consists  of  two  high  hills ;  the  greater  of  which, 
after  night  had  como  on,  the  troops  sent  forward  from  tho 
camp  by  Demosthenes  preoccupied  unobseved ;  while  tho 
Ambraeiots  ha<l  previously  ascended  tho  smaller,  and  bivou- 
ocod  on  it.  DemovSthenes,  after  supper,  marched  with  the 
rest  of  tho  army  as  soon  as  it  was  evening ;  himself  with  half 
of  his  force  making  for  tho  pass,  tho  remainder  proceeding 
over  tho  mountains  of  Ampliilochia.  At  dawn  of  day  ho  fell 
upon  tho  Ambraeiots,  Avhile  they  were  yet  in  their  beds,  and 
had  had  no  notice  of  his  measures,  but  much  rather  imagined 
that  liis  forces  were  their  own  countrymen.  For  Demosthenes 
h;id  j)urposely  posted  tho  Messtinians  first,  with  orders  to  ad- 
dress them,  speaking  iii  tho  Doric  dialect,  and  so  creating  con- 
fidenco  in  tho  sentinels  ;  while  at  tho  same  time  they  >vcro  riot 
visible  to  tho  eye,  as  it  was  still  night.  When  therefore  he 
fell  upon  them,  tliey  routed  them,  and  slew  tho  greater  part 
on  tho  spot;  tho  rest  rushed  in  flight  over  the  mountains. 
But  as  tho  roads  wero  preoccupied,  anci  tho  Amphilochians, 
moreover,  wero  Mell  acquainted  with  their  own  country,  and 
light-armotl  against  a  lieavy-armed  cnomy,  wliorcas  the  Am- 
braciotA  wero  unacnuainted  with  it,  and  Icncw  not  which  way 
to  turn,  tlu»y  ]>eristied  by  falling  into  ravines,  and  the  am- 

'  'Αθρόοι  Bcoms  to  be  in  opposition  to  ner'  όλίγηνς  In  tho  procoding 
•ociion.  Or  it  may  sipfnlfy,  as  Arnold  takes  it,  in  euoh  numbers  aa  wouM 
justify  tho  experiment,  which  small  parties  mif?ht  think  too  hawirdoua 

10* 


22β  THUOYDIDES.  ΙΠ.  [cxui. 

bushes  that  had  been  previously  laid.  Afler  attempting 
every  mode  of  escape,  eomo  of  them  also  turned  to  the  sea, 
which  was  not  far  oft';  and  when  they  saw  the  Athenian 
ships  coasting  along  shore  at  the  time  that  the  afiair  hap- 
pened, they  swam  to  them,  in  their  present  alarm  thinking 
It  better  to  bo  Blaiu,  if  they  must,  by  those  on  board,  than 
by  their  barbarous  and  most  bitter  enemies,  the  Amphi- 
lochians.  The  Ambraciots  then  were  destroyed  in  this  man- 
ner, and  only  few  of  many  escaped  to  their  city.  Tho 
Acarnanians,  after  stripping  tho  dead,  and  erecting  trophies, 
returned  to  Argos, 

113.  Tho  next  day  there  came  to  them  a  herald  from  tho 
Ambraciots  Λνΐιο  had  fled  from  Olpae  into  Agra^a,  to  ask  per- 
mission to  take  up  tho  dead  whom  they  had  slain  after  the 
first  engagement,  Avhen  they  left  the  camp  without  j>ermiasion 
with  the  Mantineans  and  those  λυΙιο  had  received  it.  At 
sight  of  the  arms  taken  from  tho  Ambraciots  from  the  city, 
the  herald  was  astonished  at  their  number ;  for  ho  was  not 
acquainted  with  the  disiistcr,  but  imagined  that  they  had  be- 
longed to  their  own  party.  And  some  one  asked  him  why 
ho  was  so  astonished ;  and  how  many  of  them  had  been  killed ; 
his  interrog.itor  again  supposing  him  to  be  the  herald  from  tho 
troops  at  Idomene.  lie  said,  "  About  two  hundred."  His  in- 
terrogator, taking  him  Uj»,  said,  **  These  then  are  evidently  not 
the  arms  [of  such  a  number],  but  of  more  than  a  thousand.'* 
The  herald  said  in  reply,  "  Then  they  are  not  tho  arms  of 
those  who  fought  >vith  us."  lie  answered,  **Yes,  they  are; 
if  at  least  it  was  you  that  fought  yesterday  at  Idomene."  "  We 
fought  Avith  no  one  yesterday ;  but  the  day  before,  on  our 
retreat."  "Ay,  but  we  fought  yesterday  with  these,  who 
had  come  as  a  reinforcement  from  the  city  of  the  Ambraciots." 
AVhen  tho  herald  heard  that,  and  learned  that  the  reinforce- 
ment from  the  city  had  been  cut  οίΤ,  breaking  out  into  wailing, 
and  astounded  at  the  magnitude  of  tho  present  evils,  he  re- 
turned without  executing  his  commission,  and  no  longer  asked 
back  tho  bodies.  For  this  Λvas  the  greatest  disaster  that 
befell  any  one  Grecian  city  in  an  equal  number  of  days  during 
the  course  of  this  war:  and  I  have  not  recorded  the  numbers 
of  the  slain,  because  the  multitude  said  to  have  fallen  is  in- 
credible, in  comparison  with  the  size  of  the  city.  I  know, 
however,  that  if  tho   Acarnanians  and    Amphilochians  had 


oxiT.,cxv.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  ΙΙΓ.  227 

wished,  in  comj)Haiico  with  tho  ndvico  of  Demosthenes,  io 
take  Ambracia,  they  ΛνουΚΙ  liavo  done  so  on  the  first  assault  I 
but  ns  it  was,  they  were  afraid  that  the  Atlieniaus,  if  they  had 
possession  of  it,  might  prove  more  troublesome  neighbors  to 
themselves.  • 

114.  After  this,  they  allotted  a  third  of  tho  spoils  to  tho 
Athenians,  and  divided  the  rest  amonjoj  their  several  cities. 
Those  given  to  tho  Athenians  were  taken  while  on  their 
voyage  home ;  and  what  are  now  deposited  in  the  temples  of 
Attica,  arc  three  Imndred  full  suits  of  armor,  which  were 
reserved  for  Demosthenes,  and  with  which  he  sailed  back 
home ;  his  restoration  after  tho  disaster  in  ^tolia  being  ren; 
dered  more  safe  in  consequence  of  this  achievement.  Tho 
Athenians  on  board  tho  twenty  ships  also  returned  to  Nau- 
paetus.  The  Acarnanians  and  Amphilochians,  on  tho  de- 
parture of  the  Athenians  and  of  Demosthenes,  granted  a  truco 
to  the  Ambraciots  and  Peloponnesians  who  had  taken  refugo 
with  Salynthus  and  tho  Agra^ans,  to  return  from  uilniadie, 
whither  they  had  removed  from  tho  country  of  Salynthus, 
And  to  ]>rovido  for  tho  future,  they  also  concluded  a  treaty 
and  alliance  for  a  Imndred  years  with  the  Ambraciots,  on 
those  conditions :  that  neither  the  Ambraciots  should  march 
with  tho  Acarnanians  against  tho  Peloponnesians,  nor  tho 
Acarnanians  Λvith  tho  Ambraciots  against  the  Athenians; 
but  that  they  should  succor  each  other's  country;  and  that 
the  Ambraciots  should  restore  Avhatever  towns  or  hostages 
they  held  from  the  Ampliilochians,  and  not  go  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Anactorium,  which  >vas  liostile  to  tho  Acarnanians. 
llanng  made  these  arrangements,  they  put  an  end  to  the  war. 
Afterward  the  Corinthians  sent  a  garrison  of  their  own  citi- 
zens to  Arabracia,  consisting  of  three  hundred  heavy-armed, 
under  the  command  of  Xenoclides  son  of  Euthycfes,  who 
reached  their  destination  by  a  difficult  route  through  Epirus. 
Such  was  tho  conclusion  of  the  measures  in  Ambracia. 

115.  The  Athenians  in  Sicily  tho  same  winter  made  a  do- 
Rcent'  from  their  ships  on  tho  territory  of  llimcra,  in  concert 
with  tlio  Sicels,  who  had  made  an  irruption  on  its  borders 
from  tho  interior ;  they  also  sailed  against  tho  islands  of 
Ah\us,  On  their  return  to  Rhegium  they  found  that  Py- 
thodorus  son  of  Isolochus,  a  general  of  the  Athenians,  had 
como  to  succeed  to  the  command  of  the  ships  under  Laches; 


328  THUOYDIDEa  ΙΠ.  (οχη 

tho  allies  in  Sicily  having  eailod  and  persuaded  the  Athe- 
nians to  assist  them  with  more  vessels.  For  though  the  Sy- 
racusans  commanded  their  laud,  yet,  as  they  were  excluded 
from  tho  sea  by  only  a  few  ships,  they  were  making  prepara• 
tions,  and  raising  a  fleet,  with  a  determination  not  to  put  up 
with  it.  And  tho  Athenians  manned  forty  ships  to  send  to 
them ;  thinking  tliat  so  tho  war  in  that  quarter  would  bo  moro 
speedily  brought  to  a  conclusion,  and  at  the  same  time  wishing 
to  practice  their  men  in  seamanship.  They  dispatched  there- 
fore one  of  their  commanders,  Pythodorus,  with  a  few  ships ; 
intending  to  send  out  Sophocles  son  of  Sostradides,  and  ICu- 
rymedon  son  of  Thucles,  with  the  larger  squadron.  So  Pytho- 
dorus, being  now  in  command  of  Laches'  ships,  sailed  at  tho 
close  of  the  winter  to  the  fort  of  tho  Locrians,  %vhich  Laches 
had  formerly  taken;  and  returned  after  being  defeated  in 
battle  by  tho  Locrians. 

116.  Just  about  the  beginning  of  this  spring,  the  fire  flood 
issued  from  ^tna,  as  it  had  done  on  former  occasions,  and 
destroyed  some  of  tho  territory  of  tho  Catanaians,  who  live  on 
Mount  yEtna,  tho  largest  mountain  in  Sicily.  It  is  said  that 
this  eruption  took  place  fifty  years  after  tho  preceding  one ; 
and  that  it  hiis  occurred  three  times  in  all  since  Sicily  has 
been  inhabited  by  the  Greeks.  These  were  tho  events  of  this 
winter ;  and  so  ended  tho  sixth  year  of  this  war,  of  which 
Thucydidei  wrote  the  history. 


BOOK  IV. 


1.  Τηβ  following  Bummer,  about  the  time  of  the  corn's 
coming  into  ear,  ten  Syracusan  ships  and  an  emial  number  of 
Locrians  sailed  and  occupied  Messana  in  Sicily,  at  the  in- 
vitation of  the  inliabitants ;  and  so  Messana  revolted  from  the 
Athenians.  This  was  chiefly  done  by  the  Syracusans  be- 
cause they  saw  that  the  place  afforded  an  approach  to  Sicily, 
and  were  afraid  that  the  Athenians  might  hereafter  make  it 
their  head-qtiartcrs  and  proceed  against  thcni  with  α  larger 
force ;  by  the  Locrians,  for  hatred  of  the  people  of  Rhe- 
gium,  and  with  a  wish  to  reduce  them  by  hostilities  on  both 
sides.  At  the  same  time  too  the  Locrians  had  invaded  the 
territory  of  Rhcgium  Λvith  all  their  forces,  to  prevent  their 
going  to  the  rescue  of  Messana,  and  also  at  the  mstigation  of 
some  exiles  from  Khegium  Λνΐιο  were  with  them.  For  that 
town  had  beeii  for  a  long  time  torn  by  faction,  and  it  was  im- 
possible at  the  present  time  to  resist  the  Locrians ;  for  which 
reason  they  were  the  more  determined  to  attack  them.  After 
devastating  the  country',  the  Locrians  retired  with  their  land- 
forces,  but  their  ships  remained  to  guard  Messana ;  and  others 
that  were  being  manned  were  to  go  to  that  station,  and  carry 
on  the  war  from  it. 

2.  About  the  same  period  of  the  spring,  before  the  com  was 
ri}">e,  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies  made  an  incursion  into 
Attica,  under  the  conduct  of  Agis  son  of  Achidamus,  king  of 
the  Lacedaemonians ;  and  pitching  their  camp  in  the  country, 
proceeded  to  lay  it  Avaste.  But  the  Athenians  dispatched  the 
forty  ships  to  Sicily,  as  they  had  been  preparing  to  do, 
and  the  remaining  generals,  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles;  for 
Pythodorus,  the  third  of  them,  had  already  arrived  in  Sicily 
before  them.  These  they  also  ordered  to  attend,  as  they  sailed 
by  the  island,  to  those  of  the  Corcyreans  who  were  in  the  city, 
and  who  were  being  plundered  by  the  exiles  on  the  mountain ; 
sixty  ships  having  likewise  sailed  from  the  Peloponncso  to  assist 


230  iflUCYDIDES.  ly.  [ui^  ir, 

those  on  tbo  mountaiDi  and  with  an  idea,  that  as  there  was  a 
ςζτβ&ί  famine  in  the  city,  they  ehould  easily  possess  themselves 
uf  the  government.  Demosthenes,  who  had  continued  in  α 
private  capacity  since  his  return  from  Acamania,  was,  at  his 
own  request,  authorized  by  them  to  use  that  fleet,  if  he  wished, 
for  service  about  the  Peloponneso. 

3.  WTien,  on  their  voyage,  they  were  off  Laconia,  and  heard 
that  the  Peloponnesian  ships  were  already  at  Corcyra,  Euryme- 
don  and  Sophocles  were  for  hastening  thither,  but  Demosthenes 
desired  them  to  touch  first  at  Pylus,  and  after  doing  what  wjis 
necessary,  then  to  proceed  on  their  voyage.  ΛVhilo  they  were 
making  objections,  a  storm  han|Mined  to  come  on,  and  carried 
the  fleet  to  Pylus.  So  Demosthenes  immediately  begged  them 
to  fortify  the  place  (for  this,  ho  said,  was  his  object  in  sailing 
with  them),  and  showed  thorn  that  there  was  great  abundance 
of  timber  and  stone,  and  that  the  post  Λvas  a  strong  one,  and  un- 
occupied, both  itself  and  a  considerable  distance  of  the  country 
round.  For  Pylus  is  about  four  hundred  stades  from  Spartii, 
and  is  situated  in  what  was  once  the  Messanian  territory,  be- 
ing called  by  the  Lacedaemonians  Corj'phasium.  lint  the  com- 
manders said  that  there  ΛveΓo  many  unoccupied  promontories  in 
the  Peloponnese,  if  ho  wished  to  j)ut  the  state  to  expense  by 
occupying  them.  IL»,  however,  considered  that  this  was  a  more 
advantageous  post  than  any  other,  inasmuch  as  there  was  a 
harbor  close  by,  and  the  Messanians,  Λvho  in  early  times  Λvero 
connected  with  the  j)lace,  and  spoke  the  same  dialect  Avith  the 
Lacedaimonians,  would  do  them  very  great  injury  by  their  ex- 
cursions from  it,  and  at  the  same  time  bo  trusty  guardians  of 
the  place. 

4.  ΛVhen  ho  could  not  convince  either  the  generals  or  tho 
soldiers,  having  subsequently  communicated  his  views  to  tho 
subordinate  otHcers  also,  ho  remained  quiet  from  stress  of 
weather ;  till  tho  soldiers  themsi^'lves,  in  their  want  of  occupa>» 
tion,  were  seized  with  a  desire  to  set  to  and  fortify  the  j)ost. 
Accordingly  they  took  tho  work  in  hand,  and  proceeded  with 
it,  though  they  had  no  iron  tools,  but  carried  stones  just  as 
they  picked  them  up,  and  put  them  together,  as  they  severally 
might  happen  to  fit;  Λνΐιίΐο  tiio  nioi tar,  wherever  it  was  ne- 
cessary to  use  any,  for  want  of  hods  lluy  caniiMl  on  their 
back,  stooping  down  in  such  a  way  that  it  might  best  lie  on,- 
and  clasping   their  hands  behind  theuj,  to  prevent  iuj  falling 


T.-vm.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  231 

off.  Indeed  in  every  way  they  made  haste  to  anticipate  the 
Lacedaemonians,  by  completinij^  the  most  assailable  points  of 
the. work  before  they  came  to  the  rescue;  for  the  greater  part 
of  the  position  λ\άά  stronjr  by  nature,  and  had  no  need  of 
fortifications. 

5.  Now  the  Lace<la;monians  happened  to  bo  celebrating  a 
festival ;  and,  moreover,  >vhen  they  heard  it,  they  made  light 
of  it,  thinking  that  when  they  took  the  field,  cither  the  enemy 
ΛνοηΜ  not  wait  their  attack,  or  they  should  easily  take  the  place 
by  btorm.  To  a  certain  extent  also  the  fact  of  their  army  being 
Btill  before  Athens  delayed  them.  So  the  Athenians,  after  forti- 
fying in  six  days  the  side  toward  the  interior,  and  what  most 
required  it,  left  Demosthenes  there  with  five  ships  to  protect  the 
])lace,  while  with  the  main  body  of  the  Jlcct  they  hastened  on 
their  voyage  to  Corcyra  an<l  Sicily. 

G.  AVheu  the  IVloponnesians  in  Attica  heard  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Pylus,  they  returned  liome  with  all  sjx'ed ;  for  the  Lace- 
docmonians  and  Agis  their  king  thought  that  the  affair  of  Pylus 
closely  atfected  them ;  and,  besides,  having  made  their  incursion 
early  in  the  season,  and  while  the  corn  Λvas  still  green,  they 
were  in  Λvant  of  provisions  for  most  of  their  troops;  while 
Rtormy  >veather,  coming  on  with  greater  violence  than  was 
usual  at  that  season,  distressed  the  army.  So  that  for  many 
reasons  it  happened  that  they  returned  quicker  than  usual,  and 
that  this  was  the  shortest  incursion  they  liad  made ;  for  they 
remained  in  Attica  but  fifteen  days. 

1,  At  this  same  period,  Simonides,  nn  Athenian  com- 
mander, having  got  together  a  few  Athenians  from  the  guard- 
stations,  and  a  largo  body  of  the  allies  in  that  neighborhood, 
took  possession  of  Eion  in  Thrace,  a  colony  from  Mendc, 
and  hostile  [to  Athens],  which  was  betrayed  to  him.  -But 
the  Chalcidians  and  Bottiajans  having  immediately  come  to 
its  rescue,  ho  was  beaten  out  of  it,  and  lost  many  of  hie 
soldiers. 

8.  On  the  return  of  the  Peloponnesians  from  Attica,  tho 
Spartans,  themselves  and  the  nearest  of  tho  Peroeici  immedi- 
ately went  to  the  rescue  of  Pylus ;  but  tho  other  Lacedaemo- 
nians \yero  more  slow  in  marching  against  it,  as  they  had  but 
just  reached  homo  from  a  different  expedition.  They  dispatch- 
ed orders  also  through  tho  rest  of  tlie  Peloponnese  to  bring  up 
their  reinforccments^to  Pylus  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  sent 


232  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [ττπι 

for  ;^hcir  sixty  ehips  at  Corcyra.    These  having  been  hauled 
over  the  isthmus  of  Leucas,  and  having  so  escaped  the  observa- 
tion of  the  Athenian  fleet  at  Zacynthus,  reached  Pylus;   the 
land-forces  also  having  by  that  time  arrived.     While  the  Pelo- 
ponnesiaus  were  yet  sailing  up,  Demosthenes  anticipated  them 
by  secretly  sending  two  ships  with  ft  message  to  Eur}'medoa 
and  the  Athenians  on  board  the  fleet  at  Zacynthus  to  join  him, 
as  the  place  was  in  danger.     So  the  ships  sailed  with  all  speed, 
according  to  the  orders  of  Demosthenes ;  while  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians prepared  to  assault  the  place  both  by  land  and  sea,  hoping 
easily  to  take  a  building  completed  in  haste,  and  with  only  α 
few  men  in  it.     At  the  same  time,  expecting  the  arrival  of  the 
Athenian  fleet  from  Zacynthus  to  its  relief,  they  intended,  in 
case  of  their  not  having  taken  it  before,  to  bar  also  the  entrances 
into  the  harbor,  that  the  Athenians  might  not  bo  able  to  come 
to  anchor  in  it.     For  tlie  island  that  is  called  Sphacteria  both 
secures  the  harbor,  by  stretching  in  a  line  with  it,  and  close  off 
it,  and  narrows  its  entrances ;  on  one  side,  near  the  Athenian 
fortifications  and  Pylus,  leaving  a  passage  for  two  ships ;  on  the 
other,  toward  the  rest  of  the  mainland,  for  eight  or  nine.     It 
was  all  woody  and  pathless  from  its  desert  condition,  and  in 
extent  about  fifteen  stades.    The  entrances  then  they  intended  to 
bar  with  a  close  line  of  vessels,  with  their  heads  looking  outward, 
while  fearing  this  island,  lest  the  enemy  should  carry  on  their 
operations  against  them   from  it,  they  conveyed   over  some 
heavy-armed  troops  into  it,  and  posted  others  along  the  main- 
land.     For  BO  they  thought  that   both  the  island  would  bo 
unfavorable  to  the  Athenians,  and  the  mainland  also,  as  it  did 
not  aflbrd  any  landing-place;   for  the  shores  of  Pylus  itself 
outside  the  inlet,  looking  toward  the  open  sea,  >vould  present 
no  ground  from  which  they  might  proceed  to  the  aid  of  their 
countrymen ;  and  so  they  should  stonn  the  place,  in  all  j^roba-. 
bility,  without  the  risk  of  a  sea-fight,  Jis  there  were  no  provisions 
in  it,  and  it  had  been  occupied  after  short  preparation.     Hav- 
ing adopted  these  resolutions,  accordingly  they  conveyed  over 
the  heaf^:-armed  into  the  island,  drafting  them  by  lot  from 
all  the  hchi.^     There  had  also  been  some  others  sent  over 
before   in    turns;   but  these   last   Avho   Λvent,  and   who   were 
left  there,  Avere   four  hundred   and   twenty  in    numk'r,  with 

*  On  theso  divisions  of  tlio  Lacodicmoniaa  army,  soo  Arnold's  not(^ 
V.  C3.  3. 


jz^x.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  233 

their  attendant  Helots ;   their  commander  being  Epitadas  son 
of  Molobrus. 

9.  Demosthenes,  seeing  the  Lacedrcmonians  about  to  attack 
him  both  t)y  sea  and  land  at  once,  made  his  own  preparations 
also ;  and  having  drawn  up  under  the  fortifications  tho  tri- 
remes lie  had  remaining  from  those  that  had  been  left  him,  ho 
inclosed  them  in  a  stockade,  and  armed  the  crews  taken  out 
of  them  %vith  shields  of  an  inferior  kind,  and  in  most  cases 
made  of  osiers.  For  it  was  not  possible  in  so  lonely  a  place 
to  provide  themselves  with  arms ;  but  even  these  they  had  got 
from  a  thirty-oared  privateer  and  skift*  belonging  to  somo 
Messanians,  who  happened  to  havo  como  to  them.  Of  theso 
Messanians  there  were  also  about  forty  heavy-armed,  whoso 
services  he  used  with  tho  rest.  The  main  body,  both  of  tho 
unarmed  and  the  armed,  he  posted  at  tho  most•  fortified  and 
secure  points  of  tho  place,  facing  tho  interior,  %vith  orders  to 
repel  tho  land-forces,  should  they  make  an  assault ;  whilo  ho 
himself,  having  picked  from  tho  Avholo  forco  sixty  heavy- 
armed  and  η  few  bowmen,  proceeded  outsido  tho  wall  to  tho 
sea,  whore  he  most  expected  that  they  would  attempt  a  land- 
ing, on  ground  which  was  difficult,  indeed,  and  rocky,  look- 
ing as  it  did  to  tho  open  sea,  but  still,  as  their  wall  was  weak- 
est at  that  point,'  ho  thought  that  this  would  tempt  them 
to  bo  eager  in  attacking  it.  For  they  built  it  of  no  great 
strength  just  there,  expecting  never  to  bo  beaten  at  sea  them- 
selves; and  also  thinking  that  if  tho  enemy  onco  forced  a 
landing,  tho  place  then  bocamo  easy  to  take.  At  this  point 
then  ho  went  down  to  tho  very  sea,  and  posted  his  heavy- 
armed,  to  prevent  a  landing,  if  possible ;  whilo  ho  encouraged  , 
them  with  these  words  : 

10.  *' Soldiers,  who  havo  shared  with  mo  this  adventure,  let 
none  of  you  in  such  an  emergency  wish  to  show  himself  clever 

*  I  havo  followed  tho  usual  interpretation  of  this  sontonco,  though  tho 
sense  can  not  fairly  bo  drawn  from  the  words  as  they  now  stand.  Either 
tiv  must  be  supplied  with  έπισττύσασΟαι^  or  it  must  bo  changed  into  tho 
future,  ns  Dobreo  proposes,  even  allowing  Gollcr's  explanation  of  tho 
following  verb  being  put  in  tho  future :  Futuro  ιτ(^θνβήα(οβαι  usus  est,  ' 
quia  in  totA  ecntentlA  futurro  rol  signiflcatio  inost."  Would  it  bo  possible 
to  avoid  tho  diflBculty  by  taking  iirioTriwaaOni  in  ono  of  its  other  senses, 
"to  win"  or  "carry!'  tho  wall  t  The  general  usage  of  Thucydidee,  I  con- 
fess, is  against  this  interpretation ;  but,  on  tho  otiior  hand,  there  is  in  oil 
the  M88.  but  ono  various  reading  of  tho  passage,  and  that  would  not  rem- 
ody  the  Ciult  in  tho  tcnso,  if  tho  ordinary  forco  of  tho  verb  bo  retained• 


234  THUOYDIDESL  IT.  t» 

by  calculaung  the  whole  amount  of  the  danger  that  eurrounds 
U9,  but  rather  to  clmrge  the  enemy  with  reckless  confidence, 
and  with  the  probability  of  escaping  by  thesa  means.  For  cir- 
cumstances which  are  as  pressing  as  ours  by  no  means  admit 
of  calculation,  but  recjuiro  the  danger  to  be  faced  as  quickly 
as  possible.  But  indeed  I  see  the  greater  part  of  them  fav- 
orable to  us,  if  we  will  but  stand  our  ground,  and  not,  through 
being  alarmed  at  the  enemy's  numbers,  throw  away  the  ad- 
vantages we  have.  For  the  difliculty  of  landing  which  the 
place  presents  I  consider  to  bo  in  our  favor:  for  while  we  re- 
main where  we  are,  this  assists  us  in  the  struggle ;  but  if  wo 
retreat,  we  shall  find  that  though  [naturally]  difficult,  it  will 
be  easy  when  there  is  no  one  to  offer  resistance.  And  in  that 
caso  we  shidl  find  the  enemy  the  more  formidable  oii  this  very 
account,  because  his  retreat  will  not  bo  easily  eft'ected,  even 
though  he  may  be  driven  back  by  us.  For  while  on  board  their 
ships,  they  are  jnost  etusy  to  repel ;  but  Avhen  they  have  once 
lauded,  they  are  then  on  equal  terms  with  us.  Nor  shoul»! 
you  be  very  nmch  alarmed  at  their  numlxTs ;  for  though 
great,  they  will  engage  in  small  detachments,  through  the  im- 
possibility of  bringing  to :  and  it  is  not  an  army  on  the  land, 
fighting  on  ecjual  ground,  Avhile  superior  in  numWrs ;  but  one 
on  board  a  fleet,  for  which,  when  at  sea,  many  lucky  chances 
are  required  [to  make  it  eflective].  So  that  I  consider  their 
difficulties  a  fair  equivalent  for  our  numl>ers;'  and  at  the  same 
time  I  call  on  you,  Athenians  as  you  are,  and  knowing  from  ex- 
perience Bs  you  do  the  nature  of  a  naval  descent  on  the  coast 
of  others,  namely,  that  if  a  man  should  stand  his  ground,  and 
not  retreat  for  fear  of  the  roaring  surf  and  the  terrors  of  the 
ships  sailing  to  shore,  ho  ΛνοπΜ  never  be  driven  back ;  [I  call 
on  you,  I  say,]  now  in  your  own  case  to  stand  your  grounJ,  and 
by  resisting  them  along  the  very  beach  to  save  both  yourselves 
and  the  place." 

11.  When  Demosthenes  had  thus  encouraged  them,  they 
>vere   more   inspirited,   and   went    down    against    them,   and 

.  '  With  tho  uso  of  7τλ//0ος  in  tliis  pas5?ngo,  to  signify  inferior  numbers, 
comparo  tho  frequent  uso  of  τοσυντος  and  τι/λικοντοι;  with  tho  same  in^ 
Uolinito  moaning,  applying  to  small  quantities  or  numbers,  as  well  as  to 
threat;  e.  g.,  Domosth.  Philipp.  I.  23,  Ύοσαντηυ  μίν,  ώ  άνδρες  'Αθηναίοι, 
ihu  TaiJra,  ότι  υνκ  Ινι  ννν  νμϊν  ιτορίαααϋαι  ύίναμιν  την  έκείνω  ηαραταξο^ 
μίνην.  '•  Only  so  largo  a  force."  So  also  Soph.  Aj.  747,  and  Eur.  Ιϋρρς 
804. 


jm]  TiiucrDiDEa  iv.  235 

rancjcd  thcmsclvos  closo  aloruLj  tho  son.  Tlio  Lacoilncmonians, 
moved  from  their  position,  and  assaulted  the  I'ort  at  the  same 
time  both>vith  their  army  by  land  and  with  their  ship^,  of  which 
there  were  forty-three;  tliC  admiral  on  board  being  Thrasymcli- 
dns,  son  of  Cratesielos,  a  Spartan.  And  he  assaulted  it  just  whcro 
])emosthci)es  was  expecting  him.  So  the  Athenians  defended 
themselves  on  both  sides,  landward  and  seaward ;  while  their 
opponents,  divided  into  detachments  of  a  few  ships,  bccauso 
it  was  not  possible  for  more  to  bring  to,  and  relieving  each 
other  in  turn,  were  sailing  up  against  them  with  all  cagcrnesa 
and  mutual  exhortation,  if  by  any  means  they  might  forco 
their  passage  and  take  the  place.  Tho  most  distinguished  of 
all,  however,  was  Brasidas.  For  being  captain  of  a  trireme, 
and  seeing  that,  in  consequenco  of  tho  difficulty  of  the  posi- 
tion, the  captains  and  steersmen,  even  where  it  did  seem  po'• 
siblo  to  land,  shrunk  back  and  were  cautious  of  wrecking  their 
vessels,  he  shouted  out,  and  said  that  it  was  not  right  to  bo 
chary  of  timbers,  and  put  up  with  the  enemy's  having  built  Λ 
fort  in  their  country ;  but  he  bade  them  shiver  their  vessels 
to  force  a  landing,  and  told  tho  allies  not  to  shrink,  in  return 
for  great  benefits  received,  to  sacrifice  their  ships  for  the  La• 
ced.Tmonians  on  the  present  occasion,  but  to  run  them  ashore, 
and  land  by  any  means,  and  secure  both  tho  men  and  the  place. 
12.  in  this  way  ho  urged  on  the  rest,  and  having  compelled 
his  own  steersman  to  run  tho  ship  asliorc,  he  stepped  on  tho 
pang-board,  and  was  endeavoring  to  land  when  ho  was  cut 
down  by  the  Athenians,  and  fiiintcd  away  after  receiving  many 
wounds.  Having  fallen  into  the  ship's  bows,  liis  shield  slipped 
from  around  his  arm  into  tho  sea ;  and  on  its  being  thrown 
ashore,  tho  Athenians  picked  it  υρ,  and  afterward  used  it  for 
the  trophy  which  they  erected  for  this  attack.  Tho  rest  wero 
eager  to  land,  but  unable,  both  from  tho  difliculty  of  the  ground 
and  from  tho  Athenians  standing  lirm  and  not  giving  way. 
And  such  was  the  revolution  of  fortune,  that  Athenians  fight- 
ing froni  land,  and  that  α  part  of  Laconia,  were  repelling  La- 
ccdoemonians  when  sailing  against  them ;  while  Laccdojmo- 
nians  wero  landing  from  ships,  and  on  their  own  country, 
now  hostile  to  them,  to  attack  Athenians.  [I  call  it  a  revo- 
lution of  fortune,]  for  it  formed  at  that  time  tho  main  glory 
of  tho  Laccdncmonians,  that  they  wero  an  inland  people,  ftnJ 
most  jpowerful  by  land ;   arid  of  tho  Athenians,  that  they 


23β  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  [xm.,  χιν. 

wero  α  maritlmo  people,  and  had  by  far  the  most  powerful 
navy. 

13.  Having  then  made  their  attacks  during  that  day  and 
part  of  the  following,  they  ceased  from  them,  and  on  the  third 
sent  Bomo  of  their  ships  to  Asino,  to  fetch  timber  for  the  con- 
struction of  their  engines ;  hoping  that  though  tho  wall  op- 
posite the  harbor  was  high,  yet  as  tho  landing  was  most 
practicable  there,  they  would  take  it  by  means  of  engines. 
Meanwhile  the  Athenian  ships  from  Zacynthus  arrived,  fifty  in 
number  ;  for  they  were  reinforced  by  some  of  the  guard-sliips 
at  Naupactus,  and  four  Chians.  When  they  saw  both  the 
mainland  and  tho  island  crowded  with  heavy-armed,  and  tho 
ships  in  the  harbor,  and  not  sailing  out  of  it ;  being  at  α 
loss  where  to  get  anchorage,  they  sailed  at  tho  time  to  the 
island  of  Prote,  which  is  not  far  οίΤ,  and  is  uninhabited,  and 
there  they  passed  tho  night.  Tho  next  day  they  weighed 
anchor  in  readiness  for  an  engagement  in  the  open  sea,  should 
the  enemy  be  disposed  to  put  out  to  meet  them  there  ;  if  not, 
intending  to  sail  in  and  attack  them.  They,  however,  neither 
put  out  to  meet  them,  nor  had  done  Avhat  they  had  intended, 
viz.  to  bar  the  entrances  ;  but  remaining  quiet  on  shore,  λυχτο 
manning  their  ships,  and  preparing,  in  case  of  any  one's  sail- 
ing in,  to  engage  in  the  harbor,  which  is  of  no  small  extent. 

14.  The  Athenians,  on  perceiving  this,  advanced  against 
them  by  each  entrance ;  and  finding  most  of  their  ships  already 
afloat  and  drawn  up  to  meet  them,  they  attacked  and  put  them 
to  flight,  and  chasing  them  as  well  as  tho  short  distance  per- 
mitted, disabled  many,  and  took  five,  one  of  them  with  its 
crew ;  while  the  rest  they  charged  after  they  had  taken  ref 
ugo  under  the  land.  Some  too  were  battered  while  still 
being  manned,  beloro  they  got  under  weigh;  while  others 
they  lashed  to  their  own,  and  began  to  tow  ofl*  empty,  tho  crews 
having  taken  to  flight.  The  Lacedajmonians  seeing  this,  and 
being  exceedingly  distressed  at  the  disaster,  because  their  men 
were  being  intercepted  on  tho  island,  went  to  the  rescue,  and 
rushing  into  the  sea  with  their  arms,  laid  hold  of  the  vessels, 
and  began  to  pull  them  back  again ;  every  one  thinking  the 
business  to  bo  obstructed  in  that  part  in  which  he  was  not 
himself  engaged.  Thus  tho  uproar  occasioned  was  great,  and 
the  very  reverse  of  what  was  habitual  to  both  parties  with  re- 
gard to  ships :  for  the  Laccdicmonians,  in  their  eagerness  and 


τν.,χνι]  TIIUCYDIDES.  IV.  237 

•lismay,  wcro  absolutely  cngftgcd  in  a  scafight,  so  to  Bpeak, 
trom  \ho  land ;  and  the  Athenians,  victorious  as  they  were, 
nnd  wishing  to  follow  up  their  present  success  as  far  as  pos- 
sililc,  were  engaged  in  a  land-fight  from  their  vessels. '  After 
inflicting  much  labor  and  many  wounds  on  each  other,  they 
separated  ;  and  the  Laceda)monians  saved  their  empty  vessels, 
excepting  those  first  taken.  Both  sides  having  returned  to  their 
encampment,  the  Athenians  erected  a  trophy,  gave  back  tho 
slain,  secured  tho  wrecks,  and  immediately  began  to  cruise 
round  the  island,  and  guarded  it  vigilantly,  considering  the  men 
as  intercepted;  while  the  Peloponnesians  on  the  mainland, 
who  had  by  this  time  come  with  their  contingents  from  all  tho 
cities,  remained  stationary  at  Pylus. 

15.  When  tidings  of  what  had  taken  place  at  Pylus  reached 
Sparta,  it  >vas  determined  that,  in  so  great  a  calamity,  tho 
authorities  shoiild  go  down  to  the  camp,  and  immediately  de- 
cide on  inspection*  what  they  thought  best.  They,  seeing  that 
it  was  impossible  to  assist  their  men,  and  not  wishing  to  run 
the  risk  of  their  perishing  by  starvation,  or  being  overpowered 
and  taken  by  superior  numbers,  determined  to  conclude  with 
tho  Athenian  generals,  if  they  were  willing,  an  armistice  con- 
corning  matters  at  Pylus,  and  then  send  embassadors  to  Athens 
on  the  subject  of  a  convention,  and  to  try  to  recover  their  rr>cn 
(IS  quickly  as  possible. 

16.  Tho  generals  having  acceded  to  their  proposal,  an  Rr- 
mistico  was  concluded  on  tho  following  terms:  "That  tho 
Laccdosmonians  should  bring  to  Pylus,  and  deliver  up  to  tho 
Athenians,  the  ships  with  which  they  had  fought  the  battle,  and 
all  in  Laconia  that  were  vessels  of  war;  and  should  make  no 
attack  on  tho  fort,  cither  by  land  or  sea.  •  That  tho  Athenians 
should  allow  tho  Laccdajmonians  on  the  mainland  to  send 
over  to  their  men  in  the  island  a  stipulated  quantity  of  corn, 
ready-kneaded,  viz.  two  Attic  choenixes  of  barley-meal  a  man, 
with  two  cotylai  of  wine  and  a  piece  of  flesh  ;  and  half  that 
iiuantity  for  each  attendant."  That  they  should  send  in  these 
rations  under  tho  eyes  of  tho  Athenians,  and  that  no  vessel 
should  sail  in  by  stealth.  That  the  Athenians  should  keep 
guard  over  tho  island,  nevertheless,  so  long  as  they  did  not 

•  ITftnck,  Goller,  and  Dindorf  retain  tho  old  rcadiu;»,  wpof  τΛ  χμ^μα^ 
depending  on  όμώντας^  "  on  inspection  of  tlio  case." 

*  •.  e.,  each  of  those  who  aro  called,  ch.  8.  9,  EiXutfr  ol  itepl  αυτούς^ 


ί38  TOUOYDIDEa  IV.  [xviL/xvra. 

land  on  it,  and  should  abstain  from  attacking  tho  forces  of  tho 
Peloponnesians,  either  by  land  or  by  sea.  That  if  cither  porty 
should  break  any  of  these  terras,  in  any  particular  whatever, 
the  armistice  should  at  once,  be  void.  That  it  should  be  in 
force  till  the  Lacedtemonian  embassadors  returned  from  Athens, 
the  Athenians  conveying  them  thither  in  α  trireme,  and  bring- 
ing them  back  again.  That  on  tlieir  arrival  this  armistice 
should  bo  void,  and  the  Athenians  should  deliver  back  tho 
ships,  in  tho  same  condition  as  they  had  received  them."  Tho 
armistice  was  concluded  on  these  terms ;  and  accordingly  tho 
ships,  amounting  to  about  sixty,  were  given  up,  and  the  em- 
bassadors dis2)atclied ;  who,  on  their  arrival  at  Athens,  spoke 
as  follows : 

IT.  "Athenians,  the  Laccdiemonians  have  sent  us  to  ciTect, 
in  behalf  of  our  men  in  the  island,  whatever  arrangement  wo 
may  prove  to  be  most  advantageous  for  you,  while  at  the  same 
time  it  Avould  be  most  creditable  for  us  with  regard  to  our 
misfortune,  as  far  as  present  circumstances  allow.  Nor  will 
it  be  contrary  to  our  habit  that  we  shall  address  you  at  some 
length ;  but  it  is  the  fashion  of  our  country,  where  few  words 
are  suilicicnt,  not  to  use  many  ;  but  to  use  more  than  ordin- 
ary, when  there  is  occasion  for  proving  by  words  a  point  of 
importance  to  us,  and  so  eileeting  our  purpose.  Iteccivo  then 
what  we  say,  not  in  a  hostile  spirit,  nor  as  though  you  were 
considered  ignorant  and  were  being  instructed  by  us;  but 
rather  regarding  it  as  an  admonition  to  take  good  advice, 
oflered  to  men  who  are  well  informed.  For  it  is  in  your  power 
honorably  to  secure  your  present  good  fortune,  keeping  the 
advantages  you  have,  and  receiving  an  accession  of  honor  and 
renown ;  and  not  to  feel  as  men  do  that  gain  any  advantage 
contrary  to  their  Imbit ;  for  through  hope  they  are  ever  grasp- 
ing for  more,  because  they  have  unexpectedly  enjoyed  even 
their  present  good  luck.  But  those  who  liave  had  most  changes 
of  fortune  both  ways,  ought  fairly  to  be  most  distrustful  of 
prosperity.  And  this  migljt  reasonably  be  the  case,  both  with 
your  city,  owing  to  its  great  experience,  and  with  ourselves. 

18.  "  You  may  learn  this  lesson  by  looking  at  our  present 
misfortunes ;  for  though  enjoying  the  highest  reputation  of  all 
the  Greeks,  we  are  now  come  [with  this  request]  to  you, 
though  we  were  before  accustomed  to  think  that  we  haJ  our- 
selves more  power  to  grant  what  wo  have  now  como  to  sue 


iix]  TnUCYDIDES.   IV.  239 

for.  And  yet  wc  were  not  reduced  to  this  cither  from  decay 
of  power,  or  from  insolence  on  account  of  greater  accession  lo 
it,  but  from  failure  in  our  plans,  while  reckoning  on  our  ordin- 
ary resources  ;  a  subject  in  which  the  same  thing  is  alike  inci- 
dent to  all.  So  that  it  is  not  right  for  you  to  suppose,  that 
because  of  the  present  strength  of  your  city  and  its  nccessions, 
fortune  too  will  be  always  on  your  side.  They  indeed  are 
wise  men  who  cautiously  regard  their  good  things»  as  doubt- 
ful ;  (the  same  men  would  also  deal  with  misfortunes  moro 
discreetly  than  others ;)  and  who  think  that  war  docs  not  con- 
form itself  to  that  measure  on  Avhich  men  may  >vish  to  meddle 
Λvith  it,  but  will  proceed  as  chances  may  lead  them  on.  Such 
men,  too,  while  they  meet  with  fewest  failures,  because  they 
are  not  elated  by  confiding  in  their  military  success,  woidd  bo 
most  inclined  to  bring  the  Avar  to  a  conclusion  during  their 
prosperity.  And  you,  Athenians,  have  now  an  excellent  op- 
jwrtunity  of  doing  this  with  ns;  and  of  escaping  hereafler, 
should  you  not  be  persuaded  by  us,  and  then  meet  Avith  re- 
verses (which  is  very  possible),  the  imputation  of  having 
gained  even  your  present  advantiigcs  by  mere  chance  ;  Avhen 
you  might  have  lefb  behind  you  a  character  for  power  and 
wisdom  exposed  to  no  such  hazard. 

19.  "  Now  the  Laccdivmonians  invite  you  to  a  treaty  and 
conclusion  of  the  war,  olfering  you  peace  and  alliance,  and 
that  there  should  subsist  between  us  in  other  respects  closo 
friendship  and  intimacy  with  one  another ;  Avhilc  they  ask 
back,  in  return,  their  men  in  the  island  ;  ftt  the  same  time, 
thinking  it  better  for  both  parties  not  to  try  the  chances  of 
war  to  the  uttermost,  whether  they  may  escape  by  force 
through  some  accidental  means  of  preservation,  or  be  reduced 
to  surrender,  and  bo  moro  severely  dealt  with.  And  wc  think 
that  great  enmities  would  be  most  ciTectually  reconciled,  not 
if  ono  party,  acting  in  a  revengeful  spirit,  and  after  gaining 
most  advantages  in  tho  war,  should  bind  the  other  down  by 
compulsory  oaths,  and  make  an  arrangement  with  him  on  un- 
equal terms ;  but  if,  when  ho  might  do  so,  showing  regard  for 
fairness,  and  conquering  him  by  a  display  of  goodness,  ho 
should,  beyond  his  expectations,  bo  reconciled  to  him  on  mod- 
crate  terms.  For  his  adversary  being  now  bound,  not  to 
retaliate  on  him,  as  ono  who  had  been  treated  with  violence, 
but  to  make  liim  α  return  of  goodness,  is  moro  disposed,  for 


240  THUOITDIDKS.  IV.  [χχ.,χχι. 

very  ehaino,  to  abido  by  tho  terms  of  his  agreement.  And 
men  act  thus  toward  their  greatest  enemies,  more  than  toward 
those  who  have  quareled  with  them  in  an  ordinary  degree : 
and  they  are  naturally  disposed  with  pleasure  to  give  way  in 
their  turn  to  such  as  willingly  yield  to  them ;  but  against 
those  that  are  overbearing,  to  hazard  all,  even  against  their 
better  judgment. 

20.  ''  To  come  to  terms  then  were  good  for  both  of  us  now, 
if  ever,  before  any  irremediable  disaster  overtake  us  in  tho 
mean  time ;  in  Λvhich  case  we  must  forever  feel  α  privato 
hatred  of  you,  in  addition  to  the  public  one  ;  and  you  must  loso 
the  advantages  to  which  wo  now  invite  you.  But  while  things 
are  undecided,  and  while  glory  and  friendship  with  us  are  of- 
fered to  you,  our  own  misfortune,  on  tho  other  hand,  being 
adjusted  on  moderate  terms,  belbrc  any  disgrace  befalls  us, 
let  us  bo  reconciled,  and  both  ourselves  choose  peace  instead 
of  war,  and  grant  α  respite  from  their  miseries  to  the  rest  of 
the  Greeks;  who  herein  also  will  think  you  the  chief  agents. 
For  they  are  harassed  with  war  without  knowing  which  of  tho 
two  parties  began  it ;  but  if  a  pacification  be  effected,  on  which 
you  have  now  the  greater  power  to  decide,  they  will  refer  tho 
obligation  to  you.  if  you  thus  decide,  you  liave  an  opportunity 
of  becoming  firm  friends  with  the  Lacediemonians,  at  their  own 
request,  and  by  conferring  a  favt)r  on  them,  rather  than  by 
treating  them  with  violence.  And  In  this  consider  what  great 
advantages  are  likely  to  be  involved ;  for  if  wo  and  you  agree 
together,  be  assured  that  tho  rest  of  Greece,  being  inferior  in 
power,  Avill  honor  us  In  the  highest  degree." 

21.  Tho  LacedaMuonians  then  spoke  to  this  efi*ect,  think- 
ing that  tho  Athenians  were  before  desirous  of  a  truce,  but 
debarred  from  it  through  their  own  opposition ;  and  that  if 
peace  were  olVcred,  they  would  gladly  accept  it,  and  give  back 
tho  men.  They,  however,  since  they  had  the  men  in  tho 
island,  thought  tho  treaty  was  now  ready  for  them,  whenever 
they  might  wish  to  conclude  it  with  them,  and  were  grasping 
after  further  advantage.  They  were  especially  urged  to  this 
oy  Cleon  son  of  Cleaiuetus,  a  demagogue  at  that  time,  and 
most  influential  with  tho  populace ;  who  persuaded  them  to 
answer,  that  tho  men  in  tho  island  must  first  surrender  their 
•  niis  and  llieniselves,  and  be  conveyed  to  Athens ;  and  that  on 
iheir  arrival,  when  the   l^accda3monians  had  restored  Nisiea, 


xxn..xxiii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  241 

PegaB,  Tropzcn,  and  Aohaia — which  thoy  had  taken,  not  by 
war,  but  by  Tirtuo  of  the  former  arrangement,  Λvhen  tho 
Atl^pniana  had  conceded  tliem  under  the  pressure  of  calami- 
ties, and  were  at  that  time  somewhat  more  in  need  of  a  truco 
— they  should  then  recover  their  men,  and  conclude  a  treaty 
for  as  long  a  ]ieriod  as  both  sides  might  wish. 

22.  To  this  answer  they  made  lio  reply,  but  desired  them 
to  choose  commissioners  to  meet  them,  Λνΐιο  should  speak  and 
hear  on  each  point,  and  so  calmly  come  to  any  arrangement  to 
which  they  might  persuade  each  other.  Upon  tliat  Cleon 
foil  violently  upon  thotn,  saying  that  he  knew  beforehand  that 
they  had  no  sound  purpose;  and  it  Avas  evident  now;  sinco 
thoy  were  unwiliing  to  say  any  thing  before  the  people,  but 
wished  to  moot  in  council  with  a  few  individuals;  if,  how- 
ovor,  they  had  any  honest  intentions,  he  told  them  to  declare 
it  before  all.  liiit  the  Lacedjcmonians  seeing  that  they  could 
not  speak  before  the  multitude  (even  though  they  did  think  it 
best,  in  consequence  of  their  misfortune,  to  make  some  con- 
cessions), lost  they  sh(nild  lose  favor  with  their  allies  by 
speaking  and  not  su'ccoeding;  and  being  convinced  that  tho 
Athenians  would  not  grant  their  proposals  on  moderate  terms, 
returned  from  Athens  without  cft'octing  their  puqioso. 

23,  On  their  arrival,  the  truco  concluded  .at  Pylus  Λvas  im- 
mediately at  an  end,  and  the  Lacediemonians  asked  back  their 
ships,  according  to  agreement,  hut  tho  Athenians,  alleging 
as  grounds  of  complaint  an  attack  on  the  fort  in  contraven- 
tion of  the  truce,  and  other  particulars  Λνΐήοΐι  appear  not  ΛvoΓth 
mentioning,  refused  to  return  them;  laying  stress  on  its 
having  been  said,  that  if  there  were  any  violation  of  it  >vhat- 
ovcr,  tho  truco  Avas  at  an  end.  Tho  Lacedajmonians  denied 
it,  and  charging  them  with  injustice  in  their  conduct  respect- 
ing tho  ships,  went  away,  and  set  thcmiielvca  to  tho  war. 
And  now  hostilities  were  carried  on  at  Pylus  with  tho  great- 
est vigor  on  both  sides;  tho  Athenians  cruising  round  tho 
island  continually  with  two  ships  in  opposite  directions  during 
tho  day,  while  by  night  they  were  all  moored  round  it,  ex- 
cept on  tho  side  of  tlio  oi>en  sea,  whenever  thero  was  a  wind 
blowing;  (twenty  ships  too  had  joined  them  from  Athens  to 
assist  in  the  blockade,  so  that  in  all  they  amounted  to  seventy ;) 
and  the  Peloponnesians  being  encamped  on  the  continent|  and 

.11•  --^  ---ΐ:--— .t-: 


242  THUCYDIDEa  IV.  ["iv-,  xxr 

making  attacks   on  tho  fort,  on  the  look-out  for  opportu- 
nity, should  any  offer,  of  rescuing  their  men. 

24.  In  tho  mean  time  the  Svracusans  and  their  aliiee  in 
Sicily,  having  taken  to  join  tho  ships  on  guard  at  Messana  tho 
other  squadron  wliich  they  were  preparing,  carried  on  tho 
>var  from  that  place.  They  λυογο  especially  urged  on  to  this 
by  tlio  Locrians,  out  of  hatred  for  tho  people  of  Rhegium, 
whoso  territory  tliey  had  themselves  also  invaded  with  all  their 
forces.  And  they  wished  to  try  tho  result  of  a  sea-fight,  Fee- 
ing that  tho  Athenian  ships  stationed  at  Messana  were  but 
few ;  Avhilo  by  the  greater  part  of  them,  including  those  that 
were  to  conic  thither,  they  heard  that  tho  island  was  being 
blockaded.  For  if  they  gained  tho  advantage  by  sea,  they 
hoped  that  by  blockading  Uhegium  both  with  their  land- 
forces  and  their  ships  they  would  easily  reduce  it,  and  then 
their  success  would  bo  secured;  for  as  the  promontory  of 
Kliegium  in  Italy,  and  that  of  Messana  in  Sicily,  lay  close  to- 
gether, the  Athenians  would  not  l»e  able  to  cruise  against 
them,  and  command  tho  strait.  This  strait  is  formed  by  the 
sea  between  Khegium  and  Messana,  where  Sicily  is  at  tho 
least  distance  from  tho  continent;  and  is  tho  Charybdis,  so 
called,  through  which  Ulysses  is  said  to  have  sailed.  And 
as  tho  sea  falls  into  it  through  a  narrow  passage  from  two 
great  mains,  tho  Tuscan  and  Sicilian,  flowing  at  the  sanu• 
time  ΛνΙΐΙι  a  strong  current,  it  has  naturally  been  considered 
dangerous. 

25.  In  this  strait  then  tho  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  with 
rather  more  than  thirty  ships,  Avero  compelled  to  engage,  lato  in 
the  day,  about  tho  passage  of  a  boat,  and  put  out  to  meet  six- 
teen vessels  from  Athens  and  eight  from  Khegium.  IJeing 
defeated  by  the  Athenians,  they  sailed  otf  with  all  speed,  as 
they  severally  happened,  to  the5-  own  camps,  tho  one  at 
Khegium,  the  other  at  MeSsana,  after  tho  loss  of  one  ship, 
^ight  having  overtaken  them  in  the  action.  After  this,  tho 
iiocrians  witlidrew  from  tho  Rhegian  territory ;  and  tho  fleet 
j>{  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  united  and  came  to  anchor 
ftt  Capo  Pelorus  in  the  Messanian  territory,  their  land-forces 
having  also  joined  them.  Tho  Athenians  and  Rhegians  sailed 
up  to  thetn,  and  seizing  their  ships  unmanned,  attacked  them- 
and  now  on  their  side  lost  a  ship,  through  an  iron  grapplo 


XXV,]  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  243 

having  boon  thrown  on  it,  but  the  men  swnm  out  of  it.  After- 
ward, when  the  Syracusans  liad  gone  on  board  their  ships,  and 
Avcrc  being  towed  along  shore  to  Mcssana,  tlio  Atlienians  again 
advanced  against  them,  and  lost  another  vessel,  the  enemy 
having  got'  their  ships  out  into  the  open  sea,  and  charged  thera 
first.  Til  us  the  Syracusans  tiafl  the  advantage  in  the  passage 
along  shore  and  in  the  engagement,  which  was  su^h  as  has 
been  described,  and  i)assed  on  to  the  port  of  Mcssana.  The 
Athenians,  on  receiving  tidings  that  Camarina  was  going  to 
bo  betrayed  to  the  Syracusans  by  Archias  and  his  party, 
sailed  thither ;  while  the  Messanians,  in  tho  mean  time,  with 
all  their  forces  made  an  expedition,  at  once  by  land  and  by 
sea,  against  Naxos,  a  Chalcidian  town  near  their  borders. 
The  first  day,  having  driven  tho  Naxians  within  their  Avails, 
they  ravaged  tho  land,  and  tho  next  day  sailed  round  with 
their  fleet,  and  did  the  same  in  tho  direction  of  tho  river 
Acesines,  while  with  their  land-forces  they  made  their  incur- 
sion toward  tho  city,  ^ieanwhilo  tho  Sicels  came  down 
from  tho  highlands  in  great  numbers  to  assist  against  tho 
Messanians;  and  when  tho  Naxians  saw  them,  they  took 
courage,  and  cheering  themselves  with  the  belief  that  tho 
Ix!ontmes  and  other  (trecian  allies  were  coming  to  their  aid, 
made  a  sudden  sally  from  tho  town,  and  fell  upon  the  Messa- 
nians, and  liaving  routed  them,  slew  more  than  a  thousand, 
tho  rest  having  a  miserable  rcttirn  liomeward ;  for  the  barba- 
rians fell  upon  tbeni  on  tho  road,  and  cut  off  most  of  them. 
The  ships,  having  put  in  at  Mcssana,  subsequently  dispersed 
for  their  several  homes.  Immediately  after  this,  the  Leontines 
and  their  allies,  in  conjunction  with  tho  Athenians,  turned 
their  arms  against  Mcssana,  in  tho  belief  of  its  having  been 
weakened ;  and  attempted  it  by  an  attack,  tho  Athenians  with 
their  ehips  on  tho  si<{o  of  tho  harbor,  tho  land-forces  on  tho 
sido  of  tho  town.  But  tho  Messanians,  and  somo  Locrians 
with  Demoteles,  who  after  its  disaster  had  been  left  in  it  as  a 
f^trrison,  suddenly  fell  upon  them,  and  routed  the  greater  part 
of  the  Leontino  troops,  and  slew  many  of  them.  Tho  Atheni- 
ans, on  seeing  it,  landing  from  their  ships,  went  to  their  as- 
sistance, and  drovo  tho  Messanians,  back  again  into  the  town, 
having  come  upon  them  while  in  confusion ;  they  then  erected 

.     '  For  tho  diflbront  explanations  of  άποσι/ιυηύντυν,  roo  Arnold's  nolo. 


^44  THUCYDIDE&  IV.  (χχτί. 

a  trophy*  and  returned  to  Ilhegium.  After  this,  tho  Greeks  in 
Sicily  continued  to  make  war  on  each  other  by  land  without 
the  co-operation  of  the  Athenians. 

26.  At  Pylus,  in  the  mean  time,  the  Athenians  were  etill 
blockading  tho  Lacedajmouians  in  tho  island,  and  tho  Pelo- 
ponnesian  forces  on  tho  continent  remained  where  they  were. 
But  the  w&tch  was  kept  by  the  Athenians  with  preat  trouble, 
through  want  of  botli  victuals  and  water ;  for  there  Avas  no 
spring  but  one  in  tho  citadel  of  Pylos  itself,  and  t^iat  not  a 
copious  one ;  but  most  of  them  were  drinking  such  water  aa 
they  v,'0\i\d  be  likely  to  find  by  digging  through  tho  shinglo 
near  tho  sea.  They  sutiered  too  from  want  of  room,  being 
encamped  in  a  narrow  space ;  and  a»  tho  ships  had  no  rt^id- 
Btead,  some  of  them  took  thoir  meals  on  shore  in  their  turn, 
>vhile  others  lay  oft'  at  anchor.  But  their  greatest  discourage- 
ment was  caused  by  the  time  being  prolonged  beyond  their 
expectation ;  for  they  imagined  that  they  should  reduce  them 
to  surrender  in  a  few  days,  shut  up  in  a  desert  island  as  they 
were,  and  having  only  brackish  water  to  drink.  Tho  cause 
of  this  delay  was  tho  Laceda'monians  liaving  proclaimed,  that 
any  one  λυΙιο  Λvished  should  carry  into  the  island  ground  com, 
wine,  cheese,  and  any  other  food  that  might  be  ser\iceablo  in 
the  siege  ;  rating  it  a  liigh  price,  and  promising  freedom  to 
any  of  the  Helots  who  should  carr}'  it  in.  Many  others  there- 
fore carried  it  in,  at  all  risks,  and  especially  tho  Helots,  put- 
ting out  from  any  part  of  the  Peloponnesians,  as  might  happen, 
and  landing  by  night  on  the  side  of  the  island  toward  tho  open 
sea.  But  what  they  particularly  watched  for  was  a  chance  of 
being  carried  to  shore  by  a  >vind ;  for  they  moro  easily  escaped 
the  look-out  of  the  triremes,  wlien  there  Λvas  a  breeze  from 
Eca-ward  ;  as  it  was  then  impossible  for  tho  cruisers  to  anchor 
round  it,  while  their  own  landing  Avas  effected  in  a  reckless 
manner;  for  their  boats  being  rated  at  their  value  in  money, 
they  drove  them  up  on  tho  beach,  while  the  soldiers  were 
watching  for  them  at  the  landing  places  in  tho  island.  But 
all  that  ran  the  risk  in  calm  weather  were  taken  prisoners. 
Divers  also  swam  in  under  water  on  tho  side  of  tho  harbor, 
dragging  by  a  chord  in  skins  poppy-seed  mixed  with  honey,  and 
bruised  linseed  ;  but  though  these  escaped  unobsen'cd  at  first, 
precautions  were  afterward  taken  against  them.  Indeed  each 
party  contrived  in  every  possiblo  manner,  tho  one  to  throw  in 


XXVII.,  xxvni.]  THUCYDIDES.  IT.  245 

provisions,  the  other  to  prevent  its  l>cing  done  without  their 
observation. 

27.  Λνΐιοη  they  heard  at  Athena  the  circumstances  of  the 
array,  that  it  was  thus  being  harassed,  and  that  corn  was  thus 
taken  in  for  the  men  in  tlie  island,  they  were  perplexed,  and 
afraid  that  winter  might  surpriso  tliem  in  the  blockade.  For 
they  saw  that  lK)th  carrying  provisions  round  the  Peloponnese 
would  then  bo  impossible — at  the  same  time  they  were  in  an 
uninhabited  country,  [where  they  could  get  none  themselves], 
and  even  in  summer  they  were  not  able  to  send  round  suffi- 
cient supplies  for  them — and  that  the  blockade  by  sea  of  bo 
harborless  a  country  could  not  bo  continued  ;  but  that  the  men 
would  either  escape  through  their  giving  up  their  guard,  or 
Avould  watch  for  a  storm,  aud  sail  out  in  the  boats  that  carried 
the  corn  in  for  them.  Above  all,  they  were  alarmed  by  the  con- 
duct of  the  Lacedicmonians ;  for  they  imagined  that  it  was  from 
their  having  some  strong  point  on  their  side  that  thev  made  no 
more  overtures  to  them;  and  they  regretted  not  having  as- 
fiented  to  the  treaty.  Cleon  observing  their  ssupicions  of  him, 
with  regard  to  the  obstacles  thrown  in  the  way  of  the  conven- 
tion, said  their  infonnanta  did  not  speak  the  truth.  When  thoso 
Λνΐιο  had  come  \vith  the  tidings  advised  them,  if  they  did  not 
believe  them,  to  send  some  commissioners  to  see,  ho  himself, 
with  Theogencs,  was  chosen  by  the  Athenians  for  that  purpose. 
Aware  therefore  that  ho  would  bo  compelled  either  to  give  tho 
same  account  as  those  whom  he  was  slandering,  or  to  ha  proved 
a  liar  if  he  gave  a  ditferent  one,  he  advised  tho  Athenians — 
seeing  that  they  were  really  more  inclined  in  their  minds  for  a 
fresh  expedition — that  they  should  not  send  commissioners,  nor 
delay  and  waste  their  opportunity,  but  sail  against  the  men,  if 
they  thought  tho  re|K)rt  was  true.  And  he  pointedly  alluded 
to  Nicias  tho  son  of  Niceratus,  Λvho  >vas  general  at  tno  time ; 
liating  him,  and  tauntingly  observing,  that  it  was  easy,  if  their 
generals  were  men,  to  sail  with  a  forco  and  take  thoso  in  the 
island ;  and  that  if  ho  had  himself  been  in  office,  he  would  have 
done  it 

28.  Nicias,  observing  that  tho  Athenians  began  to  murmur 
at  Cleon  for  not  sailing  as  it  was,  if  he  thought  it  so  easy,  and 
at  the  same  time  seeing  that  he  aimed  his  taunts  at  Atm,  de- 
eired  him  to  take  whatever  force  he  chose,  as  far  as  the 
generals  were  concerned,  and  make  the  attempt    CIcon  think- 


246  THUCYDIDEa  IV.  [xxix. 

ing  at  first  that  be  only  pretended  to  give  up  the  command  to 
bim,  was  prepared  to  accept  it ;  but  when  bo  found  tbat  be 
really  wisbed  to  transfer  it  to  biiu,  be  drew  back,  and  said 
tbat  be  was  not  i^oueral,  but  tliey ;  Wiu^f  afraid  now,  and  not 
supposing  tbat  Niciaa  would  have  brouj^bt  himself  to  retire  in 
bis.  favor.  lie,  however,  again  urged  him  to  uudertake  it, 
and  resigned  the  command  agaiust  Pylus,  and  called  on  the 
Atlienians  to  attest  it.  They,  as  the  multitude  is  ever  wont 
to  do,  the  more  Cleon  shrank  from  the  expedition,  and  tried  to 
escaf»e  from  what  be  had  said,  jiressed  Nicias  the  more  to  give 
up  the  command  to  him,  and  called  loudly  on  Cleon  to  set 
sail.  So  that  not  knowing  how  to  evade  his  words  any  longer, 
bo  undertook  the  voyage,  and,  coming  forward,  said,  that  ho 
was  not  afraid  of  the  Lacedjemonians,  but  would  set  sail,  tak- 
ing with  him  no  one  out  of  the  city,  but  only  the  Lenmians 
and  Imbrians  tlwit  were  there,  with  home  targeteers  that  ha»! 
come  to  their  aid  from  Qinus,  and  four  hundred  bowmen  from 
other  quarters.  With  these,  in  addili«jn  to  the  soldiers  at  Pylus, 
be  said  that  within  twenty  days  he  would  either  bring  tV.o  Lace- 
diemonians  alive,  or  kill  them  on  the  si)ot.  The  Athenians 
were  seized  with  laughter  at  his  vain  tilking,  but  nevertheless 
the  sensible  part  of  them  were  pleasetl  with  the  business, 
reckoning  that  they  should  gain  one  of  two  good  things; 
either  to  bo  rid  of  Cleon,  wliirii  they  ratiier  hoped,  or,  if  de- 
ceived in  their  opinion,  to  get  the  Lacediemonians  into  their 
bands. 

29.  AVhen  ho  had  thus  arranged  every  thing  in  tho  assem- 
bly, and  tho  Athenians  had  voted  him  tho  command  of  the 
expedition,  having  associateil  with  himself  one  of  tho  generals 
at  Pylus,  namely,  Demosthenes,  bo  prepared  to  set  sail  as 
quickly  as  possible,  llo  chose  Demosthenes  for  his  colleague, 
because  ho  heard  that  he  Avas  himself  meditating  a  descent  o:i 
the  island.  For  the  soldiers,  being  distressed  by  their  want  of 
room,  and  being  a  besieged  rather  than  a  besieging  party,  were 
eager  to  run  all  risks.  The  firing  of  tho  island  had  moreover 
given  him  confidence.  For  f*»rmerly,  in  consequcncci  of  its 
being  extensively  covered  with  wood,  and  pathless,  from  its 
having  always  been  uninhabited,  ho  was  afraid,  and  considered 
this  to  be  rather  in  favor  of  the  enemy ;  as  when  he  landed 
with  a  largo  force,  they  might  attack  him  from  an  unseen  posi- 
tion, and  so  do  bim  damage.     For,  owing  to  the  forest,  their 


xxx.,xxxi.l  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  247 

mistakes  and  aiViOttnt  of  forces  would  not  bo  bo  distinctljr  seen 
1>V  him,  >vhilo  all  tlio  blunders  of  his  troops  >vould  be  visible  to 
tiiein  ;  so  that  they  might  fall  on  liim  unexpectedly  at  whatever 
point  they  pleased,  it  being  always  in  their  power  to  make  tho 
attack.  And  if,  again,. he  should  force  them  to  an  engagement 
in  the  forest,  lie  thought  the  smaller  number,  with  knowledge 
of  the  country,  Avould  have  an  advantage  over  the  larger  Avith- 
out  that  knowledge  ;  and  that  their  own  army,  great  as  it  was, 
might  impercoptii)ly  l)c  cut  off,  while  they  could  not  sec  in  AvhicU 
direction  to  assist  each  Ofher. 

30.  It  was,  above  all,  from  his  disaster  in  iEtolia,  which  in 
a  great  measure  had  been  occasioned  by  the  forest,  that  these 
thoughts  struck  liim.  Tho  sohliers,  liowever,  having  been 
com|)clled  by  want  of  room  to  land  on  the  extremities  of  tho 
island,  and  take  their  dinners  with  a  guard  posted  in  advance  ; 
and  one  of  them  having  unintentionally  set  fire  to  a  small  part 
of  the  wood,  and  a  wind  having  afterward  arisen,  tho  greater 
part  of  it  was  consumed  before  they  >vere  aware  of  it.  In  this 
Λvay  then  observing,  on  a  clearer  >iew,  that  the  Laced.Tmo- 
nians  were  more  numerous  than  ho  had  expected — for  before 
this,  ho  imngined  that  they  took  in  provisions  for  a  smaller 
number — and  now  perceiving  that  tho  Athenians  wotq  moro 

η  earnest  about  it,  as  a  thing  that  was  worth  their  attention,• 
and  that  the  island  was  more  easy  to  land  on,  ho  was  preparing 
for  the  adventure,  by  sending  for  troops  from  tho  neighbor' 
ing  allies,  and  getting  every  thing  else  in  readiness,  when 
Cleonv  after  previously  sending  liim  word  that  ho  was  coming, 
arrived  at  Pylus  with  tho  forces  he  liad  asked  for.  After  their 
meeting,  they  sent,  in  the  first  ])lace,  a  herald  to  tho  camp 
on  tho  continent,  wishing  to  know  whether,  without  ninning 
any  risk,  they  would  desiro  tho  men  in  the  island  to  surrender 
to  them  their  arms  and  themselves,  on  condition  of  their  being 
kept  in  mild  custody,  till  somo  gcnefal  agreement  wore  con- 
cluded. 

31.  ΛΜιοη  they  did  not  accept  their  proposal,  tliey  waited 
one  day,  and  on  the  next  put  out  by  night,  having  embarked 
all  their  heavy-armed  on  board  a  few  vessels,  and  a  littlo  Ix?- 
foro  morning  cfibcted  a  landing  on  each  side  of  tho  island, 
l>oth  that  of  the  opca  sea  and  that  of  tho  harbor,  amounting 
to  about  eight  hundred  heavy-armed,  and  proceeded  at  a  nm 
against  tho  first  post  in  tho  island.    For  tho  following  was  the 


248  THUCTDIDES.  IT.  [zzzii, xxzm. 

way  in  which  the  men  wero  disposed.  In  this  first  guard 
there  were  thirty  heavy-armed;  the  center  and  most  level 
part  was  lield  by  their  main  body,  and  Epitadas  their  com- 
mander; while  a  small  division  guarded  the  very  corner  of 
the  island  toward  Pylus,  which  on  the  sea  side  wiis  pre- 
cipitous, and  on  the  land  side  least  exjKjsed  to  assault.  For 
there  stood  there  an  old  fort,  rudely  built  of  stone,'  which 
they  thought  might  be  of  service  to  them,  if  they  should  bo 
driven  to  a  compulsory  retreat.  In  this  Λvay  tlien  were  they 
posted. 

32.  The  Athenians  immediately  put  to  the  sword  the  men 
forming  the  first  guard,  whom  they  had  thus  attacked ;  for 
they  were  still  in  their  bods,  or  only  just  taking  up  their 
arms,  the  landing  having  surprised  them,  as  they  fancied  that 
the  ships  wero  only  sailing,  according  to  custom,  to  their  sta- 
tions for  the  night.  As  soon  as  it  was  morning,  the  rest  of  tho 
forces  also  disembarked,  viz.,  all  the  crews  of  seventy  ships 
and  rather  more  (except  tho  lowest  rank  of  rowers),  with 
their  diiferent  Cijuipments;  eight  hundred  bowmen,  and  no 
less  a  number  of  tiirgeteers,  the  Messanian  reinforcements,  and 
all  others  who  wore  in  any  positions  about  Pylus,  except  tho 
garrison  on  the  f<»rtifi('ations.  IJy  the  arrangement  of  Demos- 
thenes, they  wore  divided  into  parties  of  two  hundred,  moro 
or  less,  and  occupied  the  highest  grounds,  that  tho  enemy 
might  bo  most  sevi-rely  harassed  by  being  surrounded  on  all 
sides,  and  not  know  wlu-re  to  make  resistance,  but  bo  annoyed 
by  a  double  discharge  of  missiles ;  being  attacked  by  those  bo- 
hind  them,  they  charged  thosii  before,  and  by  those  posted  on 
each  side,  if  they  made  a  flank  movement.  And  so,  wherever 
they  Λvent  they  would  have  the  enemy  on  their  rear,  liglit- 
nrmed,  and  the  most  dillicult  to  deal  with,  being  strong  at  a 
distance  from  tho  use  of  arrows,  darts,  stones,  and  slings,  and  it 
being  imj)ossible  even  to  get  near  them ;  for  they  would  con- 
quer while  flying,  and  when  their  enemy  retreated,  would  press 
them  close.  It  was  with  such  a  view  (>f  tho  case  that  Demos- 
thenes both  originally  jdanned  tho  descent,  and  matlo  his  ar- 
rangements in'tho  execuiiion  of  it. 

a3.  Tho    party  under  Epitadas,  which   was  also  tho    main 
division  in  tho  islan<i,  on  seeing  tho  first  post  cut  off,  and  an 
army  advancing   against  themselves,  closed  their  ranks,  and 
*  Literally,  "  with  stones  as  thoy  wore  pici<cd  up." 


XXXIV.]  THUOTDIDES.  IV.  249 

advanced  to  meet  tho  heavy-armed  of  the  Athenians,  with  a 
wisli  to  engage  with  them ;  for  they  were  stationed  on  their 
front,  but  tho  light-armed  on  their  flanks  and  rear.  They 
could  not  however  come  up  Λvith  them,  and  avail  themselves 
of  their  superior  skill  in  arms  (for  the  light  troops  kept  them 
in  check  y\'u\\  their  missiles  from  both  sides;  while  at  the 
same  time  tho  heavy-armed  did  not  come  on  to  meet  them, 
but  remained  still) ;  but  the  irregulars,  on  whatever  point 
they  ran  up  and  charged  them  most  closely,  they  routed ;  and 
these  again  would  retreat,  and  still  defend  themselves,  being 
lightly  equipped,  and  easily  getting  a  good  start  in  their  flighty 
from  the  diflicult  nature  of  tlie  ground,  and  its  rough  condition 
through  being  before  uninhabited,  over  >vhich  tho  Kacedaj- 
monians  Λvith  their  heavy  armor  could  not  pursue  them. 

34.  For  some  short  time  then  they  skirmished  with  each 
other  in  this  way.  But  Λvhcn  tho  Laced.Tmonians  were  no 
longer  able  λυϊιΙι  vigor  to  dash  out  against  them  where  they 
made  their  attack,  the  light-armed,  observing  that  they  wero 
now  slackening  in  their  resistance,  and  themselves  deriving 
most  confidence  from  a  closer  view — appearing  as  they  did 
many  times  more  numerous  than  the  enemy — and  having  now 
moro  accustomed  themselves  to  look  on  them  no  longer  with 
such  terror,  because  they  had  not  at  once  suffered  as  much  as 
they  hafl  expected,  when  they  were  first  landing  with  spirits 
rx)wed  at  tho  thought  of  attacking  Lacedicmonians  [under 
these  circumstances,  I  say],  they  despised  them,  and  with  a 
shout  rushed  on  them  in  one  body,  and  attacked  them  with  stones, 
arrows,  and  darts,  whichever  came  first  to  their  hand.  From  tho 
shouting  thus  raised,  Λνΐήΐο  they  ran  upon  them,  bewilderment 
seized  them,  as  men  unaccustomed  to  such  a  mode  of  fighting. 
Tho  dust  also  from  tho  wood  that  had  been  burnt  was  rising 
thick  into  tho  nir,  and  it  was  impossible  for  any  one  to  seo 
before  him,  for  the  arrows  and  stones  which,  together  with  the 
dust,  were  fl3nng  from  such  a  host  of  men.  And  hero  tho 
action  became  distressing  to  the  Lacedaemonians;  for  their 
caps  wero  not  proof  against  tho  arrows,  and  darta  wero 
broken  in  them,  when  they  wero  struck;  and  they  could 
make  no  use  of  their  weapons,  being  excluded,  so  far  as  eight 
was  concerned,  from  any  view  before  them  ;  and  nol  hearing, 
for  the  louder  shouts  of  the  enemy,  their  own  word  of  com- 
mand ;  while  danger  surrounded  them  on  every  side,  and  they 

n» 


850  THUCYDIDEa  IV.  [xxxv.,xxxvl 

bad  no  hope  of  any  moans  of  defending  and  saving  them- 
selves. 

.  35.  At  last,  when  many  λυογο  now  being  wounded  from 
constantly  moving  in  the  same  i)hice,  they  formed  into  a  close 
body,  and  went  to  the  fort  in  the  corner  of  the  ishuid,. which 
was  not  far  otf,  and  to  their  own  guards  there.  On  their  giv- 
ing Avay,  the  Hght-arnicd  then  at  once  took  courage,  and  pressed 
on  them  with  a  far  louder  shout  than  ever.  Those  of  tho 
Lacedaimonians  then  who  Avero  overtaken  in  tho  retreat  ΛνοΓΟ 
slain ;  but  tho  greater  part  escaped  to  the  fort,  and  wtth  tho 
garrison  that  was  there  ranged  themselves  all  along  it,  to 
defend  themselves  where  it  was  assailable.  Tho  Athenians, 
on  coming  up,  could  not  surround  and  enclose  them,  owing  to 
the  natural  strength  of  the  ]>lace,  but  advanced  in  front,  and 
endeavored  to  force  their  position.  And  thus  for  a  long  tim*', 
indeed  for  tho  greater  part  of  tho  day,  though  suifering  from- 
the  battle,  dust,  and  sun,  both  sides  held  out;  the  one  striving 
to  drive  them  from  the  high  ground,  the  other  not  to  give 
way  ;  and  the  Lacedaiujoniaiis  now  defeuiled  themselves  more 
easily  than  before,  as  there  was  no  surrounding  them  on  tho 
Hanks. 

30.  AVhen  the  business  was  still  undecided,  the  commander 
of  the  Messanians  came  to  Cleon  and  Demosthenes,  and  told 
them  that  they  wero  laboring  in  vain;  but  if  they  would 
give  him  a  part  of  the  bowmen  and  light-armed,  to  go  round 
in  their  r -ar  by  a  way  that  ho  should  himself  discover,  ho 
thought  ho  could  force  the  approach.  Having  received  Λνίκιΐ 
ho  asked  for,  he  started  from  a  point  out  of  the  enemy's  sight, 
that  they  might  not  observe  it,  and,  advancing  wherever  tho 

1)recipitou3  side  of  the  island  allowed  a  passage,  and  where  tho 
jacedaimonians,  relying  on  the  strength  of  tho  ground,  kept 
no  guard,  with  great  labor  and  ditiiculty  he  got  round  unob- 
served, and  suddenly  appearing  on  the  height  in  their  rear, 
struck  the  enemy  with  dismay  at  the  unexpected  movement, 
and  gave  much  greater  confidence  to  his  friends  by  the  sight 
of  Avhat  they  >vero  looking  for.  And  now  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  exposed  to  missiles  on  both  sides,  and  reduced  to  the 
R.'uno  result  (to  comparo  a  small  case  with  a  great  one)  as 
that  whicK  happened  at  Thermopylic  ;  for  those  troops  wero 
cut  otf  through  the  Persians'  getting  round  by  tho  path ;  and 
these,  being  moro  assailed  on  all  sides,  no  longer  held  their 


Μχνιι.,  xxxviii.]  THUCYDIDilS.  IV.  251 

ground,  but  from  fighting,  as  they  were,  a  few  against  many, 
and  from  Avoakncss  of  body  tljrough  want  of  provisions,  they 
began  to  retreat ;  and'  so  tlic  Athcnyins  now  conmianded  tho 
approacliea. 

37.  Cleou  and  Demoptlienes,  aware  that  if  they  gave  way 
even  the  lca«^t  degree  more,  tliey  would  bo  destroyed  by  the 
Athenian  forces,  8to]>f)ed  the  engagement,  and  kept  their  men 
off  them,  wishing  to  take  tliem  alive  to  Athens,  if  by  any 
means,  in  accordance  with  their,  proposals,  they  might  ho 
induced  to  Burrender  tlieir  arms,  and  yield  to  their  present 
danger.  And  so  they  sent  a  herald,  to  ask  if  they  would  sur- 
render their  arms  and  themselves  to  tho  Athenians,  to  bo 
treated  at  their  discretion.' 

38.  On  hearing  this,  the  greater  part  of  them  lowered  their 
shields,  and  waved  their  hands,  to  show  that  they  acccptc<l 
the  proposal.  After  this,  when  the  cessation  of  liostilities 
liad  tak«'n  place,  a  conference  was  held  between  Cleon  and 
Demosthenci»,  and  vStyphon  the  son  of  Pharax,  on  the  other 
side;  for  Epitadas,  the  first  of  their  former  commanders,  had 
been  killed,  and  IIip]>agrctas,  the  next  in  command,  was  lying 
among  the  slain,  still  alive,  but  given  up  for  dead;  and 
Styphon  had  been  chosen,  according  to  custom,  to  take  tho 
command  in  ca'*e  of  any  thing  happening  to  them.  lie,  then, 
and  those  Avho  were  with  him,  Bai<rthat  they  wished  to  send  a 
herald  to  the  Lacedrcmonians  on  tho  mainland,  and  ask  what 
they  should  do.  When  the  Athenians  would  not  allow  any  of 
them  to  leave  the  island,  but  themselves  called  for  heralds 
from  tho  mainland  ;  and  when  questions  had  passed  between 
them  twice  or  thrice,  tho  last  man  that  came  over  to  them 
from  tho  Lacedajmonians  on  the  mainland  brought  them  this 
message ;  "  The  I^cedoimonians  bid  you  to  provide  for  your 
own  interests,  so  long  as  you  do  nothing  dishonorable."  So 
after  consulting  by  themselves,  they  surrendered  their  anne 
and  their  person».  That  day  and  tho  following  night  tho 
Athenians  kept  them  in  custwly ;  but  tho  next  day,  after 
erecting  a  trophy  on  tho  island,  they  mado  all  their  other 
arrangements  for  sailing,  and  distributed  tho  men  among  tho 
captains  of  tho  fleet,  to  take  charge  of;  whilo  tho  Lacedajmo- 
nians  sent  a  herald,  and  recovered  their  dead.  Now  the  num- 
ber of  thoso  who  were  killed  in  tho  island,  or  wero  taken  alivo, 

»  Literally,  "for  thorn  to  decide  as  they  pleased,'* 


252  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  (ixxix.-xll 

was  as  follows.  There  bad  crossed  over  in  all  four  hundred 
and  twenty  heavy-armed,  two  hundred  and  ninety-two  of 
which  were  taken  [to  Aliens]  alive,  arid  the  rest  were  slain. 
Of  those  that  were  living,  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  were 
Spartans.  On  the  side  of  the  Athenians  there  were  not  many 
killed ;  for  the  battle  was  not  fought  hand  to  hand. 

39.  The   whole  length  of  time  that  the  men  were  block-  ^ 
aded,  from  the  sea-fight  to  the  battle  in  the  island,  was  sev-  t 
cnty-two    days ;    for    about    twenty    of    which,    >vhile    the 
embassadors   were   gone  to    treat   of    i)eace,   they    had  pro- 
visions  given;    but  for    the   remainder,    they  were    fed    by 
those  that  sailed  in  by  stealth.     And  there  was  still  corn  in 

the  island,  and  other  kinds  of  food  were  found  in  it ;  for 
Epitadas,  the  commander,  supplied  them  with  it  more  spar- 
ingly than  ho  might  have  done.  The  Athenians  then  and  the 
Peloponnesians  returned  with  their  forces  from  Pylus  to  their 
several  homes,  and  Cleon's  promise,  though  a  mad  one,  Avas 
fulfilled ;  for  within  twenty  days  ho  took  the  men  to  Athens, 
as  he  engaged  to  do. 

40.  And  of  all  the  events  of  the  war  this  happened  most 
to  the  surprise  of  the  Greeks ;  for  their  opinion  of  the  Lace- 
dyemonians  was,  that  neither  for  famine  nor  any  other  form  of 
necessity   would  tliey  surrender  their  arms,  but   would  keep 
them,  and  fight  as  they  could,  till  they  were  killed.     Indeed       .   i 
they  did  not  believe    that  those  who  ha<.l   surrendered  wero         .  ζ 
men  of  the  same  sttimp  with   those  who  had  fallen ;  and  thus  [ 
one  of  the  allies  of  tlie  Athenians  some  time  after  asked  one  | 
of  the  prisoners  from  the  islantl,  by  way  of  insult,  if  thoso  of  f 
them  who  had  fallen   were    honorable*  and    brave  men  ?    to  |. 
which  he  answered,  that  the  atractus^   (meaning  the  arrow)  | 
would  bo  worth  a  great  deal,  if  it  knew  the  brave  men  from,  f, 
the  rest;  thus  stating  the  fact,  that  anyone  was  killed  who  ^• 
came  in  the  way  of  the  stones  and  arrows. 

41.  Oa  the  arrival  of  the  men,  the  Athenians  determined 
to  keep  them  in  prison,  till  some  arrangement  should  be  niiwle ; 
and  if  the  l/U'elaimonians  nhouM  before  that  invado  their 
territory,  lo  tak"  them  out  and  put  them  to  death.     They  also 

*  i.  e.,  "  goutloiiKu''  of  tho  iruo  Spartau  blood,  such  as  ihoy  wero  so 
fond  of  repreaentiug  themaelvea.     See  Arnold's  noto. 

»  "  One  of  tho  ordinary  Spartan  words  to  express  what  tho  other 
Oroeka  called  ύιστύς.^*     Id. 


iLn.]  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  253 

nrrangcd  for  tho  defcnso  of  Pylus;  and  tho  Mcssanians  of 
Naupactus  sent  to  the  place,  a»  to  tho  land  of  their  fathcrn 
(for  Pyliia  is  a  part  of  what  was  formerly  tho  Messanian  coun- 
try), such  of  their  men  as  were  most  fit  for  the  Fcrvice,  and 
])iundered  Laeonia,  and  annoyed  them  most  seriously  by  means 
of  their  common  dialect.  Tlio  Laceda;monians  haviuf;  had  no 
experience  aforetime  in  such  a  predatory  kind  of  warfare,  and 
finding  their  Helots  desertincf,  and  fearing  that  they  might  soo 
their  country  revolutionized  to  even  a  still  greater  extent, 
were  not  easy  under  it;  but,  although  unwilling  to  show  this 
to  tho  Athenians,  they  sent  embassadors  to  them,  and  en- 
deavored to  recover  Pylus  and  tho  men.  They,  however, 
were  grasping  at  greater  advantages,  and  though  they  often 
went  to  them,  sent  them  back  >vithout  effecting  any  thing. 
These  then  were  tho  things  that  happened  about  l*ylu8. 

42.  The  same  summer,  immediately  after  these  event»»,  tho 
Athenians  made  an  expedition  against  the  Corinthian  territory 
with  eighty  ships,  two  thousand  Iieavy-armed  of  their  own 
people,  and  two  liundred  cavalry  on  board  horse-transports ; 
tho  Milesians,  Andrians,  and  Carystians,  from  among  tho 
allies,  accompanying  them,  and  Nicias  tho  son  of  Niceratus 
taking  tho  command,  with  two  colleagues.  Setting  sail,  they 
mado  land  in  the  morning  l)etwecn  tho  Chersonesus'  and 
Rheitus,  on  tho  beach  a<1joining  to  tho  spot  abovo  which  is  tho 
Solygian  hill,  on  which  tho  Doriajis  in  early  limes  established 
themselves,  and  carried  on  war  against  the  Corinthians  in  tho 
city,  who  were  ^>)lians ;  and  oi^;  which  there  now  stands  a 
village  called  Solygia.  From  this' beach,  where  the  ships  camo 
to  land,  tho  village  is  twelve  stadcs  off,  the  city  of  Corinth 
sixty,  and  the  Isthmus  twenty.  Tho  Corinthians,  having  heard 
long  before  from  Argos  that  the  armament  of  tho  Athenians 
was  coming,  went  with  succors  to  tho  Isthmus,  all  but  thoso 
who  lived  above  it :  there  were  absent  too  in  Ambracia  and 
Ixjucadia  five  hundred  of  them,  serving  as  a  garrison ;  but 
the  rest,  with  all  their  forces,  >vere  watching  where  tho  Athe- 
nians would  mako  the  land.  I^ut  when  they  had  come  to 
during  the  night  unobserved  l\v  them,  and  tho  appointed 
signals  were  raised  to  toll  them  ot  the  fact,  they  left  half  their 

'  1.  «.,  tho  peninsula  and  tho  stream ;  tho  former  runnlnj?  out  into  tho 
HQ%  from  tho  ridgo  of  Mount  Oncum.  Soo  tho  sketch  of  tho  coast  in 
Arnold,  voL  it 


254  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  [xuii.,XLir. 

forces  at  Conchresc,  in  case   tho  Athenians  should  advance 
against  Crommyon,  and  went  to  the  rescue  with  all  speed. 

43.  And  Battus,  one  of  the  generals  (for  there  were  two 
present  in  the  eni^agement),  took  a  battalion,  and  went  to  tho 
village  of  Solygia  to  defend  it,  as  it  was  uuwalled ;  while 
Lycophron  gave  them  battle  with  tho  rest.  First,  tho  Cor- 
inthians attacked  the  right  wing  of  the  Athenians,  immediately 
after  it  had  lauded  in  front  of  Chorsonesus,  then  the  rest  of 
their  army  also.  And  tho  battle  was  an  obstinate  one,  and 
fought  entirely  hand  to  hand.  The  right  wing  of  tho  Athe- 
nians and  Carystians  (for  these  had  been  posted  in  the  extrcm-  " 
ity  of  the  line)  received  tho  charge  of  tho  Corinthians,  and 
drove  them  back  after  some  trouble  ;  but  after  retreating  to  a 
Λ\:»11  (for  tho  ground  was  all  on  a  rise)  they  assailed  them 
witli  stones  from  the  higher  ground,  and  singing  tho  pa;an, 
Fi'turned  to  tho  attack ;  >vhich  being  n'ceived  by  the  Athe- 
nians, the  battle  was  again  fought  hand  to  hand.  Meanwhile 
a  battalion  of  tho  Corinthians,  having  gone  to  the  relief  of  their 
left  wing,  broke  the  right  of  the  Athenians,  and  pursued  them 
to  the  sea ;  but  the  Athenians  and  Carystians  from  the  ships 
drove  them  back  again.  Tho  rest  of  tho  army  on  both  sides 
>vere  fighting  without  cessation,  especially  the  right  wing  of 
tho  Corinthians,  in  Λν1ήι•1ι  Lycophron  was  o|)po8ed  to  the  left 
of  tho  Athenians,  and  acting  on  the  defensive ;  for  they  ex- 
pected them  to  try  for  the  village  of  Solygia. 

44.'  For  a  h^ng  time  then  they  held  out  witlu>ut  yielding  to 
eiuiii  other;  but  afterward  (the  Athenians  having  a  service- 
able force  on  their  side  in  their  cavalry,  while  tho  others  had 
no  horse)  the  Corinthians  turned  and  retired  to  tho  hill,  where 
they  piled  their  arms,  and  did  not  come  down  again,  but  re- 
mained quiet.  It  was  in  this  rout  of  tho  right  wing  that  tho 
greater  j)art  of  thejn  ftll,  and  Lycophron  their  general.  Tho 
rest  of  the  army,  whoso  flight,  when  it  was  broken,  was  effected 
in  this  manner — with  neither  hot  jmrsuit  nor  hurry — with- 
drew to  tho  higher  ground,  and  there  took  up  its  position. 
Tho  Athenians,  finding  that  they  no  longer  advance<l  to  engage 
them,  spoiled  the  dead,  and  took  uj)  their  own,  and  immediately 
erected  a  trophy.  But  to  that  half  of  the  Corinthians  which 
had  been  posted  at  Cenchreio  for  protection,  lest  the  enemy 
should  sail  against  Crommyon,  the  battle  was  not  visible, 
owing  to  [an  intervening  ridge  of]  Mount  Oneum ;  but  when 


χιν.,χινί}•  TUUCYDIDES.  IV;  255 

they  saw  duBt,  and  were  nwaro  of  it,  llicy  immediately  went 
to  tho  Rceno  of  action ;  as  also  did  the  older  Corinthians  from  tho 
city,  when  they  found  Avhat  ha  1  been  done.  Tho  Athenians, 
seeinjGf  them  coming  all  toixether  against  them,  and  thinking 
that  reinforcements  were  being  brought  by  tho  neighboring 
Poloponnesinns,  retreated  with  all  speed  to  their  shipi*,  Avith  tho 
Fpoils  and  their  own  dead,  except  two  Avhom  they  had  left  on 
tlio  field  becauso  they  could  not  find  them,  Having  gone  on 
board  their  phips,  they  crossed  over  to  the  islands  that  lie  olT 
tho  coast,  and  Irom  them  sent  a  herald,  and  took  up  under  truce 
tho  bodies  they  had  led  l>ohind  them.  There  were  killed  in 
tho  battle,  on  tho  pide  of  tho  Corinthians,  two  hundred  and 
twelvo  ;  of  tho  Athenians,  rather  less  than  fifty. 

45.  Putting  out  from  tho  islands,  tho  Athenians  fiailed  tho 
same  day  to  Cn>mmyon  in  tho  Corinthian  territory,  distant 
from  tho  city  ono  hundred  and  twenty  staples,  and  having  come 
to  their  moorings,  ravag<>d  the  land,  and  passed  the  night  there. 
Tho  next  day,  having  first  coasted  along  to  the  Epidaurian  ter- 
ritory and  made  a  «lescent  upon  it,  they  came  to  Methonc, 
which  stands  between  Epidaurus  and  Tro^zen  ;  and  cutting  off 
tho  isthnms  of  tho  peninsula  in  which  Methono  is  situated,  they 
fortified  it,  and  having  made  it  a  post  for  a  garrison,  continued 
afterward  to  lay  wnsto  tho  land  of  Troezen,  llalia^,  and  Epi- 
daurus. After  cutting  oil*  this  spot  by  a  wall,  they  sailed  back 
homo  with  their  ships. 

4G.  At  the  same  tinio  that  these  things  were  being  done, 
Eurymedon  and  Sophocles,  after  >veighing  from  Pylus  for 
Sicily  Λvith  an  Athenian  squadron,  came  to  Corcyra,  and  with 
tho  Corcyrrcans  in  tho  city  carried  on  war  upon  those  that 
hail  established  themselves  on  Mount  Istone,  and  wlio  at  that 
time,  after  crossing  over  subsequently  to  the  insurrection, 
commanded  tho  country,  and  were  doing  them  much  damage. 
They  attacked  their  stronghold  and  took  it,  but  tho  men, 
having  escaped  in  a  body  to  a  higher  eminence,  surrendered 
on  condition  of  giving  up  their  auxiliaries,  and  letting  tho 
Athenian  people  decide  their  own  fate,  after  they  had  given  up 
their  arms.  So  the  generals  carried  them  across  under  truco 
to  tho  island  of  Ptychia,  to  be  kept  in  custody  until  they  were 
sent  to  Athens ;  with  an  understanding  that  if  any  ono  were 
caught  running  away,  tho  treaty  would  be  void  in  tho  case  of 
ull.    But  tho  leaders  of  tho  popular  party  at  Corcyra,  fearing 


25β  THUOYDIDES.  IV  [xlvil,  xlvul 

that  the  Atheniane  might  not  put  to  death  those  that  were  sent 
to  them,  contrive  the  following  stratagem.  They  persuade 
some  few  of  the  men  in  the  island,  by  secretly  sending  friends 
to  them,  and  instructing  them  to  say,  as  though  with  a  kind 
motive,  that  it  was  be>>t  for  tlieni  to  make  their  escape  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  that  they  would  themselves  get  a  vessel  rea<ly, 
for  that  the  Athenian  generals  intended  to  give  them  up  to  the 
Corey raian  populace., 

47'.  So  when  they  had  persuaded  them,  and  through  their 
own  arrangements  about  the  vessel  the  men  were  caught  Siii!- 
ing  away,  the  treaty  Avas  declared  void,  apd  the  whole  party 
given  up  to  the  Oorcyrajans.  And  the  Athenian  generals 
contributed  no  small  share  to  such  a  result — that  the  pretext 
seemed  strictly  true,  and  its  contrivers  took  it  in  hand  more 
securely — by  showing  that  they  would  not  wish  the  men  to 
bo  conveyed  to  Athens  by  another  party  (they  themselves 
being  bound  for  Sicily),  and  so  to  confer  the  honor  on  those 
Λνΐιο  took  them  there.  AVhen  the  Corcyraians  had  got  pos- 
session of  tlu'in,  they  shut  them  up  in  a  largo  building,  and 
afterward  taking  them  out  by  twenties,  led  them  through 
two  rows  of  heavy-armed  soldiers  posted  on  each  side ;  the 
prisoners  Wing  bound  together,  and  beaten  and  stabbed  by 
the  men  ranged  in  the  liui-s,  wherever  any  of  them  happened 
to  see  a  personal  enemy  ;  while,  men  carrying  whii)S  went  by 
their  side,  and  hastened  on  the  way  those  that  were  proceeding 
too  slowly. 

48.  As  many  as  sixty  men  they  took  out  in  this  manner, 
and  put  to  death  >vithout  the  knowledge  of  those  in  the  buiUl- 
ing ;  (for  they  supposed  that  they  were  taking  them  to  bo  re- 
moved to  soiue  other  place ;)  but  when  they  Λvere  aware  of  it, 
through  some  ones'  having  jminted  it  out  to  them,  they  called 
on  the  Athenians,  and  desire»!  that  they  Avould  themselves  put 
them  to  death  if  they  wisheJ.  They  refused  also  any  longer 
to  leave  the  building,  and  said  they  >vould  not,  as  far  as  they 
could  prevent  it,  permit  any  one  to  conio  in.  The  Corcy- 
r;eans  indeed  Avero  themselves  not  disposed  to  force  a  passage 
by  the  doors;  but  having  gone  up  to  the  top  of  the  building, 
and  broken  through  the  roof,  they  threw  the  tiles  and  dis- 
charged their  arrows  down  on  them.  The  prisoners  sheltered 
themselves  as  well  as  they  could,  while  at  the  same  time  the 
greater  part  were  dispatching  themselves,  by  thrusting  into 


XLIX.-LI.]  THUOTDIDEa  IV.  257 

their  throats  the  arrows  which  their  enemies  discharged,  and 
hanging  themselves  with  the  eorda  from  some  beds  that  hap- 
jicned  to  be  in  the  place,  and  by  making  Btrips  from  their 
clothes  ;  and  so  in  every  mannor  during  the  greater  part  of  tho 
niglit  (for  night  came  o!i  while  tho  tragedy  was  acting),  they 
were  destroying  themselves,  and  were  dispatched  >vitli  missiles 
by  those  on  the  roof.  Wlien  it  was  day,  tho  Corcyrajans  threw 
them  in  layers  on  wagons,  and  carried  them  out  of  the  city ; 
while  all  tho  Avomen  that  were  taken  in  tho  building  were  re- 
duced to  slaver}'.  In  this  way  wero  the  Corcyr,Tans  of  the 
mountain  cut  off  by  the  commons ;  and  tho  sedition,  after 
raging  so  violently,  came  to  this  termination,  at  least,  as  far  as 
the  present  war  is  concerned  ;  for  of  one  of  the  two  parties  there 
was  nothing  left  worth  mentioning.  The  Athenians  then  Failed 
away  to  Sicily,  which  was  their  original  destination,  and  carried 
on  the  war  Avith  their  allies  there. 

4Π.  At  the  dose  of  the  summer,  the  Athenians  at  Naupactus 
and  tho  Acarnanians  made  an  expedition,  and  took  Anactorium, 
a  city  belonging  to  the  Corinthians,  which  is  situated  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Ambraciati  (iulf,  and  was  betrayed  to  them.  And 
having  turned  out  tho  Corinthians,  Acamanian  settlers  from  all 
parts  of  the  country  themselves  kept  possession  of  tho  place. 
And  so  tho  summer  ended. 

50.  Tho  following  winter  Aristides  son  of  Archippus,  a 
commander  of  tho  Athenian  ships  which  had  been  sent  out 
to  tho  allies  to  levy  contributions,  arrested  at  Eion  on  tho 
Strymon  Artapherncs,  a  Pcrsan,  on  liis  way  from  tho  king 
to  Laced.'cmon.  On  his  being  conveyed  to  Athens,  they  got. 
his  dispatches  translated  out  of  tho  Assyrian  character,  and 
read  them :  tho  substance  of  which,  as  regarded  tho  Lacedae- 
monians (though  many  other  things  were  mentioned  in  them), 
wa•*,  that-tho  king  did  not  understnnd  w  hat  they  >vould  have ; 
for  though  many  embassadors  had  come  to  him,  no  one  ever 
mado  the  same  statement  as  another;  if  then  they  would 
but  speak-  |>lainly,  they  might  send  men  to  him  in  company 
with  this  Persian.  Tho  Athenians  afterward  sent  back  Ar- 
taphernes  in  a  triremo  to  Ephesus,  and  embassadors  with  liim  ; 
but  on  hearing  there  that  king  Artaxerxcs,  son  of  Xerxes,  was 
/lately  dead  (for  it  was  at  that  time  that  he  died),  they  returned 
home. 

51.  Tho  same  winter  also  the  Cliians  dismantled  their  new 


258  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [uL.Lm. 

fortifications,  at  tlio  command  of  the  Athenians,  and  in  conse- 

3uence  of  their  puspecting  that  tlioy  would  form  some  new 
esigus  af^aiust  them  :  they  obtained,  Itowever,  ]>ledgea  from  the 
Athenians,  and  security  (as  fur  as  they  could)  for  tlieir  makiuij 
no  change  in  their  treatment  of  tliem.  And  so  the  winter  ended, 
and  the  seventh  year  of  this  war,  of  which  Thucydides  wrote 
the  history. 

52.  At  the  very  commencement  of  the  foUowing  summer, 
there  was  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  at  the  time  of  a  new  moon, 
and  in  the  early  i)art  of  the  same  month  an  earthquake. 
Moreover,  the  exiles  of  the  Mytilenteans  and  the  other  Les- 
bians, setting  out  most  of  them  from  the  continent,  and  liaving 
taken  into  tlieir  pay  an  auxiliary  force  from  the  Peloponnes*.*, 
and  raised  troops  from  the  neighborhood,  tt)ok  lihoeteum,  but 
restored  it  Avithout  injury  on  the  receipt  of  2000  l*hoca'an 
staters.  After  this  they  marched  against  Antandrus,  and 
took  the  town  through  the  treachery  of  the  inhabitants.  And 
their  design  was  to  liberate  both  tho  other  Actaian  towns,'  as 
they  were  called— which  the  Athenians  held,  though  formerly 
the  Mytilenaians  owned  them — and,  above  all,  Antandrus ; 
having  fortified  which  (for  there  were  great  facilities  for 
building  shij)S  there,  as  there  was  a  supply  of  timl>er,  with 
Ida  close  at  hand),  and  sallying  from  it,  as  they  easily  might, 
Vfiih.  resources  of  every  other  kind,  they  purposed  to  ravago 
Lesbos,  which  lay  near,  and  to  -subdue  the  yfeolian  towns  on 
the  mainland.  Such  were  the  preparations  which  they  meant 
to  make. 

53.  Tho  Athenians  in  the  same  summer  made  an  expedi- 
tion against  Cythera,  with  sixty  ships,  two  thousiuid  heavy- 
armed,  and  a  few  cavalry,  tiiking  Avith  them  also  from  among 
the  allies  the  Milesians  and  some  others ;  under  the  command 
of  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  Nicostratus  son  of  Diotrophes,  and 
Autocles  son  of  Tolm.Tus.  This  Cythera  is  an  island  lying 
oif  Laconia,  opposite  to  ^L'llea.  Tho  inhabitants  are  Laconians, 
of  the  class  of  tho  periccci.,  and  an  olhcer  called  the  Judge  of 
Cythera  went  over  to  the  j)lace  annually.  They  also  sent  over 
regularly  a  garrison  of  heavy-.irmed,  and  paid  great  attention 
to  it.  For  it  was  their  landing-place  for  the  merchantmen  from 
Kgypt  and  Libya ;  and  at  the  same  time  privateers  were  less 

•  1.  e.,  Bituatcd  on  tho  (Ur/),  or  coast  of  Asia,  opposite  to  Lcsboe. 


i,iv.,LV.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  259 

able  to  atinov  Laconia  from  tlio  sea,  tlio  only  Bido  on  wliieh  it 
could  be  injured  ;  for  the  whole  of  it  runs  out  toward  tho 
Sicilian  and  Cretan  seas. 

54.  Tl)o  Athenians,  therefore,  havini»  made  tho  land  with 
their  annameut,  with  ten  of  their  ships  and  two  thousand  heavy- 
armed  of  the  Milesians,  took  tlio  town  on  the  coast  called  Scan- 
<loa  ;  >vhilo  with  tho  rest  of  their  forces  they  landed  on  the  side 
of  tho  island  loolcini^  toward  Malea,  and  advanced  airainst  the 
lower  town  of  (Jythera,  and  at  onco  found  all  tho  iidiabitants 
encamped  there.  Λ  battle  having  been  fought,  the  Cytherians 
stood  their  ground  for  some  short  time,  and  then  turned  and 
lied  into  the  U)>per  town  ;  after  which  they  camo  to  an  agree- 
ment with  Nici.'us  and  his  colleagues  to  throw  themselves  on 
tho  mercy  of  tho  Athenians,  only  stipulating  that  they  should 
not  bo  put  to  death.  Indeed  there  liad  been  before  certain 
proposals  made  by  Nicias  to  some  of  tho  Cytherians,  in  con- 
soquence  of  which  tho  terms  of  tho  capitulation  wero  settled 
more  quickly  and  favorably,  both  for  their  present  and  fu- 
ture interests:  and  the  Athenians  would  have  expelled  tho 
Cytherians,  both  on  the  ground  of  their  being  Lacedaemo- 
nians and  of  tho  island  being  so  adjacent  to  Laconia.  After 
the  cai)itulation,  the  Athenians,  having  got  possession  of  Scan- 
dca,  tho  town  near  tho  harbor,  and  appointed  a  garrison  for 
Cythera,  sailed  to  Asine,  llelus,  and  most  of  tho  places  on  tho 
sea ;  and  making  descents  and  passing  tho  night  on  shore  at 
such  spots  as  wero  convenient,  they  continued  ravaging  tho 
country  about  seven  days. 

65.  The  Lacedaemonians,  seeing  tho  Athenians  in  pos- 
session of  Cythera,  and  expecting  them  to  make  descents  of 
this  kind  on  their  toiTitory,  nowhere  opposed  them  with 
their  collected  forces,  but  sent  about  garrisons  through  tho 
country,  consisting  of  such  numbers  of  licavy-arraed  as  wero 
required  at  the  different  places.  And  in  other  respects  they 
wero  ^ very  cautious,  fearing  lest  somo  innovation  should  bo 
ma<lo  in  their  constitution,  in  consequonco  of  tho  unexpected 
and  severo  blow  Avhich  had  befallen  them  in  tho  island,  and 
of  tho  occupation  of  Pylus  and  Cythera,  and  of  their  being 
surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a  war  that  Λvas  rapid  and  defied 
all  precautions.  So  that,  contrary  to  their  custom,  they  raised 
four  hundred  horse  and  some  bowmen ;  and  now,  if  ever,  they 
were  decidedly  more  timid  than  usual  in  military  matters, 


2β0  TIIUCYDIDES.  IV.  [lvi.,  Lvn. 

being  engaged  in  a  conflict  oppo8cil  to  the  usual  cbaractcr  of 
their  forces,  to  be  maintainod  at  sea,  and  that  against  Athe- 
nians, by  wliom  whatever  tliey  did  not  attempt  was  always 
regarded  as  a  failure  in  their  estimate  of  the  eugcess  they 
bhould  have.  At  tiio  same  time  the  events  of  fortune,  many 
of  which  had  in  a  short  space  of  time  happened  contrary  to 
their  expectation,  caused  them  the  greatest  disraav ;  and  they 
were  afraid  that  some  disaster  like  that  in  the  island  might 
.again,  some  time  or  other,  happen  to  them.  And  for  this 
reason  they  had  less  courage  for  fighting,  and  thought  that 
whatever  movetiient  they  made  they  should  do  wrong ;  Ικΐ- 
cause  their  minds  had  lost  all  assurance,  owing  to  their  foimer 
inexf)orience  in  misfortune. 

60.  Accordingly,  Avhile  the  Athenians  were  at  that  time 
ravaging  their  sea-coast,  whatever  might  be  the  garrison  in  the 
neighborhood  of  which  each  descent  was  made,  generally  speak- 
ing they  kept  quiet,  thinking  themselves  in  each  case  too  few  to 
resist  them,  and  from  their  present  state  of  feeling.  And  ono 
garrison  which  did  offer  resistance  about  Cotyrta  and  Aphr».>- 
disia,  though  it  terrilied  by  an  attack  the  scattered  crowd  of 
light-armed,  yet  retreated  again,  on  its  charge  being  sustained 
by  the  heavy-armed ;  and  some  few  men  belonging  to  it  wero 
killed,  and  some  arms  were  taken ;  and  the  Athenians  raised 
a  trophy,  and  thou  sailed  back  to  Cythera.  Thence  they 
Bailed  round  to  the  Limeran  Epidaurus,  and  after  laying 
waste  some  portion  of  the  land,  came  to  Thyrea,  >vhich  forms 
a  ])art  of  the  Cynurian  territory,  as  it  is  called,  and  is  on  the 
frontiers  of  Argos  and  Laeonia.  This  district  the  Laceda;- 
monians,  who  owned  it,  gave  to  the  -^]ginetans,  when  ex|>elled 
from  their  island,  as  a  residence,  for  the  service  they  had  dono 
them  at  the  time  of  the  eartlujuako  and  insurrection  of  the 
Helots,  and  because,  though  subject  to  Athens,  they  always 
stood  on  their  side. 

δ7.  While  then  the  Athenians  wero  yet  sailing  toward 
them,  the  -^ginetans  evacuated  the  fortifications  on  the  sea 
which  they  had  happened  to  be  building,  and  retreated  to  the 
upper  town,  in  >vliich  they  lived,  at  the  distance  of  about  ten 
stadea  from  the  sea.  Antl  one  of  the  garrisons  in  the  country, 
which  was  also  assisting  them  in  the  works,  would  not  go  with 
Iheni  within  the  wall,  though  the  yEginetans  requested  them ; 
but  thought  it  dangerous  to  bo  shut  up  within  it ;   and  so 


LViiL.Lix.]  THUCYDIDES.    IV.  261 

Imving  retreated  to  the  higher  ground  remained  quiet,  ns  they 
did  not  consider  themselves  a  matcli  for  the  enemy.  In  the 
mean  timo  the  Athenians  landed,  and  advanced  straightway 
with  all  their  forces,  and  took  Thyrea.  The  town  they 
Inimed  down,  and  plundered  tlio  property  in  it,  and  U)ok  tho 
^'Eginctans  with  them  to  Athens,  excepting  those  that  had  fallen 
in  battle,  and  the  Lacedaemonian  commander  who  was  among 
them,  Tantalus  tho  son  of  Patrorlos ;  for  ho  was  taken 
prisoner  afU^r  being  woundcfl.  They  also  took  with  them 
some  few  indinduals  from  Cythera,  wliom  they  thought  l)cst 
to  remove  for  security.  These  tho  Athenians  determined  to 
deposit  in  tho  islands;  to  order  tho  rest  of  tho  Cytherians, 
while  they  retained  their  own  country,  to  pay  a  tribute  of  four 
talents;  to  jmt  to  death  nil  tho  yEginetans  that  had  been 
taken,  for  their  former  perpetual  hostility ;  and  to  throw,  Tan- 
talus in  prison  with  tho  other  Lacedaimonians  taken  in  tho 
island. 

58.  Tho  same  summer,  the  inhahitnnt'i  of  Camarina  and  Gela 
in  Sicily  first  male  an  armistice  with  one  another ;  and  then  all 
tho  rest  of  the  Sicilians  also  assembled  at  (Jela,  Λvith  embassies 
from  all  tho  cities,  and  held  a  conference  together  on  tho  sub- 
ject of  a  reconciliation.  And  many  other  opinions  were  ex- 
pressed on  both  sides  of  tho  nuestion,  while  they  stilted  their 
diiferences  and  urged  their  claims,  as  they  severally  thought 
themselves  injured;  and  llermocrates  son  of  llermon,  a  vSyra- 
cusan,  the  man  who  had  tho  greatest  influenco  with  them, 
addressed  tho  following  words  to  tho  assembly : 

69.  "  It  is  not  because  I  am  of  a  city  that  is  cither  the  least 
powerful,  or  tho  most  distressed  by  hostilities,  that  I  shall  ad- 
dress you,  Sicilians,  but  in  order  ])ublicly  to  stato  what  appears 
to  mo  tho  best  policy  for  tho  whole  of  Sicily.  And  now  with 
regard  to  war,  to  prove  that  it  is  a  disastrous  thing,  why  need 
one  particularize  all  tho  evil  involved  in  it,  and  so  make  a  long 
speech  before  thoso  who  aro  acquainted  with  it  ?  For  no  ono 
is  either  driven  to  engage  in  it  through  ignorance,  or  deterred 
from  it  by  fear,  should  he  think  that  ho  will  gain  any  advan- 
tage ;  but  it'  is  tho  lot  of  tho  former  to  imagine  tho  gains 
greater  than  tho  dan^re ;  and  tho  latter  will  faco  the  perils 
rather  than  put  up  with  any  present  loss.  But  if  both  should 
iiappen  to  be  thus  acting  unseasonably,  exhortations  to  peace 
would  be  useful.    And  Sun  would  be  most,  serviceable  to  ue 


262  THUOYDIDEa  IV.  [ix.lxi. 

too  at  tho  present  time,  if  we  did  but  believe  it.  For  it  vras 
surely  with  a  purpose  of  well  securing  our  own  several  interests 
that  we  botH  went  to  war  at  first,  and  are  endeavoring  by  means 
of  conference  to  come  to  terms  again  with  each  other ;  and  it 
each  one  should  not  succeed  in  going  away  with  >vhat  is  fair, 
we  shall  proceed  to  hostilities  again. 

60.  "  We  should  bo  convinced,  however,  that  it  is  not  for  our 
own  separate  interests  alone,  if  we  are  wise,  that  this  congress 
will  be  held ;  but  to  consider  whether  wo  shall  bo  able  any 
longer  to  save  tho  whole  of  Sicily,  Λvhich,  as  I  conceive,  is  tho 
object  of  the  machinations  of  the  Athenians.  And  we  should 
regard  that  jKoplo  as  much  more  compulsory  mediators  in 
such  case  than  my  ΛvoΓds ;  who,  possessing  as  they  do  the 
greatest  power  of  all  the  Ci reeks,  are  watching  our  blunders, 
being  hero  with  a  few  ships ;  and  under  the  legitimate  name 
of  alliance  are  speciously  bringing  to  a  profiUible  conclusion 
their  natural  hostility  to  us.  For  if  we  go  to  war,  and  call 
them  in  to  our  aid,  men  who  of  their  own  accord  turn  their 
arms  even  upon  such  as  do  not  call  them  in  ;  and  if  wo  injure 
ourselves  by  means  of  our  own  resources,  and  at  tho  same 
time  pavo  the  way  for  their  dominion :  it  is  probablo  that  Λvhen 
they  observe  us  worn  out,  they  will  come  hereafter  with  a  great 
force,  and  endeavor  to  bring  all  these  states  into  subjection  to 
them. 

61.  "  And  yet  wo  ought,  if  we  are  wise,  to  aim  at  acquiring 
for  our  own  respective  countries  what  does  not  belong  to  them, 
rather  than  at  diminishing  Avhat  they  already  have,  both  in 
calling  in  allies  and  incurring  fresh  dangers;  and  to  consider 
that  faction  is  most  ruinous  to  states,  and  particularly  to  Sicily, 
tho  inhabitants  of  which  are  all  being  plotted  against,  while 
wo  are  at  variance  city  with  city.  Knowing  this  then,  Λνο 
ought  to  make  j)eace,  individual  with  individual,  and  state  with 
etate,  and  to  make  a  common  etlbrt  to  save  tho  whole  of  Sicily : 
and  the  thought  should  bo  entertained  by  no  one,  that  though 
tho  Dorian  part  of  us  are  enemies  of  tho  Athenians,  tho  Chal- 
cidian  race  is  secured  by  its  Ionian  connection.  For  they  aro 
not  attacking  our  nations,  because  they  are  different,  and  from 
their  hatred  of  ono  of  them ;  but  from  coveting  the  good  things 
of  Sicily,  which  wo  possess  in  common.  And  this  they  have 
now  shown  upon  the  invitation  of  tho  Chalcidian  race  :  for  to 
those  who  had  never  yet  assisted  them  on  tho  ground  of  their 


Lxii.J  THUCTDIDES.    IV.  263 

alliance,  thoy  thomsclvos  with  forwardness  answcrod  their 
elaim,  heyond  the  letter  of  the  comj)act.  And  very  excusable 
is  it  that  the  Athenians  should  i)ractico  this  covetousness  and 
forecasting ;  and  I  blanio  not  those  who  wish  to  leign,  but 
those  who  are  too  ready  to  bo  subject  For  liuninn  nature  is 
always  disposed  to  rule  those  that  submit,  but  to  guard  against 
those  that  attack.  And  if  any  of  us  know  this,  but  do  not  fore- 
cast as  we  ought,  an<l  if  any  one  has  come  here  without  regard- 
ing it  as  his  first  caro,  that  all  should  make  a  good  arrange- 
ment for  what  is  a  general  cause  of  alarm ;  λυο  are  mistaken 
in  our  views.  Most  speedily  then  should  λυο  be  rid  of  that 
alarm  by  makincr  peace  Avith  each  other :  for  it  is  not  from  their 
own  country  that  the  Athenians  set  out  against  us,  but  from 
that  of  those  who  invited  them  here.  And  in  this  way  war  is 
not  terminat^^d  by  war,  but  our  quarrels  are  ended  without 
trouble  by  peace ;  and  those  who  Jiavo  been  called  in,  having 
come  with  specious  injustice,  will  go  back  with  reasonable  want 
of  success. 

62.  "  With  reganl  to  the  Athenians  then,  fo  great  is  found 
to  be  the  benefit  of  our  taking  goi>d  advice.  And  with  regard 
to  peace,  which  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  bo  a  most  excellent 
thing,  liow  can  it  fail  to  be  incumbent  on  us  to  conclude  it 
among  oursi'lves  ?  Or  do  you  think,  that  whatever  good  thing, 
or  the  contrary,  any  one  has,  nniet  would  not  more  effectually 
than  Λvar  put  a  slop  to  the  latter,  and  help  to  preserve  the 
former;  and  that  peace  has  not  the  less  hazardous  honors 
.and  splendors  ?  with  all  other  topics  which  one  might  dis- 
cuss in  many  Λvords,  on  such  a  subject  as  war.  Considering 
then  these  things,  you  ought  not  to  disregard  what  I  say,  but 
should  rather  provide  each  for  your  own  safety  in  compliance 
with  it  And  if  any  one  think  that  he  shall  certainly  gain  somo 
advantage,  cither  by  right  or  might,  let  him  not  be  annoyed 
by  failure  through  the  unexpected  result ;  knowing  that  many 
men  cro  now,  both  Λvh!lo  pursuing  with  vengeance  those  who 
have  wronged  them,  and  hoping,  in  other  instances,  to  win  an 
ndvantago  by  greater  power,  in  the  one  case,  bo  far  from 
avenging  themselves,  have  not  oven  saved  themselves ;  and 
in  the  other,  instead  of  gaining  more,  liavo  happened  also  to 
lose  what  they  had.  For  vengeance  is  not  necessarily  buc- 
ccssful,  because  a  man  is  injured;  nor  is  strength  euro,  be- 
cause it  is  sanguine.    But  the  incalculable  nature  of  tho  futuro 


264  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [lxiil,lxi7. 

prevails  to  tho  greatest  possible  de/rree ;  and  though  the  most  de- 
ceptive of  all  tbiugs,  still  proves  the  most  useful :  for  bocjiuse  we 
are  equally  afraid,  we  are  more  cautious  in  attacking  one  another. 
03.  "  And  now,  on  account  of  our  indefinite  fear  of  this  un- 
known future,  and  our  inunediato  dread  of  tho  Athenians*  pres- 
ence, being  alurnied  on  both  these  grounds,  and  thinkincf,  with 
regard  to  any  failure  in  our  ideas  of  what  we  severally  thoui^ht 
to  achieve,  that  these  obstacles  are  a  suiiicient  bar  to  their  ful- 
fillment, let  us  send  away  from  the  country  tho  enemy  that  is 
among  us,  and  ourselves  make  ])eacc  Ibrever,  if  jwssible ;  but 
if  not  that,  let  us  make  a  treaty  for  tho  longest  term  we  can, 
and  put  oil*  our  j)rivatc  dilVerences  to  a  future  period.  In  a 
word,  let  us  bo  convinced  that  bv  following  my  a<ivico  wo  shall 
each  have  a  free  city,  from  Avhich  wo  shall,  as  our  own  nuusters, 
make  an  e«iually  good  return  to  him  who  treats  us  either  well 
or  ill :  but  if,  through  not  following  it,  wo  are  subject  to  others, 
then,  not  to  hpeak  of  avenging  ourselves  on  any  one,  we  ne- 
cessarily become,  even  if  m<j.st  fortunate,  friends  to  our  greatest 
enemies,  and  at  variance  with  those  with  whom  we  ought  not 
to  be  so, 

04.  *'  And  for  myself,  although,  as  1  said  at  tho  Wginning  of 
my  speech,  I  represent  a  most  j)owerfiil  city,  and  am  more  likely 
to  attack  another  than  to  defend  myself,  yet  I  think  it  right  to 
provide  against  these  things,  and  to  make  concessions;  and  not 
so  to  injure  my  enemies  as'  to  incur  greater  damage  myself; 
nor  through  a  foolish  animosity  to  think  that  I  have  absolute 
sway  alike  over  my  own  plans  and  over  fortune,  Λνΐήοΐι  I  can 
.  not  control ;  but  to  give  way,  as  far  as  is  reasonable.  And  I 
call  on  you  all,  of  your  own  free  will,  to  act  in  the  same  manner 
as  myself,  and  not  to  bo  compelled  to  do  it  by  your  enemies. 
For  there  is  no  disgrace  in  connections  giving  way  to  connec- 
tions, whether  a  Dorian  to  a  Dorian,  or  a  Chalcidian  to  those 
of  tho  same  race ;  in  a  \vord,  all  of  us  who  are  neighbors,  and 
live  together  in  one  country,  and  that  an  island,  and  are  called 
by  the  one  name  of  Sicilians.  For  we  shall  go  to  war  again, 
I  suppose,  when  it  may  so  happen,  and  come  to  terms  again 
among  ourselves  by  means  of  general  conferences :  but  to  foreign 
invaders  we  shall  always,  if  we  are  wise,  olier  united  resistance, 
inasn\uch  as  by  our  separate  losses  we  are  collectively  endan- 
gered ;  and  we  shall  never  in  future  call  in  any  allies  or  me- 
diators.    For  by  acting  thus   Λνο  shall  at   the   present   time 


ixv.,Lxvi.]  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  205 

avoid  doprivini^  Sicily  of  two  blcssinijs — riddance  botii  of  ibo 
Athtnianft  and  of  civil  war — and  shall  in  future  tnjoy  it  bv  our. 
solves  in  frccdoTU,  and  less  exposed  to  the  machinations  of  others." 

Go.  llennocrates  havincj  spoken  to  this  eft'ect,  the  Sicilians 
agreed  nrnouij  themselves  in  a  determination  to  have  dono  with 
tiio  war,  retainiii^f  tlieir  several  possessions,  but  that  Morgantina 
should  bo  ceded  to  the  Camarinaeans  on  their  payin;^  a  stipu- 
lated sum  of  money  to  the  Syracusans.  So  tlie  allies  of  tho 
Athenians  c^-dled  those  of  them  who  were  in  conimand,  and  said 
that  they  should  conclude  ]>eace,  and  that  the  treaty  >vould  ex- 
tend to  them  also.  AVhen  tho  generals  had  expressed  their 
assent,  they  concluded  peace,  and  tho  Athenian  ships  afterward 
Failed  away  from  Sicily.  But  on  the  arrival  of  tlie  generals, 
the  Athenians  at  !κ)ηιο  banished  Pythodorus  and  Sophocles, 
and  fined  Kurymedon,  on  tho  belief  of  their  having  been  bribed 
to  return,  >vhen  they  miijht  liave  brought  Sicily  under  their 
dominion.  Thus  in  their  present  success  they  presumed  that 
they  could  meet  v,\U\  no  im|x'diment,  but  equally  achieve  >vhat 
was  |H.)ssiblo  and  impossible,  with  ample  or  deficient  resources 
alike.  The  reason  of  whi(di  was  their  general  success  Wyojid 
their  calculations,  >vhich  suggested  to  them  an  idea  of  strength 
resting  only  on  hope.' 

GO.  Tho  same  summer,  the  Megareans  in  the  city,  pressed 
at  once  by  tho  hostilities  of  the  Athenians,  >vho  always  in- 
vaded their  country  in  full  forco  twice  α  year,  and  by  their 
own  exiles  in  IVga•,  >vho  had  l>een  expelled  during  tho  strife 
of  factions  by  the  popular  party,  and  harassed  t'lem  by  their 
forays,  began  to  discuss  among  themselves  tho  propriety  of 
receiving  back  their  exiles,  and  not  ruining  the  city  in  botli 
Mays.  The  friends  of  tho  banished,  when  aware  οί  such  dis- 
cussion, themselves  begged  them  more  openly  than  before  to 
adopt  this  proposal.  But  the  leaders  of  tho  commons,  know- 
ing that  the  populace  would  not  bo  able  im<ler  the  pressure  of 
their  sufferings  to  hold  out  with  them,  in  their  fear  entered  into 
communication  with  the  Athenian  generals,  Hippocrates  eon 
of  .Ariphron,  and  Demosthenes  son  of  Alcisthenea,  wishing  to 
betray  the  city  to  them,  and  thinking  that  the  danger  to  them- 
selves would  bo  less  than  from  tho  return  of  those  who  had 
Ικτη  banished  by  them.    It  was  agreed  then  that  in  tho -first 

'  t.  «•.,•'  not  arising  from  renlity  or  from  resources  now  In  existence^ 
tut  from  tho  hopo  of  guiuiiig  audi." — Arnold. 


[t^va 


# 


see  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [t^va 

place  the  Atlieniaiis  should  take  the  long  walls  (they  were 
about  eight  etades  in  length,  from  the  city  to  Nisaea  their 
port),  that  the  Peloponnesians  might  not  come  to  the  rescue 
from  Nisaia,  where  they  alone  formed  the  garrison  to  secure 
the  good  faith  of  Megara ;  and  then  that  they  should  endeavor 
to  put  the  up[)er  town  into  their  hands ;  and  they  thought  the 
inhabitants  would  the  more  readily  surrender  when  that  had 
beon  done. 

67.  The  Athc^iians,  therefore,  when  preparations  had  been 
made  on  each  side,  both  by  deeds  and  words,  sailed  in  the 
night  to  Minoa,  an  island  otl'  Megara,  with  six  hundred  heavy- 
armed  under  tho  command  of  Hippocrates,  and  posted  them- 
Bclves  in  an  excavated  piece  of  ground,  from  w  hich  they  used  to 
make  their  bricks,  and  Avhich  Avas  not  far  off;  while  the  troops, 
with  Demosthenes,  the  «ther  commander,  consisting  of  light- 
armed  I*lataians,  and  a  second  corps  con)posed  οΐ peripoliy^  j)laced 
themselves  in  ambuscade  in  the  ground  consecrated  to  Mars, 
which  Wi'is  at  a  less  distance.  Now  no  one  was  aware  of  this 
but  those  Λγΐιο  took  care  to  know  [what  was  doing]  that  night. 
AVjien  day  was  about  to  dawn,  the  traitors  among  tho  Me- 
gareans  did  as  follows.  Tliey  had  for  a  long  time  past  used 
means  to  secure  the  opening  of  the  gates,  and  with  the  con- 
sent of  tho  officer  in  commaml,  in  the  guise  of  privateers,  to 
carry  on  a  cart,  during  the  night,  a  boat  worked  by  sculls  along 
the  trench  down  to  the  sea,  and  so  sail  out ;  and  before  it  was 
day,  they  brought  it  again  on  the  cart,  and  took  it  within  the 
wall  through  tlie  gates ;  that  the  Athenians,  as  they  preten<letl, 
might  not  know  what  ]>recautions  to  take,  no  boat  being 
visible  in  the  harbor.  And  on  that  occasion  the  cart  was 
already  at  the  gates,  and  on  their  being  opened  in  the  usual 
manner  for  tho  skitf,  as  they  thought,  tho  Athenians  (for  this 
had  been  done  by  agreement  >vith  them),  on  seeing  it,  ran 
full  speed  from•  their  ambush,  Avishing  to  reach  tho  spot  before 
the  gates  were  shut  again,  and  Λνΐιϋο  tho  cart  was  still  in  tht> 
entrance,  and  prevented  their  being  closed  ;  tho  Megareaus 
who  were  in  concert  Avith  them  at  tho  Fame  time  dispatching 
the  guard  at  tho  gate.  Demosthenes  with  his  Platajans  and 
2)€ri]>oli  were  the  first  to  run  in  (at  the  point  where  the  trophy 

*  Tho  peripoli  wcro  cmproycd  ns  a  movable  force,  and  confined  exclu- 
sively williiii  tho  walls  of  fortified  places,  but  disposable  for  tho  defense 
of  any  point  that  might  be  particularly  threateucd.     See  Arnold's  note. 


Lxriii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  IV.  ί267 

now  fitftnds),  and  Λ9  soon  as  tlioy  wcro  within  the  wall  (for  no>7 
tho  nearest  Pcioponncsians  were  awaro  of  it),  tho  Plataians  cn- 
gagoJ  with  and  defeated  those  who  came  to  the  rescue,  and  se- 
cured tlio  gatc'8  for  tho  advancing  heavy-armed  of  tho  Athenians. 
08.  Then  each  of  the  Athenians,  as  ho  successively  entered, 
proceeded  against  tho  Avail.  And  of  tho  IVloponnesian  gar- 
rison a  few  at  first  resisted,  and  defended  themselves,  and 
some  of  them  were  killed  ;  but  the  greater  part  took  to  flight, 
being  terrified  in  consequence  of  the  enemy  having  attacked 
them  by  night,  and  tho  Megaroan  traitors  fighting  against 
them ;  and  thinking  that  all  the  Megarcans  had  betrayed  them. 
For  it  happened  that  tho  Athenian  herald  had  of  his  own 
accord  proclaime<l,  that  whoever  of  tho  Megarcans  Avished, 
should  go  and  jiile  his  arms  w  ith  the  Athenians.  So  when 
they  heard  that,  they  staid  no  longer;  but  thinking  that  they 
were  certainly  tho  objects  of  a  common  attack,  fled  for  refugo 
to  Nisaia.  In  tho  morning,  when  tho  Avails  were  now  taken, 
and  the  Megarcans  in  tho  city  were  in  confusion,  those  -who 
had  negotiated  with  tho  Athenians,  and  others  with  them,  viz, 
tho  popular  j)arty  who  Avero  privy  to  tho  measure,  said  that 
they  ought  to  throw  open  the  gates,  and  march  out  to  battle. 
It  had  been  arranged  i)y  them,  that  when  the  gates  wero  open- 
ed, tho  Athenians  should  rush  in ;  and  they  themselves  would 
be  distinguished  from  tho  rest,  for  they  said  they  Avould  anoint 
themselves  with  oil,  that  they  might  not  bo  hurt.  And  they 
felt  tho  greater  security  in  opening  the  gates,  since,  according 
to  agreement,  the  four  thousand  Athenian  heavy-armed  from 
I'^leusis,  and  six  hundred  liorse,  had  marched  all  night,  and 
wero  now  there.  But  when  they  wero  anointed,  and  wcro 
now  standing  about  tho  gates,  one  of  their  associates  gave  in- 
formation of  tho  plot  to  the  other  party,  Λνΐιο  consequently 
unitod,  and  came  in  a  body,  and  urged  that  they  ought  neither 
to  march  out  (for  not  even  before,  when  they  wcro  stronger, 
had  they  ever  ventured  on  this),  nor  to  bring  tho  city  into 
evident  danger ;  and  if  any  one  did  not  obey  them,  there  [in 
Megara  itselfj,  should  tho  battle  bo  fought. .  But  they  gavo 
UQ  intimation  of  their  being  acquainted  with  their  practices, 
but  positively  maintained  that  they  wero  giving  the  best  ad- 
vice; and  at  tho  same  time  they  kept  their  post  about  tho 
gates,  80  that  it  was  not  |)ossiblo  for  tho  conspirators  to  »c- 
eomplish  what  they  intended. 


268  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  (LXii.,L2r, 

69.  The  Athenian  generals,  finding  that  some  obstacle  had 
arisen,  and  that  they  would  not  be  able  to  take  tlie  city  by 
force,  immediately  proceeded  to  invest  Nisaia ;  thinking  that 
if  tliey  could  take  it  before  it  was  relieved,  Megara  also  would 
the  more  quickly  surrender.  Now  iron,  stone-masons,  and 
all  other  reouisites  were  ijuickly  brought  from  Athens.  So 
they  began  Irom  the  wall  which  they  occupied,  and  built  a 
cross-wall  on  the  side  of  Megara,  from  the  point  mentioned 
down  to  the  sea  on  each  side  of  Niftica;  the  λυΙιοΙο  army 
having  divided  among  themselves  the  trench  and  wails ;  and 
they  used  the  stones  and  bricks  from  the  t^uburb,  and  cutting 
down  the  fruit-trees  and  timber,  strengthened  with  a  palisndo 
whatever  point  might  require  it.  The  houses,  too,  iu  the 
suburb,  wheu  j)rovided  Λvith  battlements,  were  in  themselves 
a  fortification.  That  whole  day  they  continued  working;  and 
about  afternoon  of  the  next  day  the  Avail  was  all  but  com- 
pleted, when  the  garrison  in  Nisica,  in  despair  of  provisions 
(lor  they  us(.'d  to  receive  daily  rations  from  the  Ujiper  city), 
not  thinking  that  the  Peloponnesians  would  soon  relievo  them, 
and  suj)})Osing  the  Megareans  to  be  tluir  enemies,  capitulated 
to  the  Athenians,  on  condition  that  after  surrendering  their 
arms,  they  should  each  Ik;  ransomed  ft)r  a  stipulated  sun» ;  but 
that  the  Lacedaimonians,  both  the  commander  and  all  others 
in  the  place,  should  be  treated  by  the  Athenians  according  to 
their  pleasure.  On  these  conditions  they  surrendered  and 
went  out ;.  and  the  Athenians,  having  broken  down  the  long 
walls  at  tlieir  abutment  on  Megara,  and  having  taken  posscs- 
sion  of  Nisaia,  proceeded  with  their  other  ])reparations. 

70.  Now  Ikasidas  son  of  Tellis,  the  Laceda?monian,  hap- 
j)ened  at  this  time  to  be  in  tlie  neighborho<jd  of  Sicyon  and 
Corinth,  preparing  an  army  for  Thrace.  And  >vhen  he  heard 
of  the  capture  of  the  wall-^,  fearing  both  for  the  l*eloj)onnesians 
in  Nisjea,  and  lest  Megara  should  be  t  iken,  ho  sent  to  the 
licDotians  with  orders  to  meet  him  with  a  body  t>f  troi)ps  as 
quickly  as  possible  at  Tripodiscus  (it  is  a  village  in  the  Me- 
garean  territory  that  has  this  name,  under  Mount  Gerania), 
and  went  himself  with  two  thousand  seven  hundred  Corinthian 
heavy-anned,  four  hundred  Phliasian,  six  hundred  Sicyonian, 
ami  all  his  own  forces  that  had  been  already  raised,  thinking 
lli.'it  h(i  should  still  find  Nisjca  untaken.  liut  when  he 
heard   of  its  capture  (for  he  happened  to  have  gone  out  to 


Lxxi.,Lxm]  TIIUCYDIDES.  IV.  200 

Tiipodisctis  by  niijlit),  pickinpf  out  three  hundred  men  from 
liis  army,  l)rfore  ho  Avas  lu-ard  of,  ho  advanced  to  Megara  un- 
observed by  the  Athenians,  who  ΛνοΓο  about  the  shore  ;  wish- 
ing nominally,  and  really  too,  iflie  eould,  to  make  an  attempt 
on  Nisa'a;  but,  al)ovo  all,  to  elVeet  an  entranee  into  Megara, 
niul  secure  it  Aceordingly  ha  begnred  them  to  receive  Ins 
forces,  telling  them  tliat  ho  was  in  hope  of  recovering  Nifwn. 

71.  But  the  Megarean  factions  were  afraid,  on  the  one  eide, 
that  ho  might  introduce  the  exiles,  and  expel  them ;  on  tho 
other,  that  the  popular  party,  through  fear  of  this  very  thing, 
might  attack  them,  and  so  tho  city  bo  mined  by  their  fighting 
with  each  other,  wliilo  tho  Atlienians  were  close  at  hand  in 
ambush  against  thom ;  and  tliereforo  they  did  not  receive  him, 
but  both  parties  determined  to  remain  quiet,  and  wait  to  see  tlie 
restilt.  For  eacli  side  expected  that  a  battle  would  be  fouglit 
!)etwcen  the  Athenians  and  those  who  l)a<l  come  to  relieve  tho 
place,  and  that  so  it  would  be  safer  for  themselves  to  go  over 
to  the  side  they  favored,  if  it  were  victorious.  When  therefore 
Brasidas  did  not  prevail  on  them,  lie  returned  again  to  the  rest 
of  the  anny. 

72.  In  the  morning  the  Boeotian^  joined  them,  having  in- 
deed puqx)se<l,  even  l)efore  Ikasidas  sent  to  tlicm,  to  march  to 
tho  relief  of  Megara,  considering  the  danger  to  affect  them- 
selves, and  l)eing  already  in  full  force  at  Tlataia ;  but  when 
llio  messenger  reached  them,  they  felt  much  more  confidence, 
and  after  dispatching  two  thousand  two  hundred  Jieavy- 
amied,  and  six  hundred  cavalry,  they  returned  again  ΛνϊίΙι 
tho  main  force.  When  tho  whole  army  was  now  come, 
amounting  to  no  less  than  six  thousand  heavy-armed,  an<l 
when  tho  Athenian  heavy-armed  were  formed  in  line  about 
Kisica  at  the  shore,  but  their  light-armed  were  dispersed  over 
tho  plain ;  tho  Boeotian  horse  fell  upon  tho  light-armed,  and 
drove  them  to  the  sea,  while  they  were  not  expecting  it ;  for 
before  this  no  succors  had  vet  como  to  tho  Megareans  from 
any  quarter.  But  the  Athenian  horso  charged  in  return,  and 
camo  to  dose  quarters  with  them ;  and  there  was  a  cavalry 
action  which  lasted  for  a  long  time,  in  which  both  parties 
claim  to  have  had  tho  Ix^tter.  For  tho  Athenians,  cloeo  under 
tlio  walls  of  Nisffia,  charged,  killed,  and  stripped  the  Boeotian 
commander  of  the  horse,  and  somo  few  others ;  and  having 
got  possession  of  thcso  bodies,  restored  them  under  truce,  and 


270  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  [lxxiiu 

erected  a  trophy:  yet,  regarding  the  action  aa  a  whole,  neither 
party  retired  with  a  decided  result,  but  the  Boeotians  drew  off 
to  their  forces,  and  the  Athenians  to  Nisiea. 

73.  After  this,  Brasidas  and  the  army  moved  nearer  to  the 
sea   and  to  Megara^.aud   having  chosen  a  convenient   8{K)t, 
drew  up  in  order  of  battle,  and  remained  still,  thinking  that 
the  Athenians  would  advance  against  them,  and  knowing  that 
the  Megareans   >vero  waiting  to  see  on  which  side  would  bo 
tlio  victory.     And  they  considered  that  both  results  Avere  fa- 
vorable for  them,  their  not  being  the  first  to  make  the  attack, 
and  voluntarily  to  begin  an  engagement  with  all  its  haziinl 
(since,  at  any  rate,  they   had  clearly  shown  that  they  were 
ready  to    defend   themselves),    and    the    victory   being   fairly 
assigned   to  tlnin,  Λνΐΐΐιουΐ  any  struggle,  so  to  speak  ;  and  that 
at  the  same  time  it  wa<s  favorable  to  their  interest  at  Megara. 
For  iftlu'y   ha  1  not  shown  themselves  there,   they  >vould  not 
have  had   a  chance,    but  would   certainly  have  lost  the   city, 
being  considered  as  good  as  beaten,     liut  as  it  was,  the  Athen- 
ians might   liai)pen  to  bo  not  disposed   for  a  contos:  ;  so  that 
Avithout  lighting    they  would    succeed  in  the    objecls  of  their 
coming.     And  this  was  indeed  the  case.     For  the  Athenians 
came  out,  and  drew  up  by  the  long  walls,  but  renmined  (|ui»'t 
on  their  side  also,  as  the  enemy  did  not  attack  them  :  since  their 
commanders  too   considered  it  no  equal  hazard,  on  the  one 
hand  for   them,  after   succeeding  in  most  of  their  designs,  to 
commence   an    engagenient  «gainst   superior    numbers,    ami 
either,   it"  victorious,    only    to    take  Megara,  or,  if  beaten,  t«> 
sacrifice  the   flower  of  their  heavy-soldiery ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  for  merely  a  part  of  their  enemies'  whole  force,  nay  even 
of  that  which  was  ]>resent  in  each  ciise,  to  bo  willing,  as  they 
reasonably  might,    with   boldness  to  risk   a   battle.     So  Avhen, 
after  waiting  some  time  and  no  attack  being  made  on  either 
side,    the    Athenians  first   returned  to   Nisoy»,    and   then  tlu) 
Peloponnesians    to  the  jX)int  they  hatl  set   out  from ;   under 
these  circumstances  the    friends  of  the  Megarean  exiles  Λνΐΐΐι 
greater  confidence  threw  open  the  gates  to  lirasidas  and  tlu^ 
commanders  from  the  ditierent  states  (considering  that  he  had 
proved   his  superior  strength,  and  that  the  Athenians  had  no 
longer  been  willing  to  fight),   and  having  received  them,  pro- 
ceeded  to  confer  with  then),   while  those  who  had  negotiated 
with  the  Athenians  were  now  confounded. 


LXJHV.,  LXX7  ] 


TnUCYDIDES.  IV. 


271 


T4.  Afterward,  when  Brasidns  had  dismissed  the  allies 
to  their  several  cities,  he  himself  went  hark  to  Corinth,  and 
prepared  for  his  expedition  to  Thrace,  which  was  the  orifpnal 
destination.  AVhen  the  Athenians  also  had  returned  home, 
eurh  of  the  ^h\ί;aΓeans  in  the  city  a»  had  been  most  implicated 
in  the  negotiations  with  them,  knowing  that  they  had  been 
marked,  immediately  stole  away ;  while  the  rest,  having  con• 
ferred  with  the  friends  of  the  exiles,  restored  the  party  nt 
Pega?,  after  binding  them  by  solemn  oaths  to  forget  the  past, 
and  to  advise  what  was  best  for  the  city.  When,  however, 
they  h.'ul  been  put  in  of!i<'e,  and  held  a  review  of  the  heavy- 
arme<l  troops,  having  separated  the  battilions,  they  selected 
η  hundred  of  their  enemies,  and  of  those  who  appeared  to  havo 
joined  most  decidedly  in  the  negotiations  %vith  the  Athenians ; 
and  having  compelled  the  commons  to  pass  an  open  sentence 
upon  them,  on  their  being  condemned,  they  ])ut  thorn  to  death  ; 
and  established  a  thorough  oligarchy  in  the  city.  An<l  this 
change  of  government  lasted  a  very  long  time,  though  efiectcd 
by  a  very  few  men  through  the  triumph  of  a  faction. 

15.  Tlie  same  summer,  when  Antandrus  Λvas  gi>ing  to  bo . 
strengthene<l  by  the  Mytilenncans,  as  they  were  planning 
[when  we  last  mentioned  them],  Demodocus  and  Aristitles, 
the  commanders  of  the  ships  sent  to  levy  contributions,  being 
about  the  Hellespont  (for  Lamachus,  their  third  coUeaguo, 
had  sailed  with  ten  ships  into  the  Pontus),  became  aware  of 
the  provisions  made  for  the  place,  and  thinking  there  was 
danger  of  its  l)ecoming  what  Anoea  was  to  Snrtlos — where  tho 
Samian  exiles  hwl  estjiblished  themselves,  and  l>oth  assisted 
the  Teloponnesians  by  sending  pilates  to  their  squadrons,  and 
threw  the  Samians  in  tho  city  into  confusion,  and  received 
those  who  deserted  them— on  these  grounds  they  collected  ft 
force  from  the  allies  and  sot  sail,  and  liaving  defeated  in  a 
battle  those  who  came  out  from  Antandrus  against  them,  re- 
took tho  place.  Not  long  after,  I^maehus,  who  had  sailed 
into  tho  Tontus,  having  anchored  in  tho  river  Calex,  in  tho 
territoilr  of  Ileraclefv  lost  his  ships  in  cons(^quencc  of  a  rain 
in  the  interior,'  and  the  flood  coming  suddenly  down  upon 
them.  ITo  himself  and  his  troops  went  by  land  through  tho 
Bithynian   Thracians,   who   aro   situated    across  tho  strait  in 


•  Poppo  orplaini  άνωθεν  by  "coelitua."    Seo  Arnold's  note 


272  THUOYDIBES.  IV.  t^-^vi••  "x^i^ 

Asia,   to  Chalcedob,   tho   Megarcan  colony  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Pontue. 

76.  Tho  samo  summer  Demosthenes,  tho  Athenian  genenti, 
>vent   to  Naupactus   with    forty  ships   immediately  after  tho 
return    from    the   Megariil.     For   communications    respectint» 
tho  affairs  of  Ikiiotia  wero  being  carried  on  \i'ith  Ilippocfat^s 
and  him  by  certain  men  in  tho  cities,  who  ^lished  to  chango 
tho  constitution,  and  to  bring  them  under  a  democracy  like 
that  of  Athens;  it   being   espcially  under   tho    direction  ol 
I'toiodorua,    an    exile   from    Thebes,    that  these    preparations 
Avero  miklo  by  them.  A  party  was  to  betray  to  them  Sipha•, 
a  sea-jx)rt  town  in  the  Thespian  territory,  on  tlio  Crisa»an  Hay  ; 
Λνΐιϋο  Cha*ronea,  which  was  de|K'ndent  on  what  was  formerly 
called  the  Minyan,  but  now  the  JJoiOtian  Orchomenus,  >vas  to 
be  delivered  up  l)y  another  party  in  that  city  ;  the  exiles  from 
it  also  co-o|K,' rating  most  warmly,  and  raising  mercenary  trooj)s 
from  the  Pelopgnntse.     Chuironca  is  the  frontier  town  too  of 
l^otia,  near  to  Phanotis  in  ]*hocis,  and  a  party  of  Phocians 
joined  in  the  design,     (hi  tho  other  hand,  tho  Athenians  were 
to  seize   Delium,  tho   sanctuary  of  ΛροΙΙο  in   tho  territory  of 
Tanagra,   looking  toward   Kuboea;   and  these  measures  werti 
to  l>e  sinniltaneously  executed  on  tho  samo  day  ;  that  the  Pa»- 
otians  might  not  oppose   them  in  a  body  at  Delium,  but  have 
to   attend    to  their   own  res|K*ctivo    neighborhoods    that  were 
being  revolutionized.      And  should  tho  attempt  succeed,  and 
Delium   bo  foititied,   they  coiiiidently  hoj)ed    that   even  if  no 
change  in   tli^ir  ci^nstitution   were  immediately  made   ]»y  the 
Pa»o(ians,  yet  Avhen    these  posts    were  occupied  by  Atheniai» 
garrisons,  and  the  land   wjis  b  ing  ]>lundered,   and  tlie  several 
parlies  had  a  rallying  place  close  at  hsind,  that  things  would  not 
remain  in  tlu*ir  j)resent  j)osition,  but  that,  in  the  course  of  time, 
when  tho  Athenians  supported   the  disaffected,  and  the  power 
of  tho  oligarchs  wiis  disunited,  they  ΛνοηΜ  settle  them  to  their 
own  advantage.     Such  then  was  the  disign  in  preparation. 

77.  Now  Hippocrates  himself,  with  a  force  raised  at  home, 
was  ready,  when  the  time  came,  to  tahg  the  field  against  the 
Poiotians;  but  Demosthenes  he  sent  on  before,  with  the  forty 
t.hips  mentioned,  to  Naupactus ;  that  after  raising  in  those 
tjuarters  an  army  of  Acainanians  and  tho  other  allies,  lie 
might  sail  to  Siphai,  in  expectation  of  its  being  betrayed  to 
him  :  and   tho  day  liad   been  fixed  between   them  on  which 


Lxxviii.]  TnUCTDIDES.  IT.  273 

llicy  were  simultaneously  to  carry  out  thoso  plans.  Accord- 
incjly,  Demosthenes  went  to  Naupactus,  and  finding  ^niadic 
compelled  l>y  all  the  Acarnanians  to  join  tho  Athenian  con- 
federacy, and  having  himself  raised  all  tho  allies  on  that  side, 
and  m;ir(;hed  lirst  against  Salynthius  and  tho  Agraeans,  and 
reduced  them  to  subjection,  he  proceeded  to  mako  his  other 
preparations  for  going  at  the  i)roper  time  to  Sipha;. 

78.  About  tho  same  ])art  of  tho  summer,  when  Brasida•», 
biiing  on  his  march  >vitli  one  thousand  seven  liundrcd  lieavy- 
armed  to  tho  Thrace  Λvard  countries,  had  come  to  Ileraclea  in 
Trachinia;  and  when,  on  his  sending  before  him  a  messenger 
to  his  partisans  in  I'harsalus,  and  requesting  them  to  conducf. 
Iiimself  and  his  army  through  the  country,  thero  came  to  Me- 
litia,  in  Achaia,  l\ina;rus,  Dorus,  Ilippolochidas,  Torylaus, 
and  Strophacu•*,  Λνΐιο  was  proTcnus  to  tho  Chalcidians; 
Ujion  that  ho  proceeded  on  liis  march,  l^'ing  conducted  both 
by  other  Thessalians  and  especially  by  Niconidas  of  Larissa, 
>vho  was  a  friend  of  Perdiccas.  For  on  other  grounds  it  was 
not  easy  to  pass  through  ThoBsaly  >vithout  an  escort,  and 
with  an  armed  force,  osixicially,  to  pass  through  a  ncighbor*8 
country  without  having  obUiined  his  consent,  was  regard- 
ed witli  suspicion  by  all  tho  Greeks  alike.  Besides,  tho  great 
mass  of  tho  Thessalians  had  always  been  on  friendly  temw 
with  Athens  :  so  that,  had  not  Thessaly,  by  tho  constitution  of 
their  country,  been  under  tho  dominion  of  a  few  individuals, 
rather  than  in  the  enjoyment  of  civil  equality,  ho  >vould  never 
have  mado  his  way;  since  even  as  it  was,  another  party,  of• 
i'ontrary  views  to  thoso  who  liave  been  named,  met  him  on  liis 
march  on  tho  river  Enipeus,  and  tried  to  stop  liim,  tolling 
him  that  ho  did  wrong  in  advancing  without  tho  national  con- 
sent But  his  con<luctor8  said  that  they  would  not  escort  him 
against  their  will,  and  that  they  were  only  attending  him  as 
friends,  on  his  unexpectedly  coming  to  them.  Brasidas  him- 
self also  told  them  that  he  camo  as  a  friend  both  to  tho  coun- 
try of  tho  Thessalians  and  to  themselves,  and  was  brining 
his  forces  against  tho  Athenians,  who  λυογο  at  war  with  his 
country,  and  not  against  them ;  nor  did '  ho  know  of  any  en- 
mity existing  betweed  tho  Thessalians  and  tho  Lacedaenio- 
nians,  to  prevent  their  having  access  to  each  other's  territoix; 
and  now  ho  would  not  advance  against  their  will  (for  neither 
indeed  could  he) ;  but  yet  ho   claimed  not  to  bo  obstnicfced* 

12» 


274  THtJOYDIDEa  IV.  [lxxix.,  lxxx. 

After  hearing  this,  they  \\'ent  away ;  and  he,  without  halting 
at  all,  pushed  ou  at  a  rapid  pace,  accordin*^  to  the  advice  of  hie 
conductors,  before  a  grcaUr  force  might  be  collected  to  stop 
him.  And  so  on  the  day  of  his  setting  out  from  Molitia  he  per- 
formed the  Λνΐιοΐυ  distance  to  Pharsalus,  and  encuni[)ed  on  tlio 
river  Apidanus;  thence  to  Phaciuin,  aiid  thence  to  Perjebia. 
At  that  point  his  Thossaliau  escort  returned ;  but  the  Perai- 
bians,  who  were  subject  to  the  Thessalians,  brought  him  to 
Dium,  in  the  dominions  of  IVrdiccas,  a  town  of  Macedonia 
lying  under  Mount  Olympus,  on  the  side  of  Thossaly. 

79.  In  this  way  lirosidas  stole  a  rapid  march  througli 
Thessaly,  before  any  one  was  prepared  to  stop  him,  and 
reached  Perdiccas  and  Chalcidicc.  For  Λvhat  brought  the 
army  up  out  of  the  Pclt>ponne.se,  >vhile  the  alVairs  of  Athens 
were  so  prosjxTous,  Avas  the  fear  of  the  Tliracc-wani  cities 
Avhich  had  revolted  from  the  Athenians,  and  that  of  l*erdiccas : 
the  Chalcidians  thinking  that  the  Athenians  would  in  the 
first  place  march  against  thi'm  (and  moreover,  tho  cities  near 
to  them  which  had  not  revolted,  secretly  joined  in  the  invita- 
tion), and  Perdiccas,  though  not  an  open  enemy,  yet  being 
afraid,  on  his  part  also,  because  of  his  old  ipiarrels  with  the 
Athenians,  and  most  of  all  being  desirous  of  reducing  to  sub- 
jection Arrhilueus,  the  king  of  the  Lynccstians. 

80.  And  what  contributed  to  their  getting  the  army  out  of 
the  Peloponnese  the  more  easily,  was  the  misfortune  of  tho 
Lacedaimonians  at  that  time.  For  as  tho  Athenians  were 
})ressing  hard  upon  tho  Peloponnese,  and  especially  upon  their 
territory,  they  hoped  to  divert  them  from  it  most  etiectually, 
if  they  annoyed  them  in  return  by  sending  an  anny  to  their 
allies;  especially  as  they  Avere  ready  to  maintain  it,  and  were 
calling  them  to  their  aid,  with  a  view  to  revolting.  Besides, 
they  were  glad  to  have  a  pretext  for  seniling  away  some  of  the 
Helots ;  lest  in  the  present  state  of  affairs,  Λν1κ>η  Pylus  was 
occupied  by  an  enemy,  they  might  atUinpt  some  revolution. 
Indeed  through  fear  of  their  youth  ami  great  numbers,  they 
even  perj)etrated  the  following  deed  (for  at  all  times  most  of 
tho  Lacetla;monian  institutions  were  framed  particularly  with  a 
view  to  the  Helots,  to  guard  against  then») :  They  made  proc- 
lamation, that  as  many  of  them  as  claimed  to  have  done  tho 
state  most  service  against  the  enemy  should  bo  picked  out, 
professing  that  they  would  give  them  their  liberty ;  thus  ap- 


Lxxxi.-Lxxxiii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  IV.  275 

plying  a  test  to  thorn,  nnd  tbinkinir  that  those  who  pcverallv 
claimed  to  be  first  made  free,  would  also,  through  their  hign 
Fpirit,  be  most  ready  to  attack  tliein.  Having  thus  selected  ns 
many  nstwo  thousand,  the  Helots  crowned  themselves,  and  went 
round  to  the  temples,  on  the  strength  of  having  gained  their 
freedom ;  but  the  Spartans  soon  ar*er  did  away  with  them,  and 
no  one  ever  knew  by  Avhat  means  they  Avere  severally  dispatched. 
And  on  this  occa«iion  they  eagerly  sent  away  seven  hundred  of 
them  with  Brasidaa  as  heavy-armed  troops :  the  rest  of  his 
army  lie  induced  by  pay  to  follow  Inm  from  the  Peloponnese. 
As  for  lira«»idas  liitnself,  it  was  chiefly  at  his  own  desire  that 
the  Lacedrcmonians  sent  him  out. 

81.  Hut  the  Chalcidians  were  also  very  anxious  to  have  him, 
as  a  man  who  both  appeared,  while  in  Sparta,  to  l)e  active  in 
every  thing,  an«l  after  he  had  gone  from  home,  proved  himself 
most  valuable  to  the  Lacodwmonians.  For  at  that  present  time, 
by  showing  himself  just  and  moderate  toward  the  cities,  ho 
caused  their  revolt  in  most  instances;  while  other  places  ho 
took  through  their  being  Iwtrayed  to  him  ;  so  that  the  Lacede- 
monians, if  thev  might  wish  to  conclude  peace  (as  they  did), 
had  towns  to  give  and  receive  back,  and  a  respite  from  the  Avar 
in  the  Teloponnese.  And  at  a  later  period  of  the  war,  after 
what  had  haj>pened  in  Sicily,  it  Avas  tlie  probity  and  tact  of 
lirasidas  at  this  time,  experienced  by  some  and  lieard  of  by 
others,  that  most  raised  among  the  allies  of  Athens  a  strong 
inclination  toward  the  Lacednemonians.  For  by  going  out  first, 
and  showing  himself  to  l)o  in  all  res]>ects  a  worthy  man,  ho 
left  among  them  an  assured  hope  that  the  rest  also  >vere  like 
him. 

82.  On  liis  arrival  then  at  this  time  in  the  coimtriei»  Thrace- 
ward,  the  Athenians,  when  they  heard  it,  declared  war 
against  Perdiccas,  thinking  that  ho  was  the  cause  of  liis 
march  thither ;  and  kept  a  closer  Avatch  over  their  allies  in 
that  quarter. 

83.  Perdiccas  immediately  took  Brasidas  and  his  army,  and 
led  them  with  his  own  forces  against  ArrhilvTUs  the  son  of 
Dronierus,  king  of  the  Lyneestian  Macedonians,  whose  terri- 
tory bordered  on  his  own;  for  lie  had  η  quarrel  with  him, 
and  wished  to  reduce  liim  to  subjection.  Put  when  ho  hatl 
(omo  with  his  army,  accompanied  by  Brasidas,  to  the  pass 
into  Lyncus,  Brasidas  told  hmi  that  ho  wished  to  go,  before 


27β  THUOTDIDEa  IV.  [nxxiy.,  υαχτ. 

hostilitiee  were  commencod,  and  by  means  of  words  bring 
Arrliibaeus  into  allianco  with  the  Lododx^moniane,  if  ho  could. 
Indeed  Arrhibaeus  sent  a  herald  to  make  some  advances, 
being  willing  to  refer  the  matter  to  Brasidas  as  an  arbitrator 
between  them :  and  the  Chalcidian  envoys  who  were  with 
him,  advised  him  not  to  remove  the•  apprehensions  of  Per- 
diccas,  that  they  might  bo  able  to  command  his  more  hearty 
assistance  in  their  own  ntfuirs  also.  Besides,  the  envoys  from 
Perdiccas  hal  injido  at  Lacediemon  a  declaration  to  this  ef- 
fect, that  he  would  bring  many  places  around  him  into  allianco 
with  them  ;  so  that  Brasidas,  on  the  strength  of  this  thought 
himself  entitled  to  arrange  the  atfairs  of  ArrhibiEus  in  com- 
mon* with  Perdiccas,  rather  than  leave  them  to  him  alone. 
But  Perdiccas  said  tliat  ho  had  not  taken  Brasidas  as  an  arbi- 
trator in  their  dispute's,  but  ratlur  to  destroy  the  enemies  ho 
should  point  out  to  him ;  and,  that  he  would  act  unjustly,  if, 
while  he  supported  half  his  anny,  he  should  hold  a  conference 
with  Arrhibajus.  But  Brasidas,  against  the  king's  will,  and 
after  a  quarrel  witli  him,  had  a  meeting  with  Arrhibaius,  and, 
being  persuaded  by  his  arguuients,  drew  oif  the  army  before 
they  entered  his  counti^ .  And  Perdiccas  after  this  supplied 
but  a  third,  instead  of  a  lialf,  toward  the  support  of  the  army, 
considering  himself  to  be  aggrieved. 

84.  The  same  summer,  Brasidas,  accompanied  by  the  Chal- 
cidians,  immediately  made  an  expedition  against  Acanthus,  tho 
colony  of  the  Adrians,  a  little  before  the  vintage.  The  people 
there  were  divided  into  parties  among  themsilves  on  the  subject 
of  receiving  him,  thoso  who  with  the  Chalcidians  joined  in  in- 
viting him,  and  the  commons  [who  were  opposed  to  it].  Never- 
theless, through  fear  for  their  fruit,  which  was  still  out,  Λvhcn 
the  commons  were  urged  by  Brasidas  to  admit  him  alone,  and 
to  decide  after  heanng  him,  they  admitted  him.  And  coming 
forward  to  speak  to  the  i)eople  (being,  for  a  Laceda;monian, 
not  deficient  m  eloquence),  he  addressed  them  as  follows : 

85.  "  The  sending  out,  Acanthians,  of  myself  and  my  army 
by  tho  Lacedasmonians,  has  been  executed  to  verify  tho  reason 
wo  alleged  for  liostilities  at  tho  commencement  of  them,  viz., 

>  Or,  Kotv,)  μάλλον  may  si{?nify  "  on  moro  public  grounds,"  t.  «.,  on  the 
Htronjilh  of  what  Perdiccas  had  held  out  at  Sparta  as  a  national  advan- 
tage that  would  result  from  their  sending  troops  to  co-operato  with  hiiu. 
Γορρο  and  Bloomfield  think  it  signiiioB  '*  more  impartially." 


LxxiT]  TnUCTDIDES.  IV.  211 

tliat  to  liberate  Greece  wo  should  go  to  war  with  the  Athenians. 
And  if  wc  have  been  lonir  in  cominn;  to  you,  through  bei;ig 
disappointed  iu  our  expectation  regarding  the  Avar  in  th)so 
j)arts,  accoeiing  to  Avhich  we  hoped  quickly  l»y  ourselves,  and 
without  any  ritsk  on  your  ])art,  to  overthrow  the  Athenians, 
let  no  one  find  fault  with  us;  for  now,  when  wc  had  an  0|> 
portunity,  we  are  como,  and  will  endeavor,  in  concert  with 
you,  to  subdue  them.  l?ut  I  am  astonished  at  my  being  shut 
out  of  your  gat•»,  and  that  my  arrival  should  Ik»  unwelcome  to 
any  of  you.  For  wo  Lacodaimonians,  as  thinking  that  wo 
should  como  to  men  who  in  feeling,  at  any  rate,  were  on 
our  side,  even  before  wo  actually  joined  them,  and  that  wo 
should  1)0  welcome  to.  you,  ran  the  great  risk  of  making  λ 
march  of  many  days  through  the  countiy  of  strangers,  and 
evinced'  all  possible  zeal :  and  now,  if  you  have  auglit  else  in 
mind,  or  if  you  should  stand  m  the  way  of  your  own  Hberty, 
and  that  of  the  rest  of  the  (ireeks,  it  would  be  a  hard  case. 
For  it  is  not  merely  that  you  oppose  mo  yourselves,  but  of 
those  also  to  whom  I  may  apply,  each  will  bo  less  disposed  to 
come  over  to  me,  raising  a  difticulty  on  the  ground  that  you, 
to  whom  Ϊ  first  came,  and  λυΙιο  are  seen  in  the  possession  of  η 
considerable  city,  and  are  considered  to  bo  prudent  men,  did 
not  admit  me.  And  I  shall  not  be  able  to  prove  the  credibility 
of  the  reason  [alleged  by  us  for  the  war],  but  shall  bo 
charged  Avith  eitlier  bringing  to  them  a  liberty  which  has  an 
unjust  end  in  view,  or  of  having  come  too  weak  and  powerless 
to  assist  them  against  the  Athenians,  in  case  of  their  attacking 
them.  And  yet  when  I  >vent  with  the  army  I  now  have  to 
the  relief  of  Nis.i»a,  the  Athenians  though  more  numerous, 
were  unwilling  to  engage  with  me:  so  that  it  is  not  likely, 
that  coming  with  forces  conveyed  by  sea,'  they  will  send 
against  you  an  army  equal  in  numbers  to  that  at  Nistra.  AVith 
regard  to  myself,  too,  I  have  como  to  you,  not  for  the  injury, 
but  for  the  liberation  of  the  Greeks — having  bound  the  Laco- 
dsemonian  authorities  by  the  most  solemn  oaths,  that  such  as  I 

*  Tf  tho  re  n(tor  κίιΑννον  is  to  bo  retained,  I  think  ITaack'a  explanation 
nf  tho  passage  tho  only  ©no  that  can  givo  it  its  tnio  force,  vix.,  that 
'ΐταρααχόμη'οι  is  carelessly  introduced  instead  of  ττΗρτηχήμιθα,  If  Pop- 
po's  objection  to  tliis  bo  considered  valid,  I  should  then  ngrco  with  him 
in  omitting  rr. 

'  I  have  followofl  Γορρο  in  understanding  στρητφ  after  νηΐτ^,  so  thot 
thrro  is  no  reason  for  striking  out  tho  words  τφ  ίν  Νισαίφ, 


278  tHUCYDIDEa  IV.  [lxxxtl,  ιχχχνπ. 

Λνίη  ον^τ  shall  assuredly  bo  independent  confederates — nor, 
again,  that  wo  may  have  allies  whom  wo  have  got  by  violence 
or  deceit,  but,  on  the  contrary,  prepared  to  act  as  allies  to  you, 
who  are  enslaved  by  Hie  Athenians.  I  claim,  thelifcre,  neither 
to  bo  suspected  myself,  since  I  have  given  the  strongest  pledges 
for  my  honesty,  nor  to  bo  considered  a  powerless  avenger ;  and 
I  call  upon  you  to  come  over  to  mo  with  confidence. 

86.  **  And  if  any  one  bo  backward  to  do  so,  from  being  per- 
sonally afraid  of  some  individual  or  other,  lest  I  should  put  the 
city  into  the  hands  of  a  particular  party,  let  him  above  all  others 
feel  confidence.  For  I  am  not  como  to  be  a  partisan;  nor  am 
I  minded  to  bring  you  a  doubtful  lil)erty,  as  I  should  do,  if, 
disregarding  your  hereditary  constitution,  I  should  enslave 
the  many  to  the  few,  or  the  few  to  the  many.  For  that  would 
bo  more  grievous  than  foreign  dominion;  and  toward  us 
I^cedaimoiiians  no  obligation  would  bo  felt  for  our  exertions, 
but  instead  of  honor  and  glory,  accusation  rather.  And  those 
charges  with  which  wo  are  throwing  down  tho  Athenians, 
Ave  should  ourselves  seem  to  incur  in  a  more  odious  degree 
than  a  party  which  has  shown  no  |»retensions  to  lionesty.  For 
to  gain  atlvantago  by  sja-cioiis  trickery  is  more  disgra(;eful,  at 
any  rate  for  men  in  high  station  than  to  do  it  by  open  violence  : 
since  tho  one  is  a  case  of  {iggression  on  the  plea  of  might, 
which  fortune  has  given ;  tho  other,  by  the  insidiousness  of  a 
dishonest  policy.  80  great  care*  do  wo  take  for  things  which 
most  deeply  interest  us ;  ami  in  addition  t(  oaths,  you  could  not 
receive  a  greater  assurance  than  in  tho  case  of  men  >vhose  ac- 
tions,when  viewed  in  tho  light  of  their  words,  convey  a  necessary 
conviction  that  it  is  even  expedient  for  them  to  do  as  they  have 
said. 

87.  "liut  if,  when  I  advance  these  arguments,  you  say  that 
you  have  not  tho  ])Ower  to  (!ompIy  with  them,  and  yet  claim, 
on  the  strength  of  your  kind  wishes,  to  incur  no  harm  by 
refusing;  and  allege  that  freedom  does  not  appear  to  you  un- 
accompanied with  danger,  and  that  it  h  right  to  otfer  it  to 
those  λυΙιο  have  tho  power  to  accept  it,  hut  to  force  it  on  no 
one  against  his  Λνϋΐ :  in  that  case  I  will  take  tho  gods  and 
heroes  of  your  country  to  witness,  that  after  coming  for  your 

*  "  Oltu  toa/./jv  TTfpiuziiV,  K.  T.  /..]  Tlic'so  words  should  bo  closely 
connected  with  tho  fullowiug  clause,  καΐ  οΐκ  «*'  μει^ω—^ς  είπυν,  and  tlio 
chapter  should  end  at  ιίττυν,  iastead  of  at  τηαονμιύα^ — Arnold. 


Lxxxviii.,  Lxxxix.]         THUCYDIDES.  IV.  270 

l)cncfit,  I  can  not  prevail  upon  you  to  accept  it ;  and  will  en• 
doavor  to  compel  you  by  ravaofing  your  country.  Nor  Rhall 
I  then  think  that  I  am  doini;  wrong,  but  that  reason  is  on  my 
side,  on  the  ground  of  two  compulsory  considerations ;  with  re- 
gard to  the  Lacedicmonians,  that  they  may  not,  with  all  your 
kind  feelings  toward  them,  bo  injured,  in  case  of  your  not  being 
won  over  to  them,  by  means  of  the  money  paid  by  you  to  the 
Athenians  ;  and  with  reganl  to  the  Greeks,  that  they  may  not 
be  prevented  by  you  from  escaping  bondage.  For,  otherwise, 
certainly  we  should  have  no  right  to  act  thus ;  nor  are  wo  Lice- 
diemonians  bound  to  liberate  those  who  do  not  wish  it,  except 
on  the  plea  of  some  general  good.  Nor  is  it  dominion  that  wo 
aim  at;  but  rather  being  anxious,  as  Λνο  are,  to  stop  others  from 
acquiring  it,  we  should  wrong  the  mnjority,  if,  Λvhen  bring- 
ing iudependonco  to  all,  wo  should  jKrmit  you  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  it.  Wherefore  advise  well,  and  ,«trivo  to  bo  tho 
first  to  give  liberty  to  tho  Greeks,  and  lay  up  for  yourselves 
everlasting  glory;  and  both  to  avoid  suffering  in  your  private 
capacities,  and  to  confer  on  your  whole  city  tho  most  honor- 
able title." 

88.  To  this  effect  spoke  IJrasidas.  The  Acanthians,  after 
much  previous  speaking  on  both  sides  of  tho  question,  gave 
their  votes  upon  it  in  secret ;  and  because  Ikasidas  had  urged 
alluring  arguments,  ami  at  the  same  time  through  fear  for  their 
fruit,  the  majority  determined  to  revolt  from  the  Athenians ; 
and  after  pledging  him  to  tho  oaths  which  the  Lacedaemonian 
authorities  swore  before  they  sent  him  out,  that  such  as  he  won 
(»ver  should  assuredly  bo  i nde pc^ndcn t ^allies,  in  this  way  they 
admitted  the  army.  Not  Fong  after,  SUigirus,  a  colony  of  tho 
Andrians,  also  joined  them  in  the  revolt.  Such  then  wqtq  tho 
events  of  this  summer. 

89.  At  tho  very  commencement  of  tho  following  Avinter, 
Λνΐιοη  tho  towns  in  Bojotia  wero  to  be  delivered  up  to  Hippo- 
crates and  Demosthenes,  the  Athenian  generals,  and  Demos- 
thenes was  to  repair  with  his  ships  to  Siphai,  Hippocrates  to 
Delium ;  a  mistake  having  been  made  in  tho  days  on  which 
thev  were  both  to  take  the  field,  Demosthenes  sailed  first  to 
SiplhT,  with  tho  Acarnanians  and  many  allies  from  those  parta 
on  board,  but  did  not  succeed  in  his  undertaking,  through  in- 
formation of  tho  design  having  been  given  by  Nichomacnua,  α 
riiocian  pf  Phanoteus,  who  told  tho  Lacedamohians,  and  thejr 


280  THUOYDIDES.  IV.  [xc.,xcl 

the  Boeotians.  Accordingly,  eucco»  being  brought  by  all 
the  Boeotians  (for  Hippocrates  was  not  yet  in  their  country  to 
make'  a  diversion),  Siphuj  and  Chairouea  were  secured  by  sur- 
prise ;  and  when  the  cOiispirators  wore  aAvaro  of  tho  mistake, 
they  attempted  no  movement  in  tho  cities. 

00.  But  Hippocrates  having  drawn  out  the  whole  popula- 
tion of  Athens,  citizens,  resident  aliens,  and  all  the  forcigiiori 
then  in  tho  city,  afterward  arrived  at  Delium,  when  tho 
Boeotians  had  now  returned  from  Siphai;  and  having  en- 
camped his  army,  proceeded  to  fortify  Delium,  tho  sanctuary 
of  Apollo,  in  tho  following  manner.  Tkey  dug  a  trench  aU 
round  tho  sacred  j)reciuct  and  the  fune,  and  from  the  ground 
thus  excavated  threw  uj)  tho  earth  in  a  mound,  as  a  substitute 
for  a  wall ;  and  fixing  stakes  on  it,  cut  down  tho  vines  that 
were  round  tho  sanctuary  a^ji  threw  them  in,  taking  down 
also  at  tho  same  time  stones  and  brick-woik  from  tiio  neigh- 
boring houses;  and  so  they  ran  up  tho  work  in  every  way. 
They  .also  erected  wooden  towers  where  there  was  occasion 
for  them,  antl  where  there  was  not  already  any  building  be- 
longing to  the  teuiple:  for  [on  one  side]  tho  gallery  that  onco 
existed  had  fallen  down.  Having  Ix'gun  the  work  on  tho 
third  day  after  setting  out  from  home,  they  continued  it 
that  day,  tho  fourth,  and.  till  dinner-timo  of  tho  fifth.  Then, 
as  the  main  part  of  it  was  finished,  tho  army  went  forward 
from  Delium  about  ten  stades  on  its  way  homo  ;  whence  most 
of  tho  light-armed  j)roceeded  straight  on,  but  tho  heavy-armed 
halted,  and  remained  stationary ;  while  Hi]»pocrates  was  still 
staying  l)ehind,  and  arranging  tho  guards,  and  how  they  should 
complete  such  parts  of  tho  out-works  as  remained  to  be  finished. 

91.  Now  during  tho  days  thus  employed,  tho  Boeotians  were 
mustering  at  Tanagra;  and  when  they  were  come  from  all 
the  cities,  and  found  tlio  Athenians  on  their  j)rogress  home- 
ward, tho  rest  of  tho  Bau>tarehs  (who  were  eleven  in  nuuiber), 
not  consenting  to  an  engagement,  since  tho  Athenians  were 
no  longer  in  Boeotia  (for  they  were  just  within  the  borders  of 
tho  Oropian  territory  when  they  halted),  l*agondas  son  of 
yEijladas,   being    Bceotarch    of  Thebes    together  Avith    Arian- 

*  Thia  is,  I  think,  tho  truo  force  of  rrapr λύτΓί  ia  this  passage ;  and  it 
has  a  Boinewhat  fiimilar  one,  Xen.  Anab.  II.  0.  20,  idov/.tro  όέ  καϊ  ύ 
Κ'λέη{)\(}ς  ά:ται>  το  ατμάτιν/ια  νμΰς  ίαντύν  Ixttv  τίν  H'uurjv,  καΐ  τοΐ( 
παμαλυπυνντας  ίκττοί^ων  eh'at. 


icu.]  THUCYDIDES.   IT.  281 

tliiclas  Bon  of  Lysimachidas,  and  havinj?  the  command  at  tlio 
liiHP,  wished  to  fight  the  battle,  and  thought  it  best  to  run  tho. 
lisk;  and  so,  oalHng  tho  men  to  him  separately,  in  their  differ- 
ent battalions,  that  they  might  not  all  at  once  leave  the  arms 
that  were  piled,  he  tried  to  persuade  the  I'oiotians  to  mareh 
against  the  Athenians  and  bring  on  the  contest,  by  speaking  to 
this  effect : 

92.  "  Men  of  Boeotia,  it  should  not  have  even  entered  tho 
t]iought3  of  any  of  u»  your  eoinmanders,  that  it  would  not  be 
right  to  engage  with  the  Athenians,  in  case  we  found  them  no 
longer  in  l^oeotia.  For  it  is  liceotia  that  they  intend  to  ravnge, 
after  coming  from  the  border  territory,  and  building  a  fortress 
in  it:  and  so  they  are  surely  our  enemies,  Avherever  they  may 
be  found,  atid  from  Λvhatever  country  they  may  have  come  to 
act  as  enemies  would,  lint  now,  if  any  one  has  thought  this 
the  safer  course,  let  him  change  Jiis  mind  on  the  question.  For 
{)rudence,  in  the  case  of  men  iit tacked  by  others,  does  not  admit 
of  such  nice  calculation  as  in  the  case  of  those  λυΙιο  are  enjoying 
their  own,  and  yet  wilfully  attack  others  through  coveting  moie. 
The  custom  of  your  country,  too,  is  to  repel  alike  a  foreign  force 
that  has  invaded  you,  whetfier  in  your  own  or  in  your  neighbor's 
territory,  l^ut  against  Athenians,  and  borderers  besides,  this  is 
far  more  necessary  thim  against  any  others.  For,  with  respect  to 
their  neighbors,  equality  in  tho  case  of  all  men  constitutes 
lil)erty ;  and  against  these  men,  most  especially,  wlio  endeavor 
to  make  vassals  not  only  of  those  who  are  near  them,  but  (»f 
those  also  λυΙιο  are  far  away,  how  can  it  fail  to  be  our  duty  to 
struggle  to  tho  very  utmost?  (for  in  the  Euboeans  across  tlio 
strait,  and  in  the  greater  part  of  the  rest  of  (ireece,  wo  have  nil 
example  of  the  position  in  which  they  stand  toward  them)  ;* 
nn^  to  bo  convinced,  that  >vith  others  their  neighbors  figlit 
about  tho  boundaries  of  their  land,  but  that  in  our  case  there 
will  he  fixed  for  tho  whole  of  it,  if  Λνο  aro  conquered,  one  bound- 
ar}•,  not  to  bo  controverted ;  for  they  will  invade  it  and  take  by 
force  whatever  Λνο  have.  So  much  more  dangerous  neighbors 
have  we  in  these  men  than  in  any  others.  It  is  usual,  also,  with 
such  as  through  confidence  in  their  power  attack  those  who  aro 
near  thera,  as  tho  Atlicnians  arc  now  doing,  to  marcli  moro 

*  For  liirtxf i/iai.  used  in  ft  similar  manner,  comp.  Xcn.  Anab.  II.  6.  27, 
Λϊΐλός  f  ην  πύνν  Φιλικώς  οίήμενος  όιακεΐσθαι  τψ  Ύίσσαι^ίρνεί.  "  That  he 
was  on  a  very  fnondly  footing  with  him." 


282  THUOTDIDEa   IV.  [xcm. 

fearlessly  against  those  who  remain  quiet,  and  only  defend 
themselves  in  their  own  territory;  but  to  bo  less  ready  to 
grapple  with  those  who  meet  them  beyond  their  borders,  and 
strike  the  first  blow,  if  they  have  an  opportunity.  And  we  have 
had  a  proof  of  this  in  the  case  of  these  very  men ;  for  by 
conquering  them  at  Coroncea,  when  they  got  possession  of  our 
country  through  our  own  divisions,  wo  won  great  security  for 
Boeotia,  which  has  lasted  up  to  the  present  time.  liemember- 
ing  which,  wo  ought,  the  older  part  of  us,  to  como  up  to  our 
former  deeds,  and  the  younger,  as  sons  of  fathers  λυΙιο  then 
behaved  so  bravely,  to  strive  not  to  disgrace  the  noble  qual- 
ities that  by  birth  belong  to  them  ;  but  to  trust  that  the  gods 
will  bo  on  our  side,  whose  sjuictuiiry  they  have  lawlessly  forti- 
fied, and  are  using,  and  to  rely  on  the  omens,  which,  after 
sacrificing,  appear  favorable  to  us ;  and  so  to  meet  these  men 
in  battle,  and  show  them  that  what  they  want  they  nmst 
go  and  get  by  attacking  such  as  will  not  resist  them  ;  but 
that  from  those  who  deem  it  noble  ever  to  secure  by  their 
arms  the  liberty  of  their  own  country,  and  not  to  enslave 
unjustly  that  of  other  people,  they  shall  not  go  away  without  a 
Struggle." 

93.  By  thus  exhorting  the  Boeotians,  Bagondas  persuaded 
them  to  go  against  the  Athenians,  and  quickly  breaking  up  his 
camp,  led  the  army  forward  (for  it  was  now  late  in  the  day). 
On  approatthing  near  to  their  for(;es,  he  placed  his  troops  in'  a 
position  Λvhere,  in  consequence  of  a  hill  intervening,  the  armies 
did  not  see  each  other;  and  there  he  drew  them  up,  and  made 
his  arrangements  for  battle.  AVhen  llippocrati'S,  who  was  still 
at  Delium,  received  tidings  of  the  advance  of  the  Bteotians,  ho 
sent  his  troops,  with  orders  to  throw  themsidves  into  line,  and 
himself  joined  them  soon  after,  leaving  three  hundred  horse  at 
Delium,  both  to  defend  it  if  any  one  came  agjiinst  it,  and  to 
watch  their  opportunity  and  fall  upon  the  licjcotians  during 
the  engagement.  Against  these  the  Boeotians  posted  a  divi- 
sion to  resist  their  charge ;  and  when  all  was  w<'ll  arranged 
by  them,  they  appeared  over  the  hill,  and  halted  in  the  order 
they  intended  to  light  in,  to  the  nundter  of  about  seven  thou- 
sand heavy-armod,  more  than  ten  thousand  liixht-armed,  one 
thousand  horse,  and  five  hundred  targeted^.  Tlie  right  wing 
was  held  by  the  Thebans  and  those  of  the  same  division,  of 
Bieotia ;   the  center  by  the  llaliartians,  Coronaiuns,  Copaiana, 


xciv.-xcvi.]  TnUCTDIDES.  IT.  283 

and  tho  otiior  people  γοιιικΙ  tlio  lake ;  the  left  by  the  Thos- 
]>lan»,  Taiiagneans,  and  Orclioiuonians.  The  cavalry  and 
lln^ht-armed  were  posted  on  each  flank.  The  Thchans  forin- 
od  their  line  fivc-and-twenty  deep ;  the  rest,  as  miirht  liappen. 
Tliesc  then  were  tho  forces  and  tlio  dispositions  of  the  13oeo- 
tians. 

04.  On  tho  Bido  of  tho  Athenians,  tho  lieavy-armed  formed 
their  whole  lino  eicfht  deep,  being  equal  in  numbers  to  their 
adversaries,  with  the  cavalry  on  each  Hank.  As  for  linrht-armed 
regularly  equipped,  there  was  neither  any  present  on  that  oc- 
ciision,  nor  nad  the  state  ever  raised  any.  Such  as  had  joined 
in  tho  invasion,  thouixli  many  times  more  numerous  than  thoso 
on  the  other  side,  had,  for  tho  most  part,  followed  unarmed ; 
inasmuch  as  there  was  a  levy  "on  masse"  of  foreiijners  who 
were  present,  as  Λν^Ι  as  of  citizens ;  and  on  their  first  setting 
out  for  liome,  they  did  not,  ν,'ύΚ  a  few  exceptions,  keep  to 
their  standards.  When  tlie  armies  were  formed  in  line,  and 
now  on  the  point  of  engaging,  Hippocrates,  tho  general,  passed 
along  tho  Athenian  ranks,  and  encouraged  thoin,  by  speaking 
as  follows : 

95.  "  Athenians,  my  advice  is  given  you  in  a  f(»w  words,  but 
it  is  equally  availing  to  brave  men,  and  is  intended  to  remind, 
rather  than  exhort  you.  Let  the  thought  then  bo  entertained 
by  none  of  you,  that  we  aro  improperly  running  this  hazard  in 
another  peo]>le's  territory.  For  though  in  these  men's  terri- 
tory, the  struggle  will  be  for  the  good  of  our  own  ;  and  if  wo 
conquer,  the  I'eloponnesians  will  never  invn<le  your  country, 
when  deprived  of  the  liocotian  horse;  but  in  one  battle  you 
will  both  gain  possession  of  this  land,  and  cotirm  the  liberty 
of  that.  Advance  to  meet  them,  then,  in  a  manner  worthy  of 
tho  state  in  wh'uih  each  of  you  boasts  that  ho  has  tho  first 
country  in  Greece ;  and  of  your  fathers,  who,  by  defeating  theso 
men•  in  battle,  at  yEnophyta,  under  Myronides,  once  got  posses- 
sion of  Bceotia.'* 

90.  While  Hippocrates  was  thus  exhorting  his  men,  and 
when  ho  had  reached  tho.  center  of  tho  line,  but  had  not  had 
timo  to  go  further,  tho  lioeotians,  having  also  l)een  exhorted 
iii  few  words  by  Pagondas,  on  that  occasion  as  well  as  tho 
former,  raised  tlieir  pxan,  and  advanced  against  tliom  from  tho 
hill.  Tlio  Athenians,  on  their  side,  also  advanced  to  meet  them, 
and  closed  with  tbera  at  a  run.    Tho  extremity  of  neither  lino 


284  THUOTDIDES.   IV.  fxovit 

came  into  action,  but  both  were  in  the  same  case ,  for  water- 
courses were  in  their  way :  but  the  rest  met  in  an  obstiuaio 
engagement,  slaeld  to  ehielil.    And  the  Bceotian  letl,  and  ub  far 
ft»  tlie  center,  was  beaten  by  the  Athenians,  who  prcRsed  hard 
both  tlie  others  ])0stud  there,  and  especially  the  Tltespians.    For 
the  troops  next  to  theui  in  the  line  having  given  way,  and  the 
Thespians  being  thus  surrounded  in  a  narrow  space,  those  of 
them  who  were  killed  were  cut  down  while  defending  theni- 
selves  hand  to  hand:  and  some  of  the  Athenians  also,  being 
thrown  into  confusion  through  surrounding  the  enemy,  failed 
to  recognize  their  own  men,  and  so  killed  each  other.    This 
part  then  of  the  Boeotian  line  was  beaten,  and  retreated  on  that 
which  was  still  fighting;  but  their  right,  where  the  TlieVans 
were  posted,  had  the  advantage  over  the  Athenians,  and  drt>vo 
them  back,  and  pursued  them,  though  but  gradually  at  first. 
It  happened  also,  that  Pagondas  liaviiig  seeretly  6c*nt  two  squad- 
rons of  horse  round  the  hill  when  his  left  was  distressed,  and 
these  suddenly  making  their  apj)earance,  the  victorious  wing  of 
the  Athenians,  thinking  that  another  army  was  coming  against 
them,  was  seized  with  a  panic ;   and  so  now  on  both  parts  of 
the  field,  owing  to  this  supposition,  and  to  the  Thebans'  pui*su- 
ing  them  and  breaking  their  line,  the  whole  Athenian  army 
took  to  ilight.   Home  hurrieil  to  Dcliuni  and  the  sea-coast,  others 
toward  Oropus,  others  to  Mount  I'arnes,  and  others  as  they 
severally  had  hope  of  saving  themselves.     The  Boeotians,  in  the 
mean  time,  were  pursuing  them  close,  and  jmtting  them  to 
the   sword,  especially  the   cavalry,  both    their  own    and   the 
Locrian,  whieh  came  to  their  succor  just  as  the  rout  took  place: 
but  the  mass  of  the  fugitives  escaped  more  easily  than  they 
would  else  have  dt»ne,  in  consequence  of  night  coming  on  be- 
fore the  business  wjls  over.     The  next  day,  the  triK^ps  at  Oro- 
pus and   those  at  Delium,  liaving  left  a  garrison  in  it  (for 
they  still  continued  to  hold  it  notwithstanding),  returned  homo 
by  sea. 

97.  The  Boiotians,  after  erecting  a  trophy,  taking  up  their 
own  dea^l,  stripping  those  of  the  enemy,  and  leaving  u  guard 
over  them,  retired  to  Tanagra,  and  formed  ]>lans  for  assault inii 
Delium.  Meanwhile,  a  lierald  from  tlie  Athenians,  coming  to 
ask  back  the  dead,  met  a  Boeotian  herald,  who  turned  liim  back, 
and  Hold  him  that  ho  would  gain  nothing  before  he  himself  hatl 
come  back  again.     Then  ho  Λvcnt  to  the  Athenians,  and  dc• 


xCTin.J  TIIUCYDIDES.  IT.  285 

livcred  tho  mcss.ijnfo  of  tlio  liceotians,  viz.,  "that  thoy  li.-ul  not 
aftcd  right  in  violatinpf  the  laws  of  the  Greeks.  For  it  was  a 
])riniiple  ai'knowledired  by  all,  that  in  an  invasion  of  caeh  other\s 
territory,  they  should  abstain  from  injuring  tho  temples  that 
were  in  it.  liut  tho  Athenians  had  fortified  Deliuni,  and  wero 
living  in  it,  every  thing  that  men  do. in  profane  ground  being 
done  there ;  and  they  drew  and  nsed  for  ordinary  purpose» 
the  water  whioh  was  never  touehed  by  themselves,  except  to 
)!so  in  tho  laver  of  purifieatii)n.  In  tlic  god's  behalf,  there- 
fore, as  well  as  their  own,  the  Hceotians  appealed  to  tho  asso- 
ciated deities  and  to  Apollo,  and  charged  them  to  retire  from 
the  sanctuiiry,  and  then  take  back  tho  dead  which  belonged  to 
them."' 

98.  The  herald  having  spoken  to  this  elToct,  the  Athenians 
sent  their  own  herald  to  the  Ikrotians,  and  said,  that  as  for  tho 
s.inctuary,  they  had  neither  done,  it  any  injury,  nor  would  they 
in  future  voluntarily  damage  it ;  for  neither  had  they  originally 
entered  it  for  that  purpose,  but  to  avengo  themselves  from  it 
on  those  w'no  Averc  rather  injuring  them.  Now  tho  law  of  tho 
(Greeks  was,  that  whoever  in  any  case  had  command  of  tho 
(Duntry,  Λvhether  more  or  less  extensive,  to  them  tho  tcfnples 
always  belonged,  provided  they  received  such  honors  as  tho 
occupiers  had  the  power  to  pay,  without  limiting  them  to  what 
were  usual.'  For  the  Jkrotians,  and  most  others  ΛνΙιο  had  ex- 
pelled any  people  from  their  coimtry  and  taken  forcible  pos- 
session of  it,  had  proceeded  against  temples  >vhich  originally 
belonged  to  others,  and  now  held  them  as  their  own.  And  if 
tho  Athenians  had  been  able  to  make  themselves  masters  of 
tho  l^oROtian  territory  to  a  greater  extent,  such  would  have 
been  the  case :  but  as  it  was,  from  the  part  in  which  they  then 
w(»rc  they  would  not,  if  they  could  help  it,  retire;  as  they  con- 
sidered that  it  belonged  to  them.  Tho  water  they  had  dis- 
turbed under  tho  pressure  of  necessity,  which  they  had  not 
wantonly  brought  on  themselves ;  but  they  wero  compelled  to 
\iso  it  while  defending  themselves  against  tho  Boeotians,  who 
had  first  como  against  their  country.    And  every  thing,  it  was• 

'  Or,  as  Hobbes  and  Bloomflcld  tako  it,  "  to  carry  away  thoir  propcrtj 
with  them."  But  I  think  that  there  is  α  rcforcnco  to  this  paragraph  in 
'10  7th  and  8th  of  tho  next  chapter;  and  in  that  caso  it  can  only  boar 
ll.    moaning  which  I  have  given  to  it. 

'Literally,  "in  addition  to  what  wero  usual" 


28β  THUOYDIDEa  ΙΥ.  [χοιχ,α 

natural  to  suppoec,  done  under  pressure  of  war,  or  any  other 
danger,  would  bo  considereil  as  pardonable  even  in  the  eyes  of 
the  god.  For  the  altars  were  a  place  of  refuge  in  uuintentionjil 
oflenses ;  and  transgression  was  a  term  applied  to  tliose  who 
were  wicked  through  no  compulsion,  and  not  to  those  who  hatl 
ventured  to  do  any  thing  in  consequence  of  their  misfortunes. 
Nay,  the  Boeotians  were  much  more  imj)ious  in  wishing  to  give 
back  dead  bodies  in  return  for  sanctuaries,  than  they  >vere  who 
would  not  at  the  price  of  sanctuaries  recover  things  not  suit- 
able [for  such  bartering].  They  begged,  then,  that  they  would 
simply  tell  them  to  take  up  their  dead,  not  "  after  evacuating 
the  territory  of  the  iJajotians" — for  they  were  no  Jpnger  in 
their  territory,  but  in  one  which  they  had  won  with  their  arms 
— but,  "  on  making  a  truce  according  to  the  custom  of  their 
fathers." 

99.  The  Ikeotians  replied,  that  "  if  they  were  in  lioeotia, 
they  might  take  up  their  dead  after  evacuating  tkcir  country ; 
but  if  in  Athenian  territory,  then  they  knew  tliemsclves  what 
to  do:"*  considering  that  the  Oropian  territory,  in  which  the 
bodies  happened  to  be  lying  (for  the  battle  was  fouirht  on  the 
borders),  was  indeed  subject  to  At  hens,  and  yet  that  the  Athe- 
nians could  not  get  possession  of  them  without  their  consent. 
Nor,  again,  were  they  disposed,  they  said,  to  grant  any  truco 
for  a  country  belonging  to  Athens;  but  they  thought  it  was  a 
fair  answer  to  give,  that  "  when  they  had  evacuated  the  Baotian 
territorj%  they  might  then  recover  what  they  aske»l."  So  the 
herald  of  the  Athenians,  after  hearing  their  answer,  returned 
without  eflecting  his  object. 

100.  The  Boeotians  immediately  Si-nt  for  dartmen  and  sling- 
ers  from  the  Malian  gulf,  and  having  been  reinforced  since 
the  battle  by  two  thousand  Corinthian  heavy-armed,  and  the 
Teloponnesian  garrison  which  had  evacuated  Nisa;a,  and  some 
Megareans  with  them,  they  marched  against  Delium  and 
assaulted  the  fortress,  lx)th  attempting  it  in  other  ways,  and 
bringing  against  it  an  engine  of'  the  following  description, 
which  was  the  means  of  taking  it.     Having  sawn  a  great  beam 

'  i".  p.,  they  mif?ht  take  them  away  when  they  pleased.  But,  as  Arnold 
remarks,  "The  liuiotians  knew  all  tho  time  tliat  this  was  merely  vexa- 
tious ;  for  tho  Athenians  would  not  bury  their  dead  without  their  leave, 
whether  tho  ground  which  they  occupied  belonged  to  Attica  or  to  Boeo- 
lia." 


ΟΙ,  αι.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  287 

in  two»  tlioy  hollowed  out  the  whole  of  it,  nnrl  fitted  it  nicely 
t()crother  again,  like  a  pipe,  and  hung  by  chains  nt  the  end  of 
it  a  caldron,  into  Λνΐήϋΐι  was  placed  an  iron  bellows-pipe,  in- 
clining from  the  beam,  the  timl)cr  alt^o  beinnr  for  a  considerable 
.distance  covered  with  iron.  Thw  they  brought  up  from  a 
distance  on  carts  to  that  part  of  the  wall  where  it  had  been 
ohiefiy  built  of  the  vines  and  timber ;  and  Avhen  it  >vas  near, 
they  applied  great  bellows  to  the  end  of  the  beam  next  them- 
selves, and  blew  them.  The  blast  passing  closely  confined 
into  the  caldron,  which  held  lighted  coals,  gul[)hur,  and  pitch, 
})roduced  a  great  flame,  and  set  fire  to  a  part  of  the  wiill ;  so 
that  no  one  could  any  longer  stand  upon  it,  but  they  left  it 
and  took  to  flight ;  and  in  this  >vay  the  fortress  Avas  taken.  Of 
the  garrison  some  were  killed,  and  two  liundred  taken  :  of  tho 
rest  the  greater  part  got  on  board  their  ships,  and  returned  home. 

101.  Dclium  having  thus  been  taken  on  the  fifteenth  day 
after  tho  batth^  and  the  Athenian  herald,  Avithout  knoAving 
any  thing  that  had  happonetl,  having  soon  after  come  again 
respecting  the  bodies,  the  Boeotians  restored  tliem,  and  no 
longer  made  tho  same  answer  as  before.  There  foil  in  tho 
engagement  of  the  Boeotians,  not  quite  five  Imndred ;  of  tho 
Athenians,  not  quite  a  thousand,  and  Hippocrates  the  general ; 
but  of  light-armed  and  camp-followers  a  great  number. 

A  idiort  time  after  this  battle,  Demosthenes,  liaving  had  no 
success  with  regard  to  Sij)h{c  being  betrayed  to  him,  when  ho 
sailed  thither  at  that  time,  and  having  still  on  board  his  ships 
tlie  Aearnanian  and  Agnean  forces,  with  four  himdred  Athe- 
nian heavy-armed,  ma«lo  a  descent  on  the  territory  of  Sicyon, 
J)Ut  before  all  his  ships  reached  the  shore,  tho  8icyonians 
eamo  against  them,  and  routed  those  that  had  landed,  and 
drove  them  back  to  their  vessels,  killing  eome,  and  taking 
others  prisoners.  Having  erected  a  tropliy,  they  restored  tho 
dead  under  truce.  It  Λvas  also  about  tho  same  time  as  tho 
afl^air  at  Delium,  that  Sitalces,  king  of  tho  Odrjsa»,  died,  after 
making  an  expedition  against  the  Triballi,  and  being  de- 
feated in  battle ;  and  Seuthes  son  of  Sparadociis,  his  nephew, 
succeeded  to  tho  kingdom  of  the  Odrj-sa»,  and  the  other  parts 
of  Thrace,  over  which  Sitalces  had  reigned. 

102.  Tho  same  winter  Bfasidas  with  his  alli«i  Thrace- 
vard  marched  against  Amphipolis,  the  Athenian  colony  on  tho 
river  Strymon.  "  On  the  eito  on  which  tho  town  now  stands 


288  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [cni. 

ft  settlement  was  before  attempted  by  Aristagoras  the  Milesian, 
when  flying  from  king  Darius;  but  ho  was  diiven  away  by 
the  Edonians:  and  then  by'tlie  Athenians,  two-and-thirty 
year»  lutAir,  who  sent  ten  thousand  settlers  of  their  own  citi- 
zens, and  whoever  else  would  go;  who  wero  cut  off  by  the. 
Thracians  at  Drabescus.  Twenty-nino  years  after,  the  Athp- 
nians  went  again,  llagnon  son  of  Nicins  being  sent  out 
m  leader  of  the  colony,  and  expelled  the  Eilonians,  and 
lounded  a  town  on  the  spot  Avhich  before  was  called  "  Nine- 
ways."  They  set  out  for  the  purpose  from  Eion,  which  they 
occupied  themselves  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  on  tho  coast, 
at  a  distance  of  five-and-twenty  stades  from  tho  present  town, 
which  llai^non  named  Ami)hipoiis,'  l)ecause,  as  tho  river 
Strymon  flows  round  it  on  both  sides,  with  a  view  to  inclos- 
ing it,  *  he  ran  a  long  wall  across  from  river  to  river,  and  built 
the  town  so  as  to  be  conspicuous  both  toward  the  sea  and 
toward  the  land. 

103.  Against  this  town  then  lirasidas  marched  with  his 
forces,  starting  from  Arnai  in  Chalcidice.  Having  arrived 
about  dusk  at  Anion  and  IJromiscus,  where  tho  lake  13olbo 
emptier*  itself  in.to  tho  sea,  and  there  supped,  he  proceeded 
during  tho  night.  The  weather  was  stormy,  and  it  was  snow- 
ing a  little;  on  Avhich  account  he  hurried  on  the  more, 
wishing  to  sur[)nse  the  j>eople  of  Amjdnpolis,  excej»t  those 
who  were  to  betray  it.  Tor  there  were  residing  in  it  some 
Argilians  (this  people  are  a  colony  from  Andros),  and  some 
others,  who  were  carrying  on  this  intrigue  together ;  some  at 
the  suggestion  of  IVrdiccas,  others  at  that  of  the  Chalcidians. 
But  most  active  of  all  were  the  Argilians,  who  lived  close  by, 
and  had  always  been  susju'cted  by  tho  Athenians  of  forming 
d(?signs  upon  the  jdace.  For  when  the  opportunity  now  pre- 
sented itself,  and  Hnusidas  had  come  ;  as  they  hiul  for  sometime 
past  been  iutnguing  with  their  countrymen  who  resided  there 
with  a  view  to  its  ln-ing  delivered  up  to  hnn,  so  at  that  time  they 
received  him  into  their  own  town,  and  revolted  frtmi  Athens, 
and  took  him  forward   that  same  night  to  the  bridge  over  the 

•  ί  e.,  "a  city  looking  both  ways."  For  α  doacription  of  it,  sco  the 
memoir  at  tho  end  of  Arnold's  2d  vohmio. 

"  1  have  fqjlowod  Arnold  in  supposing  that  ύια  in  this  passage  expresses 
Γιπ:ι1,  rather  than  efficient  cause,  ns  it  often  does  with  uii  inlinitivo  mood; 
at.  least  I  uifcr  that  such  was  his  view  of  it,  from  thy  pa.ssagea  wliich  hi* 
coiiii>arei  willi  \t,  <^i'  <i\f>i/^!'ii"U  eh.  10.  'J,  and  V.  t)'.'>,  <U(i  τ/,ΐ'  ίσττικι^α. 


ciT.,cr.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  280 

river.  The  town  stands  further  off  than  the  passai^o  of  the  river, 
and  the  walls  did  not  reach  down  to  it  as  they  do  now,  hut 
there  was  only  a  small  guard  posted  there ;  Avliich  Brasidas 
easily  drove-  in  (partly  from  there  Ix'innj  treason  among 
tliem,  and  partly  from  the  stormy  Aveather  and  the  suddenness 
of  his  attack),  and  then  crossed  the  bridge,  and  was  at  once 
master  of  all  the  property  outsido  the  town  l>elonging  to  tho 
Amphipolitans,  who  lia<l  houses  over  the  whole  quarter. 

104.  His  passage  having  tlms  taken  by  surprise  those  Λνΐιο 
were  in  the  city,  while  of  those  who  Λvero  outsido  many  \vcro 
tnade  prisoners,  and  others  took  refuge  within  tho  wall,  tho 
Amphipolitans  were  thrown  into  great  confusion,  especially 
as  they  were  suspected  by  each  other.  Indeed  it  is  said  that 
if  urasidas  wouM  not  liavo  set  liis  troops  to  plunder,  but 
marched  straightway  to  tho  town,  ho  would  probably  have 
taken  it.  l>nt  as  it  was  after  establishing  liis  army  there, 
ho  overran  tho  property  outside ;  and  when  he  found  no  re- 
sult produced  by  those  within,  as  he  expected,  ho  remained 
(luiet.  In  the  mean  time,  the  party  opposed  to  the  traitors, 
))revailing  by  their  numbers  to  prevent  the  gates  being  im- 
mediately throw  η  open,  sent  with  Eucles  the  general,  w  ho  had 
come  to  them  from  Alliens  to  defend  tho  place,  to  tho 
otlier  commander  Thraceward,  Thucydides  son  of  Olorus, 
the  historian  of  this  war,  who  was  at  Th.'usos  (this  island  is 
a  colony  of  the  Parians,  distant  from  Amphipolis  about  half 
a  day's  sail),  requesting  him  to  come  to  their  relief.  On  hearing 
the  news,  he  set  sail  Λvith  tho  greatest  speed,  with  seven  ships 
which  happened  to  bo  there;  wishing,  if  possible,  to  reach 
Amphipolis  in  time,  before  any  surrender  was  made,  or,  at 
any  rate,  to  reach  Eion. 

105.  In  tho  mean  timo  Brasidas,  being  afraid  of  tho  naval 
succor  from  Thasos,  and  hearing  that  Thucydides  possessed 
the  right  of  -working  the  gold  mines  in  those  parts  of  Tliracc, 
and  by  this  means  had  influence  among  tho  chief  persons 
on  the  mainland,  made  hasto  to  get  possession  of  tho  town  be- 
forehand, if  possible  ;  lest,  if  ho  came,  tho  populace  of  Amphi- 
polis, hoping  that  ho  would  raise  a  confederate  force  from  tho 
sea  and  from  Thrace,  and  so  save  them,  should  not  then  sur- 
render to  him.  Accordingly  he  was  willing  to  come  to  moderate 
terms  with  them,  and  made  this  proclamation ;  that  of  tho 
Amphipolitans   and  Athenians  in  tho  town  whoever  would 

13 


200  TUUCYDIDBa  IV.  [OTL.OTii. 

might  remain  in  possession  of  his  property,  sharing  in  a  fair 
and  equal  government ;  and  >vhoever  would  not,  might  depart 
and  taKc  out  his  property  with  him,  within  five  days. 

100.  The  mass  of  tlio  people,  on  hearing•  this,  rj^thcr 
changed  their  minds ;  especially  as  only  a  small  number  of 
Athenians  were  citizens  of  the  ])lace,  the  majority  being  a 
mixed  multitutle.  There  were  also  Avithin  the  walls  many 
relations  of  those  who  had  been  taken  without;  and  they  con- 
Bidered  the  proxilamation  to  be  reasonable,  when  measured  by 
the  standard  of  their  fe.'ir.  The  Athenians  took  this  view  of 
it,  because  they  were  glad  to  go  out,  thinking  that  the  danger 
was  greater  for  them  than  the  rest,  and,  besides,  not  expect- 
ing any  speedy  relief ;  the  rest  of  the  multitude,  because  they 
were  not  to  bo  deprived  of  their  franchise,  on  an  Cipial  footinir, 
and  were  released  from  peril  beyond  their  expectation.  When 
therefore  the  partisiins  of  lirasidas  now  openly  advocateti 
these  proposals,  on  seeing  that  the  j)opulace  had  changed  their 
minds,  an•!  no  longer  listened  to  the  Athenian  commander, 
who  was  ])resent ;  the  surrender  was  made,  and  they  admitted 
him  on  the  terms  of  his  proclamation.  In  this  way  they  de- 
livered up  the  city ;  and  Thucydides  and  his  ships  landed  at 
Eion  late  on  the  same  day.  Brasidas  had  just  taken  })osses- 
sion  of  Ainphipolis,  and  was  within  a  night  of  taking  Eion; 
for  if  the  ships  had  not  quickly  come  to  his  aid,  in  the  morning 
it  would  have  been  in  his  hands. 

107.  After  this,  Thucydides  arranged  matters  in  Eion,  so 
that  it  might  bo  safe,  both  for  the  present  time,  if  Brasidas 
should  attack  it,  and  in  future ;  receiving  into  it  those  who 
had  chosen  to  come  there  from  up  the  country,  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  And  IJrasidas  suddenly  sailed  down 
the  river  to  Eion,  with  a  great  number  of  boats,  on  the  chance 
of  taking  the  point  of  land  which  runs  out  from  the  wall,  and 
so  commanding  the  entrance  into  the  place ;  and  he  attempted 
it  by  land  at  the  same  time ;  but  was  l>eaten  oft'  in  both  in- 
stances: at  Amphipolis,  however,  ho  was  putting  every  thing 
in  readiness.  Myrcinns,  an  Edonian  town,  also  came  over  to 
him  ;  Pittacus,  the  king  of  the  Edonians,  having  been  killed 
by  the  sons  of  Goaxis,  and  Brauro  his  own  wife :  and  not 
long  after,  Galepsus  and  (Jiisyme,  colonies  of  tho  Thasians,  did 
the  same.  Terdiccas  also  came  inunediately  after  tho  capture 
of  Amphipolis,  and  took  part  in  these  arrangements. 


cnii.]  THUCTDIDES.  IV.  201 

108.  When  Amphipolis  was  in  the  enemy's  hands,  tho 
Atlicnians  wore  reduced  to  great  fear,  especially  because  the 
tow»  was  of  Rorvice  to  them  by  supplying  timber  for  ship  build- 
ing, and  in  point  of  payment  of  revenue ;  and  because,  though  • 
as  far  as  the  Strymon  the  Lacedccmonians  had  a  passage  open 
to  them  for  reaching  tho  allies  of  Athens,  if  the  Thessalians 
allowed  them  to  go  through  their  country,  yet  so  long  as  they 
were  not  masters  of  the  bridge,  they  could  have  gone  no  fur- 
ther ;  as  on  tho  inland  side  a  largo  lake,  formed  by  the  river, 
spread  for  a  great  distance,  while  in  tho  neighborhood  of 
Eion  they  were  watched  by  cruisers:  but  now  the  passage 
wa^  considered  to  have  been  rendered  easy.  They  were 
also  afraid  that  their  allies  ΛνοηΜ  revolt.  For  Brasidas 
both  showed  himself  modernt<i  in  other  respects,  and  in  his 
speeclies  every  \vhcro  declared  that  lie  was  sent  out  to  give 
freedom  to  Greece.  And  the  cities  subject  to  Athens,  liearing 
of  the  capture  of  Amphipolis,  and  what  advantages  it  enjoyed,* 
and  the  gentleness  of  Jkasidas,  Avero  most  strongly  encouraged 
to  make  innovations,  and  sent  secret  messages  to  liim,  de- 
siring liim  to  come  to  them,  and  each  wishing  to  bo  the  first 
to  revolt.  For  they  thought  they  might  do  it  with  security ; 
their  mistake  in  the  estimate  of  the  Athenian  power  being  as 
great  as  that  power  afterward  showed  itself,  and  their  judg- 
ment resting  on  blind  desire,  rather  than  on  safe  forethought : 
since  men  are  accustomed  to  grant  to  inconsiderate  hope  what- 
ever they  wish ;  but  to  thrust  asido  with  despotic  reasoning 
whatever  they  do  not  like,  liesides,  as  the  Athenians  ha<l 
lately  met  with  a  heavy  blow  in  lioeotia,  and  Ikasidas  as- 
serted what  was  attractive,  but  not  true,  that  tho  Athenians 
had  been  unwilling  to  fight  liim  at  Nisjca  Λvith  his  own  forco 
alone,  they  were  full  of  confidence,  and  believed  that  no  ono 
would  come  against  them.  Above  all,  from  regard  to  what 
was  agreeable  at  the  moment,  and  because  they  would  be  likely 
to  find  tlio  Laced iemonians  zealous  in  their  behalf  at  first,  they 
were  ready  on  all  accounts  to  run  the  risk.  The  Athenians  per- 
ceiving this,  distributed  guards  in  tho  different  states  as  well 
ixs  they  could  in  a  short  time,  and  in  the  winter  season ;  whilo 

•  napcyerai  has  generally  boon  snppoflod  to  refer  to  Brasidas;  but  tho 
introduction  otineivov  boforo  πραότητα  in  tho  next  clanso  induces  mo  to 
think  that  Amnhipolis  is  its  subject ;  and  the  eonso  of  enjoying  is  ono 
which  it  often  bears.    8co  85.  4,  π-όλίμ  άξιήχρούν  ir(if)r\nitiVovf* 


292  THUOYDIDEa  IV,  IoiX.,(X 

Brasidae  sent  dispatches  to  Lacedaemon,  bogjring  them  to  eend 
him  additional  forces,  and  himself  prepared  for  building  tri- 
remes in  the  Strymon.  But  the  Locedarmonians  did  not  com- 
ply with  his  wishes,  partly  through  envy  felt  by  tho  principal 
men,  and  partly  because  they  were  more  anxious  to  recover 
the  men  taken  m  the  island,  and  to  bring  the  war  to  a  con- 
clusion. 

109.  Tho  same  winter  tho  Mcgaroans  took  and  razed  to 
their  foundations  tho  long  walls  in  their  country  which  tho 
Athenians  had  held ;  and  Brasidas,  aft<ir  tho  capture  of  Ain- 
phipolis,  marched  with  his  allies  against  tho  territory  called 
Acte.  This  territory  runs  out  from  tho  kini^'s  diko  on  tho 
inner  side  of  the  isthmus,  Athos,  a  high  mountam  which  stands 
in  it,  being  its  boundary  on  tho  side  of  tho  -^gean  Sea.  Of 
tho  town  it  contains,  ono  is  Sane,  a  colony  of  tho  Andrians 
close  to  tho  dike,  facing  tho  sea  toward  Kubcea ;  tho  others 
are  Thyssus,  Cleona;,  Acrothoi,  Olophyxus,  and  Dium.  Theso 
are  inhabited  by  mixed  races  of  men  8jK»aking  two  difterent 
languages,  a  small  portion  of  them  being  Chalcidians,  but  tho 
mam  part  I*elasgiaus — a  tribe  of  those  Tyrrhenians  who  onco 
settled  in  Lemnos  and  Athens — Bisaltians,  Crestonians,  and 
Edonians ;  and  they  lived  in  small  towns,  Tlio  greater  part  of 
them  surrendered  to  l^rasidas,  but  Sano  and  l)ium  held  out 
against  him ;  and,  accordingly,  ho  staid  with  his  army  in  their 
territory,  and  laid  it  waste. 

110.  ΛVhen  they  did  not  listen  to  his  proposals,  ho  marched 
straightway  against  Toronc  in  Chalcidice,  which  was  held  by 
tho  Athenians,  being  invited  by  a  few  persons  Avho  were  pre- 
pared to  deliver  up  tho  towTi  to  him.  Having  arrived  wliilo 
it  >vas  yet  night,  and  jui^t  about  day -break,  ho  sat  down  >vith 
his  army  near  tho  temple  of  tho  Dioscuri,  distant  from  the  town 
about  three  stades.  Now  by  the  rest  of  the  town  of  tho  Toron- 
aians,  and  by  the  Athenians  who  wero  in  garrison  in  it,  ho  was 
not  observed  ;  but  his  partisans,  knowing  that  ho  >vould  come, 
and  some  few  of  them  liaN-ing  privately  visited  him,  wero  watch- 
ing for  his  arrival.  And  when  they  found  that  ho  was  come, 
they  took  in  to  them  seven  light-armed  men  Λvith  daggers ; 
(for  such  only  Avas  the  number,  out  of  twenty  λυΙιο  were  at  first 
appointed  to  tho  work,  that  wero  not  afraid  to  enter,  their  com- 
mander being  Lysistratua,  an  Olynthian.)  These  having  passed 
through  tho  sea-ward  wall,  and  escaped  observation,  went  up 


cxT.-cxiii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  IT.  2U3 

and  put  to  tho  sword  the  garrison  in  tlio  liigliest  gimrd-houso 
(for  tlio  town  stands  on  a  liill),  and  broke  open  the  postern 
towards  Canastraeum. 

111.  Brasida-s,  meanwhile,  after  advancinjOf  a  short  distance, 
remained  quiet  with  the  rest  of  his  army,  but  sent  forward  a 
hundred  targetoers,  tliat  when  any  gates  were  opened,  and  tho 
signal  raised  whicli  had  been  agreed  on,  they  might  bo  the  first 
to  rush  in.  These,  ha\nng  waited  some  time,  and  wondering 
at  the  delay,  had  come  by  degrees  near  the  town  ;  while  those 
of  tho  Toronicans  Avithin,  who  were  preparing  matters  with  tho 
party  that  had  entered,  after  tho  postern  had  l)cen  broken  open 
by  them,  and  tho  gates  leading  to  tho  market-place  opened  by 
cutting  through  the  bar,  in  tho  first  place  brouglit  a  party 
round  to  the  postern  and  introduced  them,  that  in  their  rear, 
and  on  both  sides  of  them,  they  might  suddenly  strike  terror 
into  tho  townsmen,  knowing  nothing  of  what  was  going  on. 
Next  they  raised  the  fire-signal  as  had  been  appointed ;  and 
then  received  the  rest  of  tho  targctecrs  through  the  gates  lead- 
ing to  tho  market-plao. 

112.  And  now  15ra<?idas,  on  seeing  tho  appointed  signal, 
ordered  his  troops  to  rise,  aftxir  giving  a  shout  all  together,  and 
causing  much  consternation  to  those  in  the  town,  and  ran  at 
full  sjioed.  Some  immediately  burst  in  through  the  gates, 
others  over  some  square  timbers  that  happened  to  bo  lying  by 
the  wall,  Λvhich  had  fallen  and  Avas  being  rebuilt,  for  tho 
purpose  of  drawing  up  stones.  Brasidas,  therefore,  and  tho 
greatest  part  of  the  troojis  turned  immediately  up  to  the 
liighest  parts  of  the  town,  wishing  to  tako  it  from  top  to  bottom, 
and  securely ;  tho  rest  of  tho  multitude  spread  in  all  directions 
alike. 

113.  While  tho  capture  of  Torono  was  being  efiected,  tho 
mass  of  tho  people,  knowing  nothing  of  tho  matter,  was  con- 
founded ;  but  tho  conspirators,  and  such  as  were  pleased  with 
tho  proceedings,  straightway  joined  those  who  had  entered  tho 
town.  When  tho  Athenians  (for  there  happened  to  bo  about 
fifty  heavy-armed  sleeping  in  tho  market-place)  were  awaro  of 
it,  some  few  of  them  were  killed  in  close  combat ;  of  tho  rest, 
somo  fle<l  by  land,  others  to  their  ships  (for  there  were  two 
keeping  guard  there),  and  escaped  to  Lecythus,  the  fort  which 
they  held  themselves,  having  occupied  a  comer  of  the  town 
running  out  into  tho  sea,  and  cut  ofi*  by  ita  position  on  a  narrow 


294  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  [cxiY,,cxv. 

isthmus.    As  many  of  the  Toronseans  also  as  were  on  their 
side,  took  refuge  with  tlicm. 

114.  When  it  wua  now  day,  and  the  town  was  safely  in  his 
possession,  Brasidas  made  a  proclamation  to  the  ToronaeuiH 
who  had  taken  refuge  with  the  Athenians,  that  whoever 
Avished  should  come  out  to  liis  own  property,  and  live  in  tho 
town  in  security.  To  tin)  Athenians  ho  sent  a  herald,  and 
told  them  to  evacuate  Lecythus  under  truce,  with  their  prop- 
erty, as  the  Jilace  helonged  to  the  Chalcidians.  They  refused 
to  evacuate  it,  but  begged  him  to  grunt  them  a  truce  for  one 
day,  that  they  might  take  up  their  dead,  lie  granted  it  for 
two  days;  during  which  ho  himself  fortitied  the  neighboring 
houses,  and  the  Athenians  their  positiuns.  Having  convened 
also  an  assembly  of  the  Toronieans,  he  said  nearly  the  same 
things  as  at  Acanthus;  "that  it  wjls  not  right  for  them 
to  regard  as  bad  men,  or  traitors,  those  who  had  negotiatetl 
with  them  for  the  capture  of  the  city ;  (for  they  had  not  done 
BO  to  bring  it  into  slavery,  nor  because  they  had  been  bribed, 
but  fur  the  advantage  and  liberty  oi'  the  town  ;)  nor  f  ;r  those 
Λvho  had  taken  no  j>art  in  it  to  su})p<)so  that  they  wuuld  nut 
reap  the  same  benefits ;  fur  ho  had  not  conio  to  destroy  either 
city  or  individual.  Fur  this  reason  he  had  njiulo  the  proc- 
lamation to  those  who  had  Hed  lor  refuge  to  the  Athenians,  m 
he  had  none  the  worse  opinion  of  tliem  fur  their  friendship  to 
them :  and  he  thought  that  when  they  ha»!  made  trial  of  the. 
Lacedoimonians,  they  would  not  be  less  kindly  disposed  toward 
them,  but  fur  niore  so,  iuiisnmeh  as  they  were  acting  more 
justly  :  but  as  it  was,  through  want  of  such  a  tiial,  they 
were  afraid  of  them.  And  he  desired  them  all  to  prepare  for 
being  stanch  allies,  an<l  for  having  to  answer  in  future  for 
whatever  they  did  amiss  :  but  as  regarded  the  past,  it  was  not 
the  Laceduimonians  that  were  injured,  but  themselves  rather, 
by  others  who  vvere  too  strong  for  them ;  and  so  allowance 
was  to  bo  made  for  any  tiling  in  which  they  had  ojiposc'd 
liim." 

115.  Having  thus  addressed  and  entiouraged  them,  on  the 
expiration  of  tho  truce,  he  made  his  asault  ni)on  L••cythus; 
while  tho  Athenians  defended  themselves  from  a  poor  wall, 
and  from  some  houses  that  had  battlements.  For  one  day  they 
beat  him  oil;  but  on  tho  next,  when  an  engine  was  going  to  bo 
brought  up  against  them  by  tho  enemy,  from  which  they  in- 


cxvi.,  CIVIL]  THUCTDIDES.  IV,  205 

tended  to  throw  fire  on  the  wooden  defenses,  and  when  tho 
nrmy  was  no>v  ndvancincr  where  thev  thought  they  should  best 
brinir  up  tlio  engine,  nnd  wlioro  tho  i)lace  was  most  assail- 
able"; the  defenders  place»!  λ  wootlcn  tower  on  the  Avail  opposite 
to  them,  and  carried  up  on  to  it  many  jars  and  casks  of  water, 
with  larpfo  stones,  and  η  largo  party  of  men  a«5cended  it.  But 
tho  building,  having  ha<i  too  great  a  weight  put  on  it, 
Fuddenly  broke  down,  nnd  making  a  loud  noise,  vexed  moro 
iium  it  terrified  those  of  the  Athenians  wlio  were  near  and  saw 
•  it ;  but  those  Λνΐιο  were  at  a  distance,  nnd  most  of  all  those 
who  were  at  tlio  greatest,  thinking  that  tho  place  was  already 
taken  in  that  quarter,  hurried  away,  and  fled  to  the  sea  and  to 
their  ships. 

116.  When  lirasidas  perceived  that  they  were  deserting 
tlie  battlements,  and  saw  what  Avas  going  on,  ho  rushed  up 
with  liis  army,  nnd  immediately  took  the  fort,  and  j)Ut  to  tho 
eword  a«  many  as  he  found  in  it.  The  Athenians  in  this  way 
cvacuat^^d  the  place,  and  Avent  across  in  their  boats  and  ships 
to  IVdene,  Now  there  is  in  L•^cythus  a  templo  of  Minerva ; 
nnd  Brasidas  had  proclaimed,  when  lie  was  about  to  make  tho 
assault,  that  to  the  man  who  first  scaled  the  wall  he  would  give 
thirty  minic  of  silver.  Thinking,  therefore,  that  tlio  capture 
liad  luen  cfiected  bv  other  means  than  human,  ho  presented 
the  thirty  minai  to  the  goddess,  for  tho  use  of  lier  temple;  and 
liaving  razed  and  cleared  Lecythus,  ho  devoted  tho  whole,  as 
sacred  ground.  During  the  remainder  of  tho  Avinter,  he  was 
settling  the  atfairs  of  the  places  in  his  possession,  and  forming 
designs  against  others  ;  nnd  at  the  expiration  of  tlio  winter,  tho 
eighth  year  of  this  war  ended. 

117.  At  tho  commencement  of  tho  spring  of  the  following 
summer,  the  Lacinhemonians  nnd  Athenians  immediately  con- 
cluded an  armistice  for  a  year;  the  Athenians  considering 
that  Brasitlas  would  then  no  longer  win  any  more  of  their 
towns  to  revolt,  before  they  had  made  their  preparations  for 
securing  them  at  their  leisure  ;  and  at  tho  same  time,  that  if 
it  >vero  for  their  interest,  they  might  conclude  a  general  peace  : 
λυΙπΙο  the  Laced aimonians  thought  that  the  Athenians  feared 
what  they  really  were  afraid  of;  and  that  after  liaving  a  sus- 
pension of  their  miseries  and  sutTering,  they  would  bo  moro 
desirous,  from  their  taste  of  it,  to  effect  a  reconciliation,  and, 
restoring  their  men,  to  make  a  treaty  for  a  longer  time.    For 


296  THUOYDIDES.  ΠΓ.  [cxtui. 

they  deemed  it  of  greater  importance  to  recover  their  men*  at 
a  time  when  Brasidus  was  etill  prosperous :  and,  [on  the  other 
hand,]  if  he  reached  a  still  greater  measure  of  success,  and  put 
matters  on  an  equality,  they  were  Hkely  to  lose  those  men,  and 
while  defending  themselves  wiih  their  others,  on  equal  terms, 
still  to  run  a  risk  of  not  gaining  the  mastery.  An  armistice 
was  therefore  concluded  by  them  and  their  allies  on  the  follow- 
ing terms : 

118.  "  With  regard  to  the  tem[)lo  and  oracle  of  tlie  Pythian 
Apollo,  we  agree  that  any  one  who  wishes,  may  have  access• 
to  it,  without  deceit,  and  without  fear,  according  to  the  laws 
of  our  res|>ectivo  countries.  The  Lacedaemonians,  and  such 
of  the  allies  as  are  present,  agree  to  this,  and  declare  that 
they  will,  to  the  lest  of  their  j)ower,  persuade  the  13a?otians 
and  Phocians  to  do  so,  by  sending  heralds  to  thtm  on  the 
subject 

"  With  regard  to  the  treasures  of  the  gotl,  we  agree  to  exert 
ourselves  to  tiud  out  such  as  unjustly  meddle  with  them,  u|)- 
rightly  and  honestly  acting  in  accordance  \vith  the  laΛvs  of  our 
forefathers,  both  wo,  and  you,  and  such  of  the  rest  as  may 
consent  to  this  article ;  all  acting  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
of  our  respective  countries.  On  these  jK)ints,  then,  the  Lace- 
dieinoniaiis  and  the  rest  of  the  allies  agree,  according  to  the 
terms  mentioned. 

*'  On  the  following  ])oints  the  Lacedaimonians  and  the  res 
of  the  allies  agree,  in  case  the  Athenians  make  a  treaty 
to  that  ellect ;  tliat  wo  shall  each  remain  in  our  own  territory, 
keeping  what  we  now  have ;  the  garrison  in  Coryphasium 
confining  themselves  within  the  liuphras  and  Tomeus ;  that 
in  Cythera  holding  no  intercourse  wiih  tho  allied  states, 
neither  we  with  you,  nor  you  with  us ;  and  that  in  Nigaia  and 
Winoa  not  crossing  tho  road,  which  runs  from  the  gates  leading 
from  the  temple  of  Nisus  to  that  of  Neptune,  and  from  the 
temple  of  Neptune  straight  to  the  bridge  at  Minoa  (the 
Megareaiis  and  tho  allies  being  also  bound  not  to  cross  this 
road),  and  tho  Athenians  retaining  the  inland  taken  by  them, 


*  Τ  have  followed  Goller  in  referring  τοις  <V  to  tho  troops  wliich  Sparta 
would  still  retain,  in  opposition  to  τών  μ^ν,  tho  prisoners  whoso  eervicts 
eho  would  havo  lost.  Others  refer  it  to  tho  Athenian*»-  while  Arnold 
thinks  it  corrupt 


cxniLj  TnUCYDIDES.  IV,  207 

without  nny  communication  on  either  eido ;  and  lastly,  with 
regard  to  Troezon,  that  each  party  shall  retain  what  they  now 
possess,  and  as  was  arranged  Λvith  the  Athenians. 

"  With  recrard  to  tlio  navij^ation  of  the  sea,  that  aloncf  their 
own  coast  apd  that  of  their  confederacy,  the  LacedcTnioniana 
ni:iy  sail,  IjKit  in  a  ship  of  war,  but  iti  any  other  vessel  rowed 
bv  oars,  ai>d  carryinir  not  more  tlian  500  talents  tonnage. 

'  "Tliat  any  herald,  embassadors,  and  attendants,  as  many  as 
they  may  choose,  on  their  way  to  tho  Peloponnese  or  to  Athens^ 
for  bringinif  tho  war  to  a  conclusion,  and  adjusting  all  claims, 
shall  have  free  passage,  going  and  returning,  both  by  land  and 
by  sea.  That  deserters  shall  not  bo  received  in  tho  mean  time, 
neither  freo  nor  bond,  neither  by  you  nor  by  us.  Further, 
that  wo  shall  give  judicial  eatisfaction,  both  you  to  us  and  wo 
to  you,  according  to  tho  laws  of  our  respective  countries,  de- 
ciding all  disputes  by  law,  without  recourse  to  hostilities, 

"  tho  Lacediemonians  and  allies  agree  to  these  articles :  but 
if  you  think  any  thing  clso  either  better  or  more  just,  come  to 
Lacedacmon  and  explain  your  views ;  for  neither  tho  Lacedae- 
monians nor  the  allies  Avill  object  to  any  thing  you  may  say 
with  justice.  ]?ut  let  those  who  come,  come  with  full  powers 
to  treat,  as  you  also  desire  us.  Tho  truce  shall  continue  ono 
year." 

"Tho  people  [of  Athens]  ratified  tho  truce.  Tho  tribo 
Acamantis  had  the  pryti^ny ;'  Phoeiiippus  Λvas  secretary ;  Nici- 
ades  was  chairman.  Laches  moved, '  that  they  do  conclude  the 
armistice  (and  may  they  do  it  for  the* good  fortune  of  Athens!) 
on  tho  terms  agreed  to  by  tho  Lacediemonians  and  tho 
allies.'  And  they  agreed  in  tho  assembly  of  tho  people,  *  that 
tho  armistice  bo  for  a  year,  commencing  this  very  day,  tho 
fourteenth  of  the  month  of  Elaphebolion ;  that,  during  that 
time,  embassadors  and  heralds  shall  proceed  to  each  other's 
country,  and  discuss  on  what  terms  tho  war  shall  be  brought 
to  a  conclusion.  That  tho  generals  and  prytancs  havmg 
summoned  an  assembly  of  the  people,  tho  Atnenians  shall,  in 
fho  first  place,  consult  on*  tho  peace,  and  on  tho  manner  in 
which  tho  envoys,  for  putting  an  end  to  the  wars  shall  bo  ad- 
mitted. That  tho  envoys  now  present  in  tho  city  shall  imme- 
diately bind  themselves  in  the   presence  of.  the   people,  thai 

*  For  a  full  explanation  of  those  terms,  eco  Schomann,  De  Comitiil 


13 


208  THUCYDIDBS,  IV.  [οχιχ.»οχχ 

they  will  oseuredly  abido  by  this  truce  for  the  epace  of  a 
year.'» 

119.  To  tlieso  articles  tho  Lacedaemonians  agreed  (tbeif 
allies  also  sweariug  to  them),  with  tho  Athenians  and  their 
allies,  on  tho  tweltth  day  of  tho  Spartan  month  Gerastius, 
Those  who  agreed  to  tho  article:*  and  ratified  them  by  liba- 
tions, were  tlio  following:  Of  tho  Lacedajmonians,  Taurus 
Bon  of  Echetimidas,  Atlienaius  son  of  rericleidas,  and  Philo- 
charidas  son  of  Eryxidaidas ;  of  tho  Corinthians,  yEneas  son 
of  Ocytus,  and  Euphamidas  son  of  Aristonynms ;  of  tho  Siey- 
onians,  Damotimus  son  of  Naucrates,  and  Onasimus  son  of 
Megacles ;  of  tho  Megareans,  Nicasus  son  of  Cecal  us,  and 
Monecratcs  son  of  Amphidorus;  of  tho  Epidaurians,  Am- 
phias  sou  of  Eupaidas ;  of  the  Athenians,  tho  following  gener- 
als, Nicostratus  son  of  Diitrephes,  Niciiis  son  of  Niceratus, 
and  Autocles  son  of  Tulmicus.  This  then  was  the  armistico 
which  was  concluded ;  and  during  it  they  were  throughout 
holding  conferences  for  α  more  general  treaty. 

120.  About  the  time  at  which  they  wero  thus  going  back- 
ward and  forward  to  each  other,  Scione,  a  town  in  Talleno, 
revolted  from  the  Athenians  to  linisidas.  Now  those  Scio- 
naians  say  that  they  are  I'alleneans  from  the  relopt)nnese,  and 
that  their  first  founders,  while  on  their  voyage  fron»  Troy, 
wero  carried  to  this  place  by  the  storm  which  tho  Achaans 
experienced,  and  there  took  uj)  their  abo<le.  On  their  re- 
volting, Brasidas  crossed  over  to  Sciono  by  night,  with  a 
friendly  trireme  sailing  ahead  of  him,  and  himself  following 
at  some  distance  in  a  skifi';  that  in  case  of  his  falling  in  with 
any  vessel  larger  than  tho  skiif,  tho  trireme  might  como  to 
his  aid ;  while  if  another  trireme  of  equal  force  came  against 
them,  ho  thought  that  it  would  not  turn  upon  tho  smaller 
vessel,  but  upon  the  ship,  and  in  tho  nu'an  time  ho  should 
make  his  esca])e.  Having  thus  crossed  over,  and  convened  an 
assembly  of  the  Scion;eans,  ho  spoke  to  the  same  eflect  as  at 
Acanthus  and  Torone :  and  told  them,  moreover,  that  they 
were  most  deserving  of  praise,  inasmuch  as,  though  TalleniP 
within  tho  isthmus  was  cut  off  from  succors  by  land  through 
llie  Athenians  occupying  Potidaia,  and  they  were  virtually 
nothing  else  but  islanders,  they  had  of  their  own  accord  joined 
the  banner  of  liberty,  an(l  had  not  through  cowardico  waited 
for  compulsion  to  bo  a])plied  to  them,  in  tho  caso  of  what  was 


cix!.,  cxxii.]  THUCYDIDE3.  IV.  209 

manifestly  for  their  own  mlvantagc.  That  Um  was  a  proof 
that  they  would  also  endure  like  men  any  other  even  of  tho 
greatest  perils,  if  [by  their  so  dointr]  their  affairs  should  bo 
arranijed  to  their  satisfaetion  ;  in  short,  that  he  should  con- 
sider them  as  truly  the  most  faithful  allies  of  the  LaccdtTmo- 
nians,  and  show  them  all  other  ])roofs  of  his  respect. 

121.  The  Scionicans  were  elated  by  his  language,  and  all 
alike  taking  courage,  even  those  who  before  were  not  pleased 
with  tho  business,  resolved  to  carrj'  on  the  war  %vith  spirit ; 
and  both  received  Brasidas  Λvith  other  marks  of  honor,  and 
])ul)licly  crowned  him  with  a  crown  of  gold,  as  the  liberator, 
of  Greece;  while  individually  they  decked  him  Λvith  garlands, 
and  thronged  to  him  as  to  a  victorious  athlete.  At  that  time, 
after  leaving  them  some  guards,  ho  crossed  over  again,  and 
not  long  after  sent  them  over  a  larger  force  ;  as  he  Avished,  in 
conjunction  Avith  them,  to  make  an  attempt  on  Mendc  and  Poti- 
doDa,  thinking  that  the  Athenians  would  como  to  their  relief, 
as  though  it  were  an  island,  and  desiring  to  be  beforehand 
with  them,  lie  was  carrying  on  also  S4>mc  communications 
Avith  those  towns,  with  a  view  to  their  being  betrayed  to  him. 
And  thus  he  was  meditating  an  attack  on  these  places. 

122.  Hut  in  the  mean  time  there  came  to  him  in  a  trireme  tho 
commissioners,  who  were  carrying  round  intelligence  of  the  ar* 
mistice,  Aristonymus  on  the  sido  of  tho  Athenians,  and  Athe- 
n.Tus  on  that  of  the  Lacedaimonians.  So  the  troops  crossed  over 
again  to  Torone ;  Avhilc  they  informed  Brasidas  of  tho  truce, 
and  all  the  allies  of  tho  Lacedicmonians  Thraceward  assented 
to  what  had  been  done.  Now  Aristonymus  allowed  all  the 
other  cases ;  but  finding,  on  a  calculation  of  the  days,  that  tho 
Scionaeans  had  revolted  after  the  dato  of  tho  corivention,  he  said 
that  they  would  not  bo  included  in  it.  But  Brasidas  earnestly 
contended,  on  the  other  hand,  that  they  had  revolted  before 
tho  truco  was  made,  and  refused  to  givo  tho  town  up.  So 
when  Aristonymus  reported  their  ciiso  at  Athens,  the  pcoplo 
wejO  immediately  prepared  to  send  an  expedition  against 
Scionc.  But  the  Lacedaimonians  sent  envoys  and  told  them 
that  they  would  be  violating  tho  truce ;  and  laid  claim  to  tho 
town,  in  reliance  on  tho  statement  of  Brasidas;  offering,  at 
(ho  same  time,  to  let  tho  question  bo  decided  by  arbitration. 

.'I'ho  Athenians,  liowever,  did  not  wish  to  run  tho  risk  of  arbi• 
tration,  but  to  Bend  tho  e?[podition  as  quickly  as  poesiblo ;  bo- 


800  THUOYDIDES.  FV.  [cxxuL,  cxxir. 

ing  enraged  to  think  that  even  the  inhabitAnte  of  the  islands 
now  presumed  to  revolt  from  them,  trusting  in  the  power  of 
the  Lacediemonians  by  laud,  which  could  not  help  them.  And 
indeed  the  truth  of  the  question  respecting  the  revolt  vviih  rather 
{18  the  Athenians  maintained ;  for  the  Scionaeana  revolted  two 
days  after  the  truce  >vas  signed.  Accordingly,  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Cleon,  they  at  once  passed  a  decree  that  they  should 
reduce  the  Sciona;ans,  and  j)Ut  them  to  death  ;  and  so,  while 
they  remained  quiet  from  other  undertakings,  they  were  en- 
gaged in  preparing  for  this. 

123.  In  the  mean  time,  Mende  revolted  from  them,  a  town 
in  Pallene,  and  a  colony  of  the .  Eretrians.  lirasidas  received 
them,  not  thinking  that  he  wa.s  doing  wrong,  because  they 
liad  clearly  come  over  to  him  during  the  armistice :  for  in 
Bomo  points  he  himself  also  charged  the  Athenians  with  in- 
fringing the  truce.  And  for  this  reason  the  Mendaians  were 
the  more  emboldened,  seeing  the  feelings  of  Brasida^  Avarmly 
disposed  toward  them,  and  inferring  as  much  from  the  caso 
of  Scionc,  since  he  would  not  give  it  up ;  and  at  the  same 
time  because  those  of  them  who  contrived  the  revolt  were  a 
small  party,  and  since  thinking  of  it  on  that  occasion,  had 
never  let  it  rest  afterwaril,  but  Avero  afraid  of  conviction  for 
themselves,  and  forced  the  majority  to  it  against  their  inclina- 
tion. The  Athenians,  immediately  Jit^^rhig  of  it,  were  still 
far  more  enraged,  and  made  their  preparations  against  both 
the  towns.  And  Brasidas,  expecting  their  attack,  conveyed 
away  to  Olynthus  in  Chalcidico  the  women  and  children  of 
the  Scionaeana  and  Aiendaians,  and  sent  over  to  them  five 
hundred  Peloponnesian  heavy-anned  and  three  hundred  Chal- 
cidian  targeteers,  with  Polydamidas  in  command  of  them  all. 
And  so  they  joined  in  making  their  preparations,  believing 
that  the  Athenians  would  quickly  bo  with  them. 

124.  lirasidas  and  Perdiccas  meanwhile  matlo  an  expedi- 
tion together  the  second  tiuie  into  Lyncus,  against  Arrhibaius ; . 
taking  Avith  them,  the  latter,  the  forces  of  the  Macedonians 
under  his  dominion,  and  some  heavy-armed  troops  of  the 
<li(iek9  living  among  them;  the  former,  in  addition  to  thoso 
of  the  Peloj)onnesians  whom  ho  had  still  left,  the  Chalcidians 
Acanthians,  and  of  the  rest  according  to  their  respective 
kitrength.  In  all,  the  heavy-armed  Greeks  amounted  to  about 
three  thousand  ;  all  the  cavalry  of  the  Macedonians  Λvith  the 


Γ.τχν.]  THuCTDIDEa  IT.  301 

Chalcidians  went  with  thera,  amounting  to  nearly  a  thousand, 
and  a  \ητ(ζβ  inultitu<lo  of  tho  barbarians  besides.  Havini^ 
invaded  tlie  country  of  ArrliibiOUs,  and  findin<r  tlio  Lynces- 
tians  encamped  in  the  field  aijaiiist  them,  they  also  took  up  a 
jiosition  opposite  to  them.  Tiie  infantry  oceupyinjx  a  hill  on 
each  side,  and  the  space  between  beinj;  a  plain,  the  horse  of 
both  armies,  in  tho  first  place,  palloped  down  into  it,  and  cn- 
p^aged  in  a  cavalry  action.  Then  tho  Lyncestian  heavy-armed' 
having  advanced  first  from  their  hill  with  their  cavalry,  and 
being  ready  for  action,  Hrasidas  and  Perdiccas  also,  in  their 
ium,  led  their  forci?s  against  them,  and  engaged  in  battle,  and 
routed  the  Lyncestians,  and  killed  many  of  them  ;  but  tho  rest 
took  refuge  on  the  heightii,  and  there  remained  quiet.  After 
this,  having  erected  a  trophy,  they  waited  two  or  three  days, 
in  expectation  of  the  Illyrians,  who  were  to  join  Perdiccas  as 
mercenaries*  Then  IVrdiccas  wished  to  advance  against  tho 
villages  of  Arrhiboius,  and  not  to  sit  still ;  but  Hrasidas  was 
anxious  for  Mende,  lest  if  the  Athenians  should  sail  against 
it  before  his  return,  it  shouM  meet  Avith  some  disaster ;  and 
as  the  Illyrians,  moreover,  had  not  joined  them,  ho  was  not 
eager  to  advance,  but  rather  to  retreat. 

125.  In  the  mean  tiine,  Λνΐύΐο  they  wero  thus  at  variance, 
news  arrived  that  the  Illyrians  had  actually  betrayed  Perdic- 
cas, and  joined  Arrhibanis :  so  that  now  both  parties  thought 
it  best  to  retreat  through  their  fear  of  them,  »#  they  wero 
men  of  a  warlike  character ;  but  nothing  being  settled,  in  con- 
sequence of  their  quarrel,  as  to  Λvhen  they  should  march,  and 
night  coming  on,  the  Macedonians  and  the  multitude  of  tho 
barbarians  were  immediately  terrified  (as  great  armies  aro 
wont  to  bo  panic-stricken  for  no  certain  cause)  ;  and  thinking 
that  many  times  more  than  liad  really  como  wero  advancing 
against  them,  and  had  all  but  reached  them,  they  broke  into 
sudden  flight,  and  proceeded  liomcward.  l*erdiccas,  who  at 
first  Avas  not  aware  of  it,  Λvas  compelled  by  them,  on  his  learn- 
ing it,  to  depart  before  seeing  Brasidas  (for  they  were  encamped 
at  a  great  distance  from  each  otlicrj.  In  the  morning,  when 
Brasidas  saw  that  tho  Macedonians  narl  gone  before  him,  and 
that  tho  Illyrians  and  Arrhibajus  wero  on  tho  point  of  attack- 
ing him,  he,  on  his  side,  drew  his  hea>'y-armod  together  into 
a  square,  and  taking  tho  light-armed  multitude  into  tho  cen- 
ter, intended  to  retire.     And  ho  appointed  his  youngest  men 


302  THUOYDIDES.  IV,  [oxxvl 

to  daeh  out,  on  whatever  point  thoy  might  charge  them  ;  while 
ho  himself  with  three  hundred  picked  men  in  the  rear  intended 
during  the  retreat  to  face  about,  and  resist  the  first  of  the 
enemy  that  should  fall  upon  them.  Before  the  enemy  came 
near,  he  addre8so«l  his  men,  as  well  as  the  short  time  allowed 
him,  with  the  following  exhortation  : 

120.  "Men  of  the  Pelopouneso,  if  I  did  not  suspect  that 
in  consequence  of  your  being  left  alone,  and  because  your 
assailants  are  barbarians,  and  there  are  many  of  them,  you 
were  thrown  into  consternation,  1  should  not  have  given  you, 
us  I  do,  information  at  tho  same  time  as  encouragement.  But 
as  it  is,  \i\Ui  resjK'Ct  to  the  desertion  of  our  friends,  and  the 
superior  numbers  of  our  adversjiries,  I  ΛνΐΙΙ  endeavor,  by  a 
brief  admonition  and  advice,  to  convince  you  of  Λvhat  is  most 
important  for  you.  For  it  is  your  proj)er  character  to  be  brave 
in  warlike  operations,  not  from  the  presence  of  allies  in  each 
case,  but  from  your  own  native  valor;  and  to  fear  no  number 
of  your  enemies  whatever:  since  neither  «re  the  govern- 
ments from  which  you  come  of  such  a  character* — govern- 
ments in  Avhich  the  many  do  not  rule  the  few,  but  rather  the 
smaller  number  the  greater,  having  ac<juired  their  power  by 
no  other  means  than  by  being  victorious  in  battle.  But  with 
regard  to  barbarians,  of  whom  you  are  now  afraid  throngh 
inexperience,  you  onght  to  know,  both  from  the  contest  you 
liave  already  had  with  those  («f  them  who  are  Macedonians,  and 
froUi  Λvhat  I  myself  conjecture,  and  indeed  have  ascertained 
from  hearsay,  that  they  will  not  j)rovo  forn»idable.  For  with 
regard  to  such  points  in  an  enemy  as  have  an  appearance  of 
strength,  Λvhile  they  are  in  reality  weak,  when  correct  informa- 

'  I  venture  to  difler  from  all  the  editors  whose  opinion  I  generally  fol- 
low, in  thinking  that  there  is  no  need  to  consider  υΰ  as  carelessly  intro- 
duced here,  either  by  Thucydides  himscir,  or  by  his  copyists.  The  perfect 
agreement  of  all  the  MiSS.  in  retaining;  it  renders  tlie  latter  supposition 
exceedingly  iinprobablo  ;  and  though  our  author  is  doubtless  souietinics 
careless,  there  is  no  reason  for  assuming  that  ho  was  so  iu  this  passage, 
if  his  wortls  can  bo  explained  on  any  other  view  of  them.  And  such,  I 
think,  is  tho  case,  if  the  relative  clause  be  taken  as  more  particularly  re- 
ferring to  roAtrtiui',  instead  of  being  regarded  as  exjilanatory  of  toiuvtuv. 
Tho  meaning  of  tho  latter  word  will  then  be  "  of  such  a  character  as  to 
warnmt  your  entertaining  any  such  ftar  of  superior  numbers."  When 
tho  passage  is  read  with  tho  stress  on  no/.tTfiui•,  which  its  prominent 
position  seems  to  require,  I  can  not  but  think  that  this  interpretation 
will  appear  most  natural. 


• 


cxxTii.]  TUUCYDIDES.  IV.  303 

lion  19  plained  refipccting  tlicm,  it  rather  pives  confidence  to  thoso 
Λνΐιο  resist  the!n :  whereas  in  tlic  case  of  thoso  who  have  any 
solid  mlvantiiio,  men  >vould  meet  them  the  more  boldly  from 
havinnf  no  ])revious  acquaintance  Λvith  them.  Now  these  mm 
present  indeed  a  demonstration  fearful  to  such  as  are  unsic- 
(|uainted  with  them  :  for  they  are  formidable  in  their  num- 
bers which  meet  the  eye,  and  intolerable  from  the  loudness  of 
their  shoutinj^ ;  and  the  brandishing  of  their  weapons  in  tho 
air  liaft  α  look  of  threatenini]j.  liut  to  thoso  wlio  stand  their 
iiround  against  them,  they  are  not  what  they  seem ;  for  they 
have  no  definite  order,  eo  as  to  bo  ashamed  of  leaving  any 
particular  position,  when  hard  pressed ;  and  their  retreat  and 
attack  being  considered  equally  honorable  puis  their  courago . 
also  bt^yond  tho  reaoh  of  ])roof;  while  their  independent 
niodo  of  fighting  wouM  most  frequently  atlbrd  a  mim  α  pretext 
for  saving  himself  with  a  fair  show.  And  so  they  consider 
the  probability  of  their  frightening  you  without  any  danger 
to  themselves  a  surer  game  than  meeting  you  hand  to  hand ; 
else  they  would  have  adopted  that  method  instead  of  their 
present  one.  And  in  this  way  you  clearly  see,  that  all 
that  was  previously  terrible  in  them,  is  but  little  in  reality, 
though  to  the  eye  and  to  tho  ear  very  urgent.  If,  therefore, 
you  stand  firm  against  its  approach,  and  when  you  have  an 
opportunity,  again  retire  in  good  order,  and  in  your  ranks, 
you  will  tho  sooner  reacih  a  place  of  safety ;  and  will  know  in 
future  that  to  those  who  sustain  their  first  attack,  such  rab- 
h\m  only  mako  a  vaunting  demonstration,  l)y  threatening  at  a 
distance  ;  but  in  tho  case  of  thoso  who  yi'dd  to  them,  they  aro 
(juick  in  displaying  their  courago  in  pursuit,  when  they  can  do 
it  with  security." 

127.  In  this  Avay  did  lirasidas  exhort  them,  and  Iwgan  to 
lead  off  his  forces.  When  the  barbarians  saw  it,  they  pressed 
<»n  him  >vith  much  sliouting  and  uproar,  thinking  that  ho  Avas 
Hying,  and  being  detennined  to  overtake  and  eut  him  otf.* 
Then,  when  the  reserve  wmpanies  met  them,  at  whatever 
]K)int  they  charged  ;  and  Brasidas  liimself  with  his  picked 
men  withstood  the  pressure,  and  they  liad,  contrary  to  their 
<'xiK)ctation,  resisted  their  first  rush,  and,  afttir  that,  received 

'  ^ομίβαντις  scorns  to  be  used  hero  in  a  difforerit  sonso  with  rcfcrenco 
to  tho  two  inflnitivca  which  follow  it.  For  its  moaning  with  the  latter, 
compare  chap.  8G.  2,  ovJ'  άσα^ν  τήν  iXtvOepiav  νομίζω  innpipetv. 


t 

804  THUOYDIDEa  IV.  [ciivin.,  oxxix. 

nnd  repelled  thorn  when  they  carao  on,  but  refired  themselves, 
>vhen  the  enemy  withdrew:  then  indeed  the  main  body  of 
the  barbarians  ceased  attackinj^  the  Greeks  witli  Brasidas  in 
the  open  country;  and  having  loft  a  portion  of  their  forces  to 
follow  and  Jiarass  them,  tlie  rest  advanced  at  a  run  against 
tho  flying  Macedonians,  rutting  down  Buch  as  they  fell  i:i 
with ;  and  got  in  time  to  j)re-occupy  tho  narrow  pass  which 
runs  between  two  hills,  into  tho  country  of  Arrhibaius,  know- 
ing tliat  there  >vas  no  other  way  of  retreat  for  Brasidas.  And 
when  ho  was  coming  to  just  where  tho  road  now  became 
impassable,  thoy  proceeded  to• surround  him,  >vith  a  view  to 
cutting  him  oU\ 

128.  lie,  on  perceiving  it,  gave  orders  to  his  band  of  three 
hundred  to  advance  at  a  run  to  that  one  of  tho  hills  >vhirh 
he  thought  they  miglit  take  more  cjusily,  as  quickly  as  each  * 
man  could,  witliout  observing  any  order ;  and  to  endeavor  to 
dislodge  from  it  the  barbarians  who  >vero  already  upon  it, 
before  their  main  force  that  Λvas  surrounding  liim  should 
join  them  tlure.  Accordingly,  they  charged,  and  oveφowered 
the  party  on  the  hill,  and  the  main  force  of  the  Greeks  now 
advanced  more  easily  uj)  to  it ;  tor  the  barbarians  wero  fright- 
ened  on  finding  their  men   on  that  Mde  dishxlged  from  tho 

•  •      • 

lieiglit,  and  no   longer   followed   tho  main  body,  considering 

that  they  wero  now  on  tho  borders,  and  liad  escaped  them. 

AVhen  Brasidas  had  thus  reached  the  heights,  lio  proceeded  with 

greater  safety,  and  arrived  tho  8amo  tlay  at  Arnissa,  tho  first 

town  in  the  doniinions  of  Perdiccas.     And  as  tho  sfjldiers  worn 

enraged   at   the   Macedonians  liaving   retreated   before  them, 

whatever  yokes  of  oxen  Monging  to  them  they  fell  in  with  oa 

the  road,  or  whatever  baggage  that  had  drop|K^d  off  (as  was 

likely  to  ha]>])en  in  case  of  a  retreat  by  night,  and  under  an 

alarm),  on  their  own  authority  they  unyoked  and  cut  down  tho 

cattle,  and  iij)prupriatod  the  baggage.     From  this  time  IVr- 

diccas  first  regarded  l^rasiilas  as  an  enemy,  and  cherished  in 

future  a  Iiatred  of  tho  Lacedaimonians,  which  was  not,  indeo<], 

congenial   >vith   his  feelings,  because  of  his  aversion  for  tho 

Athenians ;   but  ho  departed   from   his  natural  interests,  anl 

was  contriving  in  what  way  he  might  soonest  como  to  tenu> 

with  tho  Athenians,  and  bi'  rid  of  the  Peloponnesians. 

129.  On   his   return   fiom   Macedonia,   Brasidas  found  the 
Athenians  already  in  possession  of  Monde ;  and  remaining  quiet 


cxxij  TnUCYDIDES.   IV.  906 

quiet  tlicrc,  tliougli  l»o  confiidorcd  Inm^iolf  uimblo  to  cross  over 
into  Palleuc,  and  assist  it,  lio  kept  watch  over  Torono. 
loT  about  tlio  same  timo  as  llio  cain])aign  in  Lyncus,  the 
Athenians  Bent  tlio  expedition  airainst  Mendc  and  Seione,  as 
tliey  were  prei)aring  to  do,  Avith  fifty  sliips,  ten  of  which  were 
Cliians,  and  ono  thousand  heavy-armed  of  their  own,  six 
hundred  bowmen,  ono  thousand  Thracian  mercenaries,  and 
others  of  their  allies  from  that  country  wrving  as  targetecrs, 
under  the  conmiand  of  Nicias  «on  of  Niceratus,  and  Nicos- 
tratus  Bou  of  Diitreplies.  After  advancing  from  Potidira  with 
their  ships,  they  came  to  land  opposite  the  tem])lo  of  Neptune, 
and  j)roceeded  against  the  MendaDans.  They,  both  themselves 
and  three  hundred  8<'ion.Tan3  who  had  come  to  their  aid,  and 
the  Peloponnesian  auxiliaries,  seven  hundred  lieavy-armed  in 
all,  Avith  Polydamidas  their  commander,  Λvero  cn(!am|x»d  out- 
fiido  the  city  on  a  strong  liill.  Nicias,  with  ono  hundred  and 
iMcnty  Methonaian  light-armed,  sixty  picked  men  of  the 
Ath-enian  heavy-armed,  and  all  the  bowmen,  attempted  to 
coujc  at  them  by  a  path  running  up  the  hill;  but  being  wound- 
ed by  them,  was  unable  to  force  their  position :  Λνΐιίίο  Nicos- 
tratus,  with  all  the  rest  of  the  army,  advancing  by  a  different 
approach,  and  from  a  more  distiUit  j)oint,  against  the  liill, 
which  >vas  difficult  of  access,  wa.s  beaten  back  in  utter  confu- 
sion, and  the  whole  force  of  the  Athenians  Λvas  within  a  little 
of  being  conquered.  For  that  day,  then,  as  t!»o  Mendaiann 
and  their  allies  did  not  give  way,  tlie  Athenians  retreated  and 
jiitclied  their  camp  ;  and  the  ^k'ndarans,  when  night  carao  on, 
returned  into  the  town. 

130.  Tho  day  following,  the  Athenians  sailed  round  to  Iho 
fide  toward  Seione,  and  took  the  suburb,  and  ravaged  the 
land  tho  whole  day,  no  ono  coming  out  against  them.  For 
indeed  there  was  some  o])position  of  parties  in  tho  town  ;  and 
tho  three  hundred  of  tho  Sciouirans,  on  the  approach  of  night, 
returned  home.  Tho  next  day  Nicijus  advanced  Avith  half  tho 
f«)rces  to  the  borders  of  tho  8ciona»ans,  and  laid  waste  tho  land, 
whilo  Nicostratus  with  tho  remainder  eat  down  before  <l>o 
town,  near  tho  upper  gates,  by  tho  way  they  go  to  Potidai'a. 
There  Polydamidas  (an  tho  arms  of  tho  Mendaeans  and  their 
auxiliaries  happened  to  bo  piled  in  that  quarter)  began  to 
draw  them  up  for  battle,  and  exhorted  the  Mendseans  to  march 
out  against  tho  enemy.    Ono  of  tho  popular  faction  replying 


800  THU0YDIDE3.  IV.  [cxxxi.,  cxxxn. 

to  bim,  in  tho  epirit  of  party,  that  thoy  would  not  go  out, 
and  did  not  want  a  war,  and,  Λνίκ'η  ho  had  thus  replied,  bein<^ 
dragged  to  him  by  tho  hand,  and  roughly  treated,  tho  coin- 
moua  immediately  took  up  their  anus,  and  advanced  in  a 
great  rage  against  tho  Teloponnesians,  and  those  who  had 
joinud  them  iu  opposition  to  themselves.  Having  tlnis  fallen 
upon  them,  they  routed  them,  in  consequence  both  of  tho 
huddenness  of  tho  charge,  and  of  their  alarm  at  tho  gati-s 
being  opened  to  the  Athenians;  for  they  imagined  that  tho 
attack  had  been  made  in  consequence  of  some  agreement 
Avilh  them.  Tiiey  then,  as  many  as  were  not  immediately 
killed,  took  refuge  in  the  citadel,  wliieh  was  liefore  held  by  them- 
selves ;  w  hile  the  Athenians  (tor  by  this  time  Nieias  also  had 
returned  and  was  close  to  the  town)  ruslied  with  all  their  fonts 
into  Mende,  in;isnmeh  as  it  had  not  tlirown  (>}x*n  its  gates  to 
them  on  the  ground  of  any  convention,  and  sacked  it  as  though 
they  had  taken  it  by  storm ;  the  generals  \s'\\\i  diiliculty  le- 
straining  them  from  even  butchering  the  inhabitants.  After- 
Λvard  they  tv>ld  the  Men«lieans  to  retain  their  civil  rights,  as 
usual,  after  having  tried  among  themselves  whomever  tliey 
considered  to  have  been  the  originators  οϊ  tho  revolt :  but  the 
party  in  the  citadel  they  cut  oif  by  a  wall  down  to  the  sei  on 
each  bide,  an  1  stationed  troops  to  kiep  guard  over  them. 
AVhen  they  had  thus  got  j>ossession  of  Mende,  they  proceedetl 
against  Scione. 

131,  The  inhabitants  of  that  town,  both  themselves  an<l  the 
l*eloponnesians,  marched  out  to  opjjose  them,  and  were  ]>ost»'<l 
on  a  strong  hill  before  the  city,  without  tho  occupation  of 
which  by  the  enemy  there  was  no  possibility  of  investing 
them.  vSo  the  Athenians  attacked  it  vigorously,  and  liaving 
driven  off  by  their  charge  those  w  ho  were  upon  it,  j)itched  their 
camp,  and  after  erecting  a  trophy,  j>repared  for  the  circun»- 
vallation  of  the  place.  Not  long  after,  while  they  were  now 
engaged  in  the  work,  {\h)  auxiliaries  who  w»re  being  besieged 
in  tho  citadel  of  Mende  having,  during  the  night,  driven  in 
tho  guard  by  the  hca-side,  arrived  at  Scione ;  and  most  of  them 
escaping  through  the  troops  incauiped  before  it,  threw  them- 
selves into  the  j)lace. 

132.  AVhilo  Scione  was  invested,  Perdiccas  sent  a  herald  to 
tho  Athenian  generals,  and  concluded  an  arrangi'inent  with  the 
Athenians,  through  his  hatred  of  Brasidas  in  consequence  «>f 


cxxxiii.,  cxxxiv.]  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  307 

tlio  retreat  from  Lynciis ;  liavinj^  borrun  to  iic/]jotiate  for  it 
from  tliat  ver\'  time.  And,  ns  Isnijoraa  the  Laref]aimoiiian  tlien 
Imppened  t^bo  on  the  point  of  takinir  an  army  !»y  land  to  join 
Hra^ida^  Feidiccas,  partly  because  Nieiaa  advised  liini,  smco 
lie  had  come  to  terms  >vitli  the  Athenians,  to  φχο  them  somo 
ilear  proof  of  liis  lM.'in«r  η  firm  friend ;  and  partly  becauso 
ho  liimself  wished  tlu^  LacedaRmonians  never  again  to  go  to 
his  territories ;  won  over  to  his  views  his  friends  in  Thessaly, 
(lor  ho  was  always  intimate  with  the  principal  men),  and 
stopped  the  army  and  its  equipments,  po  that  they  did  not 
even  try  the  mind  of  the  Thessalians  on  tho  subject.  Is- 
siixoras,  however,  Ameinias,  and  Aristeus,  themselves  camo  to 
Urasidas,  being  conmiissioned  by  tlio  Lacedaemonians  to  in- 
s{»ect  tho  state  of  aftairs ;  and  took  from  Sparta,  in  oppo- 
sition to  tho  spiiit  of  their  laws,  some  of  tlieir  young  men, 
with  a  view  to  api)ointing  them  to  the  command  in  the  cities, 
instead  of  intrusting  it  to  any  that  might  ha}>pen  to  bo  thero 
at  j>resent.  Accordingly,  he  appointed  C'learidas  son  of  Cle- 
onymus  to  the  command  in  Amphipolis,  and  Pasitelidas,  son  of 
llegesander  in  Torono. 

133.  Tho  same  summer,  the  Thebans  dismantled  the  wall  of 
tho  Thespians,  on  a  charge  of  their  favoring  the  Athenians; 
having  always  >vished  to  do  it,  but  finding  it  more  easy  at 
that  time,  since  all  tho  llower  of  their  population  had  fallen 
in  tho  battle  against  the  Athenians.  Tho  temple  of  Juno  at 
Argos  AVMs  also  burned  dt)wn  that  same  summer,  in  conse- 
quence of  ( 'hrysis  tho  priestess  liaving  placed  a  lighted  torch 
near  tho  garlands,  and  fallen  asleep  after  it;  so  that  they  all 
caught  fire,  and  were  in  a  fiame  before  she  perceived  it.  Chr}'- 
sis  immediately,  the  same  night,  fled  to  riilius,  in  her  fear  of 
the  Argives;  who,  according  to  the  law  laid  down  on  tho  sub- 
j<»ct,  appointed  another  priestess,  by  name  Phaeinis.  Tho 
)>riesthood  of  Chrysis,  at  tho  time  slio  fled,  embraced  eight 
years  of  this  war,  and  to  tho  middle  of  tho  ninth.  And  now, 
toward  tho  close  of  tho  summer,  Scionc  was  entirely  invested ; 
and  the  Athenians,  having  left  a  garrison  to  keep  watch  over 
it,  rctiimed  with  tho  rest  of  their  army. 

134.  Tho  following  Λvintcr,  tho  Athenians  and  Lacedajmo- 
nians  remained  quiet,  in  consequenco  of  tho  armistice;  but 
tho  Mantineans  and  Tofreans,  with  the  allies  on  both  sides, 
fought  α  battle  at  Laodicmm,  in  tho  district  of  Oresthis,  and 


308  THUCYDIDES.  IV.  (cxxxr. 

the  victory  was  doubtful ;  for  each  side  having  put  to  fliglit 
one  of  tho  enemy's  wings  which  was  opposed  to  them,  they 
both  erected  trophies,  and  sent  sjX)ils  to  Delp^|^  Thougli, 
however,  many  had  fallen  on  each  fcide,  and  the  battle  was 
undecisive,  and  night  interrupted  tho  action,  tho  Tegeans  bi- 
vouaced  on  the  field,  and  erected  a  trophy  immediately; 
whereas  the  Mantineans  withdrew  to  Bucolion,  and  erected 
their  counter-trophy  afterward. 

135.  Toward  tho  end  of  tho  same  winter,  and  when  it 
was  now  approaching  to  spring,  Ikasidas  also  made  an  at- 
tempt on  Potidaea.  For  ho  went  thither  by  night,  and  planted 
α  ladder  against  tho  wall,  and  so  far  escajK'd  observation  ;  tho 
ladder  having  been  planted  just  in  tho  interval  when  tho 
bell  had  been  passed  round,*  before  tho  man  who  passed  it  re- 
turned to  that  side.  Afterward,  however,  on  their  immedi- 
ately perceiving  it,  before  his  troops  camo  up  to  the  place, 
he  led  them  back  again  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  did  not 
wait  for  tho  day  to  break.  And  so  the  winter  ended,  and 
the  ninth  year  of  this  war,  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  tho 
history. 

*  Reepecting  this  expoJicat  for  securing  tlio  vigilance  of  troope  on 
guard,  iteo  Arnold's  nolo. 


BOOK  V. 


1.  ΤπΕ  followln;^  summer,  t]»o  tnico  for  a  year  contimied 
till  the  rythian  panics,'  aii<l  thou  onded.  Duriiicj  the  Fiispension 
of  arms,  the  Athenians  cxpellnl  the  Delians  from  their  island, 
thinkini^  that  they  had  been  consecrated  >vhen  in  a  state  of 
impurity  from  some  crime  of  ancient  date  ;  atid,  moreover,  that 
thi^  liad  been  the  deficiency  in  their  former  purification  of  it; 
in  which  case  I  liave  before  explained  that  they  considered 
themselves  to  have  performed  it  rightly  by  taking  up  the  cof- 
fins of  the  dead.  The  Delians  found  a  residence  at  Atramyt- 
tium  in  Asia,  given  to  them  by  Thaniaces,  as  each  of  them 
arrived  there. 

2.  After  the  armistice  had  expired,  Cleon,  having  persuaded 
the  Athenians  to  the  measure,  led  an  expedition  against  the 
Thrace-ward  towns,  Λνίίΐι  twelve  Imndred  heavy-armed,  and 
three  hundred  cavalry  of  the  Athenians,  a  larger  force  of  the 

'  For  the  nrpumcntg  with  which  ArnoUl  establishes,  ns  I  think,  this 
interpretation  of  the  passage,  see  his  Appendix.  All  tlio  later  German 
tditors,  adopt,  with  little  or  no  variety,  the  view  of  llcilmann,  Bwkh, 
and  others,  who  suppose  it  to  mean,  that  "in  the  following  summer  tho 
truco  was  broken,  and  war  renewed  until  tho  time  of  the  Pythian  games.'* 
In  addition  to  what  Arnold  ha,s  observed  respecting  tho  unsuitabloncss 
of  tho  pluperfect  tenso  to  such  a  modo  of  interpretation,  it  may  bo  re- 
marked that  Thucydides  applies  tho  term  τήν  έκΓχηρίαν  to  tho  year's 
truco  in  tho  last  chapter  but  ono  of  tho  preceding  book;  and  thercforo  it 
is  much  moro  natural  that  tho  samo  armistieo  should  bo  intended  by  tho 
pamo  term  in  this  and  tho  following  chapters.  It  seems  evident  too  that 
there  is  an  opponthn  expressed  by  tho  fifv  hero  and  tho  (U•  in  tho  first 
line  of  tho  next  chapter — tho  ono  sentence  stating  how  long  tho  truco 
continued,  viz.,  until  tho  Pythian  games,  and  tho  other,  what  military 
measure  was  first  executed  after  its  expiration ;  while  tho  chief  event 
which  occurred  during  its  continuance  is  mentioned  parenthetically  be- 
Iwetm  tho  two.  Nor,  again,  docs  it  seem  at  all  like  the  stylo  of  Thucy- 
dides to  allude  so  cursorily,  and  by  anticipation,  to  the  Pythian  games, 
as  tho  cause  which  put  a  final  stop  to  hostilities,  and  to  make  no  subse- 
quent mention  of  them  at  all  in  what  would  be  the  natural  place  for 
doing  so ;  but  to  load  his  readers  to  conclude  that  the  proposals  for  peace 
originated  solely  in  the  difficulties  of  both  tho  great  belligerent  powers, 
and  their  natural  anxiety  to  be  released  ih)m  them ;  which  is  tho  euni 
and  iubstanco  of  hie  history  from  chapters  13  to  17. 


810  THUCYDIDEa    V.  {ία 

allies,  and  thirty  shins.  After  landing  in  tlio  flrsi  place  at 
Scione,  which  was  still  being  besieged,  and  taking  theuco  some 
heavy-arincd  from  the  garrison,  ho  sailed  into  tlio  port  of  the 
Colophonians,  belonging  to  the  Torona;ans,  and  at  no  great 
distance  from  their  city.  Tlicnce,  having  learned  from  de- 
serters b*)th  that  Brasidas  was  not  in  Torone,  and  that  thoso 
who  were  in  it  were  not  strong  enough  to  give  him  battle, 
with  his  land  forces  ho  marched  against  the  city,  while  he  sent 
ten  ships  to  sail  round  into  the  harbor.  First,  then,  ho  camo 
to  the  fortifications  Avhich  Brasidas  had  raised  anew  round 
the  city,  from  a  Avish  to  include  the  suburb,  and  so  by  taking 
down  a  part  of  the  original  wall  had  made  it  one  city. 

3.  Pasitolidas,  the  Lacedaemonian  commander,  and  the  gar- 
rison that  was  there,  went  to  the  dt-fenso  of  the  fortifications, 
and  tried  to  resist  the  assault  of  the  Athenians.  When  they 
were  being  driven  in,  and  the  ships  that  had  been  sent  round 
Averc  at  the  same  time  sailing  into  the  harbor,  l*a.sitelida'<, 
fearing  that  the  ships  might  find  the  city  deserted  by  its  do- 
fenders  beft)re  he  could  reach  it,  and  that  if  the  fortifications 
were  carried  h<j  might  bo  made  ])iison<'r  in  them,  left 
them,  and  ran  into  tho  city.  But  the  Athenians  from  tho 
ships  had  had  timo  to  take  Torone,  and  their  land  forees,  rush- 
ing after  him,  on  the  very  first  assault  burst  in  with  him 
through  tho  ])art  of  the  old  wall  that  had  been  removed.  And 
thus  some  of  the  Peloj)onnesians  and  Toronwans  they  slew 
immediately  in  cKise  condiat,  and  others  they  took  alive,  with 
Pasitelidas  the  commander.  Now  Brasidas  avjis  coming  to  tho 
relief  of  Torone;  but  hearing  of  its  capture  while  on  his  way, 
ho  Avent  back  again,  having  l>een  but  forty  st-ades  short  of 
arriving  in  time.  (Ίοοη  and  the  Athenians  erected  two  tro- 
phies, one  by  tho  harbor,  tho  other  near  the  fortifications; 
and  sold  into  slavery  the  women  and  children  of  tho  Toronai- 
ans,  while  the  men  themselves,  Avith  the  Peloponnesians,  and 
Avhatever  Chalcidians  there  wore  l)esides,  seven  hundred  in 
all,  they  sent  oif  to  Athens ;  Avhenee  some  of  them  afterward 
WQTQ  dismissed,  on  conclusion  of  peace,  while  others  Avero  re- 
covered by  the  Olynthians,  througli  an  exchango  of  prisoners. 
About  the  same  time,  too,  the  Ba?<)tians  took  by  treachery 
I'anactum,  a  fortress  of  tho  Athenians  on  tho  borders.  Cleon, 
r.fter  establishing  a  garrison  in  Torone,  weighed  anchor,  and 
Bailed  round  Athos  on  his  way  to  Amphipolis. 


IV.,  τ.]  THuCTDIDES.  V.  311 

4.  About  tins  same  time,  ΓΙκέλχ,  sou  of  Ernsistratus,  with 
t\vo  collenguos,  being  comtnissioncd  by  the  Athenians,  saiied 
witli  two  ships  as  embassador  to  Italy  and  Sicily.  For  on 
llic  departure  of  tlie  Athenians  from  Sicily  after  the  pacifica- 
tion, the  I^ontines  had  enrolled  a  large  number  of  new  cit- 
izens, aijd  the  commons  were  thinking  of  dividing  the  land. 
When  tlio  aristocratical  party  Avoro  awaro  of  it,  they  called  in 
the  Syrrtcusans,  and  expelled  the  commons ;  Λνΐιο  >vandcrcd 
about  as  they  severally  happened ;  Λνίπίο  the  nobles  entered 
into  an  arrangement  with  the  vSyracui^ans,  and  having  aban- 
doned and  lai<l  waste  their  own  city,  livecl  nt  Syracuse  with 
the  enjoyment  of  the  franchise.  Atlerward  some  of  them,  ih 
consequence  i»f  not  being  pleased,  withdrew  from  Syracuse, 
and  occupied  a  quarter  of  the  city  of  Lcontini,  called  Phoceai, 
and  IJriciimije,  which  was  a  stronghold  in  the  Leontine  coun- 
try. There  the  majority  of  the  popular  party  who  had  been 
ex|)elled,  came  to  them,  and  having  thus  established  them- 
selves, they  carried  on  the  war  from  the  fortifications.  Tho 
Athenians,  liearing  this,  dispatched  TluTax,  to  try  if  by  any 
means  they  might  persua<lo  the  allies  they  had  there,  and  tho 
rest  of  the  Sicilians  if  they  could,  to  join  in  attacking  tho 
Syracusjms,  on  tho  strength  of  their  gaining  such  additional 
]>ower,  and  thus  might  save  tho  commons  of  Lcontini.  So 
riiaiax  came,  aixl  j>revailed  on  tho  Camarina^ans  and  Agri- 
gentines ;  but  when  tho  question  was  settled  against  bim  at 
(iela,  ho  did  not  then  ])roceed  to  the  others,  as  he  fjund  that 
lie  should  not  prevail  on  them ;  but  having  returned  through 
the  country  of  the  Sicels  to  Catann,  and  liaving  on  his  route 
also  visited  Hricinniic,  and  encournged  itn  inhabitants,  ho  sailed 
back  again. 

5.  On  his  course  to  Sicily  and  return  from  it,  he  also  com- 
municated with  cc^rtnin  cities  in  Italy  on  tho  subject  of  friend- 
ship with  tho  Athenians.  llo  likewise  fell  in  Λvith  tho 
^icrian  settlers  banished  from  Messana,  who,  after  tho  pacifi• 
cation  effected  by  tlio  Sicilians,  when  tho  Messanians  wew» 
divided  into  factions,  and  one  of  them  had  invited  tho  Locri- 
ans  to  their  aid,  had  been  sent  out  for  that  purpose ;  and  so 
Messana  came  into  the  hands  of  tho  Locrians  for  some  timo• 
Phaeax  then,  Iiaving  fallen  in  with  these  men  on  their  way 
homo,  did  them  no  harm,  as  proposals  had  been  made  tc  him 
by  the  Locrians  for  coming  to  terms  with  tho  Athenians• 


812  THUOYDIDES.  V.  [▼'••▼π. 

For  they  were  the  only  people  of  the  allies  who,  whtfu  the 
Sicilians  were  reconciled  to  each  other,  did  not  make  peace 
with  the  Athenians :  nor  would  they  liavo  done  it  then,  had 
they  not  been  pressed  by  hostilities  with  the  Itonicans  and 
MeiDBans,  who  lived  on  their  borders,  and  were  a  colony  from 
them.  So  Phaiax  returned,  and  arrived  at  Athens  some  time 
after.  • 

0.  Now  when  Cleon,  at  the  time  we  last  mentioned  him, 
lailed  round  from  Torono  to  ^o  against  Amphipolis,  making 
Eion  the  base  of  his  operations,  ho  assaulted  Stagirus,  a 
colony  of  the  Andrians,  but  \vithout  reducing  it ;  but  Galep- 
Kus,  the  Thasiun  colony,  lie  took  by  storm.  And  having  sent 
embassadors  lo  Perdiceas,  that  he  might  join  him  with  an  army 
according  to  the  terms  of  their  alliance,  and  others  into 
Thrace,  to  l*olles,  the  king  of  the  Odomantians,  who  was  to 
bring  as  many  Thracian  mercenaries  as  he  coulil,  ho  himself 
'  remaiiuid  quiet  in  Eion,  awaiting  tlieir  arrival.  On  hearing 
this,  Prasidas,  on  his  side  also,  took  up  an  opposite  position  ou 
Cerilylium.  Tiiis  8j)ot  is  in  the  Argiliau  country,  being  ou 
the  high  groun<l  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  not  far  from  tho 
city  of  Amphipolis;  and  every  thing  was  distinctly  seen  from 
it;  so  that  Clcon  could  not  unobserved  by  him  set  out  with 
liis  army  ;  as  he  expected  him  to  do,  and  despising  tho  numbers 
of  the  Lacedaimomans,  to  march  up  Avith  the  forces  ho  had 
with  him  against  Amphipolis.  At  the  same  time  he  was  get- 
ting ready  tifteen  hundred  Thracian  mercenaries,  and  was  call- 
ing all  tho  Edonians  to  liis  aid,  both  targeteers  and  cavalry ; 
and  he  had  a  thousand  targeteers  of  the  Myrcinians  and  Chal- 
cidians,  in  addition  to  those  in  Amphijiolis.  All  liis  heavy- 
armed  force  too  was  nmstered,  about  two  thousand  in  number, 
and  three  hundred  Grecian  horse.  AVitli  fifteen  lumdred  of 
these  Ikasidas  stationed  himself  on  Cerdylium,  while  tho  rest 
were  posted  with  Clcaridas  in  Amphipolis. 

7.  Cleon  remained  quiet  for  some  time,  but  was  then  com- 
pelled to  do  what  Brasidas  had  expected.  Kor  his  soldiers 
being  annoyed  at  sitting  still,  and  reflecting,  with  regard  to 
his  command,  against  what  skill  and  daring  in  the  enemy,  with 
>vhat  ignorance  and  cowardice  in  himself  it  would  be  held,  and 
how  unwillingly  they  had  accompanied  him  from  home,  he  ρίτ- 
ceive»!  their  munnurs ;  and  not  wishing  them  to  be  exasperated 
by  renuiining  stationary  in  tho  same  place,  ho  broke  up  hii 


nil.]  THUCTDIDES,  V.  313 

camp  nnd  led  them  forward.  And  he'  adopted  the  siimo  plan 
as  ho  had  also  succeeded  with  at  Pylus,  and  therefore  felt  con- 
fident in  his  own  discernment.  For  that  any  one  would  como 
out  ajnrainst  him  to  battle,  ho  had  not  so  much  as  a  thought ; 
but  said  that  ho  was  going  up  rather  to  sec  the  place,  and  was 
waiting  for  his  more  numerous  forces;  not  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  a  victory  Λvithout  any  risk,  should  he  bo  compelled  to 
engage,  but  of  surrounding  the  city  on  all  sides,  and  so  taking 
it  by  storm.  Having  come,  therefore,  and  posted  his  army  on 
a  strong  hill  in  front  of  Amphipolis,  ho  himself  proceeded  to 
reconnoiter  the  lake  fonned  by  the  Strymon,  and  what  was 
the  position  of  the  city  on  the  side  of  Thrace.  lie  thought 
to  retire,  whenever  lie  pleased,  Avithout  a  battle;  for  indeed 
there  was  neither  any  one  seen  on  the  wall,  nor  did  any  ono 
como  out  through  the  gates,  but  they  were  all  closed  :  so  that 
ho  even  considered  he  had  made  a  mistnke  in  not  having  como 
down  with  engines ;  for  ho  believed  that  in  that  case  he  might  . 
have  taken  the  city. 

8.  Immediately  that  Brnsidas  saw  the  Athenians  in  mo- 
tion, he  too  went  down  from  Cerdylium,  and  entered  Amphi- 
polis. Now  for  any  regular  sally,  and  array  of  troops  against 
the  Athenians,  lie  made  none;  being  afraid  of  his  own  re-  , 
sources,  and  considering  them  inferior  to  the  enemy;  not  so 
much  in  numbers  (for  they  Avere  pretty  nearly  equal),  but  in 
character;  (for  il'  was  the  flower  of  the  Athenian  force  that 
was  in  tlio  field,  and  tlio  best  of  the  Lcmnians  and  Im- 
brians  ;)  but  ho  prepared  to  attack  them  by  means  of  a  strata- 
gem.    For  if  lie   showed   the  enemy  his  numbers,  and   the  * 

'  Or  τώ  τρήπφ  may  bo  understood,  as  by  ITaack  and  Arnold,  "of  tlio 
temper  and  habits  of  Clcon's  mind."  But  tlio  aorist  tcnso  of  tlio  verba 
ίχρήσατη,  Iniurevae,  anW  ήλπισεν  scorns  intended  to  refer  to  tho  single 
fiiet  of  his  having  adopted  a  particular  plan,  and  his  reasons  for  doing  it, 
rather  than  to  a  continued  state  of  mind,  which  would  rather  take  the 
imperfect.  And  tho  following  description  of  that  plan,  ονχ  ώς  τψ  ύσι^αλεί 
— «λλ'  ώς  κνκλφ  ττεριστύς  jiiqi  ηΙμήσων  ττ)ν  ιτόλιν,  agrees,  as  closely  as 
tho  different  position  of  tho  parties  rendered  possible,  with 'that  of  tho 
arrangements  for  the  decisive  battle  in  Sphacteria^  which  were  made  by 
Demosthenes,  but  tho  credit  of  which  Cleon  would,  of  course,  assume  to 
himself.  Compare  especially  IV.  32.  3,  δττως  δη  πλήοτη  aropia  y  τοις 
•  troAf/iioif  ηανταχήθεν  κεκνκλωμενοΐζ,  και  μτ)  Ιχωσι  ηρός  δτι  άvτιτάξuvτa^f' 
άλν  αμφίβολοι  γί}νωνται  τφ  ηλήθει,  κ.  r.  λ, 

«  Literally,  "tho  Athenian  force  that  was  in  tho  field  had  gone  forth 
pure;"  i.  e.,  free  from  all  such  things  as  might  have  marred  their  eCft- 
tictiey :  χρηοτοΐζ  Kr.ra?.nyotr  εκκριβίν,  as  ho  expresses  it,  VI.  31,  3. 

14  » 


314  THUCYDIDES.  V.  [ιχ. 

equipment  of  tho  troops  with  him,  which  was  such  as  nccee- 
eity  alono  dictated/  he  did  not  think  that  ho  should  conquer 
them  80  well  as  ho  should  without  their  seeing  his  forces  bo- 
forehand,  and  despising  thcni  on  sufficient  grounds.'  Uaving 
therefore  himself  picked  out  a  hundred  and  fifty  heavy-armed, 
and  having  put  tlic  rest  imdcr  tho  command  of  Clearidas,  ho 
purposed  making  a  sudden  attack  on  tho  Athenians  before  they 
could  retire ;  as  lio  did  not  think  that  ho  should  catch  them 
Again  so  isolated,  if  onc3  their  reinforcements  bhould  have 
joined  them.  Calling  therefore  all  his  toldicrs  together,  and 
wishing  to  encourage  them  and  acquaint  them  with  his  design, 
lie  spoke  to  the  following  etVect : 

9.  "  Men  of  thi  Pehjponnese,  with  regard  to  the  diaracter 
of  tho  country  from  which  wo  are  come,  namely,  that  through 
its  bravery  it  has  always  been  a  freo  country,  and  thiit  you 
arc  Dorians  about  to  engage  with  lonians,  to  whom  you  aro 
habitually  superior,  let  a  brief  declaration  suffice.  But  >vith 
regard  to  the  j)resent  attack,  I  will  explain  in  Avhat  >vay  I 
purpose  making  it;  that  the  fact  of  your  meeting  tho  danger 
m  small  divisions,  and  not  in  one  body,  nuiy  not  cause  a  want 
of  courage  by  an  appearance  of  weakness,  Tor  I  conjecture 
that  it  is  through  contempt  of  us,  and  their  not  expecting  any 
one  to  march  out  against  them  to  battle,  that  the  enemy  went 
up  to  their  present  position,  and  aro  now  thinking  nothing  of 
us,  while,  >vithout  any  order,  they  aro  engaged  in  looking 
about  them.  But  whoever  best  observes  bueh  mistakes  in  his 
opponents,  and  also  plans  his  att«ick  upon  them  with  regard 
to  his  own  j)Ower,'  not  so  much  in  an  open  manner  and  in 

»  "  ώαγκαίαν  ονσαν,]  i.  e.,  not  such  as  Ihcy  would  bavo  wished,  but 
such  as  they  couUl  get.  Compare  II.  70.  1,  ^ρώοεως  ττεμί  αναγκαίας,  and 
I.  CI.  2,  ξνμ(>αηιν  άιαγκαίανΓ — Arnold. 

2  Or,  *'  and  ceasing  to  despise  them  on  insufficient  grounds."  For  tho 
different  explanations  of  this  strange  construction  which  have  been  pro- 
posed, seo  Poppo's  note,  in  his  last  edition  ;  which  has  been  completed 
since  this  translation  was  conjmenced,  and  will  bo  always  referred  to  in 
future,  unless  tho  larger  edition  is  expressly  mentioned.  The  position 
of  tho  TE  seems  to  show  that  καταφΐ)οι•7}σεως,  us  well  as  ηροάψεως,  ia  de- 
pendent upon  uiev,  and  therefore  that  tho  /i/)  must  bo  considered  aa  re- 
dundant. Or  is  it  possible  that  it  could  have  been  carelessly  used  with 
a  double  force,  qualifying  at  once  both  άπο  τόύ  ΰντος  and  κατα<Ρι>ονήαίως\ 
lis  it  is  in  a  .«somewhat  similar  manner,  I.  40.  2  ? 

3  "  i.  €.,  when  it  is  delieicnt  in  actual  strength,  making  up  for  it  by  art 
and  by  rapidity  of  niovcincnt." — AnwlJ. 


χ]  THUCYDIDES.  V.  815 

Γο/xuliir  battle-array,  ns  with  rcfcronco  to  liis  present  ndvanta;:ro, 
that  man  would  be  most  successful.  And  those  stratagems  by 
which  ojio  would  most  deceive  his  enemies,  and  benefit  his 
friends,  have  the  highest  reputation,  AVhile,  then,  they  aro 
still  unprepared,  yet  confident,  and  aro  thiiikinjj,  from  >vhat  I 
see,  of  retiriiifif  rather  than  of  remaininc^ ;  while  their  minds  aro 
irresolute,  and  before  their  plans  are  more  definitely  arranged, 
I  will  take  my  own  division,  and  surprise  them,  if  I  can,  by 
falling  at  full  speed  on  the  center  of  their  forces.  And  do 
you,  Clearidas,  afterward,  when  you  see  mo  now  charging, 
and  in  all  probability  frightening  them,  take  your  division, 
both  the  Amphipolitans  and  the  other  allies,  and  suddenly 
opening  the  gates  rush  out  against  thom,  and  make  all  hasto  to 
(Ιοί,ο  with  them  as  <iuickly  as  possible.  For  wo  may  exjwct 
that  in  this  way  they  will  bo  most  alarmed ;  sineo  the  force 
which  follows  up  an  attack  is  more  terrible  to  an  enemy  than 
that  which  is  already  before  him  and  engaged  with  him.  And 
«lo  you  be  a  brave  man  yourself,  as  it  is  natural  that  you 
should,  being  a  Spartan  ;  and  do  ye,  allies,  follow  him  courage- 
ously ;  and  consider  that  it  is  the  ])roof  of  good  soldiership  to 
bo  willing,  and  to  be  alive  to  shame,  and  to  ol)cy  your  com» 
manders.  Kcileet,  too,  that  on  this  day  you  either  gain  yom 
liberty,  if  you  act  bravely,  and  the  title  of  confederates  of  tho 
Lacedajmonians ;  or  are  slaves  of  the  Athenians— if  you  faro 
as  well  as  you  possibly  can,  without  being  reduced  to  personal 
bondage,  or  put  to  de;ith — and  incur  a  more  g.alling  slavery 
than  before,  Λνΐύΐο  you  oppose  the  liberation  of  tho  rest  of  tho 
Greeks.  Do  not  you,  then,  act  ns  cowards,  seeing  for  hoAV 
much  you  aro  struggling;  and  /will  show  you  that  I  am  not 
l)0tter  able  to  give  advice  to  others,  than  to  carry  it  out  in  ac- 
tion myself." 

10.  Ilanng  thus  spoken,  l»rasidas  himself  picpared  for 
marching  out,  and  posted  tho  rest  of  the  troops  with  Clearidas 
at  what  were  called  tho  Thracian  gates,  to  sally  out  after  him, 
ns  had  been  arranged.  His  descent  from  Cerdylium  having 
Ικίοη  observed,  as  also  his  sacrificing,  when  lie  was  in  tho  city 
— of  Λvhich  a  view  is  commanded  from  tho  outside — near  the 
temple  of  Minerva,  and  his  being  occupied  with  these  meas- 
ures, tidings  were  carried  to  Cleon  (for  lie  had  gono  forward 
at  the  time  to  look  about  liim)  that  the  enemy's  whole  force? 
wa?  visible  in  tho  city  ;  and  that  under  tho  jornte.i  were  observed 


316  TflUOYDIDEa  V.  [χ 

many  feet  of  horses  and  men,  as  though  prepared  fo  make  α 
sally.  On  receiving  this  intelligence  he  came  up  to  the  spot ; 
and  when  ho  saw  that  it  was  ^i,  not  wishing  to  come  to  a  de- 
cisive engagement  before  his  reinforcements  also  had  arrived, 
and  thinking  that  lie  should  have  time  to  retire,  ho  at  once 
gave  orders  for  the  signal  to  march  back,  and  sent  word  to  tho 
troops  on  the  retreat  to  draw  off  in  tho  direction  of  Eion, 
moving  on  their  leffc  wing;  >Vhith  iuileed  was  the  only  way 
they  could.  15ut  Avhen  he  thought  there  was  a  dihitoriness 
on  their  part,  lie  himself  njado  tho  right  \ving  turn  rouml,  and 

i>resenting  their  exposed  side  to  tho  enemy,  began  to  lead  olF 
lis  troo))S.  Upon  this,  lirasidas,  marking  his  oj»portunity,  and 
seeing  that  the  Athenian  force  wjus  on  the  move,  says  t<j  hi:* 
own  company  and  the  rest:  '*The  men  are  not  disj>osed  to 
wait  for  us  as  is  evident  by  tho  motion  of  their  spears  and  of 
their  heads ;  for  thoso  who  have  this  going  on  among  them 
do  not  generally  receive  iho  charge  of  their  assailants.  So 
then  let  somebody  throw  ο|κ>η  for  me  the  gates  I  have  men- 
tioned, and  let  us  march  out  against  them  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible, and  with  good  courage."  lie,  aicordingly,  sallied  out 
by  the  gates  near  tho  stockade,  the  first  in  tho  long  wall 
which  was  then  standing,  and  ran  full  speed  along  the  high 
road,  >vliere  tho  trophy  now  stands,  as  you  go  by  the  strongest 
part  of  the  position  ;  and  falling  on  the  Atlienians,  Λνΐιο  were 
both  terrified  by  their  own  disorder  and  confounded  by  his 
boldness,  in  tho  center  of  their  forces,  he  j)ut  them  to  tho  rout. 
Clearidas  too,  as  had  l)een  arranged,  sallied  out  after  him  by 
the  Thracian  gates,  and  rushed  upon  the  enemy's  troops.  Tho 
consequence  was,  that  by  this  unexpected  and  sudden  charge 
on  both  sides,  the  enemy  were  thrown  into  confusion  ;  and  their 
left  wing,  on  tho  side  of  Eion,  which  ha<l  already  advanced 
some  distance,  immediately  broke  away  and  fled.  AVhen  it  was 
now  on  its  retreat,  Brasida%  in  ailvancing  along  to  attack  tho 
right  wing,  received  a  wound  ;  an<l  while  the  Athenians  did  not 
observe  his  fall,  those  who  Avero  near  him  took  him  up,  and 
carried  him  off  the  field.  Tho  right  of  tho  Athenians,  how- 
ever, stood  its  ground  better ;  and  though  Cleon,  >vho  from 
the  first  had  no  intention  of  making  a  stand,  immediately  fled, 
and  Λvas  overtaken  and  killed  by  a  Myreinian  targeteer,  his 
heavy-armed  retreated  in  a  close  bo<ly  to  the  hill,  and  re- 
pulsed the  charge  of  Clearidiis  twice  or  thrice,  an«l  did   not 


Tt.,m]  TIlUCYDIDEa  V.  317 

givo  way  till  tlio  Myrcinian  and  Clinlcidian  horse,  with  th( 
tar^^tetTH,  Imvinj^  surrouiulod  them,  and  pouring  their  niissilee 
upon  them,  put  them  to  the  rout.  And  eo  now  the  whole 
army  of  the  Athenians,  fl.yini^  with  great  difficulty,  and  taking 
many  difToront  roads  over  the  mountains,  eflectetl  their  return 
to  Eion;  excepting  such  as  were  killed  either  in  the  imme- 
diate action,  or  l>y  the  Chalcidian  horse  and  the  targeteers. 
Those  who  had  taken  up  and  rescued  l^rasidas,  carried  him 
still  hreathing  into  the  city ;  Avhero  ho  lived  to  hear  that  his 
troops  were  victorious,  but  after  a  short  interval  expired.  The 
rest  of  the  army,  on  returning  >vith  Clearidas  from  the  pursuit, 
stripped  the  dead,  and  erected  a  trophy. 

11.  After  this  all  the  allies  attended  in  arms,  and  interred 
lirasidas  at  the  public  expense  in  the  city,  in  front  of  the  pres- 
ent market-place.  And  ever  since  the  Amphipolitans,  having 
inclosed  his  tomb  with  a  fence,  have  made  offerings  to  liim  ns 
to  a  hero,  and  have  given  him  the  lionor  of  games  and  annual 
sacrifices.  They  also  referred  the  settlement  to  him  as  its 
founcJiir,  demoliAhing  the  buildings  of  Ilagnon,  and  obliterating 
whatever  memorial  of  his  founding  the  place  was  likely  to  re- 
main: for  they  considered  that  Brasidas  had  l)een  their  pro 
sener;  and  at  the  present  time  too,  through  fear  of  tho 
Athenians,  they  courted  the  Ijacedacmonian  confederacy ;  while, 
on  tho  other  hand,  they  thought  that  Ilagnon,  in  consequence 
of  their  hostility  toward  tho  Athenians,  would  not  retain  hie 
honors  either  so  l>eneficially  or  so  agreeably  to  them.  The 
dead  they  resti^red  to  the  Athenians.  There  were  killed,  of 
the  Athenians,  al>out  six  hundred ;  of  their  adversaries,  only 
seven ;  because  the  battle  >vas  not  fought  with  any  regular  order, 
but  wai  rather  brought  on  by  such  an  accidental  occurrence 
and  previous  alarm  as  has  been  described.  After  taking  up 
their  dead,  the  Athenians  sailed  away  home ;  Avhile  Clearidas 
and  his  party  proceeded  to  settle  matters  about  Amphipolis. 

12.  About  tho  samo  time,  toward  tho  close  of  summer, 
Itimphias,  Autocharidas,  and  Enicydidas,  Lacedncmonians,  led 
a  reinforcement  of  nine  hundred  heavj^-armed  to  the  Thrace• 
ward  towns,  and  on  their  arrival  at  Ileraclea  in  Trachinia 
arranged  whatever  appeared  to  them  not  to  bo  on  a  good 
footing.  ΛνΐήΙο  they  thus  prolonged  their  stay  in  the  placx^, 
this  battle  of  Amphipolis  happened  to  bo  fought ;  and  βα  the 
summer  ended. 


ZIH  TnUCTDIDES.  V.  [ζηι,,ζιτ. 

13.  Tho  fullowing  \Yiuter,  Ramphias  and  Lis  oompaniona 
immediately  passed  through  tho  cOuutry  as  far  as  Pierius  in 
Theseiily ;  out  na  the  Thessaliaus  forbad  their  odvauco,  and  Ri 
Brasidaa»  moreover,  was  deiul,  to  whom  they  were  leading  tho 
force,  they  turned  back  home  ;  thinking  the  time  for  action  bad 
gone  by ;  as  both  tho  Atlienians  hail  departed  in  consequonco 
of  their  defeat,  and  they  were  not  competent  to  execute  any  of 
his  designs.  But,  most  of  all,  they  returned  becauso  they  knew 
that  tho  Lacedaemonians,  at  the  time  of  their  setting  out,  wero 
more  strongly  disposed  for  peace. 

14.  It  happened  too,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Am- 
phipolis  and  the  retreat  of  Kamphias  fmrn  Thessaly,  that  nei- 
ther party  any  longer  applied  themstiws  at  all  to  the  war, 
but  they  were  ratlhr  inclined  for  peaie.  The  Athenians  wero 
BO,  as  having  received  a  severe  blow  at  Dclium,  and  again 
shortly  after  at  Am})hipolis  ;  and  as  no  longer  having  that  con- 
fident hope  in  their  strength,  tiirough  which  they  would  not 
before  accept  tho  otl'ered  treuty,  thinking,  in  conseijuenco  of 
their  present  success,  that  they  should  come  oil*  vict  'vigus  in 
tho  struggle.  Besides,  they  were  also  afraid  of  i\u  I:  allies, 
lest  they  should  be  encouraged  by  their  reverses  to  revolt  on 
a  larger  scale ;  and  they  repented  not  h.'iving  come  to  an  ar- 
rangement, Avhen  they  hiui  a  fmo  op[>ortunity,  after  the  events 
at  Pylus.  Tho  Lacedannonians,  on  the  other  hand,  wished 
for  peace,  because  they  found  j)rotra('ted  beyond  their  expecta- 
tion those  hostilities  by  \\h\Ai  they  imagined  that  in  a  few 
years  they  should  reduce  the  ]>o\ver  of  tho  Athenians,  if  they 
ravaged  their  land ;  and  because  they  had  met  >vith  tho  dis- 
aster on  the  islaml — such  as  had  never  yet  befallen  Sparta: 
and  in  consequence  of  their  country  being  i)lundered  from 
Pylus  and  Cythera ;  while  their  Helots  also  wero  deserting, 
and  thero  was  a  constant  apprehension  lest  even  thoso  that  re- 
mained in  tho  country,  trusting  in  tho  su|>port  of  those  who 
wore  out  of  it,  should,  on  tlie  strength  of  tlio  present  state  of 
things,  adopt  eomo  revolutionary  designs  against  them,  &s  ou 
η  former  occasion.  It  happened,  too,  that  their  thirty  years' 
truce  with  the  Argives  Avas  on  tho  point  of  ex])ii  ing,  and  tho 
Argives  would  not  renew  it,  unless  the  Cynurian  territory 
were  restored  to  them;  so  that  it  appeared  impossible  for 
them  to  carry  on  war  at  once  with  tho  Argives  and  Athe- 
nians.    Besides,  they  Busjxicted  that  some  of  the  states  in  the 


XT.,  XVI.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  V.  310 

Peloponncso  would  revolt  from  them  to  tlio  Arijives ;  as  was 
really  the  case. 

15.  On  those  considerations  hoth  parties  thought  it  hest  <o 
conclude  the  arranjrenient ;  and  particularly  the  Laccda?moni- 
ans,  throuiijh  the  desire  of  recovering  their  men  taken  in  tho 
island  ;  for  those  of  them  who  >vere  Spartans  were  of  tho 
highest  rank/  and  connected  with  themselves  in  the  same 
Avay.  They  hegan  therefore  to  negotiate  immediately  after 
their  capture ;  but  the  Athenians  being  bo  successful,  would 
not  yet  make  peace  on  fair  terms.  When,  however,  they  had 
been  defeated  at  Delium,  immediately  the  Lacedajmonians, 
hnding  that  they  would  now  be  more  ready  to  accept  their 
proposals,  concluded  tho  armistice  for  a  year,  during  which  they 
should  meet  together,  and  consult  res|)ecting  a  treaty  for  α 
longer  period. 

ίο.  And  when,  moreover,  tho  defeat  at  Amphipolis  had  be- 
fallen the  Athenians,  and  Cleon  and  lirasidas  Avere  dead,  who 
on  each  side  vfVTQ  most  oj)posed  to  the  cause  of  peace — tho 
one,  because  ho  was  successful  and  honored  in  consequence 
of  the  war ;  the  other,  because  he  thought,  tliat  if  trannuillitv 
were  secured  ho  would  be  more  easily  detected  in  his  evd 
practices,  and  less  believed  in  his  calunmiations — then  the  in- 
dividuals who  in  either  country  were  most  desirous  of  taking 
the  lead,  namely,  IMeistanax  son  of  Tausanias,  king  of  tho 
Lacedaiinouians,  and  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  who  of  all  hi^ 
cotemporaries  y\a^  most  generally  successful  in  his  military 
commands,  Λvero  much  moro  «anxious  for  pe.ico  than  ever, 
Nicias  was  so,  because  he  Avished,  Avhilc  ho  had  met  with  no 
disaster,  and  >vas  in  liigh  repute,  permanently  to  secure  liis  good 
fortune  ;  and  both  at  present  to  obtain  a  respite  from  troubles 
Iiimself  and  give  his  countrymen  tho  same,  and  to  hand  down 
to  futurity  a  name  for  having  continued  to  tho  end  without 
Bubiccting  tho  state  to  any  disaster;  and  ho  thought  that 
Buch  α  result  is  secured  by  freedom  from  danger,  and  by  a 
man's  committing  himself  as  little  as  possible  to  fortune,  and 
that  BUch  freedom  from  danger  is  affor<led  by  peace.  Pleisto- 
auax,  on  tho  other  hand,  took  tho  same  view,  because  ho  was 

'  'Ομοίως.]  Tho  meaning  of  this  word  is  considered  very  doubtful ;  but 
to  rao  it  appears  to  signify,  that  as  tho  prisoners  wero  men  of  tho  highest 
rank  (or  whatever  tho  dignity  might  bo  which  was  intended  by  tho  word 
ff^Kjroi),  80  they  wero  connected  with  thoso  among  thomselvcs  who  wore 
of  tho  same  rank. 


820  THUCYDIDEa  V.  [x?H 

calumniated  by  his  enemies  on  the  subject  of  his  restoration, 
and  was  continually  being  brought  forward  by  them  as  the 
object  of  religious  scruple  on  tlio  part  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
whenever  they  met  with  any  defeat ;  as  though  it  were  owing 
to  his  illegal  restoration  that  these  things  befell  them.  For 
they  charged  him  with  having,  in  conceit  with  Aristoiiles,  his 
brother,  prevailed  on  the  projihetoss  at  Delphi  to  give  the  fol- 
lowing charge  to  such  Lacedaemonians  as  went,  during  a  long 
period,  to  consult  the  oracle ;  "  that  they  should  bring  back 
the  seed  of  the  demigod  son  of  Jupiter  from  a  foreign  land  to 
his  own ;  else  they  would  i)low  >vith  a  silver  share."*  And 
so  they  said  that  in  the  course  of  time,  >vhen  he  had  gone  as 
an  exile  to  Lycaium  (in  consequence  of  his  former  return  from 
Attica,  whitth  was  thought  to  have  l)cen  etVected  by  bribery), 
and  had  then,  through  fear  of  the  Lacedamonians,  half  ins 
house  within  the  sanctuary  of  Juj/iter,  he  induced  them,  in  the 
nineteenth  year  of  his  exile,  to  restore  him  with  the  same 
dances  and  sacrifices  as  when  they  aj)pointcd  their  kings  on 
first  settling  in  Lacedu'inon. 

27.  Being  annoyed  therefore  by  this  calumny,  and  thinking 
that  iu  time  of  peace,  when  no  reverse  was  exjK'iienced,  and 
when,  moreover,  the  Lju'edienionians  were  recovering  their 
men  from  the  islantJ,  he  too  should  give  liis  enemies  no  han<lle 
against  him  ;  whereas,  as  long  as  there  was  war,  the  leading 
men  must  always  be  exposed  to  accusations  from  the  occurrence 
of  disastei-s ;  he  was  ardently  desirous  of  the  pacification.  And 
80  during  this  winter  they  Avere  meeting  in  conference ;  and 
when  il  was  now  chise  upon  spring,  the  terrors  of  an  arma- 
ment,' for  which  orders  were  sent  round  to  the  ditferent  states, 
as  though  for  the  purpose  of  building  forts,  were  held  forth  by 
the  Lacedaimonians,  that  the  Athenians  might  the  more  readily 
listen  to  them.  And  when,  after  these  conferences  had  been 
held,  and  they  had  urged  many  claims  against  each  other,  it 
was  agreed  that  they  should  make  j^'aco  on  restoring  what 
they  had  respectively  taken  during  the  war ;  but  that  the 
Athenians  should  keep  Nisnea ;  (tor  on  their  demamling  back 

•  i.  <•.,  tliat  owinpr  to  tho  scarcity  of  provisions,  they  avouM  liavc  to  buy 
them  as  dearly  as  though  tho  iinplemouta  used  ni  raisinj,'  theiu  had  beeu 
made  of  silver. 

«  Literally,  "au  armament  was  shakon  on  \\\^\i  beforo  them,"  i.  e., 
Jicld  "  iu  te'rrorcui"  over  their  heads ;  liko  α  woapoa  braadishoA  in  α 
liittu's  faeu. 


xviil]  THUCYDIDEa  V.  321 

riataea,  the  Thebans  said  that  it  was  not  by  force  that  they 
lield  tho  place,  but  in  consequence  of  the  inhabitants  them- 
Relves  having  surrendered  on  definite  terms,  and  not  betrayed 
it  to  them ;  and  tho  Athenians  maintained  that  in  tho  eamo 
way  had  they  got  possession  of  Nisaia),  then  the  Lacedaϊmon- 
ians  convened  their  allies ;  and  when  all  the  rest,  except  tho 
Boeotians,  Corinthians,  Eleans,  and  Megareans,  who  were  dis- 
pleased Avith  what  was  being  done,  had  voted  for  putting  an 
end  to  tho  war,  they  concluded  tho  arrangement,  and  made  η 
treaty  and  bound  themselves  by  oaths  to  tho  Athenians,  and 
they  to  them,  to  the  following  effect; 

18.  1st,  "Tho  Athenians  and  Lacedaimonians,  with  their 
allies,  made'  a  treaty  on  the  following  terms,  and  sworo  to 
observe  it,  state  by  state.  AVith  regard  to  tho  tetnples  com- 
mon to  the  nation,  that  whoever  wishes  shall  sacrifice,  and  go 
for  that  purposo,  and  consult  tho  oracle,  and  attenjl  tho  games, 
according  to  tho  custom  of  his  fathers,  whether  proceeding 
by  sea  or  land,  without  fear, 

2d,  "That  the  tcmplo  and  slirinc  of  Ajwllo  at  Delphi,  and 
tho  Delphians,  shall  be  independent,  self-taxed,  and  self-judged, 
iis  regards  both  themselves  and  their  territory,  according  to 
their  hereditary  usage. 

3d,  "That  the  treaty  shall  be  in  force  fifty  years  l)etweeu 
tho  Athenians  and  their  allies,  and  tho  Lacedaimonians  and 
theirs,  >vithout  guile  or  >vronir,  by  land  and  by  sea. 

4th,  "That  it  shaU  not  be  lawful  to  t-iko  the  field  for  tho 
j)urposc  of  inflicting  fnjury,  either  for  the  Laced a;monians  and 
their  allies  against  the  Athenians  and  their  allies,  or  for  tho 
Athenians  and  their  allies  against  the  Lacedaimonians  and  their 
allies,  by  any  means  whatever,  lint  should  any  dispute  ariso 
between  them,  they  must  have  recourse  to  justice  and  oaths,  in 
whatever  way  they  may  arrange. 

6th,  "That  the  Laccd.Tcmonians  and  their  allies  shall  restore 
Araphipolis  to  tho  Athenians.  That  of  all  the  cities,  however, 
which  tho  Lacedaemonians  may  restore  to  the  Athenians,  tho 
inhabitants  shall  bo  allowed  to  depart  wherever  they  please, 

•  ίπηιήηαντη.'\  I  have  not  translated  this,  as  Ilobbcs  and  Blooroflcld 
do,  08  though  it  had  tho  forco  of  a  perfect;  bccauso  I  think  tho  aorist 
was  purposely  used  in  euch  passages  with  reference  to  those  who  would 
read  tho  record  at  any  future  timo ;  end  not  to  those  who  then  look  part 
•n  making  tho  treaty.  Comparo  tho  uso  of  tho  same  tonso  for  the  samo 
reason  in  tho  first  lino  of  tho  history,  ίυνίγραψί  rdv  noXtuov, 
.14* 


322  THUOYDIDEa  V.  [xviiu 

themselves  and  their  property  \?ith  them ;  and  tlio  cities  ehalt 
be  independent,  only  paying  tlio  tribute  that  was  paid  in  the 
'  time  of  Aristidea.  That  it  sliall  not  bo  hiwful  for  the  Athen- 
ians, or  their  allies,  to  take  the  lield  against  them  for  their 
injury,  after  the  treaty  has  been  concluded.  The  cities  re- 
ferred to  are  Ariiilus,  St;i£jirus,  Acanthus,  Scolus,  Olynthus, 
and  Spartolus.  That  these  bhall  bo  cousidereti  as  allies  to 
neither  party,  neither  the  Lacedaimonians  nor  the  Athenians ; 
but  if  the  Athenians  gain  the  consent  of  the  cities,  then  it 
shall  bo  lawful  for  them  to  make  them  their  allies,  >vith 
their  own  free  will.  That  the  MeeylKirnicans,  Sania^ans,  and 
Singa;ans  shall  inhabit  their  own  cities,  like  the  Olynthians 
and  Acanthians ;  but  that  the  Lacedaimonians  and  their  allies 
shall  restore  Punactum  to  the  Athenians. 

6th,  *'That  the  Athenians,  also,  shall  restore  to  the  L-tce•» 
daemonians  ^Coryphasium,  Cythera,  Methone,  Pteleum,  and 
Atalanta,  and  all  the  Lacedaimonians  that  are  in  prison 
at  Athens,  or  any  where  else  in  all  the  Athenian  dominions ; 
and  shall  release  those  of  the  Peloponnesians  who  are  being 
besieged  in  Scione ;  and  all  others  in  that  place  who  are  allies 
of  the  Lacedaimonians;  and  Avhoever  among  the  allies  of  the 
Lacedicmonians  is  in  prison  at  Athens,  or  any  where  else  in 
the  Athenian  dominioni». 

7th,  "That  the  Lacedaimonians  too,  and  their  allies,  shall 
in  the  same  Λvay  restore  whomever  of  the  Athenians  and  their 
allies  they  may  have  in  their  hands. 

8th,  *' That  in  the  case  of  the  Scionicans,  Toronieans,  and 
Sermylians,  and  whatever  other  city  the  Atheniaiis  have  pos- 
session of,  resjKicting  these  and  the  rest  they  shall  adopt  such 
measures  as  they  please. 

9th,  "That  the  Athenians  shall  take  the  oaths  to  the  Lace- 
daimonians and  their  allies,  state  by  state ;  and  that  every 
man  shall  swear  by  the  most  binding  oath  of  his  country,  ac- 
cording to  his  respective  state.  That  the  oath  must  be'to  this 
eifect :  *  I  will  abide  by  these  arrangements  and  articles  of  the 
treaty,  lionestly  and  >vithout  guile.'  That  in  the  same  way  an 
oath  shall  be  taken  by  the  Lacetloimonians  and  their  allies  to 
tiie  Athenians ;  and  that  on  both  sides  the  oath  shall  be  re- 
newed yearly.  That  the  contracting  parties  shall  erect  pillars 
at  Olympia,  Pythia,  the  Isthmus,  at  Athens  in  the  citadel,  and 
at  Laeedienion  in  the  temple'  of  Apollo  at   Amyclie.      That 

'  "  The  tcrnplo  of  Apollo  at  Arayclae  might  as  well  bo  called  at  S!pari4\ 


XIX.-XXL]  TnUCYDIDEa  Τ.  823 

if  they  foTgci  any  thing,  whatever  it  may  bo,  and  on  whatever 
point,  it  shall  bo  consistent  with  their  oaths  for  both  parties, 
Atheni.ans  an<l  Laccdapnionians,  by  means  of  fair  discussion, 
to  clianiTO  it  in  such  manner  as  they  please. 

19.  "The  treaty  conmiences  from  the  cplioralty  of  Pleisto- 
las,on  the  27th  of  the  mouth  Artemisium,  and  from  the  archon-• 
ship  of  Alcanis  at  Athens,  on  the  25tli  of  the  month  Elaphe- 
bolion.  Those  who  took  the  oaths  and  subscribed  the  treaty 
were  as  follows :  on  the  side  of  the  LacedaRmonians  [Pleisto- 
anax,  Aijis],  Pleistolas,  Pamapetus,  Chionis,  Metngenes,  Acan- 
thus, Daitlius,  Ischaixoras,  Philoeharidas,  Zeuxidas,  Antippus, 
Tellis,  Alcinidas,  Empedias,  Menas,  and  Laphilus :  on  tho 
side  of  tho  Athenians,  Lampon,  Isthmionicus,  Nieias,  Laches, 
Euthydemus,  l^rocles,  Pythodonis,  Haffnon,  ^ίyrtilus,  Thrasy- 
cles,  Theopfenes,  Aristoorates,  lolcius,  Timocratcs,  Leon,  Lama- 
chus,  and  Demosthenes." 

20.  This  treaty  was  concluded  at  the  end  of  the  winter, 
when  tho  sprinjj  was  commcncinn;,  immediately  after  the  city- 
festival  of  l^acclius,  Avhen  just  ten  years  liad  elapsed,  >vith 
the  variation  of  a  few  days,'  since  tho  invasion  of  Attica  was 
first  maile,  and  this  Avar  commenced.  But  let  every  one 
rocjard  this  with  reference  to  the  periods  of  time,  and  not,  as 
placing  greater  confidence  in  sucli  a  view,  with  respect  to  the 
enumeration  of  the  public  officers  in  tlic  several  places,  or  of 
the  titles  derived  from  any  honorable  appointment  wliich 
serve  to  mark  past  events.  For  that  gives  no  definite  idea,  as 
to  who  were  in  tho  commencement  of  their  ofliice,  or  in  tho 
middle  of  it,  or  Avhatever  part  it  miglit  be,  when  any  event 
occurred.  Ihit  if  ho  reckon  by  summers  and  winters,  as  I 
liavo  written  my  histor}%  he  will  find  that  while  each  of 
these  amounts  to  half  a  year,•  there  were  ten  eummcrs  and  ad 
many  winters  included  in  this  first  war. 

21.  Now  tho  Laceda;monians  (for  it  fell  to  their  lot  to  bo 
the  first  to  restore  what  they  heltl)  immediately  released  tho 
men   who  were   prisoners  in  their  country ;  and  sending  as 

as  tho  tomplo  of  .Tnno  wns  said  to  bo  nt  Argos,  Thucyd.  IV.  133.  2, 
nlthough  it  was  forty  stadia  distant  from  tho  city,  Strabo,  VIII.  6.  2; 
Ilcrod.  I.  31.  Ar^Arnnld. 

•  For  an  instance  of  ιτηρίκρίρω,  used  in  this  intransitivo  ecnso,  like 
ί^αφίρω,  compare  Dionye.  Hal.  Ant  1. 27,  p.  73,  Roiske,  τούτων  <f  γλώσσα 
Ιλίγον  ιταραψ{ρ(ΐ ;  as  quoted  in  Bloomfleld's  note,  2d  edition. 

»  Literally,  "  having  tho  virtue,  or  sum,  of  the  year  in  half  moaeure.'* 


824  THUOYDIDEa  V.  [χχα,χχιπ. 

cmbassadoro  to  the  countries  Thraceward,  Iscbagoraa,  Menaa, 
and  Philocharidas,  commanded  Ciearidas  to  restore  Ampbi- 
polis  to  tbe  Atbcnians,  and  tbo  rest  o(  the  states  to  accept  the 
treaty,  as  it  bad  been  severally  arranged  for  them.  They, 
however,  Would  not,  as  they  thoujifht  it  not  favorable  to 
them ;  nor  did  Ciearidas  restore  tbo  city,  wishing  to  oblige  the 
Chalcidians,  and  declaring  that  lie  could  not  give  it  up  in  op- 
position to  tbem,  lie,  however,  went  in  baste  to  Lacedx»mon 
with  embassadors  from  that  ]»lace,  to  defend  himself,  if  Ischa- 
goras  and  bis  party  should  bring  any  charge  against  him  for 
not  obeying ;  and  at  tbe  same  timo  from  a  wish  to  know 
whether  tbe  arniiigeinent  might  still  bo  altered :  but  when  bo 
found  tbo  treaty  secured  being  sent  back  again  himself  by  tbo 
Lacediemonians,  and  ordered  to  deliver  up  tlie  place,  if  possible, 
but  if  not,  to  bring  out  all  tbe  Peloponnesians  that  were  in  it, 
lie  set  out  with  all  speed. 

22.  Now  tbe  allies  happened  themselves'  to  bo  at  Lacc- 
daimon,  and  tbose  of  tbeui  who  bad  not  accepted  tbe  treaty 
Λvere  commanded  by  tbe  Laceda3munians  to  adopt  it.  They, 
however,  on  tbe  same  grounds  as  they  bad  at  first  rt»jected  it, 
refused  to  accept  it,  unless  tbey  made  a  more  eipiitable  ono 
than  that  So  when  tbey  di.l  not  listen  to  tbem,  tbey  sent 
tbem  away,  and  themselves  proceeded  to  conclude  an  allianco 
with  the  Athenians ;  thinking  that  tbe  Argives  (  since'  they 
refused,  on  Ampeli«las  and  Liclias  going  to  tbem,  to  make  a 
fresh  treaty)  would  be  by  no  means  formidable  without  tbe 
support  of  tbo  Athenians,  and  tbat  tbe  rest  of  tbe  reloj)onneso 
Avould  be  most  disposed  to  remain  <iuiet ;  w  bcrejis  tbey  would 
have  gone  over  to  the  Atbenians,  if  tbey  bad  bad  tbe  power. 
Embassadors,  therefore,  liaving  come  from  tbe  Atbenians,  and 
a  conference  having  been  lield,  tbey  came  to  an  agreement, 
and  oaths  were  taken,  and  tbis  alliance  concluded,  on  tbo  fol- 
lowing terms : 

23.  "Tbe  Lacedaimonians  shall  be  allies  of  tbe  Atbenians 
for  fifty  years. 

'  Arnold  translates  αντοί,  "of  their  own  accord;"  but  Poppo  remarke, 
Willi  truth,  that  this  is  in  op|)osition  to  the  statement  that  titcy  had  been 
KUinmoncd  by  tho  Lace«lieinonians,  ch.  17.  2,  and  27.  1.  Ho  supposes, 
tiierof(jre,  that  it  means  *'  tlie  allies,  as  well  as  Ciearidas." 

'''  For  instances  of  tho  aoriat,  or  tho  present,  thus  used  after  <;>ύι>αι, 
PopjK)  refers  to  Xen.  Anab.  iv.  5.  15,  and  Ilel.  v.  i.  32.  Respecting  tho 
Quaeolutiion  also  in  the  following  senteuco,  see  his  noto,  and  that  uf  Ar> 
uold. 


xxir.]  THUCTDIDES.  V.  325 

2d,  "That  should  any  come  as  enemies  ngainflt  Uio  territory 
of  the  Lacod.Tmonians,  and  do  them  injury,  the  Athenians 
Rhall  a«i!tist  them  in  such  manner  as  thoy  can  most  efficiently, 
to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  That  should  they  have  ravaged 
the  land  and  departed,  that  state  shall  bo  considered  as  liostilo 
to  the  Lacedicmonians  and  Athenians,  and  bo  punished  by 
both  of  them ;  and  that  both  stites  shall  make  peace  at  tho 
same  time.  That  these  conditions  shall  bo  observed  lionestly, 
heartily,  and  sincerely. 

3rd,  "  That,  apjain,  should  any  come  as  enemies  acfainst  the 
country  of  the  Atlienians,  and  injure  them,  the  Lacedaimonians 
shall  assist  them  in  whatever  manner  they  can  most  efficiently, 
to  tho  utmost  of  their  power.  That  should  they  have  ravaged 
tho  land  and  departed,  that  state  shall  be  considered  as  hostile 
to  the  Lacedemonians  and  Athenians,  and  punished  by  both  o\ 
them ;  and  that  both  states  shall  make  peace  at  tho  same  time. 
That  these  conditions  shall  bo  observed  honestly,  heartily,  an«l 
sincerely. 

4th,  "That  should  the  slave  populatiim  rise  up  against 
them,  tho  Athenians  nhall  w^sist  tlio  Lacedajmoniuns  with  all 
their  might,  according  to  their  ability. 

5th,  *'That  these  articles  shall  be  sworn  to  by  tho  same  per- 
sons as  swore  to  the  other  treaty,  on  both  sides.  That  they 
shall  bo  renewed  every  year,  by  the  Lacedajmonians  going  to 
Athens  at  the  Dionysian  festival,  and  by  tho  Athenians  going 
to  Licedaimon  at  the  Hyacinthian.  That  they  shall  each  erect 
a  pillar,  that  at  Lacediemon  near  tho  statue  of  Apollo  in  tho 
Amyclieum,  and  that  at  Athens  in  the  citadel,  near  the  statiio 
of  Minerva.  That  should  tho  Licedaimonians  and  Athenians 
choose  to  add  to,  or  take  away  from,  these  terms  of  alliance, 
Λvhatever  they  please  so  to  do  shall  bo  consistent  with  tho  oaths 
of  both  parties." 

24.  Tho  oath  was  sworn  by  the  following  on  the  side  of  tho 
Lacedaimonians :  IMeistoanax,  Agis,  IMeistolas,  Damagetus, 
Chionis,  Metagenes,  Acanthus,  Daithus,  Ischagoras,  Philo- 
charidas,  Zeuxida<»,  Antippus,  Tellis,  Alcinadas,  Empedias, 
Menas,  and  Laphilus :  and  on  tho  side  of  tho  Athenians,  by 
Lampon,  Isthmionicus,  Nieias,  loaches,  Euthydemus,  Procles, 
Pythodorus,  Ilagnon,  Myrtilus,  Thrasycles,  Theogones,  Aris- 
tocrates,  lolcius,  Timocrates,  Leon,  Lamachus,  and  Do- 
moethencs. 


326  THUOYDIDES.  V.  [χχτ.,χζη 

This  alliance  was  entered  into  not  long  after  the  treaty,  and 
the  Athenians  restored  to  the  Lacedsemonians  the  men  taken 
from  the  island ;  and  thus  began  the  summer  of  the  eleventh 
year.  During  these  ten  years,  then,  the  first  war  was  car- 
ried on  continuously,  and  such  is  the  history  of  it. 

25.  After  the  treaty,  and  the  alliance  between  the  LacedjB• 
moniaiis  and  Athenians,  which  were  concluded  at  the  end  of 
the  ten  years*  >var,  in  the  ephoralty  of  Pleistolas  at  Lacedai• 
mon,  and  the  archonship  of  Alcaeus  at  Athens,  those  who  had 
acceded  to  them  were  at  ])eace;  but  the  Corinthians,  and 
some  of  the  states  in  the  Pcloponnese,  were  tr}'ing  to  alter 
what  had  been  done;  and  another  disturbance  immediately 
arose  on  the  part  of  the  allies  against  Laceda?mon.  Moreover, 
the  Laeedaimoniaiis,  as  time  went  on,  became  suspected  by  the 
Athenians  also,  through  not  |)erforming  in  some  respects  wliat 
had  been  agreed  on,  according  to  the  treaty.  And  though 
for  six  years  and  ten  months  they  abstained  from  marching 
against  each  other's  territory,  yet  out  of  it,  during  the  exist- 
ence of  a  doubtful  suspension  of  arms,  they  were  doing  one 
another  the  greatest  possiblo  damage.  SubsiMjuently,  how- 
ever, they  were  compelled  to  break  the  treaty  concluded  after 
the  ten  years'  war,  and  again  ])roceedeil  to  open  hostilities. 

20.  And  the  same  Thucydides  the  Athenian  has  also  written 
the  history  of  these  transactions  in  order,  as  they  severally 
happened,  by  sununei-s  and  winters,  until  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  their  allies  put  an  end  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Athenians, 
and  took  the  long  walls  and  I'lru^'us.  To  the  time  of  that  event 
there  Avere  spent  in  the  war  seven-and-twenty  years  in  all.  AVith 
regard  to  the  intervening  arrangement,  if  any  one  shall  object 
to  consider  it  as  a  state  of  war,  ho  will  not  estimate  it  rightly. 
For  let  him*  regard  it  as  it  is  characterized  by  the  facts  of 
the  case,  and  he  will  iind  that  there  is  no  reason  for  its  being 
deemed  a  state  of  peace;  since  during   it  they  neither  gave 

*  On  this  uso  of  όηφηται,  sco  Poppo  or  BloomficUl.  "With  regard  to 
tliO  Tt  in  this  clauso,  it  is  the  opinion  of  GoUer  that  it  refers  to  και  beforo 
ίίψήσει;  hut  Poppo  observes,  in  opposition  to  this,  tlwit  the  imperative 
ΰΟρίίτω  lias  a  conditional  force,  a.s  it  freijuoMtly  has  in  (ireck,  Latin,  (Jer- 
nian,  and  French:  "si  quin  spcctavcrit,  inveniet;"  and  therefore  that  re 
has  no  force.  Arnohi  nnd  Bloonilield  consider  that  it  is  answered  by  Ιζω 
re  τούτων.  "  First  of  all,  tho  treaty  wasin  itself  practically  inefficient, 
inasmuch  as  its  very  stipulations  wero  not  all  fulfilled  ;  and  then  there 
were  mutual  causes  of  complaint  with  respect  to  other  matters,  of  Λvhich 
tho  treaty  had  made  no  rocntiou." 


xxyn.]  THUCYDIDE3.  V.  327 

nor  received  back  nil  they  had  arranged  to  do ;  and  besides 
this,  there  were  oflfenses  committed  on  both  sides,  as  in  tho 
case  of  the  Mantiiieau  and  Epidauriaii  wars,  and  other  in- 
stances; and  tho  Thraceward  alUcs  were  in  no  resjxict  less 
at  war  than  l>ofor«  ;  while  the  Boeotians  liad  only  a  tnice  from 
ono  ten  days  to  another.  Including,  therefore,  tho  first  war 
often  years,  tho  suspicious  cessation  of  hostilities  which  fol- 
lowed it,  and  tho  subse(|Uont  war  Λvhich  succeeded  to  that,  any 
OIK!  will  fin  I  that  the  numlxT  of  years  was  what  I  liavo  men- 
tioned (reckonincf  by  tho  great  divisions  of  time),  with  only 
α  few  days*  difterenco ;  and  that  such  as  positively  assorted 
any  thing  on  tho  strength  of  oracles,  found  this  tho  only  fact 
which  provetl  true.  At  least  I,  for  my  own  part,  rememlxir 
that  all  along,  both  at  tho  beginning  of  the  war,  and  till  it  Avas 
brought  to  a  conclusion,  it  >vas  alleged  bv  many  that  it  was  to 
last  thrico  nine  years.  And  I  lived  on  through  tho  Λνΐιοΐο  of 
it,  being  of  an  age  to  comprehend  events,  and  paying  atten- 
tion, in  order  to  gain  accurate  knowledge  on  each  ]»oint.  It  was 
also  my  lot  to  bo  banished  my  country  twenty  years  after  my 
command  at  Ani^diipolis ;  and  thus,  by  being  present  at  the», 
transactions  of  either  party,  and  especially  of  the  Peloponnesians, 
in  consequence  of  my  banishment,  to  gain  at  my  leisure  a  more 
perfect  acquaintance  with  each  of  them.  The  difi'erence,  then, 
Avhich  aroso  after  the  ten  years,  and  tho  breaking  up  of  the  treaty, 
and  tho  subsequent  course  of  hostilities,  I  ΛνίΙΙ  now  relate. 

27.  Wiien,  then,  the  fifty  years'  treaty  had  been  concluded, 
and  the  alliance  afterwanl,  the  embassies  from  tho  Pelopon- 
nese,  which  had'  been  summoned  for  that  business,  returned 
from  Lacedajmon.  Acxjordingly  tho  rest  went  home  ;  but  tho 
Corinthians  repaired  to  Argos,  and  in  tho  first  j»lace  held 
coinmiinications  with  somo  of  tho  Argives  who  were  in  office, 
to  tho  cflfect  that,  since  tho  Lacedajmonians,  not  for  tho  good, 
but  for  tho  subjugation  of  tho  Peloponnesc,  had  entered  into 
treaty  and  alliance  with  tho  Athenians,  >vho  were  before  their 
bitterest  enemies ;  tho  Argives  ought  to  consider  how  tho  Po- 
loponncso  might  bo  preserved  ;  and  to  pass  a  decree,  that  any 
city  of  tho  Greeks  that  wished,  l>eing  independent,  and  giving 
>  al  ξυμμαχιηι.]  Poppo  remarks,  in  his  note  on  48. 1,  on  this  use  of  tho 
plural  noun  with  roferonco  to  a  single  alliance;  but  docs  not  ofTer  any 
explanation  of  it.  Probably  it  arises  from  tho  separato  ratification  of  tho 
alliance  by  each  of  tho  two  states ;  eo  that  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  two* 
fold  transaction.  • 

•. 


828  THUOTDIDEa  Υ,  [χχνιπ.,χχϊΐ; 

judicial  eatiefaction  for  wrongs,  on  fair  and  equal  terms,  might 
enter  into  alliance  with  the  Argives,  on  condition  of  defending 
each  other's  country :  and  that  they  should  appoint  a  few  per- 
sons as  commissioners  with  full  powers,  instead  of  the  discus- 
sion of  the  measure  being  held  before  the  ))eoplo ;  in  order 
that  those  might  not  be  known  who  had  failed  to  persuade  tho 
multitude.  And  they  asserted  that  many  wouUl  come  over  to 
them  for  hatred  of  tho  Lacedajmonians,  The  Corinthians  then, 
having  suggested  these  things,  returned  home. 

28.  When  those  of  tho  Argives  who  heard  their  proposals 
had  reported  them  to  tho  government  and  the  people,  tho 
Argives  passed  the  decree,  and  chose  twelve  men,  with  whom 
any  one  of  the  Greeks  who  wished  should  conclude  an  alliance, 
except  the  Athenians  and  Licedaiuionians,  neither  of  whom 
should  liavo  liberty  to  enter  into  treaty  without  the  consent  of 
the  Arglve  people.  Tho  Argives  acceded  the  more  readily  to 
these  proposals,  because  they  saw  that  they  should  havo  the 
war  with  the  LaceJiemonians,  (for  their  treaty  with  them  was 
on  the  point  of  expiring),  and  also  becausti  they  hoped  to 
gain  the  Fupreniacy  of  the  Peloponnese.  For  at  that  time 
Lacedicmon  was  in  very  bad  repute,  and  Avas  despised  in  con- 
sequence of  its  misfortunes;  Λνΐιίΐο  the  Argives  were  in  an 
excellent  condition  in  all  respects,  as  they  had  tiiken  no  part 
in  tho  war  against  Athens,  but  had  rather  reaped  the  good 
fruits  of  having  been  in  treaty  Avith  both  sides.  Thus,  then, 
the  Argives  were  admitting  into  alliance  such  of  the  Greeks 
as  wished  it. 

29.  The  Mantineans  and  their  allies  were  the  first  to  join 
them,  through  fear  of  tho  Lacedaimonians.  For  a  certain 
part  of  Arcadia  had  been  reduced  to  subjection  by  tho  Man- 
tineans, >vhilo  tho  war  with  tho  Athenians  wiis  still  going  on  ; 
and  they  thought  that  tho  Lacedicnhinians  would  not  allow 
their  sovereignty  over  it,  since  they  had  now  leisure'  to  in- 
terfere ;  so  that  they  gladly  turned  to  tho  Argives,  consider- 
ing them  to  bo  a  powerful  state,  and  one  which  was  always  at 
variance  with  tho  Lacedaimonians,  and  under  a  demoi^atical 
government  like  themselves.  When  tho  Mantineans  had  re- 
volted, tho  rest  of  tho  I'eloponneso  also  was  thrown  into 
coiuniotion,  with  tho  idea  that  they  too  ought  to  do  tho  saiire ; 

*  Tho  force  of  tUo  καί  before  αχολήν  appears  to  bo,  "leiauro,  as  well 
OS  iucliuatiou."  * 


XXX.J  THUCTDIDES.  V.  S20 

ns  they  thought  that  thoy  had  changed  sides  through  knowing 
more  than  the  rest.  At  the  pamo  time  thoy  were  angry  with 
tlie  LacodsBmonians,  both  on  other  grounds,  and  because  it  had 
been  mentioned  in  the  treaty  witli  Athens»  that  it  should  be 
consistent  with  tlieir  oatlis  to  add  to  it,  or  take  from  it,  whatever 
miglit  seem  fit  to  both  states,  tlie  Lacednemonians  and  Athenians. 
For  it  was  this  clause,  above  all,  that  caused  the  excitement  in 
the  Peloponnese,  and  sot  them  on  suspecting  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians, in  concert  with  the  Athenians,  might  wish  to  reduce 
them  to  slavery :  for  it  was  only  just,  they  thought,  that  the 
alteration  should  have  been  referred  to  all  the  allies.  The 
majority  therefore,  through  fear,  were  eager  to  conclude  the . 
alliance  with  the  Argives  on  their  own  part,  respectively,  as  the 
Mantinoans  had  done. 

30.  When  the  Lacedaemonians  porcoivod  tliis  commotion 
which  had  arisen  in  the  Peloponnese,  and  that  the  Corinthians 
were  the  advisors  of  it,  and  were  themselves  about  to  enter 
into  treaty  with  Argos,  they  sent  embassadors  to  Corinth, 
wishing  to  ])revent  \vhat  wns  going  to  happen.  They  cliarge<i 
them  therefore  with  suggesting  the  whole  business ;  and 
said  that  if  they  Λvithdrew  from  them,  and  became  allies  of 
the  Argives,  they  would  violate  their  oaths ;  and  that  they 
were  already  doing  wrong  in  not  accepting  the  treaty  with 
the  Athenians,  when  it  had  l>een  declared,  that  wliatever  the 
majority  of  the  allies  decreed  should  be. binding,  unless  there 
were  some  impediment  on  the  part  of  go<ls  or  heroes.  The 
Corinthians,  in  the  presence  of  all  the  allies  who,  like  them- 
selves, ha<l  not  acceded  to  the  treaty  (for  they  liad  themselves 
j)reviously  invited  them  thither),  spoke  in  reply  to  the  Lacc- 
daimonians ;  not  indeed  directly  stating  the  injuries  they  had 
received,  namely,  that  they  had  not  recovered  Sollium  from  the 
Athenians,  nor  Anactorium — with  any  other  point  on  whicli 
they  considered  themselves  to  l>o  aggrieved  ;  but  urging  as  a 
pretext  their  det<Tmmation  not  to  betray  the  Thraceward 
Greeks;  for  (hey  had  taken  oaths  to  them,  both  by  themselves, 
ΛνΙιοα  in  the  first  instance  they  revolted,  in  concert  with  the  Po- 
tidaeans,  and  others  afterward.  They  were  not  then,  they  said, 
\'iolating  their  oaths  to  the  allies  by  refusing  to  accede  to  the 
treaty  with  the  Athenians ;  for  eince  they  had  ewom  to  their 
Thrace  ward  friends,  with  appeals  to  the  gods,  they  should  not 
ft  proper  regard  for  their  oaths,  if  they  betrayed  thenu 


330  THUCYDIDEa  Τ.  [rxxi 

Besides,  it  had  been  expressly  mentioned,  "  unless  there  were 
some  impediment  on  the  part  of  gods  or  heroes ;"  this,  then, 
they  considered  an  impediment  on  the  part  of  the  gods.  Thus 
much  they  said  on  the  subject  of  their  former  oaths :  with  re- 
gard to  the  Argivo  alliauce,  they  would  consult  with  their 
friends,  and  do  whatever  was  right.  So  the  envoys  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  returned  home.  Hut  there  happened  to  bo  in 
Corinth  at  that  time  some  embassadors  from  the  Argives  also, 
who  urged  the  Corinthians  to  enter  at  once  into  their  confeder- 
acy, and  not  delay.  They  however,  told  them  to  come  to  the 
next  congress  which  was  to  bo  held  in  their  city. 

31.  Inmiediately  after,  there  came  also  an  embassy  from  the 
Eleaus,  who  concluded  an  alliauce  with  the  Corinthians  in  the 
first  place,  and  then  proceeded  thence  to  Argos,  as  they  had  been 
j)reviou8ly  instructed,  and  became  allies  of  the  Argives.  For 
they  were  at  variance  with  the  Lacedaemonians  just  then  about 
Lepreum.  For  a  Nvar  having  before  this  arisen  between  the 
Lepreans  and  some  of  the  Areudians,  and  tho  Kleans  having 
been  invited  to  alliance  by  the  Lej)reans,  on  condition  of  re- 
ceiving half  their  territory,  and  having  brought  tho  war  to  a 
conclusion,  tho  Kleans  imj)oseil  on  tlio  Lepreans,  λυΙιο  were 
themselves  allowed  to  oecuj>y  the  territory,  tho  payment  of  a 
talent  to  tho  Olympian  Jupiter.  This  they  continued  to  pay 
till  the  Attic  Avar  broke  out ;  when,  on  their  ceasing  to  do  so  on 
the  pretext  of  tho  war,  the  Eleans  j>roceeded  to  comfR'l  them  ; 
on  which  they  had  recourse  to  the  Lacedicmonians.  When  the 
case  was  thus  submittej  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Laceda-mo- 
nians,  the  Eleans,  suspecting  that  tluy  should  not  have  justice, 
renounced  tho  reference,  and  laid  waste  the  Leprean  territory. 
The  Lacedaimonians  nevertheless  decided  that  the  Lepreans 
were  independent,  and  that  tho  Eleans  were  acting  with  in- 
justice ;  and  inasmuch  as  they  had  not  stood  by  the  arbitration, 
they  sent  into  Lepreum  a  garrison  of  heavy-armed  troops.  So 
the  Eleans,  considering  tho  Lacedicmonians  to  be  receiving  a 
city  which  had  revolted  from  them,  and  alleging  the  agree- 
ment in  which  it  had  been  declaretl,  that  Avhatever  each  party 
had  when  they  entered  on  the  Attic  war,  that  they  should  also 
have  when  they  retired  from  it;  since  they  considered  that  they 
liad  not  their  due,  they  went  over  to  the  Argives ;  and  thus  they 
too,'  as  they  had  been  previously  instructed,  concluded  tho 
.    *  καΟύπίμ  τΐμοίφητο.]  I  do  not  think  that  this  expression  can  signify, 


ΐιχπ.]  TTIUCYDIDES.  V.  331 

alliance.  Immodiately  after  lliem  tlic  Corintliians  and  Tliraoe- 
λ\ΆτΛ  Chaleiilians  also  entered  into  alliance  \s\i\\  the  Argives ; 
Imt  the  Boeotians  and  Mep^areans,  lioldincf  each  the  Fame  lan- 
guago  as  the  other,  remained  quiet;  being  neglected'   by  tho 

occording  to  BloomfioW's  translation  of  it,  which  Poppo  approves,  "in  tho, 
manner  aforesaid ;"  t.  c,  by  communicating  with  tho  twelve  Af^ivo  com- 
missioners, ch.  28.  Surely,  if  that  had  been  tho  writer's  meaning,  ho 
would  havo  used  tho  perfect  tense,  not  tho  pluperfect.  Ilaaek's  inter• 
I)rctation,  therefore,  must  bo  tho  correct  ono ,  "  as  had  been  previously 
ordered  by  their  countr}'men."  And  in  sec.  5,  where  tho  same  words 
aro  repeated  with  refcrcnco  to  tho  Kleans,  they  may  either  refer  to  tho 
decree  passed  by  tho  stato  at  largo  for  its  own  course  of  policy ;  or  tho 
Λνΐιοΐο  people  may  bo  said  to  havo  joined  tho  Argivo  league,  though  it 
was  done  through  tho  agency  of  its  emhaxsadors,  in  accordiinco  with  tho 
commands  they  had  received  for  tho  purpose. 

*  7Τ(ριηΐ}ώμη'ηι.'\  To  tho  interpretation  of  this  word  which  Arnold 
adopts  from  Bishop  Thirhvall,  Poppo,  in  his  last  edition,  objects  that  thcro 
Avas  nothing  in  the  terms  of  the  peace  to  raise  puch  a  feeling  in  tho  minds 
of  tho  Ba'Otians  and  Megareans.     But  surely  they  might  share  tho  jeal- 
ousy and  suspicion  which,  wo  aro  told,  were  excited  throughout  tho  wholo 
of  the  Pelopoimeso  by  the  clause  of  tho  treaty  empowering  Sparta  and 
Athens  to  mako  alterations  in  it  by  themselves,  without  tho  consent  of 
tho  allies  in  general.     Chap.  29.  3.     At  any  rate,  such  α  clause  seems 
quite  incompatible  with  tho  supposition  of  t'ho  Megareans  and  Boeotians 
having  been  treated  at  this  particular  time,  however  they  might  havo 
been  in  general,  with  that  extreme  respect  and  attention  which  Poppo 
ppcaks  of,  and  which  Guller  and  other  commentators  consider  to  bo  ex- 
pressed by  ττεριορώ/ιενηι.     Tho  absence  of  fuv  and  (^t,  which  ono  would 
certainly  havo  expected,  to  mark  tho  opposition  between  tho  two  clauses, 
may  in  somo  measure  bo  supplied  by  tho  adversative  force  which  I  havo 
given  to  the  κηί ;  that  conjunction  in  Attic  writers  sometimes  passing 
into  tho  signification  of  Krttroi.     See  Jelf;  Or.  Gr.  750  3.     This  difficulty 
would  bo  entirely  avoided,  and  a  very  appropriate  meaning  given  to  tho 
wholo  sentenco,  if  trrpinpufiFvoi  co\ild  bo  taken  in  tho  sense  of  '•  left  to 
themselves,  not  interfered  with,  permitted  to  do  what  they  pleased."  Tho 
verb  is  very  frequently  used  in  a  manner  closely  approaching  to  this,  as 
w*ell  as  tho  cognate  ones  from  which  it  borrows  somo  of  its  tenses ;  but 
in  such  cases  it  is  usually  followed  by  a  participle,  infinitive,  or  adjective, 
which  serves  to  limit  its  meaning  to  somo  particular  case.    If,  however, 
it  should  be  thought  possible  for  it  to  have  been  hero  used  without  such 
limitation,  it  would  pivo  α  very  good  reason  why  tho  states  should  prefer 
tho  Laecdoemoninn  alliance  to  that  of  the  restless  and  meddling  Atheni- 
ans.   It  would  also  express  an  important  diiTcrenco  between  tlio  case  of 
tho  Megareans  and  Brrotians  and  that  of  tho  Eleane,  with  whoso  policy 
toward  tho  Lepreans  Sparta  is  mentioned  as  having  interfered ;  and  that 
of  tho  Mantlneans,  who  are  expressly  said  to  havo  abandoned  their  con- 
nection with  her,  because  they  expected  similar  interference.    Ch.  29. 1, 
ινόμιζον  ού  ηιριόψεσθαι  α^ύς  τούζ  Αακίόαιμονίονς  upxtiVf  ίπαύή  καϊ 
οχολήν  ηγον,  ^ 


332  THUOYDIDEa  V.  [xxxil 

Lacedaemonians,  and  yet  thinking  that  the  democracy  of  tlie 
Argives  was  less  suited  to  them,  with  their  oligarchical 
form  of  governraout,  than  the  constitution  of  the  Laceda?mo. 

nians. 

32.  About  the  same  j)eriod  of  this  summer,  the  Athenians, 
having  jeduced  tlie  Sciouaeans  to  surrender,  put   iho  adult 
males  to  death ;  while  they  sold  into  slavery  the  women  and 
children,  and  gave  the  territory  for  the  Plataans  to  occupy. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  brought  back  the  Delians  to  their 
country,  from  scruples  arising  from  their  disasters  in  different 
battles,  and  because  the  god  at  Delphi  had  so  commanded  tlicm. 
At  this  time,  too,  the  Phociaus  and  Locrians  commenced  lios- 
tilities.     And  the  Corinthiarm  and  Argives,  being  now  in  al- 
liance, went  to  Tegea,  to  procure  its  revolt  from  the  Lncedic- 
monians,  seeing   that  it  formed    a  considerable    part   of  the 
Peloponnese,  and  thinking  that,  if  it  were  added  to  them,  tiny 
would  command  the  whole  of  it.     15nt  when  the  Tegeans  paid 
they  would  do  nothing  in  opposition  to  the  Lacedicmonians, 
the  Corinthians,  though  hitherto  verj'  hearty  in   their  meas- 
ures, relaxed  in  their  vehemence,  and  were   afraid   that  none 
of  the  other  parties  nnght  now  come  over  to  them.     They 
went,  liowever,  to  the   li<eotians,  and   begged   them   to  enter 
into  alliance  with  themselves  and  the  Argives,  and   act  in   all 
other  resjxicts  in  concert  Avith  them.     AVith   reference  to  the 
ten  days*  truces  also,  ΛνΙΓκΊι  had  been  made   with   each   other 
by  the  Athenians  and   the  liceotiaris  not  long   after  the  con- 
clusion  of  the  fit'ty  years'   treaty,  the  (Orinthians  desired  tlie 
Ikeotians  to  accompany  them  to  Athens,  and  obtain  the  same 
for  them  also,  on  the  same  footing  as  the  Boiotians ;   and  in 
case  of  the  Athenians  not  acceding  to  this,  then  to  renounce 
the  suspension  of  arms,  and  in  future  to  make  no  truce  with- 
out being  joined  by  them.      On  the  Corinthians  preferring 
these  requests,  the   Ba'otians  desired   them   to  desist  on   the 
subject  of  the  Argive  alliance  :    they  went  with  them,  liow- 
cver,  to  Athens,  but  did  not  obtain  the  ten  days'  truce ;  as  the 
Athenians  answered,  that  they  were  already  in  treaty  with 
the  Corinthians,  inasmuch  as  they  Avere  allies  of  the   Lacedai- 
monians.     The  Boeotians,  then,  did  not  any  the  more  on  that 
account  renounce  their  ten  days'  truce,  though  the  Corinthians 
called  on  them  to  do  so,  and  expostulated  with  them  on   the 
ground  of  their  having  agreed  to  do  it.  Between  the  Corinthians, 


χχιπι^χχχν.]  THUCYDIDES.  V.  333 

however,  nnd  tlio  Athenians  there  was  a  suspension  of  arms 
without  any  actual  truce.' 

33.  The  same  summer,  the  Lacedaemonians  made  an  ex- 
pedition with  all  their  forces,  under  the  command  of  Pleis- 
toanax,  son  of  Pausanias,  their  king,  into  the  country  of 
the  Parrhasians  in  Arcadia,  who  were  subject  to  the  Manti- 
noans,  and  who  had  invited  their  interference  in  the  spirit  of 
faction  :  intending  also,  if  they  could,  to  demolish  the  strong- 
hold at  Cypscla,  Λvhich,  being  situated  in  the  Parrhasian  terri- 
tory, the  Mantiiieans  had  fortified  and  garrisoned  Λvith  their  own 
troops,  for  the  annoyance  of  the  district  of  Sciritis  in  Laconia. 
The  Lacedncmonians  therefore  proceeded  to  ravage  the  land  of 
the  Parrhasians;  while  the  Mantineans,  having  committed 
their  city  to  the  custody  of  Argivo  troops,  themselves  kept 
guard  over  their  confederates'  countrj'.  Being  unable,  how- 
ever, to  save  tiie  fort  at  Cypsela,  and  the  towns  in  Parrliasia, 
they  retired.  The  Laceda?monians,  after  making  the  Parrha- 
sians independent,  and  demolishing  the  fortress,  returned  home. 

34.  Moreover,  in  the  course  of  the  same  summer,  on  tho 
arrival  of  tho  troops  from  Thrace  who  had  marched  out  with 
Brasidas,  and  >vhom  Clearidas  had  brought  back  after  tho 
treaty  was  made,  tho  Laced  aim  onians  decreed  that  tho  Helots 
who  had  fought  under  Brasidas  should  be  free,  and  live  whero 
they  pleased ;  and  not  long  after  they  settled  them,  together 
with  tho  Neodamodes,'  at  Lepreum,  which  is  situated  on'  tho 
liordera  of  Laconia  and  Elis ;  for  they  wero  now  at  variance 
with  tho  Eleans.  But  with  regard  to  those  of  their  own  botly 
who  had  been  taken  in  tho  island,  and  had  surrendered  their 
arms,  fearing  they  might  suppose  that  they  would  \)0  sub- 
je(;tcd  to  some  degradation  in  consequence  of  their  misfortime, 
and  so,  if  allowed  to  retain  their  franchise,  might  attempt  a 
revolution,  they  disfranchised  them,  oven  while  eomo  were  hold- 

•  **By  ίιηηονΛης  ia  meant  a  mere  nRfccmcnt  in  words,  not  ratified  by 
iho  eolcmnitios  of  rolipion.  And  tho  Greeks,  as  wo  have  bccr,  consid• 
ered  tho  breach  of  their  word  very  different  from  tho  breach  of  their 
oath.    Soo  II.  6,  7."— -ylrwoW. 

•  "That  tho  Neodamodes  wcro  a  distinct  class  from  tho  ncwly-cnfran- 
cWscd  IIolols  seems  clear  from  this  pasaaj^o  and  V.  67.  1. ;  nnd  Midler's 
supposition  is  highly  probable  (noricr,  vol  ii.  p.  45),  that  tho  latter  after 
ft  lime  roso  to  tho  condition  of  the  former;  possibly  in  tho  next  genera- 
tioo;  so  that  tho  eon  of  an  enfranchised  Helot  bocamo  a  Neodamode ; 
like  the  distinction  between  Libertus  and  Libertinus."— ^rnoW. 


334  THUCTDIDE3.  V.  [rxx7. 

ing  offices ;  and  with  a  disfranchisemont  of  such  λ  kind  that 
they  could  neitlier  titko  oilicc,  nor  liavo  power  to  buy  or  scli 
any  thing.  Subsequently,  however,  in  the  course  of  time,  they 
were  aiyain  enfranchised. 

35.  The  same  summer  also  the  Diana  took  Thyssus  en  tho 
promontory  of  Athos,  α  colony  of  tho  Athenians.  And  durin•^ 
the  whole  of  this  summer  there  was  intercourse  indeed  be- 
tween tho  Athenians  and  reloponnesians,  but  both  parties 
suspected  each  other,  from  immediately  after  tho  conclusion 
of  the  treaty,  on  the  ground  of  their  not  mutually  restorini^ 
the  places  speciiiod.  For  the  Lacedx'uionians,  to  whoso  lot 
it  fell  first  to  restore  Amphipolis  and  the  other  towns,  lial 
not  done  so :  nor  did  they  make  their  Thraceward  allies  ac- 
cede to  tho  treaty,  nor  the  lia^otians,  luor  tho  Corinthians; 
thou^i^h  they  were  continually  sayini^  .that,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Athenians,  they  ΛνοηΚί  compel  those  states  to  do  so, 
if  they  would  not  of  their  own  accord.  Thoy  also  jjleaded  in 
excuse  the  fact  of  the  time  not  being  specified,  at  which  those 
Λνΐιο  did  not  accede  to  it  were  to  be  considered  as  enemies  to 
both  sides.  Tho  Athenians  therefore,  seeing  none  of  theso 
things  really  perfv)rmed,  suspected  that  tho  Lacedremonians 
liad  no  upright  intentions ;  so  that  on  their  demanding  back 
Pylus,  they  refused  to  restore  it  (nay,  they  even  rej>ented  of 
liaving  given  thom  back  their  prisoners  taken  in  the  island),  and 
kept  tho  other  |)laces,  waiting  till  they,  on  their  part,  performed 
for  them  Avhat  had  been  arranged.  Tho  Lacedaemonians  said 
that  they  had  done  what  was  possible ,  for  that  they  had  re- 
stored the  Athenian  prisoners  who  were  in  their  hands,  and 
had  recalled  tho  troops  in  Thrace ;  and  whatever  else  they  had 
in  their  power.  AVith  regard  to  Amphipolis,  they  wero  not, 
they  said,  masters  of  it,  so  iis  to  give  it  up ;  but  they  Avouhl 
endeavor  to  bring  the  lieeotians  and  Corinthians  over  to  the 
treaty,  and  to  recover  Panactum ;  and  would  restore  as  many 
of  tho  Athenians  as  were  prisoners  in  liceotia.  They  required, 
however,  that  they  should  restore  Tylus  to  them;  or  if  not  that, 
should  withdraw  tho  Messanians  and  IlehAs,  as  they,  on  their 
part,  had  Avithdrawn  their  troops  from  Thrace ;  and  that  tho 
Athenians  themselves  should  garrison  it,  if  they  would.  80 
when  conferences  had  been  held,  many  and  often,  during  this 
tiunimer,  they  prevailed  on  the  Athenians  to  withdraw  from 
Pylus  the  Messanians,  and  the  rest  of  tho  Helots,  and  all  who 


χχχΠμ  XXXVII  ]  THUCYDIDES.  V,  335 

had  dcsorli'd  from  Lnconia  J  and  they  ecttlcd  tliem  nt  Crnnii  in 
Cepliallciiia.  During  this  Biunmor,  then,  there  was  peace  and 
free  intorcourso  Avith  each  otlior. 

36.  But  the  following  winter  (different  cpliors  happening 
now  to  be  in  ofilce,  and  not  those  under  whom  the  treaty  had 
Ix'en  made,  and  some  of  them  being  even  opposed  to  it), 
when  embassies  had  come  from  their  confederacy,  and  tho 
Athenians,  Ikcotians,  and  Corinthians  were  there,  and  they 
had  held  many  discussions  with  one  another,  and  come  to 
no  agreement;  on  their  departing  homeward,  Cleobulus  and 
Xenares — those  of  tho  ej)liors  who  most  wished  to  break 
up  tho  treaty — held  a  private  conference  with  tlio  Boeotians 
and  Corinihians,  advising  them  to  pursue  as  far  as  pos* 
siblo  tho  same  policy;  and  that  the  IJa'otians,  after  first  en- 
tering into  alliance  with  Argos  themselves,  should  tlien  en- 
deavor to  bring  the  Argives  together  with  themselves  into 
alliance  witli  the  Laccdicuionians.  For  in  this  way  tlie  Boeo- 
tians were  least  likely  to  be  forced  to  accede  to  tlio  Attic 
treaty ;  since  tho  Lacedaemonians  Avould  prefer  gaining  tho 
friendship  and  alliance  of  the  Argives  even  at  the  risk  of  tho 
enmity  of  the  Athenians  and  the  dissolution  of  tho  treaty. 
For  they  know  that  the  Larednnmonians  were  always  desirous 
that  Argos  should  l>e  their  friend  on  fair  terms;  tliinking  that 
so  the  war  out  of  tho  rdoponneso  would  be  more  easily  con- 
ducted by  them.  They  begged  tho  Boeotians,  however,  to  put 
Panactum  into  the  liands  of  tho  Lacedicmonians  ;  that  by  get- 
ting back  Tyhis,  if  they  could,  in  exchange  for  it,  they  might 
more  easily  proceed  to  hostilities  with  the  Athenians, 

37.  Tho  Boeotians  and  Corinthians,  having  received  from 
Xenares  an<l  Cleobulus,  and  such  of  the  Lacedicmonians  as 
were  friendly  toward  them,'  these  instructions  to  carry  to 
their  governments,  went  each  their  way.  But  two  persons 
of  tho  Argives,  who  held  tho  highest  office  in  their  country, 
watched  for  tliem  by  tho  way,  as  they  were  returning ;  and 
having  met  them,  entered  into  conversation   with   them  on 

*  ίτρό.]  More  literally,  "  in  tho  faoo  of."  Γορρο  adopts  Dobrce*e  ex• 
planation .  '•  Pluris  enim  facturos  Lacedaomonios  Arf^ivorum  amicitiam 
ct  Bociotatom  quam  Athcnicnsium  inimicitiam  ac  fcBderum  cum  ipsis 
junctonira  yiolationom :  t.  e.,  mapria  illam  cupero  quam  banc  mctuore." 
For  the  force  of  κα7.ώς,  In  the  next  sontcnco,  sco  Arnold's  noto. 

»  ηντοΐς.]  i.  c,  to  tho  Boeotians  and  Corinthians,  not  to  Xenares  and 
Cleobulus,  ae  Bloomfleld  supposes.    Compare  sec.  3. 


33β  THUOYDIDEa  V  [xxxFUt 

tho  possibility  of  iho  Boeotians  becomin<»  their  allies,  as  tho 
Corinthians,  Elenns,  and  Mantineans  had  done ;  for  if  that  could 
bo  well  arranged,  they  thought  they  might  then,  on  advan- 
tageous terms,  both  carry  on  war  and  make  peace,  both  with 
the  Laceda3monians,  if  they  should  wish  it — holding  the  same 
language  all  together — and  with  whomever  else  it  might  bo 
necessary.  Tho  Ikeotian  envoys  were  pleased  at  hearing  this; 
fiir  they  happened  to  ask  the  same  tilings  as  their  friends  in 
Lacedaimon  had  instructed  them  to  propose.  So  when  the  men 
from  Argos  perceived  that  they  listened  to  their  suggestions,  they 
Raid  they  would  send  embassadors  to  the  Boeotians,  and  went 
away.  The  Boeotians,  on  their  arrival,  reported  to  tho  Boeo- 
tirchs  what  had  been  said  to  them,  both  at  Lacedajmon,  and  by 
tlie  Argives  who  had  met  them :  and  the  Boeotarchs  were 
j)!eased,  and  were  much  more  eagor  in  the  business,  since  it  had 
turned  out  so  luckily  for  them  in  both  quarters,  that  their 
friends  among  the  Lacedaemonians  requested  tho  same  things  as 
the  Argives  were  anxiously  wishing.  Not  long  after,  embas- 
sadors came  from  Argos  with  the  proposals  that  have  been 
mentioned  ;  whom  the  Boeotarchs  sent  back  after  assenting  to 
their  terms,  and  promising  to  send  envoys  to  Argos  on  tho 
question  of  tne  alliance. 

38.  In  the  mean  time  it  was  determined  by  the  Bicotarchs, 
the  Corinthians,  the  Megareans,  and  the  embassadors  from 
Thrace,  in  the  first  place,  to  bind  themselves  by  oaths  to  each 
other,  that  assuredly,  Avhen  occasion  offered,  they  would  assist 
the  party  which  needed  it ;  and  that  they  would  carry  on  war 
with  none,  or  make  peace,  without  common  assent ;  and  that 
so  tho  Boeotians  and  Megareans  (for  they  had  tho  same  object 
before  them)  should  then  enter  into  treaty  >vith  the  Argives. 
l^ut  before  the  oaths  were  taken,  the  Boeotarchs  comnmnicated 
theso  resolutions  to  the  four  councils  of  tho  Boeotians,  which 
liavo  tho  sole  power  of  ratifying  measures;  and  recommended  to 
them  that  oatlis  should  be  exchanged  with  such  cities  as  wished 
to  league  with  them  for  mutual  assistance.  However,  the  mem- 
bers of  tho  Boeotian  councils  did  not  accede  to  tho  plan,  fearing 
that  they  should  do  what  was  displeasing  to  the  Laced aamonians, 
if  they  leagued  with  the  Corinthians,  who  had  separated  from 
them.  For  tho  Bccotarchs  did  not  tell  them  of  what  had  taken 
place  '  at  Lacedaiuion,  namely,  that  Cleobulus  and  Xenares, 
among    the    ephors,  and   their  friends,  advised   them  fii'st   to 


xxxix,]  TnUCYDIDES.  V.  337 

enter  into  allinnco  with  the  Arpvos  nnd  Corintliianf»,  nnd  tlien 
to  join  tho  Lacedaemonians ;  as  Ihoy  imagined  that  thoncfh 
they  ehould  not  mention  it,  tlio  conncil  wouM  decree  nothininr 
different  from  what  they  had  previously  determined  on,'  and 
now  recommended  to  their  country.  AVheu  tlio  husiness  Imd 
met  with  this  check,  tho  embassadors  from  Corinth  and  Tliraco 
departed  without  concludiuij  any  thinj? ;  Λvhil(?  tho  Bocotarchs, 
who  bcforo  intended,  if  they  cirried  the.-c  measures,  to  at- 
tempt also  to  ofiect  the  nllianco  with  th<;  Argives,  did  not  now 
hrmrr  tho  question  of  the  Arcrives  before  tlio  councils,  or  Bcnd 
to  Arcfos  tho  embassadors  they  had  promised  ;  but  thero  nroso 
an  inditlerenco  and  procra^^ti nation  in  the  whole  business. 

30.  In  tho  course  of  tho  same  summer,  tho  Olynthians 
assaulted  and  took  Mecyberna,  which  was  garrisoned  by  Athe- 
nians. After  these  events,  conferences  being  continually 
held  between  tho  Athenians  and  Lacedirmonians  respecting 
tho  possessions  of  eafh  other  which  they  still  retained,  tho 
Laced.Tmonians,  hoping  that,  if  tho  Athenians  should  rcceivo 
b.ack  r.anactum  from  tho  l>ceolians,  they  would  themselves  re- 
cover I*ylus,  werit  on  an  embassy  to  tho  l^ceotians,  and  begged 
them  to  deliver  up  to  them  Tanactum  and  tlio  Athenian 
prisoners  that  they  might  recover  Pylus  in  exchange  for 
them.  Btit  tho  Jiocotians  refused  to  deliver  them  up,  unless 
thoy  would  make  an  especial  allianco  with  them,  as  with  tho 
Athenians,  Although  theroforo  tho  Lacedocmonians  wero 
aware  that  they  bIiouKI  bn  acting  wrong  to  tho  Athofians,  sinco 
it  had  been  stipulated  that  they  should  make  neither  peaco 
nor  war  with  any  but  by  mutual  consent ;  yet,  as  they  wished 
to  receive  Panactum  from  them,  believing  that  so  they  should 
recover  Pylus,  and  as  tho  i>arty  which  was  anxious  to  break 

'  (T0i(7<  ηροΛιη)  νόντις  τταραινονσιν.]  Arnold  is  followed  hy  Poppo  nnd 
Bloomflold  in  supposinj?  that  σ<ρίσι  refers  to  tho  pubjcct  of  ψηψιειηθηι ; 
but  as  his  explanation  docs  not,  I  think,  remove  tho  extreme  harshness 
of  such  a  construction,  GWillor  seems  to  bo  right  in  referring  it  to  tho 
BcEOtarchs;  except  that  I  would  not  confine  it,  os  ho  docs,  to  Xonarcs 
nnd  Clcobulus,  but  extend  it  to  tho  whole  number  of  thom ;  and  sup- 
pose that  it  is  cither  povemcd  by  πρηΛιαγνόι^τες,  meaning,  "tho  plan 
which  they  had  already  decided  on  fbr  themselves,  nnd  now  recommended 
to  tho  councils ;"  or  that  it  eigniflos  "their  countrymen  ;"  tho  execulivo 
being  identified  with  tho  people  at  largo,  as  it  appears  to  bo  in  see.  3. 
0/  ιίοιωτάρχαι — ναρήνονν  ytvioffat  ορκηνς  ταΐς  ηόλεσιν,  Itoai  βήνλονται 
/τ*  ώφίλίΐα  (ftftiet  ζυνημνννω.  If  tho  former  construction  is  preferred, 
eoiai  may  be  considered  as  a  "  dativns  commodi."  See  Jelf,  Or.  Gr.  6D.  8. 
•     15 


338  THUCYDIDEa  V.  [xu.XLi. 

up  the  treaty  earnestly  entered  into  the  Boeotian  negotiation ; 
they  concluded  the  alliance,  when  the  winter  was  now  closing 
and  the  spring  at  hand ;  and  Panactum  was  immediately  be- 
gun to  bo  demolished.  And  thus  ended  the  eleventh  year  of. 
this  war. 

40.  As  soon  as  the  spring  of  the  next  summer  com- 
menced, the  Argives  finding  that  the  Boeotian  embassadors, 
whom  they  said  they  would  send,  did  not  come,  and  that 
Panactum  was  being  demolished,  and  an  esi^cial  alliance  had 
been  concluded  by  the  Boeotians  with  the  Lacedaimonians, 
were  afraid  that  they  might  bo  left  alono,  and  all  the  con- 
federacy go  over  to  the  Lacedaimonians.  For  they  supposed 
that  the  13oeotians  had  been  persuaded  by  the  Lacedaimonians 
both  to  demolish  Panactum  and  to  accede  to  the  treaty  with 
the  Athenians;  and  that  the  Athenians  were  privy  to  thes«i 
measures;  so  that  they  themselves  had  no  longer  power  even 
to  make  alliance  with  the  Athenians  :  Avhereas  they  hoped  bo- 
fore,  in  consequence  of  the  existing  dissensions,  that  if  their 
treaty  with  the  Lacedaimonians  should  not  continue,  they  would, 
at  any  rate,  bo  in  alliance  with  the  Athenians.  The  Argives, 
then,  were  involved  in  these  difficulties,  and  feared  they  might 
be  engaged  in  war  at  once  with  the  Liicedajmonians,  Tegcans, 
Boeotians,  and  Athenians  :  and  consequently,  though  they  did 
not  before  aecej)t  the  treaty  with  the  Lacedaimonians,  but  en- 
tertained the  proud  hope  that  they  should  enjoy  the  supremacy 
over  th^Vdoponnese  ;  they  sent  as  envoys  to  Laceda?mon,  as 
quickly  as  they  could,  Eustrophus  and  ^on,  who  were  con- 
sidered to  be  tho  most  acceptable  persons  to  them  ;  thinking  to 
Jive  in  quiet  by  making  a  treaty  >vith  tho  Lacediemonians,  as 
they  best  could  under  present  circumstances,  whatever  might 
bo  tho  arrangement.' 

4L  On  the  arrival  of  their  embassadors,  they  made  pro- 
posals to  tho  Lacedaimonians,  as  to  tho  terms  on  which  tho 
treaty  should  bo  concluded  between  them.  And  at  first  tho 
Argives  claimed  thai  they  should  have  a  judicial  reference 
granted  them,  either  to  some  state  or  individual,  respecting 
tho  Cynurian  territory ;  concerning  which  they  have  always 
been  debating  as  it  is  border-land  :  (it  contains  the  towns  of 
Thyrea  and  Anthene,  and  is  occupied  by  tho  Lacedaimonians.) 

•  Or,  "on  whatever  terms  they  miijht  bo  allowed."  Seo  Bloomfleld'e 
note. 


xLii.J  THUCYDIDES.  V.  339 

Afterward,  when  the  Lacedicmonians  begged  them  not  to 
mention  that,  but  said  that  if  they  wished  to  make  a  treaty  as 
before,  they  were  ready  to  do  so;  the  Argive  embassadors 
nevertheless  induced  the  Lacedajmonians  to  agree  to  the  fol- 
lowing conditions  ;  that  at  the  present  time  tliey  should  mako 
a  treaty  for  fifty  years;  but  that  on  either  party  giving  a 
challenge,  at  a  time  when  there  was  neither  plague  nor  war  in 
Lnccdacmon  or  Argos,  they  should  be  at  liberty  to  decide  by 
battle  the  question  of  this  territory — as  on  a  former  occasion, 
when  each  side  claimed  the  victory  for  themselves — but  not  to 
pursue  the  fugitives  beyond  the  frontiers,  whether  toward. 
Argos  or  Lacedremon.  Now  the  Lacedaimonians  at  first  con- 
sidered this  as  mere  folly ;  but  afterward  (for  they  wero 
anxious  on  any  terms  to  have  Argos  for  a  friend),  they  agreed 
to  the  conditions  they  demanded,  and  made  a  treaty  with  them 
in  writing.  Before,  however,  any  thing  >vas  definitely  ar- 
ranged, the  Lacedoeinonians  desired  them  to  return  first  to 
Argos,  and  show  it  to  their  people ;  and  if  it  pleased  them, 
then  to  come  at  the  llyacinthia,  to  take  the  oaths.  Accord» 
ingly  they  returned. 

42.  In  the  mean  time,  >vhilo  the  Argives  were  negotiating 
these  matters,  the  Lacedaimonian  embassadors,  Andromedes, 
Phoe  limus,  and  Antimenidas,  who  wero  to  restore  Panactum 
to  the  Athenians,  and  to  receive  the  prisoners  from  the  Boeo- 
tians, and  bring  them  back  home,  found  Panactum  demolished 
by  the  Boeotians  themselves,  on  the  pretext  of  there  having 
been  exchanged  in  former  times  between  the  Athenians  and 
IkEotians,  in  consequence  of  a  dispute  about  it,  an  oath  that 
neither  party  should  inhabit  tho  place,  but  that  they  should 
graze  it  in  common.  Tho  men,  liowever,  whom  the  Boeotians 
held  as  prisoners  taken  from  tho  Athenians,  Andromedes  and 
his  colleagues  received  from  them,  and  conveyed  to  Athens,  and 
restored.  They  likewise  announced  to  them  tho  demolition  of 
Panactum,  thinking  that  so  thev  restored  that  too;*  for  no 
enemy  to  tho  Athenians  would  m  futuro  inhabit  iU  On  this 
announcement  tho  Athenians  expressed  great  indignation; 
thinking  themselves  wronged  by  tho  Laccdajmonians,  both 
with  regard  to  tho  demolition  of  Panactum,  which  they  ought 
to  havo  delivered  up  to  them  standing,  and  tho  intelligijnco  of 

*  Or,  as  Poppo  explains  it,  "that  that  very  announcement  was  equiv- 
alent to  restoring  it*' 


340  THtJOYDlDES.  V.  [χυιι,,χατ. 

their  having  on  their  own  account  made  treaty  with  the  Boeo- 
tians, though  they  formerly  declared  that  they  would  join  in 
compelling  those  who  did  not  accede  to  the  general  treaty. 
They  also  looked  for  any  other  points  in  which  they  had  de- 
parted from  their  compact,  and  considered  themselves  to  have 
been  overreached  by  them  ;  so  that  they  gave  an  angry  reply  to 
the  embassadors,  and  sent  them  away. 

43.  When  the  Laceda;monians,  then,  were  in  such  a  stato 
of  variance  with  the  Athenians,  thoso  at  Athens,  again, 
who  wished  to  do  away  with  the  treaty,  were  immediately 
urgent  against  it.  Among  others  who  were  to  was  Λ1- 
cibiades  son  of  Clinias,  a  man  Λνΐιο  in  age  was  still  at  that 
time  a  youth  (as  he  would  have  been  thought  in  any  other 
state),  but  honored  ση  account  of  the  nobility  of  his  an- 
cestors. He  considered  that  it  was  really  better  to  side  with 
the  Argives ;  though  ho  also  opposed  the  treaty  in  the  bitter- 
ness of  wounded  pride,  because  the  Lacedaemonians  had  ne- 
gotiated through  the  agency  of  Nicias  and  Laches,  having 
overlooked  him  on  aciiouiit  of  his  youth,  and  not  having  shown 
him  the  respect  suitable  to  the  old  connection  of  his  family  as 
their />roj*eni,  which,  having  been  renounced  by  his  grandfather, 
he  himself  thought  to  renew  by  showing  attention  to  the  pris- 
oners taken  in  the  island.  Considering  himself  therefore  to  bo  in 
every  way  slighted  by  then),  he  both  spoke  against  the  treaty  in 
the  iirst  instance,  saying  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were  not  to 
bo  depended  upon,  but  wera  only  making  a  treaty  in  order  that 
by  so  doing  tlioy  might  depri\e  Athens  of  the  Argivcs,  and 
again  come  against  them  when  left  alone ;  and  at  that  time, 
Λνΐιοη  this  difference  had  arisen,  he  immediately  sent  to  Argas 
on  his  own  ac(;ount,  urging  them  to  come  as  quickly  as  possible 
with  proposals  for  alliance,  in  com})any  with  the  Mantineans 
and  Eleans,  since  it  was  a  line  oj)portunity,  and  he  Avould  co- 
operate with  them  to  the  utmost. 

44.  When  the  Argives  received  this  message,  and  found 
that  the  alliance  witli  the  Boeotians  had  nut  been  brought 
about  in  concert  Avith  the  Athenians,  but  that  they  were 
involved  in  a  serious  quarrel  Avith  the  Lacedaemonians ;  they 
thought  no  more  of  their  embassadors  at  Lacedu;mon,  who 
were  just  at  that  time  gone  thither  on  the  subject  of  the  treaty, 
but  paid  more  attention  to  the  Athenians ;  thinking  that  so, 
ii'  they  went  to  war,  there  would  be  on  their  side  in  it  a  state 


XLV.,  XLVi]  TIIUCYDIDES.   T.  34I 

which  had  been  their  friend  from  of  old,  and  was  under  a  dt;- 
mocratical  form  of  jrovernmont,  like  themselvei»,  and  wielded  a 
iTTcni  power  in  the  command  of  the  sea.  Thoy  immediately 
itljercforc  sent  enibassadorrt  to  the  Athenians  to  treat  of  the 
alliance ;  and  wurc  also  accompanied  by  envoys  from  tho 
Eleans  and  Mantineans. 

There  came  likewise  with  all  speed,  as  embassadors  from 
the  Lacedemonians,  persons  who  were  thouirht  to  be  favor- 
ably inclined  toward  tho  Athenians,  namelv  Philocharidas, 
Ιαόπ,  and  Endius;  through  fear  that  in  tLeir  anger  they 
might  conclude  the  alliance  with  tho  Argives,  and  at  tho  samo 
time  to  ask  back  Pylus  in  exchange  for  Tanactum,  and  to 
])lead  in  excuse  for  the  Boeotian  alliance,  that  it  had  not  been 
made  for  tho  purpose  of  hurting  the  Athenians. 

45.  hy  speaking  in  tho  counsel  on  these  points,  and  de- 
claring that  they  had  come  with  full  ]>owers  to  effect  a  settle- 
ment of  all  their  disputes,  they  made  Alcibiadcs  afraid  that  if 
ihcy  Avcrc  to  talk  in  tho  same  strain  to  the  popular  assembly, 
they  λ\οΜ  win  over  the  multitude,  and  tho  Argive  allianco 
Avould  l>o  rejected,  lie  adopted  therefore  tho  following 
device  against  them.  He  gained  the  confidence  of  tho  Lace- 
daeiuonians  bv  giving  them  a  solemn  assurance,  that  if  they 
would  not  acknowletlge  in  tho  assembly  that  they  had  como 
with  full  j><)wcrs,  he" would  restore  Pylus  to  them  (for  ho 
would  himself  persuade  tho  Athenians  to  the  measure,  as  ho 
now  opposed  it),  and  would  settle  all  other  points  of  difference. 
It  was  with  a  wish  to  withdraw  them  from  tho  influence  of 
Nicias  that  ho  did  this;  and  in  order  that  by  accusing  them 
before  tho  people,  as  having  no  sincere  intentions,  and  never 
saying  tho  same  tiling,  lio  might  cause  tho  Argives,  Eleans, 
and  Mantineans,  to  be  taken  into  alliance.  And  so  it  turned 
out.  For  when,  on  coming  before  tho  people  and  being  asked 
that  question,  they  did  not  say,  as  tliey  had  sai<l  in  the  coun- 
cil, that  they  were  come  with  full  powers,  the  Athenians  could 
endure  it  no  longer;  but  on  Alcibiadcs*  exclaiming  against 
the  Lacedicmonian»  much  more  vehemently  than  before,  they 
l)Oth  listened  to  him,  and  were  ready  Rlraightway  to  bring  for- 
wanl  the  Argives  and  those  who  were  with  them,  and  take  them 
into  alliance.  An  earthquake,  liowever,  having  occurred  before 
any  thing  was  finally  settled,  that  assembly  was  adjourned. 

4β.  In  tho  ono  which  was  held  next  day,  although  the 


342  THUCYDIDES.  V.  (xLVi. 

Lacedffitnoniaas  had  been  outwitted,  and  ho  himself  utterly 
deceived  with  regard  to  their  confessing  not  to  have  eoino 
with  full  powers,  Nicias  nevertheless  maintained  that  they 
ought  rather  to  become  friuuils  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  anuj 
deierring  their  nieosures  with  the  Argives,  to  send  once  more 
to  them,  and  ascertain  tlieir  intentions.  He  represented 
that  it  was  to  their  own  honor,'  but  to  their  rivals*  discredit, 
for  the  war  to  be  put  off:  for  since  their  own  affairs  were  in 
so  good  a  condition,  it  was  best  to  j)reserve  their  pros])erit}f 
as  long  as  possible ;  wherciw  to  the  Lacedicmonians,  in  their' 
present  mislbrtunes,  it  would  bo  gain  to  run  all  hazards  as 
quickly  as  possible.  So  he  prevailed  on  them  to  send  embas- 
sadors, of  Λνΐιοηι  ho  Λναβ  himself  one,  to  bid  the  Lacediemo- 
nians,  if  they  had  any  just  intentions,  to  restore  Punactum 
standing,  with  Amphipolis,  and  to  give  up  their  alliance  with 
the  Boeotians,  if  they  refused  to  accede  to  the  treaty ;  as  it 
had  been  stipulated  that  th'iy  should  make  i>oace  with  nono 
but  by  mutual  consent.  They  toKl  thcui  also  to  say,  that  they 
too,  if  they  had  wished  to  act  unjustly,  might  havo  already 
taken  the  Aryivat  for  their  allies,  since  they  were  come  to 
them  for  that  very  purjxjse.  And  whatever  complaint  tliey 
had  against  them,  they  gave  instructions  on  the  subject  to 
Nicias  and  his  colleagues,  and  then  sent  them  off.  When  they 
came  there,  and,  after  delivering  their  other  messages,  finally 
declared,  that  unless  they  gave  up  their  alliance  Λvith  the  lioe- 
otians,  in  case  of  their  not  acceding  to  the  treaty,  the  Athenians 
also  would  take  as  their  allies  the  Argives  and  those  who 
joined  them ;  the  Lacedicmonians  refuse<l  to  renounce  the 
alliance  Λνΐΐΐι  the  lioiotians — the  j>arty  of  Xenares,  the  ephor, 
and  all  the  rest  who  had  the  same  views,  having  sufficient 
influence  to  secure  that — but  the  oaths  they  renewed  at  the 
reauest  of  Nicias :  for  ho  was  afraid  of  returning  with  all  his 
objects  unaccomplished,  and  of  being  exposed  to  censure  (iis 
indeed  was  the  case),  since  ho  was  considered  as  the  author  of 
the  treaty  with  the  Dxcediemonians.  On  liis  return,  when  the 
Athenians  heard  that  n(ithing  had  been  done  at  La(;ed;em()n, 
immediately  they  were  enragtid  ;    and  since  they  considered 

>  Or,  as  Arnoltl,  Poppo,  and  others  explain  it,  "advisiii)?  that  hostili- 
ties should  bo  deforrod."  For  α  very  similar  uso  of  tV  with  an  adjective, 
compare  I.  137.  6,  ίπειΛί)  Iv  τ<^  ασ^ολα  μίν  ίμοί,  ίκύνφ  ύί  Ιν  έπίκινύύνω 
πάλιν  η  αποκομιδή  iyiyvtro. 


iLvii]  TnUCTDIDEa  V.  343 

themselves  injured,  the  Arnpves  and  their  nlHes  happeninnr  to 
Imj  present  (having  lyecn  introduced  by  Alcibiades),  tliey  niado 
a  treaty  and  alliance  with  them  on  the  following  terms : 

47.  "The  Athenians,  Arrives,  Mantineans,  and  Eleans 
made  a  treaty  for  a  hundred  years,  on  behalf  of  themselves 
and  the  allies  in  their  respective  dominions,  to  bo  observed 
Avithout  guile  or  injury,  both  by  land  and  by  sea.  That  it 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  take  up  arms  Λvith  a  mischievous  de- 
sign, either  for  the  Argives,  Eleans,  nnd  Mantineans,  with 
their  allies,  against  the  Athenians,  or  for  the  Athenians  and 
their  allies  against  the  Argives,  Eleans,  and  Mantineans,  with 
their  allies,  by  any  means  whatever. 

"That  the  following  are  the  terms  on  wliicli  the  Athenians, 
Argives,  Eleans,  and  Mantineans  shall  bo  allies  for  α  hundred 
years. 

"  That  in  case  of  an  enemy  marclnng  ajOfninst  the  territory 
of  the  Athenians,  the  Argives,  El(>ans,  and  Mantineans  shail 
go  to  the  succor  of  Athens,  a<'cording  to  whatever  message 
the  Athenians  may  send  them,  in  such  manner  as  they  can 
most  efTectually,  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  That  in  easo 
of  their  having  ravaged  it  and  departed,  that  state  siiall  bo 
considered  as  an  enemy  to  the  Argives,  Mantineans,  and 
Eleans,  and  shall  be  exposed  to  the  vengeance  of  all  these 
stites;  and  that  no  one  of  them  snail  be  at  liberty  to  termin- 
ate liostilities  with  that  state,  unless  they  all  think  fit  to  do  so. 
That  tlic  Athenians  likewise  shall  go  to  the  succor  of  Argos, 
Aiantinea,  and  Elis,  in  ca^^e  of  an  enemy  marching  against 
the  Elean,  Mantinean,  or  Argive  territory,  according  to  what- 
ever message  these  states  may  send,  in  such  manner  as  they  can 
most  effectually,  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  That  in  case  of 
their  having  ravaged  it  and  departed,  tlmt  state  shall  bo  con- 
sidered as  an  enemy  to  the  Athenians,  Eleans,  Mantineans, 
and  Argives,  and  shall  be  exposed  to  the  vengeance  of  all  of 
them ;  and  that  it  shall  not  Ικ)  lawful  to  terminate  hostilities 
with  that  state,  unless  all  the  states  think  fit  to  do  so. 

"That  they  shall  not  allow  armed  troops  to  pass  for. hostile 
piirposcs  through  their  own  land,  or  that  of  the  allies  in  their 
respective  dominions,  nor  by  sea,  unless  all  the  states,  the 
Athenian»,  Argives,  Mantineans,  and  Eleans,  have  decreed 
that  their  passage  be  allowed. 

"That  to  tlio  troops  going  as  succors  the  state  which 


344  THUCYDIDES.  V.  [xLVix. 

eends  tliem  shall  furnish  provisions  for  thirty  days  after  their 
nriival  in  the  st^ito  which  sent  tl^ni  word  to  suocor  it,  and 
oa  their  return  in  the  same  way :  but  that  in  case  of  their 
wishing  to  avail  themselves  of  their  service  for  a  longer  time, 
the  state  which  sent  for  them  shall  supply  them  with  provisions 
at  the  rate  of  three  -^giuetan  oboli  a  day  for  a  heavy-anned 
soldier,  a  light-armed,  or  a  bowman,  and  of  an  .^nnetiin 
drachma  for  a  horseman. 

"That  the  state  which  sent  for  them  shall  have  the  com- 
mand, while  the  war  is  in  its  own  territory ;  but  that  in  case 
of  the  states  resolving  to  make  a  joint  expedition  in  any 
quarter,  an  equal  share  of  the  command  shall  be  enjoyed  by 
all  the  states. 

"That  the  treaty  shall  be  sworn  to,  by  the  Athenians  on  be- 
lialf  both  of  themselves  an<l  their  allies,  but  on  the  part  of  the 
Argives,  Mantineai\3,  Eleans,  and  their  allies,  by  each  siveral 
state.  That  they  shall  swear  that  oath  resjx'ctively  Avhich  is  the 
most  binding  in  their  country,  over  full-grown  victims ,  and  the 
oath  shall  be  to  this  ellect ;  '  I  will  standi  by  this  alliance  ac- 
cording to  the  stipulations,  honestly,  without  injury,  and  with- 
out guile,  and  will  not  violate  it  by  any  method  or  means 
whatever.'  That  the  persons  to  take  the  oath  shall  be,  at 
Athens,  the  council  and  the  home  magistrates,  the  j)rytane8 
iKlministering  it;  at  Argos,  the  council,*  the  eighty,  and  the 
eWy/iflP,  the  eighty  ailministering  it;  at  Mantinea,  the  de7ni- 
nr(/i,  the  council,  and  the  other  magistrates,  the  tfi(ori  and 
the  [kolcmarchs  administering  it;  at  Elis,  the  dcmiuriji^  the 
magistrates,  and  the  six  hundred,  the  dciniur<ii  and  thesmo- 
j)hulaccH  aduiinistering  it.  That  the  oaths  shall  be  renewed, 
by  the  Athenians,  on  going  to  Elis,  Mantinea,  and  Argos, 
thirty  days  before  the  ()lynq)ic  festival  ;  by  the  Argives, 
Eleans,  and  Mantineans,  on  going  to  Athens,  ten  days  before 
the  great  ]*anathenai<;  festival. 

"  That  the  stipulations  respecting  the  treaty,  the  oaths,  and 
the  alliance,  shall  be  inscribe»!  on  a  stone  pillar,  by  the  Athe- 
nians, in  the  citadi'l ;  by  the  Argives  in  the  market-place,  in 
the  temple  of  Apollo;  i»y  the  Mantineans,  in  the  temple  of 
Jupiter  in  tlie  niarket-pla(  <• :  and  that  a  brazen  j)illar  shall  be 
erected  at  their  joint  expense  at  01ynq)ia,  at  the  present  fesli- 

'  For  what  littlo  is  known  of  the  several  offices  hero  mentioned,  see 
Arnold's  nolo,  and  the  authorities  quoted  in  it. 


XLviir,  xLix.]  TnUCYDIDES.  V.  345 

val.  That  should  tlioso  states  think  it  better  to  make  any 
addition  to  the  ftrticlcs  ag^-ecd  on,  whatever  seems  fit  to  all  tho 
states,  on  holding  common  deliberation,  that  shall  be  binding." 

48.  In  this  way  were  tho  treaty  and  alliances  concluded; 
and  yet  that  between  tho  Laced aimonians  and  Athenians  was 
not  renounced  on  this  account  by  either  party,  l^ut  though 
tho  Corinthians  were  allies  of  tho  Argives,  they  did  not  ao 
c:odo  to  tho  new  treaty.  Nay,  before  this  time,  when  an  al- 
lianco  >vas  formed  between  tho  Eleans,  Argives,  imd  Mantir 
neans,  to  bo  at  war  and  peace  with  tho  samo  states,  they  did 
not  join  tho  league,  but  said  that  they  were  content  with  tho 
first  alliance  which  had  been  made  for  purposes  of  defense,  on 
condition  of  succoring  one  another,  but  not  joining  to  attack 
any  party.  The  Corinthians,  then,  thus  stood  aloof  from  their 
allies,  and  turned  their  thoughts  again  toward  tho  Lacedaimo- 
niuns. 

49.  Tho  Olympic  festival  was  lield  this  summer,  that  at 
which  Androsthenes  tho  Arcadian  was  victor  the  first  timo  in 
the  pancratium. '  The  Lacedaimonians  were  excluded  from  tho 
temple  by  the  Eleans,  so  that  they  could  neither  sacrifice  nor 
enter  tho  lists,  as  refusing  to  pay  tho  fine  to  Λvhich  the 
Eleans,  by  virtue  of  the  Olympian  law,  liad  condemned  them, 
alleging  that  they  had  attacked  tho  fortress  of  Phyrcus, 
and  sent  a  body  of  their  heavy-armed  into  Lepreum  during 
the  Olympic  truce.  The  fine  imi>osed  Mpon  them  Avas  two 
thousand  mina»,  being  two  for  each  heavy-armed  soldier,  as 
tho  law  ordains.  Ihit  the  Lacedaimonians  sent  embassadors, 
and  pleaded  that  it  had  not  been  fairly  imposed  upon  them ; 
«leclaring  that  tho  truce  liad  not  yet  been  proclaimed  at  La- 
eedajmon,  when  they  sent  their  troops  into  Lepreum.  Tho 
Eleans,  however,  maintained  that  tho  cessation  of  arms  in 
their  country  liad  already  commenced  (for  they  proclaim  it 
among  themselves  first),  and  that  whilo  they  wero  living  in 
quiet,  and  not  expecting  any  thing,  as  it  was  a  time  of  truce, 
the  Lacedajmonians  had  committed  an  injury  upon  them  by 
surprise.  Tho  Lacedaimonians  replied  that  there  was  no  need 
of  tho  Eleans  hanng  still  proclaimed  the  truce  at  Lacedcemon, 
if  they  had  thought  them  already  guilty  of  injustice  ;  but  they 
had  dono  so,  as  not  thinking  it ;  and  they  themselves  had  no 
longer  gone  any  where  to  attack  them.    The  Eleans,  howerer, 

'  Consisting  of  wrestling  ttnd  boxing. 

n* 


34ϋ  TUUCYDIDES.   V.  [l.,u. 

udhered  to  tho  samo  statement,  namely,  that  they  could  never 
be  persuaded  that  they  were  not  guilty  ;  but  that  if  they  would 
restore  Leprcum  to  them,  they  were  really  to  give  up  their 
own  share  of  tlio  money,  and  would  thcma-lvee  pay  for  them 
that  which  fell  to  tho  gckl. 

50.  When  they  did  not  coniply,  they  rfijuirud  them  a^'ain 
to  do  as  follows :  not  to  give  baik  Lopreuin,  if  they  objected 
to  it,  but  to  mount  on  tho  altar  of  the  Olympian  Jupiter — since 
they  were  so  anxious  to  have  access  to  the  temple — and  swear 
before  tho  Greeks  that  assuredly  they  would  discharge  the 
lino  at  a  future  period.  But  when  they  would  not  do  thi* 
either,  tho  Lacedicmonians  were  excluded  from  the  temj)le — 
from  the  saiiritice  and  from  the  games — and  n»ade  their  otlr- 
iugs  at  home;  while  the  rest  of  the  (i reeks,  except  the  Ia- 
preaus,  sent  their  deputations  to  the  festival.  However,  the 
Eleans  >vere  afraid  of  their  sacriticing  by  force,  and  kept  guard 
with  α  heavy -armed  couipany  of  their  yt)ung  men  ;  while  there 
also  came  to  them  a  iKxIy  of  Argives  and  Mantineans,  each  a 
thousand  strong,  and  some  Athenian  cavalry,  that  were  at 
Argos,  waiting  for  the  festival.  And  a  great  alarm  was  pro- 
duced in  the  assembly  lest  the  Laceda'monians  should  come  in 
arms;  especially  after  Liclias  son  of  Arcesilaus,  a  L•u'e^laί- 
Uioniau,  >vas  scourged  on  the  course  by  the  lictors,*  because, 
on  his  horses  being  the  winners,  and  the  liceotian  jieople  being 
proclaimed  victor,  on  account  of  his  having  no  right  to  enter 
the  lists,  he  came  forward  on  to  the  course,  and  crowned  the 
charioteer,  from  a  wish  to  sliow  that  the  chariot  was  his.  All 
therefore  were  now  nmch  more  afraid,  and  thought  there 
would  bo  some  disturbance.  However,  the  Lacedaiuionians 
kept  quiet,  and  let  the  feast  thus  pass  by.  After  the  Olym- 
pic festival,  the  Argives  and  their  allies  repaired  to  Corinth, 
to  beg  that  state  to  come  over  to  them.  Some  Lacedaemonian 
embassadoi-s,  too,  haj)pened  to  be  there ;  and  after  there  had 
been  much  discussion,  nothing  was  accomplished  at  last ;  but 
an  earthquake  liaving  occurred,  they  dispersed  to  their  several 
homes.     And  so  the  summer  ended. 

51.  The  following  winter  the  Ileracleans  in  Trachinia  fought 
a  battle  with  the  -^]nianians,  Dolopians,  Maleans,  and  some  of 
the  Thessalians.  For  these  nations  Avere  bordering  on,  and 
liostilo  to,  their  city;  as  it  was  against  no  other  country  but 

'  Or,  "  hy  tho  umpires,"  as  Brcdow,  llaack-  and  others  thiDk. 


Lir.,Liii.J  TnUOYDIDES.  V.  347 

theirs  that  the  pJace  was  fortified,  Acconlinijly  they  oppo.seil 
the  city  on  ite  first  settlement,  hy  annoying  it  as  far  as  they 
could  ;  and  at  this  time  they  defeated  the  lleracleans  in  the  en- 
gagement, Xenaroi»,  son  of  Cnidis,  a  Lkioedajmouian,  being  slain, 
and  others  of  the  lleracleans  also  cut  ofl^  And  thus  tho 
winter  ended,  and  the  twelfth  year  of  tho  war. 

62.  At  tho  very  commencement  of  the  follo>ving  summer, 
tho  liocotians  sc^-izod  on  lloraclen,  when .  it  was  miserably  re- 
duced after  tho  battle,  and  sent  away  llegesippidas  tho  Lace- 
dicmonian,  on  tho  charge  of  governing  it  ill.  They  occupied 
the  j)la(ic  through  fear  that,  while  tho  Laced  ncm  on  inns  wero 
distracted  with  tho  affairs  of  tho  Peloponnese,  the  Athenians 
iniglit  take  it.  The  LacedrRmonians,  liowever,  wero  offended 
with  them  for  what  they  liad  done.  Tho  same  eumnier,  Al- 
cibiades  son  of  Clinias,  being  one  of  tho  generals  at  Athens, 
having  tho  co-ojieration  of  tho  Argives  and  tho  allies,  went 
into  tho  Peloponnese  with  a  few  Athenian  hcavy-ainicd  and 
bowmen;  and  taking  with  him  some  of  tho  allies  in  those  parts, 
l)oth  proceeded  to  settle  in  concert  with  them  other  matters 
connected  with  tho  alliance,  marching  about  the  IVloponneso 
with  his  troops,  and  persuaded  the  Patreans  to  carry  their 
walls  down  to  the  sea ;  intending  also  himself  to  build  a  fort 
bosido  tho  Achaean  Rhium.  l?ut  the  Corinthians  and  Sicy- 
onians,  and  all  to  >vhose  injury  it  would  have  been  built,  caino 
against  him,  and  prevented  Ids  doing  it 

53.  Tlie  same  sunimer  a  war  broke  out  between  the  Epi• 
daurians  and  Argivcs ;  nominally,  about  the  offering  to  Apollo 
Pytliacus,  which  tho  Epidaurians  were  bound  to  make,  but 
did  not,  for  certain  lands  by  the  river  side  ; '  (tho  Argivcs  had 
the  chief  management  of  the  temple  ;)  but  even  independently 
of  this  charge,  Alcibiades  and  the  Argivcs  thought  it  desirable 
to  get  possession  of  Epidaurus,  if  they  could ;  both  to  insure 
the  neutrality  of  Corinth,  and  thinking  that  the  Athenians 
would  find  it  α  shorter  .passage  for  their  succors  through 
.^Egina,  than  by  sailing  round  Scyllaeum.  Tho  Argivcs  there• 
foro  prepared  to  invade  Epidaurus  by  themselves,  in  order  to 
exact  tho  offering. 

*  I  have  adopted  Poppo's  reading,  παραηοτημίων,  as  Arnold  himself 
ponfcesos  that  the  common  one,  βοταμίων,  Is  perfectly  inexplicable.  Of 
Bloomfleld'g  conjecture,  βοτανύμων,  '•  pastures,"  Poppo  says,  **  reAitatlone 
non  indigot/' 

# 


848  TIIUOYDIDES.  V.  [ur. 

54.  Ttio  LacedsemoniaQR,  too,  at  tho  eanio  timo  marched 
out  with  all  their  forces  to  Leuctra,  oa  their  own  borders,  op- 
l)osite  Mount  Lycaeuin,  under  tho  coinmand  of  Agis  son  of 
Archidamus,  their  king ;  but  no  one  knew  what  was  their 
destination,  not  even  tho  cities*  from  which  contingents  were 
sent.  When,  however,  tho  omens  from  their  sacrifices  wero 
not  favorable  for  crossing  tho  border,  they  both  returned 
liome  themselves,  and  sent  Wiird  to  their  allies  to  prepare 
to  take  tho  field  after  tho  ensuing  month ;  (that  being  tho 
month  Carneiis,  a  holy  period  among  tho  Dorians).  On  their 
retiring,  tho  Argives  marched  out  υη  the  2Cth  of  tho  month 
preceding  Carneus;"  and  advancing  that  day  tho  whole  of  tho 
time,  invaded  tho  Epidaurian  territory,  and  proceeded  to  lay  it 

•  Buker  and  Poppo  suppose  tho  cities  of  D^conia  to  bo  hero  intended. 

*  I  havo  followed  Arnold's  former  interpretation  of  this  very  doubtful 
passage,  as  appearing  less  objectionable,  on  tho  whole,  than  any  other 
that  has  been  proposed ;  though  ho  himself  abandons  it  in  his  last  edi- 
tion. Goller  and  Bloorafield  put  tho  comma  after  ταίτην,  and  read 
ίσίίαλλον  ;  but  to  this  thero  is  what  appears  to  mo  an  insuperable  objec- 
tion. Often  iis  tho  verb  ίσΟά/.7.ο  occurs  in  Thucydidcs,  it  is  never  used, 
when  speaking  of  a  country^  to  signify  a  coutinuanco  of  oflensivo  meas- 
ures ;  but  always  expresses  tho  ono  deliniio  act  of  crossing  an  enemy's 
borders  and  invading  his  territory ;  and  tho  easo  is  tho  samo  with  regard 
to  tho  cognato  substantive  icW/.ij.  The  imperfict  tenso  therefore,  though 
quite  appropriiito  for  expressing  tho  ravages  which  troops  continued  to 
raako  when  onco  in  tho  country,  is  inappropriato  with  reference  to  tho 
invasion  itself;  and  could  only  bo  used  with  ττάίτα  τον  χμύί'ον  on  tho 
supposition  of  tho  army  retreating  within  its  own  frontier  continuall}', 
and  invading  tho  country  afresh ;  whicli  is  not  only  improbable  in  this 
particular  instance,  but  in  direct  opi)Ositiou  to  tho  first  sentence  of  tho 
next  chapter:  "  καί  καθ'  iv  χι>'η'υν  ίν  Τ/}  Έτ<(5αι'/ίω  ο/  Άργεϊοι  jjfiar." 
Accordingly,  in  tho  very  next  chapter,  sec!  2,  wo  havo  tho  aorist  iatCaXov 
followed  by  tho  imperfect  toijuvv;  and  as  all  tlie  MS3.  but  two  have  the 
eamo  reading  hero,  thero  can  bo  no  doubt,  I  think,  of  its  being  tho  gen- 
uine one,  Poppo  objects  to  iJiiller's  explanation,  but  does  not  propose 
any  thing  himself.  Bp.  Thirhvull  adopts  tliut  of  Portus,  Acacius,  and 
Hoffmann;  " although  they  havo  always  kept  that  day  holy."  To  this 
Arnold  objects;  "  but  can  Thucydides  have  written  και  uyovrer^s  signi- 
fying καί:τε()  άγονης  V^  I  certainly  do  not  seo  why  ho  could  not,  sinco 
h(j  aopears  to  havo  used  a  similar  construction  elsewhere;  seo  VI.  IG.  0, 
/•  ου  και  πεμίγενόμπΌΐ  τίι  μΊχτ]  ονύί:τω  και  νι'ν  ιΊε,ίαίως  UapaovJi  ;  if  not 
also  15.  4.  But  it  is  pcrliaps  a  moro  solid  objection,  that  ho  novor  uses 
cither  uytiv  with  iiuipav  in  that  sense  (though  ho  does  with  ίημτήν);  nur 
1TUVTU  Τον  χι»ήι•υν  to  signify  **tho  whole  course  of  time,"  as  distinguished 
from  ''tho  wholo  of  the  time,"  i.  e.,  of  somo  deflnito  period;  but  cither 
(hi  or  t)ui  παντός.  Nor,  again,  does  tho  statement  thus  supijosed  to  bo 
mado  respecting  tho  holy  day  rest  on  any  thing  but  aasumptioii. 


LV.,  Lvi.]  THUCYDIDES.    V.  349 

w  astc.  The  Epidaurians  invoked  the  aid  of  their  allies ;  hut  sorao 
of  them  pleaded  the  month  as  an  excuse,  wliile  others,  even  after 
coniinij  to  the  borders  of  Enidaurus,  reniained  inactive. 

55.  At  the  time  that  llic  Ari^ives  were  in  Epidaurus,  de- 
putations from  the  stales  assembled  at  Aiantinea,  on  the  in- 
vitation of  the  Athenians.  And  when  the  conference  bc^an, 
the  Corinthians  said  that  tlieir  words  did  not  agree  with  their 
deeds ;  since  they  were  sitting  in  council  on  the  subject  of 
peace,  while  the  Epidaurians  with  their  allies  and  the  Argives 
Λ\χτο  arrayed  against  each  other  under  arms.  Deputies  there- 
fore from  each  party  ought  first  to  go  and  separate  the  armies, 
and  then  come  and  speak  again  on  the  subject  of  peace.  In 
compliance  with  this  sentiment,  they  went  and  brought  back 
the  Argives  out  of  the  Ejadaurian  territory.  They  then  as- 
sembled again,  but  could  not  even  then  come  to  any  agree- 
ment ;  but  the  Argives  again  invaded  Epidaurus,  and  laid  it 
Avaste.  The  Lacedicmonians,  too,  marched  out  to  Carj-a? ; 
and  returned  iigain,  when  the  omens  on  that  occasion  also 
proved  unfavorable  to  them.  The  Argives,  after  ravaging 
about  a  third  of  tho  Epidaurian  territory,  returned  home. 
Moreover,  a  thousand  heavy-armed  of  the  Atlienians  had  como 
to  their  assistance,  with  Alcibiades  as  general ;  but  on  learning 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  ha  I  ended  their  expedition,  and  that 
there  was  no  longer  any  need  for  them,  they  returned  homo. 
And  so  tho  sunmier  passed  by. 

50.  The  following  winter,  the  Lacedaimonians  eluded  tho 
vigilance  of  tho  Atlienians  in  sending  by  sea  to  Epidaurus 
three  hundred  garrison  troops,  under  command  of  Agesippidns, 
The  Argives  therefore  >vent  to  tho  Athenians,  and  complained, 
that  though  it  had  been  specified  in  tho  treaty  that  they 
should  not  .allow  an  enemy  to  pass  through  their  respective 
countries,  they  had  allowed  them  to  go  there  by  sea ;  and 
therefore  they  should  consider  themselves  aggrieved,  if  tho 
Athenians,  on  their  side,  did  not  take  tho  Mcssenians  and  He• 
lots  toPylus,  to  annoy  tho  Lacedaemonians.  So  tho  Athenians, 
at  tho  instigation  of  Alcibiades,  inscribed  at  tho  bottom  oif 
tho  Laconian  pillar,  that  tho  Lacedaimonians  bad  not  adhered 
to  their  oaths;  and  they  conveyed  tho  Helots  who  were  at 
Cranii  to  Pylus,  to  plunder  tho  country ;  though  in  other  re- 
spects they  remained  quiet.  Now  in  the  course  of  hostilities 
during  this  winter  between  the  Argives  and  Epidaurians,  no 


360  THUCYDIDES.  V.  [tTlL.LViii. 

pit€hed  battle  was  fought,  but  there  wore  only  ambuecades 
and  skirmishes,  in  which  some  were  slain  on  each  side,  as 
might  happen.  When  the>vinter  was  closing,  and  spring  was 
now  at  hand,  the  Argives  went  with  scaling  ladders  to  Epi- 
duurus,  8Ui)posing  that  it  would  bo  left  Unguarded  on  account 
of  the  war,  and  intending  to  take  it  by  stonu ;  but  returned 
unsuccessful.  And  thus  the  winter  ended,  and  the  thirteenlh 
year  of  this  war. 

67,  In  the  miildlc  of  the  next  summer,  when  the  Laceda?* 
monians  saw  that  the  Epidauriaus,  who  were  their  allies, 
wtiro  in  distress,  and  that  the  other  states  in  the  Peloponnewj 
had  either  separated  from  them,  or  Λvere  unfavorably  dis|)08cd 
toward  them ;  thinking  that  if  they  did  not  quickly  prevent 
it,  they  would  proceed  to  a  greater  degree  of  disatlection, 
they  marched  Avitli  all  their  forces,  themselves  and  the  II*- 
lots,  against  Argos,  under  the  command  of  Agis  son  of  Archi- 
danms,  king  of  the  Lacedicmonians.  They  Avere  accompa- 
nied by  the  Tegeans,  and  as  niany  others  of  the  Arcadians 
: IS  were  in  alliance  with  them.  The  allies  in  the  rest  of  the 
Peloponneso  also,  and  those  beyond  it,  mustered  at  l^hlius ; 
the  Boeotians  witli  five  thousand  heavy-armed,  the  same  num- 
ItC'T  of  light-armed,  five  hundred  cavalry,  and  an  equal  number 
of  hamippi ;  *  the  Corinthians  with  two  thousand  heavy- 
armed  ;  the  rest  as  might  severally  happen  ;  but  the  I'hliasians 
in  full  force,  as  the  army  was  j)osted  in  their  country. 

68.  Now  the  Argives  had  from  the  first  been  aware  of  tho 
])reparations  of  the  Lacedicmonians ;  and  when  they  were  on 
their  march  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  rest  at  Pldius,  then 
they  also  took  the  field.  They  were  reinforced  by  the  Man- 
tineans  with  their  allies,  and  by  three  thousand  heavy-iunied 
of  the  Eleans.  And  as  they  advanced,  they  met  the  Laceila;- 
monians  at  Methydrium  in  Areatiia,  and  each  army  occupied 
a  hill.  The  Argives  then  j)rej)ared  to  engage  the  Lacedaimo- 
nians,  cut  off  as  they  were  by  themselves  :  but  Agis  broke  up 
in  the  night,  and  eluding  them,  proceeded  to  the  rest  of  the 
allies  at  Phlius.  The  Argives,  on  finding  this,  marched,  as 
Foon  as  it  was  morning,  to  Argos  first,  and  then  to  where  they 
ex{>ected  the  Lacedaimonians  with  their  allies  would  descend 
into  their  country,  namely,  the  road  running  by  Nemea.     Agis, 

*  t.  i.,  li^ζht  infantry  who  accompanied  the  cavalry  into  action.  Soo 
Poppo'a  note. 


Lix.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  V.  351 

however,  did  not  tnko  that  road,  ns  they  expected  him  to  do ; 
hut  having  given  orders  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  Arca- 
dians, and  Epidaurians,  ho  advanced  by  another  and  more 
difficult  route,  and  so  canio  down  into  the  plain  (»f  Argos, 
Tlio  Corinthiatis,  Pcllcnians,  and  Phliasians  marched  by  an- 
other steep  rua<l ;  while  the  l>a»otians,  Megarcans,  and  Sicyo- 
niane  liad  been  ordered  to  descend  by  that  leading  to  Nemea, 
where  the  Argivcs  were  posted,  in  order  that,  if  the  Argivcs 
should  advance  into  the  plain  against  his  own  division,  they 
might  hang  on  their  rear,  and  use  their  cavalry  with  effect, 
lie  then,  having  made  these  arrangements  and  entered  tho 
plain,  proceeded  to  ravage  Saminthus  rnd  other  ])laces. 

59.  Tho  Argives,  liaving  discovered  it,  advanced  from  Ne- 
mea, when  it  was  now  day,  to  their  succor;  and  falling  in 
with  the  forces  of  the  Phliasians  and  Corintldans,  killed  a 
few  of  tho  fi)rmer,  but  themselves  liad  rather  more  killed  by 
the  latter.  And  now  tho  l^oiotians,  Megarcans,  and  Sicyo- 
nians  advanced,  as  they  ha<l  been  ordered,  toward  Nemea, 
and  found  the  Argives  no  longer  there ;  ])ut  tliey  liad  gone 
down,  on  seeing  their  pro|x»rty  ravaged,  and  were  forming  for 
battle ;  while  tlio  Laced.Tinonians  also  were  preparing  to  meet 
them.  Now  tho  Argives  were  intercepted  in  tho  midst  of 
their  enemies ;  for  on  the  side  of  the  plam  the  Lacedaimonians 
and  those  with  them  exclude<l  them  from  their  city;  above 
them  were  the  Corinthians,  Phliasians,  and  Pcllcnians ;  and 
in  the  direction  of  Nemea  the  Boeotians,  Sicyonians,  and  Me- 
garcans. They  liad  no  cavalry  with  them  ;'  for  the  Athenians 
alone  of  all  the  allies  had  not  yet  joined  them.  Now  the 
mass  of  the  Argives  and  their  allies  did  not  consider  their 
present  position  so  formidable;  but  fancied  that  tho  battle 
would  1)0  fought  on  favorable  terms,  and  that  they  had  inter- 
cepted the  Lacedaimonians  in  their  own  country,  and  close  by 
their  city.  Put  two  individuals  of  the  Argivcs,  Thrasyllus, 
one  of  the  five  generals,  and  Alciphron,  the  proxcnus  of  tho 
Lacedaimonians,  when  the  armies  were  now  on  tho  very  point 
of  engaging,  Λvent  to  Agis,  and  in  a  conference  urged  him  not 
to  bring  on  a  battle ;  since  the  Argives  were  prepared  to  givo 
and  accept  fair  and  equal  arbitration  for  whatever  complaints 
tho  Lacedaemonians  had  against  them,  and  to  make  α  treaty 
and  live  in  |)cace  for  tho  future. 

>  Implying,  of  courso,  that  tlio  Athenians  were  tho  only  people  Among 
tlio  confedoratoa  who  had  any  dUvalry. 


352  THUCYDIDEa  V.  [lx^lxl 

CO.  Thoee  of  tho  Argives  who  mado  theso  statements  did  eo 
on  their  own  authority,  and  not  by  order  of  the  people  ;  and 
Agis  on  his  own  discretion  received  their  proposals  ;  and  with- 
out consulting,  any  nioro  than  they  had,  with  tho  majority, 
but  only  communicatiug  thein  to  one  of  tho  officers  who  joined 
tho  expedition,  granted  a  truce  for  four  months,  during  wXuck 
they  were  to  fuliill  their  agreement.  And  so  ho  immediately 
led  back  tho  army,  Avithout  explaining  tho  matter  to  any  of 
tho  other  confederates.  Tho  Laced aimonians  and  allies  fol- 
lowed, indeed,  as  ho  led  them,  out  of  resjK'ct  for  tho  law  ;  but 
among  each  other  they  blamed  him  exceedingly,  considering 
that  when  they  had  had  an  opportunity  of  fighting  on  favor- 
able terms,  and  their  enemies  were  hemmed  in  on  all  sides, 
both  by  infantry  and  cavalry,  they  were  returning  Avithout 
having  achievcil  any  thing  Avorthy  of  their  preparations.  For 
indeed  this  was  the  finest  Grecian  army  that  had  ever  been 
brought  together  up  to  that  time  ;  and  it  appeared  suoh  espec- 
ially while  it  was  still  all  united  at  Nemea,  consisting  of  tho 
Lacediemonians  in  full  force,  tho  Arcadians,  Boeotians,  Co- 
rinthians, Sicyuiiian^  IVllein'ans,  Pliliasians,  and  Megareans; 
and  those,  tuo,  all  jiieked  men  from  their  respective  popula- 
tions, and  thinking  themstilvi  s  a  match,  not  only  for  the  Anrivo 
confederacy,  but  even  for  another  such  added  to  it.  llius 
then  the  army,  finding  ^rcat  fault  with  Agis,  withdrew,  and 
dispersed  to  their  several  homes,  liut  tho  Argives,  on  their 
Fide,  blamed  far  more  severely  still  those  who  had  concluded 
the  truce  without  couNulling  tho  people ;  as  they  too  thought 
that  tho  LacediiMnonians  had  escaped  when  they  never  could 
have  had  a  finer  oj)portunity  of  destroying  them ;  since  tho 
contest  would  have  been  deciiled  near  their  own  city,  and  in 
concert  with  many  bravo  allies.  On  their  return  therefore 
they  began  to  stono  Thrasyllus  in  tho  bed  of  the  Charadrus, 
where  they  try  all  causes  that  niay  arise  from  any  expedition, 
before  they  enter  the  city,  lie  escaped  by  flying  lor  refuge  to 
tho  altar;  his  ])roperty,  however,  Avas  confiscated  by  them. 

Gl.  After  this,  when  tho  Athenian  succors  arrived,  con- 
sisting of  a  thousand  heavy -armed  and  three  hundred  cavalry, 
commanded  by  Laches  and  Nicostratus,  tho  Argives  being 
loath,  notwithstanding  their  arrival,  to  break  the  truco  Avith 
tho  Lacedaemonians,  coimnanded  them  to  go  back,  thoufjh 
they  wished   to   make    a   communication    to  them,   and   did 


Lxn.,Lxni.]  TnUCTDIDKS.    V.  353. 

not  grant  them  a  public  amlicnco,  until  the  Mantineans  and 
Eloans  (for  they  were  Rtill  there),  by  tlieir  entreaties,  con- 
Ptrained  them  to  do  so.  The  Athenians  then — Alcibiadcs  beirijc^ 
])resent  as  embassador — spoke  before  tlio  Arijives  and  their 
allies  to  this  ellect ;  that  it  was  not  right  for  the  truce'  even 
to  have  been  made,  without  the  consent  of  the  other  allies  ;  and 
that  now,  since  their  force  lia<l  come  so  seasonably,  they  oupht 
to  proceed  to  liostilities.  And  having  persuiwfed  tlio  allies 
by  their  arguments,  they  immediately  marched  against  Orcho- 
nlenus,  all  but  the  Argives,  ΛνΙιο,  though  persuaded  to  the 
measure,  still  staid  behind  at  first;  afterward,  however,  they 
also  v,cim  Thus  they  all  sat  down  before  Orchomenus,  and 
besieged  it,  and  made  assaults  upon  it;  being  for  other  reasi.ns 
desirous  to  get  possession  of  it,  and  esj>eci/dly  as  some  hostages 
from  Arcadia  were  deposited  there  by  the  Laced icmonians. 
The  Orchomenians,  alarmed  at  the  weakness  of  their  wall  and 
the  number  of  tlic  hostile  forces,  and  fearing,  since  no  succors 
had  arrived,  that  they  might  ])erish  before  they  did,  surrendered 
on  condition  of  joining  the  confederacy,  giving  hostages  of  their 
own  to  the  Mantineans,  and  delivering  up  those  whom  the  La- 
cedaemonians had  deposited  with  them. 

G2.  After  this,  when  the  allies  Avero  now  in  possession  of 
Orchomenus,  they  consulted  to  which  of  the  remaining  places 
they  should  proceed  first.  The  Eleans  urged  them  to  go 
against  Lepreum,  the  Mantineans  against  Tegca;  and  the 
Argives  and  Athenians  sided  Λτith  the  Mantineans.  The 
Eleans,  being  angry  at  their  not  determining  to  march  against 
Lepreum,  returned  liome  ;  >vhile  the  rest  of  the  allies  mailo 
preparations  at  Mantinea  for  proceeding  against  Tegea ;  and  a 
party  of  the  Tegeans  themselves  in  the  town  Averc«ready  to  give 
up  the  government  to  them. 

03.  As  for  the  Laceda>moniiins,  when  they  had  returned 
from  Argos  after  concluding  the  four  months*  truce,  they 
blamed  Agis  exceedingly  for  not  having  brought  Argos  into 
subjection  to  them,  when  there  was  so  fine  an  opportunity  as 
they  thought  had  never  before  presented  itself;  for  it  Avas  no 
easy  thing  to  find  so  many  and  such  allies  collected  together. 

•  και  Ytvotvro.]  Arnold  and  Ρόρρο  ogroo  with  Bauer  in  thinking  that 
καΐ  ought  to  liavo  been  put  before  ai  σπην^αί ;  but  may  it  not  bo  in- 
tended to  qualify  γήοιντο  alone,  as  I  have  taken  it?  in  which  case  it 
•tands  Just  ae  it  ouglit. 


354  IHUCYDIDEa  V.  [LXiy.,Lxv. 

But  when  tidings  also  camo  of  the  capture  of  Orchomenus,  they 
were  far  more  enraged,  aud  under  the  influence  of  anger  resolved 
immediately  (contrary  to  their  general  habit)  that  they  ought 
to  demolish  his  house,  and  fine  him  ten  thousand  drachmas. 
But  he  besought  them  to  do  none  of  these  thing ;  for  he  would 
atone  for  his  faults  by  good  service  when  he  next  took  the 
field,  or  they  might  then  do  to  liim  whatever  they  pleased. 
Accordingly,  they  abstained  from  the  fine  and  the  demolition 
of  his  house,  but  passed  a  law  at  that  time  which  had  never 
before  existed  among  them ;  for  they  chose  ten  Spartans  to 
act  as  counselors  with  him,  without  whose  consent  ^  should 
have  no  power  to  lead  an  army  out  of  the  city. 

C4.  Meanwhile  intelligence  reached  them  from  their  friends 
in  Tegea,  that  unless  they  came  there  nuickly,  Tegea  would 
go  over  from  them  to  the  Argives  and  their  allies,  and  that  it 
had  all  but  done  so.  U|ton  this  then  succor  was  given  them 
by  the  Lacedaiinonians  and  their  helots  in  full  force,  with  vigor, 
and  in  such  a  way  as  had  never  been  done  before.  They  ad- 
vanced to  Orestheum,  in  the  Maitialian  territory ;  and  com- 
manded those  of  the  Arcadians  Λνΐιο  >vere  their  allies  to  muster 
and  march  close  after  them  to  Tegea ;  while  they  themselves, 
after  coining  all  of  them  as  far  as  Orestheum,  from  that  place 
Bent  back  homo  the  sixth  part  of  their  force,  for  which  were 
included  those  who  were  too  old  or  too  young  for  foreign  serv- 
ice, to  protect  their  property  at  home,  and  Λvith  the  remainder 
of  their  army  arrived  at  Tegea,  Avhere  their  allies  from  Ar- 
cadia joined  them  not  long  after.  They  also  sent  to  the  Cor- 
inthians, Boeotians,  Thocians,  and  Locrians,  with  orders  to 
reinforce  them  as  quickly  as  possible  at  Mantinea.  But  to 
these  the  notice  was  short,  and  it  was  not  easy,  except  in  a 
body,  and  after  waiting  for  each  other,  to  cross  the  enemy's 
territory ;  for  it  closed  up  the  communication,  lying  just  in 
the  way  of  it :  however,  they  made  all  haste  notwithstanding. 
The  Lacedaimonians,  meanwhile,  taking  \vith  them  their  Ar- 
cadian allies  who  had  joined  them,  invaded  the  territory  of 
Mantinea,  and  having  encauij)ed  near  the  temple  of  Hercules, 
laid  waste  the  land. 

C5.  The  Argives  and  their  allies,  on  seeing  them,  occupied 
a  position  that  was  strong  and  dilHcult  of  access,  and  drew  up 
their  troops  for  actic.i.  The  Lacedaimonians  and  their  allies 
immediately  advanced  against  them,  aud  proceeded  to  within 


Lxvi.]  TnUCYDIDES.  Τ.  365 

stone's  throw  or  arrow-shot ;  when  one  of  tho  ciders  called  oni 
to  Agis,  "  that  ho  was  purposing  to  euro  evil  with  evil ;"  mcan- 
in<i  that  his  present  unseasonable  eagerness  was  intended  to  bo 
a  reparation  of  his  culpable   retreat  from   Argos.     Ho  then, 
ΛνΙίοΐΙιοΓ  in  consequence  of  this  exclamation,  or  because  lio  was 
himself  suddenly  struck  by  some  resolution,  diiferent  from  what 
lie  liad  before  adopted,  led  his  army  back  again  Λvith  all  speed, 
before  tho  engagement  had  begun  ;  and  going  into  the  Tegean 
country,  diverted  over  that  of  tho  Mantineans  the  water  about 
which  tho  Tegenns  and  Mantineans  arc  continually  engaged 
in  hostilities,  as  it  cau;H\s  a  general  injury  to  whichever  coun- 
try it  fills  into.     His  object  was  to  bring  tho  Argives  and 
their  allies  down  from  the  liill,  on  their  coming  to  resist  tho 
diversion  of  the  water,  when  they  heaixl  of  it,  and  so  to  fight 
tho  battle  on  tlie  plain.     Accordingly,  after  staying  there  in 
tho  neighborhood  of  tho  water,'  during  that  day,  ho  turned  it 
off.     Tho  Argives  and  their  allies,  on  tho  other  hand,  were  at 
first  amazed  at  his  sudden  retreat,  when  at  so  short  α  distance 
from  them,  and  did  not  know  what  to  conjecture.     Afterward, 
when  tho  cneiny  had  withdrawn  out  of  sight,. while  they  them- 
selves remained  still,  and  did  not  follow  them,  thev  then  began 
to  blame  their  generals  again  ;  both  because,  on  tho  former  oc- 
casion, tho  Lacedaimonians,  when   fairly  caught  near   Argos, 
liad  been  suffered  to  esca])e ;  and  now,  when  they  were  run- 
ning away,  no  one  pursued  them  ;  but  with  perfect  quiet  tho 
enemy  were  saving   tlicmselves,  Λνΐιίΐο  ihcij   >vero  being  be- 
trayed.    The  generals,  then,  were  at  tho  moment  confounded, 
but  afterward  they  led  them  off  from  tho  hill,  and  having  ad- 
vanced on  tqitho  plain,  pitched  their  camp,  with  tho  intention 
of  advancing  against  tho  enemy. 

66.  Tho  next  day  tho  Argives  and  their  allies  formed  their 
lino  as  they  intended  to  engage,  should  they  fall  in  with  their 

*  Though  it  is  tnio,  as  Arnold  obscr\'C8,  that  neither  βοηΟονντας,  nor 
tho  participlo  in  tho  other  passages  quoted  by  Poppo,  is,  strictly  speak• 
ing,  a  present  put  for  α  future ;  yet  tho  full  meaning  of  those  participles 
appears  to  bo  most  naturally  conveyed  in  Knglish  by  the  sign  of  tho 
future,  since  they  are  cxprcssivo  of  intention  ;  a  force  which  tho  present 
indicative  frequently  has,  and  which  might  therefore  bo  expected  in  tho 
participlo  aa  well.  For  other  instances  of  it  in  Thucydidee,  compare  II. 
65.  8,  όιά  rd  μί)  κτώμίνος  Ιξ  ου  προσηκόντων  τήν  Λνναμιν  ηρός  ίιΑονήν  re 
>.eytiv,  IV.  β1.  1,  χρή  τά  μ^  ηροϋήκοντα  έπικτωμένονς  μύλλορ  ή  τώ 
έτοιμα  βλάπτοντας  ξνμμάχονς  τιίιτύγεο9αι»  «.  η  λ. 


350  THUCYDIDEa  V.  [lxvil,  Lxvni. 

oppononts;  and  tho  Lacedaemonians,  on  going  Lack  aguiu 
fiom  the  water  to  the  temple  of  Hercules,  into  their  old  en- 
campment, see  tho  enemy  at  a  short  distance  from  them,  all 
by  this  time  iu  order  of  battle,  and  advanced  from  tho  hill. 
The  Lacedaimonian»,  then,  were  on  this  occasion  iu  the  greatest 
consternation  they  had  ever  experienced  \vithin  their  memory. 
For  their  preparations  had  to  be  made  on  a  short  notice  ;  and 
immediately  they  fell  into  their  ranks  in  a  hurry,  Agis,  their 
king,  giving  all  orders,  according  to  the  law.  For  Λvhen  a 
king  is  at  the  liead  of  an  army,  all  commands  are  given  by 
liim ;  and  ho  communicates  to  the  polemarcha  what  is  to  Wi 
done,  they  to  the  lochagi^  thoso  to  the  peiitccontcrs^  theso 
again  to  the  enomotarchs^  and  these  to  their  enomoty  ;  aiid 
thus  their  orders,  whatever  they  wish  to  bo  done,  pass  iu  the 
same  manner,  and  quickly  reach  the  troops ;  for  pretty  nearly 
all  the  army  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  a  small  j)ortiou  excepted, 
are  oiHcers  over  ofticers ;  and  to  attend  to  Avhat  is  going  ou, 
is  a  duty  incumbent  on  many. 

C7.  On  that  occasion  the  Sciritai  formed  their  left  Λving ; 
who  alone  of  the  Lacedaemonians  have  always  that  post 
by  themselves.  Next  to  them  >vero  the  soldiers  who  had 
served  with  Brasidas  in  Thrace,  and  tho  Neodamodes  with 
them.  Then  came  tho  LaceJaimonians  themselves,  with 
their  luchi  posted  one  after  tho  other ;  by  their  side  the. 
Arcadians  of  llera'a;  after  them  the  Mienalians ;  and  on  tho 
right  wing  tho  Tei(eans,  with  a  few  of  tho  Lacedaemonians 
holding  tho  extreme  j)osition.  Their  cavalry  was  posted  ou 
each  wing.  The  Laeeda'Uionians,  then,  wore  drawn  up  iu 
this  way.  Ou  tho  side  of  their  opponents,  their  right  wing 
was  occupied  by  tho  Mantineans,  because  the  actidfc  was  to  be 
fought  iu  their  country ;  and  by  their  side  were  the  Arcadian 
allies.  Then  came  the  thousand  picked  men  of  the  Argives, 
for  whom  the  sti«to  had  for  a  long  time  furnished  at  the  public 
expense  a  course  of  training  in  military  matters;  next  to  them 
the  other  Argives ;  and  after  these,  their  allies  tho  Cleonaians 
and  Orneans;  then  tho  Athenians,  holding  tho  extreme  left, 
and  their  own  cavalry  with  them. 

C8.  Such  was  tho  order  of  battle,  and  tho  preparation  ou 
both  sides.  The  army  of  tho  Laceda'monians  appeared  the 
larger  of  the  two ;  but  as  for  stating  any  number,  either  of 
tho  several  divisions  on  each  side,  or  of  their  collective  force, 


Lxix.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  V.  357 

I  could  not  do  it  with  ncciiracy.  For  tlio  number  of  tho 
L:icoda)nionians,  on  Account  of  the  Rccrery  of  thoir  govern- 
ment, w.is  not  known  ;  and  Λνΐιαί  of  the  otliei's,  in  consequenco 
f.f  men's  natural  tendency  to  boastini^  with  regard  to  their  own 
numbars,  was  regarded  Avith  distrust.  From  the  following 
moJo  of  calculating,  liowever,  one  may  see  the  number  of 
liioedscmonians  that  was  present  on  that  occasion.  Thero 
were  engage•]  in  the  batllo  seven  locht\  exclusive  of  the  Sci- 
rita;,  who  amounted  to  hix  hundred ;  and  in  each  lochus  thero 
woro  four  pentccoatycH^^  and  in  the  jmitccosti/  four  cnomnticr» 
In  the  first  rank  of  the  cnomoty  there  were  four  fighting  men. 
In  depl,h,'  though  they  ha^l  not  all  k'cn  drawn  up  alike,  but 
as  each  loehagm  chose,  they  took  their  position  on  the  field 
uniformly  eight  deep.  And  thus,  along  tho  whole  line,  tho 
first  rank  consisted  of  four  hundred  and  forty-eight  men, 
besMes  tho  Sciritai. 

09.  When  they  were  now  on  tho  point  of  engaging,  tho 
following  admonitions  ΛνοΓο  then  severally  addressed  to  them 
by  their  own  generals.  To  tho  Mantineans,  that  the  battlo 
would  bo  fought  for  their  country,  and  to  decide  on  the  ques- 
tion of  empire  and  slavery — that  they  might  not  be  deprived 
of  tho  former  after  tasting  it,  and  might  avoid  again  tasting 
tho  latt^T.  To  tho  Argives,  th.'it  they  ΛνοηΜ  fight  for  their 
original  supremacy,  and  not  to  brook  being  forever  deprived 
of  their  former  equal  share  of  tho  Peloponnesc;  and  at  tho 
same  timo  to  avenge  themselves  on  men  who  were  their  ene- 
mies, and  near  ones  too,  for  many  acts  of  injustice.  To  tho 
Athenians,  that  fighting  as  they  >vcro  in  concert  with  many 

'  "Tho  regular  complcmont of  tho  cnomotia was  twonty«fonr men, be- 
Bides  its  captain ;  tho  pontocosty  was  corapoRcd  of  two  onomotiro,  and  tho 
lochus  of  two  pontccostyos;"—.'!  r«o/(i.  Soo  his  wholo  note  on  this  passaf^o. 

*  As  tho  number  of  tlio  ranks  must  have  depended  on  that  of  tho  ftlcs, 
and  havo  boon  tho  Famo  throufrhout  tho  army,  if  that  wcro,  or  havo  dif- 
fered, bocauso  that  did;  it  is  ovidont  that  any  change  which  tho  com- 
maador-in-chiof  mif<ht  havo  mado  in  tho  previous  dispositions  of  tho 
sovcral  lochajji,  must  havo  aflcctod  tlio  breadth  of  tho  ranks  as  well  as 
tho  depth  of  tho  files,  though  tho  latter  only  Is  mentioned,  or  rather  Im- 
plied, by  our  author.  The  supposition  of  such  a  change  is  warranted  by 
tho  variation  in  tho  tenses  of  tho  verbs ;  and  is  tho  only  way  of  solving 
tho  difficulty  noticed  by  Dobree — that  tho  depth  of  tho  lino  in  each 
lochus  appears  to  bo  left  to  tho  discretion  of  its  commander,  even  after 
lie  number  of  men  in  tho  front  rank  of  all  of  them  has  been  said  to 
have  boen  uniformly  four;  though  after  this  had  onco  been  settled,  the 
other  must,  of  course,  havo  been  no  less  uniform.    Seo  Poppo's  note. 


358  THUCYDIDES.   V.  [lix.,lxxi 

bravo  allies,  it  was  a  glorious  thing  for  them  to  show  them- 
selves inferior  to  none ;  and  that  by  defeating  the  Laceda;- 
inonians  in  the  Peloponnesc,  they  Avould  enjoy  their  empire 
more  securely,  and  to  a  greater  extent,  while  no  one  else  would 
ever  march  against  their  country.  To  the  Argives  and  their 
allies  such  wore  the  admonitions  that  were  addressed.  Tho 
Lacedaemonians,  on  tho  other  hand,  both  individually  among 
themselves,  and  with  their  national  war-songs,  exhorted  one 
another,  as  bravo,  men,  to  remember  what  they  had  learnt'<l 
before ;  knowing  that  actual  training  for  a  long  time  previous 
was  of  more  benefit  than  a  brief  verbal  exhortation,  however 
well  expressed. 

70.  After  this  tho  conflict  commenced;  the  Argives  and 
their  allies  advancing  with  haste  and  im|)etuosity  ;  tlio  Lace- 
daemonians slowly,  and  to  the  music  of  many  flute-player«, 
placed  among  them  according  to  custom,  not  with  a  religious 
object,  but  that  they  might  advance  evenly,  stepping  in  time, 
and  so  that  their  lino  might  not  be  broken,  a  thing  which 
large  armies  are  apt  to  do  in  their  approaches  to  an  enemy. 

71.  AVhilo  they  >vere  yet  closing  in  battle.  King  Agis  re- 
solved to  execute  a  maneuver,  as  follows.  All  armies,  on  going 
into  battle,  are  forced  out  too  much  on  their  right  wing;  be- 
cause tho  men,  in  their  fear,  each  shelter,  as  far  as  possible, 
their  exposed  side  with  tho  shield  of  tho  miin  who  is  posted 
next  to  them  on  the  right,  and  think  that  tho  closer  they  aro 
locked  together,  the  more  effectually  they  are  protected.  Tho 
man  who  primarily  gives  occasion  to  this  is  ho  who  stands 
first  on  tho  right  wing,  through  wishing  continually  to  with- 
draw from  the  enemy  his  own  unamied  sido ;  and  tho  rest 
follow  him  under  the  influence  of  the  same  fear.  And  so,  on 
that  occasion,  tho  Mantineans  reached  mth  their  wing  f;.r 
beyond  tho  Scirit»,  and  tho  Dicedaimonians  and  Tegeans  fur- 
ther still  beyond  the  Athenians,  inasmuch  as  their  army  was 
larger  than  theirs.  Agis  therefore,  being  afraid  that  their  left 
might  bo  surrounded,  and  thinking  that  tho  Mantineans  were 
extending  too  far  beyond  it,  gave  orders  for  tho  Sciritai  and 
Ikasidean  soldiers  to  advance  from  their  position  with  a  part 
of  their  number,  and  e(|ualizo  their  lino  to  that  of  tho  Man- 
tineans; while  into  tho  void  thus  created  ho  ordered  llip- 
ponoidas  and  Aristocles,  two  of  the  polemarchs,  to  move  over 
from  the  right  >ving  with  their  hchi^  and  by  tlirowing  them- 


Lxxn.]  THUCTDIDES.  V.  359 

pclvos  into  it  to  fill  it  up;  thinking  that  thoir  own  right  would 
Ptill  have  an  ahundanco  of  strength,  and  that  the  line  opposite 
the  Mantincans  >vould  be  formed  the  more  firmly. 

72.  Now  as  ho  gave  these  orders  at  the  very  moment  of  the 
cliarge,  and  on  a  sudden,  the  consequence  was,  that  Aristocles 
and  llipponoidas  would  not  move  on  (they  were  for  this  yflfense 
afterward  banished  from  Sparta,  being  thought  to  have  shown 
cowardice),  and  that  so  the  enemy  closed  >vilh  them  before 
any  thing  could  be  done ;  and  moreover,  that  when  lie  ordered 
the  SciritT  to  rejoin  their  comrades,  since  the  1(κ1ή  did  not 
move  on  to  their  support,  neither  could  these  now  fill  up  iho 
line.  But  when  the  Lacediemonians  were  most  decidedly  and 
in  every  respect  beaten  in  point  of  skill,  at  that  very  timo 
they  proved  themselves  no  less  superior  in  point  of  courage.* 
For  Avhen  they  had  come  to  close  quarters  with  their  o})poTicnts, 
though  the  right  Aving  of  the  Mantineans  broke  their  Scirit.an 
and  Brasiflean  corps,  and  the  Mantineans  and  their  allies,  with 
the  thousand  ]ucked  men  of  tlie  Argives,  rushing  in  through 
the  open  and  unclosed  piirt  of  the  line,  cut  up  the  Lacedcemo- 
nians,  having  surrounded  and  l)roken  them,  and  drove  them 
to  the  baggage  wagons,  and  killed  some  of  tho  veterans 
who  Avere  ]>osted  as  a  guard  over  them :  though  in  this  part 
of  the  field,  I  say,  the  Lacedicmonians  were  worsted,  yet 
with  the  rest  of  their  forces,  and  especially  tho  center, 
where  was  King  Agis,  and  around  him  tho  three  hundred 
horsemen,  as  they  are  called,"  they  fell  on  tho  veterans  of  tho 
Argives,  and  what  arc  named  tho  five  lochi^  with  tlie 
Cleonicans,  tho  Orneans,  and  those  of  the  Athenians  who  "wero 
posted  next  to  them,  and  put  them  to  flight ;  tho  majority  not 
having  even  waited  to  close  with  them,  but  having,  on  tho 
approach  of  tlie  Laced.Tmonians,  immediately  given  way,  and 
somo  of  them  having  been  even  trodden  under  foot,  in  their 
hurry  to  avoid  being  anticipated  and  ovcrtikcn.' 

•  Or,  "  proved  that  it  was  mainly  through  thoir  courage  that  thoj  won 
tho  victory." 

•  "Ho  adds  κα'Κηίμίνηι,  because,  though  called  horsemen,  they  were 
really  Infantry.  Tho  actual  cav.ilry  were  on  tho  wings,  as  had  been  al- 
ready elated,  ch.  67.  1.  Thcso  *  three  hundred  horsemen,'  as  they  wero 
called,  were  originally,  wo  may  suppose,  so  many  chiefs,  who  fought 
round  thoir  king,  not  on  foot,  but  in  their  chariots;  this  being  tho  early 
•enso  of  Ιπηενς  and  Ιππύτηι:^  as  wo  find  from  Homer." — Arnold. 

•  Literally,  "that  tho  overtaking  might  not  anticipate  them."    For 


3β0  THtJCYDIDES.  V.  [lxiiii,  ixxir. 

73.  When  tl»o  nrmy  of  tho  Argivea  and  their  allies  had 
given  way  on  this  eido,  their  lino  was  now  broken  off  both 
Avays ;'  wliilo  at  tho  eaino  time  tho  right  wing  of  tho  Laceda- 
inonians  and  Tegeans  was  surrounding  tho  Athenians  with  tho 
troops  which  outflanked  them,  and  they  λυογο  encompassed 
witlf  danger  on  both  sides,  as  they  were  being  surrounded  on 
one,  and  were  already  beaten  on  tho  other.  Indeed  they  would, 
have  sulfered  most  severely  of  all  the  army,  if  the  presence  of 
their  cavalry  had  n<jt  been  of  service  to  them.  It  happened 
too,  that  Agis,  on  perceiving  tho  Lacediemonian  left  win!^, 
which  was  opposed  to  the  Martiueans  and  the  thousand  Λι- 
gives,  to  be  hard  pressed,  gave  orders  for  tho  Λνΐιοΐο  army  to 
advance  to  tho  RU|)port  of  tho  division  which  was  being  de- 
feated. And  when  this  was  done,  the  Atlienians  meanwhile, 
as  tho  enemy's  forces  passed  on,  anil  withdrew  from  then», 
escaped  at  their  leisure,  and  with  them  tho  beaten  division  of 
tho  Argivc•?.  Tho  Mantineans  and  their  allies,  on  the  other 
hand,  and  tho  picked  men  of  the  Argives,  were  no  longer  dis- 
])Osed  to  press  on  their  adversaries;  but  seeing  their  own  side 
defeated,  and  tho  Lacedu-monians  advancing  against  them, 
they  took  to  flight.  And  of  the  Mantineans  many  were  slain, 
but  of  tho  picked  Argives  the  great  majority  escaped.  However, 
tho  flight  and  retreat  were  not  hard  jiressed,  nor  to  any  great 
distance ;  for  though  the  Laced;emonians,  until  they  have 
routed  their  enemies,  figlit  for  a  long  time,  and  stubbornly,  as 
regards  standing  their  ground ;  yet  when  they  have  routed 
them,  they  pursue  but  for  a  short  time  and  for  a  littlo  distance. 

74.  Of  such  a  character  then,  and  answering  as  nearly  as 

i>ossiblo  to  this  description,  Avas  tho  battle — the  greatest  that 
lad  occurred  for  a  very  long  time  among  tho  Greeks,  and 
fouglit  by  the  most  considerable   states.     Tiio  Lacedjemonians, 

tho  diflbrcnt  explanations  of  this  very  doubtful  expression,  boo  Poppo'a 
or  Arnold's  note.  I  liavo  followed  lledman  and  Haack  in  considorinff 
την  ίγκατύ?.ηφιν  as  tho  subject  οΐ  <^UJjvai  (though  it  is,  Avhat  Poppo  calls 
It,  *'  durior  cxplanatio") ;  beeauso  m  every  other  iustanco  that  I  havo 
observed,  in  which  Thucydidea  uses  tho  article  τοϋ  with  an  inflnitivo, 
whether  with  ^/)  or  without  U,  it  expresses  purpose,  and  not  eirect,  or 
cause.  Seo  I.  4 ;  II.  4.  2  ;  32.  1 ;  V.  27.  2. ;  VJII.  14.  1 ;  39.  4.  Tho 
only  ono  of  these  passages  which  might  seem  an  exception  to  what  has 
been  stated,  is  tho  second;  and  that  is  not  really  one,  if  τοϋ  μη  Ικφη•}€ΐ^ 
be  joined  with  otuaouTar,  as  Poppo  takes  it. 

»  "  i.  f.,  by  one  part  of  it  having  advanced  beyond  it  to  pursue  tho  one- 
my   and  by  auotlier  part  having  boon  beaten  back  behind  it." — Arnoll. 


Lxxr.,  Lxxvi.]  TUUCYDIDES.  V.  361 

after  piling  their  arms  in  front  of  the  enemy's  dead,  immedi- 
ately erected  a  tropliy,  and  stripped  the  slain  ;  and  taking  up 
their  own  dead  carried  them  hack  to  Tegea,  where  they  wcro 
buried,  while  they  restored  the  enemy's  under  truce.  Thero 
were  killed,  of  the  Argives,  Orneans,  and  Cleonrcans,  bcvcii 
hundred ;  of  the  Mantineans,  two  liundred ;  and  the  same 
number  of  the  Athenians  including  the  ^ginetans,  with 
their  generals.  On  the  side  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  allies 
did  not  suffer  to  such  an  extent  that  any  number  worth  men- 
tioning ^ero  killed ;  and  of  themselves  it  was  diflicult  to  learn 
the  truth,  but  about  three  hundred  were  said  to  have  fallen. 

76.  Now  when  the  engagement  was  about  to  take  place, 
rleistoanax  also,  the  other  king,  set  out  to  their  aid  with  thoso 
who  were  above  and  below  the  usual  ago  for  service,  and 
reached  as  far  as  Tegea,  but  went  back  again  on  hearing  of 
the  victory.  The  Laceda-monians  sent,  too,  and  turned  back 
the  allies  from  Corinth  and  from  beyond  the  Isthmus;  and 
having  themselves  returned  and  dismissed  their  allies,  they 
kept  tho  festival  (for  it  happened  to  be  the  time  of  their 
Carnea).  And  tho  imputations  which  at  that  time  were  urged 
airainst  them  by  the  Greeks,  both  on  the  score  of  cowardice  in 
consequence  of  their  disaster  in  tho  island,  and  of  their  bad 
management  and  dilatoriness  in  other  respect•*,  they  wiped  out 
by  this  one  action ;  liaving  been,  as  was  now  thought,  re- 
duced by  fortune,  but  still  the  same  men  at  heart. 

Now  the  day  before  this  battle  it  also  happened  that  tho 
Kpidaurians  >vith  all  their  forces  invaded  tho  Argivo  terri- 
tory, and  cut  off  in  great  numbers,  when  they  camo  out  to  givo 
them  battle,  those  of  the  Argives  who  were  left  behind  to  keep 
guard.  Moreover,  when  three  thousand  of  the  Elcan  heavy- 
armed  liad  como  after  tho  battle  to  tho  succor  of  tho  Manti- 
neans,  aad  a  thousand  Athenians  in  addition  to  their  former 
force,  all  these  allies  at  onfco  marched  against  Epidaunis, 
while  tho  Laccdaeraonians  were  keeping  the  Carnea;  and 
dividing  the  work  between  them,  tliey  began  λ  wall  of  circum- 
vallation  round  the  city.  And  though  the  rest  abandoned  tho 
ΛvoΓk,  tho  Athenians  finished  it  round  tho  promootor)•  called 
the  lleracum,  the  part  which  had  been  assigned  to  them.  And 
having  all  Joined  in  leaving  a  garrison  in  this  fortress,  they  re- 
turned to  their  several  cities.     And  so  tho  summer  ended. 

70.  At  tho  beginning  of  tho  following  winter,  tho  Laocda> 
^0 


362  THUCYDlDEa  V.  [lxzvil 

moiiiaus,  after  they  hml  celebrated  the  Carnean  festival,  im- 
luediutely  took  the  ficKl ;  aud  on  arriving  at  Tegea,  sent  on 
to  Argos  j)roj)osal3  for  an  accommodation.  For  there  liaii 
been  there  previously  a  j)arty  in  their  interest,  and  desirous  of 
putting  down  the  democraiy  at  Argos ;  and  since  the  battle 
had  been  fought,  thoy  were  much  better  able  to  persuade  the 
people  at  large  to  the  proposed  arrangement.  Their  wish 
was,  after  first  concluding  a  treaty  Avith  the  Liiceda*moiiians, 
then,  in  the  second  place,  to  enter  into  alliance  with  them ; 
and  so  at  length  to  atUick  the  democracy.  Accordingly,  there 
came  from  the  Lacedicmonians  to  Argos,  Lichas,  eon  of  ArccF»- 
laus,   who  was  proxcnus   ϊότ   the  Argives,   bearing    two   prt)- 

{)osals,  one  as  to  the  mode  in  which  they  should  carry  on 
lostilities,  if  they  preferred  it;  the  other,  as  to  the  footing  on 
Λνΐήοΐι  they  should  remain  at  fx^ace,  if  they  preferred  thaf. 
And  after  there  had  been  nmih  controversy  on  the  subjcel 
(lor  Alcibiades  also  happened  to  be  j)resent),  the  party  λ^Ιιο  no» 
gotiated  for  tlie  Laceda^'mouians,  and  who  now  ventured  to  do 
so  openly,  prevailed  on  the  Argives  to  accept  the  j)roposal  for 
an  accommodation  ;  >vhich  >vas  to  this  eiiect: 

77.  "It  seems  good  to  the  assembly  of  the  Lacx^da*monians 
to  enter  into  agreement  with  the  Argives  on  the  following 
conditions : — That  they  shall  restore  their  children  to  the 
Orchomeiaans,  their  men  to  the  Micnaliaiis,  and  the  men  de- 
posited at  Mantinea  to  the  Lacediemonians.  That  they  shall 
evacuate  Epidaurus,  and  tlemolish  their  fortification  there : 
and  that  if  the  Athenians  tlo  not  withdraw  from  Epidaurus, 
they  shall  bo  declared  enemies  to  the  Argives  and  Lnceda•- 
monians,  with  the  allits  of  both  those  suites. — That  if  the 
Lacedaimonians  have  any  children  in  their  custody,  they  shall 
restore  them  to  all  the  states. — That  w  itli  respect,  to  the  oii'er- 
ing  to  the  god,  the  Epidaurians  shall  be  at  liberty  to  take  an 
oath  .on  the  subject,  and  that  tlie  Argives  shall  allow  them  to 
do  so.' — That  the  states  in  the  iVloponnese,  both  small  an»! 
great,  shall  be  all  independent,  according  to  the  institutions  of 
their  fathers. — That  if  any  of  those  beyond  the  Peloponnese 
come  against  the  Peloponnesian  territory  with  evil  intent, 
they  shall   repel  the  invader   by  common  counsel,'  on    fucIi 

'  dliev  ?yi•.]  For  tlio  various  conjocturt'S  as  to  the  tnio  reading  iu  this 
passage,  soo  Poppo. 

2  o/ioO/.j  Or,  as  AruoM  takes  it,  after  Brodow,  "  any  where," 


LXXvin.,LXXix.]  THUCYDIDES.  V.  303 

terms  as  shall  seem  most  just  for  tho  Peloponncsians. — That 
whatever  people  out  of  tho  Peloponneso  aro  allies  of  the  Lace- 
(licmonians,  they  shall  stand  on  the  same  footing  as  the  allies  of 
the  Lacedjemonians  and  of  tho  Argives,  retaining  their  own  pos- 
sessions.— That  tho  contracting  parties  shall  show  theso  con- 
ditions to  the  'allies,  and  enter  into  agreement  Avith  them,  if 
they  seem  satisfactory  to  tlioin  ;  but  that  if  any  thing  elso 
seem  good  to  the  allies  they  shall  send  them  away  home." 

78.  This  proposal  tho  Argivos  in  the  first  place  accepted, 
and  tho  army  of  the  Lacedncmonians  returned  homo  from 
Togea.  Afterward,  when  intercourse  Avith  each  other  was 
now  held  by  them,  not  long  subsequently  the  same  party 
again  contrived  that  tho  Argivos  should  renounce  their  al- 
liance Λvith  tho  Mantineans,  Eleans,  and  Athenians  and  con- 
clude a  treaty  and  alliance  with  tho  Laccdaimonians ;  Avhicli 
w(  re  to  this  clFcct : 

79.  "The  following  arc  the  terms  on  λυΙηοΙι  it  seemed  go<xl 
tf>  tho  Lacedrcmonians  and  Argivos  that  a  treaty  and  alliance 
should  l>c  concluded  between  them  for  fifty  years. — That  they 
shall  atford  to  each  oth<T  judicial  decision  of  diiTercnces,  on 
fiir  and  equal  terms,  according  to  tho  institutions  of  their 
fathers. — That  tho  other  stales  in  tho  l*eloponneso  shall  par- 
ticipate in  this  treaty  and  alliancxi,  as  independent  and  self- 
governed,  retaining  their  own  possessions,  and  aflibrding  fair 
and  equal  judicial  decisions,  according  to  the  institutions  of 
their  fathers, — That  whatever  people  out  of  tho  Peloponneso 
aro  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  they  shall  stand  on  the  same 
footing  as  the  Laced aimoni an s,  and  tho  allies  of  the  Argives  on 
the  same  footing  as  tho  Argives,  retaining  their  own  posses- 
sions.— That  if  a  common  cxi^edition  to  any  quarter  should  bo 
required,  tho  Lacedaemonians  and  Argives  shall  consult  upon 
if,  deciding  as  may  be  most  just  for  tlic  allies. — That  if  .any  of 
the  states,  either  in   tlie  ΓοΙοροηηοβο  or  out  of  it,  have  any 

*  ξνμ^)αλίηΟαι.'\  Bloomfield  supposes  "  tlio  ollice"  to  bo  tho  subject  of 
this  inflnitivo ;  but  it  surely  must  bo  tho  parties  to  which  έττιόείξαντης 
refers.  The  eamo  parties  must  also  be  tho  subject  of  άπιάλλειν  in  the» 
following  sentence :  but  their  object  in  thus  sending  them  away  is  doubt- 
ful ;  whether  it  was  that  the  embassadors  might  consult  their  govcrh• 
meats  on  tho  objections  tlicy  had  mndc  to  tho  treaty ;  or,  that  they  might 
not,  by  their  intrigues,  attempt  to  tmsettio  the  relations  between  Argoj 
.ind  Lacodflcmon.  Tho  latter  appears  to  mo  moro  accordant  with  th<.» 
brief  and  eumtnary  expression,  υ'ικαό'  άπιάλλαν» 


364  THUOYDIDES.  V.  (Lxxx.,  utxxi. 

points  of  dispute,  whether  concerning  their  borders  or  any 
thing  else,  they  shall  bo  judicially  decided,' — ^I'hat  if  any  of 
the  allied  states  should  have  a  quarrel  with  another,  they  shall 
have  recourse  to  the  arbitration  of  whatever  third  state  may 
bo  thought  inij)artial  by  both.— That  the  private  citizens  in 
each  state  shall  liave  their  causes  tried  according  to  the  institu- 
tions of  their  fathers." 

80.  This  then  was  the  treaty  and  alliance  that  was  con- 
cluded; and  wliatever  belonging  to  each  other  they  h;ul  tiiken 
in  the  war,  or  whatever  other  ground  of  diil'erence  existed 
iKitween  theni,  they  came  to  a  settlement  of  all  such  mat- 
ters. And  as  they  now  arranged  their  measures  in  concert, 
they  adopted  a  resolution  not  to  receive  any  heraKl  or  em- 
bassy from  the  Athenians,  unless  they  Avithdrew  from  the 
Peloponnese,  and  evacuated  their  forts ;  and  neither  to  make 
])eaco  nor  carry  on  war  with  any  except  conjointly.  And 
besides  conducting  their  otlier  measures  Avith  vehemence, 
they  both  of  them  sent  embassadors  to  the  Thraceward 
towns,  and  to  Perdicoas,  whom  they  persuaded  to  join  their 
league.  He  did  not,  however,  immediately  separate  from  the 
Athenians,  but  purposed  doing  so,  because  ho  saw  that  tho 
Argives  ha<l  also ;  for  he  himself  Λvas  originally  from  Argos. 
They  likewise  renewal  their  former  oaths  with  the  Chalcidi- 
ans,  and  bound  themselves  by  new  ones.  Moreover,  tho 
Argives  sent  embassadors  to  tho  Athenians,  commanding 
them  to  evacuate  their  fortress  in  Epidaurus.  They  therefore, 
seeing  themselves  to  be  but  few  against  many  who  had  joined  iu 
garrisoning  it,  sent  Demosthenes  to  lead  their  men  out  of  it ; 
who  having  arrived,  and  instituted,  by  Avay  of  pretext,  α 
gymnastic  contest  outside  tho  fortress,  Λνΐιοη  the  rest  of  tho 
garrison  had  gone  out,  slmt  the  gates  uj)on  them.  After- 
ward, having  renewed  their  treaty  with  the  Epidaurians,  the 
Athenians  by  themselves  gave  up  the  fortress. 

81.  Subsequent  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Argives  from  tho 
confederacy,  the  Mantineans,  after  first  holding  out,  and  then 

'  Λιακριβΐ/μεν.  Or,  as  Arnold  takes  it,  simply  "  brou^lit  to  an  issue," 
of  whatever  kind  it  inipht  bo.  Poppo  agrees  with  Bloomtield  that  only 
an  appeal  to  legal  principles  is  hero  intended  by  tho  word  ;  but  observes 
Ihtit  it  is  α  less  Uefinito  term  than  ίς  ττόλπ• — '/.Ikii;  the  method  pre- 
fUTibed  when  both  tho  contending  states  wero  members  of  tho  leagues; 
ii  ί  including  tho  decisions,  not  only  of  a  third  state,  but  also  of  tho 
I'clphiaa  oracle,  tho  Amphictyons,  and  of  individual  referees. 


Lixxii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  V.  365 

findini»  themselves  unable  to  do  so  without  the  Argives,  camo 
to  terms  on  their  part  also  Avith  tho  Lacedaimonians,  and  relin- 
quished their  sovereii^Jity  over  the  cities.'  And  now  the  La- 
eedremonians  and  Arrives,  eaeh  a  thousand  utiOnj]^,  took  the 
field  toc^ether,  and  the  Lnoedicmonians  by  themselves  went  and 
put  the  jnfoverninent  of  iSieyon  into  the  lurnds  of  a  smaller  num- 
ber than  l)efore,  and  then  both  of  them  together  also  put  doAvn 
the  democracy  at  Arc^os,  an  oligarchy  being  established,  in  ac- 
cordance with  tho  interests  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  These 
things  occurred  at  tho  close  of  tho  winter,  when  spring  was  now 
near  at  hand  ;  and  so  ended  tho  fourteentli  year  of  the  war. 

82.  The  following  summer,  tho  inhabitants  of  Dium  on 
Athos  revolted  from  tho  Athenians  to  tho  Chalcidians;  and 
tho  Laccdajmonians  settled  tho  atiairs  of  Achaia,  which  Ικϊ- 
fore  had  not  been  suitable  to  their  views.  And  now  the  com- 
mons party  at  Argos  gradually  combining  and  recovering 
their  spirits,  made  an  attack  upon  tho  oligarchical  party,  hav- 
ing watched  their  opportunity,  when  it  was  just  the  time  of 
the  Lacedaimonian  (iymnoprcdiaj.  And  a  battle  having  been 
fought  in  the  city,  the  commons  gained  tho  victory,  and  slew 
some  of  them,  and  banished  others.  The  Lacediemonians, 
while  their  friends  had  been  sending  for  them  a  long  time  be- 
fore, did  not  go  ;  but  at  length  put  off  tho  Gymnopaidiai,  and 
marched  to  their  aid.  On  hearing  at  Tegea  that  the  oligarchi- 
cal party  had  been  defeated,  they  would  not  advance  any  fur- 
ther, though  entreated  by  those  who  had  escaped  ;  but  returned 
home,  and  kept  the  Gymnopacdiai.  Afterward,  when  embas- 
sadors had  como  both  from  the  Argives  in  the  city  and  from 
those  driven  out  of  it,'  and  when  the  allies  also  were  present, 
and  much  had  been  said  on  both  sides,  they  decided  that  tho 
party  in  the  city  >vero  in  the  Λvrong,  and  resolved  to  march 
against  Argos;  but  much  delay  and  procrastination  ensued* 
In  tho  mean  time  the  commons  at  Argos  were  afraid  of  tho 
Lacedaimonians,  and  as  they  courted  tho  alliance  of  Athens 
again,  and  thought  that  it  would  bo  of  tho  greatest  service  to  them, 
they  built  long  walls  to  tho  sea ;  that  if  they  should  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  use  of  tho  land,  tho  importation  of  things  by 

'  «.  β.,  their  Biibjcct  allies,  mcntionod  ch.  33.  G8.  1,  and  clsowhero. 

»  αγγέλων.]  Bokkcr,  Poppo,  and  Arnold  all  think  this  word  corrupt? 
while  Gkiller  understands  by  it  a  party  in  Argos  who  were  in  constant 
communication  with  Sparta:  but  surely  that  is  a  very  forced  interpretation^ 


800  TnUCYDIDES.   V.  [lxxiiil 

sea,  through  tho  help  of  Uiq  Athenians,  might  be  of  benefit  to 
them.  Some  of  the  cities  in  tho  Peloponneso  were  also  privy 
to  their  building  these  walls.  The  Argives  therefore  were 
engaged  in  the  work  with  all  their  population,  themselves,  their 
wives,  and  their  slaves ;  while  there  came  to  them  from  Athens 
carpenters  and  stone-masons.     And  so  the  summer  cntled. 

83.  The  following  Λvinter,  when  the  Lacedu;monians  wero 
aware  of  their  buiUing  tho  walls,  they  nmrched  against  Argos, 
both  themselves  and  their  allies,  excepting  tho  Corinthians; 
communications  being  also  held  with  them  from  Argos  itself. 
Tho  leader  of  the  army  Avas  Agis,  son  of  Archidamus,  king  oi 
tho  Lacediemonians.  With  regard,  then,  to  tho  advantagen 
which  they  thought  they  had  secured  in  tho  city  itself, 
nothing  more  came  of  thein  ;  but  the  walls  that  >vero  being 
built,  they  took  and  demolished.  And  having  taken  llysite,  a 
town  in  the  Argive  territory,  and  j)ut  to  tho  sword  all  tho 
free-men  they  got  into  their  hands,  they  returned  and  dis- 
persed to  their  resjK'ctive  cities.  After  this,  tho  Argives,  in 
their  turn,  marched  against  the  I'hliiisian  country,  a.ul  hud  it 
>vasto  be  tore  they  returned,  becauso  they  harboivd  their 
exiles ;  for  the  greater  part  of  them  had  settled  there.     The* 

*  All  tho  editors  agreo  in  thinkint?  diiTorent  parts  of  tliis  sontonco  cor- 
rupt, and  propose  various  emendations  of  it;  but  iiono  of  lliem,  in  my 
liurublo  opinion,  lias  struck  at  tiio  root  of  tho  evil,  whieh  lies,  1  think,  ia 
tlio  verb  κατίκλτισαν.  Tlio  idea  of  tho  Athenians  "blockading"  α  Λνΐιοΐο 
country  so  oxtonsivo  as  Macedonia  ap|»ears  too  extravab'ant  to  bo  ad- 
mitted; particularly  as  no  i)roof  is  adduced  of  κατακ/.ίΐίΐν  being  ever 
used  in  such  a  sense;  but  it  always  refers  to  men  being  "shut  up"  in 
particular  7>/act' 9.  Until  liloomlleld  thereforo  brings  forward  an  instaneo 
of  its  being  so  oniployod,  ho  must  not  assunio  that  his  reading  of  tho 
passago  "yields  an  excellent  sense,  and  ouo  not  open  to  any  welUfound- 
od  objection."  Kriiger's  conjeeturo  κατε'λ/}ισαι>  would  suit  tho  passago 
admirably ;  but  Poppo  observes  that  tho  active  form  of  tho  compound 
verb  is  nover  usod,  and  that  thosiniplo  verb  would  bo  going  too  far  from 
tho  traces  of  tho  common  text.  To  rectify  this  ovil,  I  venluro  to  proposo 
και  άλήίσαν;  retaining  Μακκ^ήας  as  a  partitive  genitive,  and  adopting 
GoUor's  punctuation  and  reading  οΐΙΙιμύίκκα  ;  go  that  tho  whole  passago 
would  run  thus:  Kul  έ?.ήΐοαν  ύί:  τον  αντοϋ  χειμΰνος  και  ^ιίακίδυιύας 
^ΧΟηναΊοι,  ΠεμΜκκα  ίττίκαλ.  κ.  τ.  λ.  Tiiouiih  t^i  at\pr  καϊ  is  not  used  ao 
froquontly  by  Thucydides  as  by  Xenophon  and  sonio  other  writers,  ic 
occurs  in  threo  other  places,  if  not  more;  nauKly,  I.  13'J.  2;  II.  31».  1 ; 
and  VII.  5G.  3,  at  the  beginning  of  a  paragraph  in  tho  last  instaneo,  in  u 
manner  exactly  similar  to  what  is  proposed  here.  Kui  i/v  6i  άξως  ύ 
ά)ών  κατά  τε  ταύτα,  κ.  τ.  λ.  Ι  may  add,  that  this  reading  is  perhaps 
confirmed  by,  or  at  any  rate  agrees  very  well  with,  tho  next  noiico  wo 


Lxxxiv.,  Lxxiv.]  TIIUCTDIDES.  V,  307 

Atlionians  ravageil,  too,  durincf  tho  βΛτηο  winter  λ  part  of  Ma- 
(H'donia  also,  clmrijing  Pcrdic.cas  Λvitlι  tho  loapjuo  ho  Jiad  entered 
into  witli  tlio  Arrives  ηικί  Lai-edaiiiionians ;  and  with  tho  fact 
that  when  they  had  prepared  to  lead  ail  army  against  tlio 
J'hrareward  Clialcidian.s  and  Amphipolis,  under  tho  command 
of  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  ho  had  proved  falso  to  his  allies, 
and  tho  armament  was  chiefly  broken  up  in  consequence  of 
liis  liavincf  des(»rted  tho  cause.  lie  Avas  therefore  proclaimed 
an  enemy.  And  thus  tho  winter  ended,  and  tho  fifteenth  year 
of  the  war. 

84.  ΊΊ10  next  summer,  Aleihiades  sailed  to  Argos  witli 
twenty  ships,  and  seized  three  liuiidred  men,  who  were  still 
thou£^ht  to  bo  suspicious  characters,  and  to  favor  tho  cause  of 
tho  Lacedaemonians ;  and  these  tho  Athenians  deposited  in  tho 
iioiixliboring  islands  within  their  dominions.  Tho  Athenians 
also  undertook  an  expedition  ai^ainst  tiie  island  of  Melos,  with 
thirty  ships  of  their  own,  six  of  tho  Chians,  two  of  tho  Lesbi- 
ans, sixteen  hundred  of  their  own  heavy-armed,  three  hun- 
dri'd  bowmen,  twenty  mounted  arcliers,  and  about  five  tljou- 
sand  five  Inrndnul  lieavy-armed  of  tho  allies  and  tho  islanders. 
Now  tho  Melians  are  a  colony  of  tho  Lacedicmonians,  and 
would  not  submit  to  tho  Athenians,  liko  tho  rest  of  tho  island- 
<Ts,  but  at  first  n^nainod  rjuiet  as  neutrals,  and  then,  when 
llie  Athenians  tried  to  comiK'l  them  by  devastating  their  land, 
went  openly  to  Λvar  with  them,  tho  generals  therefore, 
Cleomedes  son  of  Lyco?nedes,  and  Tisiaa  son  of  Tisimachus, 
having  gono  and  encam])ed  in  their  territory  wi(h  this  arma- 
ment,' before  injuring  any  j)art  of  the  land,  first  sent  em- 
bassadors to  hold  a  conference  with  tliem.  These  tho  Melians 
<lid  not  intro(hico  to  their  popular  assembly,  but  desired  them  to 
vtato  tho  objects  of  their  mission  before  tho  magistrates  and  tho 
few,     Tho  embassadors  of  tho  Athenians  then  spoko  as  follows : 

85.  Ath.  "Since  our  words  arc  not  to  bo  addcessed  to  your 
populace,  in  order  that  the  many  may  not  bo  deceived,  for- 
Kooth,  by  hearing  at  once  in  one  continuous  oration  persua- 
fnve  and  irrefutable  arguments  (for  we  know  that  this  is  tho 

havo  of  Pcrdiccas,  VI.  1.  4,  whcro  it  is  again  montlonod  that  tho  Alho• 
nianf  Ικακηνρνηνν  τήν  iiepoiKiiov,  • 

•  οτρατοιν(όενηάμ€νοι  (ς  Tr)v  γήν.]  A  concieo  form  for  what  le  raoro 
I'lilljr  oxprcssed  by  όια6ύντΐς  iorpamntdevaavro^  VIII.  25.  1 ;  and  bj 
ΚΗΤαπλενσαντις  iorparoircitvaavrOf  VIII.  79.  4.— /Vpjw. 


368  THUCYDIDES.  V.  [lxxxvl-lxxxix. 

meaning  of  your  introducing  us  to  the  few),  do  ye  who  are  seated 
liero  in  congress  pursue  a  still  more  cautious  method.  For  do 
not  ye,  either,  make  one  continuous  speech  on  the  several  topicK, 
hut  unmediately  taking  us  up  at  whatever  does  not  appear  ti> 
be  advanced  in  accordance  witli  your  interest,  decide  that  ques- 
tion.  And  first  tell  us  it'  you  are  pk'iised  with  what  λυο  pro- 
j)Ose."     TI»o  conmiissioners  of  the  Melians  made  tliis  rej)ly : 

80.  Mel.  **Tho  fairness  of  thus  cahuly  instructing  each 
other  is  ojxm  to  no  objection  :  but  your  preparations  for  war, 
which  are  already  here,  and  not  merely  coming,  appear  to  bo 
at  variance  with  it.  For  wo  see  that  you  are  come  to  be  your- 
selves judges  of  what  will  be  said ;  and  that  the  issue  o4*  the 
conference  will  in  all  probability  bring  us  >var,  if  we  are 
stronger  in  the  justice  of  our  cause,  and  therefore  refuse  to 
submit ;  or  slavery,  if  we  are  convinced  by  you." 

87.  Ath.  "  If  now  you  have  met  to  argue  upon  suspicions  <.»f 
the  future,  or  to  do  any  thing  else  but  to  consult'  for  your 
country  with  a  view  to  its  preservation,  according  to  \vhat  is 
present  and  beftjre  your  eyes,  we  will  stoj) ;  but  if  for  this  ob- 
ject we  will  s]>eak." 

88.  Mel.  ^  it  is  but  natural  and  ])ardonablc  for  men  so 
circumstanced  to  have  recourse  to  many  things,  both  in  think- 
ing and  speaking.  However,  this  our  meeting  is  held  with  a 
view  to  our  preservation;  and  let  the  discussion  proceed,  if 
you  ]»least%  in  the  way  which  you  propose." 

89.  Ath.  "  We  tlieu  shall  not  ourselves  advance  fair  pre- 
tenses, either  of  our  justly  enjoying  empire  in  consequence  of 
liaving  overthrown  the  Mede,  or  of  now  coming  against  you 
because  we  are  Ix-ing  injured — and  so  make  a  long  sj>eech 
which  would  not  be  believed ;  nor  do  we  wish  you  to  think 
of  persuading  us  by  saying,  either  that  you  did  not  join  the 
standard  of  the  Laceda;monians,  though  you  were  their 
colony ;  or  that  you  have  done  us  no  w  rong.  But  we  advise 
you,  according  t*)  the  real  sentiments  of  us  both,  to  think  of 
getting  Avhat  you  can ;  since  you  know,  and  are  speaking  to 
tiioftc  who  know,  that,  in  the  language  of  njen,  what  is  right  i.-* 
estimated  by  cipiality  of  j)ower  t*)  compel ;  but  what  is  possi- 

•  .ioiz/fiaoiT/t]  Tlio  active  form  of  this  verb  occurs  ηκαίη,  cli.  III.  2, 
vla-ro  Arnold  explains  it  as  expresainf?  tlio  act  of  the  ^ovornment,  con* 
Bultiag  for  the  safety  of  its  subjects.  Poppo,  however,  refers  to  a  similar 
Asage  of  it,  IV.  41.  1,  where  there  is  apparently  no  such  force  intended. 


xc.xci.]  THUCYDIDES.  V.  369 

ble  is  that  which  tho  stronger  practice,  and  to  which  tho  weak 
submit" 

90.  Mel.  "  So  far  then  as  our  opinion  goes, '  it  is  for  our  ad- 
vantage (for  Ave  must,  since  you  liavc  so  prescribed,  speak  of 
what  is  expedient,  to  tho  neglect  of  >vhat  is'  right)  that  you 
sliould  not  take  away  what  is  a  common  benefit ;  but  that  for 
every  one  who  at  any  time  is  in  danger,  what  is  reasonable 
should  also  bo  considered  riglit ;  and  that  if  he  can  gain  assent 
to  something  which  falls  short  of  strict  justice,  he  should  liavo 
the  l>enefit  of  it  And  this  is  not  less  for  your  interest ;  inas- 
much, as  you  would  afford  to  others,  should  you  fail,  a  pattern 
for  inflicting  tho  heaviest  vengeance  upon  you."' 

91.  Ath.  "Nay,  for  our  part,  we  are  not  disheartened  about 
the  end  of  our  empire,  even  should  it  bo  brought  to  an  end. 
For  it  is  not  those  who  rule  over  others,  like  tho  Lacedemo- 
nians, that  are  to  \)Q  feared  by  tho  vanquished.  Nor  is  it 
with  tho  Lacedaemonians  that  we  have  to  struggle,  but  with 
tho  possibility  of  our  subjects  in  any  quarter  by  themselves 
attackitjg  and  overpowering  those  who  have  liad  rule  over 
them.  So  on  this  point  let  the  danger  Ix;  left  to  us.  But  that 
Ave  are  come  hero  for  tho  bi«iefit  of  our  empire,  and  that  wo 
shall  also  speak  on  tho  present  occasion  for  tho  preservation  of 

*  I  havo  not  followed  Arnold'a  rcadini^  in  this  passaf^c,  though  Bckkor 
and  Giillcr  also  adopted  it ;  because  it  seems  improbable  that  η  μίν,  tlio 
reading  of  nearly  all  tho  MSS.,  should  havo  been  a  mistake  of  tho  copy- 
istii  for  ono  so  much  cosier,  and  so  diiTcrent  from  it,  as  ημεϊς.  At  tho  same 
lime  I  am  far  from  certain  whether  ;}  μή>,  that  which  I  havo  preferred, 
on  the  authority  of  Herman,  Poppo,  and  Bloomfield,  bo  really  tho  truo 
ono;  for  in  no  other  passago  in  Thucydidcs,  I  believe,  haa  ^  tho  forco 
which  is  lioro  given  to  it;  and  though  Ijloomfiold  quotes  ono  instance  of 
its  being  ao  used  by  Xenophon,  ho  is  thcro  writing,  not  as  α  historian, 
but  as  α  philosopher ;  and  so  uses  it,  as  it  is  very  commonly  used  by  phil- 
osophical writers  in  later  times.  Should  this  objection  bo  thought  to 
havo  any  weight,  1  would  venture  to  propose  7/μΊν,  which  comes  nearer , 
to  the  various  readings  of  tho  MSS.  than  ημείς;  and  gives  a  senso  in 
exact  accordance  witlx  what  follows :  for  καΐ  πρ<)ς  νμύ\\  at  tho  beginning 
of  tho  next  paragraph,  would  stand  in  strong  opposition  to  it :  "  For  Uf, 
then,  wo  certainly  think  it  advantageous — and  it  is  no  loss  for  your 
interest  also."  It  may  perhaps  bo  regarded  as  Bomo  corroboration  of 
this  conjecture,  that  the  scholiast  quoted  by  Arnold  usee  ημϊν  in  hie  par- 
aphrase:  νομίζομεν  ημίν  ιτροστ}κειν  μή  καταλνείν  τό  Kotvdv  αγαθόν. 

*  This  Is  pretty  nearly  the  interpretation  of  the  passage  given  by  Bauer, 
and  sanctioned  by  Γορρο.  For  tho  many  others  that  havo  been  adopted, 
POO  tho  noto  of  the  latter. 

16* 


370  THUOYDIDEa  V.  [xciL-xcix 

your  country,  on  theeo  \)ou}ia  wo  will  give  you  proofs ;  gince  we 
wish  to  maintain  our  own  soveroii^ty  over  you  without  trouble, 
and  to  have  you  prescTveil  for  the  advantago  of  us  both." 

02.  Mel,  "And  how  then  could  it  prove  advantageous  for 
us  to  serve,  iu»  it'is  for  you  to  govern?" 

93.  Ath.  "  Jiecause  you  would  have  the  benefit  of  submit- 
ting before  you  sulfered  the  last  extremities ;  while  wo  should 
bo  gainers  by  not  destroying  you." 

04,  Mel.  "But  ΛνοηΚΙ  you  not  accept  our  proposals,  on  con- 
dition of  our  remaining  quiet,  and  being  friendf)  instead  of  ene- 
mies, but  in  alliance  with  neiUier  side  i" 

95.  Ath.  "  No ;  for  your  enmity  is  not  so  hurtful  to  us,  as 
your  friendship  is  to  our  subjects  an  evident  proof  of  our 
weakness,  but  your  hatred,  of  our  power." 

96.  Mel.  "  And  do  your  subjects  then  take  such  a  view 
of  equity,  as  to  put  on  the  same  footing  those  who  are  not  at 
all  connected  with  you,  and  those  who,  being  in  most  cases 
your  colonists,  and  in  some  casfs  having  revolted  from  you, 
have  been  reduced  to  subjection  ?" 

97.  Ath.  "  Why,  for  an  argument  resting  on  justice  they 
think  that  neitlicr  of  us  are  at  a  loss ;  but  that  on  the  ground 
of  their  power  they  escape,  and  wo,  through  fear,  absUiiu  from 
attacking  them.  So  that,  Ix-sides  our  ruling  over  more  sub- 
jects, you  would  also  through  your  subjection  confer  security 
upon  us ;  especially  liy  the  fact  that  you  Λνΐιο  are  islanders, 
and  weaker  too  than  some  others,  did  not  escaj>o  our  do- 
minion, who  have  the  command  of  the  sea." 

98.  Mel.  "And  do  you  consider  that  there  is  no  security 
in  that  other  case  ?  (For  here  again,  as  you  have  excluded  us 
from  a])j)eals  to  justice,  and  urge  us  to  yield  to  considerations 
of  your  advantage,  we  too  nmst  explain  what  is  expedient 
for  ns,  and  so  endeavor  to  j)ersuade  you,  if  the  same  happen 
to  be  for  your  interest  also.)  For  how  can  you  avoid  making 
enemies  of  all  that  are  at  present  neutral,  when,  on  looking  to 
the  present  case,  they  reckon  that  some  time  or  other  you  Avill 
proceed  against  them  also  ?  And  by  that  course  Λvhat  do  you 
vlo,  but  aggrandize  your  ])resent  enemies,  and  bring  those  upon 
you  against  their  will  who  Avould  never  else  be  likely  to  be- 
come liostile  to  you  ?" 

99.  Ath.  "AVhy,  we  do  not  consider  those  who  live  any  where 
on  the  mainland,  and  who  in  consequence  of  their  liberty  will 


c.-€iiL]  THUCYDIDES.  V,  371 

long  delay  taking  precautions  iwrainst  us,  to  bo  so  formidable  to 
us  as  those  who  "are  islanders  any  where  without  being  under 
our  rule,  like  you,  and  those  who  by  the  severity  of  our  rule 
are  now  exasperated  against  us.  FOr  it  is  these  who  would 
most  give  way  to  recklessness,  and  bring  both  themselves  and 
us  iiito  danger  that  was  evident  beforehand." 

100.  Aid,  "  Surely  then,  if  you  run  such  a  risk  not  to  bo 
deprived  of  your  empire,  and  those  who  are  already  in  sub- 
jection, to  bo  released  from  it ;  for  us  who  are  still  free  it  warn 
great  baseness  and  cowardice  not  to  have  recourse  to  every 
thing  Ixifore  we  submit  to  it." 

101.  Ath.  "  No  ;  not  at  least  if  you  tako  a  sensible  view  of 
the  case.  For  you  are  not  on  equal  terms  contending  for  hon- 
or, to  avoid  incurring  disgrace;  but  you  are  rather  deliberating 
for  your  preservation,  to  avoid  resisting  those  Λνΐιο  are  far 
stronger  than  yourselves." 

102.  Mel.  "Hut  we  know  that  warlike  measures  sometime» 
come  to  more  impartial  results  than  might  have  been  expected 
from  the  ditferent  numbers  on  each  side.  And  in  our  case  to 
yield  is  immediate  despair ;  but  by  making  an  effort  there  is 
yet  hope  of  our  keeping  ourselves  up." 

10:].  Ath,  "Hope,  which  is  the  solace  of  danger,  >vhen  en- 
tertained by  thoso  who  have  abundant  means,  tliough  it  may 
injure,  yet  does  not  ruin  them,  hwi  in  the  case  of  tlioso  who 
risk  all  they  have  on  α  throw  '  (for  it  is  naturally  an  extrava- 
gant passion),  it  is  oidy  found  out  at  the  time  of  their  ruin, 
and  leaves  no  room  for  guarding  against  it  in  future,  when  it 
is  found  out.  Do  not  you  then,  weak  as  you  are,  and  hanging 
on  one  single  turn  of  the  scale,  bo  desirous  of  this  fate,  nor  of 

'  Ις  άται»  ro  νττάρχον  άναρριπτονσι.']  Ducas  and  Goller  take  ίς  ατταν 
soparatoly  from  τύ  νπ<ψχον,  but  Poppo  agrees  with  Arnold  in  unitinfif 
them,  and  thinks  with  Bloomfield  that  κνδον  is  properly  understood  with 
ΰναρρίπτόύηιν.  Ho  also  approves  of  Scholcficld's  explanation  of  the  fol- 
lowing part  of  the  sentence:  "Nequo  destituit,  quamdiu  ab  cA  cognita 
oavere  poterit  aliquis ;  sed  turn  demum,  cum  pcriculo  nullum  relinquitur 
rcmedium."  I  can  not,  however,  but  think  that  α  much  more  natural 
interpretation  is  that  of  Tortus  and  Kriiger,  whom  I  have  followed.  Nor 
is  the  sense  given  by  them  to  ίλλήηη  bo  entirely  destittito  of  authority 
as  has  been  eupppsed ;  for  the  verb  is  uied  in  exactly  the  same  manner, 
Kur.  El.  609,  ου  Λ\  U  βάθρων  yup  ττΰς  ώ^ρησηι,  <(>ιλοις  ονό'  ίλλέλοιπας 
ιλτάΓ,  Ιβθί  μου  κλύων.  In  the  present  passage  we  may  perhaps  under• 
ptand  ύυτφ  after  it,  so  that  the  preposition  may  haye  its  proper  tort», 
Bekker,  in  his  edit  of  1832,  proposoe  to  road  ονκίτι  ietirn. 


873  THaCYDIDEa   V.  Iciv^cr. 

Tesembling  the  greater  part  of  mankind,  who,  wlien  they 
might  have  been  saved  by  human  means,  after  visible  liopcs 
have  failed  them  in  their  distress,  betake  themselves  to  such 
ns  are  invisible,  namely,  prophecy,  and  oracles,  and  all  such 
things  as  bring  men  to  ruin,  together  with  the  hopes  resting 
upon  them." 

104.  Mel.  "Difficult  indeed  even  we,  bo  well  assured, 
consider  it  to  contend  against  your  power  and  fortune,  unless 
we  are  able  to  do  it  on  equal  terms.  However,  we  trust  that 
in  point  of  fortune  we  shall,  by  the  favor  of  the  gods,  not  Ix) 
worsted,  because  wo  are  standing  up  in  a  righteous  cause 
against  unjust  opponents ;  and  that  our  deficiency  in  power 
will  bo  made  up  by  our  Lacedamoniau  allies ;  who  are  under 
a  necessity  of  succoring  us,  if  for  no  other*  rcjison,  yet  on 
account  of  our  connectioa  with  them,  and  for  very  shame." 

105.  Ath.  "As  regards  then  the  favor  of  heaven,  wo  trust 
that  we  too  shall  not  fall  short  of  it :  since  we  are  not  requiring 
or  doing  any  thing  beyond  the  opinion  of  men,  with  resjn^ct  to 
the  gods,  or  their  determination,  with  respect  to  themselves. 
For  of  the  gods  we  hold  as  a  matter  of  opinion,  and  of  men 
ΛΥΟ  know  as  a  certuinty,  that,  in  obedience  to  an  irresistiblo 
instinct,  they  always  maintain  dominion,  wherever  they  are  the 
stronger.  And  wo  neither  enacted  this  law,  nor  were  the 
first  to  carry  it  out  when  enacted ;  but  liaving  received  it 
when  already  in  force,  and  being  about  to  leave  it  after  us  to 
be  in  force  forever,  λυο  only  avail  ourselves  of  it ;  knowing 
that  both  you  and  others,  if  raised  to  the  same  power,  would 
do  the  same.  And  so,  with  regard  to  the  gcxls,  we  are  with  good 
reason  fearless  of  defeat.  But  with  regard  to  your  opinion 
respecting  the  L:icedaimouiaus,  according  to  which  you  trust, 
that  from  a  sense  of  shame,  forsooth,  they  will  iissist  you ; 
though  we  bless  your  simplicity,  λνο  do  not  admire  your  folly. 
For  with  respect  to  theuiselves,  and  the  institutions  of  their 
country,  the  Lacedaiinonians  do  indeed  to  a  very  great  extent 
practice  virtue  ;  but  with  respect  to  other»,  though  wo  might 
descant  at  length  on  their  conduct  toward  them,  speaking 
nmst  concisely  wa  should  declare,  that  of  all  the  men  we  arc 
ai(]ualnted  with,  they  most  <ividently  consider  what  is  agree- 
able to  be  honorable,  and  what  is  expedient  to  be  just.  And 
yet  su(  h  a  view  of  things  is  not  in  favor  of  your  present  uu- 
re;isonable  hopes  of  safety." 


cvr.,cx.]  TIIUCYDIDEa  V.  οτα 

106.  Mel.  "  But  it  is  on  tliia  very  ground  that  we  now  rely 
on  their  senso  of  interest,  and  believe  that  they  will  not  be- 
tray us  Melianf»,  wlio  arc  tlieir  colonists,  and  so  loso  tho  con- 
fidence of  tlu)so  Greeks  who  >vish  them  well,  Avhile  they  lielp 
those  Λνΐιο  arc  l)ostilo  to  tlieni.'* 

107.  Ath,  "Then  you  do  not  think  that  interest  is  con- 
nected with  security,  whereas  justice  and  lionor  are  practiced 
with  danger ;  a  course  on  which  tho  Lacedaemonians,  generally 
speaking,  least  of  all  men  venture." 

108.  Mel,  "  Nay,  but  wo  are  of  opinion  that  they  would 
even  incur  dangers  for  our  sake,  more  than  usual,  and  would 
regard  them  as  less  liazardous  than  in  tho  case  of  others; '  in- 
a'irauch  as  wo  lie  near  tho  Peloponnese,  for  tho  execution  of 
their  measures ;  while  in  feoling  wo  are,  through  our  kindred 
with  them,  more  to  be  trusted  than  another  party  would  be." 

109.  yl/A.  "Ay,  but  to  men  going  to  tako  part  in  a  quarrel 
safety  does  not  appear  to  consist  in  tho  good  feeling  of  those 
who  call  them  to  their  aid,  but  in  the.fHct  of  their  being  far 
su])erior  in  power  for  action  ;  and  tho  L^icedacmonians  look  to 
this  even  moro  than  tho  rest  of  the  Avprld.  At  any  rate, 
through  their  mistrusting  tlieir  own  resources,  it  is  only  in 
concert  with  many  allies  that  they  attack  those  who  are  near 
to  them;  so  that  it  is  not  likely  they  will  cross  over  to  an 
island,  Λνΐιίΐο  we  are  masters  of  the  sea." 

110.  Mel.  "  ]iut  they  Λνοι.Μ  have  others  to  send  ;  and  the 
Cretan  sea  is  of  Avide  cxtont,  and  to  intercept  a  party  in 
crossing  it  is  moro  diiHcult  for  those  who  command  it,  tlian  to 
<'scape  is  for  those  Λνΐιο  wif^h  to  eluflo  observation,  l^esides, 
if  they  shoul»l  be  disappointed  in  this,  they  would  proceed 
against  your  territory,  and  to  the  remainder  of  your  allies, 
such  as  Brasidas  did  not  reach  :  and  you  will  liavo  to  exert 
yourselves,  not  so  much  f  )Γ  territory  Λvhich  does  not  belong 
to  you,  as  for  your  own  confederacy  and  country." 

'  Ις  Λλληνς.]  Arnold  thinks  that  perhaps  ΐΓαρακινΛυνεϋσαι  or  πάρα• 
fia}.eTv  may  bo  substituted  for  tho  kindred  substantivo  κινΑννηνς,  so  ae  to 
avoid  tho  harsh  construction  of  κινΛννηνς  ff  αλλονς,  "pcricula  propter 
nUoa  suscopta,"  ns  Scholoflold  renders  it.  But  there  seems  no  necessity 
for  any  sucli  change,  if  ίς  bo  taken  in  tho  moro  general  scnso  of  relation, 
which  It  frequently  admits  of.  Compare  105.  1,  της  ΰι>Ηρωπειας  των  μίι> 
ϊς  τυ  Ofiov  νημίηεως  τών  tV  ϊς  (ΤΦΛς  αύτηϋς  ιίηνλήϋεως.  The  samo  senso 
must,  I  think,  bo  attributed  to  tho  ^nitivo  της  γνώμης  in  tho  last  clauso 
of  tho  chapter,  though  Poppo  objects  to  it,  and  proposes  to  substitute 
either  tho  dativo  or  accusative 


374  TIIUCYDIDES.  V.  .     [cxi 

111.  Ath.  "On  ibis  point  you,  as  well  as  others,  may  learn 
by  actual  experience,  and  not  remain  ignorant,  that  froni  no 
single  siege  did  the  Atbeuians  ever  yet  retreat  through  fear 
of  others.     But  it  strikes  us  that  though  you  said  you  would 
consult  for  the  safety  of  your  country,  you  have  in  all  this 
long  discussion  advanced  nothing  which  men  might  trust  to  for 
thinking  that  they  would  bo  saved ;  but  your  strongest  points 
depend  on  hope  and  futurity,  while  your  present  resources  are 
too  scanty,  comjiared  >vith  those  at  present  opposed  to  you,  to 
give  you  a  chance  of  esca[)e.     And  so  you  ati'ord  proof  of 
great  folly  in  your  views,  if  you  do  not  even  yet,  after  allow- 
ing us  to  retire,  adopt  some  counsel  more  prudent  than  this. 
For  you  surely  will  not  betiike  yourselves  to  that  shame,  which 
in  dangers  that  are  disgraceful,  because  foreseen,  destroys  men 
more   than  any  thing  else.     For  in  the  case  of  many  men, 
though  they  foresee  all  the  time  >vhat  they  are  running  into, 
the  tiling  which   is  called  disgrace,  by  the  inlluence  of  a  se- 
ducing name,  allures  them  on,  enslaved  as  they  are  to  the 
word,  in  fact  to  fall  wilfully  into  irretrievable  disasters,  and 
to  incur  a  shame  more  shanjeful  as  the  attendant   on   folly 
than  on  fortune.      Against  this  then   you,  if  you   take  good 
advice,   will    bo   on    your   guard  j    and    Λ\ϋ1    not    consider   it 
discreditable  to  submit  to  the  most  powerful  state,  Λvhen  it 
orters  you  fair  terms,  namely,  that  you  should  become  tributary' 
allies,  Avith  the  enjoyment  of  yt)ur  own  country  ;  and  when  a 
choice  of  war  or  safety  is  given  you,  to  avoid  choosing  through 
animosity  what  is  worse  for  you.     For  whatever  men  do  not 
yield  to  their  etjuals,  while  they  keep  on  good  terms  with  their 
BUi>eriors,  and  are  mo<lerato  to  their  inferii>rs,  they  would  be 
most  successful.     Consider  then,  even  after  wo  have  retired  ; 
and  reflect  again  and  again,  that  it  is  for  your  country  that  you 
are  consulting, '  whieh  you  can  do  but  for  one  country,  and 
for  once,  whether  it  prove  successful  or  unsuccessful." 

*  The  construction  of  this  sentence,  according  to  tho  common  rcadinf^, 
is  abandoned  as  desperate  by  all  the  editors,  (ί tiller  and  Bloomfield 
Rubstituto  ΐ(ττε  for  lauu  ,  but  Poppo  protusts  strongly  ai?ainst  tho  clian^?e. 
AVitli  duo  deferonco  to  such  authorities,  I  would  venture  to  ask,  whether• 
the  text,  as  it  stands,  may  not  bo  explained  by  supposing?  Cw?.tv(c(ini  to 
be  understood  with  ίπτηι — the  inthiitive  being  suggested  by  the  indica- 
tive at  tho  end  of  tho  anteeedent  clause — and  referring  f/»•,  not  to 
ττητιηΛογ,  as  has  been  done  hitherto,  but  to  iinvAt}i•.  'Kf  μΐ(ΐι>  would  then 
Ktund  without  its  substantivo,  as  it  dojs  Iloni.  11.  2.  37U,  though  iu  a 


rxii.cxv.J  THUCYDIDES.  V.  376 

112.  So  the  Athenians  retired  from  tlio  conference;  and 
the  Mclians,  having  been  left  ti>  themselves,  as  they  still 
tlioiijiht  pretty  nearly  the  sanio  as  they  had  maintained 
in  tiio  discussion,  gave  the  followinn^  answer :  "  AVe  neither 
tliink  differently  from  what  wo  did  at  first,  Athenians,  nor 
will  we  in  a  short  space  of  time  rob  of  its  liberty  a  city  which 
li.xs  now  been  inhabited  seven  hun«lred  yt-tirs ;  but  trusting  to 
the  fortune  >vhich,  by  the  favor  of  heaven,  has  hitherto"  pre- 
served it,  and  to  the  lielp  of  man,  esi)ecially  of  the  Laccda;- 
monians,  wo  will  enfleavor  to  save  ourselves.  But  Λνο  propose 
to  you  that  wo  should  bo  your  friends,  and  the  enemies  of 
ni'ither  party;  and  that  you  should  retire  from  our  country 
after  making  such  a  treaty  as  may  appear  suitable  for  both 
sides." 

113.  Such  then  was  the  answer  which  the  Melians  gave. 
The  Athenians,  now  departing  from  tho  conference,  said: 
"  Well  then  you  are  the  only  men  who  by  these  counsels,  as 
appears  ta  us,  consider  what  is'  future  as  more  cert.iin  than 
what  is  seen,  and  regard  what  is  out  of  sight  as  already  oc- 
curring, K'ciiuse  you  wish  it;  and  having  stakeil  and  relied 
most  on  [such  things  as 'J  Lacedaemonians,  and  fortune,  and 
hopes,  you  will  also  be  most  disaj)jM^inted." 

114.  So  tho  Athenian  embassadors  returned  to  their  forces: 
aiul  their  generals,  since  the  Melians  did  not  listen  at  all  to 
their  pwposals,  imme<liately  proceeded  to  apply  themselves  to 
war;  and  having  divided  tho  work  between  the  different 
states,  inclose<l  the  Melians  with  lines  on  all  sides.  Afterwanls, 
the  Athenians  led  a  part  of  their  own  troops  and  the  allies, 
to  keep  guard  both  by  land  and  sea,  and  returned  with  tho 
main  body  of  the  forces.  Those  Avho  were  left  behind  remain- 
ed and  besieged  tlio  place. 

115.  About  tho  same  time   an  Argivo  force  invaded  tho 

'lifToront  sense.  Or,  if  that  bo  considered  a  difficulty,  it  would  perhaps 
bo  nothing  inconsistent  with  tho  frequently  carclesa  stylo  of  Thucydides 
to  suppose  a  confusion  of  two  expressions,  bo  that  both  i/v  and  μίαν 
should  bo  left  in  concord  with  <^ονλήν.  Tho  sense  of  tho  passage  would 
certainly  bo  moro  natural,  and  tho  construction'  easier,  if  r/f  could  bo 
substituted  for  »>:  btit  a.%  MS?',  afford  no  authority  for  tho  change,  and 
ji.^  it  does  not  appear  absolutely  necessary,  it  might  bo  considered  rash 
to  adopt  it. 

'  Theso  words. aro,  I  think,  implied  by  tho  omission  of  tho  article  b<x 
foro  tho  foUowing  nouns. 


3ΐβ  THUCYDIDEa  V.  [cxtl 

Phliasian  territory,  and  bein|:j  intercepted  by  an  ambuscade  of 
the  Phliasians  and  their  allies,  were  cut  off  to  the  number  of 
Eighty.  And  now  tlic  Athenians  at  Pylus  took  great  8iM)ils 
from  the  Lacedicmonians ;  in  consequence  of  which  the  Lace- 
daemonians, though  even  then  they  did  not  renounce  tlio 
treaty,  and  go  to  war  with  them,  proclaimed  that  any  of 
their  people  who  plciused  might  plunder  the  Athenians. 
Moreover,  the  Corinthians  proceeded  to  hostilities  witli  the 
Athenians  for  some  private  quarrels  of  their  own;  but  tlio 
rest  of  tlio  Peloponnesians  remained  quiet.  The  Melians,  too, 
attacked  by  night  the  part  of  the  Athenian  lines  opposite  the 
market-place,  and  slew  some  of  the  men ;'  and  having  carried 
in  corn,  and  as  many  useful  things  as  they  could,  returned  and 
kept  quiet ;  Avhile  the  Athenians  made  better  provision  for  the 
guard  in  future.     And  so  the  summer  ended. 

IIG.  The  following  winter,  the  Lacediemodians  intended  to 
march  against  the  Argive  te-rritorv,  but  returned  on  finding, 
when  at  the  frontier,  that  the  sacrifices  for  crossing  it  were  not 
favorable.  Owing  to  this  intention  on  their  part,  the  Ar- 
gives,  sus])ecting  a  certain  party  in  tlicir  city,  seized  some  of 
them,  while  others  eseajied  theui.  About  the  same  time,  the 
MeHans  again  took  a  part  of  the  Athenian  lines  in  another  di- 
rection, the  garrison  not  being  numerous.  A  fresh  force  hav- 
ing afterwards  come  from  Athens  in  consequence  of  these 
occurrences,  under  the  command  of  I'hilocrates  son  of  Demeas, 
and  the  inliabitants  being  now  vigorously  blockaded,  after 
there  had  also  been  some  treachery  practiced  by  their  own 
men,  they  surrendered  at  discretion  to  the  Athenians;  who 
put  to  death  all  the  ^ίelian  adults  they  took,  and  made  slaves 
of  the  children  and  w»>men.  As  for  the  country,  they  after- 
ward sent  out  five  hundred  colonists,  and  inhabited  it  them- 
selves. 

'  1.  e.,  of  tho  besic^'iug  forco.     See  liluonifiold's  note. 


BOOK  VI. 


1.  Τπκ  pamo  Tvintcr  tlio  Athenians  wislied  to  sail  a^jain  to 
Sicily,  with  a  larc^cr  annament  than  that  under  Laches  and 
Eurymedon,  and  brincf  it  into  subjection  to  them,  if  they  could  ; 
the  mass  of  the  jxioplo  beinpj  ignorant  of  the  size  of  the  island, 
and  the  number  of  its  inhabitants,  botli  Greeks  and  barbarians; 
and  that  they  >vere  undert^ikinj^  a  war  not  much  inferior  in 
magnitude  to  that  with  (he  reh>|)onnesians. 

For  the  voyat^o  round  Sicily  in  a  merchant  vessel  is  one  of 
not  much  less  than  eight  days ;  and  though  it  is  of  such  extent,' 
it  is  only  excluded  by  the  8i)aco  of  about  twenty  stades  of  sea 
from  l»cing  mainland. 

2.  Now  it  was  settled  originally  in  the  following  manner, 
and  these  were  all  the  nations  that  occupied  it.  The  earliest 
people  said  to  have  lived  in  any  part  of  the  country  are  tho 
Cyclopes  and  La^strygones ;  with  regard  to  wliom,  I  can  nei- 
ther tell  their  race,  nor  whence  they  camo  into  it,,  nor  whither 
they  departed  out  of  it :  but  let  tliat  suffico  which  has  been 
said  by  tho  poets,  and  which  every  body  in  any  way  knows  of 
them.  The  Sicanians  appear  to  have  been  the  first  who 
settled  in  it  after  them  ;  indeed,  as  they  themselves  assert, 
<!ven  before  them,  as  being  the  aboriginal  poj)ulation ;  but  ft» 
the  truth  is  found  to  be,  they  were  Iberians,  and  were  driven 
from  tho  river  Sicanus,  in  Theria,  by  the  Ligurians.  And  it 
was  from  them  that  the  island  was  at  that  time  called  Sicania, 
having  previously  been  called  Trinacria;  and  still,  even  to 
this  day,  they  inhabit  Sicily  in  its  western  districts.  Hut  on 
tho  capture  of  Troy,  eomo  of  tho  Trojan»,  having  cBcnped  tho 
(irceks,  camo  in  vessels  to  Sicily»  and  haviog  sottled  in  tho 

*  "Tho  rcnuonini?  omployod  in.  tlio  words  τηηηντη  oiW  Is  very  much 
in  tho  stylo  of  tho  jfooffrnphy  of  Herodotus.  Tho  notion  is,  that  so  lar|?o 
nn  island  ought  to  liavo  boon  in  tho  midst  of  a  wide  soa,  proportioned  to 
its  own  mognitudo ;  ond  not  to  havo  been  so  close  upon  tho  coast,  as  to 
loom  a. sort  of  appendage  to  tho  mainland."— ilrnoW. 


878  TnUCYDIDES.  ΥΓ.  [in. 

noigliborhood  of  tho  Sicanians,  they  were  all  together  called 
Ely  mi,  and  their  cities,  Kryx  and  Sigesta.     There  were  also 
settled  with  them  some  of  tho  rhocians,  who,  while  returning 
from  Troy,  were  carried  by  a  tem[)est,  first  t»>  Libya,  and  then 
from  that  country  to  Sicily.     The  Sicols,  again,  went  over  into 
Sicily  from  Italy  (tor  it  was  there  that  they  used  to  live),  while 
flying  from  some  (Jpicans ;  crossing  on  rafts  (as  is  j)robal>le,  and 
reported  to  have  been  the  case),  having  watched  an  opportunity 
for  tho  passage,  when  tho  wind  set  down  tho  strait;'  or,  perhaps, 
having  sailed  to  it  in  some  other  way.     Even  to  this  day  there 
are  still  Sicels  in  Italy ;  and  it  was  in  this  way  that  the  country 
was  called  Italyj  after  Itiilus,  a  king  of  tho  Sicels  who  had 
that  name.     Having  gone,  tlien,  to  Sicily  with  a  great  host, 
and  being    victorious  in  battle  over  the  Sicanians,  they  com- 
pelled them  to  remove  to  the  suuthern  and  western  parts  of  it, 
and  caused  the  island  to  be  called   Sieily,  instead  of  Sicania, 
and  occupied  the  best  j)arts  of  tho  land ;  liaving  held  them, 
after  they  crussi'd  over,  nearly  three  hundred  years  before  any 
Greeks  came  into  Sicily ;   an»!  still,  even  to  this  day,  they  re- 
tain tho  central  and  nurthern  j)arts  of  tho  island.     There  Λvere 
also  PhaMiieians  living  around'   tho  Λνΐιοΐο  of  Sicily,  having 
occupied  promontories  on  the  sea-coast,  and  tho  small  islands 
aljaciont,  for  ])urposes  of  trading  Λvith   tho   Sicels:   but  after 
the  Greeks  sailed  to  it  in  great  numlnTs  by  sea,  in  addition  to 
those  alrea<ly  there,  thoy  evacuated  the  greater  ])art  of  them, 
and  lived  in  Motya,  Solois,  and   Tanormus,  near  the  Elymi, 
having  united  with   them,  both  from   confidence  in  their  al- 
liance, and  because  from  that  (piailx'r  the  v»)yago  from   Sicily 
to  Carthage  is  shortest.     As  regards  barbarians,  then,  so  many 
of  them    were    thero   that    inliabited    Sicily,  and    in   such   a 
manner. 

3.  Of  the  Greeks,  on  tho  other  hand,  some  Chalcidians  of 
Euboea  first  sailed  >vith  ThucK'S  as  the  leader  of  the  colony, 
and  founded  Naxos,  and  built  the  altar  to  Apollo  Archegetes,* 

'  Or,  "  set  steadily  in  that  direction,"  i.  β.,  was  fivorublo. 

ί  Or,  as  Poppo  explains  it,  "<///  about  llio  wholo  isluml."  But  tho 
words  iinniediately  following  aro  in  favor  of  tlio  other  intcrpretatit)n. 
(lunij>aro  eh.  85.  2,  Kuimft  νηπιώταν  όΐ'Τας  Kui  cu'/./jrrTuL'r,  ύωτι  iv  χωρίοΐζ 
ί::ικ(ΐίΐ)(ΐις  ilni  -^tftl  τϊ,ν  ΧΙύ.οττύννηαον. 

'  "  The  epithet  άρχηγέτης  or  ΰρχαγίτας,  as  tho  Dorians  wroto  tho 
word,  was  given  to  Apollo,  because  tho  Chaloidiau  colony  had  sailed  to 
kJicily  by  his  direction.     Seo  Scholiast  on  Tiudar,  Pytl».  Λ''.  80." — Arnold. 


IV.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VI.  370 

whuAi  is  now  out«?iilo  tho  city,  nnd  on  whicli,  when  any  deputies 
to  the  games  sail  from  Sicily,  tliey  first  sacrifice.     Syracuso 
was  foumlc'(l  the  next  year  by  Archias,  of  the  family  of  lier- 
cule»  at  Corintli,  after  he  liad  first  expelled   the  Sicola  from 
the  island ;  on  >vliich,  beint^  no  long(»r  surrounded  with  water, 
the  inner  city  now  stand» ;  and  at  a  later  |x>riod  the  outer  ono 
also  was  inclosed  within  the  >vall,  and  l)ecanio  j)opulous.    Morc- 
(•vcr,  Thucles  and  the  Chaleidians  from  Naxos  set  out  in  the 
fifth  year  after  the  foundinjij  of  Syracuse,  and  liavincj  expelled 
the  Sicels  by  arms,  re-scttled  Lcontini,  and  after  it  Catena,  tho 
Catauians  themselves  having  chosen  Evarchns  as  their  founder. 
4.  At  the  same  time  Lamis  arrived  in  Sicily  with  a  colony 
froin  Aiegara,  and  after  settling   in  a  place  .beyond  tho  river 
I'antacyas,  Trotilus  by  name,  and  subsequently  removing  thence, 
and  uniting  for  a  short  time  Avith  tho  Chaleidians  at  Leontini, 
mid  Ix'ing  driven  out  by  them,  he  founded  Thapsus,  and  then 
he  himself  died ;   while  the  rest,  being  ex])elled  from  Thapsus, 
cfil'cted  a  settlement  at  Megara,  called  tho  Ilyblacan,  Hyblo, 
a  Sici'l  king,  having  given  up  the  place  to  them  and  Io<l  them 
in.      After  inhabiting   it  two   liundred    and   forty-fivo  years, 
they  were  expelled  from  tho  city  and  country  by  (ielo,  tyrant 
of  Syracuse.      13eforo   their   expulsion,   liowevcr,   a   hundred 
years  after  their  settlement,  they  founded  Selinus,  having  sent 
l*amillus  for  tho  purpose,  >vho  came  from  Megara,  their  mother- 
city,  and  joined  them  in  founding  it.    (iela,  again,  was  founded 
l>y  Antiphemus  from   Rhodes,  and   ?>ntimus  from  Crete,  who 
leil  a  common  colony,  in  tho  forty -fifth  year  after  tho  founding 
of  Syracuse.•    The  name  of  tho  city  was  taken  from  the  river 
<ielas,  but  tho  spot  where  "the  city,"   [properly  so  called], 
now  stands,  and  which  Λvas  first  fortified,  is  named   Lindii.' 
The  institutions  established  among  them  were  Dorian.     Just 
about  a  hundred  and  eight  years  after  their  own  settlement, 
tho  Geloans  settled  Acragas,  [or  Agrigentum],  naming  tho 
<ity   from   tho   river  Acragas :    they   mado    Aristonous    and 
l^ystilus  tho  leaders  of  their  colony,  and  gave  it  tho  institu- 
tion» of  the  Geloans.     Zancle,  ag;iin,  \vtis  originally  founded 
from  Cuma,  the  Chalcidian  city  in  tlie  country  of  tho  Opici, 
by  some  freebooters  who  Avcnt  there ;  but  afterward  a  great 

*  •'  So  named  bocauso  Antlphomus  and  hie  Rhodian  companions  had 
t>rincipally  como  from  Lindua  in  Rhodoe.  See  Herod.  VII,  153.  2."— 
Arnold. 


880  THUCYDIDES.  VI,  [v.  \t, 

number  wont  from  Chalcis  and  the  rest  of  Euboea,  and  ebared 
with  them  in  the  occupation  of  tho  land ;  iU  founders  beiii^ 
l^erierea  and  Crata?menos,  one  from  Cuma,  the  other  from 
Chalcis.  Λ3  regards  its  name,  it  was  at  first  called  Zauclc  by 
the  Sicels,  because  tho  site  rcsinibles  a  reaping-hook  iu  figure, 
and  tho  reaj)ing-hook  is  called  by  tho  Sicels  zanclon.  After- 
ward, these  settlers  were  expelled  by  pome  Samians  and  other 
lonians,  who  landed  in  Sicily  while  fiying  from  tho  Medcs ;  and 
again,  Anaxilas,  tyrant  of  Rhogium,  having  not  long  aftef 
expelled  the  Samians,  and  colonizi'd  their  country  with  a  mixed 
population,  changed  its  name  to  Messana,  after  his  own  original 
country. 

δ.  llimora  was  foun<led  fnmi  Zanclo  by  Euclidos,  Simus, 
and  Saco,  and  most  of  thoso  wlio  went  to  the  colony  >vere  Clinl- 
cidians,  though  there  were  also  unitod  with  them  some  exlK  s 
from  Syracuse,  who  had  been  defeated  in  a  strife  of  factions — 
tho  Mylaitida»,  as  they  are  called.  Tho  languaj^o  was  a  mix- 
ture of  the  Chalcidian  and  Dorian ;  but  the  Chalcidian  wero 
the  prevailing  institutions.  Aerie  and  Casniense  wero  foimded 
by  tho  Syraeusans;  Acrai  seventy  years  after  Syracuse,  and 
Ciismenai  nearly  twenty  years  after  Acraj.  Camarina  was 
in  tho  first  instance  founded  by  tho  Syrac'usaus,  just  about  a 
liundred  and  thirty-five  years  after  the  building  of  Syracuse,, 
its  founders  being  lJ|ascon  and  Menecolus.  l»ut  tho  Camarinic- 
ans  Iiaving  been  driven  out  atler  a  Avar  by  the  Syraeusans  on 
account  of  their  revolting  from  them,  some  time  after,  llipjK)- 
crates,  tyrant  of  Gela,  having  received  their  territory  as  a 
ransom  for  some  Syra<*usan  jirisoners,  liimself  acting  as  a 
founder,  re-settled  Camarina.  And  having  again  been  de- 
populated by  Gelo,  it  >vas  settled  for  tho  third  time  by  tho 
(jeloans. 

C.  So  many  wero  the  nations  of  Greeks  and  barbarians  that 
inhabited  Sicily,  and  such  was  tho  size  of  tho  island  against 
which  tho  Athenians  wero  eager  to  mako  an  expedition ;  be- 
ing desirous  (to  mention  their  truest  motive)  of  gaining 
dominion  over  the  whole  of  it ;  but  at  tho  same  time  wishing, 
as  a  plausible  pretext,  to  succor  their  own  kinsmen,  and  the 
allies  they  had  gained  besides.  Above  all,  they  were  insti- 
gated by  embassadors  from  tho  Segestans,  λ\1ιο  had  come  to 
Athens  and  invoked  their  aid  more  earnestly  than  ever.  For 
being  borderers  of  the  Selinuutines,  they  had  gone  to  war  with 


m]  TnuCYDIDES.  VI.  381 

tliotn  on  certain  questions  respecting  marriaG^c  righti»,  and  for 
some  debated  territory ;  and  the  Selinuntiues,  Iiaving  taken 
tlio  Syracusang  for  their  allies,  were  pressing  them  bard  with 
hostilities  both  by  land  and  sea.  Consequently  the  Segestans 
rctninded  tho  Athenians  of  their  alliance,  which  had  been 
formed  in  tho  time  of  Laches  and  of  the  former  war  with  tho 
I/'ontines,  and  begged  them  to  send  a  fleet  and  assist  them ; 
alleging  many  other  things,  and,  as  the  sum  and  substance  of 
all,  *'  that  if  tho  SyracusaiH  should  be  unpunished  for  tho  do- 
population  of  Leontini,  and  by  ruining  such  of  the  Athenian 
allies  as  were  still  left  should  themselves  obtain  tho  Avholo 
power  of  Sicily ;  there  would  be  danger  of  their  some  time  or 
other  coming  with  a  largo  force,  as  Dorians,  to  tho  aid  of  Do- 
rians, on  the  strength  of  their  connection,  and,  moreover,  as 
colonists,  to  tho  aid  of  tho  Peloponnesians  who  liad  sent  them 
out,  and  so  joining  in  tho  destruction  of  tho  Athenian  power. 
It  wero  wiso  therefore,  in  concert  with  the  remaining  allies,  to 
resist  the  Syracusans :  especially  as  they  would  themselves 
furnish  moncjr  sufficient  for  the  war/'  The  Athenians,  hearing 
these  things  in  their  assemblies  from  tho  Segestans  and  their 
supporters,  >vho  wcro  repeatedly  alleging  them,*  passed  a  de- 
cree on  the  subject ;  sending  embassadors,  in  the  first  place,  to 
see  about  the  money,  whether  it  were  already  laid  up,  as  they 
asserted,  in  the  treasury  and  in  the  temples,  and  at  the  same 
tune  to  ascertain  Λvhat  was  tho  state  of  tho  war  witli  tho  Sc- 
hnuntines. 

1.  Tho  embassadors  of  tho  Athenians,  then,  wcro  thus  sent  to 
Sicily.  The  same  winter,  tho  Lacedannonians  and  their  allies, 
except  the  Corinthians,  having  made  an  expedition  into  tho  Ar- 
givc  territory,  ravaged  a  small  part  of  tho  land,  and  took  some 
yokes  of  oxen,  and  carried  oil*  some  corn.  They  also  settled 
the  Argivo  exiles  at  Omeaj ;  and  having  left  them  a  few  men 
from  tho  rest  of  their  forces  also,  and  raado  a  truce  for  some 
time,  on  condition  of  tho  Orneataj  and  tho  Argives  not  injur- 
ing each  other's  land,  they  returned  homo  with  their  army. 
Jiut  tho  Athenians  having  como  no  long  timo  after  with  thirty 
ships  and  six  hundred  heavy-armed,  tho  Argives,  in  con- 
junction with  the  Athenians,  taking  tho  field  with  all  their 
force,  besieged  tho  men  in  Omcaj  one  day ;  but  at  night,  tho 

*  Or,  •'  Toted  to  send,"  etc.,  according  to  Bckkor'e  and  Poppo'a  reading 
of  πίμψαί,  iostead  of  πίμφαντις,  • 


882  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [πιι,,ιχ. 

army  having  bivouacked  at  bodio  distanco,  thoy  escaped  out  of 
it.  Tlie  next  day,  the  Argives,  on  finding  this,  razed  OrnoiB  and 
returned,  and  the  Athenians  afterward  went  home  with  their 
ships.  Moreover,  the  Athenians  took  by  sea  some  of  their  own 
cavalry,  and  the  Macedonian  exiles  who  were  >vith  them,  to 
Methone,  tlie  country  bordering  on  Macedonia,  and  ravaged  tho 
territory  of  Perdiceas.  The  Lacedaiuioninns  therefore  sent  to 
the  Cluilcidians  Thraceward,  >vho  ha<i  a  truce  with  the  Athe- 
nians from  one  ten  days  to  another,  and  urged  them  to  join 
Terdiccaa  in  the  war;  but  they  >vould  not.  And  so  tho  winter 
ended,  and  the  sixteenth  year  of  this  war,  of  which  Thucydides 
wrote  the  history. 

8.  Tho  following  summer,  as  soon  as  tho  spring  commenced, 
the  embassadors  of  the  Athenians  came  from  Sicily,  and  tho 
Segestans  with  tliem,  bringing  sixty  talents  of  uncoined  silver, 
as  a  month's  pay  for  sixty  ships  wiiieh  they  were  to  beg  them 
to  send.  And  tho  Athenians  having  held  an  assembly,  and 
heard  from  the  Segestans  and  their  own  embiissadors  a  seduct- 
ive and  untrue  report  on  tho  other  subjects,  and  also,  with  re- 
gard to  the  money,  that  it  was  provided  in  abundance  in  tho 
tem])le3  and  tho  treasurj^ ;  they  voted  to  send  sixty  ships,  w  ith  t 
Alcibiades  son  of  Clinias,  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  and  Lamachus  I 
son  of  Xonophanes,  as  commanders,  Avith  full  ]>owers,  to  assist  ι 
the  Segestans  against  the  Selinuntines,  and  to  join  in  re-found-  | 
ing  Leonlini,  should  they  gain  any  advauUige  in  tho  war,  and  ! 
to  carry  out  all  other  measures  in  Sicily,  as  they  should  deem  * 
best  for  the  Athenians. — On  the  iifth  day  after  this,  an  assembly 

was  again  held,  to  consider  in  Avliat  way  the  preparations  for 
the  ships  should  be  most  (jui(,kly  made,  and  whatever  else  >vas  | 

wanted  by  the  generals  be  voted  them  for  the  expedition. 
Nicias  then,  λυΙιο  had  been  chosen  against  his  will  to  take  tho 
command,  and  thought  that  the  state  was  not  well  advised,  but, 
on  a  trifling  and  specious  pretext,  Λva3  coveting  tho  whole  of 
Sicily — an  arduous  design  to  achieve — came  forward   Avith  a  i 

Λvish  to  divert  tho  Athenians  from  it,  and  advised  them  to  the  | 

following  ertect : 

9.  "  This  assembly  Avas,  it  is  true,  convened  to  consider  the 
subject  of  our  preparations,  namely,  in  what  way  we  ought  to  j 
make  the  expedition   to  Sicily.     My  oj)inion,  however,  is,  that  : 
we  ought  still  to  consider  this  very  point,  Avhether  it  be  better 

to  send  out  our  ships ;   and  not  on  svich  slight  deliberation  on 


χ.]  THUCTDIDES.  VI.  383 

matters  of  prc«it  moment,  at  the  instigation  of  aliens,  to  take 
upon  ourselves  a  war,  with  which  wo  have  nothing  to  do. 
Λη<1  yet  I,  for  my  own  part,  receive  honor  from  eiich  a 
])olicy,  ami  have  less  fear  than  others  for  my  own  personal 
safety:  (though  I  consider  that  man  to  be  an  equally  good 
citizen  who  takes  some  forethought  both  for  his  person  and 
liis  proj>erty ;  for  such  a  man  ΛνοηΜ,  for  his  own  sake,  be  most 
desirous  that  liis  country  also  should  prosper:)  nevertheless, 
neither  aforetime  have  I  ever  spoken  contrary  to  my  con- 
victions, for  the  sake  of  being  honored  above  others,  nor 
will  I  now,  but  as  I  think  best,  so  >vill  I  speak.  And  thotigh 
against  your  inclinations  my  words  would  be  powerless,  should  I 
adnse  you  to  keep  Avhat  you  have,  and  not  expose  your  present 
possessions  to  danger  for  things  Avhich  arc  uncertain  and  future ; 
yet  that  neither  are  you  timely  in  your  haste,  nor  the  objects 
of  your  ambition  easy  to  attain,  on  these  points  I  will  give  you 
instruction. 

10.  *'i  say  then,  that  you  Λvish,  though  leaving  many 
enemies  behind  you  liere,  to  bring  hither  ifresh  ones  besides, 
by  sailing  there.  And  you  fancy,  perhaps,  that  the  treaty 
that  has  beon  made  by  you  affords  some  ground  of  confidence. 
]»ut  though,  as  long  as  you  remain  quiet,  that  will,  indeed, 
l>c  a  treaty — in.  name  (for  to  this  condition  have  certain  per- 
sons here  and  among,  your  enemies  brought  it  by  their  in- 
trigues), yet  if  wo  are  ever  defeated  with  any  considerable 
force,  tiioso  who  hate  us  will  quickly  make  an  attack  upon  us; 
r-eeiiig,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  arrangement  was  mado  of 
necessity  by  them,  under  circumstances  of  disaster,  and  of 
greater  discredit  to  them  than  to  us ;  and,  secondly,  that  in 
this  very  arrangement  wo  have  many  subjects  open  to  debate. 
There  are  some,  too,  who  have  not  yet  acceded  even  to  this 
composition,  such  as  it  is,  and  those  not  tho  least  powerful 
states ;  but  some  of  them  arc  at  war  with  ns  downright,  and, 
in  tlio  case  of  others,  because  tho  Lacedficmonians  remain 
quiet  at  present,  they  too  are  restrained  by  truces  from  one 
ten  days  to  another,  l^ut  probably,  if  they  ebould  find  our 
|)ower  divided  (which  we  are  now  so  anxious  to  bring  about), 
they  would  witli  all  their  might  attack  us,  in  conjunction  witn 
the  Sicclipts,  whose  alliance  they  woTild  in  time  past  hive 
valued  most  highly.'  Every  one  therefore  ought  to  lool»  to 
I  Literally,  •'abovo  many  things."    Compare  T.  33. 


384  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  fxi. 

this,  and  not  presume  to  run  risks  with  α  state  bo  unsettled, 
and  to  grasp  at  another  eiiipiro  before  we  have  secured  the 
one  we  have ;  seeing  that  the  Chalcidians  Thraceward,  though 
they  have  revolted  from  us  so  many  years,  are  still  unsub- 
dued ;  and  there  are  some  others  on  the  ditierent  coasts  of  the 
mainland  who  yield  us  but  a  doubtful  obedience.  And  so 
we  are  quick  to  succor  the  Segestans,  who  aro  our  allies,  for- 
sooth, as  being  injured ;  but  on  those  by  whoso  revolt  wo  have 
ourselves  long  ago  been  injured,  wo  still  defer  to  avenge  our- 
Bclves. 

11.  "  And  yet  the  latter,  if  subdued,  might  be  kept  in  sub- 
jection by  us ;  but  the  former,  even  if  wo  conquered  them,  we 
should  hardly  be  able  to  govern,  so  far  oiF  and  so  numerous  jw 
they  are.  But  it  is  folly  to  ^o  against  men  Avhom  we  could 
not  keep  under,  if  Λve  conquered  them  ;  while,  if  λυο  did  not 
succeed  in  the  attempt,  we  should  not  be  in  the  same  position 
as  we  were  before  making  it.  Again,  regarding  the  present 
condition  of  the  Siceliots,  tliey  a] «pear  to  me  even  still  less 
likely  to  bo  formidable  to  us,  if  the  Syracusans  should  have 
dominion  over  them ;  tl>at  supposition  Λνΐΐΐι  which  the  Seges- 
tans especially  try  to  frighten  us.  For  at  present  they  might, 
perhaps,  como  either  iis  separate  states,  to  ohWfrQ  the  Kicedic- 
monians;  but  in  tho  other  case,  it  is  not  likely  that  they 
should  urideiljike  the  expedition,  empire  against  empire :  for 
in  the  same  manner  as  tiiey,  in  conjunction  with  the  Laecd.-e- 
monians,  had  taken  away  oui-s,  it  is  probable  that  they  woul«l 
have  their  own  taken  away  by  the  samo  Peloponnesians,  and 
by  tho  samo  prin(;iple.*  And  tho  Greeks  in  those  parts  would 
bo  most  in  awe  of  us,  if  we  did  not  go  there  at  all ;  and  next 
to  that,  if  after  making  a  demonstration  of  our  power  wo  re- 
tired in  a  short  time :  but  if  we  should  meet  Avith  any  reverse, 
they  would  very  ouie.kly  despise  us,  and  attack  us  in  concert 
with  our  enemies  here.  For  we  all  know  that  what  is  furthest 
otf  is  most  admired,  and  what  gives  the  least  room  for  having 
its  fame  tested.  And  this  has  at  present  been  your  east•, 
Athenians,  with  referenco  to  tho  Lacedajmonians  and  their 
allies ;  from  having,  contrary  to  your  expectation,  gained  tho 
advantage  over  them  (comparing  your  present  position  with 
th(3   fears  you  at  lirst  entertained),  you  have   despised  them, 

•  /.  Λ,  their  wish  to  resoiio  tho  cities  from  Iho  yoko  of  Syracuse,  aa 
lluy  had  done  from  that  of  Atheua 


xii.,xiii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  VI.  385 

and  are  now  desiring  the  conquest  of  Sicily.  Yon  ought  not, 
liowcver,  to  1)0  elated  through  the  misfortunes  of  your  advcr- 
f^aries,  but  then  only  to  feel  confident  when  you  have  mastered 
their  spirits ;  nor  should  you  think  that  the  Lacedaimonians 
are  doing  ouglit  but  considering,  in  consequence  of  their  dis- 
grace, in  what  way  they  may  even  now,  if  possible,  overthrow 
us,  and  bring  their  own  discredit  to  a  hapj>y  termination  j 
especially  as  they  have  studied  a  reputation  for  bravery,  as  a 
thing  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  for  the  greatest  length  of 
time.  So  that  our  great  struggle  will  be,  if  we  are  wise,  not 
for  the  Segestans  in  Sicily,  ηκ'η  who  are  barbarians,  but  that 
Ave  may  vigorously  guard  against  a  state  which  is  plotting  against 
us  by  the  spread  of  oligarchical  j)rineiples,' 

12.  "We  ought  to  remember,  too,  that  wo  have  but  lately 
recovered  a  little  from  a  great  pestilence  and  war,  so  as  to  bo 
somewhat  recruited  both  in  our  proj)erty  and  persons ;  and 
that  it  is  but  fair  for  us  to  expend  these  hero  at  homo,  on  our- 
selves, and  not  on  these  exiles  who  are  begging  your  aid ;  Λνΐιοββ 
interest  it  is  to  utter  specious  falsehoods,  and  contending  at 
their  neighbors*  risk,  while  they  themselves  only  contribute 
words,  cither  to  show  no  proper  gratitude  if  they  succeed,  or  if 
in  any  instance  they  fail,  to  ruin  their  friends  along  >vith  them. 
And  if  there  be  any  one  who  is  pleased  at  being  appointed  to 
command,  and  therefore  urges  you  to  make  the  expedition, 
looking  to  his  own  interest  alone  (especially  as  he  is  yet  too 
young  {(vr  office),  in  order  that  while  he  is  arlmired,  for  liis 
horse-keeping,  he  may  also  receive  from  his  aj^pointment  somo 
benefit  on  the  score  of  expense  ;  do  not,  cither,  allow  that  man 
to  exhibit  his  own  individual  splendor  at  the  peril  of  the  state  ; 
but  consider  that  such  men  injure  the  public  interests,  whilo 
they  squander  their  private  possessions  ;  and  that  this  is  a  busi- 
ness of  great  importance,  and  not. one  for  a  young  man  to  de- 
liberate upon,  and  rashly  to  take  in  hand. 

13.  "lam  alarmed,  indeed,  when  I  see  such  characters  sit- 
ting here  at  present  by  the  side  of  that  same  individual,  in 
compliance  Avith  his  bidding ;  and  in  return  I  bid  the  older 
men — whichever  of  them  may  have  one  of  those  characters 
sitting  by  him — not  to  be  put  down  through  shame,  in  order 
to  avoid  being  thought  a  coward  if  he  should  not  vote  for  going 

*  Or,  OS  Arnold  renders  it,  "in  the  way  of  oligarchy,"  i  e.,  threatening 
u«.  not  Avith  the  loss  of  our  conquests,  but  with  a  change  of  govemmenV 


380  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  («τ.,  xv. 

to  war ;  iior,  "as  their  opi^ncnts  themselves  might  feel,  to  bo 
madly  enamored  of  what  they  do  not  j)08seKs;  beinjof  eon- 
vinced  that  in  very  few  thincjs  do  men  suceeed  throiii^li  desire, 
but  iu  very  many  through  forethought ;  but  in  behalf  of  their 
country,  as  exposing  itself  to  the  greatest  danger  it  has  over 
done,  to  give  their  support  to  the  op|x)sito  side,  and  vote  that 
the  Siceliots  keep  the  siuno  boundaries  with  respeet  to  Us  as  at 
present — boundaries  >vith  which  no  one  can  find  fault — namely, 
the  Ionian  Seii,  if  one  sail  along  shore ;  and  the  Sicilian,  if  ono 
cross  the  open  deep ;  and  that  while  they  enjoy  their  own  po*• 
bc'ssions,  they  shall  also  settle  their  own  quarrels ;  and  that  wo 
tell  the  Sogestans  in  particular,  that  since  thoy  went  to  war 
W'lUi  tho  Sc'linuntines  in  the  first  instance  without  consulting 
the  Athenians,  they  may  also  make  peace  with  them  by  them- 
selves :  and  that  we  do  not  in  future  make  alliance,  as  we  have 
been  accustomed,  with  men  w  horn  λυο  shall  assist  >vhen  they 
are  imfortiuiato,  and  when  we  ask  assistance  ourselves,  ehall 
not  obtain  it 

14.  "And  do  you,  Prytanis,  if  you  think  it  your  duty  to  caro 
for  the  state,  and  if  you  wish  to  show  yourself  a  good  citizen, 
put  this  to  the  vote,  and  tiike  a  second  time  the  opinion  of  the 
Athenians ;  reflecting,  if  you  feel  afraid  to  move  the  question 
again,  that  the  violation  of  the  law  would  noi,  with  so  many 
abettors,  involve  any  guilt ;  but  that  you  would  be  acting  as  a 
physician  to  the  state,  when  it  has  taken  bad  counsel ;  and  that 
good  government  consists  in  this — for  a  man  to  do  his  country 
as  much  good  as  possible,  or,  at  least,  to  do  it  voluntarily  no 
harm." 

15.  To  this  effect  spoke  Nicias.  Of  the  Athenians,  the 
greater  part  who  came  forward  advised  making  the  expeditioi», 
and  not  animlling  what  luid  been  decreed ;  though  there  were 
some  also  who  spoke  against  it.  But  the  man  who  most  earn- 
estly recommended  the  expedition  Λvas  Alcibiades  son  of 
Clinias,  who  at  once  wished  to  thwart  Nicias — both  as  being' 
in  other  respects  opposed  to  him  in  politics,  and  because  he  had 
alluded  to  him  in  a  disparaging  manner — and  Λνββ  most  anxious 
to  take  the  command,  and  hoped  by  that  means  to  reduce  Sicily 
and  Carthage,  and  at  the  same  time,  in  consequence  of  his 
success,  to  promote  his  own  private  interests  in  point  of  fame 
and  wealth.  For,  iH'ing  heKl  in  high  repute  by  the  citizens, 
he  indulged  his  inclinations  on  too  largo  a  scale  (or  hu  existing 


χπ.)  THUCTDIDES.    VL  387 

means,  with  regard  to  keeping  horses,  and  all  other  expenses. 
And  this  too  Λvas  wliat  afterward  mainly  caused  tho  destruc- 
tion of  the  Athenian  state.  For  being  alarmed  at  tho  extent  of 
Iiis  disregard  for  tho  laws  in  his  own  person,  with  respect  to 
his  mode  of  life,  and  of  his  designs  in  tho  measures  he  severally 
undertook,  in  whatever  business  ho  might  bo  engaged,  tho 
greater  part  of  tho  people  became  his  enemies  on  tho  belief  of 
his  aiming  at  tyranny ;  and  though  in  his  public  capacity  ho 
conducted  tho  war  most  ably,  yet  being  severally  offended  at 
his  habits  in  his  private  life,  and  committing  tho  administration 
to  others,  after  no  long  interval  they  brought  their  country  to 
ruin.  However,  at  that  tirao  ho  camo  forward,  and  advised  tho 
Athenians  as  follows : 

10.  "It  is  both  Ixifitting,*  Athenians,  for  me,  moro  than 
others,  to  enjoy  command  (for  with  this  topic  must  I  com- 
menco  my  speech,  since  Cleon  has  attacked  mo  upon  it),  and 
at  tho  same  time,  I  deem  myself  worthy  of  it.  For  thoso 
things  about  which  I  am  so  assailed  with  clamor,*  confer 
honor  on  my  ancestors  and  myself,  and  benefit  on  my  country 
at  the  same  time.  For  the  Greeks  considered  our  state  to  bo 
greater  than  they  had  ever  done,  even  beyond  its  actual  power, 
through  tho  splendor  of  my  display  as  its  deputy  to  the  Olympic 
games ;  (whereas  they  hoped  before  that  it  had  been  exhausted 
by  the  war);  inasm\ich  as  I  entered  seven  chariots — a  number 
which  no  private  individual  had  ever  yet  entered — and  gained 
the  first  prize,  and  was  s(»cond  and  fourth,  and  provided  evory 
thing  else  in  a  stylo  worthy  of  my  victory.  For  according  to 
tho  usual  view  of  them,  Rueh  things  are  a  subjoct  of  honor ; 
while,  from  tho  practice  of  them,  an  idea  of  ^wer  is  also 
formed.  And  again,  whatever  distinction  I  gain  at  homo  by 
my  exhibitions  of  choruses,*  or  in  any  other  way,  it  is  naturally 
envied  by  my  fellow-citizens,  but  for  foreigners  this  too  has  an 
appearance  of  power,*    And  this  is  no  useless  folly,  when  a 

'  ^^ προσήκα  μοι,  'on  account  of  my  wealth,  birth,  and  mopniflcont 
expenditures;'  άξιος  n/ia  νομίζω  ehai,  *0Q  account  of  my  personal  worth 
and  tried  eorvicos."— Jlrwolk 

*  Or,  to  USD  a  moro  colloqtual  expression,  "cried  out  apainst" 

'  On  tho  whole  subjoct  of  tho  χορηγίαι,  see  Buckh  Public  Econ.  of 
Athens,  vol  ii.  p.  207,  Eng.  Trans. 

<  Arnold  translates  this — and  Bloomflold  borrows  his  version—"  this 
appears  to  bo  even  strength :"  but  tho  position  of  tho  καΐ  sccais  to  mo  to 
bo  incompatible  with  such  a  ecnso;  reading,  as  thoy  both  do  avr?,  in• 
«lead  of  rturv. 


888  THUOYDIDEa  VL  {tm, 

man  benefite  at  hie  own  costs,  not  himself  only,  but  his  country 
also.  Nor  is  it  unfair  for  one  who  prides  himself  on  his  own 
prosperity,  to  refuse  to  be  on  an  equality  with  the  mass ;  since 
in  the  same  way  he  who  is  unfortunate  shares  his  calamities 
>vith  no  one  else.  But  as  we  are  not  courted  when  in  adversity, 
by  the  same  rule  let  a  man  also  submit  to  bo  slighted  by  thy 
prosperous ;  or  let  him  treat  the  unfortunate  as  on  an  equal  foot- 
mg,  [when  he  is  in  prosperity,]  and  so  claim  the  like  treatment 
in  return,  [when  he  is  himself  in  adversity].  I  know,  however, 
that  men  in  such  circumstances,  and  all  who  ever  surpassed 
others  in  splendor  of  any  kind,  though  disliked  in  their  own 
life-time,  most  of  all  in  their  dealings  with  their  equals,  and 
then  ΛνίίΙι  the  rest  of  the  world  iilso,  have  yet  left  to  some  of 
those  who  came  after  them  a  desire  to  claim  connection  with 
them,  even  Avhere  there  were  no  grounds  for  it ;  and  a  subject 
for  glorying  to  the  country  they  belonged  to,  not  as  for  aliens, 
or  otienders,  but  as  for  countrymen,  who  had  achieved  glorious 
things.  And  in  my  case,  Λvho  aim  at  such  things,  and  am 
therefore  in  private  assailed  with  clamor,  consider,  Avith  regard 
to  public  atlairs,  whether  1  administer  them  in  a  manner  inferior 
to  any  one  else,  or  not.  For  having  united  the  most  powerful 
states  of  the  iVloponnese,  Avithout  any  great  danger  or  expense 
to  you,  I  brought  the  Lacedajmonians  to  a  single  day's  struggle 
for  their  all  at  Aiantinea ;  in  consequence  of  which,  although 
they  were  victorious  in  the  battle,  tney  do  not  ever  now  feel 
any  finn  confidence  in  themselves. 

17.  "In  this  way,  then,  did  my  youth  and  preternatural 
folly,  as  it  is  thought,  deal  with  the  i)ower  of  the  Pelopoune- 
sians  by  meaSi^of  suiUiblc  arguments  ;  and,  gaining'  credit  by 
my  vehemence,  obtained  their  assent.  And  now  too  be  not 
afraid  of  it ;  but  while  I  am  still  in  the  flower  of  it,  and 
Nicias  appears  fortunate,  avail  yourselves  fully  of  the  services 
of  each  of  us.  And  Avith  regard  to  the  expedition  to  Sicily, 
change  not  your  determination  from  an  idea  that  it  would  bo 
undertaken  against  a  great  power.  Tor  it  is  only  with  a 
mixed  rabble  that  its  cities  are  populous ;  and  they  easily  ad- 
mit changes  in  their  government,  and  adopt  new  ones.  And 
(or  this  reason  no  one  is  furnished,  as  though  m  Ixihalf  of  his 
own  country,  either  with  arms  for  the  j)erson,  or  with  ordinar)' 

For  other  modes  of  iatorpretmg  this  sontonco,  bco  Poppo'a  note. 


rvii.]  TIIUCYDTDES.  VI.  380 

rosourcof»,  fts  regards  tho  rountr)^ ; '  I  tut  ΛνΙιηίονοΓ  cncli  one 
thinks  that  ho  can  cjet  from  tlio  people,  cither  by  persuading 
them  througli  his  oratory,  or  by  factious  measures,  and  will  so 
find  a  homo  in  another  land,  in  case  of  liis  not  being  success- 
ful, Avith  that  ho  provides  himself.  It  is  not  likely,  then,  that 
a  populace  of  such  a  character  should  either  listen  to  any 
<Ounsel  with  one  heart,  or  apply  themselves  to  action  in  com- 
mon :  but  they  would  severally  side  Λvith  whatever  was  said  to 
]>ieaso  them ;  especially  if  they  arc  torn  by  factions,  as  we 
hear,  Aijain,  with  regard  to  hea\y -armed  troops,  neither 
have  the  Siceliots  so  many  as  arc  boasted  of,  nor  did  the  rest  of 
the  Greeks  prove  so  numerous  as  they  severally  reckoned 
themselves ;  but  Greeco  had  very  much  misstated  them,  and 
was  with  difficulty  equipped  >vith  them  in  sufficient  numbers 
on  tho  outbreak  of  this  ν,ίχτ.  The  states  in  those  parts,  then, 
from  what  I  learn  by  report,  arc  of  this  character,  and  still 
more  easy  to  deal  with — for  wo  shall  have  many  barbarians, 

'  T(i  h  rj  χώ(^η — καταηκίναϊς!\  "This  would  refer  not  only  to  public 
works  for  tho  dcfonso  of  tho  country,  such  as  forts,  or  tho  fortifications 
of  tho  city  itself,  but  to  what  wo  should  call  ordinary  improvements,  such 
as  roads,  bridpcs,  etc.,  and  perhaps  ornamental  buildings,  whether  tern• 
pics  or  thoators." — Arnold,  I  can  not  but  think  that  in  addition  to  these 
(•iijocls  of  expenditure,  if  not  bcforo  them  all,  reference  is  made  to  tho 
Flavcs,  cattle,  and  implements,  with  which  tho  land  ought  to  bo  stocked, 
but  wa8  not,  in  consequence  of  tho  unsettled  state  of  tho  country.  As 
ov^^t(ς  seems  to  refer  to  individuaU^  not  to  states,  in  the  preceding  clause, 
it  would  naturally  refer  to  them  in  this  also;  aa  ίκαατος  also  does  in  tho 
following  sentence.  And  with  regard  to  this  signification  of  καταοπενή, 
it  is  one  which  both  tho  noun  and  tho  verb  formed  from  it  repeatedly 
convey  in  Xcnophon's  political  and  economical  treatises;  f.  g.,  Do  Vccti- 
galibua,  IV.  11,  ϋζως  Οαικτουντες  μίν  ύη  τλίιατονς  «rO/xJrroi'f  ΙπΙ  τύ, 
upyi'fua  άγωμεν,  Οα(>σονντες  ύέ  καταακενηζώμεΟα  ιν  αντο'ις.  And  again, 
41,  V.i  όί  τίνες  ην  pnOovvraiy  μι)  μητηια  ΰν  γένοιτο  άντη  η  καταακενή,  ιΐ 
ττήλεμος  ίγερΟείη — τί  )<)ρ  ύ;)  ε!ς  τ^ιλεμην  κτήμα  χρησιμώτερον  ΰνΟρώιτων. 
And  in  tho  samo  way,  Thucydidcs  himself  uses  tho  verb  particularly  with 
rcfcrcnco  to  elavcs,  as  thotigh  they  formed  tho  chief  stock  in  tho  country, 
in  another  speech  which  ho  puts  into  tho  mouth  of  Alcibiados ;  ch.  91. 7, 
O/'f  re  )(i(>  ij  χώ(}η  κατεσκενααται,  τά  πολλίί  npof  νμάς^  τύ  μέν  ^ηφβίντα 
τά  Α'  ηΰτήμητη,  ηξει.  Ι  think  therefore  that  in  tho  present  passage  also 
by  tho  expression  τά  Iv  τ>)  χνφα  νομιμοις  κητηακεναϊς  ho  means  the  differ- 
ent parts  of  an  agricultural  property,  and  more  especially  tho  slaves, 
which  formed  tho  most  valuable  and  important  part,  while  a  country  was 
in  a  peaceful  and  prosperous  condition;  but  ono  so  likely  to  bo  lost  in  a 
perioiU  of  war  and  revolution,  that  tho  Siceliots,  according  to  tho  view  of 
their  unsettled  state  which  Alcibiados  hero  gives,  would  have  very  little 
inducoment  to  invest  their  money  in  them. 


890  THUOYDIDES.  VI.  [xvni. 

wbo  from  hatred  of  the  Syracusans  will  join  ue  in  attacking 
them — and  those  hero  will  not  prove  an  obstacle,  if  vou  take 
η  right  view  of  the  matter.  Fur  our  fathers  had  these  very 
men,  whom  they  say  you  would  leave  behind  you  in  hostility 
when  sailing  there,  and  the  Mede  beside,  as  their  enemies ; 
and  atill  they  won  their  empire ;  though  strong  in  nothing  else 
but  the  superiority  of  their  fleet.  And  as  things  stand  now, 
never  yet  were  the  Peloponnesians  more  hopeless  with  regard 
to  us;  and  even  if  they  are  ever  so  contideut,  for  invading  our 
country  indeed  they  are  strong  enough,  even  though.  Ave  do. 
not  undertake  the  expedition ;  but  with  their  naval  force  they 
can  not  hurt  us,  [though  wo  do  undertake  it;]  for  we  have 
a  fleet  left  behind  that  is  a  match  for  tlieni. 

18.  "On  what  reasonable  argument,  then,  could  we  ourselves 
shrink  from  it ;  or  on  >vhat  plea  addressed  to  our  allies  there 
could  we  refuse  to  succor  them  For  siiico  we  have  entered 
into  league  with  them,  we  ought  to  assist  them,  and  not  to  ob- 
ject that  they  too  have  not  assisted  us.  For  we  united  them  with 
us,  not  that  they  might  como  here  to  help  us  in  their  turn,  but 
that  by  annoying  our  enemies  there  they  might  prevent  their 
coming  here  to  attack  us.  And  it  is  in  this  way  that  empire 
has  been  won,  both  by  us  and  by  all  others  who  have  en- 
joyed it ;  I  mean  by  readily  taking  j>art  with  those  barbari- 
ans or  Greeks  who  from  time  to  time  called  them  to  their  aid  ; 
since  if  all  should  remain  <juiet,  or  nicely  choose*  whom  they 
ought  to  assist ;  λνό  should  makci  but  slight  additions  to  it, 
but  should  rather  run  a  risk  of  losing  even  what  it  now  is. 
For  men  do  not  only  defend  themselves  against  a  superior 
Avhen  he  hits  attackeil  tln-m,  but  also  strike  the  first  blow,  to 
prevent  his  attacking  them.  And  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to 
portion  out  exactly  how  far  wo  Avish  to  hold  dominion ;  but 
since  wo  are  in  our  i)resent  j)Osition,  we  nmst  form  designs 
against  some,  and  not  give  up  others ;  because  Λνο  should  bo 
subjected  to  the  rule  of  another  party,  if  wo  did  not  ourselves 
rule  over  others.  Nor  nuist  you  take  the  same  view  of  quiet 
as  the  rest  of  the  world,  unless  you  will  also  receive  fresh  in- 
stitutions assimilating  to  theirs.  Considering,  then,  that  wo 
shall  rather  agufrandize  our  possessions  here,  if  we  go  in  ouest 
of  those  there,  let  us  make  the  expedition ;  that  we  may  both 

'  Or,  "  mako  distinctions  of  race  in  choosing,"  etc. ;  according  to  tho 
reading  ψν?>οκ(ηνυΐεν,  which  Poppo,  Guller,  and  Bloomfield  adopt. 


XIX.,  XX.]  THUCTDIDES.  VI.  301 

prostrate  the  pride  of  tlio  rdoponncsians,  by  bcincf  seen,  rc- 
irardU'PS  of  ])rosont  peace,  to  Fail  even  against  Sicily;  and  at 
ihe  panic  tinio  by  either  ruling,  as  wo  most  probably  shall, 
over  the  whole  of  (ireece,  throngli  licirig  joined  by  those  there 
or  at  any  rate  by  injuring  the  Syracusans,  by  which  both 
oursi'lves  and  our  allies  will  be  beniiiited.  And  as  for  secur- 
ity, whether  for  remaining  there,  in  ca<io  of  any  success,  or 
for  returning,  our  fleet  will  provide  us  with  it:  for  by  sea  Λνο 
shall  be  8U|>erior  to  all  the  Siceliots  put  together.  And  let  not 
the  non-interfering  policy  Λνΐιίοΐι  Nicias  recommends  in  his 
speeches,  nor  his  setting  the  young  against  the  old,  divert  you  ' 
from  your  purpose» ;  but  acting  in  your  usual  order,  just  as 
our  fathers,  by  consulting  young  Avith  old,  raised  the  stat«  to 
its  present  height,  do  yo  now  too,  in  the  same  manner,  endeav- 
or to  advance  it ;  Wing  convinced  that  youth  and  old  ago, 
<an  do  nothing  without  each  other ;  but  that  the  period  of 
levity,  and  of  mid-age,  and  of  extreme  preciseness  will  liavo 
most  power  >vhi'n  joined  together;  and  that  the  state,  if  it  re- 
main (juiet,  will  be  worn  out  on  itself,  like  any  thing  else,  and 
its  skill  in  every  thing  grow  dull ;  Avhile  by  entering  into  con- 
test it  will  continually  gain  fresh  experience,  and  will  find 
s»If-«lefense  habitual  to  it,  not  in  ΛνοπΙ,  but  rather  in  deed. 
My  decided  opion  then  is,  that  I  think  a  state  of  no  inactive 
rharacter  would  most  quickly  be  ruined  by  change  to  inac- 
tivity; and  that  those  men  live  most  securely,  Avho  regulate 
thoir  affairs  in  accordance  Avith  their  existing  habits  and  insti- 
tutions, even  though  they  may  l>o  of  an  inferior  character, 
with  the  least  variation." 

1 9.  To  this  effect  spoke  Alcibiades.  When  (ho  Athenians  had 
lu'ard  him  and  the  Segest/ms  and  some  Ijcontino  exiles,  who, 
ioming  forward,  Wggcd  and  entreated  them  to  assist  them,  re- 
minding them  of  their  oaths,  they  were  much  more  eager  for 
the  expedition  than  l)cforc.  So  Nicias,  perpeiving  that  ho 
could  not  now  turn  tliem  from  it  by  the  samo  argument»  as  ho 
had  used  before,  but  miglit  perhaps  change  their  purpose  by 
the  amount  of  armament,  if  lie  should  command  η  numerous 
one  to  1)0  prepared ;  lio  came  forward  again,  and  addressed 
them  as  follows: 

20.  "Since  I  see  you,  Athenians,  altogether  bent  on  making 
tho  expedition,  may  these  things  turn  out  as  wo  whh :  nt  tho 
l»resent  lime,  however,  I  will  declaro  to  you  what  my  opinion 


002  THUCYDIDEa  YL  [xix 

18.  We  are  about  to  go  then,  as  I  learn  from  report,  against 
cities  which  are  great,  and  not  subject  one  to  another,  or  in 
want  of  a  change,  like  that  by  wliich  men  would  gladly  pass 
fri^nn  a  state  of  violent  slavery  to  an  easier  condition  instead 
of  it ;  which  will  reasonably  refuse  to  accept  our  dominion 
instead  of  freedom,  and  are  many  in  number,  considering  that 
they  are  in  one  island,  even  those  of  Greek  origin.  For  be- 
sides Naxos  and  Catana,  which  I  expect  will  side  with  us  on 
the  strength  of  their  connection  with  Leontini,  there  are  seven  | 
othere,  and  those  equipped  with  every  thing  in  a  style  just  I 
agreeing  with  our  own  power,  and  most  of  all,  those  against  [ 
which  wo  are  more  especially  sailing,  namely,  Selinus  and  | 
Syracuse.  lu>r  there  are  in  them  many  lieavy-armed,  and  I 
bowmen,  and  dartmen,  with  many  triremes,  and  crowds  t»>  j 
man  them.  They  have  money  too,  ])artly  in  private  fuiKls,  \ 
and  partly  in  the  temples  also  at  Selinus;  while  the  Syra-  I 
cusans  have  also  first-fruits  j)aid  them  by  certain  barbarian  f 
trilnis.  IJut  what  they  most  of  all  excel  us  in  is,  that  they  j)ossesH  : 
many  horses,  and  use  corn  of  native  growth,  and  not  im|)orteil. 

*Jl.  "Against  such  a  power  then  we  require,  not  only   a         | 
marine'  and  inel^cient  armament,  but  that  a  large   land  force         j 
also  should  sail  with  us,  if  we  are  to  achieve  any  thing  suitaMo         \ 
to  i)ur  design,  and  are  not  to  bo  shut  out  from  the  land  by  nu-         | 
inerous  cavalry  ;    esj)ecially  shouM  the  cities  league  together         ^ 
in    their   fear,  and    none    but   the    Segestans   be    our   friends,         i 
and    furnish    us    with    horse,  wherewith    to   defend    ourselves.         | 
liut  it  were  disgraeeful  to  return  by  compulsion,  or  to  send  ft»r         | 
fresh    8U[)plies    afterwanl,     through     having    inconsiderately         [ 
fonried    our   plans    at   first.     <>n    the    contrary,  we   must   go 
against  them  with  sutHcient  forces,  knowing  that  we  are  about 
to  sail  far  from  our  own  Ci>untry,  and  not  on  an  expedition  of         i 
the  eame  kind  as  when  you    have    gone    at   dillerent  times,  in 
the  character  of  allies,  against  any  of  your  subjects  in  theso 
parts,  where  suj)plies  of  additional  necessaries  were  easily  ob-         ^ 
tained  from  the  friendly  territory ;  but  departing  to  a  land  al-         | 

*  ναντικΤ/ς  κηϊ  φηί'λον  (ΤΤι)ητ(ΰς'\  /.<?.,  a  foreo  consist inpr  oiilj' of  tljo  few 
ii^ihting  men  on  board  the  t^liip.s.    Or  oven  if  liie  .staniiu  llienisclves  wero  t, 

joined  with  them,  yet  tlieir  Wiint  of  arms  an<l  traininj,'  for  land  i^ervieo•  f 

would  render  them  a  very  inefliciont  and  weak  forco  npainst  the  troops  V 

οΐ  Syracuse,  ou  shore,  however  eflieient  they  might  bo  on  thei»  own  tlo- 
taonL 


^ 

XXII.,  xxm.]  THUCTDIDE3.  Π  393 

together  alien  to  you,  from  which  for  as  many  as  four  months 
in  the  winter  it  is  not  easy  for  a  messenger  to  como  here.' 

22.  "  I  think  therefore  that  we  ouglit  to  take  many  heavy- 
nrnied,  both  of  our  own  and  of  our  allies,  whether  those  who 
are  subject  to  us,  or  any  in  the  Peloponncso  that  wo  may  bo 
able  either  to  prevail  upon  by  argument,  or  to  take  into  our  pay ; 
many  bowmen  also  and  sliugers,  to  offer  resistance  to  tho  Si- 
cilian liorso;  and  that  in  ships  wo  should  have  a  very  decided 
superiority,  in  order  that  wo  may  tho  moro  easily  bring  in 
what  is  necessary:  while  we*  take  our  com  from  homo  also 
in  merchant  vessels,  namely,  wheat  and  parched  barley,  with 
bakers  from  tho  mills,  compelled,  in  proportion  to  their  num- 
bers, to  serve  for  pay ;  that  should  wo  any  where  bo  detained 
by  stress  of  weather,  tho  force  may  havo  provisions ;  (for  so 
numerous  as  it  is,  it  will  not  be  one  for  every  city  to  receive). 
All  other  things  too  wo  must  provide,  as  far  as  wo  can,  and 
not  depend  upon  others ;  but,  most  of  all,  wo  must  take  from 
liomo  iis  much  money  as  possible.  For  as  for  that  of  tho  Sc- 
gostans,  which  is  asserted  to  bo  there  in  readiness,  beliovo 
that  it  is  in  tho  way  of  assertion,  moro  than  in  any  other  way, 
that  it  will  bo  ready. 

23.  *'  For  supposing  us  to  go  hence,  not  only  provided  on  a 
scale  equal  to  tho  enemy  (excepting,  at  least,  their  heavy- 
armed  fighting  forcer^,  but  even  surpassing  them  in  all  re- 
spects ;  yet  scarcely  even  then  shall  wo  bo  able  to  subdue  that 
country,  and  to  save  this.  Indeed  wo  must  consider  that  wo 
arc  going  to  found   a  city  among  aliens  and   enemies ;  and 

*  μηνών,  ονΛί  τεσσάρων.]  I  can  not  .at  all  agrco  with  Poppo's  remark: 
"  Οί'ύέ  insolentiua  trajcctum  cum  vv.  άγγελον  fxjiMov  έλθεϊν  jungcndum 
cet."  That  would  certainly  givo  a  suitable  and  moro  easy  eonao  to  the 
passage,  but  if  tho  position  in  which  ονόέ  stands  in  tho  great  majority  of 
tho  MSS.,  and  which  Poppo  himself  retains,  bo  tho  correct  one,  it  seems 
impossible  that  it  should  qualify  any  other  word  than  τεσσάρων  ;  and  in 
that  case  its  forco  appears  to  bo  what  is  hero  attributed  to  it 

*  Tdv  il  καΐ  αντήϋεν  σ'ιτον.]  Arnold  thinks  that  τοϋ  σίτου  would  bo  a 
belter  reading ;  but  there  is  no  necessity  at  all  for  such  a  change,  if  tho 
article  be  taken  as  only  distinguishing  the  class  of  provisions  hero  spoken 
of  from  another,  viz.,  tho  com  they  took  with  them,  in  opposition  to  that 
which  they  would  get  in  Sicily,  and  which  is  mentioned  in  the  words 
immediately  preceding,  Iva  καΐ  τά  επιτήδεια  fi^ov  ίσκομιζώμεθα. 

3  "  Because  as  on  tho  ono  hand  it  was  impossible  for  the  Athenian  ex- 
pedition to  match  the  Syracusan  infantry  in  point  of  numbers,  so  on  tho 
other  hand  they  were  so  superior  in  disciphne,  that  even  with  a  groat 
Uiapanty  of  numbers  they  woro  fully  ablo  to  cope  with  thom."— ^Irmrfd 

J7* 


304  THUOYDIDES.  VI,  [xxiv.,xxr. 

such  men  must  either,  the  first  day  they  land,  be  at  once  mas- 
ters of  the  country,  or  know  tliat  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  they 
ΛνϋΙ  find  every  thing  opposeil  to  them.  For  myself  then, 
being  afraid  of  this,  and  knowing  that  on  many  points  λυο 
must  tako  good  counsel,  and  on  still  more  have  good  luck 
(and  that  is  dilHcult  for  such  as  are  but  men),  I  Avish  to  sail 
IVoni  homo  committing  myself  as  little  as  possible  to  fortune, 
and  secured  against  failure  by  our  preparations,  according  to 
all  reasonable  hopes.  For  this  I  consider  to  bo  at  once  most 
safe  for  the  state  at  large,  and  conducive  to  the  preservation 
of  us  who  will  go  on  the  expedition.  But  if  any  one  think 
otherwise,  I  resign  the  command  to  him." 

24.  Thus  much  spoke  Nicias,  thinking  that  ho  should 
either  deter  the  Athenians  by  the  vast  scale  of  liis  measures, 
or  that  if  he  wctq  compelled  to  join  the  expedition,  he  should 
in  this  way  sail  on  it  most  safely.  They,  however,  had  not 
their  desire  for  the  voyage  taken  from  them  by  the  burden- 
some nature  of  the  preparations,  but  were  much  more  eager 
for  it  than  ever;  and  the  result  proved  just  contrary  to  what 
lie  had  expected  ;  for  it  was  thought  that  ho  had  given  them 
good  advice,  and  that  now  certainly  they  would  have  even 
abundant  assurance  of  success.  And  so  all  alike  were  seized 
Avith  a  longing  to  go  on  the  expedition :  the  elder,  from  a  belief 
that  they  should  either  subdue  the  places  against  which  they 
were  about  to  sail,  or  that  a  large  foreo  would  meet  with  no 
misfortune :  those  in  the  j)!  ime  of  life,  from  a  desire  of  foreign 
sights  and  spectacles,  and  because  they  were  in  good  hope  of 
returning  safe  from  it:  the  mass  of  the  people  and  of  the  sol- 
diery, from  thinking  that  they  should  both  make  money  at 
]>resent,  and  gain  additional  power,  from  which  an  unfailing 
fund  for  pay  would  be  obtained.  So  that  owing  to  the  excessive 
desire  of  the  majority  for  the  measure,  even  if  any  one  were  not 
j)leased  with  it,  ho  was  afraid  that  by  voting  against  it  he  might 
appear  ill-aflfected  to  the  state,  and  therefore  held  his  j>eace. 

25.  At  last  one  of  the  Athenians  came  fonvard,tnd  calling 
on  Nicias,  said  that  lie  ought  not  to  make  excuses  and  to  pro- 
crastinate, but  to  say  now  before  them  all,  >vhat  forces  the 
Athenians  should  vote  him.  lie  then,  though  reluctantly, 
said  that  he  would  deliberate  more  leisurely  on  the  question,  m 
concert  with  his  colleagues :  as  far,  however,  as  ho  saw  at  pres- 
ent,  they  should   not  sail  with  less  than  a   hundred  trireme» 


XXVI.,  xxvii.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  305 

(as  many  of  the  Athenian  ships  as  might  be  thought  fit  would 
carry  the  heavy  infantry,  while  others  must  bo  sent  for  from 
the  allies),  with  not  fewer  than  five  thousand  heavy-aimed  in 
all,  of  the  Athenians  and  th(3  allies,  and  even  more,  if  at  all 
possible ;  and  that  they'  >vould  get  ready  and  take  with  them 
the  rest  of  the  armament  in  j>roportion,  both  archers  from 
home  and  from  Crete,  slingers,  and  whatever  else  should  be 
thought  proper. 

20.  The  Athenians,  after  hearing  him,  immediately  voted 
that  the  generals  should  bo  invested  with  full  powers  to  make 
arrangom«!nts,  both  concerning  tho  number  of  troops,  and 
everything  connected  with  the  wholo  expedition,  as  they  might 
judge  to  be  best  for  Athens.  After  this,  the  preparations  began 
to  bo  made ;  and  they  both  sent  to  the  allies,  and  threw  up 
their  muster-rolls  at  home.  Tho  city  had  lately  recovered  itself 
from  the  plague,  and  from  continued  hostilities,  as  regarded 
both  tho  nund)er  of  young  men  who  had  grown  up,  and  the 
accumulation  of  money  in  consequence  of  the  truce;  so  that 
every  thing  was  the  more  easily  provided.  And  thus  they  were 
engaged  in  j)reparations. 

21.  In  tho  mean  time,  of  all  the  stone  Mercuries  in  the  city 
of  Athens  (they  are,  according  to  the  fashion  of  the  country, 
those  well-known  square  figures,  numerous  both  in  private 
and  sacred  door-ways),  tho  greater  part  had  their  faces  muti- 
lated in  one  night.  The  j^erpetrators  of  this  oftcnso  were  known 
to  no  one  ;  but  search  was  made  for  them,  >vith  great  rewards 
for  information  offered  at  tho  public  expense.  Moreover, 
the  people  voted,  that  if  any  one  knew  any  other  act  of  impiety 
to  havo  been  committed,  >vhoever  wished,  whether  citizen, 
alien,  or  slave,  should  without  fear  give  information  of  it. 
And  they  took  the  matter  up  more  seriously'  than  it  deserved  ; 
for  it  was  considered  to  bo  an  omen  of  tho  expedition,  and  also 
to  liavo  been  done  on  the  strength  of  a  conspiracy  for  bring- 
ing about  a  revolution,  and  for  putting  down  tho  democracy. 

»  %.  «.,  accordlnf^  to  Arnold's  explanation,  "  thgy,  including  himself 
who  was  to  command  tho  expedition ;"  according  to  Haack's  and  Poppo's, 
Nicias  himself  and  his  colloagues.  Tbo  latter  seems  tho  more  natural 
of  tho  two. 

«  Or  the  comparative  may,  perhaps,  mean  "  moro  seriously  than  they 
would  have  done  under  other  circumstances."  Or  it  may  be  used  here, 
as  in  other  places,  with  a  forco  scarcely  distioguisbable  from  that  of  the 
jxwitiva 


390  THUOYDIDE&  VL  [xxvul-xxx 

28.  Information  tbercforo  was  given  by  Bomo  naturalized 
aliens,  and  slaves  who  were  in  personal  attendance  on  their 
masters,  though  not  at  all  respecting  the  Mercuries,  yet  of 
certain  mutilations  of  other  images  which  had  l>eforu  been  per- 
petrated by  some  young  men  ia  a  drunken  frolic  :  and,  more- 
over, that  iu  certain  private  houses  the  mysteries  were  celebrated 
in  mockery.  In  this  charge  they  implicated  Alcibiades ;  and 
those  took  it  uj)  who  were  most  hostile  to  him,  as  being  an  ob- 
itacle  to  their  own  tiking  tho  permanent  lead  of  the  i)eople. 
Thinking  therefore,  that  if  they  expelled  him,  they  would  have 
tho  first  place,  they  magnified  tho  business,  and  raised  an  out- 
cry, to  tho  etlect  that,  both  tho  afiair  of  tho  mysteries  and  tho 
mutilation  of  the  Mercuries  h:ul  been  done  for  the  abolition  of 
democracy;  and  that  there  was  none  of  all  theso  things  that 
had  been  executed  witliout  his  assistance  :  alK'ging  iu  j»roi>f  of 
the  assertion  his  general  contempt  for  the  law  in  his  personal 
habits,  so  opposed  to  tho  spirit  of  democracy. 

29.  Ho  at  once  defended  himself  against  these  charges,  and 
was  ready  to  submit  to  trial,  as  to  his  being  guilty  of  any  of 
these  things,  before  going  on  the  expedition  (for  by  this  time 
all  things  necessary  for  tlie  armament  hal  been  provided),  and 
if  he  had  done  any  of  these  things,  he  was  willing  to  be  pun- 
ished; but  if  he  were  acquitted,  to  take  the  command.  He 
protesteJ,  too,  that  they  should  not  listen  to  slanders  against 
him  in  his  absence,  but  put  him  to  death  at  once  if  ho  were 
guilty ;  and  that  it  was  more  prudent  not  to  send  him  out  at 
the  head  of  so  large  an  armament,  Avith  such  an  accusation 
attaching  to  liim,  l>eforo  they  had  decided  tho  question.  13ut 
his  enemies  being  afraid  of  the  army,  lest  he  should  have  its 
good  wishes,  if  at  once  brought  to  trial ;  and  lest  tho  people 
should  relent,  Λνΐιο  courted  him,  because  for  liis  sake  iho  Ar- 
gives  and  some  of  tho  Mantineans  were  joining  in  tho  expe- 
dition; they  wished  to  put  it  ofi',  and  earnestly  dissuaded  the 
measure,  by  bringing  forward  other  orators,  who  urged  that  at 
present  lie  should  sail,  and  not  delay  the  departure  of  the  army, 
but  shouM  on  his  return  take  his  trial  within  such  a  number 
of  days  jis  might  be  appointed.  For  they  wished  to  have  him 
s'ut  for,  anil  brought  home  for  trial  on  a  graver  charge,  which 
they  could  more  easily  get  up  in  his  absence.  Accordingly  it 
was  resolved  that  Alcibiades  should  sail. 

30.  After  this,  when  it  was  now   midsummer,  tho  departure 


XXXI.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  30? 

for  Sicily  took  placo.  Now  to  the  greater  part  of  tho  allies, 
with  tho  provision  Blups,  ahd  tho  smaller  craft,  and  all  tho 
other  vcsinils  that  accompanieil  them,  orders  had  before  been 
piven  t«>  muster  at  Corcyra,  with  a  view  to  their  crossing  tho 
Ionian  Sea  in  a  body  from  that  ])liice  to  tho  lapygian  foreland, 
liut  tho  Athenians  themselves,  and  such  of  the  allies  as  wcro 
present,  went  down  to  the  Tirajus  on  an  appointe<l  day,  as  soon 
as  it  was  light,  and  proceeded  to  man  their  sliijis  for  the  purpose 
of  putting  out  to  sea.  Tho  Λνΐιοΐο  multitude  too  (so  to  speak), 
that  was  in  the  city,  both  of  citizens  and  foreigners,  went  down 
>vith  them.  Tho  natives  accompanied,  respectively,  those  who 
Wlonged  to  them,  whether  friends,  kinsmen,  or  sons;  and 
went  at  once  with  liope  and  with  lamentations ;  Λvith  hope, 
that  they  would  attain  what  they  went  for;  but  with  lament- 
ation, iis  doubtful  if  they  should  ever  again  sec  their  friends, 
when  they  remembered  on  how  long  a  voyago  they  were  set- 
ting out  from  their  country.  At  the  present  time  too,  >vhen 
they  were  now  to  take  leave  of  each  other  on  a  perilous  un- 
dertiiking,  tho  thought  of  the  tlangers  struck  them  more 
forcibly  than  when  they  were  voting  for  the  expedition : 
though,  nevertheless,  they  wero  cheered  by  the  sight  of  their 
present  strength,  through  tho  numbers  of  oacli  part  of  tho 
armament  which  they  beh(^ld.  As  to  tho  foreigners,  and  tho 
rest  of  tho  multitude,  they  went  to  see  tho  sight,  as  that  of  an 
enterprise  >vorthy  of  their  notice,  and  surpassing  belief. 

M,  This  armament  which  firs  sailed  out,'  going  from  a 
single  city,  and  consisting  of  a  («recian  force,  was  tho  most 
costly  ami  s]>lendid  of  all  np  to  that  time.  Yet  in  number  of 
ships  and  of  heavy-armed,  that  against  Epidaunis  under 
Pericles,  and  tho  same  when  going  against  Potida^a  under 
Ilagnon,  Λν.ΐ8  not  inferior  to  this :  for  there  wero  in  it  four 
thousand  heavy-armed  of  tho  Athenians  themselves,  threo 
hundred  horse,  and  a  liundred  triremes,  with  fifty  of  tho 
Lcsbiana  and  Chians,  while  many  allies  besides  joined  in  tho 
exjiodition.    But  they  wero  dispatched  on  α  short  voyago  and 

•  πηρασκη'})  αίιτη  πρώτη.]  I  have  followed  Oollcr'aand  Arnold's  inter• 
pretation  of  these  words  in  profcrenco  to  that  of  Poppo,  who  joins  rrp<or7 
with  πολντε? ιστάτη  Af/,  and  renders  tho  passage  thus:  "  Hie  cnim  fuit 
apparatus  primus  sumptuosissimus  profcctus ;"  which  appears  to  imply 
that  thoro  could  bo  more  than  one  expedition  that  was  the  most  costly  of 
λΠ  up  to  that  time.  Unless  "  primue"  la  intended  by  hlni  to  oxpree• 
Quality,  and  not  time }  which  do^a  not  eoom  probable. 


398  THUCYDIDES.  VL  [xxxj 

with  scanty  preparation :  whereas  this  expedition  started  with 
the  expectation  of  its  bcin^  a  lont^  one,  and  was  equipped  for 
both  kinds  of  servias  whichever  might  be  requirea,  with 
ships  and  land-forces  at  the  same  time.  The  fleet  was  elabor- 
ately fitted  out,  at  great  expense  both  on  the  part  of  the  cajv 
tains  and  of  the  state.  For  the  treasury  gave  a  drachma  a 
day  to  each  seaman,  and  furnished  empty  vessels,  sixty  fast 
sailers  and  forty  transports ;  while  the  captains  provided  the 
best  crews  for  them,  and  gave  gratuities  in  atldition  to  the  pay 
from  the  treiusury,  to  the  thraniUc^^  and  to  the'  petty  officers; 
and  made  use  besides  of  expensive  ensigns  and  equipments ; 
each  one  of  them  being  in  the  highest  degree  desirous  that 
his  own  ship  should  excel  most  in  beauty  and  ftust  sailing. 
The  land-forces,  on  the  other  hand,  were  selected  from  the  best 
muster-rolls,  and  vied  with  each  other  in  great  attention  to 
their  arms  and  personal  accouterments.  The  consequence 
was,  that  there  was  at  once  a  rivalry  among  themselves,  in 
the  arm  of  the  service  to  Avhich  they  were  severally  appointed ; 
and  that  with  the  rest  of  the  Greeks  it  was  imagined  to  be  a 
display  of  power  and  resources,  rather  than  an  armament 
raised  against  an  enemy.  For  if  any  one  had  reckoned  the 
public  exj)endituro  of  the  state,  and  the  private  outlay  of  in- 
dividuals ;  with  regard  to  the  state,  what  sums  it  had  already 
spent  upon  it,  and  what  it  was  sending  out  in  the  hands  of  the 
generals ;  and  with  regard  to  individuals,  viXiai  each  had  laid 
out  on  his  personal  equipment,  and,  in  the  case  of  a  captain,  on 
his  ship,  with  what  he  was  likely  to  lay  out  still ;  and,  more- 
over, what  it  was  probable  that  every  one  had  provided,  in- 
dependently of  his  pay  from  the  treasury,  toward  the  expenses 
of  a  voyage  expected  to  be  so  long ;  and  what  each  soldier  or 
trader  took  Λγith  him  for  the  purpose  of  exchange  [if  all 
theso  sums,  I  say,  had  been  calcuhited] ;  it  would  have  bc^n 
found  that  many  talents  in  all  were  being  taken  out  of  the  city. 
And  the  expedition  was  no  less  celebrated  through  men's 
astonishment  at  its  boldness,  and  the  splendor  of  its  np|)ear- 
ance,  than  for  the  superiority  of  the  armament,  compared  with 
*  ΟρανΊταΐΓ.']  i.  «.,  tho  highest  of  tho  three  banks  of  rowers  in  a  tri- 
reme, whose  hil)or  was  greater  in  proportion  to  the  greater  length  of  tho 
oara  they  worked.  G oiler  supposes  νττι/ιηπύιις  in  this  passage  to  signify 
"  tho  servants  of  tho  sailors,"  and  Poppo  agrees  with  him,  if  tho  text  bo 
allowed  to  bo  sound.  I  have  followed  Arnold's  interpretation.  See  hia 
noto  on  tho  passage. 


XXXII.,  κχπι.]  THUCYDIDES.   VI.  390 

tlioso  whom  they  were  going  to  attack ;  and  from  the  fact  of 
its  being  tho  longest  passage  from  their  own  country  that  had 
liitherto  been  undertaken,  and  with  tho  greatest  hope  of  future 
advantages  in  comparison  with  their  present  means. 

32.  Now  when  tlio  ships  were  manned,  and  every  thing 
was  put  on  boarl  that  they  meant  to  set  sail  with,  silence 
was  proclaimed  by  trumpet,  atid  they  offeri'd  the  prayers 
which  are  u^ual  bL'f)ro  putting  out  to  sea;  not  ship  by  ship 
singly,  but  all  together,  resj)onding  to  a  herald  ;  having  mixed 
bowls  of  wine  through  tho  whole  annament,  and  both  seamen 
and  their  oflicers  making  oblations  with  gold  and  silver  goblets. 
They  were  joined  also  in  their  prayers  by  the  rest  of  the  mul- 
titude on  shore,  both  tho  citizens  and  whoever  else  was  thero 
that  wished  them  well.  AVhen  they  had  eung  their  hymn, 
and  finished  their  libations,  they  weighed  anchor*,,  and  having 
at  first  sailed  out  in  a  C(dumn,  they  then  raced  each  other  as 
far  as  -^gina.  And  thus  they  hastened  to  reach  Corcyra, 
where  tho  remaining  forco  of  tho  allies  was  also  assembling. 

Now  tidings  of  the  ex|)edition  were  brought  to  Syracuse  from 
many  quarters,  but  for  a  long  time  received  no  credit  at  all. 
Nay,  even  when  an  assembly  Avas  held  on  the  subject,  both  by 
others  were  8j)eeches  to  tho  following  effect  delivered  (some 
bclioving  tho  report  of  the  Athenian  expedition,  while  some 
contradicted  it),  and  Uermocrates,  the  son  of  llermon,  coming 
forward  to  them,  from  ft  conviction  that  he  had  accurate  infor- 
mation on  the  subject,  addressed  to  them  tho  following  advice  : 

33.  "  I  shall,  perhaps,  appear  to  you,  as  some  others  liavo 
•lone,  to  speak  what  is  incredible  concerning  the  reality  of  tho 
expedition  that  is  coming  against  us :  and  I  know  that  those 
who  either  make  statements,  or  bring  reports,  which  do  not 
seem  to  be  credible,  not  only  fail  to  convince,  but  are  also 
thought  to  be  foolish.  Nevertheless  I  will  not,  through  fear  of 
this,liold  my  tongue  when  the  state  is  in  danger,  since  I  am 
myself  at  any  rate,  persuaded  that  I  speak  with  more  ccr* 
tim  knowledge  than  others.  For  the  Athenians,  much  as  you 
are  surprised  at  it,  have  set  out  against  us  with  a  largo  force 
both  for  sea  and  land  sci-vice,  nominally,  on  account  of  an  al- 
liance with  tho  Segestians,  and  fo?  the  purpose  of  settling  the 
I-Kiontineai,  but  really  through  desire  for  Sicily,  and  most  of  all 
for  our  city,  thinking  that  if  they  get  this,  they  will  easily  get 
tho  rest  also.    With  a  conviction,  then,  that  they  will  quickly 

# 


400  TnUCYDIDES.  VI.  (χχχιτ 

be  liere,  consider  how  with  your  present  resources  you  may 
best  defend  yourselves,  and  may  neither  through  despising  tho 
matter  bo  taken  off  your  guard,  nor  through  disbelieving  it 
neglect  the  common  weal.  15ut  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I  appear 
to  any  one  to  speak  credibly,  let  him  not  bo  struck  with  con- 
sternation at  their  boldness  and  power.  For  neither  will  they 
bo  able  to  do  us  more  harm  than  they  receive,  nor,  because  they 
are  coming  against  us  with  a  great  nnnament,  are  they  on  that 
account  without  atlvantago  for  us ;  but  it  is  much  better  with 
respect  to  the  rest  of  the  Siceliots  (for  they  will  bo  tho  more 
willing,  in  their  consternation,  to  join  our  alliance),  and  iu 
caso  of  our  either  defeating  them,  or  repulsing  them  without 
their  obtaining  the  objects  of  their  ambition  (for  certainly  1  am 
not  afraid  of  their  gaining  what  they  expect),  it  will  prove  the 
most  glorious  achievement,  for  us,  and  one  which,  by  me 
at  least,  is  not  unexpected.  For  few  have  bien  the  great  arma- 
ments, cither  ot  Greeks  or  barharians,  >vliieh  have  gone  far 
from  homo  and  proved  successful.  For  they  como  not  in 
greater  numbers  than  tho  natives  of  tho  country  and  those  who 
live  near  it  (sinco  all  league  together  through  fear),  and  if  they 
fail  through  want  of  ])rovisions  in  a  foreign  land,  even  thougli 
they  fail  chielly  through  their  own  fault,  they  nevertheless  leave 
a  proud  name  to  those  who  were  tho  objects  of  attack.  Just  as 
these  very  Athenians,  when  the  Mede,  contrary  to  expectition, 
>vas  so  signally  defeat<'d,  grew  great  on  tho  strength  of  tho  re- 
port, that  it  was  against  Athens  that  ho  had  come.  And  there 
IS  reason  for  hoping  that  in  our  case  the  result  may  be  the  same. 
34.  "  ΛVith  good  courage,  then,  let  us  both  make  our  prej)- 
arations  here,  and  send  to  tho  Sicels,  to  strengthen  tho  at- 
tachment of  somo  of  them,  and  endeavor  to  enti»r  into  frienil- 
ship  and  alliance  with  others;  while  wo  dispatch  envoys  to 
tho  rest  of  Sicily,  to  prove  that  tho  danger  is  common  to  all; 
and  to  Italy,  that  either  wo  may  gain  their  alliance  for  our- 
selves, or  they  may  refuse  to  receive  tho  Athenians.  I  think 
it  better,  too,  that  wo  shouUl  also  sentl  to  Carthage.  For  this 
is  nothing  unexpected  by  them ;  but  they  are  always  in  fear 
that  tliey  may  somo  timo  or  other  find  tho  Athenians  comini,' 
against  their  country  ;  and  therefore  thinking,  perhaps,  that 
if  they  abandoned  these  places,  they  would  themselves  h•• 
brought  into  trouble,  they  might  bo  willing  to  assist  us ;  at 
least  secretly,  if  not  openly;  or  at  any  rate  in  some  way  or 


ixxiv.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  401 

other.  And  thoy  aro  inoro  able  to  do  it,  if  they  please,  than 
nny  men  of  the  present  day ;  for  thoy  possess  most  gold  and 
silver;  and  it  is  by  means  of  tlieso  that  war,  like  every  thin/χ 
else,  prospiTs,  l^ct  us  likewis(i  send  to  Laredamon  and 
Corinth,  becfi^in;^  them  to  come  hither  to  our  aid  as  quiekly  as 
possible,  and  to  stir  up  the  war  there.  And  what  1  think  the 
most  expedient  course,  thoui^h  you,  throui^h  your  habitual 
love  of  quiet,  would  bo  least  quickly  jK'rsuaded  to  adopt  it, 
shall,  notwithstandinii  that,  be  mentioned.  If  then  wo 
Sioeliots — all  in  one  body,  if  possible  ;  but  if  not,  as  many  a» 
jiossible  in  concert  with  us — would  launch  the  whole  of  our 
present  navy,  Λvith  two  months'  provisions,  and  go  to  meet  the 
Athenians  at  Tarentum  and  the  lapygian  foreland,  and  show 
them  that  they  will  not  Jiavo  to  tight  about  Sicily  before  they 
have  fought  for  their  own  passage  over  the  Ionian  Sea ;  wo 
should  strike  them  with  the  greatest  fear,  and  set  them  on 
considering  that  we  are  starting  from  a  friendly  country  as  ila 
guardians  (for  Tarentum  is  ready  to  receive  us),  but  tliat  for 
them  the  tract  of  open  sea  is  a  wide  one  to  cross  >vith  all  their 
armament ;  which  would  hardly  remain  in  order  through  80 
long  a  voyage,  and  would  be  easily  attacked  by  us,  while  it 
<'ame  on  slowly  and  in  small  divisions.  But  supposing,  on 
the  other  hand,  that,  having  lightened  their  ships,  they  should 
attack  us  with  the  better  sailing  part  of  their  fleet  in  a  more 
compact  body ;  then,  if  they  use  their  oars,  wo  shall  fall  on 
them  when  they  aro  wearied;  or  if  wo  shouM  not  choose  to  do 
so,  we  mny  also  retire  to  Tarentum:  while  they  liaving 
crossed  with  few  provisions,  on  purpose  for  an  engagement, 
would  bo  at  a  loss  Avhat  to  do  in  uninhabited  regions ;  and 
would  either  be  blockaded,  if  they  remained,  or  if  they  at- 
tempted to  sail  along  the  coast,  would  abandon  the  rest  of  their 
armament,  and  wouM  bo  dispirited,  from  liaving  no  certainty 
whether  the  cities  would  receive  them  or  not.  1  therefore,  for 
Tiiy  part,  am  of  opinion,  that  being  deterred  by  this  consider- 
ation, thev  Avould  not  so  much  as  put  out  from  Coreyra ;  but 
would  either,  after  deliberating  and  reconnoitering  how  many 
wo  are,  and  in  what  position,  be  driven  on  by  the  season  of 
tho  year  into  winter ;  or,  in  consternation  at  tho  unexjH'cted 
result,  break  up  the  expedition:  especially  since  tho  most 
skillful  of  tlieir  gimerals,  as  I  hear,  is  taking  tho  command 
«gainst  his  will,  and  would  gladly  seizo  nn  excuso  to  return, 


402  THUCTDIDEa  YL.  [xxxv.,xxxtl 

it'  any  considerable  resistanco  wore  seen  on  our  part.  We 
should  be  reported  too,  I  am  quite  sure,  as  being  more  than 
wo  really  are ;  *  and  iu  aw^ordauco  with  what  u  told  them  are 
raeu*8  feelings  also  ailected ;  and  of  those  who  are  beforehand 
in  attacking,  or,  at  any  rate,  let  those  who  are  going  to  attack 
them  see  beforehand  that  they  will  defend  tliemselves,  they 
stand  in  greater  fear,  cousitlering  them  equal  to  the  danger. 
And  this  would  be  tlio  case  now  with  the  Athenians.  For 
they  are  coming  against  us  with  a  belief  that  wo  shall  oflfer  no 
resistance ;  with  gooil  reason  contemning  us,  because  we  did 
not  join  the  L:iceda;monians  in  destroying  them,  liut  if  they 
saw  us  acting  with  courage  beyond  their  expectation,  they 
>vould  bo  moro  dismayed  at  that  unlooked-for  result,  than  at 
the  power  which  Λνο  really  possess.  Bo  pei'suiuled,  therefore,  to 
show  this  boldness,  if  possible ;  but  if  not,  then,  Jis  quickly  as 
possible,  to  get  ready  all  other  resources  for  the  war  ;  and  to 
think,  every  one  of  you,  that  contempt  for  your  assailants  is 
best  shown  by  bravery  of  deeds ;  but  that,  for  the  present,  to 
consider  those  preparations  most  safe  which  are  made  with  a 
feeling  of  fear,  and  to  act  as  in  a  season  of  danger,  would 
prove  most  to  your  advantage.  For  those  men  are  both  com- 
ing against  us,  and  already,  I  know  for  certain,  on  their  voyage, 
imd  all  but  here." 

35.  Such  was  the  speech  of  Iltirmocrates.  l>ut  tlie  jieopln 
of  Syracuse  were  at  great  strife  one  with  another ;  some  niain- 
taining  that  the  Athenians  would  by  no  means  come,  and  that 
what  he  said  was  not  the  truth  ;  others  asking  what  they  couM 
do,  if  they  did  come,  which  they  would  not  sutler  on  a  largi-r 
Bcalo  iu  return.  Others,  again,  treated  the  matter  with  utter 
contempt,  and  turned  it  to  ridicule ;  while  there  were  but  few 
>vho  believed  llermocratt^'s,  and  were  afrai<l  of  what  was  coming. 
Athenagoras,  who  w.'is  a  leader  of  the  people,  and  most  intlu- 
ential  with  the  multituile  at  the  present  time,  then  came  for- 
ward to  them  an<l  8j)oke  as  follows : 

30.  "  With  regard  to  the  Athenians,  Λvhoever  does  not 
Avish  them  to  be  so  senseless,  and  to  be  reducud  into  subjection 
to  us  by  coming  here,  is  either  a  coward,  or  ill  affected  toward 
his  country.  But  with  reganl  to  those  who  bring  such  things, 
and  till  you  >vith  such  excessive  fear,  I  wonder  at  them,  not 

'  Literally,  "on  tho  sido  of  more,  or  excess;"  like  ίττΐ  τύ  μείζον,  L 
10.  .•{ 


χχχτιι.,  xxxviii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  VI.  403 

for  tlicir  aiulncity,  but  for  their  folly,  if  they  im.iirino  that  thev 
iiro  not  Biicn  through.  For  hciiii;  afraitl  themselves,  they  wish 
to  throw  the  whole  city  into  consternation,  in  order  that  they 
may  ^ei  their  own  terror  thrown  into  the  shade  by  the  general 
alarm.  And  now  this  is  the  real  value  of  these  reports:  they 
do  not  arise  in  a  natural  Λvay,  but  are  concocted  by  men  who 
are  always  raising  commotions  Iiere.  But  you,  if  well  advised, 
will  not  look  at  and  estimate  probabilities  by  the  news  which 
these  persons  bring,  but  ])y  what  men  of  talent  and  great  ex- 
perience, as  I  presuino  the  Athenians  are,  would  be  likely  to  do. 
For  it  is  not  probable  that  they,  leaving  the  Peloponnesians  be- 
hind them,  and  not  having  yet  brought  the  war  at  homo  to  a 
sure  conclusion,  should  voluntarily  come  hero  for  another  no 
less  arduous4  since,  in  my  opinion,  they  are  quite  contented 
that  we,  with  so  many  and  so  great  cities  as  Λνο  liave,  arc  not 
going  against  them. 

37.  "  l^ut,  indeed,  if  they  should  come,  as  they  arc  Faid  to 
be  coming,  I  consider  Sicily  more  competent  to  bring  the  war 
to  a  termination  than  *  the  Peloponneso  (inasmuch  as  it  is 
k^tter  provided  in  all  respect.s),  and  our  city  by  itself  far 
stronger  than  the  army  which  is  now,  as  they  say,  coming 
against  us,  even  though  it  came  twice  as  large  as  it  is.  For  ί 
know  that  neither  will  any  horses  accompany  them,  or  bo  pro- 
vided for  them  li<;re,  exce])t  some  few  from  the  Segestans,  nor 
heavy-armed  equal  in  number  to  our  own,  coming,  as  they 
must  have  done,  on  board  stiip.  For  it  is  a  great  thing  for 
even  the  ships  themselves,  lightly-laden,  to  perform  so  long  a 
voyage  hither ;  and  for  all  the  other  provisions  required 
against  such  a  city  (which  Avill  bo  no  few),  to  Ixi  furnished.  So 
far  then  am  I  from  believing  this,  that  I  think  if  they  camo 
with  another  city  as  large  as  Syracuse  in  their  possession,  and 
living  there  on  our  borders  carried  on  the  war,  they  would 
hardly  avoid  utter  ruin  :  much  less  then,  surely,  with  tho 
whole  of  Sicily  hostile  to  them  (for  it  will  league  together) ; 
and  with  an  army  established  in  tho  country  from  on  board 
ship ;  and  whilo  they  are  not  permitted  by  our  cavalry  to  ad- 
vance far  from  their  wretched  tents,  and  such  poor  equijH 
ments  as  they  are  compelled  to  put  up  with.  In  short,  I  do  not 
think  they  would  even  effect  α  landing ;  bo  far  superior  do  I 
consider  our  forces  to  be 

38,  "  But  tho  Athenians,  na  I  tell  you,  being  awaro  of  thia, 

•  ■  ■ 


404  THUOYDIDEa  VI.  [xxxix. 

aro  engaged,  I  am  well  assured,  in  preserving  their  own  }>o»- 
sessions ;  and  it  is  persons  here  tliat  are  making  up  these  stories 
of  what  neither  is,  nor  could  ever  be,  the  case.  And  I  am  not 
now  for  the  first  time  convinced  of  them,  but  have  ever  been 
60,  that  they  wish  to  terrify  your  populace  by  such  tales  as 
these,  and  still  more  wicked  ones,  if  not  even  by  deeds; 
and  80  themselves  to  have  the  rule  of  the  city.  And  in  truth 
I  am  afraid,  lest  some  time  or  other,  by  making  many  at- 
,  tempts,  they  should  even  succeed  ;  while  wo  aro  ill-disposed, 
before  wo  are  in  tho  act  of  sufl'ering,  to  take  precautionary 
measures  against  them,  and  after  finding  them  out,  to  proceed 
against  them.  And  so  by  these  means  our  city  is  seldom  at 
rest,  but  is  involved  in  many  feuds  and  conflicts — not  more 
frequently  with  its  enemies  than  with  itself — a^l  sometimes 
in  tyrannies  and  unprincipled  cabals,  liut  I  will  cudeav(»r, 
if  only  you  Λνίΐΐ  follow  my  advice,  to  let  none  of  these  things 
occur  in  our  time ;  by  convincii.g  you  >vho  form  the  mass  oi' 
the  people,  and  by  chastising  those  who  plot  such  things ;  not 
only  >vhen  convicted  in  the  acts  (for  il  is  diflicult  so  to  cateh 
them),  but  also  for  what  they  have  tho  wish,  though  not  the 
power,  to  do.  For  wc  must  avenge  ourselves  on  our  enemy, 
not  only  for  what  he  does,  but  beforehand  also,  for  his  intention 
to  do  it ;  inasmuch  as  if  wo  Avere  not  first  in  guarding  against 
him,  we  shall  be  first  in  sufi'eriug.  AVith  regard  to  the  oligarchs, 
on  the  other  hand,  I  shall  reprove  them  on  some  point**,  watc!» 
them  on  others,  and  warn  them  on  others ;  for  in  this  way  1 
think  I  shall  best  deter  them  from  their  evil  practices.  And, 
indeed,  what  is  it  (a  question  which  I  have  often  asked)  that 
ye  really  Avish,  ye  young  men  ?  Is  it  to  enjoy  j>ower  at  once  i 
liut  that  is  not  lawful ;  and  that  law  was  so  enacted  in  conse- 
quence of  your  incompetency,  rather  than  with  a  wish  to  de- 
grade you  when  competent  for  tho  task.  Well  then,  is  it  to 
avoid  being  under  the  same  laws  with  tho  people  at  large  i 
And  how  then  is  it  right  for  tho  same  people  not  to  bo  thought 
Λνοι-thy  of  tho  same  privileges  ? 

39.  "  Some  one  will  say,  that  a  democracy  is  neither  a  sensi- 
ble nor  an  equitable  thing,  but  that  those  who  have  proj>erly 
are  also  most  competent  to  rule  best.  IJut  /  say,  in  tho  fir>t 
place,  that  J  democracy'  is  a  name  for  all,  but  'oligarchy'  f>>r 
only  a  ])art ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  that  though  the  rich  are 
the  best  guardians  of  property,  tho  intelligent  would  be  tho 


XL^XLI.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  405 

l)Ofit  counselors,  nnd  the  mass  of  tlio  pooplc  Iho  best  judjorcs 
after  hearinfj  measures  discussed ;  and  that  all  these  things, 
both  severally  and  collectively,  have  their  duo  share  allotted 
to  them  in  a  democracy.  An  oligarchy,  on  the  other  hand, 
admits,  indeed,  the  many  to  a  share  of  dangers,  but  of  advan- 
taijes  it  not  only  enjoys  the  larger  part,  but  even  takes  away  and 
keeps  the  whole.  And  this  is  what  the  powerful  and  young 
among  you  desire — a  thing  impossible  to  attiin  in  a  great  city. 

40.  "Nay  then  at  length,  even  now,  Ο  yc  dullest  of  all 
nion '  (for  of  all  the  Greeks  1  know,  are  you  either  most  sensc- 
k'sft,  if  you  are  not  sensible  that  you  are  coveting  evil  things  ; 
or  most  unprincipled,  if  you  know  it,  and  still  daro  to  pursue 
them) : — nay  then,  I  say,  cither  acquire   that  knowledge,  or 
( hango  those  principles,  and  so  advance  the  interest  of  tho 
citv,  which  is  the  common  interest  of  all.     For  consider,  that 
those  who  are  good  among  you  ΛνίΙΙ  share  that  in  an  equal,  or 
even  greater  degree,  than  the  mass  of  tho  people  in  the  city ; 
but  tliat  if  you  >visli  any  thing  else,  you  run  a  risk  of  being 
deprived  of  all.     And  have  dono  with  such  reports  as  these, 
knowing  that  they  are  brought  to  those  who  are  aware  of, 
and  will  not  tolerate,  your  designs.     For  this  city,  even  if  the 
Athenians  are  coming,  Avill  resist  them  in  a  manner  worthy  of 
it'^lf ;  and  wo  have  generals  who  will  look  to  these  matters. 
And  if  none  of  the  reports  bo  truo  (wliich  is  my  opinion),  it 
will  not  lay  a  voluntary  slavery  on  itself,  by  being  panic-struck 
at  your  intelligence,  and  by  choosing  you  as  its  rulers ;  but 
will  look  at  the  circumstances  itself,  and  consider  tho  words 
iipoken  by  you  as  equivalent  to  deeds ;  and  ΛνίΙΙ  not  be  deprived 
of  its  present  liberty  by  listening  to  you,  but  will  endeavor  to 
preserve  it  by  being  cautious  in  its  actions,  and  not  allowing 
you  to  go  unpunished." 

41.  To  this  efl'ect  spoke  Athenagoras.  One  of  the  generals 
then  rose  up,  and  would  no  longer  permit  any  one  else  to 
come  forward,  but  himself  spoke  on  the  subject  before  them  to 
tho  following  effect :  "  It  is  neither  prudent  for  any  parties  to 
utter  calumnies  against  each  other,  nor  for  those  who  licar  them 
to  admit  them ;  but  rather  to  see,  with  regard  to  tho  intelli- 
gence brought  to  us,  how  we  may  prepare,  both  each  man 

'  I  have  altemptod  to  translate  this  passage  as  it  is  found  in  tho  MSS., 
but  must  refer  to  the  different  editors  for  tho  emendation  which  they 
propose  for  what  they  all  agree  in  thinking  the  corrupt  part  of  it 


406  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [xtiL.xun. 

severally  and  the  whole  city  together,  to  defend  ourselves  well 
against  the  invmlers.  And  even  8upi)08ing  it  not  to  bo'  re- 
quired, there  is  no  harm,  at  any  rate,  in  the  state  being  etjuip- 
pcd  with  horses,  and  arms,  and  every  thing  else  in  wliich  war 
rejoices.  And  we  ourselves  will  undertake  to  attend  to  and 
examine  these  things,  and  to  send  round  to  the  cities,  both  for 
observation,  and  whatever  ejso  may  appear  to  bo  expedient. 
To  some  of  them,  indeed,  \ve  have  already  attended  ;  and  what- 
ever we  discover,  we  will  lay  before  yau."  After  the  genera! 
had  said  thus  much,  the  Syracusans  departed  from  the  assembly. 

42.  Now  the  Athenians  were  by  this  time  at  Corcyra, 
themselves  and  all  their  allies.  And  in  the  first  place,  the 
generals  reviewed  the  armament  a  second  time,  and  made  their 
dispositions,  as  they  Avero  to  come  to  their  moorings,  and  to 
form  their  camp ;  making  tlireo  squadrons,  and  allotting  one  to 
each  of  their  boily,  that  they  might  not,  by  sailing  in  com- 
pany, be  at  a  loss  tor  water,  and  }>orti*,  and  provisions,  on  their 
touching  any  where ;  and  that  they  might  in  other  respects 
be  more  orderly  and  easy  to  control,  by  being  put  under  a 
particular  commander,  according  to  the  several  pquadrons. 
They  next  sent  forward  three  ships  to  Italy  and  Sicily,  to  as- 
certain which  of  the  cities  would  receive  them  ;  with  orders 
to  come  out  again  and  meet  tlu'm,  that  they  might  know  this 
when  they  put  in. 

43.  After  this,  the  Athenians  at  length  weighed  anchor, 
and  |)roceeded  to  cross  over  from  Corcyra  to  Sicily,  with  tlm 
following  force;  viz. — a  hundred  and  thirty-four  triremes,  in 
all,  and  two  lihodian  fifty-oared  galloys  (a  hundred  of  these 
were  Athenian  vessels,  sixty  of  which  Avero  fiist  sailers,  the 
rest  troop  ships ;  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  being  composed 
of  Chians,  and  the  other  allies) ;  of  heavy-armed,  in  all, 
five  thousand  one  hundred  (of  which  there  were  raised  by 
the  Athenians  themselves  fifteen  hundred,  and  seven  hundred 
Thetes  *  serving  as  Epibatai  on  board  the  ships ;  the  rest  of 
those  who  joined  the  expedition  being  allies,  some  of  them 
sent  by  their  subjects,  others  by  tho  Argives,  to  the  numk-r 
of  five  hundred,  with  two  hundred  and  fifty  Mantineans,  who 
vmTQ  also  mercenaries) ;  of  archers,  in   all,  four  hundred  aii«l 

'  Or/Tic.]  i  €.,  men  included  in  tho  lowest  of  the  four  classes  into  whicl» 
Solon  divided  tho  Athenian  people,  and  which  consisted  of  all  whoso  lauJ 
brought  in  less  than  two  hundred  modimni  of  corn  yearly.  Seo  nolo  i 
y.  1U7. 


3n,iv.,XLV.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  407 

ciplity  (eighty  of  Avhich  were  Cretans) ;  of  Rhotlian  plingcrR, 
Fcveu  lai mired ;  of  light-armed  Megarean»,  who  were  exiles, 
one  hundred  and  twenty ;  and  one  horso  transport,  carrying 
thirty  horses. 

44.  Such  was  the  amount  of  tho  first  armament  which 
sailed  over  for  tho  war.  For  these  troops  thirty  ships  of 
burden,  laden  with  corn,  carried  provisions,  Avith  the  bakers, 
Ftonc-masons,  carpenters,  and  all  the  tools  for  building  fortiti- 
c.itions;  and  also  one  hundred  boats,  which,  together  with 
the  ships  of  bunlen,  were  pressed  int^)  tlic  service  ;  >vhile  many 
other  boats  and  ships  of  burden  followed  the  armament  volun- 
tarily, for  purposes  of  commerce ;  all  of  which  proceeded  at 
that  time  to  cross  tho  Ionian  (Julf  from  Corcyra.  When  tho 
whole  armament  had  made  the  coast  at  tho  Tapygian  foreland, 
and  Tarentum,  and  as  they  severally  coiild,  they  sailed  along 
the  coast  of  Italy,  as  tho  cities  di<l  not  afford  them  a  market, 
or  the  protection  of  their  walls,  but  only  water  and  anchorage 
(and  Tarentum  and  Locri  not  even  these),  until  they  camo  to 
Uhegium,  a  promontory  of  Italy.  There  they  at  once  mus- 
tered, and  pitched  a  camp  outsitle  tho  city  (as  they  would  not 
receive  them  within  tho  Λvalls),  in  tho  sacred  inclosuro  of 
Diana,  where  they  atforded  them  a  market;  and  liaving  drawn 
up  their  ships  ashore,  they  remained  quiet.  They  then  en- 
tered into  communiration  with  the  Rhcgians,  calling  upon 
them,  as  Chalcidians,  to  assist  the  Lcontines,  >vho  were  Chal- 
cidians  also.  Tliey,  liowever,  said  that  they  Avould  join  nei- 
ther party,  but  Λvhatever  tho  rest  of  the  Italiots  should  collect- 
ively determine,  that  they  would  do.  The  Athenians  then 
turned  their  attention  to  tho  state  of  things  in  Sicily,  con- 
sidering in  what  way  they  would  best  deal  >vith  them ;  and  at 
the  same  time  were  waiting  for  tho  arrival  from  Segesta  of 
the  ships  which  had  been  sent  on  in  advance;  wishing  to 
know  respecting  tho  money,  whether  thero  wore  such  a  sum 
as  tho  messengers  stated  at  Athens, 

45.  To  tho  Syrncusans,  in  tho  mcnn  timo,  rcporte  wcro 
being  brought  from  all  fjtmrtors,  and  from  thoso  who  bad  been 
sent  by  them  to  recorinoiter  camo  positive  intelligence  that  tho 
ships  were  at  Uhegium ;  and  on  the  belief  of  this,  they  began 
to  make  preparations  with  all  their  heart,  and  were  no  longer 
incredulous.  Accordingly  they  sent  about  to  the  Sicels,  in 
some  cases,  guards }  in  others,  embassadors ;  and  wcro  putting 


408  THUCYDIDEa  VL  [xlvl,  xitil 

garrisons  into  iho  stutions  of  the  j^eripoli '  in  thoir  country ; 
while  in  their  city  they  were  seeing  if  the  eauipmcnts  were 
com|)lete,  by  examining  arras  and  horses ;  and  were  sotUirig 
every  thing  else,  in  exixictHtion  of  a  war  that  was  quickly 
coming  on  them,  and  all  but  present. 

40.  Now  the  three  ships  sent  on  in   advance  came  from  ^ 

Segesta  to  the  Athenians  at  lihegium,  with  tidings  that  the  t 

other  money  which  they  had  promised  was  hot  there,  but  that  • 

only  thirty  talents  were  to  be  seen.  The  generals  then  were 
immediately  in  a  state  of  great  despondency,  because  this 
their  first  hope  had  disappointed  them ;  as  had  the  Khegians 
also,  by  their  unwillingness  to  join  their  standard — the  people  | 

they  had  first  attempted  to  persua^le,  and  for  whom  it  was  | 

most  natural  to  assist  them,  as  they  were  of  the  same  race  as  I 

the    Leontines,  and  always  favorably  disf>osed  toward   thom-  | 

selves.  Nieias,  indeed,  was  pnip.'ired  for  the  tidings  from  the 
Siigestans,  but  by  the  other  two  it  Avas  quite  unexpected.  Tor 
the  Segestaiis  had  recourse  to  the  following  contrivance,  at 
the  time  when  the  first  envoys  of  the  Athenians  came  to  them 
to  see  the  state  of  their  funds.  They  took  them  to  the  temple 
of  Venus  at  Eryx,  and  showed  them  the  treasures  deposited  ^ 
there,  consisting  of  bowls,  wine-lailles,  censers,  and  other  | 
articles  of  furniture  in  no  small  quantity ;  >vliich  being  made  | 

(jf  silver,  presented,  >vith  a  value  really  trifiing,  a  much  greater  I 
show  of  wealth.  And  in  their  private  receptions  of  the  tri- 
remes* crows,  having  collected  the  cups  both  of  gold  and  silver 
that  were  in  Segesta  itself,  and  borrowed  those  in  the  neigh- 
boring cities,  whether  Phoenician  or  Grecian,  they  each 
brought  them  to  the  entertainments,  as  their  own.  And  thus, 
as  all  used  pretty  nearly  the  same,  and  great  numbers  of  them 
were  every  where  seen,  it  created  much  astonishment  in  the 
Athenians  from  the  triremes ;  and  on  tlieir  arrival  at  Athens 
they  spread  it  abroad  that  they  had  seen  great  wealth.  Those, 
then,  who  had  been  themselves  thus  outwitted,  and  had  at  that 
time  persuaded  the  rest,  were  severely  blamed  by  the  soldiers, 
when  the  report  went  abroad  that  there  wiis  not  at  Segesta 
the  money  they  had  expected. 

47.  The  generals  now  took  counsel  on  the  present  state  of         ♦ 

allairs.     The  opinion  of  Nicias  was,  that  they  should  sail  to         i 

Seliims  with  all  their  forces,  that  being  the  object  for  which         | 

'  Soc  note,  p.  2GG.  * 


XLViii.,  XLix.]  THUCYDIDES  VI.  409 

Ihcy  had,  most  of  all,  been  sent :  and  in  case  of  the  Segestans 
Fupplying  money  for  the  whole  armament,  tliat  then  they 
should  determine  accordingly;  otherwise,  that  they  Bhonld 
hcjX  them  to  give  provisions  for  their  sixty  ships,  the  numlxir 
which  they  liad  asked  for;  and  remaininij  there  should  bring 
Iho  Selinuntines  to  terms  with  them,  either  bv  force  or  by 
treaty ;  and  so,  after  coasting  along  by  the  other  cities,  and 
«lisplaying  the  power  of  the  Athenian  state,  as  Avell  as  proving 
their  zeal  in  the  cause  of  their  friends  and  allies,  they  sliould  sail 
hack  liome  (unles.^  they  should  bo  able,  on  a  sudden,  and 
without  expecting  it,  cither  to  do  the  Lcontines  service,  or 
to  bring  over  some  of  the  other  cities) ; — and  not  expose  their 
state  to  danger  by  spending  its  own  resources. 

48,  Alcibiades,  on  the  other  hand,  said  that  they  ought 
not,  after  sailing  from  Jiomo  with  so  largo  a  force,  to  return 
with  dislionor  and  without  eilccting  their  purpose;  but  to 
send  heralds  to  all  the  otlier  cities,  except  Selinus  and 
Syracuse,  and  endeavor  also  to  get  some  of  the  Sicels  to  re- 
volt from  the  Syracusans,  and  to  gain  the  friendship  of  others 
among  them,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  corn  and  troops ;  but 
lirst  of  all  to  win  over  the  Messanians  (for  they  lay  just  in 
the  passage  and  a]>proa(h  to  Sicily,  and  there  would  bo  a  har- 
bor for  them  there,  and  the  most  suitable  station  for  observ- 
ing the  enemy).  AVhen,  then,  they  had  brought  over  tho 
i'ities,  and  knew  with  whoso  assistance  they  would  carry  on 
tho  war,  then  they  should  attack  Syracuse  and  Selinus,  if  tho 
latter  did  not  come  to  terms  with  Segesta,  and  tho  former 
permit  them  to  settle  the  Leontines. 

49.  Lamachus,  again,  urged  that  they  ought  to  sail  straight 
(o  Syracuse,  and  immediately  fight  tho  battle  under  the  walls 
of  the  city,  >vhile  tho  inhabitants  were  most  imprepared  and 
panic-struck.  For  every  armament  was  most  formidablo  in 
the  first  instance ;  but  if  it  spent  much  time  before  coming 
into  sight,  men  grew  bold  again  in  spirit,  and  felt  more  con- 
iempt  for  it  even  on  its  appearance.  If,  then,  they  attacked 
(hem  on  η  sudden,  while  they  were  still  with  terror  looking 
for  them^  they  would  gain  tho  most  decided  advantage  over 
(hem,  and  strike  fear  into  them  in  every  way  ;  by  their  sight 
of  the  forces  (for  they  would  appear  most  numerous  at  tho 
present  time),  by  their  expectation  of  what  they  would 
^utfor,  and,  most  of  all,  by  tho   immediate  peril   of  tho  en• 

18* 


410  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  (L 

gagement.      It   was  probable,  too,  that  raanjr  would  he  eur-        Ϊ 
prised  outside  tho  city  in  consequence  of  their  nut  believinj[^        t 
that  they  would  come;    or,  if    they  were  now  carrying  in 
their  eftects,  yet  tho  army  would  be  in  no  want  of  property,  if 
it  sat  down  in  superior  force  before  the  city.      And  so  the. 
rest  of  the  Siceliots  would  then  the  more  shrink  from  entering 
into  alliance  with  the  Syracusans,  and  join  the  Athenians ;  and 
would  not  put  off,  while  they  waited  to  see  which  party  would 
be  tho  stronger.     As  for  a  naval  station,  he  said  that  after 
retiring  [from  before  Syracuse],  and  bringing   their  ships  to 
anchor,  they  should  establish  one  at   Megara ;  which  was  an 
uninhabited  place,  at  no  great  distance  from  Syracuse  either        i 
by  sea  or  land.  | 

50.  Though  Lamachus  spoko  to  this  effect,  he  nevertheless        | 
gave  his  support  to  tho  opinion   of  Alcibiades.      After  this, 
Alcibiades  sailed  across  in  his  own  ship  to  Messana,  and  made 
proposals  to  them  for  forming  an  alliance  ;  but  when  he  did 
not  prevail  on  them,  but  they  answered  that  they  could  not 
receive  him  within  their  city,  though  they  would  afford  liim  a 
market  outside,  ho  sailed  back  again  to  Rhegium.     Then  tho 
generals  immediately  joined  in  manning  sixty  ships  out  of  the 
whole  number,  and,  taking  provisions  for  them,  coasted  along 
to  Naxus,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  armament  at  lihegium  with 
one  of  their  own  body.     On  tho  Naxians'  receiving  them  within        ^ 
their  city,  they  coasted  on  to  Catana ;  and  when  the  inhabit•        | 
ants  refused  to  admit  them  (for  there  was  in  that  place  a  [iorty        I 
that  favored  tho  cause  of  tho  Syracusans),  they  proceeded  iu        f 
tho  river  Terias,    Having  s|)ent  the  night  there,  the  next  day        | 
they  sailed  in  colunm  toward   Syracuse,  with  the  rest  of  tho        i 
ships ;  for  ten  of  their  s<juadron  they  had  sent  on  before,  to        | 
sail  into  the  great  harbor,  and   observe  whether  there   were        f 
any  fleet  hiunched ;  and  to  proclaim  from  their  ships,  "that 
the  Athenians  were  come  to  reinstate  the  Leontines  in  their 
own  country,  on  the  ground   of  alliance  and   kindred ;   and         4 
therefore  that  such  of  them  as  were  in  Syracuse  should  with•         ^ 
draw  from  it,  and  without  any  apprehension  join  the  Atheni- 
ans, as  friends   and   benefactors."      So  when   this  proclama- 
tion had  been  made,  and  they  had  reconnoitered  tho  city,  the 
luirbors,  and  the  features  of  the  country  which  they  wouM 
liave  to  make  the  base  of  their  operations  in  tho  war,  they 
sailed  back  again  to  ("ataiia.  ? 

'  Or,  as  ΛηιυΜ  rciuiers  it,  "  ivliile  they  were  carryiug,"  e**'..  < 


Li.-un.]  TnUCYDIDES.  VL  411 

51.  An  assembly  having  been  held  there,  the  inhabitants  did 
not  admit  the  armament,  but  told  the  generals  to  come  in 
and  say  what  they  wished.  While  Alcibiades  was  ppeaking, 
and  the  attention  of  those  in  the  city  was  turned  to  the  assem* 
bly,  the  soldiers,  without  Wing  observed,  broke  through  a  post- 
ern which  had  been  ill  built  up  in  the  wall,  and  entering  the 
city,  stationed  themselves  in  tlio  market-place.  When  thoso 
of  the  Catan.Tans  who  favored  the  Syracusans  saw  the  army 
within  the  walls,  being  immediately  very  much  alarmed,  they 
secretly  went  out  of  the  j)lace,  as  they  formed  but  a  small  party, 
while  the  rest  voted  for  an  alliance  with  the  Athenians,  and 
borrgod  them  to  fetch  the  rest  of  their  forces  from  Rhegium. 
After  this  the  Athenians  sailed  to  Rhegium,  and  having  now 
put  out  with  all  their  armament  for  Cataua,  on  their  arrival 
there  established  themselves  in  their  camp. 

52.  Now  tidings  were  brought  to  them,  both  from  Camarina, 
that  if  they  went  there  the  inhabitants  would  go  over  to  them ; 
and  also  that  the  Syracusans  were  manning  a  fleet.  They  coast- 
ed along,  therefore,  with  all  their  force,  in  the  first  instincc,  to 
Syracuse ;  and  when  they  found  no  fleet  manning,  they  again 
proceeded  along  the  shore  toward  Camarina ;  and  having 
l»rought  to  at  tlio  beach,  sent  a  herald  to  the  people.  They, 
however,  did  not  admit  them,  saying  that  their  agreement  on 
r>ritli  was  to  receive  the  Athenians  when  they  sailed  to  them 
with  only  a  single  ship,  unless  they  should  themselves  send  for 
more.  Heing  thus  unsuccessful,  they  sailed  back  again;  and 
after  they  had  landed  on  a  part  of  the  Syracusan  territory,  and 
the  cavalry  from  Syracuse  had  come  to  the  rescue,  and  killed 
some  stragglers  of  the  light-armed,  they  went  back  to  Catana. 

53.  There  they  found  the  ship  Salaminia  come  from  Athens 
for  Alcibiades — to  order  him  to  sail  back  and  defend  himself 
against  the  charges  which  the  state  brought  against  him — and 
for  some  others  of  the  soldiers,  who  with  him  had  been  in- 
formed Against,  as  being  guilty  of  impiety  with  regard  to  the 
mysteries,  and  some  of  them  with  regard  to  the  Mercuries  also. 
For  the  Athenians,  after  the  armament  had  seiled  away,  made 
no  less  investigation  into  what  had  been  done  m  the  case  of  the 
mysteries  and  in  that  of  the  Mercuries ;  and  as  they  did  not 
test  the  character  of  the  informers,  but  in  their  suspicious* 

•  *  Or,  according  to  Poppo's  reading,  nuvra^  '•  taking,  or  regarding,  every 
thing  in  a  suspicions  Hglit." 


412  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  [UT. 

mood  Aclmittod  all  who  camo  forward,  on  tho  credit  of  un- 
principled men,  they  arrested  and  threw  into  prison  very  ex- 
cellent citizens,  thinking  it  more  expedient  to  sift  the  matter 
and  find  it  out,  than  that,  in  consequence  of  tho  bad  principle 
of  en  informer,  an  accused  person,  even  though  he  had  a  good 
character,  should  be  unquestioned,  and  escape.  For  tho  com- 
mons, knowing  by  report  that  tlio  tjTanny  of  Pisistratus  and 
his  sons  had  proved  galling  at  last,  and,  moreover,  that  it  had 
not  even  been  put  down  by  themselves  and  JIarmodius,  but  by 
tho  Lacedaimoniafls,  were  always  afraid,  and  took  every  thing 
«uspiciously. 

54.  For  tho  daring  deed  of  Aristogiton  and  llarmcHlius  was 
undertiiken  in  consequence  of  a  love-adventure,  by  relating 
which,  at  some  length,  I  shall  show  that  neither  other  j)eoplo 
nor  tho  Athenians  themselves  give  any '  accurate  account  of 
their  own  tyrants,  or  of  >vhat  has  happened  among  thenj. 
For  when  Pisistratus  had  died  at  an  advanced  ago  in  posses- 
sion of  the  tyranny,  it  Avas  not  llipparchus,  as  tho  generality 
suppose,  but  Hippias,  that  was  eldest  of  his  sons,  and  obtained 
tho  government.  Now  Ilanuodius  being  in  tho  flower  of 
youth  and  beauty,  Aristogiton,  a  citizen  of  middle  rank  in 
the  city,  was  enamored  of  him,  and  enjoyed  his  favor,  llar- 
modius,  then,  being  solicited  by  llipparchus,  son  of  Pisistra- 
tus, and  not  prevailed  upon,  denounced  him  to  Aristogiton. 
lie,  lover-like,  being  exceedingly  indignant,  and  fearing  tho 
power  of  llipparchus,  lest  ho  should  take  him  by  force,  im- 
mediately formed  a  design  (such  as  ho  could  in  tho  position 
he  held),  for  putting  down  the  tyranny.  In  tho  mean  time, 
llipparchus,  having  again  solicited  llarmodius  with  no  better 
success,  would  not  indeed  otter  any  violence  to  him,  but  pre- 
pared to  insult  him  in  some  secret  way  or  other,  as  though  it 
ΛΥοΓο  not  on  that  account.  For  neither  in  his  general  govern- 
ment was  ho  severe  toward  the  mass  of  the  people,  but  con- 
ducted it  without  exciting  any  odium  ;  and,  for  tyrants,  theso 
men  in  the  greatest  degree  studied  virtue  and  intelligence ;  and 
though  they  exacted  from  tho  Athenians  only  a  twentieth  of 
their  income,  they  atlomed  their  city  in  a  beautiful  manner,  and 
carried  on  their  Avars,  and  pro\ided  sacriiices  for  the  temples. 
The  state  enjoyed,  too,  tho  laws  which  had  been  previously 
euacted,  in  all  other  respects,  except  that  they  always  took  ear»• 
that  one  of  their  own  family  should  hold  the  olhces.     Among 


XV.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  4\6 

others  of  them  who  held  tlic  yearly  nrchonship  at  Athen»,  was 
risistratus,  son  of  the  Ilippias  who  had  been  tyrant,  who  boro 
liis  grandfather's  name,  and  dedicated,  while  anihon,  the  altar 
to  the  twelve  gods  in  the  market-place,  and  that  of  Apollo  in 
the  Pythian  precinct  The  Athenian  people  having  afterward 
made  an  addition  to  the  length  of  that  in  the  market-place,  ob- 
literated the  inscription  on  the  altar ;  but  that  in  the  Pythian 
precinct  is  even  still  \isible,  though  in  faded  letters,  to  this 
purport : 

•'  risistratus,  the  son  of  llippias,  hero, 
Ια  Pythian  precinct,  marked  his  archon  year." 

55.  Xow  that  Ilippiai»,  as  being  the  eldest  son,  succeeded  to 
the  government,  I  both  positively  assert,  because  I  know  it  bv 
report  more  accurately  than  others,  and  one  may  also  learn  it 
from  this  very  fact,  lie  alone  of  the  legitimate  brothers  a|>- 
jtears  to  have  had  children  ;  as  both  the  altar  shows,  and  the 
pillar  commemorating  the  wrong  committed  by  the  tyrants, 
placed  in  the  Athenian  citadel,  on  which  is  inscribed  the  name 
ot'  no  child  of  Thlessalus,  or  of  Ilipparchus,  but  five  of  Ilip- 
j)ias,  who  were  bom  to  him  of  Myrrhine,  daughter  of  Callias, 
son  of  IIy|>erechides.  For  it  was  natural  that  the  eldest 
should  have  married  first.  And  lie  is  the  first  mentioned  on 
the  pillar'  after  his  father,  and  that,  too,  not  unnaturally,  as  ho 
was  the  eldest  next  to  him,  and  enjoyed  the  tyranny.  Nor, 
again,  do  I  think  that  llippias  would  ever  have  obtained  the 
tyranny  >vith  such  ease  at  the  moment,  if  Ilipparchus  had 
been  in  power  when  he  was  killed,  and  llippias  had  had  to 
establish  himself  in  it  on  the  same  day.  Hut  owing  to  hie 
former  habil,  both  of  striking  fear  into  the  citizc^ns,  and  of 
paying  strict  attention  to  his  mercenaries,  ho  retained  liis 
^  sway  with  superabundiuit  security,  and  was  at  no  loss,  as 
though  he  had  been  a  younger  brother,  and  so  ha  1  not  pre- 
viously been   familiar  Λvith  the  constant  exercise  of  power.' 

^  Iv  Tt)  npury  ϋτήλγ.]  Λβ  I  do  not  think  that  ηρύτ^  can  bear  tho 
mcaninpf  wliich  Arnold,  though  with  great  doubt,  proposes  to  give  it,  and 
ns  no-  other  editor  profoescs  to  understand  its  force,  I  have  not  translated 
it  at  all. 

»  ξννΐχΰς  ώμιλήκει  Ty  ήρχή.]  These  words  seem  to  refer  to  the  iem' 
porary  exercise  of  power  which  he  might  have  enjoyed  as  archon  for  α 
year,  in  opposition  to  tho  permanerU  exercise  of  it  as  tyrant,  which  h• 
would,  not  have  enjoyed,  had  h•  been  the  younger  eon  of  his  father. 


414  THUCYDIDES.  VL  [lvi.,lvu 

But  it  wae  the  lot  of  Uipparchua,  becauso  he  was  reiulerod 
famous  by  the  sad  fate  ΛvhicU  befell  him,  to  receive  also 
ill  succeeding  ages  the  repute  of  haviug  enjoyed  the  tyr- 
iumy. 

66.  So  then,  wlieu  Ilarmodius  had  resisted  his  solicitation, 
he  insulted  him,  as  he  intended.  For  after  summouiug  a  sis- 
ter of  his,  a  young  girl,  to  come  and  bear  a  basket  in  a  cer- 
tain procession,  they  rejected  her  when  she  came,  saying  that 
tliey  had  not  summoned  her  at  all,  as  she  was  not  worthy  of 
the  honor.*  Ilarmodius  being  very  indignant  at  tliis,  Aristogi- 
ton  also  was,  for  his  sake,  much  more  exasperated  than  ever. 
And  now  all  their  other  arrangeuients  had  been  made  with 
those  who  Avero  to  join  them  in  taking  the  business  in  hand ; 
but  they  were  Λvaiting  for  the  great  Panathenaic  festival,  on 
Avhich  day  alone  it  w.os  not  considered  a  suspicious  circum- 
stance that  those  of  the  citizens  who  had  conducted  the  pro- 
cession should  meet  together  in  arms ;  and  they  were  them- 
selves to  begin,  but  the  rest  immediately  to  join  in  aiding  them 
against  the  body-guards.  The  conspirators  were  not  numerous, 
for  security's  sake ;  for  they  hoped  that  if  any  number  whatever 
dared  to  make  the  attempt,  even   those  who  were  not  before 

1)rivy  to  it  would  be  willing  at  the  monicnt,  inasmuch  as  they 
lad  arms  in  their  hands,  to  join  in  elfecting  their  own  freedom. 
57.  When,  therefore,  the  festival  arrived,  Hippias,  with  his 
body-guard,  was  arranging  outside  of  the  walls,  in  Avhat  is 
called  the  Ceramicus,  how  the  several  parts  of  the  procession 
were  to  proceed.  And  when  tln-y  saw  one  of  their  accomplices 
in  familiar  conversiition  with  Hippias  (for  ho  was  easy  of  ac- 
cess to  all),  they  were  alaiined,  and  thought  that  some  inform- 
ation had  been  laid  against  them,  and  that  they  Avould  be 
almost  immediately  arrested.  They  wished,  therefore,  to  avenge 
themselves  beforehand,  if  j)Ossible,  on  the  man  Λvho  had  ag- 
grieved them,  and  for  whose  punishment  they  Λvero  ex|X)siiig 
themselves  to  all  that  danger;  and  so  they  rushed  straightway 
within  the  gates,  and  meeting  with  llipparchus  by  the  Leoco- 
rium,  at  once  fell  on  him  in  a  reckless  manner,  under  the  in- 
lluence  of  the  most  vehement  passion,  inspired  by  love  in  the 

'  Kithcr  becauso  her  family  was  of  Phuenician  extraction,  wliieh  ex- 
cluded her  from  an  honor  continod  to  pure  Athenians;  or  becauso  hor  im- 
moral character,  us  thoy  insinuated,  incapacitated  her  for  an  omploymout 
m  which  nouo  but  virgins  of  unblemished  reputation  could  tako  α  paru 


LviiL.Lix.]  THUUTtJlDES.  Τί.  415 

one  oasso,  nnd  by  insult  in  the  other,  and  Bmoto  him,  and  slew 
]iiin.  Now  ono  of  thoni,  nninoly,  Aristonriton,  escaped  from 
(he  guards  at  the  moment,  thiOii«:,di  the  crowd  running  up,  but 
wns  seized  afterward,  and  disposed  of  in  no  gentle  manner, 
liarniodius  was  immediately  i^lain  on  the  spot, 

Γ)8.  When  the  news  were  brouglit  to  llippias  in  the  Ccra- 
inicus,  ho  proceeded  immediately,  not  to  tho  wjene  of  action, 
but  to  tho  armed  men  in  the  procession,  before  they  were  a>varo 
(»r  the  matter,  in  consequence  of  their  being  at  some  distanexj 
from  the  spot ;  and  Λvith  his  countenance  feigneri  to  suit  the  oc- 
casion, so  as  not  to  betray  his  feelings,  lio  pointed  out  a  cer- 
tain spot,  and  desired  them  to  retire  into  it  without  their  arms. 
Accordingly  they  withdrew,  sujiposing  that  ho  would  deliver 
an  address  to  them  ;  while  he,  after  commanding  his  guards 
to  remove  the  arms,  immediately  j)icked  out  such  men  as  lio 
was  disposed  to  think  guilty,  and  whoever  was  found  with  η 
dagger;  for  it  was  only  with  shield  and  spear  that  they  wcro 
accustomed  to  make  their  processions. 

59.  In  this  manner  both  the  original  conspiracy  was  entered 
into  by  Ilarmodius  and  Aristogiton  for  a  lovo  otTense,  and 
their  rash  .venture  attempted  through  their  alarm  at  tho  mo- 
ment. After  this,  tho  tyratmy  was  more  severe  on  tho  Athe- 
nians than  before ;  and  llippias,  being  now  in  greater  appre- 
hension, both  put  to  death  many  of  the  citizens,  and  kept  his 
eye  also  on  foreign  states,  in  whatever  quarter  he  had  a  pros- 
]>ect  of  a  safe  retreat  being  secured  for  him,  in  case  of  any 
revf)lution.  .  At  any  rate,  he  married  his  daughter  Archedico  to 
-.Kantides,  son  of  tho  tyrant  of  Lampsacus — Athenian  as  lie 
was,'  to  a  Lampsaceno — because  ho  saw  that  they  had  great  in- 
fluence with  king  Darius.  There  is  α  monument  to  her  at 
Lampsacus,  with  this  inscription :  * 

•'  Beneath  this  dust  Archedico  finds  ponco, 
Whoso  siro  was  llippias,  peerless  onco  in  Groeco. 
Sho,  though  of  tyrants  daughter,  sister,  bride. 
And  mother,  no'cr  was  Uflcd  up  with  prido." 

W' ith  regard  to  llippias,  having  retained  tho  tyranny  at  Athens 

•  •*.  β.,  to  ft  native  of  a  placo  so  very  far  .beneath  his  own  country  iu. 
reputation.  Coroparo  111,  59.  6,  μϊ)  \\>.αταίης  οντ(ς — Οη(>αΊοις — πα^ιηΛη- 
Οηναι :  where,  as  in  many  other  places,  the  omiesion  of  tho  article  with 
the  hamo  of  a  pooplo  expresses  something  respecting  tho  character  of 
tho  people,  whether  good  or  bad^ 


416  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [lx. 

three  years  longer,  and  being  deposed  in  tlie  fourth  year  by 
the  Lacedaiinonians  and  the  banished  AlcmsBonidae,  he  went, 
under  tivaty,  to  Sigeuui,  then  to  ^^iintides  at  Lanipeacus,  and 
llience  to  the  court  of  king  Darius,  from  whicli  also  he  set  out 
twenty  years  after,  when  now  an  old  man,  and  accompanied 
the  Median  forces  to  Marathon. 

00.  lieflecting,  then,  on  these  things,  and  recalling  to  mind 
all  that  they  knew  by  report  concerning  them,  the  Athenian 
people  were  wrathful  at  that  time,  and  suspicious  of  those  wlio 
liad  incuiTed  accusation  on  the  subject  of  the  mysteries,  and 
thought  that  every  thing  had  been  done  on  the  strength  of  a 
conspiracy  for  esUiblishing  an  oligarchy,  or  a  tyranny.  S«) 
when,  in  consequence  of  their  anger  on  this  account,  many 
pel-sons  of  consideration  were  already  in  prison,  and  the  mat- 
ter appeared  not  to  bo  stojuiing,  but  they  were  daily  proceeding 
.to  greater  severity  and  more  numerous  arrests ;  under  these 
circumsUmces  one  of  the  inen  in  continement,  who  was  thought 
to  be  the  most  guilty  of  them,  was  persuaded  by  one  of  his 
fellow  prisoners  to  give  information,  whether  true  or  not ;  for 
suppositions  are  entertained  both  ways,  and  the  certain  fact 
respecting  those  who  had  done  the  deed  no  one  was  either  able 
to  state  then,  or  has  since  been  able.  By  liis  arguuients  then 
lie  persuaded  him  that  lie  ought,  even  if  he  had  not  done  the 
deed,  both  to  save  himself  by  gaining  a  promise  of  impunity, 
and  to  stop  his  country  from  its  present  suspiciousness ;  for 
that  his  prt'servation  was  niore  sure,  if  lie  confessed  with  a 
promise  of  impunity,  than  if  he  dinied  it,  and  were  brought 
to  trial.  Accordingly  he  informed  both  against  himself  and 
some  others,  resj)ecting  the  Mercuries ;  and  the  Athenian  peo- 
ple having  gladly  aseerUiined,  as  they  supposed,  the  truth  of 
the  matter',  and  having  been  before  indignant  at  the  thought 
of  not  discovering  those  Λνΐιο  had  i>lotted  against  their  com- 
mons, immediately  set  at  liberty  the  informer  and  his  com- 
panions, such  as  ho  had  not  a(;cuse<l ;  while  with  regard  to 
those  who  were  charged  with  the  ciime,  having  brought  them 
to  trial,  they  executed  all  of  them  who  were  seized,  and  hav- 
ing j)a8sed  sentence  upon  those  who  liad  lied,  pio(;laimed  a 
reward  in  money  for  any  one  who  slew  them.  ]λγ  this  course, 
ihougli  it  was  doubtful  whether  those  who  suffered  had  been 
jiunished  unjustly  or  not,  yet  tho  rest  of  the  community  were 
iiiimifestly  beneiitcd. 


LXi]  THUOYDIDES.  ΤΙ.  417 

CI.  "With  regard  to  Alcibiades,  tho  Athenians  took  a  severe 
view  of  the  case,  beinp^  instii^ated  by  his  enemies^  tho  samo 
men  as  liad  also  attacked  him  before  Jiis  g;o\nsr  on  the  expedi- 
tion. And  wlien  they  fancied  they  vere  in  possession  of  tlio 
truth  rospectinix  the  Mercuries,  they  thoujiht  much  more  than 
ever  that  the  affair  of  tho  mysteries  also,  in  whicli  lie  was  im- 
])licateil,  had  Ixien  done  by  liim  with  the  same  design,  and  in 
connection  witli  the  plot  against  the  democracy.  For  a  small 
force  of  Laceda;monians  liappened  too,  just  at  the  time  Avhen 
they  were  in  commotion  on  these  pubjects,  to  have  advanced 
as  far  as  tlio  Isthmus,  in  pursuance  of  some  Bchemo  >vith  the 
lioeotians.  They  thought,  therefore,  that  it  had  come  by  agree- 
ment, through  his  agency,  and  not  on  account  of  the  Hocotians; 
and  that  if  they  liad  not,  in  consequence  of  the  infonnation 
they  had  receiverl,  been  beforehand  in  the  arrest  of  the  party, 
the  city  Avould  have  been  betrayed  to  them.  One  night,  in- 
deed, they  even  slept  in  arms  in  tho  Temple  of  Theseus  withiti 
tlic  walls.  The  friends,  too,  of  Alcibia<les,  at  Argos,  Λvcro  at 
the  same  time  suspected  of  a  design  to  attack  the  ])opular  gov- 
ernment; and  those  persons  of  tho  Argives  who  had  been 
deposited  in  tlie  islands  the  Athenians  on  that  occasion  gave 
lip  to  tho  Argive  commons  to  put  to  death  on  that  account. 
Thus  on  all  sides  there  arose  suspicion  against  Alcibiades  ; 
and  consequently  wishing  to  bring  Idm  to  trial,  and  put  him 
to  death,  m  this  >vay  they  sent  tho  ship  Salaminia  to  Sicily, 
both  for  him  and  for  the  rest  who  had  l)een  informed  against. 
Their  orders  Λvere,  to  charge  him  to  accompany  tho  vessel  homo 
to  plead  his  defense,  but  not  to  arrest  liim  ;  for  they  Λvero  at  tho 
same  timo  careful  to  avoid  raising  a  commotion  among  both 
their  own  soldiers  in  Sicily  and  their  enemies,  and  especially 
wished  tho  Mantineans  and  Argives  to  remain  there,  whom 
they  considered  to  liavo  been  prevailed  on  by  Alcibiades  to , 
join  them  in  tho  expedition,  lie  then,  with  his  own  ship  and 
those  who  had  been  accused  with  liim,  sailed  away  in  tho  com- 
pany of  the  Salaminia  from  Sicilv,  as  though  to  return  to 
Athens.  But  when  they  liad  readied  Thurii,  they  followed  it 
no  further,  but  left  the  vessel  and  concealed  themselves,  being 
afraid  of  going  home  to  trial  with  such  α  prejudico  existing 
ngninst  them.  The  crew  of  tho  Salajninia  for  some  timo 
mtvia  search  for  Alcibiades  and  his  companions,  but  when 
they  were  nowhere  to  bo  found,  they  departed  on  their  voy- 
.         •  18•        ,       . 


418  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  [lxii.,  lxiil 

age  back.  Alcibiados,  therefore,  being  now  an  outlaw,  croescd 
not  long  after  on  board  a  boat  from  Thurii  to  the  Puloponnese ; 
and  the  Athenians,  when  they  were  not  forthcoming,  'passed 
sentence  of  death  upon  him  and  those  with  him. 

02.  Aft(?r  these  things,  the  remaining  generals  of  the  Athen- 
ians in  Sioily,  having  made  two  divisions  of  tlie  army,  and 
each  taken  by  lot  one  of  them,  sailed  with  tlie  uhole  force  for 
Selinus  and  Segesta ;  wisliing  to  know  whether  the  Segestans 
would  give  the  promised  money,  and  at  the  same  time  to  in- 
spect the  condition  of  the  Selinuntines,  and  to  learn  the  state 
of  their  differences  with  the  Segestans.  And  so,  coasting  along 
Sicily,  with  the  shore  on  their  left  hand,  on  the  side  toward 
the  Tyrrhene  gulf,  they  landed  at  llimera,  which  is  the  only 
Grecian  city  in  tliat  ])art  of  tlio  island.  ^Vhen  they  would  not 
receive  them,  they  procieded  on  their  voyage ;  and  as  they 
coasted  along,  took  llyccara,  which,  though  a  Sicaniaii  town, 
was  engiigi'(i  in  war  with  the  St'gestans,  and  was  a  jictty 
Kca-port.  Having  taken  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  for  slaves, 
they  gave  it  up  to  the  Segestans  (for  some  of  their  cavalry  had 
joined  them),  and  they  themselves  returned  by  land  through 
the  country  of  the  Sicels,  till  they  came  to  Catana ;  while  their 
fchips  sailed  along  the  coast  Avith  the  prisoners  on  board.  ΛΊ- 
cias,  however,  coasted  along  straightway  from  llyccara  to  Se- 
gesta ;  and  after  transacting  his  other  business,  and  receiving 
thirty  talents,  rejoined  the  forces.  They  then  sold  their  slaves, 
from  Avhich  they  realized  a  hun<lred  and  twenty  talents,  and 
sailed  round  to  the  allies  of  the  Sicels,  giving  orders  to  send 
them  troops.  AVith  half  of  their  own  force,  too,  they  went 
against  Ilybla,  in  the  territory  of  (iela,  which  w  as  hostile  to 
them,  but  did  not  take  it.     And  thus  the  summer  ended. 

C3.  The  following  winter,  the  Athenians  at  once  began  to 
j)repare  for  their  advance  U})on  Syracuse,  and  the  Syracusans 
also,  on  their  side,  for  marching  against  them.  For  when  they 
did  not,  in  accordance  with  their  lirst  alarm  and  expecUition, 
attack  them  immediately  ;  as  every  day  went  on,  they  regaineil 
their  courage  more.  And  Avhen  they  were  seen  to  be  sailing 
(A\  the  other  side  of  Sicily,  far  away  from  them,  and  had  gone 
to  llybla,  and  made  an  ^ittempt  on  it  without  taking  it  by 
storm,  they  despised  them  still  more,  and  called  on  their  geu- 

'  */"//";  i^'"?•]  LitcniUy,  "by  α  deserted,  or  abandoned  trial"  Seo 
Hernia!».  Pol.  Aut.  144. 


Lxiv.]  TUUCYDIDES.  VI.  419 

oral» — nctinp  ns  a  multitude  is  wont  to  do  when  full  of  con- 
•  fidencc — to  lead  them  against  Catana,  since  the  enemy  would 
not  come  to  them.  Moreover,  Syracusan  parties  of  horse,  sent 
out  to  reconnoiter,  were  continually  riding  up  to  the  Athenian 
armament,  and  asking  them,  amonuj  other  insultinfr  expressions, 
>vhether  they  had  come  themselves  to  settle  with  them  in  a 
rtrange  eountrj^  rather  than  to  reinstate  the  Leontini. 

C4.  The  Athenian  generals  were  acquainted  with  these 
ifiings,  and  wished  to  draw  them  as  far  as  possible  from  their 
rity  with  their  whole  force,  and  themselves,  in  the  mean  time, 
<o  coast  along  with  their  ships  by  night,  and  quietly  occupy  a 
j>laro  for  eneafnpment  in  a  favorable  ]>osition,  knowing  that 
so  'thoy  would  Ικί  better  able  to  do  it  than  if  they  should  land 
from  their  ships  in  face  of  an  enemy  prepared  to  receive  them, 
or  should  bo  known  to  be  going  by  land  (for  the  Syracusan 
horse,  which  was  numerous,  while  they  themselves  had  none, 
would  do  great  mischief  to  tlu'ir  light-anned  and  mob  of  camp- 
followers)  ;  and  that  thus  they  would  take  a  position  where  they 
would  not  Ui  annoyed  by  the  cavalry  in  a  degree  worth  speak- 
ing of;  (for  porno  Syracusan  exiles  who  accompanied  them 
tohl  them  of  the  spot  near  the  Olympieum,  which  they  actually 
occupied.)  The  generals,  therefore,  adopted  the  following  Btra- 
tajxem  in  furtherance  of  their  wishes.  They  send  a  person  who 
was  a  faithful  friend  to  them,  and  no  less  in  the  interest  of  tho. 
Syracusans,  according  to  their  opinion.  This  man  Λvas  a  Ca- 
tanian,  and  said  that  he  was  come  from  certain  individuals  in 
Catania,  >vith  whoso  names  they  Avero  acquainted,  and  whom 
they  knew  to  be  still  left  in  liie  town  among  those  Avho  >vero 
well  affected  to  them.  Ilo  rtated,  then,  that  tho  Athenians 
pa'ised  the  night  at  some  distance  from  their  arms,  within  tho 
walls  of  tho  city,  and  that  if  the  Syracusans  would  come  with 
all  their  forco  early  in  tho  morning  of  an  appointed  day  to 
attack  their  armament,  tho  Cataaians  would  close  the  gates  on 

*  OvK  <iv  Λμοίως  ΛννηΟι'ντίς  καΐ  r/.]  Γορρο,  Gollcfj  and  Blonmflcld,  nil 
bracket  tho  καΐ  in  this  pnssapc,  ns  utterly  mnrring  tho  senso  of  it ;  whilo 
Arnold  only  objects  to  tho  interpretntion  of  tho  Scholinst,  without  oi- 
tcmptinjif  to  explain  it  himself.  In  support  of  tho  translation  which  i 
liavo  yonlurod  to  give,  compare  I.  143.  4,  καΐ  οίκΐτι  Ικ  mv  όιιοίην  {πτηι 
Μίληποννησην  μφης  τι  τμηΟηναι  και  Τί)ν  Άτηκήν  ΰηαηαν,  and  VII.  28.4, 
Μ  utv  γύρ  όαιτήνηι  ονχ  ομοίως  καΐ  ηρϊν,ύλλά  τολλφ  μΐίρονς  καθίβΤΜην, 
κ.  τ.  λ.  In  tho  latter  passage  tho  idea  of  excess  ie  distinctly  asserted, 
after  being  previously  implied,  as  in  the  other  passages,  by  tho  words 
ννχ  ύμοίυς  nah 


420  THUCYDIDBS.  VI.  [lxv.,lxtl 

the  men  who  were  with  them,  and  would  fire  their  ehipe,  while 
the  Syracusans  would  easily  take  the  armament*  by  an  attack 
on  their  stockade.  There  were  many,  too,  of  the  Catanians,  he 
said,  who  would  co-operate  with  them  in  this,  and  were  already 
prepared  to  do  so,  namely,  the  party  from  which  he  had  him- 
self come. 

65.  The  generals  of  the  Syracusans,  besides  feeling  confi- 
dent in  other  respects,  and  intending,  even  without  this,  to 
make  their  preparations  for  marching  to  Catana,  gave  far  too 
inconsiderate  credence  to  the  man,  and  immediately  fixing  a 
day  on  which  they  would  be  there,  dismissed  him ;  while  they 
themselves  ifor  by  this  time  the  Selinuntines  and  some  other 
of  their  allies  had  also  come)  gave  orders  for  all  the  Syra- 
cusans to  march  forth  in  a  body.  When  their  preparations 
were  made,  and  the  time  at  wlii(;h  they  had  agreed  to  come 
was  near  at  hand,  they  set  out  for  Catana,  and  bivouaced  on 
the  river  Symaithus,  in  the  Ixiontine  territory.  The  Athenians, 
on  learning  their  ap|)roach,  took  the  whole  of  their  own  force, 
with  such  of  the  Sicels,  or  any  other  people,  as  hiul  joineil 
them,  and  putting  them  on  board  their  ships  and  boats,  sailed 
by  night  to  Syracuse.  And  thus,  when  the  morning  came,  the 
Athenians  were  landing  on  the  ground  oj)posite  the  Ulympieum, 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  their  cjunj),  and  at  the  same  t^no 
the  Syracusan  cavalry,  having  ridden  up  first  to  Catana,  and 
found  that  the  Avhole  armament  ha<^l  ])ut  to  sea,  returned  and 
carried  the  news  to  the  infantry,  when  they  all  turned  back  to- 
gether, and  went  to  the  aid  of  the  city. 

GO.  In  the  mean  time,  as  the  march  they  Imd  to  make  was  a 
long  one,  the  Athenians  (piictly  pitched  their  camp  in  a  fa- 
vorable position,  where  they  would  bo  able  to  commence  an 
engagement  just  when  they  pleased,  and  the  Syracusan  horse 
would  cause  them  the  least  annoyance,  both  during  the  action 
and  before  it.  For  on  one  side  they  were  flanked  by  walls, 
houses,  trees,  and  a  marsh ;  on  the  other,  by  clifis.  They 
also  felled  the  trees  near  to  them,  and  carrying  them  down  to 
the  sea,  fixed  a  palisade  by  their  ships;  while  with  rude  stones 

•  TO  0Tfuirci\u(i.]  I  soo  no  reason  lit  nil  for  nltoring  this,  as  Arnold  pnv 
poses,  into  τφ  στμιτινμαη ;  as  it  evidently  refers  to  all  the  other  forces 
of  the  Athenians  left  behind  in  their  camp,  in  opposition  to  tho  heavy  in- 
fantry represented  oa  being  in  tho  town.  Compare  63.  3,  where  tho  term 
α  uudoubtodly  used  witli  reference  to  the  encampment  of  tho  Athoniau:*. 


LxviL,  Lxvni]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  •    42I 

and  wood  tlicy  liastily  erected  a  fort  at  Dascon,  whcro  tlicir 
position  was  most  open  to  the  enemy's  attack,  and  broke  down 
the  britlirc  over  the  Anapus.  AVhilo  they  were  making  these 
])reparations,  no  one  came  out  from  the  city  to  stop  them ;  but 
tlie  Syracusan  cavalry  was  what  first  came  against  tliem,  and 
afterward  all  the  infantry  was  mustered.  And  at  first  they  ad- 
Tanced  near  the  c^imp  of  the  Athenians;  then,  when  they  did 
not  go  out  against  them,  they  withdrew,  and  crossed  tho  road 
to  Ilelorus,  and  there  encamped  for  the  night. 

07.  Tho  next  day  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  prepared 
for  battle,  and  made  their  dispositions  as  follows :  The  right 
wing  was  held  by  tho  Argives  and  Mantineana,  the  center  by 
the  Athenians,  and  tlie  remainder  of  tho  line  by  the  rest  of 
tiie  allies.  Half  of  their  force  was  jwsted  in  advance,  drawn 
up  eight  deep  ;  tho  other  lialf,  close  upon  their  tents,  in  a  hol- 
low square,  which  was  also  formed  eight  deep,  Avith  orders  to 
look  out  Λvhere  any  part  of  the  army  might  bo  most  distressed,• 
and  go  to  its  suj^iwrt.  Within  this  l>ody  of  reserve,  too,  they 
]>laced  the  camp-followers.  The  Syracusans,  on  tho  other 
hand,  drew  up  their  heavy  infantry  sixteen  deep,  consisting  of 
the  Syracusans  in  full  force,  and  as  many  allies  as  had  joined 
them :  (they  were  reinforced  most  extensively  by  the  Selinun- 
tines ;  next  to  them,  by  tho  Oeloan  cavalry,  to  tho  numl>er  of 
two  hundred  in  all;  and  by  about  twenty  horse,  and  fifty 
archers,  from  Camarina.)  Their  cavalry  they  posted  on  their 
right  flank,  amounting  to  not  less  than  twelve  hundred,  and 
by  tlieir  side  the  dartmen  also.  The  Athenians  being  about 
to  commence  the  attack,  Nicias  advanced  along  tho  line,  and 
addressed  tho  following  exhortation  to  them,  both  in  their  sev- 
eral nations,  and  collectively : 

08.  "  What  need  is  there,  soldiers,  that  wo  should  liavo  re- 
course to  long  exhortation,  who  are  como  hero  for  the  same 
struggle?'  For  our  force  itself  seems  to  me  more  capable  of 
supplying  confidenco  than  well-spoken  words  with  a  weak 
army.  For  where  we  have  in  the  field  Argives,  Mantineans, 
Athenians,  and  the  prime  of  tho  islanders,  on  what  grounds  ought 

»  "  "Wo  are  all  engaged  in  one  common  cause,  and  the  sight  of  each 
other  should  mutually  encourage  us." — Arnold.  As  ol  ιτάρεσμεν  seems 
to  refer  to  tho  whole  force,  and  not  to  tho  general  only  who  was  address- 
ing them,  χρηοθαι  must  bo  taken  in  α  senso  sulBcicntly  wide  to  includo 
both  the  speaker  and  his  hearers: 


422  .  THUCYDIDEa   VI.  [lxix. 

WQ  not,  with  allies  so  brave  and  numerous,  to  entertain  every 
one  a  strong  hope  of  victory  ?  especially  as  we  are  opposed  to 
men  who  are  defending  Uieinsolves  in  a  promiscuous  crowd,  «nd 
not  chosen  trooj)s,  as  wo  are ;  and,  moreover,  against  Siceliote, 
who  despise  us  indeed,  but  will  not  receive  our  attack,  because 
they  have  less  skill  in  arms  than  boldness.  Let  this  thought,  too, 
be  entertained  by  each  of  you ;  that  >vo  are  far  from  our  own 
land,  and  with  no  friendly  country  near  us,  but  such  as  your- 
selves win  by  fighting.  And  so  I  otler  to  you  an  admonition, 
the  very  reverse  of  tiio  exhortation  which  our  enemies  are,  I 
well  know,  addressing  to  each  other.  For  tkei/  are  urging, 
that  the  battle  will  be  for  their  country ;  but  /,  that  it  will  be 
fought  in  what  is  not  our  country,  but  where  you  must  con- 
quer, or  not  easily  get  away ;  for  their  cavalry  will  j)res8  u|;ori 
us  in  great  numbers.  Uemenibering,  then,  your  own  high  char- 
acter, make  a  spirited  attack  oh  your  opponents,  and  regard 
your  present  necessity  and  diliiculties  as  more  formidable  than 
the  enemy." 

09.  Nicias  delivered  this  address,  and  immediately  led  on 
liis  troops.  As  for  the  Syracusans,  they  \vere  not  exj)ecting 
to  engiige  at  present,  and  some  of  them,  as  their  city  was  close 
at  hand,  had  actually  gone  away  to  it ;  and  thci^e,  althougli 
they  Λvent  to  the  aid  of  their  comrades  in  haste,  and  at  a  lull 
run,  were  too  late  [to  take  their  pro|)er  j)Iacc  in  the  ranks], 
but  posted  themselves  as  each  one  came  up  to  the  main  body. 
For  in  truth  they  were  not  deticient  in  zeal,  or  in  daring, 
neither  in  this  battle,  nor  in  the  others  ;  but  though  not  infe- 
rior in  courage,  so  far  as  their  military  science  served,  yet  in 
consequence  of  that  failing  them,  they  reluctantly  abandoned 
their  resolution  also.  Although,  tlierefore,  as  I  have  said,  they 
did  not  imagine  that  the  Athenians  would  bo  the  first  to 
make  an  attack,  and  although  they  were  comj)elled  to  defend 
themselves  on  a  short  warning,  they  took  up  their  arms,  and 
Immediately  advanced  to  meet  them.  And  in  the  first  place 
the  stone-throwers,  and  slingers,  and  archers  on  each  side  be- 
gan skirmishing,  and  successively  routed  each  other,  as  light 
troops  might  bo  expected  to  do.  Then  there  Avere  piiests 
bringing  forward  the  usual  victims  for  sacrifice,  and  trumiict' 
ers  Stirling  on  tho  heavy-armed  to  the  charge.  And  to  they 
advanced ;  the  Syracusans,  to  fight  for  their  country,  and 
their  own  personal  safety  at  present,  and  freedom  in  future ; 


lxx.,lxxl]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  423 

tho  Athenians,  on  the  side  of  their  opponents,  to  fight  for 
another  people's  land,  that  they  might  win  it  as  their  own ; 
ami  to  avoid  weakening  their  own  by  defeat — the  Argives  and 
Iho  independent  allies,  to  join  them  in  Beeuring  tho  objects 
they  had  eomc  for,  and  by  means  of  victory  to  look  again  on 
the  country  that  was  ahv.'wly  theirs — while  the  subject  allies 
showed  ft  ready  zeal,  most  of  all,  for  their  immediate  safety, 
which  was  hoj)eless  unless  they  conquered ;  then,  as  a  secondary 
consideration,  for  the  chance  of  serving  on  easier  terms,  in  con- 
sequence of  having  assisted  to  reduce  a  fresh  country  under  tlio 
Athenian  dominion. 

VO.  ΛΥΊκ'η  they  Iiad  come  to  close  combat,  they  w  ithstood  each 
other's  attacks  for  a  long  time.  And  there  happened  to  come  on 
at  once  both  thunder,  and  lightning,  and  heavy  rain :  so  that 
to  those  who  were  fighting  for  the  first  time,  and  had  liad  very 
little  acquaintance  Avith  war,  even  this  helped  to  increase  their 
fear;  while  to  tho  more  experienced  party  these  occurrences 
appeared  to  be  produced  simply  by  the  season  of  the  year,  but 
tiie  fact  of  their  opponents  not  being  defeated  caused  far 
greater  alarm.  lUit  when  tho  Argives  had  first  driven  in  tho 
left  Ming  of  the  iSyracusnns,  and  after  them  tho  Athenian?  had 
repulsed  those  opposed  to  them,  the  rest  of  the  Syracusan  army 
was  now  also  broken  and  j)ut  to  flight.  Tho  Athenians  did  not 
j»ursuo  them  to  any  great  distimce  (for  tho  Syracusan  Jiorse, 
which  was  numerous  and  unbroken,  kept  them  in  check,  and 
by  charging  their  heavy  infantry,  wherever  they  silw  any 
jiursuing  in  advance  of  the  rest,  drove  them  back  again). 
Jb)wever  they  followed  them  in  a  body  as  far  as  was  safe,  and 
then  returned  again,  and  erected  a  trophy.  Tho  Syracusans, 
on  the  other  hand,  having  collected  themselves  again  on  tho 
llelorino  road,  and  put  themselves  in  as  good  order  as  present 
circumstances  ΛνοηΚΙ  permit,  sent,  notwithstanding  their  defeat, 
a  garrison  to  tho  Olympieum,  fearing  that  tho  Athenians  might 
tike  some  of  tho  treasures  that  >vero  there ;  while  tho  rest  of 
them  returned  into  tho  city. 

71.  The  Athenians,  however,  did  not  go  to  tho  temple,  but 
after  canning  their  own  dead  together,  and  laying  them  on  a 
funeral  pile,  passed  tho  night  on  the  ground.  Tho  next  day 
they  restored  to  tho  Syracusans  their  dead,  under  a  truce 
(there  had  fallen,  of  them  and  their  allies,  about  two  hundred 
and  sixty),  and  collected  the  bones  of  their  own  (about  fifty 


424  THUCYDIDES.  VL  .  (lxxil 

of  themselves  and  their  allies  having  been  killed),  and  with 
the  spoils  of  the  enemy  sailed  back  to  Catana.  For  it  was 
winter,  and  they  thought  it  inijwssiblo  at  present  to  carry  on 
war  before  Syracuse,  till  they  had  sent  for  cavalry  from 
Athens,  and  also  raised  some  from  their  allies  in  the  country, 
to  avoid  being  utterly  defeated  by  the  enemy's  horse.  They 
wished  too,  at  the  same  time,  to  collect  money  in  the  island, 
and  to  get  a  8upj)ly  from  Athens ;  as  also  to  win  over  some  of 
the  cities  to  their  cause,  which  they  hoped  would  more  readily 
listen  to  them  after  the  battle  ;  and  to  provide  themselves  with 
corn  and  every  thing  else  they  might  require,  with  a  view  to 
attacking  Syracuse  in  the  spring. 

•  72.  They,  then,  Avith  these  intentions  sailed  off  to  Naxos 
and  Catana,  for  the  winter.  The  Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand, 
after  burying  their  dead,  held  an  assembly.  And  now  camu 
fonvard  to  lliem  Ilermocrates  son  of  llernjon,  a  man  at  onco 
Becond  to  none  in  general  iutelligence,  and  who  had  proved  him- 
self able  in  war  through  his  exjK'rience,  and  a  person  of  signal 
bravery.  lie  encouraged  them  and  told  them  "  not  to  submit 
in  conscHjuenco  of  what  had  happened;  for  it  was  not  their 
spirit  that  wits  vanquished,  but  their  want  of  discipline  that 
had  been  so  injurious.  They  had  not,  however,  been  so  much 
inferior  to  their  enemies  as  might  have  been  ex|>eeted ;  es|Ki- 
cially  since  they  had  betii  matched  against  the  first  of  the 
Greeks — mere  amateurs,*  so  to  speak,  against  regular  work-, 
men.  They  had  also  been  much  hurt  by  the  great  number 
of  their  generals  and  the  multiplicity  of  orders  (for  their 
generals  were  fifteen  in  number),  and  also  by  the  tumultuous 
insubordination  of  the  troops  in  general.  But  should  only  a 
few  men  of  ex[)enence  be  elected  generals,  and  prepare  their 
heavy-armed  force  for  serving  during  that  winter,  by  furnish- 
ing with  arms  those  who  did  not  possess  any,  in  order  that 
they  might  be  as  numerous  as  possible,  and  by  compelling 
them  to  attend  to  their  training  also ;  they  Avould,  he  said,  in 
all  probability  have  the  advantage  over  their  enemies ;  since 
courage  they  already  possessed,  and  discipline  for  the  execu- 
tion of  their  measures  Avould  thus  have  been  acquired.      For 

*  Or,  as  Bloomfield  renders  it,  *'  raw-hands."  Seo  Lia  note.  Poppo 
reads  χεφοτίχνας,  and  renders  tho  passage,  "  Quod  cum  iia  qui  priiui 
Grajcorura  peritia  (rei  niilitaris)  essent,  idioto;,  propomodura  dix*,rira 
operarii,  ])Ugna8SCDt." 


Lxxin.-Lxxv.]  TIIUCTDIDES.  VI.  425 

l»oth  these  tliinpfs  would  improve;  their  discipline  being  prac- 
ticed in  the  midst  of  dantrcrs;  and  their  courage  growing 
more  confident  than  ever  from  being  accompanied  by  tlie  ns- 
suranre  of  science.  They  ought,  then,  to  elect  their  generals 
both  few  in  number  and  invested  with  absolute  authority ;  tak- 
ing to  them  the  oath,  *that  assuredly  they  would  allow  them 
to  command  as  they  might  think  l)est,'  For  so  what  ought  to 
Im>  kept  secret  would  be  more  effectually  concealed ;  and  every 
thing  else  would  be  prepared  in  duo  order  and  without  listening 
to  any  excuses." 

1's',  The  Syracusana,  after  hearing  this  speech,  voted  every 
thing  ns  he  advised  ;  and  elected  Hermocrates  himself  as  gen- 
eral, with  lleradides  son  of  Lysimachus,  and  Sicanus  son  of 
Kxecestcs,  these  three.  They  also  dispatched  envoys  to 
( 'orinth  and  Lacedicmon ;  that  an  allied  force  might  join  them, 
:ind  that  they  might  persuade  the  Lacedicmonians,  for  tlicir 
i>(.'neiit,to  carry  on  the  war  with  the  Athenians  more  decidedly, 
by  o|>on  measures ;  that  cither  they  might  bo  compelled  to  re- 
turn from  Sicily,  or  might  less  easily  send  fresh  succors  to  their 
army  now  there. 

V4.  As  for  the  Athenian  forces  at  Catana,  they  sailed  ini- 
mediately  to  Messana,  in  expectation  of  its  being  betrayed  to 
them.  l?ut  the  intrigues  that  were  being  carried  on  did  not 
come  to  any  thing.  For  Alcibiades,  when  he  was  now  sum- 
moned home,  and  liad  left  his  command,  knowing  that  he 
would  bo  outlawed,  gave  information  of  the  intended  movc- 
njent,  to  which  he  was  privy,  to  the  friends  of  the  Syracusana 
in  Messana ;  and  they  had  both  previously  put  to  death  the 
men  implicated  in  it,  and  at  that  time  such  ns  were  on  the  same 
side,  breaking  out  into  sedition,  and  taking  up  arms,  prevailed 
Ko  far  as  to  prevent  their  admitting  the  Athenians.  When 
they,  therefore,  after  staying  ten  days,  were  suffering  froii)  tho 
severe  weather^  had  no  provisions,  and  found  none  of  their  nlans 
succeed,  they  retired  to  Naxos,  and  having  made  a  pahsado 
round  tiicir  encampment,  took  up  their  winter  quarters  there. 
They  also  sent  a  trireme  to  Athens  for  both  money  and  cavalry, 
to  join  them  in  the  spring. 

75.  Tho  SjTacusans,  on  their  part,  both  built  in  the 
course  of  the  winter  a  wall  to  their  city,  along  the  whole 
quarter  looking  toward  Epipola»,  including  the  Temenites,  to 
prevent  their  being  circum)μιllatcd  eo  easily  ns  they  would 


42β  THUOYDIDEa  VI  [lxxtl 

witli  a  less  circuit,  ia  caso  of  their  being  defeated ;  and  nlso 
fortified  Megara  aa  an  out-post,  and  another  in  the  Olym- 
pieum.  They  fixctl  palisades,  too,  alonjjf  the  edge  of  the  8ο.ί, 
at  all  points  where  there  were  iacilitioa  for  landing.  And 
as  they  knew  that  the  Atlienians  were  wintering  at  Naxo.^ 
they  marched  iu  full  force  to  Catana,  and  both  ravaged  part 
of  their  land,  and  after  burning  the  tents  and  encampment  of 
the  Athenians,  returned  home.  Hearing,  moreover,  that  the 
Athenians  were  sending  an  embassy  to  Camarina,  on  the 
strength  of  that  alliance  concluded  under  Laches,  to  try  if  by 
any  means  they  might  win  them  over  to  their  side,  the  Svra- 
cusans  also  sent  a  counter-embassy.  For  they  liad  suspicionix 
of  the  Camarinieans,  both  that  they  had  not  sent  heartily  what 
they  sent  to  join  in  the  first  battle ;  and  that  for  the  future 
they  would  not  >vish  to  assist  them  any  more,  since  they  saw 
that  the  Athenians  had  been  successful  in  the  engagement, 
but  would  be  persuaded  to  join  the  invaders  on  the  strength 
of  their  former  friendship.  On  the  arrival  therefore  at  Cama- 
rina of  llermocrates  and  some  others  from  Syracuse,  and  of 
.  EuphemuH  and  others  from  the  Athenians,  an  assembly  of  tho 
Camarinaians  having  been  convened,  llermocrates,  wishing  to 
prejudice  them  bct'orehanil  against  the  Athenians,  addressed 
them  as  follows : 

70.  "  It  was  not,  Camarinaians,  from  any  fear  of  your  Wing 
terrified  at  tho  present  forces  of  the  Athenians  that  Λνο  came 
on  this  embassy,  but  rather  from  apprehension  that  tho  words 
which  would  bo  spoken  by  them  before  you  heard  any  thing 
from  us  might  prevail  upon  you.  For  they  are  come  to  Sicily 
on  tho  pretext,  indeed,  which  you  hear,  but  \vith  tho  purpose 
which  wo  all  suspect ;  and,  in  my  oj)inion,  they  are  wishing, 
not  to  restore  the  Leontines  to  their  home,  but  to.eject  us  from 
ours.  For  surely  it  is  not  consistent  that  they  sliould  do- 
populate  the  cities  in  Greece,  but  re-settle  those  in  Sicily ; 
and  that  they  should  care  for  the  Leontines,  ΛνΙιο  are  Chalci- 
dians,  because  of  their  connection  with  them,  but  ke<*p  in 
slavery  tlio  Chalcidians  in  Kubtt»a,  from  whom  these  are  a 
colony,  liut  the  method  is  the  same,  by  which  they  both 
gained  possession  of  those  j)laces,  and  are  attempting  to  do  s•• 
with  these.  For  after  they  had  been  appointed  leaders,  by 
the  free  choice  both  of  the  lonians  and  of  all  who  were  of 
Athenian  origin,  for  tho  purpose  of  taking  vengeance  on  tho 


ixxvii.,  Lxxriii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VL  427 

Mode ;  by  cliarging  somo  of  tliom  Avitli  failure  in  military  pcrv- 
ico,  others  with  mutual  hostilities,  and  others  on  any  speeious 
plea  whieh  ihey  severally  had  to  urjo^e,  they  reduced  them  to 
subjection.  And  so  they  did  not  Avithstand  the  Medc  for  the 
sake  of  liberty — neither  these  men  for  that  of  the  Greeks,  nor 
the  Greeks  for  their  own — but  the  former  did  it  to  enslave 
the  (irecks  to  themselves,  instead  of  to  the  Medc  ;  the  latter,  to 
[fvi  a  new  master,  one  not  more  unwise,  but  more  wise  for  evil. 

77.  "Hut,  open  m  the  Athenian  state  is  to  accusation,  wo 
arc  not  come  at  the  present  time  to  j>rovo  before  those  who 
know  this  already,  in  how  many  respects  it  is  committing  in- 
justice ;  but  much  rather  to  censure  ourselves,  bec.iuse,  with 
the  warnings  given  us  by  the  Greeks  in  those  quarters,  how 
\\\oy  Avere  enslaved  through  not  assisting  one  another,  and 
with  the  same  sopliisms  being  now  practiced  on  ourselves — 
llit'ir  re-instatement  of  their  liconline  kinsmen,  and  suc- 
rors  to  their  Segestan  allies — Λνο  will  not  unite  together,  and 
^liow  them  that  the  people  hero  are  no  lonians,  or  Ilellespontines 
nnd  islanders,  λυΙιο  are  always  passing  to  a  ne^v  master,  cither 
the  Medo  or  somo  one  else,  and  still  kept  in  slavery,  but  free 
Dorians  from  the  indeiK'ndent  roleiwnneso  now  living  in 
Sicily.  Or  do  wo  wait  till  wo  have  separately  been  subdued, 
city  by  city  ?  knowing,  as  we  do,  that  in  this  Avay  only  are  we 
vincible;  and  seeing  them  have  recourse  to  tins  method, 
so  as  to  set  soine  of  us  at  variance  with  Avords  ;  to  set  others  at 
war  through  hopo  of  finding  allies ;  nnd  to  injure  others  by 
saying  something  flattering  to  them,  as  they  severally  can. 
And  do  we  then  think,  that  if  our  distant  fellow-countryman  is 
destroyed  before  us,  the  danger  will  not  come  to  each  of  our- 
selves also,  but  that  he  who  sufl'ers  before  us  keeps  his  misfor- 
tune to  himself  ? 

78.  "If,  again,  the  thought  lias  presented  itself  to  any  one, 
that  although  the  Syracusans  are  hostile  to  the  Athenians,  ho 
himself  is  not ;  and  if  ho  consider  it  a  hardship  to  incur  dan- 
gers for  our  country,  let  him  reflect  that  it  is  not  for  ours 
«specially,  but  in  like  manner  for  his  own  also  that  ho  will 
tight  in  ours;  and  that  he  will  do  it  Avith  proportionately 
irreater  safety,  inasmuch  as  ho  will  not  enter  on  the  struggle 
after  wo  have  been  first  ruined,  but  with  us  for  allies,  and  not 
h'fl  by  himself.  And  let  him  consider  that  the  wish  of  the 
Athenians  is,  not  to  chastise  our  enmity,  but,  making  us  their 


428  THUOYDIDEa  VI.  [lxxix. 

excuse,  to  secure  no  less  his  own  friendship.*  If,  inorcovi^r, 
any  cue  envies  us,  or  is  afraid  of  us  (for  to  both  these  feel• 
iugs  are  more  powerful  states  exposed),  and  for  this  reason 
wishes  Syracuse  to  be  brought  down,  that  we  may  be  taught 
moderation,  but  yet  for  his  own  safety's  sake  would  have  it 
escape  destruction,  he  indulges  a  wish  beyond  the  limit  of  hu- 
man power.  For  it  is  not  possible  for  the  same  man  to  be 
alike  the  arbiter  of  his  own  desire  and  of  fortune.  And 
should  ho  fail  in  his  views,  then,  while  lamenting^  Ids  own 
misfortunes,  ho  might,  perhaps,  some  time  or  ot]ier,  wish  again 
to  envy  our  advantages.  But  that  will  be  impossible  if  he 
.abandon  us,  and  will  not  take  his  part  in  the  same  perils; 
AThich  are  incurred,  not  for  names,  but  for  realities ;  for  though 
nominally  ho  would  preserve  our  power,  he  would  really  secure 
his  own  safety.  And  it  was  reasonable  that  you  esj)ecially, 
Camarinaians,  who  live  on  our  borders,  and  are  the  next  to  incur 
the  danger,  should  have  provided  for  this,  and  not  liavo  joined 
us  remissly,  as  you  are  now  doing ;  but  rather  that  you  should 
yourselves  have  come  to  us  ;  and  what  you  would  have  entreat-  . 
ed,  while  calling  us  to  your  aid,  if  the  Athenians  l>ad  first  come 
against  Caiiiarina,  that  ought  you  now,  on  the  same  principle, 
to  liave  come  and  urged  on  us  an  exhortation,  that  we  should 
on  no  point  submit  But  neither  have  ye,  hitherto,  nor  the 
rest,  bestirred  yourselves  for  these  objects. 

79.  "  But  through  cowardice,  perhaps,  you  will  study  what 
is  just,  both  toward  us  and  toward  the  invaders,  and  alh-g*' 
that  there  is  an  alliance  between  you  and  the  Athenians.  Yts, 
but  you  did  not  conchulo  that  to  the  injury  of  your  friends, 
but  iu  case  any  of  your  enemies  might  attack  you ;  and  to 
iussist  the  Athenians,  surely,  when  they  were  wronged  by 
others,  and  not  when  they  were  themselves  wronging  their 
neighbors,  as  they  are  now.  For  not  even  do  the  Khegians, 
although  of  Chalcidian  extraction,  consent  to  join  in  the  re- 
instatement of  the  Chalcidian  Leontines.  And  it  is  a  strange 
thing  if  they,  suspecting  the  real  meaning  of  this  fine  pretense, 
are  wise  without  any  reason  to  otter  for  their  conduct,  while 
you,  with  α  reasonable'  jJea  to  urge,  choose  to  assist  your  na• 

•  i.  e.,  80  to  reduce  the  power  of  every  stato  iu  the  island,  that  nono 
Bhall  huvo  any  alteruativo  but  to  remain  tlie  faithful  allies  of  Athens."— 
Arnold. 

8  ύλοίΐινμΟείς,]  or,  08  Pontus  and  Poppo  tako  it,  '*  lamented." 

*  ενλύγφ  πι>ο<^ύσει.]  y,v?.oyoc  is  so  constantly  used  to  signify  what 


Lxxx.]  TTIUCYDIDES  VI.  429 

tiiral  enemies,  nml,  in  concert  with  your  bitterest  foes,  to  ruin 
men  who  arc  still  more  your  natural  connections.  Nay  that  is 
not  just ;  but  rather,  to  assist  us,  and  not  to  be  afraid  of  their 
armament.  For  it  is  not  formidable  if  we  all  take  our  stand 
tojrcther;  but  only  if,  on  the  contrary,  λυο  arc  separated  from 
each  otlier,  which  they  are  so  anxious  to  effect :  since  even 
when  they  came  against  us  alone,  and  were  victorious  in  bat- 
tle, tliey  did  not  achieve  what  they  wished,  but  quickly  went 
away  «lijain. 

80.  '*  Surely  then,  if  wo  were  united,  it  Λvero  not  reasonable 
for  us  to  be  disheartened  :  but  we  ou^ht  to  enter  more  heartily 
i.;ito  alliance,  especially  as  succors  λυϊΙΙ  join  us  from  the  Pelo- 
)«)nnesc  also,  the  inhabitants  of  which  arc  altogether  superior  to 
tlicso  men  in  military  matters.  And  no  one  should  think 
(hat  forethought  of  yours  to  bo  fair  to  «.?,  while  it  is  safe  for 
ΊΟΚ ;  I  niean  your  assisting  neither  party,  as  being  allies  of 
linth.  For  it  is  not  fair  in  fact,  as  it  is  in  profession.  For  if 
it  1x5  through  your  not  siding  with  us  that  both  tho  sufferer  is 
dofoated  and  tho  conqueror  gains  tho  vi(!tory,  what  else  do  yo 
I'ut  refuse,  by  the  self-samo  standing  aloof,  to  aid  tho  one  party 
tor  their  preservation,  and  to  prevent  tho  other  from  behaving 
linsoly  ?  And  yet  it  were  honorable  for  you,  by  joining  thoso 
who  arc  injured,  and  at  the  same  time  your  own  kinsmen,  to 
iruard  the  common  interest  of  Sicily,  and  not  to  permit  tho 
Athenians,  your  friends  forsooth,  to  do  ΛVΓong.  In  short,  λυο 
Syracusans  say,  that  it  is  of  no  use  to  afford  certain  informa- 
tion, cither  to  you  or  to  tho  rest,  about  what  you  know  your- 
selves, as  well  as  we ;  but  wo  entreat  you,  and  at  tho  samo 
lime  protest,  if  wc  do  not  prevail  on  yon,  that  wo  aro  plotted 
ncrainst  by  lonians,  who  aro  always  our  enemies,  while  wo  arc 
botrayod  by  you,  Dorians  by  Dorians.  And  if  tho  Athenians 
reduce  us  to  subjection,  though  it  is  by  your  decisions  that 
they  will  gain  tho  victory,  it  is  in  their  own  name  that  they 
will  enjoy  the  honor;  and  they  will  receive  no  other  prize 
for  the  victory  than  thoso  men  who  put  the  victory  into  their 
hands.    If,  on  tho  other  hand,  we  aro  tho  conquerors,  you  will 

roally  it  reasonable,  In  opposition  to  ιύπρειτης,  what  only  appears  to  bo 
?:o,  that  I  can  not  agree  with  Arnold  and  Poppo,  who  give  a  difTcrent 
•  oMso  to  it  in  this  passage;  tho  former  rendering  it  " with  a  seeming 
n'.iponablo  pretext;"  tho  latter,  "utentes  probabill  (seu  BpeciosA)  ex- 
1  Mi8;itiono  (qu&  vostram  rationom  tueamini)." 


430  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [Lxxxi.-Lxxxni 

also  have  to  eubmit  to  the  puDishment  due  to  the  authors  of 
our  dangers.  Cousider,  then,  and  choose  at  once,  either  imme- 
diate slavery  without  any  peril,  or  the  chance  of  gaining  the 
victory  with  us,  and  so  avoiding  a  disgraceful  submission 
to  these  men  as  your  masters,  as  also  of  escaping  our  enmity, 
which  would  be  of  no  trivial  kind." 

81.  llermocratcs  spoke  to  this  effect;  and  after  him,  Eu- 
phcmus,  the  Athenian  embassador,  as  follows : 

82.  "  Though  wo  are  come  hither  for  the  purpose  of  n»- 
nowin^  our  former  alliance,  yet  as  the  Syracusan  orator  hii* 
attacked  us  ou  that  head,  wo  must  also  address  you  on  the 
subject  of  our  empire,  to  show  that  wo  enioy  it  on  just 
grounds.  The  strongest  proof,  then,  of  this  ho  himself  has 
mentioned,  in  his  assertion  that  the  lonians  have  ever  beon 
hosiile  to  the  Dorians.  And  such  too  is  the  case.  For  we,  who 
are  lonians,  considered,  with  regard  to  tlio  Peloponnesians, 
who  are  Dorians,  and  more  numerous  than  ourselves,  and 
living  near  us,  in  what  way  wo  might  be  least  subject  to  them. 
And  after  the  Median  invasion,  having  got  a  fleet,  wo  released 
ourselves  from  the  empire  and  supremacy  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians ;  since  they  had  no  more  right  to  command  us  than  wo 
them,  except  so  far  as  they  were  at  present  more  powerful, 
llms  having  been  ourselves  appointed  leaders  of  those  who 
were  before  under  the  king,  mo  so  continue ;  considering  that 
in  this  way  we  should  least  fall  under  the  ]X)wer  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  by  having  a  force  >vith  which  to  defend  ourselves ; 
and,  to  speak  accurately,  not  having  unjustly,  either,  reduced 
the  lonians  and  islanders  to  subjection,  whom  the  Syracuaans 
say  that  we  have  enslaved,  thougli  our  kinsmen.  For  they 
came  against  their  mother-country,  against  us,  I  mean,  iu 
company  with  the  Mede ;  and  could  not  bring  themselves  to 
revolt  from  him,  and  to  sacrifice  their  proj)erty — as  we  did, 
when  We  evacuated  our  city — but  chose  slavery  themselves,  and 
to  bring  the  same  on  us  also. 

83.  "  Wherefore  wo  are  worthy  of  the  empire  we  enjoy,  l)C- 
cause  wo  supplied  the  most  numerous  fleet,  and  showed  un- 
compromising zeal  in  behalf  of  the  Greeks;  and  iKjcauso  thr'so 
men,  by  so  readily  acting  as  they  did,  even  in  favor  of  the 
Mede,*  inflicted  injury  on  us ;  while  at  the  same  time  λυο  aim 
at  gaining  strength  against  the  Peloponnesians.     And  we  make        j 

*  i.  €.,  of  ono  so  utterly  opposed  to  the  good  of  Grcoce.  - 


Lxxxir^  Lxxxv.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  431 

no  fine  professions  of  justly  enjoying  dominion,  cither  as  hav- 
hvr  by  ourselves  overthrown  the  barbarian,  or  as  having  faced 
djinirer  for  tho  liberty  of  these  men,  more  than  for  that  of  all, 
andOf  ourselves  at  the  same  time.  For  in  no  one  is  it  an  invidi- 
ous thing  to  provide  for  his  own  safety.  And  now,  liaving 
rome  hither  also  for  the  sake  of  our  own  Rccurity,  we  sec  that 
these  same  things  are  expedient  for  you  likewise.  And  wc  prove 
it  from  what  these  men  state  to  our  prejudice,  and  what  you,  in 
vour  too  great  alarm,  suspect ;  knowing  that  tliose  who  through 
f'oar  are  suspicious,'  though  pleased  at  the  moment  by  the 
charms  of  oratory,  yet  afterward  attend  to  their  real  interests 
in  what  they  undertake.  For  we  have  said  that  wc  hold  our 
dominion  there  under  the  influence  of  fear,  and  that  for  the 
same  reason  wo  are  come  to  put  the  states  here  on  a  safe  foot- 
ing, in  concert  with  our  friends ;  and  not  to  enslave  them,  but 
rather  to  prevent  their  being  so  treated. 

84.  "  And  let  no  one  suppose  that  Λνο  are  interesting  our- 
s«»lves  in  you  wifhout  any  connection  existing  between  us  ;  sinco 
ho  must  know  that  through  your  being  preserved,  and  resisting 
the  Syracusans  (being  not  top  weak  to  do  so),  wc  should  bo 
less  readily  hurt  by  tlieir  sending  a  force  to  the  Pelononnesians, 
In  this  way,  then,  you  are  connected  with  us  in  the  greatest 
dcirrec ;  and  on  this  account  too  it  is  rca.sonable  that  wc  should 
rcinstiito  the  Ijcontines,  not  as  subjects,  like  their  kinsmen  in 
Kuboea,  but  in  a^  powerful  a  condition  as  possible  ;  that  from 
their  own  country,  living  as  they  do  close  to  these  men's  bor- 
ders, they  may  in  our  behalf  bo  annoying  to  them.  For  in 
(ireeco  wo  are  by  ourselves  able  to  copo  with  our  enemies; 
and  the  Chalcidians,  after  Avhose  subjugation  the  orator  says 
that  we  are  inconsistently  giving  liberty  to  those  here,  are  ad- 
vantageous to  us  by  being  without  any  armament,  and  only 
paying  us  money ;  but  the  people  here,  both  the  Leontines 
a?ul  our  other  friends,  by  being  left  as  independent  as  pos- 
Fible. 

85.  "  To  an  individual,  however,  who  has  absolute  power, 
or  to  a  state  that  holds  dominion,  nothing  is  inconsistent  that 

•  "  nermocrntos  had  endeavored  to  oxcito  tho  jealousy  of  tho  Camar• 
inroans,  by  telling  thorn,  that  tho  Athenians  did  but  pretend  to  aid  tho 
Ii<^ontines,  while  their  real  object  was  tho  subjugatioa  of  all  Sicily.  •  Such 
language,'  says  Euphemus,  '  may  possibly  beguilo  you  for  tho  moment ; 
but  when  you  como  to  act,  you  will  follow  your  real  interests.' "— Jirnoid 


482  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [lxxxvl 

19  profitablOf  nothing  reckoned  as  kindred  that  does  not  com- 
mand confidence ;  but  in  every  cose,  as  opportunity  may 
serve  you  must  become  cither  a  foe  or  a  friend.  And  in  our 
cose,  our  advantage  here  consists  in  this — not  that  we  should 
reduce  our  friends  to  weakness,  but  that,  owing  to  the  strength 
of  our  friends,  our  foes  should  be  powerless.  Nor  ought  you  to 
doubt  this.  For  even  in  the  case  of  our  allies  in  those  parts, 
as  they  are  severally  useful  to  lis,  so  we  govern  them :  the 
Chians  and  Methynma»ans  as  inde{>endent,  on  condition  of 
their  supplying  ships ;  the  greater  part  of  them  on  more 
stringent  terms,  subject  to  contribution  of  money  ;  but  others, 
although  they  are  islanders  and  easy  to  reduce,  as  allies  on 
terms  of  entire  freedom,  because  they  lie  in  favorable  posi- 
tions around  the  Peloponnese.  So  that  hero  also  it  is  natural 
that  we  should  regulate  them  Avith  an  eye  to  our  advantage, 
and,  as  we  say,  with  reference  to  our  fear  of  the  Syracusans. 
For  they  are  aiming  at  dominion  over  you,  and  wish,  aft<-'r 
uniting  you  on  the  strength  of  your  suspicions  of  us,  theni- 
Hclves  to  sway  the  empire  of  Sicily,  by  force,  or  through  your 
forlorn  condition,  when  λυο  have  departed  without  gaining  our 
object.  And  it  must  l>o  so,  if  you  unite  >vith  them;  for  neither 
will  so  great  a  force,  when  unite(i,  bo  any  longer  easy  for  us  to 
manage,  nor  would  these  men  want  strength  to  deal  with  you, 
when  we  were  not  here. 

8G.  "  And  whoever  does  not  think  this  to  bo  the  case,  the 
very  fact  itself  convicts  him  of  being  wrong.  For  on  a  former 
occasion  you  called  us  to  your  aid  by  holding  out  to  us  no 
other  fear,  than  that,  if  we  permitted  you  to  fall  under  tho 
Syracusans,  we  ourselves  also  should  be  exposed  to  danger. 
It  is  not  right  therefore  now,  that  you  should  refuse  to  bo 
persuaded  by  that  self-same  argument  by  Λvhich  you  >vished  to 
persuade  us  ;  or  that,  because  wo  are  come  with  a  larger  arma- 
ment, you  sliould  be  suspicious  of  us ;  but  much  rather,  that 
you  should  mistrust  these  men.  AVe,  at  least,  liave  no  power 
to  remain  among  you  without  your  support ;  and  even  if  wo 
should  show  ourselves  base,  and  bring  you  into  subjection,  wo 
should,  be  unable  to  keep  you  under  our  dominion,  both  on 
account  of  the  length  of  the  voyage,  and  tho  difficulty  of  keep- 
ing guard  over  cities  so  great  in  extent,  and  of  an  inland  clinr- 
iicter,  as  regards  their  resources.  These  men,  on  the  other  lian•!, 
living  near  you  as  they  do,  not  in  a  camp,  but  in  a  city  far 


Lxxxvii.]  TnUCTDIDES.  VI.  433 

fitrongcr  tlian  our  force  hero  present,  are  constantly  plottinr» 
airainst  you  :  and  when,  in  each  particular  case,  tliey  have  got 
an  opportunity,  they  do  not  let  it  slip  (as  they  have  shown 
hoth  in  other  instances,  and  in  that  of  the  Leontines),  and 
at  the  present  time  they  have  the  Jiardihood  to  urge  you,  as 
thouijh  you  were  void  of  sense,  against  those  λυΙιο  arc  pre- 
venting this,  and  λυΙιο  have  held  up  Sicily  hitherto  from  smk- 
uvr  under  them.  But  we,  in  opposition  to  them,  urge  you  to 
a  far  more  real  safety,  l>egging  you  not  to  hetray  that  which 
i«5  Hxnired  to  hoth  of  us  hy  each  other;  and  to  consider,  that 
while  for  them,  even  without  any  allies,  the  way  to  you  is 
always  open,  you  will  not  often  have  a  chance  of  defending 
ynurselv((s  in  conjun('li(»n  with  so  largo  a  fonni  of  auxiliaries; 
cf  >vhich,  if  through  ycnir  suspicions  you  allow  it  to  depart, 
either  unsuccessful,  or,  perhaps,  even  defeated,  you  will  wish 
yet  to  8*^0  oven  a  very  small  portion,  when  its  presence  will 
no  longer  accomplish  any  thing  for  you. 

87.  ''  13ut  ncitner  do  ye,  Camarinjrans,  nor  the  rest,  ho  per- 
suaded hy  these  men's  calumnies.  For  λυο  have  told  you  the 
whole  truth  concerning  these  things  about  which  we  are  sus- 
jHcted,  and  will  still  rcnnind  you  briefly  of  them,  and  so  try  to 
jx'fsuade  you.  AVo  say  then,  that  wo  exercise  dominion  over 
the  men  in  those  parts  to  avoid  being  subject  to  another ;  but 
tliat  wo  liberate  those  who  fire  here,  to  avoid  being  hurt  by 
thetn;  that  wo  are  compelled  to  meddle  witli  many  things,  be- 
eausc  we  have  also  many  things  to  guard  against ;  and  that 
we  came,  both  now  and  before,  as  allies  to  those  of  you  here,  ■ 
who  were  being  injured,  not  without  being  inviU^^d,  but  after 
R'ceiving  an  invitation.  And  do  not  ye,  either  as  judges  of 
what  is  done  by  us,  or  as  moderators,  attempt  to  divert  us 
(which  would  now  be  difficult),  but  so  far  as  any  thing  in  our 
njeddling  policy  and  dis])osition  is  at  the  same  time  profitable 
lor  yoM,  that  take  and  make  the  most  of  it.  And  believe  that 
it.  is  not  eaually  injurious  to  all,  but  that  to  a  large  majority 
of  the  Greeks  it  is  even  beneficial.  For  every  one  in  every 
]ilace,  even  where  wo  are  not  already  present,  both  he  who 
thinks  that  he  will  suflfer  wrong,  and  ne  who  is  meditating  to 
commit  it,  through  having  a  prospect  ever  closer  at  hand,  the 
"no  of  obtaining  help  from  us  agamst  his  injurer,  the  other,  tliat 
if  we  come,  they'  run  the  risk  of  not  being  free  from  alarm,  both, 

*  I  seo  no  reason,  cither  for  changing  ά^εείς  into  άδεές,  as  Dobroo  and 

49 


434  THUOYDIDEa    VI.  [Lxxxviii. 

I  8ay,  are  alike  compelled/ the  one,  to  be  moderate  against  his  I 
own  will,  the  other,  to  be  saved  without  his  own  exertion.  | 
This  security,  then,  wliich  is  common  to  all  who  require  it,  ! 
and  which  is  now  presented  to  you,  do  not  ye  reject;  but, 
acting  like  others,  insteiid  of  constantly  guarding  against  the 
Syracusans,  now  unite  with  us,  and  take  at  length  your  equal 
share  in  plotting  against  them.** 

88.  To  this  etl'ect  spoke  Euphemus.  Now  the  Camari- 
naians  had  felt  on  the  subject  as  follows :  Toward  the  Atlre- 
uians  they  were  well  inclined,  except  so  far  as  they  mi^ht 
think  that  they  would  subjugate  Sicily,  but  with  the  Syra- 
cusans  they  had  always,  in  the  sj)irit  of  borderers,  been  at 
variance.^  B^'iiig,  however,  more  afraid  of  the  Syracusans, 
ΛνΙιο  were  close  at  hand,  lest  they  might  even  without  their 
assistance  gain  the  aseendency,  they  both  sent  them  in  the  first 
instance  that  small  body  of  horse,  and  determined  for  the  fu- 
ture to  do  more  actual  service  for  the  Syracusans  (though  as 
sparingly  as  possible) ;  but  for  the  present,  that  they  might  not 
seem  to  show  less  res|)ect  for  the  Athenians — since  they  had 
even  proved  the  stronger  in  the  battle — they  resolved  to  give 
a  verbal  answer  that  should  be  fair  to  both  parties.  Having, 
therefore,  ado|>ted  this  counsel,  they  answered,  "  That  since 
mutual  hostilities  were  being  carried  on  by  parties  who  were 
both  in  alliance  with  them,  they  thought  it  to  bo  most  con- 
sistent with  their  oaths  to  aid  neither  party  for  the  present." 
And  so  the  embassadors  on  each  side  returned. 

The  Syracusans  Avero .  now  preparing  their  forces  for  war, 
while  the  Athenians  encamped  at  Naxos  were  negotiating  with 
the  Sicels,  to  get  as  many  as  possible  to  join  them.  Now  such  of 
the  Sicels  as  lived  more  on  the  plains,  and  who  were  subject  to 
the  Syracusans,  in  most  cases  stood  .iloof  from  them ;  but  those 
who  occupied  the  interior,  their  homes  having  before  this  al- 
ways been  independent,  immediately,  with  a  very  few  ex- 
ceptions, sided  with  the  Athenians,  and  carried  down  corn  for 
the  army,  and  in  some  crises  money  also.  Against  those  who 
did  not  come  over  to  them  the  Athenians  made  an  expedition, 
and  compelled  some,  but  Avere  prevented  from  compelling  others, 
by  the  Syracusan's  sending  them  garrisons,  and  coming  to  their 
aid-    "Having  moved  their  station  for  the  winter  from  Naxo3 

Arnold  wish  to  do,  or  for  tukinj?  the  word  with  an  active  significatioa 
though  it  may  possibly  bo  so  used  sometimes. 


Mxxix.]  THUCYDIDES,    V!.  435 

to  Catana,  and  havino^  raised  aii^ain  the  camp  which  had  been 
hiirned  down  hy  the  Syracusans,  they  remained  there  the 
rest  of  that  season.  They  sent  at  tins  time  a  trireme  to 
Carthago  witli  proposals  of  friendship,  on  the  clianco  of  their 
qbtaining  anv  help,  and  another  to  Tyrrhenia,  as  some  of  its  ci- 
ties had  of  their  own  accord  ottered  to  join  them  in  the  war. 
They  also  dispatched  mossongers  about  to  the  Sicels,  and  like- 
wise to  Sogesta,  desiring  th.at  they  would  forward  to  them  as 
many  horses  as  possible ;  while  tliey  also  prepared  for  the  cir- 
cumjiallation  briclvs,  iron,  and  all  other  requisites,  intending 
1i)j;Oinmerco  liostilities  in  the  spring.  The  Syracusan  em- 
l><Lssadors|^  on  the  other  hand,  who  had  been  dispatched  to 
('orinth  and  Lacedaimon,  both  endeavored,  as  they  coast^^d 
along,  to  persuade  the  Greeks  of  Italy  not  to  look  with  in- 
ditferenco  on  the  proceedings  of  the  Athenians,  since  thoy 
were  aimed  cnually  at  themselves,  and  when  they  were  conio 
to  Corinth,  delivered  an  address  to  them,  begging  for  assist- 
ance on  the  ground  of  their  connection.  The  Corinthians  im- 
mediately, in  tho  first  place,  themselves  voted  to  assist  them 
with  the  greatest  zeal,  and  then  sent  envoys  Avith  them  to  La- 
•  (\laDnion,  to  join  in  persuading  that  people  .nlso  both  to  carry 
<»n  tho  war  with  tho  Athenians  more  openly  at  home,  and  to 
send  suiicors  to  Sicily.  Accordingly  tho  embassadors  from 
(  orinth  came  to  Lacedaimon,  and  Alcibiades  also,  Λνί(1ι  liis 
fellow-exiles,  who  liad  crossed  straightway  on  board  a  vessel 
of  burden  from  Thun'a  to  Cyllene,  in  tho  Elean  territory,  in 
tho  first  instance,  and  then  afterward,  when  tho  Lacedaimo-> 
nians  themselves  Iiad  sent  for  him,  proceeded  to  Lacodacmon 
under  treaty;  for  ho  was  afraid  of  thetn,  owing  to  tho  part  ho 
had  taken  In  tho  Mantinean  business.  And  tlio  result  was, 
that  in  tho  Lacedicmonian  assembly  tho  Corinthians,  tho  Syra- 
cusans,  and  Alcibiades,  by  urging  tho  samo  request,  prevailed 
on  tho  people  there,  l^ut  when  tlio  ephors  and  tho  authorities, 
though  they  purposed  sending  embassadors  to  Syracuse,  to 
urge  them  to  make  no  terms  with  the  Athenians,  were  not  dis- 
*  posed  to  assist  them,  Alcibiades  came  forward,  and  exasperated 
and  instigated  the  LacedaGmonians  by  addressing  them  a* 
follows: 

89.  "It  is  necessary  that  I  should  first  address  yon  on  tba 
subject  of  tho  prejudice  felt  against  mo,  that  you  may  not, 
through  your  suspicions,  jitteni^  to  mo  tho  less  on  mattera  of 


43β  THUOYDIDES.  VI.  (ι•»"ις. 

public  interest  When,  then,  our  ancestors'  hatl,  on  the 
ground  of  ik>mo  quarrel  or  other,  renounced  their  connection 
with  you  as  your  proxeni^  I  myself,  from  a  wish  to  resume  it, 
paid  attentions  to  you,  both  in  other  respects,  and  in  the  case 
of  your  misfortune  at  Pylus.  And  when  I  continued  thus 
zealous,  you,  at  the  time  you  were  coneludinij  peace  with  the 
Athenians,  conferred  influence  on  my  enemies,  by  negotiatinflr 
through  them,  but  brought  dishonor  on  me.  For  these 
reasons  it  was  with  justice  that  you  received  harm  at  my 
hands,  both  when  I  turned  to  tlio  Mantiiieans  and  Argives, 
and  on  >vhatever  other  occasion  I  opix)sed  you.  And  now, 
if  there  bo  any  one  who  at  that  time,  wliilo  he  was  suffering, 
>va3  unfairly  angry  with  mo,  let  him  look  at  the  question  in 
the  true  light;  and  be  led  to  a  different  conviction.  Or  if  there 
be  any  one  who  formed  a  worso  opinion  of  me,  because  I 
rather  attachetl  myself  to  the  popular  party,  let  him  not  on  this 
ground,  either,  suppose  that  ho  Avas  Avith  good  reason  offended 
at  me.  For  wo  have  always  been  foes  to  tyrants ;  and  all 
that  are  opj^M^sed  to  the  dominant  faction  are  calletl  by  thp 
name  of  *  people/  It  was  from  this,  then,  that  our  taking  the 
lead  of  the  populace  continued ;  and  besides,  as  the  state  was 
'  under  a  democratical  government,  it  was  necessary  on  most  oc- 
casions to  follow  the  existing  order  of  things.  However,  wo 
endeavored  to  bo  more  moderate  in  polities  than  suited  the 
intemperato  spirit  which  had  before  prevailed.  Jiut  there 
were  others,  both  in  times  of  old  and  now,  who  led  on  the 
multitudo  to  more  evil  courses — the  very  party  which  also 
banished  me.  But  in  our  case  it  Λvas  the  whole  body  of  the 
people  that  we  headed ;  thinking  it  right  to  assist  in  pro- 
Kcrving  that  fonii  of  government  under  which  die  country 
was  most  great  and  free,  and  which  wo  had  rcceiveil.  For 
Avith  regard  to  deuiocracy,  all  of  us  >vho  had  any  sense  knew 
what  it  was ;  and  I  myself,  perhaps,  better  than  any  one,  'in 

>  ημΰν."]  Arnold  accounts  for  tho  uso  of  the  plural  hero  and  in  other 
parts  of  tho  chapter  by  supposing  tho  sppakcr  to  join  with  hinisell'  sorao 
relations,  as  well  as  personal  friends,  λυΙιο  had  been  banished  with  him. 

8  Ιιαφ  κάΙ  λοιύο\)ήααιμί.^  I  have  given  what  appears  to  bo  tho  meaning 
of  this  passage ;  though  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  can  bo  extracted  from 
the  Greek  as  it  now  stands.  Arnold  supposes  that  "sonio  words  havo 
bi'cn  lost  before  λυιύυμήααιμι,  so  that  the  words  ονδινυς  hi>  χιφον  prop- 
erly belong  to  that  verb,  and  after  όσω  κα\  there  should  bo  eupplied 
μάλλον  irr'  αυτής  ηόικημαι^    But  this  is  perhaps  a  nioro  ingenious  than 


xci.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  437 

proportion  as  I  could  nlso  abuse  it  more.  But  of  an  acknowl- 
edged absurdity  nothin»»  new  could  l>e  said  ;  and  yet  to  put  it 
aside  did  not  appear  to  us  safe,  while  you,  as  our  enemies, 
were  80  closely  besettinc^  us. 

90.  "With   roijjard   then   to   your   prejudices    against    me, 
Buch  were  the  facts :  but  with  regard  to  what  you  must  de- 
liberate upon,  and  I,  on  whatever  point  I  am  l)etter  informed, 
must  advise,  now  learn  from  mo.     ΛΥο  sailed  to  Sicily,  in  the 
first  place,  to  subdue  the  Siceliots,  if  we  could ;  after  them,  again, 
the  Italiots ;  and  then  also  to  make  an  attempt  on  the  dominion 
of  the  Carthaginians,  and  on  their  own  city.    If  cither  all  or  most 
of  these  schemes  proved  successful,  then  we  intended  to  attack 
the  Peloponnese,  after  bringing  here  the  united  force  of  the 
(ί reeks  that  had  joined  us  in  those  parts,  taking  many  barba- 
rians into  our  pay — both  Iberians  and  others  of  those  nations, 
confessedly  the  most  warlike'  barbarians  at  the  present  dny — 
and  building  many  triremes  in    addition   to   what  we   have 
(since  Italy  contains  timber  in  abundance).     Blockading  the 
JV'loponnese  with  these  round  its  coasts,  and  at  the  same  time 
atU'u'king  it  with  our  soldiers  on  the  land  side,  after  taking 
pome  of  the  cities  by  storm,  and  Λvalling  in  others,  we  hoped 
with  ease  to  reduce  it;  and  after  that  to  enjoy 'the  sovereignty 
of  the  whole  Grecian  race.     And  as  for  money  and  provnsions, 
to  render  each  of  these  measures  more  practicable,  the  ncwly- 

pr\fo  correction.  I  had  myself  conjectured,  bcforo  I  found  that  Bloomflcld 
had  done  the  same,  that  καΐ  might  bo  a  corruption  of  κύν,  a  contraction 
which  occurs  ch.  92.  4 ;  and  this  very  slight  change  is  perhaps  suiBcicnt 
to  remedy  tho  evil.  Though  γιγνώσκοιμι  ia  probably  understood  with 
ύι>  in  tho  preceding  clause,  I  can  not  think  that  it  could  over  have  been 
expressed,  as  Bloomficld  proposes  to  do ;  at  least  not  in  tho  position  which 
lio  would  give  to  it,  imraicdiatoly  after  ?.οιόο()ήσαιμί,  thus  giving  by  tho 
concurronco  of  tho  two  optatives  a  most  unmusical  termination  to  tho 
paragraph.  With  regard  to  tho  word  οσ«,  it  seems  dotibtful  whether  it 
is  to  bo  considered  aa  qualifying  a  comparative  understood,  os  the  com- 
mentators suppose,  or  as  used  absolutely,  aa  in  some  other  passages  of 
our  author,  signifying  "inasmuch  as;"  e.  g.,  chap.  92.  4,  κύν  φίλος  ών 
ϊκανώζ  ώί^ελοίην,  οβφ  τύ.  μίν  'Αθηναίων  οΙΑα,  τά  ό'  νμέτιρα  ζκαζον.  If  tho 
former  bo  tho  real  constniction,  it  is  possible  that  tho  whole  expression, 
ηιΛενος  αν  χεϊρον,  was  Intended  to  bo  supplied  from  tho  preceding  clause ; 
and  so  thcro  would  bo  no  necessity  for  even  tho  slight  alteration  of  καΐ 
into  kuv. 

'  Μαχιμυτάτονς.]  Poppo  readi  μαγιμωτύτων,  "  of  tho  barbarians  con- 
foasedlytho  most  warlike,^  etc.,  "which,"  says  Arnold,  "undoubtedlj 
aObrda  an  easier  sense." 


438  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [xci 

HCcuir<Bd  places  in  tboso  quarters  would  by  themselves  supply 
eufticieut,  independently  οϊ  our  revenues  from  these  parts. 

91.  "Thus,  then,  concerning  the  expedition  which  has  now 
Bailed,  you  have  heard  its  objects  from  the  man  who  knows  >vith 
thci  greatest  accuracy  what  we  purposed  l)y  it :  and  the  generals 
Λvho  still  remain  there  will,  if  they  are  able,  carry  them  out 
in  the  same  way.  But  that  the  jxiople  there  will  not  escajw 
their  attack,  unless  you  succor  them,  you  must  now  leani. 
The  Siceliots  indeed,  although  untrained,  niight  still  even  now 
gain  the  victory,  if  united  in  one  body,  liut  tlio  Syracus- 
ans  alone,  defeated  as  they  liavo  already  been  in  battle  >vitli 
all  their  forces,  and  henmied  in  by  sea  at  the  same  time,  will 
bo  unable  to  liold  out  against  the  Athenian  armament  now 
there.  And  if  that  city  is  tiiken,  the  whole  of  Sicily  also  is 
in  their  possession,  and  Italy,  too,  straightway  ;  and  the  danger 
which  I  just  now  mentioned  as  impending  irom  that  liuarUr, 
Avould  in  no  long  time  fall  upon  you.  Lot  no  one  then,  think 
that  he  is  deliberating  about  Sicily  alone,  but  about  the  Vo\o- 

5)onneso  also,  unless  you  quickly  adopt  these  measuns  ;  unless, 
.  mean,  you  send  thither  on  board  ship  such  a  body  of  troops, 
as,  after  working  their  own  j)assnge,  shall  immediately  act  as 
heavy  infantry  ;  and  also,  what  1  consider  to  be  still  more  serv- 
iceable than  troops,  a  Spartan  as  commander,  lK)th  to  disci-  i 
plino  their  prest^'Ut  forces,  and  to  compel  those  who  are  unwill- 
ing to  serve.  For  so  the  friends  you  already  have  will  feel  the 
greater  confidence,  ami  those  who  are  doubting  between  the 
two  sides  will  more  fearlessly  join  yours.  You  must  also  cany 
on  hostilities  here  in  a  more  decisive  manner ;  that  the  Syra- 
cusans,  convinced  that  you  take  an  interest  in  them,  may  olior 
the  greater  resistance ;  and  that  the  Athenians  may  the  less 
easily  send  reinforcements  to  their  troops.  And  for  that  purpose 
you  must  fortify  Decelea,  in  Attica ;  a  blow  of  which  the  Athen- 
ians have  always  been  most  afraid,  and  the  only  one  which  they 
think  they  have  not  experienced  in  the  present  war.  And  in  that 
Avay  would  one  most  surely  hurt  his  enemies,  if,  acting  on  certain  • 
information,  he  should  intlict  upon  them  those  things  >vhich  lie 
knows  them  to  fear  most :  for  it  is  but  reasonable  thai  every  peo- 
ple should  know  most  accurately  its  own  dangers,  and  fear  then» 
accordingly.  But  with  regard  to  the  ditKculties  which,  while 
you  benefit  yourselves,  you  will  create  for  your  op|)onents  hy 
thus  fortifying  the  place,  though  I  pass  over  many,  I  will 


loii.]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  439 

briefly  mention  the  cliief.  Whatever  then  the  country  is 
stocked  with,  the  greater  part  will  come  to  yon,  either  throuirh 
ho\nrr  captnrod,  or  of  their  own  accord.*  They  Λνϋΐ  also  at 
once  he  deprived  of  tlieir  revenues  from  the  silver  mines  at 
l/iuriu!n,  with  the  advantages  they  now  derive  from  their 
1;uid  and  their  courts  of  justice;'  hut,  especially,  of  the  revenuo 
foin  the  allies,  Avhich  will  ha  less  reirularly  paid  by  thorn, 
Avhcn  they  consider  that  the  war  on  your  part  is  now  vigor- 
on-^ly  prosecuted,  and  so  think  lig^itly  of  them.  To  have  each 
of  these  thinjjs  done  with  p^reater  speed  and  spirit  rests  with 
you,  L-icedicmonians ;  for  that  they  are  possible  I  am  very 
«•onfident,  and  I  do  not  think  that  1  shall  bo  proved  to  have 
been  mistaken. 

02.  "And  now,  I  becj  that  I  may  not  be  the  worse  thoucfht 
of  by  any  nmonij  von,  iKicauso  I  am  now  strenuously  attackiiicj 
my  country  with  its  bitterest  enemies,  thouiih  I  formerly  had 
a  reputation  for  ])atriotism ;  nnd  that  my  words  may  not  bo 
suspected  on  the  score  of  an  exiU's  forwardness.  For  though 
1  am  an  exile,  as  regards  the  villniny  of  those  Avho  banished 
nu»,  I  am  not  one,  as  regards  assistance  to  you,  if  you  ΛνϋΙ  bo 
pTsuaded  by  me;  nnd  the  p.irty  hostile  to  mo  was  not  you, 
who  only  hurt  your  foes,  but  rather  they  who  compelled  their 
iVicnds  to  become  their  foes.  My  patriotism,  too,  I  keep  not 
at  a  timo  when  I  am  being  wronged,'  but  only  while  I  enjoyed 
my  civil  rights  in  security,  iior  do  I  consider  myself  to  Ικ) 
going  against  what  is  still  my  country,  but  much  rather  to  l>o 
recovering  that  country  Avhich  is  mine  no  more.  And  tho 
patriot,  in  the  true  sense,  is  not  that  man  >vho,  when  ho  has 
unjustly  lost  his  country,  abstains  from  aggression  upon  it, 

*  r»i  <V  αντόμητη.]  i.  <•.,  tho  slaves,  which  I  bclicvo  to  be  chiefly  alluded 
to  by  tho  expression  οίς  η  χώρα  κητεσκηασται  (sco  noto  on  cli.  17.  3), 
(lioiiph  it  may  also  include,  as  Arnold  supposes,  cattle,  sheep,  farm- 
Ijouses,  trees,  and  other  articles  of  dead  as  well  as  live  stock. 

«  Λ(κ(ϊπτημίων.]  i.  e.,  in  various  fees  and  fines;  on  which,  sco  Bocckh 
Publ.  (Econ.  1.  p.  250.  . 

^  iv  φ.]  Or,  ns  Arnold  renders  it,  "  In  a  state  where,"  etc. ;  but  tlio  ox- 
pression  is  much  more  commonly  sipnificnnt  of  timo  than  of  condition, 
Compare  I.  3Π,  Ofr  χρην  ντε  ύσφα'λέητατοι  ynav,  rort  ηροσιεναι,  και  (//) 
f'v  φ  ///if/f  μίν  ίιύικήμεΟα  ovrot  ^ί  κινόηνεΰονσι,  μτμΥ  ίν  ώ  ί'μείς--αιτίης  Td 
Ιηην  (ξετε,  ιτήληι  ot\  κ.  τ.  λ.  Thoro  is.  however,  so  closo  a  connection 
Utween  tho  ideas  of  α  particular  period  and  of  tho  circumstances  by 
which  it  is  characterized,  that  it  is  sometimes  of  comparatively  little  iiu• 
portance  which  of  the  two  is  supposed  to  be  expressed. 


440  THUOYDIDEa   Υϊ,  [xcm.,  xci> 

but  he  who,  because  of  his  lon^ng  for  it,  endeavors  by  all 
means  to  regain  it  Thus,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  he» 
you,  LacediEmonians,  fearlessly  to  command  my  services,  both 
tor  danger  and  trouble  of  every  kind;  knowing  that  argument 
>vhich  is  advanced  by  all,  namely,  that  if  as  your  enemy  I  did 
you  very  great  hann,  I  might  also  as  your  friend  do  you  great 
service ;  inasmuch  as  I  know  tlio  plans  of  the  Athenians, 
while  I  only  guessed  yours.  I  beg,  too,  that  on  your  own  part 
also,  being  convinced  tluit  you  are  consulting  about  your 
greatest  interests,  you  will  not  slirink  from  the  expedition 
both  against  Sicily  and  Attica ;  that  by  joining  them  with  a 
small  part  of  your  forces,  you  may  at  once  preserve  the  groat 
states  in  Sicily,  and  overthrow  the  present  and  future  )>ower 
of  the  Athenians;  and  may  afterward  live  in  aecurity  your- 
selves, and  enjoy  a  volunUiry  supremacy  over  the  whole  tf 
Greece,  resting  not  on  force  but  <>n  atfection."  . 

93.  Such  was  the  address  of  Alcibiades.  The  I^ceda^mon- 
ians,  who  of  themselves  Avere  prt!viously  intending  to  nuike  an 
expedition  against  Athens,  but  were  still  acting  >vitli  delay 
and  circumspection,  were  far  more  determined  when  he  liad 
informed  them  of  those  several  j»articulars,  and  when  they 
considered  that  they  had  heard  them  from  the  man  who  had 
most  certain  knowle<lgo  of  them.  So  that  they  now  tunud 
their  thoughts  to  the  fortilication  of  Decelea,  and  to  inunediatciy 
sending  some  assistance  to  the  Sicilians,  Having  appointetl 
therc«!Ore  Clearidas  to  the  command  of  the  Syracusans,  they  in- 
structed him  to  ileliherate  with  that  people  and  the  Connlli• 
ians,  and  to  provide  for  succors  reaching  them  on  «'is  large  a 
8(;ale,  and  with  as  nuich  speed,  as  j>reRent  circumstances  lur- 
mitUid.  Accordingly  he  desired  the  Corinthians  to  send  him 
at  once  two  ships  to  Asine,  and  to  let  the  rest,  as  many  as  th*y 
j>urj>osed  sending,  be  etpnpped  and  in  readiness  to  sail,  when 
the  proper  time  came,  liaving  arrangeil  these  points,  they 
returned  fiom  Lacediemon. 

Now,  too,  arrived  the  Athenian  trireme  from  Sicily,  whidi 
the  generals  liad  sent  ft)r  money  and  cavalry.  And  when  the 
Athenians  had  heard  their  recjuest,  they  resolved  to  send  botli 
the  supplies  for  their  armament  and  the  cavalry.  And  so  the 
winter  ended,  and  the  seventeenth  year  of  this  war,  of  which 
Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

04.  At  the  very  commencement  of  the  spring  of  the  nexi 
ί 


xcr.,  xcvi.]  THUCTDIDE3.  VI.  441 

summer,  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  put  out  from  Catana,  and 
coasted  along  toward  the  Sicilian  Megara,  from  "which  tho 
Syracusans,  in  the  time  of  their  tyrant  Gelo  (as  I  have  before 
inentioneiJ),  drove  out  tho  inhabitant*,  and  themselves  con- 
tinue to  occuj)y  the  tenitory.  llaviiig  landed  therefore^  they 
ravafTcd  tho  country ;  and  after  going  against  a  fort  of  tho 
Syracusans  without  taking  it,  they  again  proceeded  both  with 
tlieir  land  force  and  ships  to  tlio  river  Terias,  and  advancing 
inlend,  both  laid  waste  tho  plain,  and  fired  the  corn.  After 
falling  in  with  a  small  body  of  the  Syracusans,  killing  some  of 
them,  and  erecting  a  trophy,  they  returned  to  their  ships. 
When  they  had  sailed  back  to  Catina,  and  supplied  themselves 
with  provisions  there,  they  went  with  their  whole  force  against 
Ceiitotripa,  a  town  of  the  Sicels,  and  returned  after  getting 
possession  of  it  by  capitulation,  burning  at  tho  same  time  tho 
corn  of  tho  Inessicans  and  Ilyblaians.  On  their  arrival  at  Ca- 
tana,  they  found  the  horsemen  come  from  Athens,  two  hundred 
and  fifty  in  number,  without  their  horses,  but  >vith  their  equip- 
ments in  expectation  of  horses  being  provided  there,  with 
thirty  mounted  archers,  and  three  hundred  taleuta  of  silver. 

05.  The  same  summer  the  LaccHajmonians  also  marched 
asfainst  Argos,  and  Λvent  as  far  as  Cleonai,  but,  on  the  occur- 
ronce  of  an  earthquake,  returned.  The  Argivcs,  after  this, 
made  an  incursion  into  tho.  Thyrean  country,  which  lies  on 
their  borders,  and  took  much  l)Ooty  from  the  Lacedicmonians, 
which  was  sold  for  no  less  than  five  and  twenty  talents.  Tho 
commons  of  tho  Thespians  also,  this  same  summer,  and  not 
long  after  ΛνΙκ^Ι  has  been  mentioned,  having  attacked  those  in 
•oftico  among  them,  did  not  get  tho  better ;  but  Theban  suc- 
cors liaving  arrived,  some  of  them  >vere  made  prisoners,  and 
others  fled  tho  country  and  went  to  Athens. 

90.  The  Syracusans,  tho  samo  summer,  hearing  that  tho 
cavalry  had  joined  tho  Athenians,  and  that  they  were  about  to 
march  against  them,  and  thinking  that,  unless  tho  Athenians 
were  masters  of  Epipolac,  a  precipitous  tract,  and  lying  right 
above  their  city,  they  could  not,  even  if  defeated  in  battle, 
bo  easily  circumvallated,  they  determined  to  guard  the  ap- 
I  Tfif  ηροαιίύσΐΐζ  αντών.]  t.  e.,  tho  openings  in  tho  cliff  at  different 
points  by  which  tho  ridge  might  bo  aflcended,  and  particularly  tho  ascent 
by  Eurycius."~^moW.  On  tho  topography  of  Syracuse,  and  tho  mili- 
tary operations  before  it,  soo  his  excellent  Memoir  in  his  third  volume; 
aa  well  as  the  other  authorities  quoted  by  Poppo  in  his  note  on  ch.  98.  2. 

•19* 


442  THUCnrDlDES.  VI.  (xcvit 

proaches  to  it,  that  the  enemy  might  not  gain  the  heights 
without  their  observation;  for  no  other  way  could  they,  as 
they  thought,  effect  it.  For  the  rest  of  the  position  rises 
high,  eloping  down  to  the  city,  and  being  all  visible  within  it : 
and  so  it  is  called  by  the  Syracusans,  from  lying  above  the  rest, 
"  Epipolae,"  [or  **  Overton"].  They  then  went  out  at  day-break 
with  all  their  forces  into  the  nicadow  along  the  course  of  the 
river  Anapus  (llermoc rates  and  his  colleagues  having  just  conio 
into  office  as  their  generals),  and  held  a  review  of  their  heavy- 
armed,  having  first  selected  from  those  troops  a  chosen  body 
of  six  hundred,  under  the  command  of  Diomilus,  an  exile  from 
Androe,  to  bo  a  guard  for  Epipolaj,  and  quickly  to  muster 
and  present  themselves  for  Avhatc^ver  other  service  they  might 
bo  required. 

97.  The  Athenians,  on  the  other  hand,  held  a  review  the 
day  following  this  night,  having  already,  unobserved  by  them, 
made  the  coast  with  all  their  armament  from  Catana,  opposiiti 
a  place  called  Leon,  about  hix  or  seven  stades  from  Kpipolu?, 
and  having  landed  their  sokliers,  and  brought  their,  ships  to 
anchor  at  Thapsus ;  where  there  is  a  peninsula  running  out  into 
the  sea,  Λvith  a  narrow  isthmus,  being  not  far  from  the  city  of 
Syracuse.  eith«'r  by  land  or  by  water.  The  naval  armament 
of  the  Athenians  lay  quiet  at  Thapsus,  having  thrown  a  stock- 
ade across  the  j)eninsula ;  but  the  land  forces  proceeded  at  full 
«peed  to  Epipohc,  and  Iwul  time  to  ascend  it,  on  the  side  of 
Eun'elus,  before  the  Syracusans,  on  perceiving  it,  coμld  come 
to  them  from  the  meadow  and  the  review.  They  came,  how- 
over,  against  them,  both  the  rest,  as  quickly  as  eiu;h  could,  and 
Diomilus,  with  his  six  hundred  :  but  they  had  a  distance  of 
not  less  than  five  and  twenty  stades  to  go,  before  they  came 
up  to  them  from  the  meadow.  Falling  on  them  therefore, 
under  these  circumstances,  in  considerable  disonler,  and  being 
defeated  in  an  engagement  at  Epipohe,  the  Syracusans  re- 
turned into  the  city,  Diomilus  being  killed,  and  about  three 
liundred  of  the  rest.  After  this,  the  Athenians  having  erected 
a  trophy,  and  restored  to  the  Syracusans  their  dead  under  a 
truce,  came  down  the  next  day  to  the  city  itself;  but  when 

*  ιξητύζοντο,  καΐ  ΙλαΟον,  κ.  τ.  λ.]  "They  had  landed  thoirmen  during 
tUo  uight,  and  hud  then  BtationeU  their  sliipa  at  Thapsus ;  while  Iho 
Holdiors,  as  soon  as  it  was  light,  after  a  brief  muster  of  their  force,  ha»l• 
died  to  ascend  to  the  Ilog's  Buck  boliind  Kpipolai." — Arnold. 


xcTiii.,  xcix]  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  443 

they  did  not  como  out  ngninst  them,  they  returned,  and  built  a 
fort  on  Labdaluin,  on  tlio  hii^hest  point  of  the  cliffs  of  Epipola», 
looking  toward  Mojirara,  to  ho  a  maijazinc  for  their  baggage 
and  treasures,  whcnover  they  advanced  either  to  fight  or  to 
work  at  the  wall. 

08.  Not  long  after,  thero  onmo  to  them  from  SegcRta  three 
liundred  cavalry,  an<l  about  a  hundred  from  the  Sicels,  Naxian», 
and  Bomo  others,  while  thero  were  already  two  hundred  and 
fifty  from  Athens,  for  whom  they  liad  received  some  horses 
from  the  Segestans  and  Catanaeans,  and  had  bought  others ; 
so  that  altogether  a  boily  of  six  hundred  and  fifty  cavalry  was 
mustered.  Having  estiiblished  a  garrison  in  Labdalum,  tho 
Athenians  advanced  to  Syca,  where  they  posted  themselves, 
and  built  with  all  speed  tho  central  point  of  their  wall  of 
<ircumvallation.*  They  struck  the  Syracusans  with  consterna- 
tion by  tho  ra])idity  of  their  building;  and  consequently 
they  resolved  to  march  out  against  them  and  give  them  battle ; 
αικί  not  allow  them  to  proceed  v,\t\\  the  work.  AVhen  they 
were  now  being  drawn  up  in  battle-array  against  each  other, 
the  Syraciisan  generals,  perceiving  that  their  forces  were  broken, 
und  did  not  CJisily  fall  into  line,  led  them  back  again  into  tho 
«ity,  excepting  some  part  of  their  cavalry.  These,  staying  be- 
lli tid,  prevented  the  Athenians  from  carrying  their  stones,  or 
ilispcrsing  to  any  great  distance;  until  one  tribe'  of  tho  Athe- 
nian lieavy-armed,  with  all  their  cavalry,  charged  and  routed 
the  Syracusan  horse,  killed  some  of  them,  and  erected  a  trophy 
for  this  cavalry  action. 

99.  Tho  next  day  some  of  the  Athenians  were  building  tho 
wall  to  the  north  of  the  central  point,  while  others  wero  collecling 
stones  and  timber,  and  laying  them  along  tho  line,  to  tho  point 
called  Trogilus  ;  keeping  in  tho  direction  in  which  their  wall  of 

*  Ιτείχισαν  rbv  κνκ'λον.']  To  avoid  appearing  to  assert  that  tho  wholo 
lino  of  circumvallation  was  at  onco  completed,  I  havo  rendered  κνκ'λην 
in  this  pa85?ago  by  one  of  tho  terms  applied  to  it  in  Arnold's  nolo;  whcro 
lio  says  that  "  6  κνκ'λος  which  is  spoken  of  as  finished,  was  on  the  one 
hand  a  part  of  tho  circumvallation,  but  was  also  α  complete  work  In  it- 
ficlf— somethuifr,  that  is,  of  an  intrenched  camp,  which  was  to  bo  tho 
point  of  junction  and  key  of  tho  two  lines  which  wero  to  run  respect• 
ivoly  to  tho  sea  by  Tro^filus,  and  to  tho  great  harbor,"  etc. 

'  We  learn  from  Herodotus,  VI.  111.  2,  that  tho  soldiers  belonging  to 
the  different  tribes  at  Athens,  were  not  mixed  together  in  an  cngnge- 
iiient,  but  were  kept  separate ;  an  arrangement  ■which  appears  from  eh. 
100.  1,  to  have  been  observed  by  the  Syracusans  also. 


444  THUCJTDIDEa  VL  Ια 

circutnvallation  would  be  completod  in  tho  Bhortest  dieiance  from 
tlio  great  harbor  to  the  sea.    Tho  Syracusana  meanwhile,  at        > 
tho  suf^gestioa  of  Heniiocrates,  more  than  of  their  other  gen-        | 
orals,  were  no  longer  disposed  to  run  tho  risk  of  general  actions        ? 
with  the  Atlienians,  but  thought  it  bettor  to  build  a  counter- 
wall  in  the  direction  in  which  they  intended  to  carry  their 
works ;  thinking  that  if  they  anticipated  them  with  this,  there 
would  bo  an  interruption  to  their  lines ;  and  that,  if  at  that  time        » 
they  eliould  come  to  oppose  them,  they  themselves  would  send 
a  part  of  their  forces  against  them,  and  have  time  to  occupy  tho 
approaches  beforehand  with  their  palisade,  while  tho  Athenians 
would  cease  from  their  work,  and  all  turn  their  attention  to 
them.     They  went  out,  therefore,  and. proceeded,  to  build  be- 
ginning from  their  city,  and  carrying  a  cross  wall  below  the         ι 
Athenian  lines,  cutting  down  tho  olives  of  tho  sacred  ground,         j 
and  erecting  wooden  towers.     Tho  ships  of  tho  Athenians  had         ; 
not  yet  sailed  round  from  Thapsus  into  tho  great  harbor,  but  the         | 
Syracusans  still  commanded  tho  sea-shore,  and  tho  Athenians        i 
conveyed  their  provisions  from  Thapsus  by  land. 

100.  AVhen    tho   S}Tacus;ins   thought   that   those  parts  of 
their  counter-work  which  had  boon  completed   by  means  of 
palisades  and  masonry  were  sufficient,  and  when  the  Atheni- 
ans did  not  come  out  to  stop  them,  as  they  feared  that  tho 
enemy  would  more  easily  contend  with  them  when  they  were        \ 
divided,  and  at  the  same  time  Λvero  hurrying  to  complete  their 
own  wall  of  circumvallation  ;  tho  Syracusans,  having  left  one 
tribo    to   guard    tho    building,  returned   into   tho   city.     Tho 
Athenians,  in  tho  mean  time,  destroyed  their  pipes  which  ran 
under  ground  into  tho  city,  carrying  water  for  drinking ;  and 
having  watched  when  tho  rest  of  tho  Syracusans  were  in  their 
tents  at  mid-day,  and  some  of  them  liad  even  gone  away  into        | 
tho  city,  while  those  in  tho  stockade  *  were  keeping  but  α  care- 
less guard,  they  appointed  three  hundred  picked  men  of  them- 
selves, and   a  chosen  body  of  the  light  troops,  armed  for  the 
purpose,  to  run  suddenly  at  full  speed  to   tho   counter-work 
while  tho  rest  of  the  anny  advanced  in  two  divisions,  one  with         «, 
one  of  the  generals  to  the  city,  in  case  they  should  come  to  tho         ;/ 
rescue,  the  other  with  tho  other  general  to  the  stockade  nour 
the  postern.     Accordingly    ihe    three   liundred  assaulted  and 

*  tv  τφ  ητανρώματι.]  "  Apparently  α  stockado  in  advance  of  tho  cros.s 
wall,  νπυτείχισμα,  and  covering  tho  aj)proach  to  it." — Arnold. 


cl]  THUCYDIDES.  VL  445 

took  tho  stookado,  tho  guard  evacuating  it,  and  taking  rcfugo 
in  tho  outworks  around  Temcnitos.  Their  pursuers  also  burst 
in  >vith  thcin,  but,  afU'r  getting  in,  were  forcibly  driven  out 
airain  by  the  Syracusans,  and  some  few  of  tho  Argives  and 
Athenians  were  slain  there.  And  now  the  whole  army  having 
returned,  tlirew  down  the  wall,  tore  up  tho  palisades,  transferred 
the  pales  to  their  own  lines,  and  erected  a  trophy. 

101.  Tho  next  day  tho  Athenians,  setting  out  from  their 
lines,  began  to  build  at  tho  cliflfs  over  tho  marsh,  λυΙποΙι  on  this 
side  of  Epipolaj  looks  toward  the  great  harbor,  and  in  which 
direction  their  wall  of  circuravallation  would  bo  finished  in  tho 
shortest  distance  by  their  going  down  over  the  plain  and  the 
marsh  to  the  harbor.  Tho  Syracusans  meanwliilo  went  out, 
and  on  their  part  also  began  again  to  interrupt  tho  lino  by  a 
palisade,  commencing  from  tho  city  across  tho  middle  of  tho 
marsh ;  and  at  tho  same  time  dug  a  ditch  parallel  witli  it^ 
that  it  might  not  be  possible  for  tho  Athenians  to  carry  their 
wall  of  circumvallation  as  far  as  tho  sea.  They,  after  their 
work  at  tho  cliff  was  completed,  again  assaulted  tho  palisade 
and  tho  ditch  of  tho  Syracusans.  They  had  ordered  their  fleet 
to  sail  round  from  Thapsus  to  tho  gVeat  liarbor  of  Syracuse, 
Λνΐΰΐο  they  themselves  descended  at  dawn  from  Epipolaj  into 
tho  plaih,  and  laying  doors  and  planks  over  tho  marsh,  Λvllero 
the  mud  wae^most  firm,*  crossed  it  upon  them,  and  in  tho 
morning  carried  the  palisade,  excepting  a  small  ])art  of  it,  and 
the  ditcli,  and  afterward  tho  remaining  part.  On  this  occa- 
sion a  battle  was  fought,  in  which  tho  Athenians  Avere  vic- 
torious, those  of  the  Syracusans  posted  on  the  right  wing 
flying  to  tho  city,  those  on  tho  left,  to  tho  river.  AVishing  to 
intercept  tho  passage  of  these,  tho  threo  hundred  chosen  troops 
of  tho  Athenians  pressed  on  at  full  speed  to  tho  bridge ;  but 
tho  Syracusans  wero  alanned,  and  as  tho  greater  part  of  their 
forces  were  there,  closed  on  these  three  hundred,  routed 
them,  and  drove  them  in  on  tho  right  wing  of  tho  Athenians^ 
By  their  charge  tho  tribo  posted  first  on  tho  wing  was  also 
thrown  into  panic;  on  observing  wliieh,  Lamachus  came  to 
thoir  assistance  from  their  left,  with  a  few  archers  and  tho  Ar- 
gives, and  having  crossed  tho  ditch  in  advance,  and  being  cut  off 
from  tho  rest,  with  only  α  few  >vho  had  crossed  Avith  him,  was 
killed  with  five  or  six  of  his  men.  Theso  tho  Syracusans  im- 
»  Literally,  "  where  it  was  muddy  ond  most  firm." 


I 
446  THUOYDIDBS.  VL  [cii^  cui         | 

^  .       ί 

mediately  snatched  up,  and  had  time  to  get  over  the  river  into  l 
a  place  of  security ;  while  tlieir  own  troops  retreated,  as  the  f 
rest  of  the  Athenian  force  was  now  coming  against  them.  5 

102.  Meanwhile,  those  of  them  who  had  at  first  fled  for  ref-  \ 
uge  to  their  city,  when  they  saw  what  was  going  od,  resumed  * 
their  courage,  and  coming  thence,  themselves  drew  up  against 

the  Athenians  in  front  of  them,  and  sent  a  part  of  tlx'ir  num- 
bers to  the  lines  on  £pi{K)lie,  thinking  they  should  take  them         ■ 
while  unguarded.    And  they  did,  indeed,  take  and  destroy  their 
outwork  *  of  a  thousand  feet  in  length,  but  the  lines  themselves        | 
Nicias  prevented  their  taking,  as  he  happened  to  have  been        i 
left  behind  in  them  through  illness.  .  lie  ordered  the  8er\'ant8•       I 
to  set  fire  to  the  engines,  and   all  the  timber  that  had  been 
thrown  down  in  front  of  the  wall ;  as  he  knew  that  for  want 
of  men  they  could  not  escape  in  any  other  way.     And  such 
was  the  result ;   for  the   Syracusims  no  longer  came  against 
them  on  account  of  the  fire,  but  withdrew  again.     Indeed,  by 
this  time  succors  had  gone  up  to  the  lines  from  the  Athenians  . 
below,  who  had  repulsed  the  enemy  in  that  part ;  and  at  the 
same  time  their  ships  from  Thapsus  were  sailing,  as  they  had 
been  ordered,  into  the  groat   harbor.     At  thti  sight  of  this, 
those  on  the  heights  retreated  with  all   speed,  and  the   whole         ■ 
army  of  the  Syracusans  retired  into  the  city,  thinking  that  they 
would  no  longer  be  able  with  their  present  force  to  prevent  the 
building  of  the  wall  down  to  the  sea.  ? 

103.  After  this,  the  Athenians  erected  a  troj)hy,  restoring 

their  dead  to  the   Syracusans  under  a  truce,   and  receiving        ] 

s 

*  Td  ύεκύ-:τλεΟμον  ττροτείχισμα.]  Arnold  supposes  this  to  havo  been  "  ο 
sort  of  redoubt,  or  covering  outwork,  raised  before  that  part  of  the  Uno  ; 

on  which  the  Athenians  were  at  work,  to  protect  the  workmen,  and  to 
cover  the  stones,  tiniber,  cranes,  scatVoUlings,  and  other  things  used  for  « 

tlio  building."  But  the  expression  seems  more  suitable  for  a  stationary 
outwork,  than  for  ono  which,  according  to  this  description,  would  bo 
moved  about  as  tho  building  progressed  ;  and  the  last  passage  in  which 
the  building  operations  aro  mentioned,  transfers  them  from  Epipolaj  to 
"  tho  cliiT,  which  formed  the  southern  extremity  of  tho  high  ground  above 
tho  valley  of  tho  Anapua."  (Soo  ch.  101.  1,  with  Arnold's  note  on  it). 
It  would  thereforo  bo  bettor,  perhaps,  to  consider  tho  outwork  in  ques- 
tion to  havo  been  intended  as  an  additional  defense  for  tho  central  poiul 
of  the  hues,  τον  κυκλον^  in  which  Nicias  might  naturally  havo  been  left, 
as  tho  place  of  greatest  security.  Tho  engines  and  timber  which  weru 
not  required  for  immediate  use,  might  havo  been  kept  near  tho  redoubt 
for  tho  same  reason. 


c,v.]  "  THUCYDIDES.  VI.  447 

back  those  who  had  fallen  with  LamachuR,  as  well  as  himself. 
AtiJ  as  they  now  had  with  them  their  wholo  force,  both  naval 
and  military,  they  began  from  Epipolae  and  the  cliffs,  and  cir- 
<',univallatod  the  Syracusans  down  to  the  sea  with  a  doublo 
wall.  Provisions  wore  now  brought  for  the  armament  from 
all  parLs  of  Italy.  Many  of  the  Sicels  too,  λυΙιο  before  were 
looking  to  S(H5  how  things  went,  came  as  allies  to  the  Athenians; 
as  did  also  three  fifty-oared  galleys  from  Tyrrhenia.  And  every- 
thing  else  wa^  prosjK'ring,  so  as  to  give  them  hope.  For  tho 
Syracusans  no  longer  thought  that  they  could  es(;ape  by  mili- 
tary measures,  since  no  assistance  had  reached  them  from  the 
Peloponnese ;  l)Ut  were  proposing  terms  of  capitulation,•  both 
among  themselves  and  to  Nicias  :  for  he  alone  held  the  com- 
mind  since  the  death  of  Lamachus.  No  decision,  indeed,  was 
como  to;  but,  as  was  natural  for  men  who  were  in  difficulties,, 
an  I  bo-^ieged  more  cloi^ely  than  before,  many  discussions  were 
Ik'M  with  him,  and  still  more  in  the  city.  For  they  also  en* 
tort:iined  some  8US[)icion  of  one  another,  in  cotjsequence  of  their 
present  misfortunes,  and  deposed  the  generals  under  whoso 
command  these  things  had  befallen  them — thinking  that  it  was 
cither  through  their  bad  fortune,  or  treason,  that  they  were 
suffering — and  chose  others  in  their  stead,  namely,  lleraclides, 
Kticles,  and  Tellias. 

104.  In  the  mean  time,  Gylippus,  the  Lacedaimonian,  and 
the  ships  from  Corinth,  were  now  off  Leucas,  wishing  to  como 
to  tho  aid  of  Sicily  with  all  speed.  AVhen  therefore  tidings 
were  carried  to  them  of  an  alarming  nature,  and  all  concurring 
in  the  same  falsehood,  namely,  that  Syracuse  wns  by  this  time 
«•ntirely  ciroumvallated,  (iylippus  had  no  longer  any  hope  of 
Sicily;  but  wishing  to  save  Italy,  ho  himself,  and  Tythen  tho 
("ofinthian,  with  two  Laconian  and  two  Corinthian  ships, 
crossed  tho  Ionian  Sea  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Tarentum ; 
while  the  Corinthians  having  manned,  in  addition  to  their 
own  ten,  two  Leucadian  and  three  Ambracian  vessels,  were  to 
sail  after  them.  Gylippus,  then,  having  first  gone  on  an  em- 
bassy from  Tarentum  to  Thuria,  on  tho  ground  of  his  father^s 
having  formerly  l>cen  presented  with  the  franchise  there,  and 
not  being  able  to  bring  them  over,  weighed  anchor,  and 
roasted  along  Italy.  Having  been  caught,  when  opposite  tho 
TorinaBan  gulf,  by  a  wind  which  in  this  quarter  blows  vio- 
lently and  steadily  from  the  north,  ho  was  carried  out  to  sea, 


448  THUOYDIDES.  VL  [or. 

and  after  enduring  exceedingly  foul  weather,  again  made  Ta• 
rentunif  and  there  drew  up  and  refitted  euch  of  his  ehipa  as 
had  eutifered  from  the  tempest.  Nicias,  on  hearing  of  his  ap• 
proach,  despised  the  number  of  his  ships  (as  had  been  tho 
feeling  of  the  Thurians  also),  and  thought  that  they  were  sail- 
ing more  like  a  piratical  armament  than  any  thing  else;  and 
so  at  present  he  took  no  precautions  against  him. 

105.  About  tho  same  period  of  this  summer,  the  Lacedo;- 
monians  invaded  Argos,  themselves  and  their  allies,  and  rav- 
aged the  greater  part  of  the  country.  Tho  Athenians  went 
to  the  assistance  of  the  Argives  with  thirty  ships ;  and  it  was 
theser  that  broke  their  treaty  Λvith  the  Lacedajmonians  in  a 
most  decisive  nianuer.  For  before  this  they  only  joined  in 
hostilities  with  tho  Argives  and  Mantineans  by  plundering 
excursions  from  Pylus,  and  by  landing  on  the  other  coasts 
around  tlio  IVloponncso,  rather  than  on  the  Liiconian ;  and 
though  tho  Argives  often  desired  tliem  only  to  touch  at  Laco- 
nia  with  their  heavy-armed,  and  to  withdraw  after  devastating 
it  with  them  ever  so  little,  they  would  not  do  it.  But  at 
that  time,  having  landed  under  the  command  of  Pythodorus, 
Lajspodias,  and  Demaratus,  at  Epid.'iurus  Limera,  Prasiai,  and 
other  plaws,  they  ravaged  part  of  tho  tiirritory,  and  so  ren- 
dered the  excuse  of  tlie  Lacedaiuionians  more  plausible  now 
for  defending  themselves  against  the  Athenians.  After  the 
Athenians  had  with  their  fleet  withdrawn  from  Argos,  and  tho 
Lacedienionians  also,  tho  Argives  having  made  an  iiTuptiou 
into  the  IMiliasian  territoiy,  ravaged  i)art  of  their  land,  killed 
some  of  their  men,  and  returned  home. 


BOOK  VII. 


1.  Gtlippcs  and  Pytlien,  after  refitting  their  uliipfl,  saileu 
along  the  coast  from  Tarentum  to  Loeri  Epizephyrii.  And 
now,  on  receiving  more  correct  information,  namely,  tliat 
Syracuse  was  not  yet  entirely  invested,  but  that  it  was  etill 
jiossible  for  a  party  coming  with  troops  to  enter  it  on  the  Fido 
of  Epipol.'P,  they  deliberated  whether  they  should  keep  Sicily 
vn  their  right  hand,  and  so  run  the  risk  of  sailing  into  it ;  or 
whether,  keeping  it  on  the  left  hand,  they  should  first  sail  to 
Ifimcra,  and  take  >vith  them  both  the  people  there,  and  any 
other  forces  that  they  might  prevail  on  to  join  tliem,  and  bo 
proceed  by  land.  They  determined,  then,  to  sail  for  Ilimcra, 
especially  as  tho  four  Athenian  ships  had  not  yet  arrived  at 
lUiegium,  which  Nicias,  on  hearing  of  their  being  at  Locri, 
notwithstanding  liis  contempt  for  them,  had  sent  out.  IL.ving 
anticipated  therefore  this  guard-squadron,  they  crossed  over  tho 
strait,  and  after  touching  at  lihegium  and  Messana,  arrived  at 
Ilimcra,  AVhilo  they  were  there,  they  persuaded  tho  Ilime- 
vicans  to  join  them  in  tho  war,  and  both  themselves  to  accom- 
jiany  them,  and  to  furnish  arms  for  such  of  tho  seamen  from 
their  ships  as  had  none  (for  they  had  drawn  up  their  ships  on 
sliorc  at  Ilimcra).  They  also  sent  and  desired  tho  Selinun- 
tines  to  meet  them  at  a  certain  place  with  all  their  forces. 
That  people  promised  to  send  them  a  force  of  no  inconsiderable 
amount,  as  did  tho  Geloans  also,  and  some  of  tho  Sicels,  who 
were  ready  to  join  them  with  much  greater  forwardness,  both 
in  consequence  of  the  recent  death  of  Archonidas,  who,  being 
king  over  somo  of  tho  Sicels  in  that  part,  and  a  man  of  con- 
siilerablo  influence,  was  a  friend  of  tho  Athenians,  and  bccnuso 
Gylippus  was  thought  to  havo  como  from  Jjacedfemon  in  a 
spirited  manner.  Thus  Gylinpus  took  with  bim  those  of  his 
own  seamen  end  Epihatas  who  were  provided  with  arms,  about 
F^ven  hundred  in  number,  the  Himeraean  heavy  and  light 
troops,  together  mustering  about  a  thousandi  with  a  hundred 


450  THUOYDIDES.  VIL  (π^ΐα 

horse,  some  light-armed  and  horse  of  the  Selinuntinee,  a  few 
Geloans,  and  a  thousand  Sicels  in  all,  and  so  advanced  against 
Syracuse. 

2.  The  Corinthians,  meanwhile,  >vere  coming  to  their  a-v 
sistance  from  Leucns  with  their  other  ships  as  quickly  as  they 
could,  and  Goui^ylus,  one  of  the  Corinthian  conimandcrs,  who 
had  put  to  sea  lust  of  all  with  a  single  vessel,  arrived  lirst  at 
Syracuse,  though  but  a  little  before  Gylippus.  Finding  them 
on  the  point  of  holding  an  assembly  to  consult  on  bringing  the 
war  to  a  conclusion,  he  prevented  their  doing  so^  and  reassured 
them  by  saying  that  there  were  other  ships  still  sailing  up, 
and  Gylippus,  son  of  Cleandridas,  sent  by  the  Lacedaimoniaus 
in  command  of  them.  Upon  this  the  Syracusans  were  rciis- 
sured,  and  iinmediately  Avent  out  in  full  force  for  the  j)urposo 
of  meeting  Gylippus ;  for  by  this  time  they  ])erceived  liim  ac- 
tually near  at  hand,  lie,  having  taken  on  his  passage  Jeta»,  a 
fortress  of  the  Sicels,  and  having  formed  his  men  for  battle, 
arrived  at  Epipolai ;  after  mounting  which,  on  the  side  by 
Kuryelus,  where  the  Athenians  also  had  ascended  at  lirst,  ho 
advanced  in  company  with  the  Syracusans  against  the  Athe- 
nian lines,  lie  ha]»ix;ued  to  have  come  at  so  critical  a  time, 
that  a  double  wall  of  seven  or  eight  stades  length  had  already 
been  completed  by  the  Athenians,  extending  to  the  great  liar- 
bor,  excei)t  for  a  short  distance  near  the  sea,  wliich  they 
were  still  building.  For  the  rest  of  their  lines,  to  Trogilus  ou 
the  other  sea,  stones  had  already  been  laid  for  the  greater  j)art 
of  the  distance,  and  some  points  Were  left  half  iinished,  while 
others  were  entirely  comj)leted.  To  such  extreme  danger  had 
Syracuse  been  reduced. 

3.  The  Athenians,  though  thrown  into  consternation  at  first 
by  the  sudden  attack  made  upon  them  by  (lylippus  and  the 
Syracusans,  quickly  drew  up  for  battle,  (iylippus  halted  near 
them,  and  sent  on  a  herald  to  tell  them  that  if  they  chose  to 
depart  from  Sicily  within  five  days,  taking  what  lielonged  to 
them,  he  v/as  ready  to  make  a  truce  to  that  eftect.  They, 
however,  paid  no  attention  to  him,  and  sent  him  back  again 
without  giving  any  answer.  After  this,  they  made  their  j)rep- 
urations  against  each  other.  And  (iylippus,  seeing  the  Syra- 
cusans in  disorder  and  not  easily  falling  into  line,  drew  oiY  his 
forces  more  into  the  open  ground ;  while  Nicias  did  not  lead  tho 
Athenians  against  them,  but  remained  still  near  his  own  wall. 


IV.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VIL  4δ1 

When  Gylippiis  found  that  they  were  not  advancing^,  he  witli- 
•Irow  Ids  army  to  what  is  called  the  citadel  of  Temenit^s,  and 
tluTo  they  stationod  themselves  for  the  night.  The  next  day 
lii'  took  the  greater  part  of  liis  forces,  and  drew  them  up  near 
the  walls  of  the  Athenians,  to  prevent  their  going  to  the  relief 
of  nnv  other  quarter,  Λνΐύΐο  lie  sent  a  detachment  to  the  fort  of 
Lal>.hilum,  and  took  it,  and  put  to  the  sword  all  the  men  Jio 
found  in  it;  the  phicc  ndl  being  \vithin  sight  of  the  Athenians. 
On  the  same  day,  too,  a  trireme  of  the  Athenians,  moored  olf 
the  harbor,  was'taken  by  the  Syracusans. 

4.  After  this,  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  commencing 
at  the  city,  began  to  build  upward  along  Epipolne  a  einglo 
wall  in  a  cross  direction,  that  the  Athenians,  if  they  could  not 
stop  their  progress,  might  no  longer  bo  able  to  invest  them. 
Tho  Athenians  had  by  this  time  gone  up  to  the  heights,  aftx^T 
(•otn])letiiig  their  wall  down  to  the  sea;  and  there  being  one  weak 
] 'art  in  the  Athenian  wall,  (iylippiis  took  his  forces  by  night 
and  Tnado  an  attac^k  upon  it  When  the  Athenians  were  awaro 
Ok  his  approach  (for  they  hajipencd  to  bo  bivouacking  out- 
side), they  advanced  to  meet  him ;  on  observing  >vhich,  ho  led 
back  the  troops  on  his  side  as  quickly  as  ho  could.  Tho 
Athenians  having  then  raised  it  liigher,  themselves  kept  guard 
at  this  point,  and  now  disposed  the  other  allies  along  tlio  rest 
of  the  ΛvoΓks  as  they  were  severally  to  man  them.  Nicias  de- 
termined also  to  fortify  what  is  called  Plemyrium,  a  lioa<lland 
opposite  the  city,  which  runs  out  lxiyon<l  tho  great  harbor, 
and  narrows  its  inouth.  If  this  Λvere  fortified,  lie  thought  that 
the  introduction  of  provisions  would  l>e  more  easily  etfected'; 
as  they  would  carry  on  their  blockade  from  a  less  distance,  near 
the  port'  occupie<i  by  tho  Syracusans,  and  would  not,  as  now, 
put  out  against  them  from  the  bottom  of  tho  great  harbor,  in 
ca*e  of  their  stirring  at  all  with  their  fleet.  And  he  now  paid 
more  attention  to  tho• maritime  operations  of  tho  war,  seeing 
that  their  aflfairs  by  land  wero  more  hopeless  since  tho  arrival 
of  Gylippus.  Having,  therefore,  crossed  over  with  a  body  of 
troops  and  his  ships,  he  completed  tho  building  of  three  forts ; 
in  which  were  deposited  the  greater  part  of  the  'stores ;  tho 
larger  boats  and  the  fast-sailing  ships  being  now  also  moored 
there.     And  in  con?iequenco  of  this,  it  was  chiefly  at  that  timo 

*  I.  €,,  tho  lesser  port,  μ  it  was  called,  to  distinguish  it  (torn  tho  greater, 
in  which  tho  Athenian  fleet  now  lay. 


462  THUCYDIDES.  VIL  [v.,tl 

that  the  wasting  of  the  crews  first  began.  For  as  they  had  but  a 
scanty  supply  of  water,  and  that  not  close  at  hand ;  and,  more- 
over, as  the  sailors  from  time  to  time  went  out  to  gather  fire- 
wood, they  were  cut  ofi'  by  the  Syracusan  horse,  which  had  the 
command  of  the  country.  For  a  third  part  of  their  cavalry 
had  been  posted  by  the  Syracusans  in  the  small  town  in  the 
Olympieum,  witli  an  eye  to  the  troops  on  Flemyrium,  to  pre- 
vent tJbeir  marching  out  to  commit  ratages.  Meanwhile  Niciaa 
learned  that  the  rest  of  the  Corinthian  ships  also  were  sailin<]^ 
to  the  island,  and  sent  twenty  vessels  to  watch  for  them,  with 
orders  to  bo  on  the  look-out  for  them  about  Locri,  Khegiuni, 
and  the  approaches  to  Sicily. 

6.  GylippuR,  on  the  other  hand,  Avas  at  once  building  the  >vall 
across  Epipolic — making  use  of  the  stones  which  the  Athenians 
before  had  thrown  down  along  the  lino  for  their  own  use — and 
leading  out  continually  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  aiul 
drawing  them  up  before  the  works ;  while  the  Athenians  fonn• 
ed  their  line  against  them.  When  Gylippus  thought  it  a  fa- 
vorablo  o])portunity,  ho  commenced  the  attack ;  and,  haviui^ 
closed  in  battle,  they  fought  in  the  space  between  tlio  works, 
where  the  cavalry  of  tho  Syracusans  was  of  no  use.  Λ\Ίκ•η 
the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  had  been  thus  defeated,  and 
had  taken  up  their  dead  under  truce,  and  after  the  Athenians 
had  erected  a  troj)hy,  Gylippus  called  his  army  together,  and 
said,  that  "the  fault  was  not  theirs,  but  his  own;  for  ho  had 
deprived  them  of  tho  benefit  of  their  cavalry  and  dart-men  hy 
his  arrangements  for  the  battle,  which  he  had  made  too  far 
within  tho  works :  wherefore  ho  would  now  lead  them  again 
to  the  charge.  And  ho  begged  them  to  make  up  their  minils 
to  this  view  of  the  case — that  they  would  not  have  the  worse, 
as  regarded  forces,  and  thai  with  respect  to  resolution,  it  would 
bo  intolerable  if  they  should  not  determine,  Peloponnesians  and 
Dorians  as  they  were,  to  get  tho  better  of  lonians,  and  islanders, 
and  a  mixed  rabblo  of  men,  and  to  drive  them  out  of  their 
country. 

0.  After  this,  >vhcn  a  favorable  opportunity  presented  it- 
self, ho  led  them  a  second  time  against  tho  enemy.  Now 
Nicias  and  the  Athenians  thought,  that  even  if  the  Syracusans 
should  not  wish  to  commence  an  engagement,  it  was  necessary 
for  themselves  not  to  permit  their  wall  to  be  carried  past  their 
own  :  for  by  this  time  the  enemy's  work  had  all  but  passed  tho 


i' 


vil]  TnUCYDIDES.  VII.  463 

tunnination  of  tlio  Athenian  lines;  and  if  it  went  on  any  fur- 
ther, it  Avas  at  once  all  the  same  to  them,  ΛνΙιβΙΙιοΓ  they  were 
rontinually  fifj^htinc^  and  victorious,  or  did  not  fight  at  all ;  and 
therefore  they  advanced  to  meet  the  Syracusans.  Gylippus 
led  his  Ijeavy-armcd  further  beyond  the  fortifications  of  the 
two  parties  than  before,  and  so  engaged  them,  posting  his  cav- 
jilry  and  dart-men  on  tho  flank  of  the  Athenians,  in  the  open 
space  where  the  works  connected  with  both  Avails  terminated. 
During  tho  battle  tho  cavalry  charged  the  left  wing  of  tho 
Athenians  whioh  Avas  opposed  to  them,  and  routed  it;  and 
in  consequence  of  this  the  rest  of  the  army  also  was  de- 
fi-ated  by  the  Syracusans,  and  driven  within  their  lines.  Tho 
following  night  they  had  time  to  build  up  to  tho  Athenian 
works,  and  to  pass  them ;  so  that  now  they  could  no  longer  bo 
Ftopped  by  tho  enemy,  while  they  deprived  thcrn^  Cven  if  vic- 
torious, of  all  chance  of  investing  tho  city  in  future. 

7.  After  this,  tho  remaining  twelve  vessels  of  tho  Corinth- 
irnis,  Ambraciots,  and  Lcucadians,  having  eluded  tho  observa- 
tion of  tho  Athenian  guard-force,  sailed  into  harbor,  under 
tho  command  of  Erasinides,  a  Corinthian,  and  joined  tho  Syra- 
cusans in  completing  tho  remainder  of  their  works  up  to  the 
crews  wall.'     And  now  Gylippus  went  away  into  tho  r^st  of 

•  ^,ννιτιΊχιηην  rb  Τ,ηιπήν,  κ.  τ.  ?..]  Gollcr  nnd  Bishop  Thirlwall  under- 
stand this  of  tho  completion  of  tho  Syracusan  counter-work,  which  thoy 
siipooso  to  havo  been  before  left  in  an  imperfect  state,  at  some  points 
whcro  tho  position  was  naturally  stronger  than  nt  others,  but  to  havo 
l>ecn  now  carried  to  an  uniform,  height  up  to  tho  Athenian  wall,  hero 
called  τον  εγκαρσίου  τείχους,  as  running  at  right  angles  to  the  counter- 
work. This,  however,  appears  to  bo  an  exceedingly  doubtful  intcrprcta• 
tioo  of  tho  passage,  liko  every  other  that  Las  been  proposed.  For  tho 
supposition  of  tho  counter-work  having  been  left  in  an  imperfect  state  has 
nothing  whatever  to  support  it  in  our  author's  description  of  it  in  tho 
preceding  chapters,  which  would  naturally,  I  think,  lead  one  to  just  tho 
epposito  conclusion.  Nor  docs  tho  description  of  tho  actual  surface  of 
Epipolaj,  as  given  in  Arnold's  Memoir,  mako  it  probable  that  there  would 
bo,  in  tho  course  of  tho  wall,  any  points  of  such  natural  strength  as  to 
havo  encouraged  thorn  to  dispense,  oven  for  a  time,  with  tho  ordinary 
means  of  securing  their  work ;  as  it  docs  not  appear  probablo  that  it 
passed  over  any  of  the  *'  four  decided  slopes  of  rock,"  by  which  alono  the 
'•  gradual  nnd  almost  imporceptiblo  ascent"  is  broken.  And  although 
ίγκάρσιον,  μ  "  a  mere  rolativo  expression,"  might  bo  applied  toeiOier  of 
the  two  works  whose  relative  position  it  describes,  it  is  surely  most  im- 
probablo,  that  after  using  it  as  our  author  undoubtedly,  I  think,  does  in 
nvory  other  pa«isage  with  reference  to  the  work  of  the  Syracusans,  ho 
■hould  in  thie  single  instance  emiJoy  it  in  tho  very  r  ontrary  manner.  On 


454  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  t^L 

Sicily  for  forces,  intending  to  raise  them  both  for  sea  and  land 
service ;  and  at  the  same  time  to  bring  over  any  of  the  cities 
that  was  either  not  hearty  in  the  cause,  or  liad  hitherto  stool 
entirely  aloof  from  the  war.  Other  embassadors  of  the  Syra- 
cusans  and  Corinthians  were  also  sent  to  Lacedoimon  and 
Corinth,  in  order  that  a  fresh  forc-c  might  bo  sent  over  to 
them,  in  whatever  way  might  answer  l)est,  whether  in  mer- 
chantmen, or  boats,  or  anyhow  else:  since  the  Athenians  t<)«> 
were  sending  for  reinforcements.  Moreover,  the  Syracusans 
proceeded  to  man  and  practice  a  fleet,  for  the  j>uqK)so  of 
making  an  attempt  in  tnat  way  also,  and  wqtq  in  other  re- 
spects much  more  full  of  confidence. 

8.  Nicias   observing   this,    and    seeing    that    the   enemy's 
strength  and  their  own  dilliculties  were  every  day  increasin•;, 

thoao  prounds  I  think  that  Arijold's  hypotliesis  is,  on  tho  whole,  more 
j)robablo;  viz.,  that  ho  alludes  to  soino  udditioual  work  carried  out  by 
tho  wholo  forco  of  tho  Syracusans  from  tho  city  wall,  to  join,  and  so 
strengthen,  tho  counter-wall.  Or,  if  this  should  bo  thought  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  in  whieh  tho  counter-wall  is  afterward  described,  eh.  4-*. 
4,  the  joint  operations  hero  spoken  of  may  i)erhaps  refer  nioro  generally 
to  tho  building  of  out-works,  extending  at  intervals  up  to  it ;  CHpecially 
jis  threo  such  πρτοειχϊσματα  aro  actually  uientioned  as  existing  tluro 
(eh.  43,  4),  though  wo  aro  not  expressly  told  when  they  wero  raisctl. 
AVith  regard  to  tho  verb  ξυνετείχισαν  being  used  with  reference  to  tho 
nominative  ai  rijer,  1  can  not  agree  with  Arnold  that  "this  is  not  tlio 
way  in  which  Thueydidcs  commonly  writes ;"  or  suppose,  for  tftift  reason 
at  least,  that  "something  has  dropped  out  of  tho  text."  Tho  other  con- 
clusion mentioned  by  him  seems  much  nioro  probable,  viz.,  ♦*  that  tho 
whole  passage  was  written  carelessly."  Tlicro  would  seem  to  be  no  ab- 
Btract  reason  why  actions  should  not  bo  attributed  to  ships,  which  could 
only  havo  been  performed  by  tho  men  in  them  ;  in  tho  same  way  as  they 
aro  continually  attributed  by  our  author  to  countries,  cities,  etc.  And 
tho  following  passages,  among  others  which  might  bo  quoted,  appear  to 
prove  that  *'  this  w  tho  way  in  which  Thucydides  writes,"  at  least  not 
unfrequently : — I,  IIG.  1,  ίτνχον  yuf}  ai  μίν  (t.  <■.,  τών  veuv)  έπϊ  Καρίης 
ίς  προσκοπ7)ν  τών  Φοινιασών  veuv  οίχόμεναι,  αϊ  (V  έπϊ  Χίου  και  Αισίου 
περιαγγέλλουσαι  βοηθεΐν.  II.  G9.  1,  ίτϊρας  d'  ίί  ΙττΙ  Καριάς  καΐ  Ανκίας 
και  Μελήσανόρον  στρατηγόν,  ύπως  ταντύ  τε  άργχ>ρο?.ογώσι  και  τό  λησηκυν 
τών  ΙΙελοποννησίυν  μή  ίώαιν,  κ.  τ.  ?.  III.  33.  1,  3,  ώόθη  γάρ  νττό  τϊ,ς 
Σαλαμινίας  καϊ  ΙΙαρά?.ου  Ιη  ηερϊ  K?Mpov  ορμών, — αντάγγελοι  cJ'  αντΰν 
Ιδούσαι  Ιν  τι)  Κλύρφ  η  re  ϊ]ύρα?.ος  και  ι)  Σαλαμινία  Ιφραααν.  BloomficlJ 
most  strangely  misrepresents  tho  meaning  both  of  Thucydides  and  of 
Bishop  Thirlwall,  by  giving  in  his  note,  as  tho  translation  of  μίχρί-  fov 
εγκαρσίου  τείχους,  tho  word.s,  '*  beyond  tho  interval  where  tho  two  walla 
converged  toward  each  other;"  which  aro  evidently  intended  by  tho  his- 
torian thus  misquoted  to  bo  explanatory  of  Ιξω  τών  τειχών,  ch.  6.  2. 


IX.-XI.] 


THUOYDIDES.  VII. 


455 


sent,  on  )ns  p'uIo  also,  to  Athens ;  havinir,  indeed,  on  many 
other  occasions  sent  mesRcnijers  at  the  time  of  their  Bcveral 
operations,  but  doing  so  tlien  especially,  l>ecauso  ho  thought 
that  they  were  in  a  perilous  condition,  and  that  unless  those 
at  homo  recalled  them  as  quickly  as  possible,  or  sent  out  no 
small  reinforcement,  there  >vas  no  lio]X)  of  jireservation  for 
them.  Fearing,  however,  that  those  >vho  were  sent  by  him, 
either  through  incapacity  for  speaking,  or  through  being  defi- 
cient in  sense,'  or  from  a  wisli  to  say  something  to  please  tho 
multitu<le,  should  not  report  tho  real  facts  of  tho  case,  ho 
wrote  a  letter,  thinking  that  by  this  means,  more  than  any 
other,  the  Athenians  would  learn  liis  own  sentiments  without 
their  being  at  all  obscured  by  tho  messenger,  and  so  would 
delilxirate  on  tho  true  state  of  tho  case.  Accordingly,  thoso 
whom  lie  sent  departed  with  the  letter  and  all  that  they  wero 
to  say  ;  while  he  himself  attended  to  the  affairs  of  tho  arma- 
ment, l)cing  engaged  now  in  precautionary  measures,  rather 
tlian  in  perils  voluntarily  incurred. 

0.  At  the  close  of  the  same  summer,  Evetion,  an  Athenian 
general,  lifting  in  concert  Avith  Perdiecas  marched  against 
Amphipolis  with  a  numerous  body  of  Thracians,  did  not  tako 
the  city,  but  after  bringing  round  some  triremes  into  the  Stry- 
τηοη,  blockaded  it  from  the  river,  making  his  approaches  from 
IIimer.Tum.     And  tluis  tho  summer  ended. 

10.  Tho  following  winter,  the  messengers  of  Nieias  anived  at 
Athens,  wlierethey  stiled  by  Avord  of  mouth  >vhat  had  been  told 
them,  ans\vered  >vhatever  further  question  any  one  asked,  and 
delivenHl  the  letter;  which  the  secretary  of  st'ito  came  for- 
Avard  and  rca<l  to  the  Athenians,  being  to  the  follow:ing  purport: 

11,  "With  our  former  operations,  Athenians,  you  have 
been  made  acquainted  by  many  other  letters  ;  but  at  present, 
it*  is  especially  seasonable  that  you  should  deliberate  with  a 
knowledge  of  tho  position  wo  aro  in.  When,  then,  wo  had  in 
many  engagements  defeated  the  Syracusans,  against  whom  wo 
were  sent,  and  had  built  tho  walls  in  which  wo  aro  now  lying 
(»ylippu9,  tho  I^cedajmonian,  camo  Avith  an  army  from  tho 
Peloponneso  and  some  of  tho  cities  m  Bicily.    And  though 

'  γνώμης.]  In  corroboration  of  Arnold'e  arj^ument  for  this  reading  in 
preference  Ui  μνήμης,  coraparo  tho  thrco  roquisito  qualiflcatione  of  an  ora- 
tor, mentioned  II.  60. 6,  of  ονδενός  οίομαι  ήσσων^  elvai  yvovat  re  ra  δέοντα 
Htit  Ιρμην^ϋααι  ταντα,  <^ιλ6ηολίς  re  καΐ  χρημάτων  κρείσσων^  κ.  τ,  λ. 


456  THUCYDIDEa  VII.  [χιι.,χια 

in  the  first  battio  ho  was  beaten  by  us,  ia  tho  one  fought  the 
next  day  we  were  driven  from  tho  field  by  numerous  cavalry 
and  dart-men,  and  retired  within  our  walla.  At  present, 
therefore,  wo  have  ceased  Avorking  at  our  lino  of  circuraval- 
lation,  in  consequenco  of  tho  enemy's  numbers,  and  are  lyini^ 
8ti  1 ;  (for  wo  should  not,  indeed,  bo  ablo  to  avail  ourselves 
of  all  our  force,  since  the  guarding  of  our  lines  has  exhaust- 
ed a  considerable  part  of  our  lieavy-armed ;)  while  they,  on 
tho  other  hand,  liavo  carried  post  us  a  single  wall,  so  that 
it  is  uo  longer  possible  to  invest  them,  unless  one  should 
assault  this  counter-work  with  a  •  largo  force,  and  take  it. 
And  the  consequenco  is,  that  we  who  are  thought  to  bo  be- 
sieging others,  are  rather  being  besieged  ourselves,  as  far. as 
operations  by  land  are  concerned  ;  for  wo  can  not  even  go  out 
far  into  the  country  because  of  their  horse. 

12.  "  They  have  also  sent  embassadors  to  tho  Peloponncso 
for  fresh  troops,  and  Gylippus  is  gone  to  the  cities  in  Sicily, 
lo  ju'suado  soino  of  them  which  are  at  present  neutral  to  join 
in  tho  war,  and  to  bring  from  others,  if  he  can  an  additional 
land  force,  as  well  as  naval  armament.  For  they  intend,  as  1 
hear,  at  tho  same  time  to  attempt  our  walls  with  their  army, 
and  to  attack  us  by  sea  with  their  fleet  And  let  none  of  you 
think  it  strange  that  1  say  by  sea  also.  For  although  (as  tho 
enemy  also  are  awiire),  our  lleet  was  at  first  in  fine  condition, 
as  regards  both  the  soundness  of  tho  ships  and  tho  complel»- 
ness  of  their  crews,  yet  now  both  the  ships  aro  leaky,  from 
having  already  been  at  sea  so  long  a  time,  and  tho  crews  havo 
been  wasted ;  it  being  inipossiblo  to  haul  up  and  careen  tho 
vessels,  because  those  of  the  enemy,  being  more  than  equal  in 
number,  aro  continually  causing  expectation  of  their  sailiiii? 
against  us.  For  they  aro  seen  practicing,  and  it  rests  Avith 
them  to  make  tho  attack  [when  they  pleiise]  ;  and  they  havo 
greater  facility  of  careening  their  ships,  since  they  are  not  en- 
gaged in  blockading  others. 

13.  "Wo  on  tho  other  hand,  could  scarcely  enjoy  this  a<l- 
vanta^e,  though  with  a  great  superabundanco  of  ships,  anJ 
though  wo  were  not  compelled,  as  at  present,  to  keep  guard  with 
all  of  them.  For  if  we  relax  our  watching  even  in  a  slight 
denrree,  wo  shall  havo  no  provisions ;  since  even  now  we  iinil 
«HiHculty  in  bringing  them  in  past  their  city.  On  this  account 
our  crews  have  been  \vasted  and  arc  still  wasting;  as  some  of 


xirj-  THUCYDIDE3  Til.  457 

our  seamen,  in  consequence  of  their  fetchinn^  woo<J,  of  foracrinsr» 
and  of  distint  watering,  are  cut  off  by  their  cavalry ;  >vhiio 
our  servants,  since  we  have  been  reduced  to  an  equal  footing 
desert  from  us,  and  tlioso  of  tlic  foreigners  who  went  on  board 
as  pressed  men  straightway  depart  to  the  several  cities;  while 
lliose,  again,  who  >vere  at  first  elated  by  the  high  pay,  and 
supposed  that  they  Averc  going  to  make  nioncy,  rather  tlian  to 
fight,  since  they  have  unexpectedly  seen  both  the  fleet  and 
every  thing  else  on  the  side  of  the  enemy  oflering  resi stance 
to  us,  either  leave  us  on  finding  some  excuse  for  going  over 
to  the  enemy,  or  in  whatever  way  they  severally  can  (and 
Sicily  is  a  larg(!  country)  ;'  while  in  some  instances,  by  engaging 
ia  traflic  themselves,  after  persuading  the  captains  to  take 
Hyccarian  slaves  on  board  in  their  stead,  they  have  destroyed 
the  perfection  of  our  navy. 

14.  "For  you,  to  whom  I  ain  writing  know  that  the  flower 
of  a  crew  is  limited  in  number,'  and  that  there  are  but  few  sea- 
men who  will  get  a  ship  under  weigh,  or  keep  the  rowing  in 
litno.  But  the  most  distressing  of  all  theso  things  is,  that  I, 
I  heir  general,  have  no  power  to  put  η  stop  to  these  abuses 
(for  your  tempers  are  difficult  to  command),  and  that  we  have 
no  means  of  recruiting  our  ships'  crews  (which  the  enemy  can 
Ίο  from  many  quarters),  but  both  Avhat  is  kept^  and  >vhat  is 
<  xpended,  must  bo  taken  from  what  wo  brought  with  us.  For 
the  cities  which  are  at  present  in  alliance  with  us,  namely, 
Naxos  and  Catnna,  are  powerless.  If,  indeed,  one  additional 
iidvantago  be  still  gained  by  the  enemy,  I  mean,  that  tho 
jilaces  in  Italy  which  supply  us  with  food,  seeing  the  con- 
«lit ion  wo  aro  in,  and  in  case  of  your  not  reinforcing  us,  go 
"ver  to  the  enemy,  tho  war  will  be  brought  to  a  conclusion  by 
thom  without  a  single  battle,  through  our  being  starved  out.*  I 
miorht,  it  is  true,  havo  had  more  agreeable  things  than  these  to 
wnUi  to  you,  but  nono  more  useful,  if  it  is  necessary. for  you 

'  And,  thcrororc,  as  ho  implies,  ••  thoro  were  so  many  points  of  rcfugo 
npon  to  tRom  that  their  cscrvpo  was  easily  eiTcctod."    See  Arnold's  note. 

•  art  βρηχΐΐα  άκμί)  ιτ1ηρύματος,'\  Or,  as  others  take  it,  "tha  thebloon) 
•f  A  crew  is  but  of  brief  duration."  But  that  statement,  has  been  ab 
r•  ady  made  in  tho  procodinpf  chapter,  see.  3  ;  and  the  words  which  fol- 
i"w  ΛΓθ  Qvidontly  intondod  to  explain  this.oxprcssion. 

'  (κηοΙιηρκηΟη'Πύν.]  Literally,  "compelled  to  surrender;"  but  tho 

-rrec^nrss  of  Arnold's  version,  which  I  havo  adopted,  Booms  proved  by 
ilio  puesago  quoted  by  him  from  I.  134.  2,  ^ιιτολιίφκηοαν  λφψ, 

ft 


458  THUOYDIDES.  VII.  [tv.-xvii, 

to  deliberate  with  α  clear  knowledge  of  affaire  Iuto.  And  bo- 
sides,  knowiug  as  I  do  your  temper,  that  you  wish,  indecil,  to 
receive  the  most  pleasing  statement,  but  tiud  fault  at'terward, 
should  any  thing  in  consequence  of  them  turn  out  different 
to  what  you  expected,  I  thought  it  siifer  to  lay  the  truth  be- 
fore you. 

15.  "And  now  be   assured  of  this,  that  for  the  business  on 
Avhich  wo  first  came  here,  neither  your  troops  nor  your  gen- 
erals have  become  in^ulequate  :  but  since  the  whole  of  Sicily  is 
being  united  together,  and  a  fresh   force  is  ex|)ected  by  them 
from  the  Peloponnese,  you  must  now  delil>erate  with  a  convic- 
tion that  your  troops  are  not  a  match   even  for  their  present 
enemies,  but  that  you  must  either  recall  these,  or  send  in  ad- 
dition to  them  another  armament  not  less  numerous,  both  mili- 
tary and  naval,  and  no  small  sum  of  money,  as  well  as  souiu      I 
one  to  succeed  me,  since  I  am  unable  to  remain  at  my  post  ia      i 
consequence  of  a  nephritic  disease.     And  I  think  that  I  may 
claim  some  consideration  at  your  hands;  for  when  1  >vas  in 
health,  I  did  you  much  service  durinir  the  j>eriods  of  my  com-      ■ 
mand.     liut  whatever  you  mean  t<;  do,  do  it  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  spring,  and  without  /uiy  delay;  since  the  enemy      ) 
>vill  in  a  short  time  provide  themselves  with  the  succors  from      I 
Sicily,  and  though  not  so  quickly  with  those   from  the  ΓοΙυ-      ♦ 
ponuese,  yet  if  you  do  not  pay  attention  to  them,  in  some  re-      | 
spects  they  will  elude  your  observation,  as  before,  and  in  others     I 
>vill  anticipate  you."  | 

IG.  Such  was  the  jmrport  of  Nicias's  letter.    The  Athenians,      f 
after  hearing  it,  did  not  allow   him  to  resign  his  command,  but     f 
till  the  arrival  of  others   who  were  elected  as  his  colleagues, 
they  joined  with  him  two  of  those  who  were  there  on  the  spot,      ' 
Menander  and  Euthydemus,  that  he  might  not  in  his  ilhies>j 
bear  the   labor  alone ;   while  at   the  same  time  they  voted  to 
send  fresh  forces,  both  naval  and  military,  composed  of  Athen- 
ians on  the  muster-roll,  and  of  their  allies.     Tliey  also  elected 
as  his  colleagues,  Demosthenes  son  of  Alcisthenes,  and  Eurjv 
medon   son  of  Thucles ;  the  latter  of  whom  they  dispatched 
to   Sicily   immediately,   about  the   winter  solstice,   with  ten 
ships,  a  Imndred  and  twenty  talents  of  silver,  and  orders  to 
tell  tlie  troops  there  that  succors  would  come  to  them,  and 
that  attention  would  be  paid  to  their  interests.  ι 

17.  Demosthenes,  in  the  mean  time,  staid  behind,  and  maJc 


xriii.]  TntJCYDIDES.  VII.  459 

preparations  for  tho  expedition,  intending  i^  start  as  soon 
jis  it  was  spring  ;  while  he  sent  tho  allies  word  to  levy  troops, 
and  i^ot  ready  at  home  money,  ships,  and  heavy-armed.  Tho 
Athenians  also  sent  twenty  ships  to  cruise  round  tho  Pelo- 
])onnese,  and  to  keep  guard  that  none  might  cross  over  from 
Corinth  and  tho  Peloponncsc  to  Sicily.  For  the  Corinthians, 
after  tho  embassadors  canio  to  them,  and  brought  a  more  fa- 
vorable report  of  affairs  in  Sicily,  thinking  that  they  had  not 
been  unseasonable  in  sending  their  former  squadron,  wcro 
now  much  more  enco\iraged,  and  ]irepared,  on  their  imrf,  to 
dispatch  heavy-armed  troops  for  Sicily  in  vessels  of  burden, 
as  the  Lacedaemonians  did  likewise  from  tho  rest  of  tho  Pelc- 
ponnoso.  Tho  Corinthians  manned  also  five  and  twenty  tri• 
ronies,  to  try  tho  result  of  a  battlo  with  the  squadron  keeping 
Avatch  at  Naupactus,  and  that  tho  Athenians  there  might  bo 
lesii  able  to  prevent  their  transports  from  putting  out,  having 
to  keep  an  eye  upon  tho  Corinthian  line  of  triremes  drawn  up 
against  them. 

18.  Tho  Lacedaemonians  prepared,  too,  for  the  invasion  of 
Attica,  both  in  accordaco  with  their  own  previous  resolution, 
and  at  tho  instigation  of  tho  Syracusans  and  Corinthians, 
since  they  had  heard  of  tho  reinforcements  about  to  bo  sent 
from  Athens  to  Sicily ;  that  they  might  be  stopped  by  an  in- 
«iirsion  being  made  into  tho  country.  Alcibiades  also  kept 
urgently  advising  them  to  fortify  Decelea,  and  not  to  let  tho 
war  rest.  But  most  of  all  had  they  gained  confidence,  be- 
♦  auso  they  thought  that  the  Athenians,  being  engaged  in  a 
twofold  wat  with  both  themsolvos  and  tho  Siceliots,  would 
bo  moro  easily  subdued;  and  also  because  they  considered 
them  to  have  first  broken  the  truce.  For  in  the  former  coursa 
<tf  hostilities  they  thought  tho  guilt  lay  more  on  their  own 
siile,  both  because  tho  Thcbans  had  entered  Plataca  during  a 
time  of  triice ;  and  because,  when  it  had  been  specified  in 
tho  former  treaty,  that  none  should  tako  up  arms  against 
others,  if  they  were  willing  to  submit  to  a  judicial  decision, 
they  tliemselves  had  not  listened  to  the  Athenians  when  ap- 
pealing to  such  a  decision.  On  which  account  they  considered 
that  they  were  justly  unsuccessful,  and  made  both  their  mis- 
fortune at  Pylus,  and  whatever  other  might  havo  befallen 
them,  a  subject  of  serious  reflection.'  But  when  tho  Athenians 
*  Or, '"of  religious  8cruplc,"^s  In  somo  oilier  pftssagcai 


460  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  (nx. 

had  set  out  from  Argos  with  those  thirty  ships,  and  ravaged  a 
part  of  Kpidaurus,  Prasiae,  and  some  other  places,  at  the  same 
time  that  they  were  also  spreading  devastation  from  Pylus•/ 
and  when  they  refused  to  intrust  the  matter  to  arbitration, 
though  the  Lacedaemonians  as  often  ns  differences  had  arisen 
concerning  any  of  the  debatable  points  in  the  treaty,  appealed  to 
a  judicial  decision ;  then,  indeed,  the  Lacedicmonians  thought 
that  the  violation  of  the  law,  which  in  tlie  former  instance  had 
been  committed  by  themselves,  had  now,  «gain,  come  in  the 
same  way  to  attach  to  the  Athenians,  and  thoy  were,  therefi)r(', 
eager  for  hostilitios.  Accordingly,  during  this  winter  they 
sent  round  to  their  allies  orders  for  iron,  and  were  getting  all 
the  tools  ready  fur  building  their  fort.  At  tlio  same  time  they 
were  tliemselves  raising  8upj)liea,  and  compelling  the  rest  of 
the  Peloponncsians  to  do  so,  with  a  view  to  dispatching  in  the 
merchantmen  succors  to  those  in  Sicily.  And  so  the  winter 
ended,  and  the  eighteenth  year  of  this  war,  of  >vhich  Thucydidos 
wrote  the  history. 

19.  The  following  spring,  at  its  very  commencement,  the 
Lacedaimonians  and  their  allies  made  a  very  early  incursion 
into  Attica,  under  the  command  of  Agis  son  of  Archidiunus. 
king  of  the  Lacedajmoniana.  In  the  first  place,  then,  they  rav- 
aged the  parts  of  the  country  about  the  plain,  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  fortify  Decelca,  dividing  the  work  among  the  con- 
tingents of  the  ditferent  states.  The  place  is  distant  from  the 
city  of  Athens  about  a  liundred  and  twenty  stades,  and  about 
the  same,  or  not  much  more,  from  l^oeotia.  Now  the  fortress 
was  raised  for  the  annoyan(;o  of  the  plain  an<l  the  richest  part» 
of  the  country,  l>eing  visible  as  far  as  Athens.  Thus,  then, 
the  IVloponnesians  in  Attica,  and  their  allies,  were  engagini 
with  their  building.  Those  in  the  Peloponnese,  about  the 
same  time,  Avore  sending  off  their  heavy-armed  troops  to 
Sicily  in  tlie  merchantmen,  the  Lacechemonians  having  pick- 
ed for  the  purpose  the  best  of  the  Helots  and  Neoilamodes, 

'  l?.}jaTevovT().]  Or,  as  Arnold  renders  it,  "they,  tho  Lacedaimoniauii, 
were  continually  being  plundered  ;"  referring  to  V.  14.  2,  /.ηστη'ομένης  τϊ,ς 
χύ(ίας  ίκ  της  Πΰλοι-.  Ρορρο  prefers  tho  activo  sense,  and  is  inclined  to 
admit  ίλήατευον,  as  Becker  has  done  on  tho  autliority  of  ono  MS.,  tho 
middlo  form  not  being  used  elsewhere.  As  both  tho  preceding  and  fol- 
lowing verbs  refer  to  tho  Athenians,  tho  change  of  subject  is  certainly 
very  harsh,  \ΐ  ί'ληατΐνυντο  bo  referred  to  the  Lacedaimonians;  even  nion» 
βά,  I  think,  than  in  that  remarkable  instanco  which  occurs  II.  3.  3. 


XX.,  XXI.]  TnUCYDIDES.  VII.  401 

nmountini?  both  toi^ethcr  to  Bcvon  hundred,  with  Eccritus,  a 
Spartan,  in  conimand  of  thcni,  and  tlio  IJoeotiana,  three  hun- 
dred lieavy-arined,  under  the  command  of  Xeno  and  Nico,  Thc- 
hansi,  and  llojjosiuider,  α  Thespian.  These  started  among 
ihe  first  from  taenarus,  in  Laconia,  and  put  out  into  the  open 
sea.  Not  long  after  them,  the  Corinthians  dispatched  five  Imn- 
dred  hcavv-armod,  some  from  Corinth  itself,  and  some  hired 
from  Arcadia  besides,  having  appointed  Alexander  a  Cor- 
inthian to  the  command  of  them,  Tho  Sicyonians  also  sent 
off,  at  tho  same  time  Λνΐίΐι  tho  Corinthians,  tvo  hundred  heavy- 
armed  under  the  command  of  Sargeus,  a  Sicyonian.  Tn  the 
moan  time  the  five  and  twenty  ships  of  the  Corinthians,  which 
had  been  manned  in  tho  >vinter,  were  stationed  in  opposition 
to  the  twenty  Athenian  vessels  at  Naupactus,  till  they  had  got 
these  heavy-armed  on  board  the  merchantmen  out  to  sea :  for 
which  purpose,  indeed,  they  had  been  originally  manned,  that 
tlie  Athenians  might  not  attend  to  tho  merchantmen  so  much 
iw  to  thci  triremes. 

20.  Meanwhile  tho  Athenians,  at  tho  time  of  tho  fortifica- 
tion of  Decelea,  and  at  tho  very  commencement  of  tho  spring, 
Kent  thirty  ships  to  cruise  round  tho  Peloponnese,  under  tho 
command  of  Chariclea  son  of  Apollodorus,  >vho  was  ordered 
to  go  to  Argos  also,  and  call  for  a  contingent  of  their  lieavy- 
nrined  to  go  on  board,  .iccording  to  tho  terms  of  their  alliance. 
I  >emosthenes,  too,  they  dispatched  to  Sicily,  as  they  had  in- 
tended, with  sixty  Athenian  ships,  and  five  Chian,  twelve  him- 
dred  Atlienian  heavy-armed  from  the  muster-roll,  and  as  many 
islanders  as  they  could  possibly  raiso  from  the  several  places ; 
λυΙπΙο  they  also  supplied  themselves  from  the  other  subject  allies 
with  whatever  they  could  get  in  any  quarter  that  %vould  be  of 
service  for  the  war.  Moreover,  he  was  instructed,  as  he  sailed 
round,  to  join  Charicles  first  in  his  military  measures  on  tho 
coast  of  Laconia.  So  Demosthenes,  after  sailing  to  ^gina, 
waited  for  any  part  of  tho  armament  that  might  have  hecn 
left  behind,  as  well  as  for  Charicles  to  fetch  tho  Argivo  troops, 

21.  In  Sicily,  about  tho  same  pcrio^l  o^  this  spring,  Gylip- 
])us  camo  to  Syracuse,  bringing  from  tho  cities  which  ho  had 
persuaded  to  join  Inm  as  largo  a  number  of  troops  as  ho  re- 
spectively could.  And  now,  having  called  the  Syracusans  to- 
gether, ho  said  that  they  ought  to  man  as  many  ships  as  pos- 
sible, and  try   tho    oxperimont   of  a  sea-fight;  for  that  bo 


462  THUCYDIDES.  ΥΠ.  [xiit 

hoped  to  produco  thereby  a  result  wortli  the  risk,  toward  the 
issue   of  the   war.    Ilermocrut^s,   too,   most  earnestly  ioined 
him  in  trying  to  persuade  theiii,  in  order  that  they  might  not 
want  courage  for  attacking  the  Athenians  by  sea;  observing, 
*'  that  that  people  hail  no  more  than  themselves  enjoyed  an 
hereditary  and  perpetual  experience  at  sea,  but  had  become  a 
naval  power  after  being,  even  more  than  the  Syracusans,  an 
inland  one ;  and  only  because  they  were  compelled  to  do  so  hy 
the  Medes.     And  to  men  of  a  daring  character  like  the  Athe- 
nians, those  who  were  daring  in  opposition  to  them  would  ap- 
pear most  formidable :  for  the  terror  with  which  that  peoj)lu 
paralyzed  their  enemies,  not,  iu  some  cases,  by  being  8U})erior  , 
to  them  in  power,  but  by  atta-^'king  them  with  confidence, 
they^^  too,  would  in  the  same  way  strike  into  their  opponents. 
And  he  was  well  assuretl,  ho  said,  that  the  Syracusans,  by.uii- 
expectedly  daring  to  otier  resistance  to  the  navy  of  the  Athe- 
nians, >vould  in  a  greater  degree  gain  advantage  from   the 
surprise  of  the  enemy  on  that  account,  than  the  Athenians  hy 
their  skill  would  harm  tho  unskillful  Syracusans.     Ho  urge^l 
them  therefore  to  proceel  to  the  trial  with  their  tleel,  and  not 
to  shrink  from   it."     Aci'ordingly  the  Syracusiuis,  at  the  per- 
suasion   of  (iylippus,   Ilermocrates,   and   whoever  else  joinel 
them,  resolved  on  the  sea-fight,  and  proceeded  to  man  their  ships. 
22.  When  Gylippus  had  prepared  the  fleet  for  action,  he 
took  the  whole  army  under  cover  of  the  night,  and  Inmselt' in- 
tended to  assault  by  land  the  forts  on  riemyrium,  >vhile  at  tho 
same  time,  according  to  agreement,   thirty-five  of  the  Syr:.- 
cusan   triremes  sailed  to  the  attack  from  the   great  harbor, 
and  forty-five  sailed  round  from  the  lesser,  >vhero  their  arse- 
nal   was  situated ;    Avishing  to  efie(it   a   junction   with  those 
within,  and  at  the  same  time  to  sail  against  Plemyriuni,  in 
order  that  the  enemy  might  be  disconcerted  by  an  attack  on 
both  sides.     The  Athenians,  on  the  other  hand,  having  with 
all   speed  manned  sixty  ships  to  oppose  them,  with  five  and 
twenty  of  them  engaged   the  five  and  thirty  of  the  Syracusans 
that  were  in  the  great  harbor,  and  with   the  remain<ler  Avent 
to  meet  those  that  were  sailing  round  from  the  arsenal.     Thus 
they  immediately  entered  into  action  before  the  mouth  of  the 

»  Kttl  ocpur,  K,  T.  ?.]  Or,  ''  they"  (».  e.,  tlio  Athenians)  "  would  thitn• 
solros  also  bo  subject  to  btforo  thoir  enemies;"  Bupposiuir,  us  l^ubrce 
.  does,  that  o^uc  is  hero  equivalent  to  άντυνς  ίκεϊνυνς. 


xxiir.,  xjnv.]  TnUCTDIDES.    VII.  4G3 

preat  harbor,  and  for  λ  loncj  time  resisted  each  other,  the  one 
side  Avishini^  to  force  an  entrance,  the  other  hcmrr  anxious  to 
j>revent  them. 

23.  In  the  mean  time  (iylippus,  when  the  Athenians  in 
Plemyrinm  had  gone  down  to  the  sea,  and  weVo  payinjy  atten- 
tion to  tlio  naval  engagement,  surprised  them  by  suddenly  at 
tl:iybreak  assaulting  the  forts,  of  which  he  took  tho  largest 
lirst,  and  then  the  other  two;  their  garrisons  not  having 
awaited  his  attack,  Avhen  they  saw  the  largest  easily  carried. 
From  tho  first  that  Avas  taken  tho  men  escaped  with  difficulty 
to  their  camp,  as  many  of  them  as  took  refuge  in  their  boats 
and  merchantmen  ;  for  as  the  Svracusans  were  getting  tho 
lM?tter  in  tho  engagement  with  tlioir  ships  in  the  great  har- 
bor, tho  fugitives  were  chased  by  one  trireme,  and  that  a  fast 
sailer;  but  when  tho  other  two  forts  were  taken,  at  that  timo 
the  Syracusans,  in  their  turn,  were  now  being  beaten,  and  so 
those  who  were  Hying  out  of  tho  forts  sailed  along  shore  Λvi(h 
greater  ease.  For  the  Syracusan  ships  that  were  fighting  be- 
fore tho  mouth  of  tho  harbor,  having  forced  their  way 
through  those  of  tho  Athenians,  sailed  in  without  any  order, 
atid  l>eing  entangled  with  ouo  another,  transferred  the  victory 
to  the  Athenians ;  who  routed  both  these,  and  thoso  by  which 
they  were  at  first  being  defeated  in  tho  harbor.  They  also 
sank  eleven  of  the  8yracusan  ships,  killing  most  of  tho  men 
on  board  of  them,  exce]>ting  thoso  whom  tliey  took  prisoners 
from  three  vessels ;  while  on  their  own  side  three  ships  were 
lost.  After  liauliiig  up  the  Λvreck8  of  tho  Syracusans,  and 
creeling  a  trophy  on  tho  small  island  in  front  of  Plemyrium, 
they  withdrew  to  their  own  encampment. 

•24.  I5ut  although  tho  Syracusans  had  thus  fared  with  re- 
gard to  tho  sea-figlit,  they  were  still  in  possession  of  tho  threo 
forts  on  Plemyrium,  and  erected  three  trophies  for  them  One 
of  tho  two  forts  last  taken  they  razed,  but  tho  other  two  they 
repaired,  and  held  with  garrisons.  In  the  capture  of  tho  forts 
many  men  were  killed,  and  many  made  prisoners,  and  a.  largo 
amount  of  property  in  all  was  taken :  for  inasmuch  as  tho 
Athenians  used  them  as  a  magazine,  there  was  in  them  much 
property  and  corn  belonging  to  merchants,  and  much  also  bo- 
longing  to  trierarchs,  since  there  were  taken  in  them,  besides 
other  things,  masts  for  forty  triremes,  with  the  rest  of  their 
equipments,  and  also  three  triremes  which  had  been  drawn  up 


464  THUOYDIDES.  Vll.  Γχχτ.  % 

Ι 
on  shore.    Indeed,  what  most  and  principally  ruined  the  army  I 

of  the  Athenians  waa  the  taking  of  Plemyriura;  since  evei  I 

the  entrance  into  tlio  liarbor  was  no  longer  secure  foi  carry-  | 

ing  in  provisions :  (tor  the  Syracusana,  blockading  them  at  I 

that  point  with  their  vessels,  prevented  it,  and  their  getting  J 

them  in  was  now  always  etiected  by  battle) ;  and  in  othei  re•  l 

epecte  it  struck  consternation  and  dismay  into  their  forces. 

25.  After  this,  the  Syracusans  sent  out  twelve  ships,  with 
Agiitharchus,  a  Syracusan,  on  board  of  them  as  commandoi.  ,. 

One  of  these  went  to  the  Peloponnesee,  carrying  embassadors,  I 

both  to  tell  of  their  own  affairs,  "  of  the  hoj)es  they  were  full  |: 

ofi  and  to  excite  them  to  the  still  more  vigorous  prosecution  | 

of  the  war  in  those  parts.     The  other  eleven  ships  sailed  to  | 

Italy,  hearing  that  some  vessels  laden  with  treasure  were  on  V- 

their  way  to  the  Athenians.     Having  fallen  in  with  tliese  vcs-  % 

Bcls,  they  destroyed  most  of  their  contents,  and  burned  a  quan-  ? 

tity  of  timber  in  the  Caulonian  territory,  which  had  been  got 
ready  ibr  the  Athe7iians.  After  this  they  came  to  Locri,  and 
while  lying  at  anchor  there,  one  of  the  merchantmen  from  the 
Peloponnese  put  in  to  shore,  carrying  a  heavy-armed  band  of  ■. 

Thespians.     Having  taken  these  on  l)()ard  their  ships,  the  Sy-  | 

racusans  coasted   on    homeward.     The  Athenians,  with  their  f 

twenty  vessels   at   Megju-a,   being  on  the   look-out  for  them,  | 

took  one  ship  with  its  crew  ;  the  rest  they  could  not  overtake,  ■ 

but  they  escaped  from  them  to  Syracuse.  There  was  also 
somti  skirmishing   in    the   harbor  about  the  piles  which   the  i 

Hyracusans  had  xJriven  in  the  sea  in  front  of  the  old  docks,  in 
order  that  their  ships  might  lie  at  anchor  within  tliem,  and 
the  Athenians  might  not  sail  against  them,  and  injure  them  by 
their  charge.  For  the  Atheniarw  having  brought  up  to  them 
a  ship  of  ten  thousand  talents  burden,  carrying  wooder  towers 
and  screens,  from  their  boats  fastened  roj^es  round  the  piles, 
and  raised  them  with  windlasses,  and  tore  them  up,  or,  diving 
down,  sawed  them  in  two.     The  Syracusans  plied  their  mis-  ■ 

siles  on  them  from  the  docks,  and  the  men  on  the  ship  of  bur-  l 

den   discharged  tlu'irs    in  return ;  and  at  last  the  Athenians  t 

removed  the  greater  part  of  the  j)iles.     But  the  most  dangerous  \ 

part  of  the  stockade  wjis  that  out  of  sight :  tov  there  were  some  I 

of  the  piles  which  they  drove  that  did  not  rise  above  the  sur- 
fiice  of  the  sea,  so  that  it  was  dangerous  to  approach,  lest  any 
one,  through  not  seeing  them  beforehand,  might  strike  hia  ship  I 


XXVI.,  XXVII.]  THUOYDIDES.  ΤΙΓ.  465 

on  them,  as  on  a  sunken  rock.  But  even  in  the  case  of  these, 
divers  >vent  down  and  sawed  them  off  for  a  reward ;  but  the 
Syracusans  made,  notwithstanding,  a  fresh  stockade.  Many- 
other  also  were  the  contrivances  whicli  they  employed  against 
one  another,  as  was  natural  with  the  armaments  l^ingnear,  and 
opposed  to,  each  other ;  and  they  were  engaged  in  skirmishes, 
and  attempts  of  every  kind.  The  Syracusans  also  sent  to  the 
cities  embassies  composed  of  Corinthians,  Ambraciots,  and 
Lacedaimoniana,  with  tidings  of  the  capture  of  Plemyrium, 
and  to  state,  with  regard  to  the  sea-fight,  that  it  was  not  so 
much  by  the  power  of  the  enemy  as  by  their  own  confusion 
that  they  had  been  beaten ;  while,  in  other  respects,  they  ΛveΓo 
to  inform  them  that  they  were  in  good  liope,  and  to  call  upon 
them  to  come  to  their  aid,  both  with  ships  and  troops,  as  the' 
Athenians  also  were  expected  Avith  a  fresh  force,  and  if  they 
could  but  destroy  their  present  armament  before  it  came,  there 
Avould  bo  an  end  to  the  war.  The  parties  in  Sicily,  then,  were 
thus  engaged. 

20.  Demosthenes,  on  the  other  liand,  Avhen  the  armament 
had  been  collected  by  him  with  which  ho  was  to  sail  to  Sicily 
to  the  aid  of  the  force  there,  having  put  to  sea  from  ^;;ina 
and  sailed  to  the  Peloponnese,  joined  Charicles  and  the  thirty 
Fhips  of  the  Athenians.  After  receiving  the  heavy-arme»! 
troops  of  the  Argives  on  board  their  sliips,  they  sailed  to  Lr.- 
conia,  and  in  the  first  place  ravaged  a  part  of  Epidaurus 
Limera.  UTien,  landing  on  the  coast  of  Laconia,  opposite 
Cythera,  where  stands  the  Temple  of  Apollo,  they  fortified  a 
certain  place  in  the  form  of  an  isthmus,  in  order  that  the 
Lacedasmonian  Helots  might  desert  to  them  there,  and  at  tho 
samo  time  foraging  parties  might  make  incursions  from  it,  as 
from  Pylus.  And  now,  immediately  after  assisting  to  occupy 
this  spot,  Demosthenes  sailed  on  for  Corcyra,  that  ho  might 
take  up  some  of  the  allies  there  also,  and  proceed  as  ouickly  as 
jwssiblo  on  liis  voyage  to  Sicily.  Charicles,  on  tho  otfier  hand, 
Avaited  until  ho  had  entirely  fortified  the  place  ;  when,  having 
left  a  garrison  there,  ho,  too,  afterward  returned  homo  with  Iiie 
thirty  ships,  and  tho  Argives  at  tho  same  time. 

27.  There  came  also  to  Athens  this  same  summer,  to  servo 

as  targeteers,  a  body  of  Thracians  who  carry  swords,  of  ilio 

tribe  of  the  Dii,  thirteen  hundred  in  numlxir,  who ,  were  to 

have  sailed  to  Sicily  with  Demosthenes ;  but  as  they  had  coma 

•  20* 


4ae  THUOYDIDE&  VIL  [χζτιη. 

too  late,  tho  Athoniane  detcrminod  to  Bend  thorn  back  again  to 
Thraco,  tho  country  they  had  come  from,  as  it  econicd  too  ex• 
pt'U&ivo  to  keep  tliem  for  tho  war  carried  on  from  Decelea, 
since  each  of  them  received  a  dnichma  a  day.  For  since  De- 
celea had  been  first  fortified  by  the  Λνΐιοΐο  Peloponnesian  army 
during  this  summer,  and  afterward  was  occupied  for  tho  an- 
noyance of  tho  country  by  ju^amsons  coming  from  the  states  at 
successive  periods,  it  greatly- injured  tho  Athenians,  and  was 
among  tho  principal  things  that  ruined  their  inwrcsts,  both 
by  tho  destruction  of  property  and  tho  loss  of  men.  For  pre- 
viously tho  invasions  >vero  but  of  brief  duration,  and  did  not 
prevent  their  enjoying  their  territory  at  other  times  ;  but  then, 
Avhen  tho  enemy  >vere  continually  stationed  there  for  their  an- 
noyance, and  sometimes  attacked  them  with  a  more  numerous 
force,  while  at  other  times  tho  regular  garrison  of  necessity' 
mado  incursions  on  the  land,  and  forayed  it,  Agis,  the  La- 
cedajmonian  king,  being  also  present  (who  mado  no  by-work 
of  the  war),  tho  Athenians  sutVered  severely  in  consequence ; 
for  they  λυογο  deprived  of  their  λυΙιοΙο  country,  and  more  than 
twenty  thousand  slaves  had  deserted,  a  great  ]>art  of  them  being 
artisans ;  and  all  their  sheep  and  beasts  of  burden  were  lost. 
Their  horses  illso,  as  the  cavalry  were  daily  on  the  move,  mak- 
ing excursions  to  Decelea  and  keeping  guard  in  tho  country, 
were  either  lamed  by  being  worked  on  rocky  ground,  and  that 
continually,  or  were  disabled  by  wounds. 

28.  Tho  conveyance  also  of  provisions  from  Euboea,  which 
was  before  efi'ected  more  quiekly  by  land  from  Oropus,  through 
Decelea,  was  now  carried  on  with  great  expense  by  sea,  round 
Sunium.  Indeed  tho  city  re(|uired  every  thing  alike  to  bo 
imported ;  and  instead  of  being  a  city,  it  was  reduced  to  a 
garrison.  For  tho  Athenians  were  harassed  by  keeping  guard 
on  tho  fortifications,  in  succession  by  day,  and  all  of  them 
(excepting  the  cavalry)  by  night — some  being  on  duty  where 
the  arms  were  piled,  and  otliers  on  the  Avails — both  sum- 
mer and  Avinter  alike.  But  what  pressed  hardest  on  them 
was,  that  they  were  engaged  in  two  Avars  at  once,  and 
li.id  anived  at  such  a  jntch  of  obstinat<^  animosity  as  no  ono 
would  have  believed  if  ho  had  heard  it  before  it  actually 
occurred.  For  that  even  when  besieged  by  tho  Pelopon- 
nesians  from  the  fortress  in  their  country,  they  should  not 
•  ί'ί  ανάγκης,]  ».  e.,  for  their  own  support. 


ΣΧίχ.]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  467 

even  tl'cn  Imvo  ΛvithdΓawn  from  Sicily,  but  have  proceeded,  in 
their  turn,  to  besiege  Syracuse  in  the  same  manner,  a  (nty  not 
loss  than  Athens,  considered  by  itself;  and  that  they  should 
have  exhibited  to  the  Greeks  so  unexpected  a  display  of  power 
and  darinc^,  that  whereas,  in  the  beginning  of  the  Avar,  somo 
of  them  thought  they  might  holfl  out  one  year,  Fome  two,  some 
even  three,  but  no  one  longer,  if  the  Peloponnesians  Bhould  iu' 
vado  their  country,  they  wow,  in  the  seventeenth  year  after  the 
first  invasion,  went  to  Sicily,  >vhen  distressed  by  hoptilities  in 
every  way,  and  entered  upon  another  war  besides,  not  less  im- 

Fortant  than  that  which  tliey  already  had  with  the  IVloponnese,* 
who,  I  say,  would  have  believed  this  before  it  actually  took 
])lace  ?]  It  was  owing  to  these  things,  then,  to  tlie  great  injury 
which  Decelea  inflicted  on  them,  and  the  other  great  expenses 
which  befell  them,  that  they  were  reduced  to  straits  for  want 
of  money ;  and  it  was  at  this  time  that  they  imposed  on 
their  subjibts  the  tax  of  the  twentieth'  on  all  sea-borne  com- 
modities, instead  of  the  tribute,  thinking  that  thus  η  larger 
amount  of  money  would  bo  raised  by  them.  For  their  ex- 
penses were  not  on  the  same  scale  as  before,  but  much  greater, 
inasmuch  as  the  Avar  also  was  greater,  while  their  revenues  were 
l)eing  destroyed. 

29.  These  Thracians,  then,  who  came  too  late  for  Demos- 
thenes, as  they  did  not,  in  consequence  of  their  present  want 
of  money,  wish  to  incur  expense,  they  immediately  sent  back, 
having  commissioned  Diitrephes  to  convey  them,  and  in- 
structed him  at  the  same  time  to  inflict  by  their  means  what- 
ever harm  ho  could  on  the  enemy  during  the  voyage  along 
shore  (for  they  were  to  pass  through  the  Euripus).  Accord- 
ingly ho  landed  them  at  Tanagra,  and  carried  off  some  plunder 
in  α  hurried  manner ;  and  then  in  tho  evening  sailed  across 
tho  Euripus  from  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  ;ind  landing  them  in 
BoDotia,  led  theu  against  Mycalessus,  .  During  the  night  he 
l»ivouacked  unobserved  near  tjio  Temj»lo  of  Mercury,  distant 
from  Myualessus  about  sixteen  stades,  and  at  daybreak  as- 
saulted tho  town,  which  was  not  η  largo  one,  and  took  it ; 
having  fallen  on  tho  inhabitants  while  off  their  guard,  and  not 

»  Owing  to  tho  lonpth  of  the  ecntcnco  in  tho  original,  tho  apodosis  was 
forgotten.    Seo  Arnold's  noto. 

«  τήν  είκοστην.]  "  An  ad  valorem  duty  of  flvo  per  cent  on  all  com• 
modities  carried  by  sea  to  or  from  any  port  iu  tho  Athenian  dominion." 
-^Arnold.  « 


408  tHUOTDIOEa  YIL  [zzz. 

expecting  that  any  one  would  ever  inarch  up  the  country  eo 
far  from  the  sea  to  attack  them  ;  their  wall,  too,  being  weak, 
and  in  some  parts  even  fallen  down,  while  in  other  parts  it 
was  built  but  low ;  and  tho.gates,  moreover,  being  open  through 
their  feeling  of  security.  The  Thraciuus,  then,  having  burst 
iuto  Mycalessus,  plundered  butii  private  houses  and  temples, 
and  butuliered  the  iuhabitaut.s,  sparing  neither  old  ago  nor 
youth,  but  killing  one  after  another  Si  they  met  with,  both 
children  and  women,  nay,  further,  even  cattle  and  beasts'  of 
burden,  and  whatever  other  living  things  they  saw.  For  the 
Thraciau  race,  like  the  most  bl<K)d -thirsty  of  the  barbarians,  is 
most  so  when  secure  from  resistam-e.  And  thus  on  that  occa- 
sion there  was  no  little  contusitm  in  other  respects,  and  every 
form  of  butuherv  was  exhibited.  And  in  particular,  they  at- 
tacked a  boys*  school,  the  largi  ^t  that  was  in  the  place  (which  the 
children  had  iust  entered),  and  cut  them  all  to  pieces.  And  this 
disaster,  which  fell  on  the  whole  town,  was  inferior  to  rtbue  in  ex- 
tent, while  it  was  more  unexiKictod  and  shocking  than  any  other. 
30.  When  the  Thebans  were  aware  of  it,  they  marched  to 
the  rescue,  and  having  overtaken  the  Thracians  when  they 
had  not  at  present  advanced  any  great  distance,  they  both  re- 
covered their*  plundered  property,  and.  having  struck  them 
with  panic  pursued  them  down  to  the  sea,  Avhere  their  boats 
which  conveyed  them  were  lying  at  anchor.  And  they  slew 
the  greatest  j)art  of  them  during  their  embarkation,  as  they 
could  not  swim,  and  as  those  on  board  the  boats,  on  seeing 
Λvhat  was  going  on  ashore,  moored  them  out  of  bow-shot. 
For  in  the  rest  of  the  retreat  the  Thracians  advanced  in 
no  contemptible  manner  to  meet  the  Thehan  horse,  which 
first  fell  upon  them ;  and  closing  their  ranks,  according  to 
their  native  tactics,  defended  themselves  against  them ;  and 
thus  only  a  few  were  killed  in  that  part  of  tho  affair.  Some 
portion  of  them  also  wore  surprised  in  tho  city,  through  their 
eagerness  in  plundering,  and  perished.  Altogether,  there  fell 
of  tho  Thracians  two  hundred  and  fifty  out  of  thirteen  hun- 
dred ;  while  of  the  Thebans  and  the  rest  who  joined  in  at- 
tacking them  they  slew  about  twenty,  liorso  and  foot  together, 
and  among  tho  Thebans,  Scirphonda-^,  one  of  the  Boeotarchs.  0;i 
the  side  of  the  Mycalessians  a  considerable  part  of  the  popula- 
tion Λva3  cut  oif.  AVith  regard,  then,  to  Mycalessus,  \vhieh  ex- 
perienced, considering  its  extent,  a  calamity  not  less  lamentablf 


XXXI.,  XXXII.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VII.  460 

Uinn  any  wliicli  happened  in  tlio  war,  eucli  were  the  thing:?^ 
which  occurred  there. 

31.  Now  Demosthenes  ho'm^  at  the  time  on  his  voyniiro  for 
Corcyia,  after  lie    liad  built  the  fortifications  on  the  side  of 
Lnconia,  fell  in  with  a  merchant  vessel  anchored  at  l*hea  in 
tile   Elean   territory,   in   Avhiclr  the   Corinthian  heavy-armed 
were  to  cross  over  to  Sicily ;   and  he  destroyed  the  ship  itself, 
hut  the  men  escaped  froir    it,  and  having  subsequently  got 
another,  proceeded  on  their  voyage.     After  this,  liaving  como 
to  Zacynthus  and  Cephallenia,  he  took  on  bpard  a  body  of 
heavy-armed,  sent  for  some  of  the  Messenians  from  Naupactus, 
and  then  crossed  over  to  the  opposite  coast  of  Acamania,  on 
the  continent,  to  Alyzia  and  Anactorium,  which  the  Athenians 
had  in  their  own  hands.     While  ho  was  in  these  parts,  he  wr.n 
met  by  Eurymedon  returning  from  Sicily,  who  liad  been  sent 
out  with  treasure  at  the  time  that  has  been  mentioned,  during 
(he  winter,  and  told  him,  among  other  tidings,  that  ho  had 
heard,  when  already  on  his  voyage,  that  Plemyrium  liad  been 
taken  by  the  Syracusans.     Conon,  too,  who  was  in  command 
at  Naupactus,  came  to  them  with  information  that  the  five  and 
twenty  Corinthian  ships  siationed   o]>posito  to  the  Athenian' 
Hipiadron  did  not  give  up  hostilities,  but  were  prepared  for  an 
engagement.      lie  bc\gged  them,  therefore,  to  send  him  somo 
ships,  as  his  own  eighteen  were  not  competent  to  fight  the  en- 
emy's fivo  and  twenty.     Accordingly  Demosthenes  and  Eury- 
medon sent  witli  Conon  the  ten  best  sailers  of  all  they  had,  to 
join  thoso  at  Naupactus.    They  themselves  at  tho  same  tinxi 
inado  preparations  for  the  muster  of  their  forces,  Eurymedon 
sailing  to  Corcyra,  urging  them  to  man  fifteen  ships,  and  enlist- 
ing heavy-armed  troops  (for  ho  now  shared  the  command  Avitli 
Demosthenes,  and  had  turned  back  again,  in  consoquenco  of  his 
election),  and  Demosthenes  raising  slingcrs  and  dart-men  from 
the  parts  about  Acamania. 

32.  As  for  the  embassadors  who  had  gone  at  tho  timo  men- 
tioned—rafter the  taking  of  Plemyrium— from  Syracuse  to  tho 
cities,  they  had  prevailed  on  them  to  join  their  side,  and  had 
raised  and  were  just  about  to  lead  oflf  tho  force,  when  Nicias, 
receiving  early  intelligenco  of  it,  sent  to  thoso  of  tho  Sicela 

*  ff^tciv.]  In  this  and  in  many  other  similar  passages,  tho  roflectivo 
pronoun  is  used  in  tho  phiral  with  rcforcnco  to  tho  counirymen  of  Ih• 
Bpcakor  in  ^noral,  rnthor  than  to  himself  individually. 


ilQ      •  THUCYDIDEa  VIL  [xxxiiL 

who  held  the  passes,  and  were  in  alliance  with  the  AthenianR, 
namely,  the  Centotripcs,  Alicya^ans,  and  some  others,  to  bo^ 
them  not  to  give  free  pussage  to  the  enemy,  but  to  unite  together 
and  prevent  their  marching  through  their  country,  since  there 
was  no  other  by  which  they  would  attempt  to  do  so,  as  the 
Acragantines  would  not  grant  them  a  passage  through  theirs. 
AVhen,  therefore,  the  Siceliots  were  even  on  their  march,  the 
Sicels,  in  compliance  with  the  request  of  the  Athenians,  laid  an 
ambuscade  for  them  in  three  diilcrent  places,  and  felling  upon 
them  while  off  their  guard  and  without  any  notice,  killed  about 
eight  hundred  of  them,  with  all  the  embassiidors  except  one, 
namely,  the  Corinthian,  who  led  to  Syracuse  those  that  had  es- 
caped, to  the  number  of  fifteen  hundred. 

33.  About  that  same  time  the  Camarinxans  also  came  to 
their  help  Avith  five  hundred  heavy-armed,  three  hundred  dart- 
men,  and  three  hundred  bow-nun.  The  (Jeloans,  too,  sent  »i 
squadron  of  five  ships,  four  hundred  dart-men,  and  two  hun- 
dred horse.  For  by  this  time  pretty  nearly  the  whole  of 
Sicily — excepting  the  Acragantines,  who  were  neutral — Iho 
rest,  I  say,  Λνΐιο  before  had  waited  to  sec  the  result  of  events, 
now  united  with  the  Syracusans,  aiul  assisted  them  ngainst 
the  Atheniafts.  The  Syracusans,  thc'U,  after  the  disaster  in 
the  Sicel  country  had  befallen  them,  ceased  for  the  j)resent 
from  attacking  the  Athenians.  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon, 
on  the  other  hand,  their  forc<?s  being  now  ready  both  from 
Conryra  and  the  continent,  crossed  the  Ionian  gulf  with  all 
their  army  to  the  lapygian  foreland.  Starting  thence,  they 
touched  at  the  Cha?ra(le9  islands,  lying  otf  lapygia,  and  took 
on  board  their  ships  some  Ia})ygian  dart-men,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  in  number,  of  the  Messapian  tribe ;  and  after  re- 
newing an  old  friendshij)  with  Artas,  who  also  had  provided 
them  with  the  dart-men  being  one  of  their  chieftains,  they  ar- 
rived at  Metapontum  in  Italy.  After  persuading  the  Meta- 
])ontrnes  to  send  Λvith  them,  on  the  strength  of  their  alliance, 
three  hundred  dart-men  and  two  triremes,  Avith  this  addition 
to  their  armament  they  coasted  along  to  Thuria.  There 
they  found  the  opponents  of  the  Athenians  recently  exjKiUed  in 
consequence  of  α  sedition.  And  as  they  wished  to  nmster 
there  the  whol»;  army,  in  case  any  part  had  In^en  left  behind, 
and  to  review  it,  as>vell  άά  to  j)crsuailo  the  Thiuians  to  join 
them  as  zealously  as  possible  in  the  expedition,  and  to  have 


Σχχιν.]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  471 

considoriiijOf  their  present  position,  the  samo  foes  and  friends  as 
the  Athenians,  they  waited  awliilo  in  TImria,  and  were  prosccut- 
m<f  those  desii^ns. 

34.  About  tho  samo  time,  tho  Teloponnesians  in  tho  fivo 
and  twenty  ships,  who,  to  securo  tho  p.'u*sago  of  tho  mcrcluint- 
mon  to  Sicily,  were  anchored  over  against  the  fleet  at  Nau- 
pactus,  liaving  made   their  pro])aratious  for  a  sea-figlit,  and 
having  manne^l  sonio  additional  sliips,  so  that  they  were  now 
but  httio  inferior  to  tho  Athenian  force,  stationed  themselves 
off  Erineus  in  Acluca,  in  tho  territory  of  Rhypa.     And  tho 
place  in  winch  they  wero  stationed  being  in  tho  form  of  α 
crescent,  their  land  forces  which  had  como  to  their  assistance 
from  tho  Corinthians,  and  from  their  allies  on  tho  spot,  wero 
ranged  on  tho  projecting  headlands  on  both  sides;  while  tho 
ships  occupied  the  intervening  space,  blocking  up  tlio  entrance. 
The  commander  of  tho  fleet  was  Polyanthes,  a  Corinthian. 
Tho  Athenians  sailed  out  against  them  from  Naupactus  with 
three  and  thirty  ships,  under  tho  command  of  Diphilus.     Tho 
Corinthians  at  first  remained  stationary,  but  afterward,  hav- 
ing raised  their  signal  for  battle,  Avlien  there  appared  to  bo  a 
favorable  opportunity,  they  advanced  upon  the  Athenians,  and 
engaged  them.      For  a  long  time  they  resistc*d  each  other;  at 
Jength  three  ships  on  the  side  of  tho  Corinthians  were  de- 
stroyed, whilo  on  that  of  the  Athenians  none  was  absolutely 
sunk,  but  some  seven  wero  disabled,  being  struck  prow  to  prow, 
and   having  their  foreships  stove  in  by  the  Corinthian  vessels, 
which  Avere  provided  with   stronger   clieeks'  than  usual  for 
this  very   purpose.     After  fighting  on   equal  terms,  so   that 
cither  party  might  claim  the  victory  (though  the  Athenians, 
nevertheless,  had  got  possession  of  tho  >vreck8,  through  tho 
wind  driving  them  out  into  the  open  sea,  and  tho  Corinthians 
no  longer  advancing  against  them),  they  separated  from  each 
other,  and  there  was  no  pursuit  made,  nor  were  any  prisoner» 
taken  on  either  side :  for  the  Corinthians  and  Peloponncsians 
oa-^ily  effected  their  escape,  as  they  wero  fighting  near  shore, 
and  no  ship  on  the  side  of  the  Athenians  went  down.    When, 
however,  the  Athenians  had  sailed  back  to  Naupactus,  the  Cor- 

•  Tflr  ίπωτίΛης.']  "Tho  word  is  known  only  in  its  technical  scnsp,  ns 
Pif^nifying  two  beams,  projeclinpf  from  α  ship's  head,  on  each  side  of  her 
bftak,  from  which  tho  anchors  were  suspended,  something  like  what  aro 
ciUod  in  our  ships  the  'cat-heads.'"— ^rnoML  I  have  borrowed  from 
l^obrco  the  word  by  which  I  have  rendered  έττωτίδας. 


473  THUCYDlDEa  VII.  [xxxv.,xxxvl 

inthians  immediately  erected  a  tropby,  as  conquerors';  because 
they  had  disabled  a  greater  number  of  their  enemy's  ships,  and 
considered  that  they  were  not  beaten,  for  the  very  same  reason 
that  the  other  party  considered  them  not  to  liavo  conquered: 
for  the  Corinthians  regarded  themselves  as  liaving  the  advan- 
tage if  they  were  not  decidedly  beaten,  and  the  Athenians  con- 
sidered them  to  be  worsted,  because  they  were  not  decidedly 
conquerors.  But  when  the  IVloponnesians  had  sailed  off,  antl 
their  troops  had  dispersed,  the  Athenians  erected  a  trophy  on 
their  side  also,  as  liavmg  gained  the  victoiy,  in  Achcca,  at  about 
twenty  stades  distance  from  Erineus,  where  the  Corinthians 
>vere  stationed.     And  so  ended  the  sea-fight. 

35.  Now  Demosthenes  and  Eur}'medon,  when  the  Tlmrians 
were  prepared  to  join  them  in  the  ex|>edition  with  seven  hun- 
dred heavy-armed  and  three  hundred  dart-men,  gave  orders  for 
the  ships  to  coast  along  toward  the  Crotonian  territory ;  while 
they  themselves  having  first  reviewed  all  the  land  forces  on  the 
river  Sybaris,  ])rocee(Jed  to  lead  them  through  the  Thurian 
country.  When  they  were  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Hylias,  and 
the  Crotonians  sent  to  them,  and  said  that  they  should  not 
choose  the  army  to  pass  through  thoir  territory,  they  descended 
toward  the  shore,  and  encamped  for  the  night  by  the  sea,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  llylias,  their  8hij)3  also  meeting  them  at  the, 
name  point.  The  following  day,  liaving  put  their  men  on 
board,  they  coasted  along,  touching  at  all  the  cities,  excepting 
Locri,  until  tiiey  camo  to  I'etra  in  the  Khegian  territory. 

3G.  The  Syracusaus,  in  the  mean  time,  hearing  of  their  ap- 
proach, wished  to  make  a  second  attempt  with  their  fleet  and 
other  forces  on  shore,  which  they  were  collecting  for  this  very 
object,  being  desirous  of  striking  a  blow  before  they  came. 
Now  they  had  etpiipped  the  rest  of  their  navy  according  as 
they  saw,  from  the  result  of  the  former  sea-fight,  that  they 
would  obtain  any  mlvantage;  and  having  cut  down  their 
ships*  prows  into  a  less  comj)iuss,  they  made  them  firmer  than 
usual,  by  fixing  stout  cheeks  to  them,  and  attaching  stays' 

i  "  Tho  cpotidcs  wero  laid  on  tho  bow  or  stem  of  the  vessel,  and  wcro 
partly  within  and  partly  without  tho  frame  of  tho  hull,  just  as  a  ship's 
bowsprit  is  at  present.  For  tho  len>?tli  of  six  cubits,  Λvhcther  from  tho 
prow,  113  Dobreo  understands  it,  or  from  tho  inner  extremity  of  tho  epo- 
tides,  '  they  supported  those  cheeks  by  a  sot  of  spars  {άιτηΐΗόας)  that 
went  from  tho  cheeks  to  tho  ship's  side,  both  insido  and  outaido  tho 
§liip.•  ''-^Arnold, 


xxxvl]  TnUCTDIDEa  ΥΠ.  473 

from  these  to  the  ships*  sides,  for  the  length  of  six  cubits  both 
inside  and  outside  the  vessel ;  in  the  very  same  way  as  the 
Corinthians  had  equipped  their  ships  ahead  against  the  squad- 
ron at  Naupaetus,  and  then  proceeded  to  engage  it.  For  the 
Syracusans  thought  that  in  this  way  they  would  have  an  ad- 
vantage against  the  Athenian  vessels,  which  were  not  in  the . 
Fame  manner  built  to  resist  them,  but  were  slight  ahead  (because 
they  did  not  charge  prow  to  prow  so  much  as  on  the  side,  after 
taking  a  circuit);  and, moreover,  that  the  battle  being  fought 
in  the  larger  harbor,  against  a  great  number  of  ships  in  no 
great  space,  would  bo  in  their  favor;  for  that  by  charging 
stem  to  stem  they  would  stave*  in  their  ]>rows,  sti iking  f.i-. 
they  would  with  solid  and  stout  l)eaks  against  hollow  and  \veak 
ones.  Nor  would  the  Athenians  in  their  narrow  room  have 
opporttmity  of  sailing  round  or  cutting  through  their  line,  ' 
tlie  maneuvers  of  their  naval  science  in  which  they  most  cor.- 
tidcd ;  for  they  themselves,  to  the  best  of  their  power,  would 
not  allow  them  to  cut  through  their  line,  and  the  want  of  room 
would  prevent  their  making  a  circuit.  And  Avliat  was  bcfiro 
thought  to  bo  want  of  skill  in  njasters,  namely,  to  charge  stem 
to  stem,  %vas  the  very  method  they  ΛνοηΜ  chiefly  adopt;  for 
they  would  have  the  advantage  in  it ;  as  the  Athenians,  if 
forced  out  of  the  line,  would  have  no  means  of  backing  water 
in  any  direction  but  toward  shore,  and  that,  too,  at  only  a  short 
distance  from  them,  and  for  a  short  space,  namely,  just  oppo- 
site their  own  encampment.  The  rest  of  the  harbor  they 
should  themselves  command ;  and  the  enemy,  if  forced  at  any 
point,  by  crowding  together  into  a  confined  space,  and  all  to 
the  same  point,  would  run  foul  of  cacli  other,  and  bo  thrown 
into  confusion  (the  very  thing,  indeed,  which  most  hurt  the 
Athenians  in  all  their  sea-fights,  since  they  had  not,  like  tho 
Syr/icusans,  the  power  of  retreating  over  tho  wholo  harbor). 
And  as  for  making  a  circuit  into  Cicarer  sea-room,  since  they 
(hemselves  commanded  tho  entrance  from,  and  tho  retreat 
into,  tho  open  deep,  they  would  not  bo  able  to  do  it ;  es|>e- 
cially  as  Plemyrium  would  be  hostile  to  them,  and  tho  mouth 
of  tho  harbor  was  not  large. 

*  ΐΓερίπλονν-^ύκκλονν.^  Tlioso  maneuvers,  ae  well  ns  tho  ύνάκμουαις 
afterward  mentioned,  were  difTerent  methods  of  piving  tho  ehip  a  mo- 
mentum roquirod  for  α  second  attack.  Sco  Arnold's  notes  on  I.  49.  3, 
odd  IL  89.  12. 


474  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  [χιχνπ.,  xxxvul 

S7.  Having  adopted  such  contrivances  to  euit  their  own  de•  f 
gree  of  knowledge  and  power,  and  at  the  same  time  feeling 
now  more  assured  in  consequeuce  of  their  former  battle,  the 
Syracusans  prepared  to  attack  them  at  onco  by  land  and  by 
sea.  Those  of  their  land  forces  which  woro  in  the  city  Gylip- 
pus  led  out  a  little  before,  and  brought  them  up  to  the  Avail  of 
the  Athenians,  at  that  part  of  it  Avhich  looked  toward  the  city ; 
while  the  troops  from  the  Olympieum,  both  all  the  heavy-armed 
that  were  there,  and  the  horse  and  light-armed  of  the  Syra-  s 
cusans,  advanced  against  the  wall  on  the  other  side ;  immcili-  f 
ately  after  which,  the  ships  of  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  ^ 
sailed  out.  The  Athenians  thought  at  first  that  they  wouM 
make  an  attempt  on  the  land  side  alone,  but  when  they  saw 
their  lleet  also  suddenly  coming  against  them,  they  wero 
thrown  into  alarm;  and  some  were  making  preparations  on 
and  in  front  of  the  walls  to  meet  the  attack,  while  others 
marched  out  against  those  λυΙιο  with  all  speed  wero  coming 
from  the  Olympieum  and  the  parts  outside  the  city — both 
horse  in  great  numbers  and  dart-men — and  others  proceeded 
to  man  the  ships,  and  at  onco  ran  to  the  l)each  to  oppose  the 
enemy.  And  when  they  were  manned,  they  put  out  against 
them  with  seventy-five  vessels,  those  of  the  Syracusans  being 
about  eighty  in  number. 

38.  For  a  great  part  of  the  day  they  continued  advancing 
and  retiring  and  making  attempts  upon  one  another ;  and  when 
neither  party  could  gain  any  advantage  Avorth  mentioning,  ex-        | 
cept  that  the  Syracusans  sank  one  or  two  of  the  Athenians'        f 
ships,  they  separated ;  and  tijo  troops  at  the  same  time  with-        ^ 
drew  from  the  walls.     The  next  day  the  Syracusans  remained        I 
quiet,  without  showing  at  all  Avhat  were  their  plans  for  the 
future.     Nicias,  on  the  other  hand,  seeing  that  the  battle  had 
been  a  drawn  one,  and  expecting  that  they  would  attack  them 
again,  compelled  the  captains  to  refit  their  ships,  whichever  of 
them  had  at  all  suftbred  ;  and  stationed  merchantmen  before  the 
Rtockado  which  had  been  fixed  ir  the  sea  in  front  of  their  ships 
to  serve  tho  pui^ose  of  an  inclosed  liarbor.     These  vessels  lu^ 
jihiced  at  intervals  of  two  hundred  feet  from  each  other,  that 
if  any  ship  were  hard  pressed,  it  might  have  means  of  retreat- 
ing in  safety  and  sailing  out  again  at  leisure.     Tho  Athenians, 
thi'n,  continued  to  make  theso  pre2)aration3  during  tho  whoW 
day  until  tho  night. 


XXXIX.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  ΥΠ.  4>5 

39.  Tho  day  following,  the  Syracusana  onijagcd  tlio  Athe- 
nians at  an  earlier  liour,  but  on  the  same  plan  of  attack,  both 
by  !*ca  and  by  land.  And  being  opposed  in  the  same  manner 
v,ith  their  phips,  they  again  continued  inaking  attempts  υροη 
each  other  for  a  great  part  of  the  day ;  until  Aristo  son  of 
ryrrhicus,  a  Corinthian,  and  the  most  able  master  tho  Syra- 
cusans  had,  persuaded  their  naval  commanders  to  send  to  thoso 
who  hail  the  direction  in  the  city,  and  beg  them  to  remove  as 
(juickly  as  possible  tho  supply  of  things  for  sale,  and  to  bring 
it  to  tho  sea-side;  and  whatever  eatables  any  ono  had,  to 
(Ompcl  all  to  come  there  and  sell  them ;  that  so  they  *  might 
enable  them  to  land  their  seamen  and  take  their  dinner  imme- 
diately by  tho  side  of  their  ships,  and,  after  a  short  interval, 
again  tho  very  same  day  to  attack  tho  Athenians,  when  they 
were  not  expecting  it. 

40.  They,  then,  in  compliance  with  this  request  sent  a  mes- 
senger, and  the  market  was  prepared  :  upon  which  tho  Syra- 
cusans  suddenly  backed  water  and  sailed  to  the  city,  landing 
immediately,  and  taking  their  dinner:  while  tho  Athenians, 
supposing  that  they  liad  retreated  to  tho  city  because  they 
Avero  worsted  by  them,  Avent  ashore  at  their  leisure,  and  were 
engaged  both  with  other  matters  and  with  providing  their  din- 
ner, imagining  that  for  that  day  at  least  tliey  would  not  have 
to  fight  again.  But  the  Syracusans  having  suddenly  manned 
their  ships,  sailed  out  against  them  a  second  time ;  while  thcy^ 
in  much  confusion,  and  most  of  them  unrefreshed,  went  on 
board  without  any  order,  and  with  great  difficulty  put  oiF  to 
meet  them.  For  some  time  they  forbore  from  attacking  each 
other,  and  stood  on  their  guard  ;  but  afterward  tho  Athenians 
did  not  ciiooso  through  thdir  own  act  to  bo  worn  out  with  fa- 
tigue by  waiting  there,  but  to  attack  them  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible ;  and  so  they  advanced  with  a  cheer,  and  commenced  tho 
action.  The  Syracusans  received  them,  and  charging  with 
their  ships  stem  to  stem,  as  they  had  determined  beforehand, 
with  their  beaks  equipped  as  they  were,  they  stove  in  the 
Athenian  vessels  to  η  considerable  extent  of  the  foreships. 
while  tho  dart-men  fighting  on  their  decks  inflicted  great 
damage  on  the  Athenians,  and  still  more  those  Syracusans  who 

»  αντοις.']  "Accordinpf  to  tho  rulo  given  in  tho  noto  on  III.  08. 1,  the 
dative  expresses  tho  action  in  its  relation  to  another  party,  numoly,  the 
^yracuaan  govemraont."— -4moW. 


47β  THUOYDIDEa  VIL  [xll,xui. 

were  sailing  about  in  their  small  boats,  falling  close  in  upi>ti 
the  oara  of  the  enemy's  ships,  sailing  up  to  their  sides,  aiul 
thence  discharging  their  darts  upon  the  seamen. 

41.  At  length,  by  fighting  in  this  way  with  all  their  might, 
the  Syracusans  gained  the  victory,  and  the  Athenians  turm-ii 
and  lied  between  the  merchantmen  into  their  own  station. 
The  Syracusan  ships  pursued  them  as  far  as  those  vessels ;  but 
then  the  beams  that  were  hung  from  the  merchantmen  over 
the  passages  between  them,  with  dolphins  attached  to  them,  * 
stopped  their  progress.  «Two,  however,  elated  by  their  victory, 
came  up  close  to  them,  and  were  destroyed,  one  of  them  beini,' 
captured  with  its  crew.  After  the  Syracusans  had  sunk  seven 
Athenian  ships  and  disabled  many  more,  having  taken  seme 
of  the  men  prisoners  and  killed  others,  they  retired,  and  erett- 
ed  trophies  for  both  the  engagements;  entertaining  now  η 
confident  hope  that  by  sea  they  Avero  very  decidedly  superii.r, 
and  thinking  that  they  should  conquer  the  enemy's  land  forces 
also.  Accordingly  they  began  to  prepare  for  making  another 
attack  in  both  ways. 

42.  At  this  time  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  arrived 
with  the  succors  from  Athens,  consisting•  of  above  seventy- 
three  ships  (including  the  foreign  ones)  and  about  five  thou- 
sand heavy-armed  of  their  owft  and  the  allies,  wiui  dart-nieii, 
both  Grecian  and  barbarian,  not  a  few,  slingers,  bow-men,  ami 
the  rest  of  the  armament  on  a  largo  scale.  No  slight  con- 
sternation was  produced  at  the  moment  among  the  Syracu- 
sans and  their  allies,  at  the  thought  that  they  were  to  havo 
no  final  deliverance  from  their  dangers,  seeing  that  there  was 
newly  come,  none  the  less  for  the  fortification  of  Decele.-i, 
an  armament  equal,  or  nearly  so,  'to  the  first,  and  that  the 
power  of  the  Athenians  apjwared  great  on  all  sides ;  while  in 
the  former  Athenian  forces  fresh  confidence  (considering  their 
late  misfortunes)  had  now  sprung  up.  Demosthenes,  on  the 
other  hand,  seeing  how  matters  stood,  thought  that  it  was  not 
possible  for  him  to  waste  the  time,  and  so  to  experience  tln^ 
fate  which  Nicias  had  done.  For  although  that  general  spreatl 
ferror  on  his  first  arrival,  bo  Avas  despised,  through  not  inmie- 
diately  attacking  Syracuse,  but  spending  the  winter  at  Cataiia, 
and  Gylippus  anticipated  his  success  by  arriving  >vith  fo'-ccs 
from  the  Peloponnese,  which  the  Syracusans  Avould  never  ha. ο 

*  ί.  e.,  heavy  weights  made  soraethiog  in  the  form  of  that  flsh. 


XLiii.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VIT.  477 

si'tit  for  at  ftU  if  ho  had  immciliatcly  ftttafkcl  thorn  ;  for  whilo 
fancying  themselves  a  matcli  for  him,  they  ΛνοιιΜ  at  onco  have 
«liiicovered  their  inferiority,  and  have  been  invested ;  so  that, 
even  if  they  had  sent  for  them,  they  would  not  then  liavo  done 
them  the  same  service.  Reviewing  these  things,  then,  and 
tliinking  that  ho  himself  too  was  decidedly  most  formidable 
to  the  adversary  at  the  present  time,  even  the  very  first  day, 
Demosthenes  wished,  as  quickly  as  possible,  to  avail  himself  to 
th  !  utmost  of  the  present  dismay  of  their  forces.  And  seeing 
that  tho  counter-wall  of  tlio  Syracusans,  by  which  they  had 
|»revented  tho  Athenians  from  circumvallating  them,  was  but 
a  single  one,  and  that  if  any  one  liad  carried  tho  ascent  to  Epi- 
])(>laj,  and  then  the  ramp  on  it,  the  work  might  easily  bo  taken 
(for  no  one  at  all  would  so  much  as  wait  liis  attack),  ho  Λvas  in 
a  hurry  to  mako  tho  attempt.  And  this  he  thought  was  Ιπλ 
shortest  way  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion;  for  ho  would 
either  gain  possession  of  Syracuse  by  succeeding  in  his  design, 
or  lea  1  back  tho  armament,  and  not  exhaust  for  no  purpose  both 
tlie  Athenians  who  joined  tho  expedition  and  tho  whole  etatc. 
In  tho  first  place,  then,  tho  Athenians  went  out  and  ravaged 
a  part  of  the  Syracusan  territory,  about  tho  Anapus,  and  wero 
superior  in  force,  as  they  liad  originally  l)cen,  both  by  land 
and  by  sea  (for  in  neither  way  did  the  Syracusans  como  out 
against  them,  except  with  their  cavalry  and  dart-men  from  tho 
Olympieum). 

43.  Afterward,  Demosthenes  resolved  first  to  mako  an  at- 
tempt on  tho  counter-work  with  engines.  But  when  tho 
engines,  after  ho  had  brought  them  up,  were  burned  by  tho 
enemy  who  wero  milking  a  defense  from  tho  wall,  and  they 
were  beaten  back  when  charging  at  many  points  with  the  rest 
of  his  forces,  ho  determined  to  delay  no  longer ;  but  having 
gained  the  assent  of  Nieias  and  the  rest  of  his  colleagues,  ac- 
cording to  the  plan  he  had  formed,  lie  proceeded  to  the  attempt 
on  Epipolaj.  Now,  in  tho  day-time  it  seemed  to  be  impossible 
for  them  to  approach  and  make  the  ascent  unobserved.  But 
having  issued  orders  for  five  days*  provisions,  and  taken  all 
the  stone-masons  and  carpenters,  with  all  the  other  apparatus 
besides,  both  arrows  and  every  thing  else  that  wae  necessary 
for  them,  ehould  they  succeed,  to  hare  while  they  were  build- 
ing, ho  himself,  with  JEurymedon  and  Menander,  took  the  whole 
forcer,  after  the  first  watch  of  tho  night,  and  advanced  against 


4'7β  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  [xuv. 

Epipolae,  Niciaa  boincf  left  behind  in  the  lines.  When  thoy 
had  come  up  to  the  hill  on  the  side  of  Euryelus,  the  same  way 
that  the  former  army  also  had  in  the  first  instanpo  made  the 
ascent,  they  escaped  the  observation  of  the  Syracusan  guar»), 
and  having  gone  to  the  fort  of  the  Syracusims  which  was  thcrt», 
thoy  took  It,  and  put  part  of  the  garrison  to  the  sword,  lint 
the  greater  part  fled  immediately  to  the  camps  (of  which  thcro 
was  three  on  Epipohe,  in  outworks^  one  com})osed  of  the  Sy- 
racusans,  one  of  the  other  Siceliots,  and  one  of  their  allies), 
and  informed  them  of  the  attack,  and  told  it  to  the  six  hun- 
dred SyTacusans  who  had  formed  the  original  guard  at  this 
])art  of  Epipolae.  They  immediately  went  against  them  ;  an.  1 
Demosthenes  and  the  Athenians  falling  in  with  them,  route.l 
them,  though  they  made  a  spirited  resistance.  They  th«  ii 
immediately  pressed  on,  that  they  might  not  bo  retarded  in 
their  ])resent  eagerness  for  accom|)lishing  the  objects  they 
had  come  for :  while  others  of  them  proceeded,  as  their  first 
measure,  to  take  the  counter-wall•  of  the  Syracusans,  and  i>u!l 
down  its  battlements.  The  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  as 
well  as  Gylippus  and  his  division,  went  to  the  rescue  from  tin• 
outworks ;  and  as  they  had  had  this  daring  attack  made  on 
them  in  the  night,  they  engaged  the  Athenians  in  some  dis- 
may, and  were  at  first  compelled  to  retreat.  Ihit  when  tlh' 
Athenians  >vere  now  advancing  in  greater  confusion,  as  havini: 
gained  the  victory,  and  were  anxious  to  pass  as  ouickly  as  pos- 
sible through  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  >vhicn  had  not  yd 
been  engaged,  that  they  might  not  rally  again  through  their  re- 
laxing in  the  attack ;  the  liceotians  were  the  first  to  oppose  them, 
imd  both  broke  them  by  their  charge,  and  put  them  to  flight. 
44.  Now  the  Athenians  were  by  this  time  in  nmch  disordtr 
and  perplexity  ;  but  on  this  subject  it  was  not  easy  for  me  to 
ascertain  from  either  side,  in  what  way  each  event  occurre<1. 
For  in  the  day-time  the  parties  engaged  have,  indeed,  a  cleans 
knowledge,  though  not  a  perfect  one  even  then,  for  each  man 
barely  knows  what  happens  in  his  own  part  of  the  field.  But 
in  a  night  engagement  (and  this  was  the  only  one  which  or- 
curred  between  gi'cat  armies  during  this  war),  how  couM 
any  one  have  a  distinct  knowledge  of  any  thing?  For 
though  there  was  a  bright  moon,  they  only  saw  one  anotlur 
(as  was  natural  they  should  by  moonlight)  so  as  to  diseern  the 
form  of  the  body  before  them,  but  to  mistrust  their  knowlelgo 


την.]  THUCYDIDEa  VII.  470 

of  its  being  tlmt  of  a  friend.  And  there  were  no  few  hcavy- 
iirmed  on  eacli  side  moving  in  a  narrow  Fpace.  Tims  on  tlio 
side  of  tlic  Athenians  some  were  even  now  being  dafeatcd,  and 
otlicrs  coming  np  unconquered  for  their  first  attack,  A  largo 
part,  too,  of  tho  rest  of  their  forces  had  only  just  nscended, 
and  others  wore  still  ascending,  so  that  they  did  not  know  on 
what  point  to  advance.  For  in  consequence  of  the  rout  which 
liad  taken  place,  every  thing  in  front  >vas  now  in  confusion, 
/ind  it  >vas  diilicult  to  distinguish  orders  through  the  uproar. 
For  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  on  gaining  the  advantage, 
were  cheering  each  other  with  no  little  shouting  (it  being  im- 
possible, during  tho  night  to  express  themselves  in  any  other 
way),  and  at  tho  same  time  were  receiving  tho  charge  of  their 
jissailants ;  and  the  Athenians  were  in  search  of  one  another, 
and  thought  that  whoever  met  them  was  a  foe,  even  though 
he  might  bo  a  friend,  belonging  to  thoso  who  were  now  flying 
back.  And  by  their  frequently  asking  for  tho  watchword,  be- 
cause they  could  not  by  any  other  means  distinguish  them, 
they  both  caused  great  confusion  on  their  own  side  by  all 
asking  at  once,  and  mado  it  known  to  tho  enemy;  whilo 
theirs,  on  tho  other  hand,  they  did  not  so  easily  discover,  be- 
cause, as  they  were  victorious  and  not  dispersed,  they  wero 
better  recognized  by  each  other.  So  that  if  they  fell  m  Avith 
any  of  tho  enemy  .with  the  advantage  of  numbers  on  their 
own  side,  the  Syracusans  escaped  from  them,  inasmuch  as 
they  knew  the  Athenian  Avatchword ;  but  if  they  themselves 
[in  such  A  case]  did  not  answer,  they  wero  put  to  the  sword. 
JUit  what  especially  and  in  tho  greatest  degree  hurt  them,, 
was  the  singing  yf  their  hymns ;  for  as  it  Avas  very  similar  on 
each  side,  it  occasioned  perplexity.  For  the  Argives,  the  Cor- 
cyricans,  and  all  the  Dorian  race  that  wero  Λvith  the  Atheni- 
ans, struck  terror  into  them  whenever  they  raised  their  paean  ; 
and  po  did  tho  enemy,  likewise•  Tlius  having,  at  last,  when 
onco  they  were  thrown  into  disorder,  come  into  collision  with 
each  other  in  different  parts  of  tho  anny,  friends  with  friends, 
.and  countrymen  with  countrymen,  they  wero  not  only  full  of 
fear,  but  even  closed  in  battle  with  cacn  other,  and  were  with 
difficulty  parted.  And  now,  as  they  were  being  pursued,  the 
greater  part  threw  themselves  down  the  cUifs,  and  perished ; 
i\s  tho  way  .down  again  from  Epipolm  was  narrow.  And 
when  those  who  cscaixjd  from  the  heights  had  reached  the. 


480  TflUuYDlDKS.  VIL  [xl?.-xltil 

plain,  though  many  of  them,  especially  such  as  belonged  to 
the  former  armament,  through  their  greater  acquaintance  with 
the  .localities,  escajied  safely  to  the  camp,  some  of  those  who 
liad  lately  arrived  lost  their  way,  and  wandered  about  tho 
country  ;  and  these,  when  it  was  day,  the  Syracusan  horse  in- 
tercepted, and  put  to  tho  sword. 

45.  Tho  next  day  the  Syracusans  erected  two  trophies,  one 
on  Epipolaj,  where  the  enemy's  approaches  liad  been  made, 
and  the  other  on  tiie  8|)ot  where  the  liceotiaiis  first  withstood 
tliem,  while  the  Athenians  recovered  tlieir  dead  under  truce. 
No  few  were  killed,  both  of  themselvis  ami  their  allies,  though 
still  more  arms  were  taken  than  in  propDriiou  to  the  numln-r 
of  the  dead;  for  of  those  wlio  were  οοηΐ|κΊΜ  to  leap  down 
tho  dirt's  unencumbered  by  their  shields,  though  sotne  per- 
ished, yet  others  escaped  with  their  lives. 

40.  After  this,  tho  Syracusans  being  again,  as  before,  re- 
stored to  confidence  on  the  strength  of  such  unex{>ected  gixxl 
fortune,  dispatched  Sicanus  with  fifteen  ships  to  Acragns, 
which  Avas  torn  by  factions,  to  induce  the  city  to  join  them,  if 
ho  could ;  while  Gylippus  again  went  by  land  to  the  other 
parts  of  Sicily  to  bring  more  forces,  being  in  hope  of  even 
taking  the  Athenian  lines  by  storm,  since  tho  atfair  on  Kpipohe 
had  turned  out  as  it  did. 

47.  The  Athenian  commanders,  in  the  moan  time,  consulted 
on  the  disiuster  Λνΐήοΐι  had  befallen  them,  and  on  the  want  of 
vigor  which  at  present  on  all  accounts  prevailed  in  their 
(;amp ;  seeing  that  they  were  both  unsuccessful  in  their  at- 
tempts, and  that  the  soldiers  were  annoyed  by  their  stay  in  tho 
country.  For  they  were  suflfering  with  sickness  from  two  dif- 
ferent causes,  both  because  this  was  tho  season  of  tho  year  at 
whieh  men  are  most  liable  to  disease,  and  at  tho  same  time, 
too,  because  tho  position  in  whieh  they  were  encamixjd  was 
marshy  and  unfavorable,  while  they  were  also  distiessed  Ix^- 
cause  every  thing  else  appeared  hopeless  to  them.  Demosthe- 
nes, then,  w.'is  of  opinion  that  they  ought  not  to  stay  any  long- 
er; but,  according  to  the  j)lan  with  which  he  had  hazarded  tho 
attack  on  Epipola?,  since  that  had  failed,  ho  gave  his  vote  for 
departing,  and  not  wasting  tho  time,  while  the  sea  might  yet 
be  crossed,  and  while,  as  regarded  forces,  they  might  com- 
mand the  superiority  with  tho  squadron  that  had  lately  joined 
then),  at  any  rate.     He  said,  too,  that  it  would  bo  more  benefi- 


XLTin.]  TnUCYDIDEa  VIL  481 

rial  to  the  stato  to  carry  on  tlio  >var  apjainst  those  wlio  λτογο 
buildinij  fortresses  for  their  annoyance  in  their  own  country, 
than  against  the  Syracusans,  wlioin  it  was  no  lonj^er  easy  to 
subdue  ;  nor,  again,  was  it  right  for  them  to  waste  hirgo  snniH 
of  money  to  no  purpose  by  continuing  the  siege.  Sucli,  then, 
was  the  view  entertained  by  Demosthenes. 

48.  Nicias,  however,  thougli  lie  too  considered  their  circum- 
stanoes  to  be  bad,  yet  did  not  wish  to  display  their  weakness 
by  Avords,  nor  that  they  should  become  a  laughing-stock  to 
tluMr  enemies  by  voting  for  the  retreat  openly,  and  in  con• 
junction  with  many ;'  for  so  they  ΛνοηΜ  far  less  elude  their  ob- 
servation in  executing  it,  whenever  they  might  wish.  To  a 
certain  extent,  also,  the  afl'airs  of  the  enemy,  judging  from 
what  he,  more  than  others,  knew  of  them,  still  atiorded  some 
liojx}  that  they  would  l>e  worse  than  their  own,  should  they 
persist  in  carrying  on  the  siege ;  for  so  they  would  exhaust 
them  by  want  of  funds ;  esj>ecially,  too,  as  they  had  now,  with 
their  present  fleet,  a  more  extensive  command  of  the  sea.  Λ 
jiarty  in  Syracuse,  also,  wWxdi  wished  to  surrender  the  city  to 
the  Athenians,  was  sending  messengers  to  Jiim,  and  urging 
him  not  to  raise  the  siege.  Knowing  these  things,  then,  ho 
Ava»  in  fact  waiting  because  ho  was  still  inclined  both  ways, 
anil  wished  to  see  his  course  more  clearly;  but  in  the  speech 
openly  made  by  him  on  that  occasion  ho  said,  "  that  he  re- 
fused to  withdraw  the  forces ;  for  lie  well  knew  that  the  Athe- 
nians would  not  ])ut  up  with  such  a  step  on  the  part  of  tho 
generals — their  returning,  he  meant,  without  a  vote  from  them- 
selves to  authorize  it.  iJesides,  those  who  would  vote  in  their 
ease,  would  not  give  their  verdict  from  seeing  tho  facts,  as 
(hey  themselves  had  done,  instead  of  hearing  them  from  tho 
invectivee  of  others;  but  whatever  calumnies  any  clever  speak- 
er threw  upon  them,  by  those  would  they  bo  persuaded. 
^ίany  too,  nay,  even  tho  greater  part  of  tho  soldiers  present  on 
the  spot,  who  were  now  clamoring  about  their  perilous  condi- 
tion, would,  ho  said,  on  arriving  there,  raise  tho  very  contrary 
rlamor,  namely,  that  their  generals  had  utterly  betrayed  them 
for  money,  when  they  returned.  For  liimself,  then,  ho  did  not 
wish  (knowing  as  ho  did  the  Athenian  character  and  temper) 
fo  die  under  a  dishonorable  charge  and  by  an  unjust  sentence 

'  ftfui  ιτο^λών,χ  i. «.,  with  tho  Taxiarchs  and  Triorarcha,  who  attended 
Λ  lion  0  regular  council  of  war  was  held.    Comparo  eh.  DO.  3. 

•21 


482  TUUOYDIDBa  Va  ΙτίΛχ 

at  the  hands  of  tho  Athonians,  rather  than  run  the  risk,  in  Lis 
own  individual  case,  of  mooting  his  fute  at  tho  hands  of  th3 
cnoiny,  if  it  must  bo  so.  As  for  tho  afluirs  of  the  Syracusiuis, 
howovor,  ho  knew  that  they  wore  in  a  still  worse  condition 
than  their  own.  For  supporting  merceimries  as  they  had  to 
do  with  their  funds,  ^nd  at  tho  sumo  time  spending  them  on 
guard-posts,  .and  maiut:iiniiig,  moreover,  a  largo  navy,  as  they 
had  now  done  for  moro  than  a  year,  they  wore  in  some  re- 
spects ill  provided,  and  in  others  would  bo  still  moro  at  a 
loss,  as  they  had  alroiidy  expended  two  hundred  talents,  and 
still  owed  mafty  more ;  and  should  they  lose  any  part  wliat- 
cver  of  their  present  forces  through  not  giving  them  su|»- 
j)lies,  their  cause  would  bo  ruined,  as  it  was  supported  by  vol- 
untary aid,  rather  than  by  compulsory  exertions,  like  theirs, 
lio  maintained,  therefore,  that  they  nmst  continue  to  carry  on 
tho  siege,  and  not  go  away  defeated  in  point  of  money,  wheie- 
in  they  were  decidedly  sui)erior." 

49.  Such  were  tho  views  which  Nicias  was  positive  in 
stating,  from  having  gained  an  accurate  acquaintance  >\itli 
the  state  of  .itfairs  in  Syracuse,  and  their  want  of  money ;  and 
because  there  were  some  who  were  desirous  that  tho  state 
should  fall  into  tho  hands  of  tlie  Athenians,  and  were  sendinir 
messages  to  him  not  to  raise  tho  siege  ;  and  at  the  same  tinn•, 
because  ho  was  influenced  by  couiidenco  in  his  fleet,*  at  any 

*  θαρσήαει  κ[>ατηθείς.]  I  have  given  what  appears  to  me  the  only  scufi 
that  this  participle  can  bear,  though  diflerent  fronn  uuy  that  has  been  at- 
tributed to  it  by  others.  Compare  the  somewhat  similar  use  of  tho  verb 
ί^ασώμαι,  in  tho  sense  of  "  yielding,"  or  "  giving  way  to,"  e.  g.,  III.  38.  5, 
i/oovrj  ησσώμενοι ;  and  with  a  genitive,  IV.  37.  1,  i^oaijtfeiev  τυν  παρ<>ι  n^, 
όεινον.  If,  however,  it  should  be  thought  that  neither  this  meaning, 
"  nor"  (to  use  tho  words  of  Arnold)  "  any  other,  can  bo  fairly  oxtraclL*l 
from  tho  sense  as  it  now  stauds,"  I  should  be  disposed  to  adopt  a  ratliLT 
bolder  emendation  than  tho  mere  substitution  of  κματννθείς,  which  Bauer 
and  so  many  others  after  him  have  admitted,  but  which,  as  Poppo  ob- 
sen'cs,  leaves  the  passage  scarcely  less  strange  in  its  phraseology  than 
before.  From  the  fact  that  six  MSS.  have  >'  uv,  instead  of  γονν,  it  seems 
probable  that  an  infinitive  njood  originally  formed  part  of  tho  sentence; 
and  I  venture  therefore  to  propose  the  following  correction:  και  άμα  ταις 
yovl•  (or  y'  iii',  whichever  may  bo  preferred)  ναυσίν  ή  πρύτερον  Οαρσησικ; 
κρατήσειν,  taking  κρατησειν  in  the  ^amo  absolute  sense  as  κρατείν  has  a•• 
ready  borne  in  a  very  similar  passage,  ch.  47.  3.  If  the  objection»  urged 
by  (joller  against  understanding  μάλ/Μν  before  y  bo  thought  valid,  hi^ 
correction  y  niay  bo  admitted;  "  from  feeling  eonftdent  that  they  shouM 
at  any  rate  have  tho  advantage  at  sea,  as  they  had  formerly ;"  i.  c,  before 
their  recent  deleat  in  the  naval  engagement. 


L.]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  483 

rate  more  than  before.  Demostbcnes,  however,  would  not  at 
all  listen  to  the  proposal  for  continuing  the  siege ;  but  if  it 
were  necessary  for  them  not  to  withdraw  the  forces  without  a 
decree  from  the  Athenians,  but  to  remain  in  the  country,  ho 
said  that  they  should  either  remove  to  Thapsus  and  do  so,  or 
to  Catana^  where  they  could  overrun  with  their  troops  a  large 
j)art  of  the  country,  and  support  themselves  by  ravaging  their 
enemies'  property,  and  so  might  injure  them;  while  at  tho 
same  time  with  their  fleet  they  would  fight  their  battles  on  the 
open  deep,  and  not  in  a  confined  space,  which  was  more  in 
favor  of  the  enemy,  but  rather  with  spacious  sea-room,  whero 
their  skill  would  bo  of  service  to  them,  and  they  would  havo 
an  opportunity  of  retreating  and  advancing  in  no  narrow  and 
f'ircumscribod  space,  both  on  putting  out  and  coming  to  land. 
Ifi  a  word,  ho  did  not,  he  said,  at  all  approve  of  remaining  in 
their  present  position,  but  of  removing  immediately  without 
«lelay.  Eurymedon  also  supported  him  in  this  view.  But  as 
Xicias  objected  to  it,  a  degree  of  diffidence  and  hesitation  was 
produced  in  them,  and  a  suspicion  also  that  Nicias  might  bo 
so  positive  from  knowing  something  more  than  ho  expressed. 
■  ΊΊιο  Athenians,  then,  in  this  way  lingered  on,  and  remained 
where  they  were. 

50.  In  the  mean  time,  Gylippus  and  Sicanus  had  come  to 

Syracuse ;  and  though  Sicanus  had  failed  in  winning  Acragas 

(for  while  ho  was  still  at  Gela,  tho  party  friendly  to  the  Syrn- 

cusans'  had  been  driven  out),  yet   Gylippus  came  with   fresh 

troops  raised  from  the  rest  of  Sicily,  and  with  tho  hea^-y-armed 

which  had  been  se«t  out  from  tho  rdoponneso  in  the  spring,  on 

board  the  merchantmen,  and  had  arrived  at  Selinus  from  Libya. 

For  when  they  had  been  carried  by  a  tempest  to  Libya,  and  tlio 

Cyrena;ans  had  given  them  two  triremes,  and  pilots  for  their 

voyage,  during  their  passage  along  shore  they  entered  into  al- 

liaaco  with  tlie  Euesperitai,  who  were,  being  besieged  by  tho 

Libyans,  and  defeated  the  latter  people ;  and  after  coasting  along 

I        thence  to  ^Teapolis,  an  emporium  of  the  Carthaginians,  from 

f        which  tho  distance  is  shortest  to  Sicily,  namely,  a  voyage  of 

two  days  and  a  night,  they  crossed  over  there  from  that  place, 

I        and  arrived  at  Selinus.  Immediately  on  their  arrival,  tho  Svracu- 

I       sans  prepared  to  attack  tho  Athenians  again  τηι  both  sides,  by 

I  •  Literally,  "the  party  for  tho  Syracusaiis,  for  friendship  with  Ihem," 

\        m  Arnold  rondora  It.    Sco  his  nolo. 


484  THUCYDIDES.   TIL  (u.,  lu. 

sea  and  by  land.  When  tho  Athenian  generals,  on  the  other 
hand,  saw  that  a  fresh  force  had  joined  them,  and  that  their  own 
circumstances  at  the  same  time  were  not  improving,  but  were 
daily  becoming  worse,  and  most  especially  were  depressed 
through  the  sickness  of  the  men,  they  repented  of  not  naving 
removed  before..  And  as  even  Nicius  did  not  now  oppose  them 
in  tho  same  degree,  except  by  begging  them  not  openly  to  vote 
on  the  question,  they  gave  orders^  as  secretly  as  tliey  could,  for 
all  to  sail  out  of  their  station,  and  to  bo  reaily  when  the  signal 
should  be  given.  And  >vhen,  after  all  was  in  readiness,  they 
were  on  the  point  of  sailing  away,  the  moon  was  eclipsed  ;  for 
it  happened  to  be  at  the  full.  The  greater  part,  therefore,  of 
the  Athenians,  urgeil  the  generals  to  stop,  regarding  the  mat- 
ter >vith  religious  scruple ;  and  Nicias  (for  he  was  somewhat 
over-addicted  to  superstition,  and  such  feelings)  de(;lared  that  ho 
would  not  now  so  much  as  consider  the  matter,  >vith  a  vnew  to 
moving,  until,  as  the  soothsayers  directed,  ho  had  waited  thricu 
nine  days.  A^^d  so  the  Athenians,  having  been  stopjKid  oa 
this  account,  remained  in  the  country. 

51.  AVhen  the  Syracusans,  too,  heard  this,  they  were  much 
more  stimulated  not  to  relax  in  their  efforts  against  the  Athe- 
nians, since  they  themselves  had  now  confessed  that  they  were 
no  longer  their  8uperioi*s,  either  by  sea  or  by  land  (for  they 
would  not  else  have  meditated  sailing  away),  and  at  tlio  sanio 
time,  Ix^cause  they  did  not  wish  them  to  go  and  settlo  in  any 
other  part  of  Sicily,  and  so  to  be  more  diliicult  to  make  war 
upon ;  but  were  desirous  of  forcing  them  to  a  sea-fight  there, 
as  quickly  jls  possible,  in  a  i)osition  that  was  advantageous  to 
themselves.  They  manned  tlieir  ships,  therefore,  and  praeticeil 
as  many  days  as  they  thought  sulhcient.  And  when  a  favor- 
able opportunity  presented  itself,  on  the  first  day  they  jissaulteJ 
the  Athenian  lines ;  and  a  small  division  of  their  heavj'-armed  and 
horse  having  sallied  forth  against  them  through  certain  gate- 
ways, they  intercepted  some  of  tho  heavy-armed,  and  routed 
and  pursued  them  back  ;  and  as  the  entrance  Was  yarrow,  the 
Athenians  lost  seventy  horses,  and  some  few  heavy-armed. 

52.  On  that  day,  then,  the  army  of  tho  Syracusans  drew  oft'; 
but  on  the  next  they  both  sailed  out  with  their  shi[)s,  seventy- 
six  in  number,  and  at  the  s;jne  time  advanced  with  their 
tnxjps  iigainst  the  walls.  The  Athenians  j)nt  out  to  meet 
then»  with  eighty-six   ships,  and  closed  and  fought  with  then». 


LifT.-LV.]  TnUCYDIDES.    VII.  485 

Now  Avhen  Eurymodon,  who  comTn.iTiilcd  the  right  wing  of 
the  Athenians,  and  wished  to  surround  the  ships  of  the  enemy, 
had  sailed  out  from  tlio  line  too  much  toward  the  shore  ;*  the 
Syracusans  find  tlieir  allies,  after  first  defeating  the  center  of 
the  Athenians,  intercepted  him  also  in  tlio  bottom  and  furthest 
recess  of  the  harbor,  and  both  killed  him,  and  destroyed  the 
ships  that  Λvero  following  him.  After  which  the  Syracusans 
closely  pursued  all  the  ships  of  the  Athenians,  and  drove  them 
ashore. 

53.  When  Gylippus  saw  the  enemy's  ships  defeated,  and 
carried  l)eyond  the  stockades  and  their  own  station,  wishing  to 
cut  off  the  men  that  were  landing  from  them,  and  that  the 
Syracusans  might  more  easily  tow  off  the  vessels,  through  tlio 
land  being  in  possession  of  their  friends,  he  ran  down  to  meet 
them  at  the  break-water  with  some  part  of  his  army.  Tho 
Tyrrhenians  (for  it  was  they  who  were  keeping  guard  at  this 
point)  seeing  them  coming  on  in  disorder,  advanced  toward 
them,  and  fell  upon  and  routed  their  van,  and  drove  them  into 
what  was  called  the  marsh  of  Lysimelea  Afterward,  Λvhen 
the  force  of  tho  Syracusans  and  their  allies  had  now  come  up 
in  greater  numbers,  tho  Athenians  also  advanced  against 
them,  being  afraid  for  their  ships,  and  entered  into  action  witli 
them,  and  defeated  and  ])ursued  them  to  somo  distance,  killing 
a  few  lieavy-armed.  They  saved  also  tho  greater  part  of 
their  own  8hij)s,  and  brought  them  together  alongside  their 
station ;  eighteen  of  them,  however,  the  Syracusans  and  their 
allies  captured,  and  put  all  tho  men  to  tho  sword.  Wishing 
also  to  bum  tlie  rest  of  them,  they  filled  an  old  merchantman 
with  faggots  and  pine-wood,  and  having  thrown  firo  into  it, 
and  tho  wind  blowing  right  on  the  Athenians,  they  let  the 
vessel  drift  toward  them.  Tho  Athenians,  alarmed  for  their 
ships,  contrived,  on  the  other  hand,  means  for  checking  and 
extinguishing  it ;  and  having  stopped  the  flames  and  the  near 
approach  of  tho  merchantman,  they  thus  escaped  the  danger. 

54.  After  this,  tho  Syracusans  erected  a  trophy,  both  for  their 
sea-%ht,  and  for  the  interception  of  the  heavy-armed  above,  at 
the  wall,  where  they  also  took  the  horses ;  while  the  Athenians 
did  the  same  for  tho  rout  of  those  of  the  infantry  whom  the 
Tyrrhenians  drove  into  the  marsh,  and  for  that  which  they 
themselves  effected  with  the  rest  of  their  army. 

55.  When  tho  victory  had  now  been  eo  decisive  on  the  «d• 


4ts6  ΤΗϋΟΥΒΠ)Ε3.  VH.  [lvl        ] 

of  the.  Syracusane,   even  at  sea  ifor  before  this  they  were 
afraid  of  the  shi[>s  newly  come  witli  Demosthenes),  the  Athe- 
nians were  in  a  state  of  utter  despondency;  and  great  was 
their  disappointment,  but  fur   greater  still   their  regret,  for 
having  made  tlio  expeilition.     For  these  were  the  only  states 
they  had  hitherto  attacked  with  institutions  similar  to  their 
own,  and  living  under  a  democracy  like  themselves ;  possess- 
ing, too,  sliips,  and  horses,  and  greatness :  antl  as  they  were 
not  able  either  to  introduce   any  change,  as  regarded  their 
government,  to  create  dissension  among  them,  by  which  they 
might  have  been  brought  over,  nor  to  elFect  that  by  moans  of 
their  forces  (though  they  were  far  suiKirior'),  but  had  failed        j 
in  most  of  their  attempts,  they  were  even  before  this  event  in        | 
perplexity ;  and  after  they  were  defeated  even  at  sea,  which        f 
they  could  never  have  exixicted,  they  were  far  more  so  still.  t 

δΟ.  The  Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand,  immediately  began 
to  sail  without  fear  along  the  harbor,  and  determined  to  close 
up  its  mouth,  that  the  Athenians  might  not  in  future  f^ail  out, 
even  if  they  wished  it,  unobserved  by  them.  For  tliey  were 
no  longer  attending  to  their  own  preservation  merely,  but  also 
to  the  prevention  of  the  enemy's  escajxi ;  thinking  (its  was  the 
fact)  that  with  their  present  resources  their  own  causo  wa^ 
decidedly  the  stronger ;  and  that  if  they  could  conquer  the 
Athenians  and  their  allies  lK)th  by  land  and  sea,  the  victory 
would  appear  for  them  a  glorious  one  in  t  i  eyes  of  the  Greeks. 
For  of  the  rest  of  the  Greeks  some  in  thut  case  were  straight- 
way liberated,  and  others  released  from  fear  (as  the  remaining 
power  of  the  Athenians  would  no  longer  be  able  to  bear  tlu) 
war  that  would  afterward  be  waged  against  them),  while 
they  themselves  also,  being  regarded  as  the  authors  of  this 
would  bo  greatly  admired,  both  by  the  rest  of  the  world,  and 

*  κρείσαονς.]  I  have  taken  this  as  α  nominativo  case,  with  Arnold  and         ' 
others,  rather  tlian  as  an  accusativo,  na  Poppo  is  inclined  to  do  in  his         | 
larger  edition ;  because  tho  superiority  of  tho  Athenian  forces  at  tho  bo-         | 
ginning  of  their  operations  is  quite  evident  from  many  other  passages,         | 
even  besides  those  referred  to  in  Arnold's  note ;  and  tho  uso  of  tho  par-         ' 
ticiplo  iTre?Muvrer  at  tho  beginning  of  tlio  section  is  nioro  suitable  to  llio 
conimoneomeni;  of  tho  siego  than  to  tho  later  period  of  it,  when  tho  Sy- 
racusans could  with  truth  bo  said  to  bo  superior  to  their  assailants.    Bo- 
sides,  ϋντ£ς  is  found  after  κμείσσονς  in  three  of  tho  M8S.     With  regard 
to  tho  construction  of  έκ  ■ηαραακενϊ/ς,  it  seems  to  depend  upon  πρυσα- 
*  ytaUat  understood  from  tho  preceding  προσήγυντο,  as  liloomfield  obscrve4 
in  the  coto  to  his  translation. 


tni]  TIIUCTDIDES.  VII.  487 

by  postority.  And  tlio  contest  was  indeed  worth  cncountcrincf, 
both  on  tlicsc  grounds,  and  because  they  wcto  Aviniiiiijnr  tlio 
victory,  not  only  over  the  Athenians,  but  over  the  oilier 
numerous  allies  also  ;  and,  nofain,  not  winninir  it  by  themselves, 
but  also  in  coinj>any  with  those  who  liad  joined  in  assistini^ 
them  ;  havini;  taken  the  lead,  too,  with  tlio  Corinthians  and 
Laceilaiinonians,  and  given  their  own  city  to  stand  the  first 
brunt  of  the  danger,  and  paved  the  way,  in  great  measure,  for 
their  naval  success.  For  t)ie  greatest  number  of  nations  met 
toi^ether  at  this  single  city,  excepting  the  whole  sum  of  tho 
confederates  assembled,  during  tho  war,  at  tho  city  of  Athens 
or  of  Laceda;mon. 

57.  For  tho  following  were  the  states  on  each  side  that  re- 
paired to  Syracuse  for  tlie  war,  eomiug  against  Sicily,  or  in  itrt 
behalf,  to  assist  the  one  side  in  winnitii?,  and  tho  other  in 
keeping  possession  of  tho  country;  taking  their  stand  with 
«•ne  another,  not  so  much  on  the  ground  of  light,  οτ  of  kindred, 
but  as  they  Avero  each  circumstanced  with  respect  cither  to 
ox|)ediency  or  to  necessity.  Tho  Athenians  themselves  Avent 
willingly,  as  lonians  against  tho  Dorians  of  Syracuse;  and 
with  them  went,  as  their  colonists,  having  tlio  same  language 
and  institutions  as  themselves,  the  Ivcmnians,  Imbrians,  and 
yKginetans,  who  then  occuj)ied  ^]gina ;  as  also  tho  Ilesticcans, 
who  inhabited  Ilestioia,  in  lioeotia.  Of  the  rest,  somo  wero 
serving  with  them  as  subj^ncts ;  others  in  consequence  of  tlieir 
alliance,  although  inde|x'ndent ;  and  others  as  mercenaries. 
Among  their  subjects  and  tributaries  wero  tho  Krotrians, 
('halcidians,  Styrians,  and  Oarystians,  of  Euboca.  From  tho 
islands  >vero  the  Ceans,  Andrians,  and  Tenians :  from  Ionia, 
the  Milesians,  Samnians,  and  Chians.  Of  these,•  the  Chians 
joined  as  independent  allies,  not  being  subject  to  tribute,  but 
supplying  ships.  All  these  were  chiefly  lonians,  and  de- 
scended from  tho  Athenians,  except  tho  Carj'stians,  who  wero 
Dryopes;  and  though  subject,  and  going. from  necessity,  still 
they  followed  at  any  rate  as  lonians  against  Dorians.'  ftoside» 
these,  there  wero  of  Jiolic  rac^,  tho  ifethymnmans,  subject  to 
supplying  ships  but  not  tribute;  and  thoTenedians  and  JEm^ 

*  implying  that  tho  present  wero  not  tho  oripfinal  Inhabitants  of  \t 
'  Ίωνές  γε  tirl  Δωρ/fOf.]  "That  is,  it  was  not  unnatural  or  irksome  to 

thorn  to  serve  against  their  natural  enemies,  although  it  was  not  in  h 

quarrel  of  their  own."— ilmoWL  . 


488  THUOYDIDEa  VIL  (ΐτη. 

ans,  who  were  tributarice.  These,  although  l/Eoliana,  were  hy 
compulsion  iightii)g  ngaiust  ^oliariH,  namely,  the  boeotiaas, 
their  foundore,  \yho  were  on  the  Syraciusau  side.  But  (luv 
l^latajans  alone  i'ought  as  Bceutians  right  in  the  face  of  hoio- 
tians,*  as  might  have  been  exj)ected,  for  the  hatred  they  bor« 
them.  Of  Khodians'and  Oytherians,  again,  both  of  Doric  race, 
the  Oytherians,  though  colonists  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  were 
fighting  in  concert  with  the  Athenians  against  the  Lacedae- 
monians with  Gyhppus;  while  the  Khodians,  who  were  Ar- 
gives  by  race,  were  compelled  to  wage  war.  against  the  Syra- 
cusans,  who  were  Dorians,  and  the  Geloans,  who  were  evin 
their  own  colonists,  serving  with  the  Syracusans.  Of  the 
islanders  around  the  Peloj)onnese,  the  Cephallenians  and  7a- 
cynthiaus  followed,  indeed,  as  independent  allies,  but  still,  on 
account  of  their  insular  position,  rather  by  constraint,  because 
the  Athenians  connnanded  the  sea.  The  Corcyraans,  though 
not  only  Dorians  but  even  Corinthians,  followed  openly  ngiiinst 
the  (Jorinthians  and  Sycacusans,  though  colonists  of  the  one 
and  kinsmen  of  the  other ;  by  compulsion,  according  to  their 
8I>ecious  profession,  but  rather  >vith  good  will,  for  the  hatred 
tliey  bore  the  Corinthians.  The  Messenians,  too,  as  they  are 
now  called,  at  Naupactus,  and  also  from  Pylus,  which  was  then 
held  by  the  Atlienians,  were  taken  to  the  war.  Moreover, 
Romo  few  Mt'garean  exiles,  owing  to  their  misfortune,  were 
iiiihting  agiiinst  the  Sclinuntines,  >vho  \vero  Megareans.  Of 
the  nst  the  service  was  now  more  of  a  voluntary  nature. 
For  it  was  not  so  umch  on  account  of  their  alliance,  as  out  of 
hatred  for  the  Lacedaimonians,  and  for  their  own  individual 
alvantago  at  the  moment,  that  the  Argives  followed  in  com- 
pany of  tho.  Ionian  Athenians  to  tight  as  Dorians  against  Do- 
rians. AVhile  the  Mantineans,  iiud  other  mercenaries  from 
Arcadia,  went  as  being  accustomeil  to  go  iigainst  the  enemies 
who  at  any  time  were  pointed  out  to  tliem ;  and  thought,  for 
the  sake  of  gain,  that  tho  Arcadians,  who  at  that  time  came 
with  the  Corinthians,  were  no  less  than  others  their  foes. 
Tiio  Cretans  and  yEtolians  also  came  for  consideration  of  j>ay ; 

*  KaTayTiKfH'.]  Such  is  perhaps  tho  force  of  the  word,  in  tho  absence  of 
any  instance  in  which  Tliucydides  uses  it  for  ύντικμίι•.  Olherwiso  the 
moaning  of  *'  absohito"  or  '•  downright  iJiEotians,"  would  suit  tho  pasfago 
much  better,  as  distinguishing  between  tlio  I'latieans  who  nctually  hved 
in  tho  country,  and  those  before  mentioned  who  were  only  colonics  from  it• 


Lviii]  THUCTDIDES.  VII,  489 

iinJ  it  happened  in  tlie  case  of  the  Cretans,  tliat  altliough  they 
liaJ  joined  the  Rhodians  in  founding  Crela,  they  now  came,  not 
with  tlieir  colonists,  but  against  them — not  by  choice,  but  for 
pay.  There  wore  also  some  Acarnanians  who  served  as  aux- 
iliaries, partly  from  motives  of  interesf,  but  mainly  as  being 
allies,  through  their  friendship  with  Demosthenes,  and  their• 
good-will  toward  the  Athenians.  These,  then,  wero  within 
tlio  l)Oundary  of  the  Ionian  gulf. '  Of  the  Italiots,  on  the  other 
lianJ,  the  Thurians  and  Metapontines,  as  they  had  been  over- 
tiken  by  such  necesvsities  at  tliat  time,  owing  to  those  seasons 
of  faction,  joined  in  the  expedition ;  and  of  the  Siceliots,  the 
Xaxians  and  Catanians.  Of  barbarians,  there  were  the  Seges- 
tina,  who  indeed  invited  them  to  their  aid,  with  the  greater 
part  of  the  Sicels ;  and  of  those  out  of  Sicily,  some  of  tho 
Tyrrhenians,  on  account  of  a  quarrel  with  tho  Syracusans, 
and  some  lapygian  mercenaries.  Such  and  so  many  were  tho 
nations  that  were  serving  with  tho  Athenians. 

58.  To  tho  aid  of  the  Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand,  camo 
tho  Camarinaians,  Avho  lived  on  their  borders ;  tho  Geloans, 
who  lived  next  to  them ;  and  then  (for  tho  Acragantines  wero 
noutral)  tho  Selinuntines,  who  wero  situated  on  tho  further 
side  of  the  island.  These  occupied  the  part  of  Sicily  opposite 
to  Libya,  but  tho  Ilimericans  the  side  toward  tho  TjTrhenian 
wa,  in  which  they  are  tho  only  Greek  inhabitiints,  and  from 
which  they  wero  the  only  auxiliaries  of  the  Syracusans.  Such 
then  were  the  Grecian  communities  in  Sicily  that  joined  in  tho 
war,  being  all  Dorians  and  independent.  Of  tho  barbarians, 
there  were  tho  Sicels  alone,  such  of  them  as  had  not  gone  over 
to  tho  Athenians.  Of  tho  Greeks  beyond  tho  limits  of  Sicily, 
tberi)  wore  tho  Licedaimonians,  who  supplied  a  Spartan  leader, 
while  tho  rest  of  the  troops  wero  Neodamodes  and  Helots ;  (tho 
term  Neodamodo  being  now  equivalent  to  free ;)  tho  Corinth- 
ians, who  alone  of  all  the  allies  joined  with  both  sea  and  land 
forces ;  tho  Leucadians,  also,  and  Ambraciots,  for  the  sake  of 
their  connection  with  them  ;  while  morconaries  wero  sent  fromi 
Arcadia  by  tho  Corinthians,  and  some  Sicyonians,  who  wero 
pressed  into  tho  service.      From  beyond    tho    Peloponncso, 

'  T^i  'lovtV  κόΧιτφ  οριζόμΐνοι,"]  i.  e.,  who  wero  separated  by  that  sea 
from  the  Greeks  of  Sicily  and  Iti^y.  Compare  VI.  13,  τους  μίν  Σικέ- 
λιύτας,  olairtp  νϋν  ύροις,  χρωμένονς  ιτρός  ί/μύς,  ού  μεμιττοΐς^  τ^  τ»  'lovtyi 
Kr'.^tTU,  «f.  τ,  λ. 

*  21* 


400  THUOYDIDEa  VU.  [ux^ix 

eome  Bceotiana  joined  them.  Compared,  however,  with  these 
>vho  camQ  m  ttuxiliaries,  the  Siceliota  themselves  supphod 
larger  numbers  in  every  branch  of  the  service,  inasmuch  as 
they  Avero  powerful  states ;  for  numerous  hoavy-urmed,  ships, 
and  horses,  and  an  abuudiuit  crowd  *  besides,  were  collected  by 
kthem.  And  compared,  again,  with  all  the  rest  put  together,  ns 
one  may  say,  the  Syracusans  by  themselves  furnished  more 
numerous  levies,  both  from  the  greatness  of  their  city,  aud 
because  they  were  in  the  greatest  peril. 

59.  Such  were  the  auxiliaries  collected  on  either  side,  which, 
by  this  time,  had  all  joined  both  parties,  aud  there  were  no 
subsequent  additions  to  either. 

The  Syracusans  aud  their  allies,  then,  reasonably  conceivid 
that  it  would  bo  a  glorious  prize  for  them,  after  their  Γυϋ<Ίΐΐ 
victory  in  the  sea-fight,  to  capture  the  whole  armament  of  tho 
Athenians,  great  as  it  >vas,  and  not  to  let  them  escape  eillur 
way,  neither  by  sea  nor  land.  They  began  therefore  imme- 
diately to  close  up  the  great  harbor,  the  mouth  of  which  was 
about  eight  stades  across,  with  triremes  ranged  broadside,  and 
merchant-vessels,  and  boats,  mooring  them  with  anchors;  while 
they  prepared  every  thing  else,  in  case  the  Athenians  should 
still  have  courage  for  a  sea-fight,  and  entertained  no  small  de- 
signs with  regard  to  any  thing. 

CO.  The  Athenians,  seeing  them  closing  up  the  harbor,  and 
having  received  intelligence  of  their  other  plans,  thought  it 
necessary  to  hold  a  council.  Accordingly  the  generals  and  the 
Taxiarchs  assembled  to  deliberate  on  their  diiliculties,  arisini( 
both  from  other  causes,  and  especially  because  they  had  neither 
any  more  provisions  for  their  immediate  use  (tor,  thinking; 
that  they  >vere  going  to  sail  away,  they  had  sent  before  to 
Catana,  and  commanded  them  to  bring  them  no  longer),  nor 
were  likely  to  have  them  in  future,  unless  they  should  g:iin 
the  command  of  the  sea.  They  detenuined  therefore  to 
evacuate  the  upper  part  of  their  lines,  and  having  inclose<l 
with  a  cross  wall  just  by  the  ships  the  least  space  that  couhl 
bo  suiliitient  to  hold  their  stores  and  their  sick,  to  garrison 
that,  while  with  the  rest  of  their  troops,  making  every  one  ^'o 
on  board,  they  manned  all  their  ships,  both  such  as  were 
sound  aud  such  as  were  less  fit  for  service ;  and  after  a  naval 
engagement,  if  they  were  victorious,  to  proceed  to  Catana; 
'  ΰμιλος,]  i.  e.,  of  ligUt-armed  irrogulars. 


iJii.,LXii.J  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  491 

l)ut  if  not,  to  bum  their  ships,  throw  themselves  into  line,  and . 
retreat  by  land,  in  whatever  direction  they  would  Foonest 
roach  ponic  friendly  town,  whether  barbarian  or  Grecian. 
They,  then,  havinir  resolved  on  these  things,  acted  accordingly  ; 
for  they  gradually  descended  from  their  upper  lines,  and 
manned  all  their  ships,  having  compelled  to  go  on  board  who- 
fver,  even  in  any  degree,  seemed  of  ago  for  rendering  service. 
Thus  they  were  manned  in  all  about  a  hundred  and  ten  ships ; 
on  boanl  which  they  embarked  a  largo  number  of  bow-men  and 
iiartinen,  taken  from  the  Acamanian  and  other  mercenaries, 
and  provided  every  thing  else,  as  far  as  it  was  possible  for  them, 
wlien  acting  upon  a  plan  which  necessity  alone  dictated,  such 
as  the  present.  When  most  things  were  in  readiness,  Nicias, 
seeing  the  soldiers  disheartened  by  their  decided  defeat  at  sea, 
and  wishing,  in  consequence  of  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  to 
liMzard  a  final  battle  as  8|)eedily  ns  possible,  assembled  them, 
jitul  on  that  occasion'  addressed  them  all  together•  first,  and 
spoke  as  follows: 

CI.  "Soldiers  of  the  Athenians,  and  of  the  other  allies,  the 
( otiiing  struggle  >vill  ha  common  alike  to  all — for  the  safety  and 
iountry  of  each  of  us,  no  less  tlian  of  the  enemy ;  since  if 
wo  now  gain  η  victory  with  our  fleet,  each  one  may  see  In's 
Dative  city  again,  wherever  it  may  be.  Nor  should  you  bo 
disheartoned,  or  feel  like  the  most  inexperienced  of  men,  >vho, 
nttor  failing  in  their  first  attempts,  ever  after  have  the  antici- 
jKition  of  their  fear  taking  the  color  of  their  disasters.  But  as 
many  of  you  here  as  «are  Athenians,  having  already  liad  cx- 
jK'rienco  m  many  wars,  and  all  the  allies  who  have  ever 
joinod  us  in  our  expeditions,  remember  the  unexpected  results 
tiiat  occur  in  Avarfare  ;  and  make  your  preparations  with  a  liopo 
that  fortune  may  at  length  side  with  ws,  and  with  a  de- 
lormination  to  renew  the  conflict  in  a  manner  worthy  of  your 
numbers,  which  you  sec  yourselves  to  bo  so  great 

02.  **  Now  whatever  wo  saw  likely  to  be  serviceable  against 
tlie  confined  space  of  the  harl>or,  with  reference  to  the  crowd 

'  rraptKe?.rvnnTo  τότε  -χρώτον.]  I  have  retained  the  oM  reading  TtWe, 
Ihonprh  nil  the  editors  Imvo  changed  it  into  rr,  because  I  tliink  it  is  by  no 
moans  inoxpresaive,  if  taken  witli  πρώτον;  the  two  words  being  intend- 
<  tl.  in  my  opinion,  to  make  a  marked  distinction  between  the  speech  ad- 
•Iroascd  bj Nicias  "on  that  first  occasion,"  to  all  the  troops  together,  and 
iliat  which  he  afterward  addressed  to  tho  trierarchs  by  themeelves.  See 
ch,  69.  2,  ανΟις  τών  τριηρι'φχων  Im  (καατον  ανεκάλει,  κ,  r,Xi 


492  -      THUCYDIDES.  VII.  Ilxiil 

of  ships  that  thero  will  bo,  and  tho  enemy*a  troops  upon  their 
deqks,  from  which  wo  suffered  before,  every  thing  has  now 
been  looked  to  and  prepartid  by  us  also,  as  far  as  present  cir- 
cumstances would  allow,  Avith  the  co-operation  of  the  masters 
of  our  vessels.  For  great  numlnirs  of  bowmen  and  dartmen 
will  go  on  board,  and  a  multitude  such  as  we  should  not  have 
used  had  wc  been  fighting  in  tho  open  sea,  as  it  would  have 
interfered  with  tho  display  of  our  skill  through  the  weight  of  our 
ships;  but  in  the  present  land-fight  which  we  are  compelled 
to  make  on  board  our  ships,  these  things  will  bo  of  service. 
We  have  also  ascertained  the  different  ways  in  which  we  must 
adapt  tho  structure  of  our  vessels  for  opposing  theirs,  and  es- 
pecially against  tho  stoutness  of  their  cheeks,  from  which  wo 
received  most  danjage,  we  have  provided  grappling-irons, 
which  will  prevent  th^  ship's  retiring'  again  after  it  has  once 
charged,  if  tho  soldiers  on  board  them  do  their  duty.  For  to 
this  necessity  are  wo  reduced,  that  we  must  maintain  a  land- 
tight  on  board  our  fleet ;  and  it  seems  to  be  our  interest  nei- 
ther to  retire  ourselves,  nor  to  suffer  them  to  do  it ;  es|)ecially  as 
tho  shore,  except  so  far  as  our  troops  occupy  it,  is  in  pos- 
session of  the  enemy. 

63.  *'  Kemembenng  this,  then,  you  must  fight  on  as  long  as 
you  can,  and  not  be  driven  to  land,  but  determine,  when  one 
ship  has  closed  with  another,  not  to  separate  before  you  have 
swept  off  the  soldiers  from  your  enemy's  deck.  And  this  ex- 
hortation I  offer  to  tho  soldiers  not  less  than  to  the  sailors,  in- 
Jismuch  as  this  work  belongs  more  to  those  upon  deck.  And 
wo  have  still  even  now  a  general  superionty  with  our  troops. 
On  tho  other  hand,  I  advise  tho  seamen,  and  entreat  them  too 
at  the  same  time,  not  to  bo  too  much  dismayed  by  their  mis- 
fortunes, as  wo  have  now  superior  resources  on  our  decks,  and 
a  larger  number  of  ships.  Consider,  too,  how  well  worth  pre- 
serving is  that  pleiisuro  enjoyed  by  those  of  you,  who,  being 
hitherto  considered  as  Athenians,  even  though  you  are  not, 
from  your  knowledge  of  our  language  and  your  imitation  of 
our  customs,  Avere  respected  tlirough  Greece,  and  enjoyed  no 
less  a  share  of  our  empire  as  regarded  tho  benefits  you  de- 
rived from  it,  and  a  far  greater  share  as  regards  being  feared 
by  our  subjects,  and  being  secured  from  injuries.     Since  then 

'  τ/)μ  ττύλίν  άκάκ()ουηιν,'\  i.  β.,  retiring  in  order  to  gain  tUo  momentum 
rcquirod  fur  α  fresh  attack.     See  note  on  ch.  3G. 


LXiv.-LXTi.]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  403 

you  alone,  ns  freo  men,  sbaro  our  empire  with  ii^  abstain,  na 
just  mon,  from  now  utterly  botrayinij  it.  And  with  contempt 
for  (/orintliians,  wliom  you  have  often  conquered,  and  for  Si- 
rcliots,  none  of  whom  jiresumed,  while  our  fleet  was  in  line  con; 
dition,  8o  mucli  as  to  stand  up  aijainst  us,  repel  theni,  and  sliow 
that,  even  when  attended  by  weakness  and  misfortunes^  your 
skill  is  superior  to  the  fortunate  strength  of  any  others. 

G4.  "  Those  of  you,  again,  who  are  Athenians,  I  must  re- 
mind of  this  also,  that  you  left  behind  you  no  more  such  ships 
in  your  docks,  nor  so  fine  a  body  of  heavy-armed  troops ;  and 
that  if  any  thing  else  befall  you  but  victory,  your  enemies  hero 
Mill  immediately  sail  thither,  and  thoso  of  our  countrymen 
uho  are  left  behind  there  will  be  unable  to  defend  themselvcsi 
airainst  both  their  opponents  on  the  spot  and  thoso  Who  will 
join  them  ;  and  thus  at  the  same  time  you  who  are  here  will 
Itc  at  the  mercy  of  the  Syracusans  (and  you  know  with  what 
f.elings  you  came  against  themj,  and  those  who  are  there  at 
homo  at  that  of  the  Lacedairaomans.  Ikung  brought  then  to 
this  one  struggle  for  both  parties,  fight  bravely  now,  if  you  ever 
did  ;  and  relloct,  both  individually  and  collectively,  that  tho^o 
of  you  who  will  now  be  on  board  your  ships  represent  both  tho 
army  and  the  navy  of  the  Athenians,  all  that  is  left  ©f  your 
country,  and  the  great  name  of  Athens :  in  behalf  of  Λvhich, 
whatever  bo  the  point  in  which  one  man  excels  another,  either 
in  science  or  courage,  on  no  other  occasion  could  ho  better 
ilisplay  it,  so  as  both  to  benefit  himself  and  to  contribute  to  tho 
j»roservation  of  all." 

G5.  Nicias  delivered  this  exhortation  to  them,  and  immedi- 
ately commanded  them  to  man  the  ships.  Gylippus  and  the 
Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand,  were  able  to  perceive,  from  tho 
sight  of  tlieir  very  preparations,  that  the  Athenians  were 
al>out  to  engage  them  at  sea,  and  tho  device  of  throwing  tho 
grappling-irons  had  also  been  previously  reported  to  them. 
They  prepared  themselves  therefore  on  all  other  points  severally, 
and  on  .this  also;  for  they  covered  over  with  hides  their  prows 
and  η  considerablo  space  of  tho  upj)cr  part  of  tho  vessel,  so 
that  the  grapple,  when  thrown,  might  slip  off,  and  not  obtain 
any  hold  on  them.  And  now,  when  every  thing  was  ready, 
their  generals,  together  with  Gylippus,  exhorted  them  by  Ppeak- 
ing  as  follows : 

00.  "  That  our  former  nchicvcmonts  have  been  glorious  οηββ^ 


4Θ4  THUCYDIDES.  VIL  [lxvil 

Syracusane  and  alliea,  and  that  this  struggle  will  be  for  glo- 
rious results  in  future,  most  of  you  seem  to  us  to  be  awaro 
(for  you  would  not  olso  have  devoted  yourselves  so  eagerly  to 
it),  and  if-  any  one  is  not  as  sensible  of  it  as  he  ought  to 
be,  wo  will  provo  it  to  him.  For  >vhen  the  Athenians  had  come 
to  this  country,  for  the  subjugation  of  Sicily  in  the  first  place, 
and  then,  if  they  succeeded,  for  that  of  the  Peloponneso  also, 
and  the  rest  of  Greece ;  and  when  they  possessed  the  largest 
enij)ire  enjoyed  hitherto,  either  by  Greeks  of  former  times  or 
of  the  preticnt,  you  were  the  first  men  jn  the  world  who  with- 
stood their  navy  with  Avhich  they  had  borne  down  every 
thing,  and  have  already  connuered  them  in  some  sea-fights, 
and  will  now,  in  all  probability,  conquer  them  in  this.  For 
when  men  have  been  j)ut  down  in  that  in  Avhich  they  claim  to 
excel,  their  opinion  of  themselves  in  future  is  far  lower  than  if 
they  had  never  entertained  such  an  idea  iit  first ;  and  failing 
through  the  disappointment  of  their  boasting,  thev  give  way 
even  beyond  the  degree  of  their  power.  And  such,  probably, 
is  now  the  feeling  of  the  Athenians. 

67.  "But  in  our  case,  both  tho  opinion  wo  entertained  be- 
fore, and  with  which,  even  while  we  were  yet  unskillful,  wo 
were  full  of  daring,  has  now  been  confirmed;  and  from  the 
addition  to  it  of  the  thought  that  we  must  l>e  the  best  seamen 
in  tho  world,  since  wo  have  conquered  the  best,  each  man'•* 
hope  is  doubled.  And,  generally  speaking,  it  is  the  greatest 
hope  that  supplies  also  tho  greatest  spirit  for  undertakings. 
Again,  those  points  in  which  thev  are  imitating  our  equi|>- 
ments  are  familiar  to  our  habits,  and  we  shall  not  be 
awkward  at  each  of  them :  *  whereas,  on  their  side,  when 
many  soldiers  are  on  their  decks  contrary  to  their  custom,  and 
many  dartmen,  mere  land-lubbers"  (so  to  speak),  Acar- 
nanians  and  others,  have  gone  on  board  their  ships,  who  wi'l 
not  so  much  as  know  how  to  discharge  their  weapons  while 

»  άνύρμοστοιΛ  or,  as  othora  tako  it,  "unprepared  against  each  of  them." 
2  χερσαίοι.]  I  have  ventured  to  use  a  rather  slung  terra,  because  the 
quaUfying  expression,  ώς  είτηϊν,  wliieh  iii  added  in  the  original,  seems 
to  imply  that  χερσαίοι  was  employed  by  him  with  a  similar  meaning  of 
reproaclu  Tho  meaning  of  <t(>(MAu.  as  used  just  below,  seems  borrownl 
from  tho  unsteady  reeling  motion  of  an  intoxicated  person  ;  tho  similo 
used  by  tho  Psalmist  with  reference  to  mariners  tossed  in  tho  storm, 
"  they  reel  to  and  fro,  and  stagger  liko  a  drunken  man,  and  aro  at  their 
wits'  end."    Or  it  may  mean  to  "  ombarra&i." 


LXTiii., Liix]  TnUCYDIDES.  VIL  405 

stationary,  liow  can  they  avoid  swaying  tho  ships,  and  falling 
all  into  confusion  among  thomsoivcs,  by  not  moving  accord- 
ing to  their  own  fashion  ?  For  neither  ΛνίΙΙ  they  derive  any 
benefit  from  the  superior  number  of  their  ships  (if  any  of  you 
Ικί  afraid  of  this,  I  mean  the  idea  of  his  not  going  to  fight  them 
Λνΐΐΐι  an  equal  number) ;  for  many  ships  in  a  small  space  will 
1h'  loss  elfectivo  for  executing  any  of  the  movements  they  may 
wish,  while  they  are  most  liable  to  be  injured  by  our  prep- 
arations. On  the  contrary,  bo  assured  of  this,  which  is  most 
true,  according  to  tho  certain  information  wliich  we  believe 
we  have  received.  It  is  through  the  excess  of  their  miseries, 
and  from  being  forced  to  it  by  their  present  distress,  that  they 
are  induced  to  make  a  desperate  eflbrt;  not  so  much  from 
«onfidenco  in  their  resources,  as  from  liazarding  a  chance,  in 
whatever  way  they  can,  that  they  may  either  force  their  pass- 
age ίίικί  sail  out,  or  afterward  retreat  by  land  ;  since,  at  any 
rate,  thoy  could  not  fore  worse  than  at  present. 

C8.  "  To  avail  yourselves  then  of  such  confusion,  and  of  the 

vcrv  fortune  of  our  bitterest  enemies,  which  has  betrayed  itself, 

Kt  us  close  with  them  in  wrath,  and  consider  that  the  feeling 

of  those  men  is  most  lawful,  >vith  regard  to  their  enemies,  who 

tlcterniine,  when  taking  vengeance  on  their  aggressor,  to  glut 

the  animosity  of  their  heart :  and  that  wo  too  shall  have  an 

o]>portunity  of  avenging  ourselves  on  our  foes — tho  verv  thing 

which  is  every  where  said  to  be  most  sweet.     For  that  tliey  are 

our  foes,  and  our  bitterest  foes,  you  all  know ;  inasmuch  a» 

thoy  came  against  our  country  to  enslave  it,  and  if  they  had 

•  succeeded,  would  have  imposed  on  our  men  all  that  was  most 

painful ;  on  our  children  and  wives  all  that  is  most  dishonorable ; 

and  on  our  whole  country  tho  title  wliich  is  most  degrading. 

Wherefore  no  one  ought  to  relent,  or  deem  it  pain  that  they 

should  merely  go  away  without  danger  to  us.     For  that  they 

will  do  just  tho  same,  even  if  they  gain  the  victory.    But  that, 

through  our  succeeding  (as  we  probably  shall  do)  m  our  wishes, 

these  men  should  be  punished,  and  should  leave  a  more  secure 

liberty  for  the  whole  of  Sicily,  which  even  before  enjoyed  that 

blessing ;  this  is  a  glorious  obiect  to  contend  for.     And  of  all 

hazards  those  are  most  rare,  which,,  while  they  cause  least  harm 

by  failure,  confer  most  advantage  by  success." 

09.  ΊΙ10  Syracusan  commanders  and  Gylippus  bavlnff   in 
their  turn  thus  exhorted  their  men,  immediately  manned  the 


406  THUCYDIDES,  VII.  (lux. 

sliips  on  their  siilo  also,  since  tbey  saw  that  the  Athenians 
ΛνβΓθ  doing  it  Nicios,  on  the  other  hand,  being  dismayed  at 
the  present  circumstances  of  himself  and  his  colleagues,  and 
seeing  how  great  and  how  close  at  hand  now  their  i)eril  wa% 
since  they  were  all  but  on  the  point  of  .putting  out ;  consider- 
jug,  too  fas  men  usually  feel  in  great  emergencies),  that  in  deed 
every  thmg  fell  short  of  what  they  would  have  it,  while  in 
word  enough  had  not  yet  been  said  by  them  ;  again  called  to 
him  each  one  of  the  Irierarchs,  addressing  them  severally  by 
their  father's  name,  their  own,  and  that  of  their  tiibe ;  \μ>\*- 
ging  each  one  who  enjoyed  any  previous  distinction,  from 
personal  considerations  not  to  sacrifice  it,  nor  to  obscure  thoso 
hereditary  virtues  for  whieli  his  forefathers  were  illustriou«« ; 
reminding  them  too  of  their  country — the  most  free  one  in 
the  world — and  the  power,  subject  to  no  man's  dictation,  which 
all  enjoyed  in  it  with  regard  to  their  mode  of  life ;  mentioniiiix 
other  things  also,  such  as  men  would  say  at  a  time  now  so 
critical,  not  guarding  against  being  thought  by  any  one  to 
bring  forwanl  old  and  haekneyed  topics,  and  such  as  are  ad- 
vanced in  all  cases  alike,  about  men's  wives  and  children  an*l 
country's  gods,  but  loudly.  ap|>ealing  to  them,  because  they 
think  they  mny  bo  of  service  in  the  present  consternation. 
Thus  he,  thinking  that  he  had  addressed  to  them  an  exhort- 
ation Avhich  was  not  so  much  a  satisfactory  one,  as  one  that  ho 
wiis  compelled  to  be  content  with,  went  away  from  them,  ami 
led  the  troops  down  to  the  beach,  and  ranged  them  over  an 
large  a  space  as  ho  could,  that  the  greatest  jx)ssible  assistanco 
might  be  given  to  those  on  board  toward  keeping  up  their 
spirits.  Demosthenes,  Menauder,  and  Euthydenms,  who  went 
on  board  the  Atheniau  tieet  to  take  the  command,  put  out 
from  their  own  station,  and  immediately  sailed  to  the  bar  at 
the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  the  passage  through  it  which 
had  been  closed  up, '  Avishing  to  force  their  way  to  the  outside. 

•  τόν  \:ταραλ{ΐ<ρΰίντα\  όιίκη?.ηνν.'\  Aa  some  correction  of  this  reading 
Bccraa  neceesary,  I  have  preferred  that  which  is  adopted  by  Aruold, 
κατα?.ηφϋίντα,  to  that  which  Bekkor  proposes,  πΐρΟ.ΐΐοβίντα :  because  it 
Bcems  far  moro  probable  from  tho  next  chapter  that  no  passapo  at  all 
was  loft  by  tho  Syracusans.  If  iliero  had  been,  why  should  tho  Ath." 
niana,  when  they  had  defeated  tho  squadron  at  tlie  harbor's  mouth,  havo 
attempted  to  break  tho  fustoninps  of  tho  vessels  which  formed  tho  bar 
(sec.  2),  instead  of  sailinj^  out  at  once,  as  some  of  them  probably  would 
have  done,  under  their  present  circumstances,  if  tho  passage  had  boon 


Lxx.]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  49Ϊ 

VO,  The  Syracusana  and  their  allios,  having  previously  put 
out  witli  ])retty  nearly  the  Banio  number  of  sliip«  as  before, 
]»nH«co(led  to  keep  guard  with  part  of  tlieni  at  the  passage  out, 
;iiid  also  round  the  circuinf(;rence  of  the  whole  harbor,  tlint 
iIk'V  might  fall  upon  tlio  Athenians  on  all  sides  at  onee,  whilo 
their  troops  also  at  the  same  time  came  to  their  aid  at  wliat)• 
t'ver  part  their  vessels  miglit  put  in  to  shore.  The  commanders  • 
of  the  Syracusan  fleet  were  Sicanus  and  Agatharchus,  each 
i>ccupying  a  wing  of  the  >vhole  force,  with  Pythcn  and  the 
<.\)rinthians  in  the  center.  When  tlio  Athenians  came  up  to 
the  bar,  in  the  first  rush  with  which  they  charged  they  got  the 
U'tter  of  the  ships  posted  at  it,  and  endeavored  to  break  the 
fastenings.  Afterward,  wlien  the  Syracu sans  and  their  allies. 
|μ»γο  down  upon  them  froiu  all  quarters,  the  engagement  was 
iToing  on  no  longer  at  the  bar  alone,  but  over  the  harbor 
also;  and  an  obstinate  one  it  was,  such  as  none  of  the 
previous  ones  had  been.  For  great  oagc»rness  for  the  attack 
was  exhibite»!  by  the  seamen  on  both  sides,  when  the  com- 
mand was  given ;  and  there  was  much  counter-maneuvering 
on  the  part  of  the  mastt^rs,  an<l  rivalry  with  each  other;  while 
tlie  soKliers  on  board  exerted  themselvas,  when  vessel  came  in 
» ollision  with  vessel,  that  the  operations  on  deck  might  not 
f;ill  short  of  the  skill  shown  by  others.  Indeed  every  one, 
whatever  the  duty  assigned  him,  made  every  effort  that  ho 
niight  himself  in  each  case  apfwar  the  best  man.  And  as  a ' 
irreat  number  of  ships  were  engaged  in  a  small  compass  (for 
in<leed  they  were  the  largest  fleets  fighting  in  the  narrowest 
spa(?e  that  had  ever  been  known,  since  both  of  them  together 
fill  little  short  of  two  hundred),  the  attacks  made  with  the 
U'aks  were  few,  as  there  were  no  means  of  backing  water,  or 
cutting  through  the  enemy's  line  ;  but  chance  collisions  wero 
more  frequent,  just  as  one  ship  might  happen  to  run  into 
another,  either  in  flying  from  or  attacking  a  second.  So  long 
.IS  a  vessel  was  coming  up  to  the  charge,  those  on  her  decks 
^)li('d  their  javelins,  arrows  and  stones  in  abundance  against 
her;    but  when  they  came   to    close   quarters,   the  hcavy- 

npcn  for  thftm.  Blootnflold  indeed  thinks  that  the  mere  fact  of  a  Syra- 
nisan  squadron  havinpf  been  posted  near  tho  mouth  of  the  harbor  proves 
that  there  must  havo  been  an  opening  left.  But  eurely  this  is  a  very 
weak  proof;  for  knowing  as  they  did  that  the  Athenians  would  break 
•lown  tho  bar  if  they  possibly  could,  it  was  α  very  natural  precaution  to 
defend  it  with  a  division  of  their  fleet 


408  THUOYDIDES.  ΥΠ.  [lzxl 

anned  marinea,  fighting  hand  to  hand,  tandeavored  to  board 
each  other^e  shipe.     lu  many  cases  too  it  happened,  tlirouji^h 
ΛναηΙ  of  room,  that  on  one  side  they  were  charging  an  enemy, 
and  on  the  other  were   being  charged  themscilves,  and  that 
two  ships,  and  sometimes  even  more,  >vere  by  compulsion  cii- 
tant^led    round  one.     And   thus  t)io  masters  had  to  guard 
against  some,  and  to  concert  measures  against  others — not  one 
thing  at  a  time,  but  many  things  on  every  side — while  the 
great  din  from  such  a  number  of  ships  coming  into  collision 
both  spread  disnuiy  and  prevented  their  hearing  what  the  boat- 
swains said.     For  many  were  the  orders  given  and  the  shouts 
raised  by  tlioso  officers  on  each  side,  both  in  the  discharge  of 
their  duty,  and   from   their  present  eagerness  for  the  battle ; 
while  they  cried  out  to  the  Athenians,  "  to  force  the  passjiiro, 
and  now,  if  ever  they  meant  to  do  it  licreafter,  to  exert  them- 
selves heartily  for  a  safe  return  to  their  country;"  and  to  the 
Syracusans   and   their   allies,   *'  that   it   would  bo  a  glorious 
achievement  for  them  to  prevent  the  enemy's  escape,  and  by 
gaining  the  victory  to  confer  lionor  on  their  respective  c^niii• 
tries."      The   commanders,   moreover,   on   each   side,   if  thty 
saw   any   captain    in   any  part  tmnecessarily  rowing   astern, 
called  out  to  him  by  name  and  asked  him,  on  the  side  of  tlu> 
Athenians,  *•  whether  they  were  retreating  because  they  con- 
sidered the  lanrl,  which  >vas  in  the  possession  of  their  bitter»*st 
enemies,  as  more  their  own  than  the  sea,  Avhicli  had  In-en  w<»n 
with  no  small  trouble  ?"  on  that  of  the  Syracusans,  "  whether 
they  were  themselves  flying  from  the  flying  Athenians,  whom 
they  knew  for   certain  to  be  anxious  to  escape  from  them  iu 
any  way  whatever?" 

71.  The  troops  on  shore  too,  on  both  sides,  Avhen  the  sta- 
fight  was  so  equally  balanced,  suftered  a  great  agony  and  con- 
flict of  feelings;  those  of  the  country  l)eing  ambitious  now  of 
still  greater  lienor,  while  their  invaders  were  afraid  of  faring 
even  worse  than  at  present.  For,  since  the  Athenians'  all  was 
staked  on  their  fleet,  their  fear  for  the  future  was  like  none 
thuy  had  ever  felt  before  ;  and  from  the  unci^ual  nature  of  tlx' 
engagement  they  were  also  compelled  to  have  an  unequal  view 
ol  it  from  the  beach.  For  as  the  spectacle  was  near  at  hand. 
and  as  they  did  not  all  4ook  at  the  same  part  at  once,  if  any 
8  iw  their  own  men  victorious  in  any  quarter,  they  would  l•*' 
encouraged,  and  turn  to  calling  on  the  gods  not  to  deprivu 


ixxiL]  TIIUCYDIDES.    ΤΙΓ.  490 

tluMH  of  safety ;  wliilo  Ihono  wlio  looked  on  tlio  part  that  was 
lu'mix  beatt'ii,  uttered  lamentations  at  the  sanic  time  as  cries, 
■111(1  from  the  eight  they  had  of  what  Λν.ΐ8  .c^oins:  on,  expressed 
iluir  feelinc^  more  than  thos<i  enp:n<xed  in  the  action.  Others, 
.'urain,  lookincf  on  a  doubtful  point  of  the  cnc^ai^ement,  in  con- 
s4'«|uenco  of  tlio  indecisive  continuance  of  the  conflict,  in  their 
excessive  fear  made  gestures  with  their  very  bodies,  cor- 
nspondinij  with  their  thoughts,  and  continued  in  the  most  dis- 
inssing  state,  for  they  were  constiintly  within  a  little  of 
<  ''<a])ini?,  or  of  being  destroyed.  And  thus  among  the  troops 
<<i'  the  Athenians,  as  long  as  they  were  fighting  at  eea  on 
((jual  terms,  every  sound  might  bo  heard  at  once,  wailing, 
shouting,  "  they  conquer,'*  *'  they  aro  conquered,"  and  all  tho 
«•tlicr  various  exclamations  which  a  great  armament  in  great 
I«  ril  would  bo  constrained  to  utter — very  much  in  the  same 
nay  as  their  men  on  board  their  ships  Avero  affected — until  at 
ItiiETth,  after  the  battle  had  continued  for  a  long  time,  tho 
Syracusans  and  their  allies  routed  tho  Athenians,  and  pressing 
•  '11  them  in  α  decisive  manner,  Λνΐϋι  much  shouting  and  clieer- 
iii<^  of  each  other  on,  pursued  them  to  tho  shore.  Then  tho 
^oa  forces,  as  many  as  were  not  taken  afloat,  put  into  tho  land 
;it  different  parts,  and  rushed  from  on  board  to  tho  camp : 
\\  liilor  tho  army,  no  longer  with  any  diflicrent  feelings,  but  all 
<n  one  impulse,  lamenting  and  .groaning,  deplored  tho  event, 
iind  proceeded,  some  to  succor  the  ships,  others  to  guard  what 
remained  of  their  wall ;  while  others,  and  thoso  tho  greatest 
part,  began  now  to  think  of  themselves,  and  how  they  should 
I  «est  provide  for  their  own  preservation.  Indeed  their  dismay  at 
tho  moment  had  been  exceeded  by  none  of  all  they  had  ever 
ft'lt.  And  |hey  now  experienced  pretty  nearly  what  thev  had 
tiiomselvcs  inflicted  at  Pylus :  for  by  the  Lacedemonians*  losing 
their  ships,  their  men  who  had  crossed  over  into  tlie  island 
Μ  ere  lost  to  them  besides :  and  at  this  time  for  tho  Athenians 
to  escape  by  land  was  hopeless,  unless  something  beyond  all 
expectation  should  occur. 

72.  After  tho  battle  had  been  thus  obstinately  disputed,  and 
many  ships  and  men  destroyed  on  both  sides,  the  Syracusans 
and  allies,  having  gained  the  victory,  took  up  their  wrecks 
and  dead,  and  then  sailed  away  to  tho  city,  and  erected  a 
trophy.  Tho  Athenians,  from  the  extent  of  their  present 
misei^,  did  not  so  much  as  ^nk  about  their  dead  or  thei? 


500  THUOTDIDEa  VIL  [lzxiii. 

wrecks,  or  of  asking  permission  to  take  them  up,  but  wishcnl 
to  retreat  immediately  during  the  niglit  Demosthenes,  how- 
ever, went  to  Nicias,  and  expressed  it  as  his  opinion  that  thoy 
should  still  man  their  remaining  ships,  and  force  their  passngo 
out,  if  they  could,  in  the  morning ;  alleging  that  they  still  had 
left  more  ships  tit  for  service  than'  the  enemy  ;  for  the  Athe- 
nians had  about  sixty  remaining,  while  their  axlversaries  had 
less  than  fifty.  But  when  Nicias  agreed  witli  this  opinion, 
and  they  wished  to  man  them,  the  seamen  ΛνοηΜ  not  embark, 
through  being  dismayed  at  their  defeat,  and  thinking  that  they 
could  not  now  gain  a  victory.  And  so  they  all  now  made  up 
their  minds  to  retreat  by  land. 

73.  But  llennocrates  the  Syracusan,  8us])ecting  tlieir  j»ur- 
poso,  and  thinking  that  it  would  be  a  dreadful  thing,  if  so  largo 
a  fort;e,  after  retreating  by  laud  and  settling  any  where  in  Sicily, 
should  choose  again  to  carry  on  the  war  with  them,  >vent  U» 
the  authorities,  and  explained  to  them  that  they  ouglit  not  to 
euifer  them  to  retreat  during  the  night  (stating  what  he  him- 
self* thought),  but  that  all  the  Syracusans  and  allies  should  at 
once  go  out,  and  block  up  the  roads,  and  keep  guard  befoie- 
hand  at  the  narrow  passes.  But  though  the  'nagistrates  also 
agreed  with  liim  in  thinking  this,  no  less  than  himself,  and 
were  of  opinion  that  it  ought  to  be  done,  yet  they  thought  that 
the  jKiople,  in  their  recent  joy  and  relaxation  after  the  labors 
of  a  great  sea-fight,  especially,  too,  as  it  was  a  time  of  feastinii 
(for  they  hapi)ened  to  (jclebrate  on  this  day  a  sacrifice  to  Ihi- 
cules),  would  not  easily  be  induced  to  listen  to  them  ;  as  tho 
majority,  from  excessive  gladness  at  their  victory,  had  falltii 
to  drinking  during  the  festival,  and  would,  they  expected, 
rather  obey  them  in  any  thing  than  in  taking  arms,  just  at 
present,  and  marching  out.  When,  on  consideration  of  this, 
it  appeared  a  diiliculty  to  the  magistrates,  and  llermocrates 
could  not  then  prevail  upon  them  to  attempt  it,  he  afterward 
devised  the  following  scheme.  Being  afraid  that  the  Athe- 
nians might  get  the  start  of  them  by  quietly  passing  during 
the  night  the  most  difficult  points  of  the  country,  he  sent  cer- 

*  il  καΐ  avTtJi  ίύόκει.]  I  seo  no  reason  whatever  for  any  such  alteration 
of  αυτφ,  OS  Bauer  and  Dobreo  propose ;  as  the  worda  evidently  refer  to 
the  fact  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter,  that  Hermocratcs 
liad  himself  suspected  (νπονοήοας  αυτών  τήν  ύιύνοιαν)  what  ho  stated  to 
the  magistrates  as  tho  design  of  tho  Athenians. 


,    Lxxiv.,  Lxxv.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VII.  501 

tain  of  Ilia  own  friends  with  pomo  cnA'nlry  to  tlio  Atlieninn 
camp,  ns  poon  rs  it  prow  dark.  Thoso,  rirlincr  up  to  within 
luarinar,  nnd  calling  to  them  certain  individuals,  as  thoui^l» 
tlicy  wero  friends  of  tho  Athenians  (for  there  Avcrc  eonio  who 
<i'\ii  tidinfxs  to  Nicias  of  what  ])aRscd  witliin  the  city)  desired 
thcin  to  tt'll  that  c^eneral  not  to  learl  off  liis  army  by  ni<]jht,  as 
til•'  Syracusans  were  piardinij  the  roads  ;  but  to  retire  leisurely 
I'vday  after  makin^f  his  preparations.  They  then,  after  deliver-. 
\\\!X  this  niessnije,  returned  ;  while  those  who  heard  it  reported 
tli<•  same  to  the  Athenian  g^enerals. 

71.  They,  in  accordance  with  the  information,  stopped  for  tho 
liiLrlit,  considerinc:  it  to  bo  no  false  statement.  And  since  they 
liad  not,  as  it  was,  set  out  immediately,  they  determined  to  re- 
main over  the  next  day  also,  that  the  soldiers  miirht  pack  np,  as 
Will  jis  they  could,  tho  most  useful  articles;  and  though  they 
left  every  thiuii  elso  Ix'hind,  to  take  with  them,  Avhen  they 
started,  just  what  was  necessary  for  their  personal  8Upp<^rt. 
I  Jut  the  Syracusans  nnd  Gylippus  had  marched  out  before 
Avith  their  troops,  and  were  hlockincf  up  tho  roads  throu;;h  tho 
< ountry  where  it  was  likely  the  Athenians  would  advance,  as 
wi'll  as  guarding  tho  passages  of  tho  streams  nnd  rivers,  and 
j'osting  themselves  for  tho  reception  of  the  army,  in  order  to 
stop  it  .where  they  thought  best ;  Λvhilc  with  their  ships  they 
^;iiled  to  those  of  tho  Athenians,  and  towed  them  otf  from  tho 
ln'ach.  Some  few  indeed  the  Athenians  themselves  had  burnt, 
as  they  had  intended  ;  but  tho  rest  they  lashed  to  their  own  at 
thdr  leisure,  as  each  liad  been  thrown  up  on  any  part  of  tho 
l\"  Ix'ach,  and,  Λvithout  any  one  trying  to  stop  them,  conveyed 
them  to  tho  city. 

75.  After  this,  when  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  thought  they 
wore   sufficiently   prepared,   tho  removal   of  tho   army   took 
place,  on  the  third  day  after  tho  sea-fight.     It  wna  a  wretched 
i,      scene  then,  not  on  account  of  the  single  circumstance  alone,  that 
I     thoy  were  retreating  after  having  lost  all  their  ships,  and  whilo 
[      both  themselves  and  their  country  were  in  danger,  mstead  of  be- 
ing in  high  hope ;  but  also  because,  on  leaving  their  camp,  every 
*»ne  liad  grievous  things  both  to  behold  with  his  eyes  and  to  feel 
in  his  heart.     For  as  the  dead  lay  unburied,  and  any  one  saw 
η  friend  on  the  ground,  he  was  struck  at  once  with  grief  and 
I'iir.    And  tho  living  who  were  being  left  behind,  wownded 
'»r  sickj  were  to  tho  living  a  much  more  sorrowful  spectacle 


502  THUGYDIDEa  VII.  [lxxt. 

than  thp  dead,  and  more  piteous  tlian  those  who  had  perislied. 
For  having  recourse  to  entreaties  and  waiHugs,  they  reduced 
Uiein  to  utter  perplexity,  begging  to  be  taken  away,  and  ap- 
j>ealing  to  each  individual  friend  or  relative  that  any  of  tlKiu 
might  any  wheixs  see  ;  or  hanging  on  their  comrades,  as  they 
were  now  going  away ;  or  following  as  fjir  as  they  could,  and 
when  in  any  ciiso  the  strength  of  their  body  failed,  not  beiiifr 
left  behind  without  many  '  appeals  to  heaven  and  many  lameut:i- 
tions.     So  that  the  whole  army,  being  filled  with  tears  and 
distress  of  this  kind,  did  not  easily  get  away,  although  from 
an   enemy's   country,  and   although   they  had   both   sutTorid 
already  miseries  too  great  for  tears  to  express,  and  were  still 
afraid  for  the  future,  lest  they  might  sntVer  more.     There  was 
also   among   them  much  dejection  and  depreciation  of  their 
own  strength.     For  they  resembled  nothing  but  a  city  starved 
out  and  attom])ting  to  escape ;  and  no  small  ono  too,  for  of 
their  λυΙιοΙθ   multitude   there  were   not  less  than  forty  thou- 
sand on  the  march.     Of  these,  all  the  rest  took  whatever  each 
one  could  that  was  useful,  and  the  heavy-armed  and  cavalry 
themselves,  contrary  to  custom,  carried  their  own  food  under 
their  arms,  some  for  want  of  servants,  others  through  distrust- 
ing them ;  for  they  had  for  a  long  time  been  deserting,  and 
did  so  in  greatest  numbers  at  that  moment.     And  even  what 
they  carried  Avas  not  suiHcient ;  for  there  was  no  longer  any 
foo<i  in  the  camp.     Nor,  again,  was  their  other   misery,  and 
their  e(iual  participation  in  sufferings  (though  it  affords  8<^)nic 
alleviation  to  endure  with   others),  considered  even  on   that 
a(;count  easy  to  bear  at   the   j)resent   time ;  especially,  wlun 
they  reflected  from  what  splendor  and  boasting  at  first  they 
liad  been  reduced  to  such  au'abject  terminatiou.     For  this  was 
the  greatest  reverse  that  ever  befell  α  Grecian  army ;  since, 
in  contrast  to  their  having  come  to  enslave  others,  they  had 
to  depart  in  fear  of  undergoing  that  themselves ;  and  instoj^ 
of  prayers  and  hymns,  with  which  they  sailed  from  home,  they 
liad  to  start  on  their  return  >vith  omens  the  very  contrar}'  ot" 
these ;  going  by  land,  instead  of  by  sea,  and  relying  on  a  mili- 
tary rather  than  a  naval  force.     But  nevertheless,  in  conse- 

'  OvK  άνευ  ύλίγων.]  Arnold  thinks  that  "tho  negative  must  bo  twic 
repeated,"  as  if  it  were  ονκ  άνευ  ονκ  ολίγων,  just  as  "  uon  modo"  hi  Latin 
is  used  instead  of  "  non  modo  non."    Or,  may  it  bo  considered  as  a  cm- 
fusion  of  two  expressions,  viz.,  υνκ  uvcv  ηυ?.?.ών  and  μετ^  οίκ  όλη  ων  i 


i,xxn.,LXXTii.j  TnUCYDIDES.  VII.  503 

(juoncc  of  tho  grcatnos;?  of  (ho  danger  still  impending,  all  these 
lliinj^  seemed  endurable  to  them. 

76.  Nicias,  seeing  the  army  dejected,  and  greatly  changed, 
jtassed  along  tho  ranks,  and  encouraged  and  cheered  them,  as 
well  as  existing  circumstances  allowed*;  speaking  still  louder 
than  l)ef<)re,  as  ho  severally  came  op|>osite  to  them,  in  tho 
lamestness  of  his  feeling,  and  from  wishing  to  be  of  service 
to  them  by  making  liimself  audible  to  as  many  as  possible. 

77.  "  Still,   even  in   our  j)resent   circumstances,  Athenians 
and  allies,  must  wo  cherish  hope;  for  some  men  liavc,  ere  now, 
In'on  i)reserv(.'d  even  from  more  dreadful  circumstances  than 
tluse.     Xor  should  you  think  too  meanly  of  yourselves,  or 
yield  too  much   to  your   misfortunes  and  present   sufferings, 
wliich  are  beyond  your  desert.     For  my  own  part,  though  I 
am  not  superior  to  any  of  you  in  strength  (for  you  sec  >vhat 
a  state   I   am  in   through    disease),    and  though.  I   consider 
myself  to  bo  second  to  none,  whether  in  my  private  life  or 
in  other   respects,   yet  now  I  am   exposed  to    every  danger, 
Ike   the   very  meanest.     And   yet  I  have   lived   v,\i\\   much 
devotion,'  as  regards  tho  J^ods,  and  much  justice  and  freedom 
frT)m  reproach,   as  regards  men.     And  therefore  my  hope  i» 
still  strong  for  tho   future ;  and   my  calamities  do  not  terrify 
me,  so  mu^h  as  they  might.     Nay,  they  may  perhaps  be  alle- 
viated; for  our  enemies  have  enjoyed  enough  goo<l  fortune; 
and  if  wo  displeased  any  of  the  gods  by  making  this  expedi- 
tion, we  have  already  been  sufficiently  punished  for  it.     Others 
also,  wo  know,  have  ere  now  marched  against  their  neighbors; 
and  after  acting  as  men  do,  have  suffered  Λvhat  they  could  en- 
dure.   And  so  in  our  case  it  is  reasonable  now  to  hope  that 
wc  shall  find  tho  >vrath  of  the  gods  mitigated  ;  for  we  are  now 
deserving  of  pity  at  their  hands,  rather  than  of  envy.     Ix)ok- 
•ing,  too,  on  your  own  ranks,  what  experienced  and  numerous 
men  of  arms  there  are  with  you,  advancing  in  battle-array  to^ 
irether,  do  not  bo  too  much  dismayed,  but  consider  that  you 
are  yourselves  at  once  a  city,  wherever  you  may  fiettle ;  and 
that  there  is  no  other  in  Sicily  that  would  either  easily  resist 
your  attack,  or  expel  you  when  settled   any  where.    With 
regard  to  the    march,    that    it  may  be  safe  and   orderly, 
look  to  that  yourselves;   with  no  other  consideration,  each 

^νόμιμα.]  Compare  tho  uso  of  tlio  cognato  participle,  ch.  80.  6,  f  ^» 
τ:ύ«αν  If  tlper^v  νενομισμίνην  Ιηηήΰενοιι; 


604  THUOYDIDES.  VIL  [lxxviil 

of  you,  than  that  >vhatcver  tho  spot  on  which  ho  may  \h} 
compelled  to  fight,  on  that  ho  will  liave,  if  victorious,  botli  α 
country  and  α  fortress.  And  wo  shall  hurry  on  our  way  both 
by  day  and  niji^ht  alikc^  as  we  have  but  scanty  provisions ;  aiul 
if  wo  can  only  reach  eonio  friendly  town  of  tho  Sicels  (fur 
they,  through  their  fear  of  tho  Syracusans,  are  still  true  to  us), 
then  consider  yourselves  to  bo  in  security.  And  a  niessaiio 
had  been  sent  forward  to  them,  and  dli'ections  havo  been  giv*>ii 
them  to  meet  us,  and  bring  a  fresh  supply  of  provisions,  la 
short,  you  must  bo  convinced,  soldiers,  both  that  it  is  neco- 
sary  for  you  to  bo  bravo  men — since  there  is  no  placo  near, 
which  you  can  reach  in  safety,  if  you  act  like  cowards — an•!, 
at  tho  same  time,  that  if  you  escape  from  your  enemies  now, 
tho  rest  of  you  will  gain  a  sight  of  all  you  may  any  where  wish 
to  SCO ;  and  tho  Athenians  will  raise  U|)  again,  though  fallen 
at  present,  tlie  gieat  power  of  their  country.  For  it  is  mm 
that  mako  a  city,  and  not  M'alls,  or  ships,  without  any  to  ηκιη 
them." 

78.  Nicias,  then,  delivered  this  exhortation,  and  at  the  sium• 
time  went  up  to  tlie  troops,  and  if  Jio  saw  them  any  wlit  n- 
straggling,  and  not  marching  in  order,  ho  collecteil  an! 
brought  them  to  their  post ;  while  Demosthenes  also  did  no 
less  to  those  who  were  near  him,  addressing  them  in  a  similar 
manner.  They  marched  in  tho  form  of  a  hollow  sijuare,  tlu- 
division  under  Nicias  taking  tho  lead,  and  that  of  Demosthen» -; 
following;  while  tho  baggage-bearers  anil  the  main  crowd  of 
camp  followers  were  inclosed  within  the  heavy-armed.  When 
thoy  had  come  to  tho  ford  of  tho  river  Anapus,  they  foun<l 
drawn  up  at  it  a  body  of  the  Syracusans  and  allies ;  but  havinir 
routed  these,  and  secured  tho  passage,  they  proceeded  onward; 
while  tho  Syracusans  [)ressed  tbem  with  charges  of  horse,  as 
their  light-armed  did  with  their  missiles.  On  that  day  tlio 
Athenians  advanceil  about  forty  stades,  and  then  halted  for 
tho  night  on  a  hill.  Tho  day  following  they  commencfl 
their  march  at  an  early  hour,  and  having  advanced  about 
twenty  8ta<les,  descemled  into  a  level  district,  and  there  en- 
camped, wishing  to  procure  some  eatables  from  tho  h(»usis 
(for  tho  placo  was  inhabited),  and  to  carry  on  with  them  water 
from  it,  since  for  many  stades  before  them,  in  the  direction  tin} 
were  to  go,  it  was  not  plentiful.  The  Syracusans,  in  the  mtaii 
timo,  had  gone  on  before,  and  were  blocking  up  the  pass  in  ai- 


Lxxix.,  Lxxx]  THUCYDIDE3  ΥΠ.  δ05 

vaiiro  of  tlicm.  For  tlicrc  was  λ  stcop  hill,  Mith  λ  prcripitoufi 
ravino  on  cither  sido  of  it,  called  the  Aor.Tum  Ixpas.  The  next 
(lav  the  Athenians  a(lvnnee<l,  and  the  liorpo  an<l  dartnicn 
of*  the  Syracusans  and  allies,  caeh  in  great  numhers,  im- 
])oded  their  proiTreus,  hurling  tlieir  missiles  upon  them,  and 
nnnoying  them  >vith  cavalry  charges.  The  Athenians  fought 
for  a  long  time,  and  then  returned  again  to  the  same  camp, 
no  longer  having  provisions  as  they  had  hefore  ;  for  it  was 
no  nioro  possible  to  leave  their-  position  because  of  the  cav• 
airy. 

VO.  Having  started  oarlv,  they  began  llieir  march  again, 
;!IhI  forced  their  way  to  the  hill  which  had  been  fortified ; 
where  they  found  l>eforo  ihem  the  enemy*»  infantry  drawn  up 
for  the  defense  of  the  wall  many  spears  deep  ;  for  the  pass  was 
biit  narrow.  The  Athenians  charged  and  a«5saultcd  the  >vall, 
but  being  annoyed  with  missiles  bv  a  large  bo<ly  from  the  hill, 
which  was  steep  (for  those  on  the  heights  more  easily  readied 
their  aim),  and  not  being  able  to  force  a  passage,  they  re- 
treated again,  and  rested.  Thero  happened  also  to  be  at  tho 
same  time  some  claps  of  thunder  and  rain,  as  is  generally  tho 
;  <nse  when•  tho  year  is  now  verging  on  autumn ;  in  conf*e- 
•  iiiencG  of  which  tho  Athenians  wero  still  more  dispirited,  and 
f  nought  that  all  these  things  also  were  conspiring  together  for 
their  ruin.  ΛΥΙηΙο  they  were  resting,  Gylippus  and  tho  Syra- 
«usans  sent  a  part  of  their  troops  to  intercept  them  again  with 
η  wall  on  their  rear,  Avhero  they  had  already  passed  ;  i)ut  they, 
on  their  side  also,  sent  some  of  their  men  against  them,  and 
prevented  their  doing  it.  After  this,  tho  Athenians  retitrncd 
again  witli  all  their  army  into  tho  more  level  country, 
and  thero  halted  for  the  night.  Tho  next  day  they  raarchcd 
forward,  while  tho  8yracusans  discharged  their  weapons  on 
them,  surrounding  them  on  all  sides,  and  disabled  many  with 
wounds;  retreating  if  tho  Athenians  advanced  against  them, 
and  pressing  on  them  if  they  gave  way ;  most  especially  at- 
tacking their  extreme  rear,  in  tho  hope  that  by  routing  them 
littlo  by  little,  they  might  strike  terror  into  tho  whole  army. 
Tho  Athenians  resisted  this  mode  of  attack  for  a  long  time, 
^•ut  then,  after  advancing  five  or  six  stades,  halted  for  rest  on  the 
plain ;  while  tho  Syracusans  also  went  away  from  them  to  theit 
"wn  ramp. 
«0.  During  tho  night,  their  troops  being  in  α  wretched 
^2 


50β  THUCTDIDES.  VIL  [lxxxi. 

condition,  both  from  the  want  of  all  provisions  which  was  now 
felt,  and  from  so  many  men  being  disabled  by  wounds  in  tli.• 
numerous  attacks  that  Iwid  been  mado  upon  them  by  {L•- 
enemy,  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  determined  to  light  as  mnny 
fires  as  possible,  and  then  lead  oiF  tho  army,  no  longer  by  iL• 
eamo  route  as  they  had  intended,  but  in  tho  opposite  direetion 
to  where  tho  Syracusiuis  were  watching  for  tliem,  namely,  ti» 
the  sea.  Now  the  whole  of  this  road  would  lead  the  arni.i 
ment,  not  toward  Catana,  but  to  tho  other  side  of  Sicily,  t»• 
Camarina,  and  Gela,  and  tho  cities  in  that  direction,  whetlwr 
(irecian  or  barbarian.  Thry  kindled,  therefore,  many  tins, 
and  began  their  march  in  the  night.  And  as  alj  armien,  ami 
especially  tho  la>gest,  are  liable  to  have  terrors  and  panics 
piixluced  among  them,  particularly  when  marching  at  ni^lit, 
and  through  an  enemy's  country,  and  with  the  enemy  not  far 
olf,  so  thet/  also  were  thrown  into  alarm;  and  the  division  if 
Nieias,  taking  the  lead  as  it  did,  kept  together  and  got  a  Ιοπ^,γ 
way  in  advance ;  while  that  of  Demosthenes,  containing  ahoui 
half  or  more,  was  separated  from  the  others,  and  proceeded  in 
greater  disorder.  By  tho  morning,  nevertheless,  they  arrived  at 
the  sea-coast,  and  entering  on  what  is  called  the  llelorine  rc.-nl, 
contiimed  their  march,  in  order  that  when  they  liad  reached  tl » 
river  Cacyparia,  they  might  march  up  along  its  banks  thioiiL:!» 
the  interior ;  for  thoy  hoped  also  that  in  this  direction  the  Sic•  1-, 
to  whom  they  had  sent,  would  come  to  meet  them.  But  >vli.  u 
they  had  reached  the  river,  they  found  a  guard  of  the  Syra»  u 
sans  there  too,  intercepting  the  pass  with  a  wall  and  a  palisa<ii , 
having  carried  which  they  crossed  tho  liver,  and  marched  ( i. 
again  to  another  called  the  Erincus;  for  this  >vas  the  rout» 
>vliich  their  guides  directed  them  to  take. 

81.  In  the  mean  time  the  Syracusans  and  allies,  as  soon  j.^ 
it  was  day,  and  they  found  that  the  Athenians  had  departed, 
most  of  tliem  charged  Gylippus  with  having  purposely  I»^t 
them  escaiKJ ;  and  pursuing  with  all  haste  by  the  route  whi*  !i 
they  had  no  difficulty  in  finding  they  had  taken,  they  overtook 
them  about  dinner-time.  When  they  camo  up  with  the  trooj  ^ 
under  Demosthenes,  >vhich  were  behind  tho  rest,  and  marchiiiu 
more  slowly  and  disorderly,  ever  since  they  had  been  throw  r. 
into  confusion  during  tho  night,  at  the  time  we  have  mention*  »!. 
ihey  immediately  fell  upon  and  engaged  them ;  imd  the  Syia 
cusan   horse  surrounded    them  with   greater  case  from  their 


LxxxiL]  THUCYDIDES.  VII.  507 

bein!^  divided,  and  confined  them  in  a  narrow  ppacc.  Tho 
divi.sion  of  Nicias  was  as  much  as  fifty  stadcs  oflf  in  advamcc ;  ' 
for  ho  led  them  on  more  rapidly,  thinking  that  their  preserv- 
ation depended,  under  such  circumstances,  not  on  staying  bc- 
liind,  if  they  could  help  it,  and  on  fighting,  but  on  retreating 
as  quickly  as  possible,  and  only  figliting  as  often  as  tliey  wcro 
eompelled.  1  >emosthenes,  on  tlio  other  liand,  was,  generally 
speaking,  involved  in  more  incessant  labor  (because,  as  ho 
v;as  retreating  in  tho  roar,  he  was  tho  first  that  tho  enemy  at• 
tacked),  and  on  that  occasion,  finding  that  tho  f^yracusans 
Averc  in  pui*suit,  ho  was  not  80  much  inclined  to  push  on  as  to 
form  liis  men  for  battle  ;  until,  through  thus  loit<'ring,  ho  wa•* 
siirrounded  by  them,  and  both  himself  and  tho  Athenians  with 
him  were  thrown  into  groat  confusion.  For  being  driven 
lack  into  a  certain  spot  wliich  liad  a  wall  all  round  it,  with  a 
road  on  each  sido,  and  inanv  olive-trees  growing  about,  they 
were  annoyed  with  missiles  m  every  direction.  This  kind  of 
iittack  tho  Syracusiins  naturally  adopted,  instead  of  close  com- 
bat ;  for  to  risk  their  lives  against  men  reduced  to  despair  was 
no  longer  for  their  advantage,  so  nmch  as  for  tliat  of  tho 
Athenians.  'IVsides,  after  success  which  was  now  so  signal, 
each  man  spared  himself  in  some  degree,  that  lie  might  not  bo 
cut  oflf  before  tho  end  of  the  ])usiness.  They  tliought  too  that, 
ivon  as  it  was,  they  should  by  this  kind  of  fighting  eubduo  and 
caj)turo  them. 

82.  At  any  rate,  wlu^n,  after  plying  tho  Athenians  and  tlieir 
allies  Avith  missiles  all  day  from  every  quarter,  they  saw  them 
now  distressed  by  wounds  and  other  sufierings,  Gylippus 
with  tho  Syracusans  and  allies  mado  a  prochunation,  in  tho 
first  place,  that  any  of  the  islanders  who  clioso  should  como 
over  to  them,  on  condition  of  retaining  his  lil>erty:  /rnd  some 
few  states  went  over.  Afterward,  ti'rras  wcro  mado  with  all 
tho  troops  under.  Demosthenes,  that  they  should  surrender 
their  arms,  and  that  no  ono  should  bo  put  to  death,  cither  by 
violence,  or  imprisonment,  or  want  of  such  nourishment  a-^ 
was  most  absolutely  requisite.  Thus  there  surrendered,  in 
all,  to  tho  number  of  six  thousand  ;  and  the  Λνΐιοΐο  of  tho 
money  in  their  possession  they  laid  down,  throwing  it  into 
tlic  hollow  of  shields,  four  of  which  they  filled  vi\{]\  it.  Theso 
they  immediately  led  back  to  tho  city,  whilo  Nicias  and  his 
division,  arrived  that  day  on  tho  banks  of  tho  river  Erineus ; 


508  THUCYBIDEa  VIL  [uxxiii ,  Lxxxi? . 

having  crossed  which,  he  posted  hie  army  on  eoino  high 
ground. 

83.  ΤΙΐθ  Syracusans,  having  overtaken  liim  the  next  day, 
told  him  that  Demosthenes  and  his  division  had  surrendered 
themselves,  and  called  on  him  also  to  do  the  same.  Being  in- 
credulous of  the  fact,  he  obtained  a  truce  to  enable  liim  to 
send  a  horseman  to  see.  When  ho  had  gone,  and  brought 
word  back  again  that  they  had  surrendered,  Nicias  sent  η 
herald  to  Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans,  saying  that  lιeΛva.s 
ready  to  agi'eo  >vith  the  Syracusans,  on  behalf  of  the  Atht'ii- 
ians  to  repay  whatever  money  the  Syracusans  had  spent  υ:ι 
the  war,  on  condition  of  their  letting  hi»  army  go ;  and  that 
until  the  money  was  paid,  ho  would  give  Athenians  as  host- 
ages, one  for  every  talent.  The  Syracusans  and  Gylippus  did 
nut  accede  to  thcso  proposals,  but  fell  upon  this  division  als»i, 
and  surrounded  them  on  all  sides,  and  annoyed  them  with  their 
missiles  until  late  in  the  day.  And  they  too,  like  the  others, 
were  in  a  wretched  plight  for  want  of  food  and  necessaries. 
Nevertheless,  they  Avatched  for  the  quiet  of  the  night,  an! 
then  intended  to  pursue  their  march.  And  they  wore  now  ju-t 
taking  up  their  arms,  when  the  Syracusans  jierceived  it  anl 
raised  their  prcan.  The  Athenians,  therefore,  tinding  that  tiny 
had  not  eluded  their  observation,  laid  their  anns  down  again  ; 
excepting  about  three  hundred  men,  Λνΐιο  forced  their  way 
through  the  sentinels,  and  proceeded,  during  the  night,  how 
and  \vhero  they  could. 

84.  As  soon  {«  it  was  day,  Nicias  led  his  troo])s  forward ; 
Avhilo  the  Syracusans  and  allies  pressed  on  them  in  the  sani.• 
manner,  discharging  their  missiles  at  them,  and  striking  them 
down  with  their  javelins  on  every  side.  The  Athenians  >ven! 
liurrying  on  to  reach  the  river  Aasinarus,  being  urged  to  this  at 
once  by  the  attack  made  on  every  side  of  them  by  the  numer- 
ous cavalry  and  the  rest  of  the  light-armed  nmltitudo  (tor 
thoy  thought  they  should  be  more  at  ease  if  they  were  on<«i 
across  the  river),  and  also  by  their  weariness  and  craving  for 
drink.  AVhen  they  reached  its  banks,  they  rushed  into  it 
without  any  more  regard  for  order,  every  man  anxious  to  b«• 
himself  the  first  to  cross  it ;  Avhilo  the  attack  of  the  enemy 
rendered  the  passage  more  diiHcult.  For  being  cotnjK-Ued  t«: 
.".ilvanco  in  α  dense  body,  they  fell  upon  and  trode  down  on  ■ 
another ;  and  some  of  them  died  immediately  on  the  javelin- 


Lxxxv.,Lxxxvi.]  TIIUCYDIDEa  Vll.  500 

and  nrtielos  of  bacfirafie,'  wliilc  others  wore  entangled  togetlior, 
and  floatcui  down  tJio  stroain.  On  tlio  otlicr  side  of  the  river, 
too,  tho  Syracusans  lined  tlio  bank,  >vliich  was  precipitous,  and 
from  the  higher  ground  discharged  their  missiles  on  the  Athe- 
nians, while  most  of  them  were  eagerly  drinking,  and  in  con- 
fusion among  themselves  in  the  hollow  bed  of  the  stream.  The 
Peloponnesians,  moreover,  came  down  to  them  and  butchered 
them,  especially  those  in  the  river.  And  thus  the  water  Avas 
immediately  spoiled ;  but  nevertheless  it  was  drunk  by  them, 
mud  and  all,  bloody  as  it  was,  and  was  even  fought  for  by  most 
of  them. 

85.  At  length,  when  many  dead  >vero  now  }>eaped  one  upon 
another  in  the  river,  and  the  army  was  destroyed,  either  at 
the  river,  or,  even  if  any  part  had  escaped,  by  the  cavalry, 
Niiias  surrendered  himself  to  Gylippus,  placing  more  con- 
Hdence  in  him  than  in  the  Syracusans  ;  and  desired  liim  and 
the  Lacediemonians  to  do  what  they  ])leased  with  himself,  r.nd 
to  stop  butchering  the  rest  of  the  soldiers.  After  this,  (Jylip- 
})us  commanded  to  make  prisoners ;  and  they  collected  all  that 
were  «ilive,  except  such  as  they  concealed  for  their  own 
benefit  (of  whom  there  was  λ  large  number).  They  also  sent 
a  piirty  in  pursuit  of  the  three  Imndred,  Avho  had  forced  their 
way  through  the  sentinels  during  the  night,  and  took  tliem. 
Tho  part  of  the  army,  then,  that  was  collected  as  general 
property,  was  not  large,  but  that  which  was  secreted  was  con- 
siderable ;  and  the  Λνΐιοΐο  of  Sicily  Λvas  filled  with  them,  inas- 
much as  thev  had  not  been  taken  on  definite  terms  of  surrender, 
like  those  with  Demosthenes.  Indeed  no  small  part  was  actu- 
ally put  to  death ;  for  this  was  tho  most  extensive  slaughter, 
and  surpassed  by  none  of  all  that  occurred  in  this  Sicilian  war. 
In  tho  other  encounters  also  which  were  frequent  oil  their 
march,  no  few  liad  fallen.  But  many  also  escaped,  neverthe- 
less ;  some  at  tho  moment,  others  after  serving  as  slaves,  and 
running  away  subsequently.  These  found  a  place  of  refuge  at 
("atina, 

86.  When  tho  Syracusans  and  allies  were  ^«isembled  toge- 
ther, they  took  with  them  as  many  prisoners  as  they  could, 
Nvith  tho  spoils,  and  returned  to  the  city.     All  tho  rest  of  tho 

'  i  «.,  Bomo  died  immediately  on  tho  javelins,  while  otiicrs  fell  over 
the  looeo  articles  of  baggape,  and  being  too  weak  to  regain  their  footing, 
were  floated  down  tho  stream    . 


610  THUOYDIDES.  VII.  [lxxxvii. 

Athenians  and  ike  allies  that  tliey  had  taken,  they  sent  down 
iuto  the  quarries,  thinking  this  the  safest  way  of  kecpiii<r 
them :  but  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  they  executed,  against 
the  wish  of  Gylippus.  For  ho  thought  it  would  bo  a  gloriouH 
distinction  for  him,  in  addition  to  all  his  other  achievement"^, 
to  take  to  tho  Lacedaimouians  even  tho  generals  who  had  com- 
manded against  them.  And  it  so  happened  that  one  of  these, 
namely  Demosthenes,  was  regarded  by  them  as  their  most  in- 
veterate enemy,  in  consequenco  of  what  ha<i  occurred  on  tlio 
island  and  at  Pylus ;  tho  other  for  tho  same  reasons,  as  most 
iu  their  interest ;  for  Nicias  had  exerted  himself  for  the  release• 
of  the  Lacedaiinoniaiis  taken  from  tho  island,  by  persuadinjjj 
the  Athenians  to  make  a  treaty.  On  this  account  tho  Lacedie- 
raonians  had  friendly  feelings  toward  him  ;  and  iiuleed  it  was 
mainly  for  tho  same  reason  that  ho  re|>osed  conlidonco  iu  (Jylij)- 
pus,  and  surrendered  himself  to  him.  liut  certain  of  thi 
Syracusans  (as  it  >vas  said)  were  afraid,  somo  of  them,  sinci 
they  had  heKl  communicatioa  with  him,  that  if  put  to  tho  tor- 
ture, ho  might  cause  them  trouble  on  that  account  in  the  midst 
of  their  success  ;  oihers,  aiid  especially  tlio  Corinthians,  lest  he 
might  bribe  ponio,  as  ho  Avas  rich,  and  effect  his  escape,  and  so 
they  should  agaK>  incur  inisc  hief  through  his  agency ;  and  there- 
fore they  persuaded  tho  allies,  and  put  him  to  death.  For  this 
cause  then,  or  something  very  like  this,  ho  Avas  executed ;  hav- 
ing least  of  all  tho  Greeks  in  my  time  deserved  to  meet  λ\ιύ\ 
such  a  misfortune,  on  acct>unt  of  his  devoted  attention  to  the 
practice  of  every  virtue. 

87.  As  for  those  in  tho  quarries,  tho  Syracusans  treated  them 
with  cruelty  during  tho  first  period  of  their  captivity.  For  n;; 
they  wore  in  a  hollow  place,  and  many  in  a  small  compass,  the 
sun,  as  well  as  tho  sutlOcating  closeness,  distressed  them  at  first, 
in  consequenco  of  their  not  being  under  cover ;  and  then,  oi\ 
the  contrary,  tho  nights  coming  on  autumnal  and  cold,  soon 
worked  in  them  an  alteration  from  health  to  disease,  by  means 
of  tho  change.  Some,  too,  in  consequenco  of  their  Avant  of 
room,  they  did  every  thing  in  tho  same  place  ;  and  the  deatl, 
moreover,  were  piled  up  ono  upon  another — such  as  died  from 
their  wounds,  and  from  the  change  they  had  expc'rienced,  and 
such  like — there  were,  besides,  intolerable  stenches;  while  at  tho 
same  time  they  were  tormented  with  hunger  and  thirst ;  for 
during  eight  months  they  gave  each  of  them  daily  only  a 


Lxxxvii.]  THUCTDIDES.  VII.  5ΐ| 

fo/y/c'  of  water,  and  two  of  com.  And  of  all  iho  other  misc-' 
lies  which  it  was  likely  that  men  thrown  into  snch  a  plaro 
would  ftuiVcr,  there  was  none  that  did  not  fall  to  their  lot.  For 
i^oine  ficventy  days  they  thus  lived  all  together ;  but  then  they 
sold  tlio  rest  of  them,  except  the  Athenians,  and  >vhatever 
Siceiots  or  Italiots  had  joined  them  in  the  expedition.  Tho 
total  number  of  those  who  were  taken,  though  it  were  difficult 
to  speak  with  exactness,  was  still  not  less  than  seven  thousand. 
And  this  >va8  tho  greatest  Grecian  exploit  of  all  that  woro'J 
performed  in  this  war ;  nay,  in  my  opinion,  of  all  Grecian 
achievements  that  wo  have  heard  of  also;  and  was  at  onco 
most  splendid  for  tho  conquerors,  and  most  disastrous  for  tho 
conquered.  For  being  altogether  vnnquished  at  all  points, 
and  having  suffered  in  no  slight  degree  in  any  respect,  thcv 
woro  destroyed  (as  tho  saying  is)  with  utter  destruction,  both 
army,  and  navy,  and  every  thing ;  and  only  a  few  out  of 
many  returned  homo.  Such  wcro  tho  events  which  occurred 
in  Sicily. 

*  Tho  coiyle  was  a  llttlo  more  than  half  an  English  pint;  and  tho  al- 
lowance of  food  here  mentioned  was  only  half  of  that  commonly  given 
to  a  slave.    Beo  Arnold's  note. 


BOOK  VIII. 


1.  When  tlio  news  was  brought  to  Athens,  for  a  long  time 
they  disbelieved  even  the  most  respectable  of  the  eoldieiv. 
who  had  escaped  from  the  very  scene  of  action,  and  gave  thoiii 
a  correct  account  of  it ;  not  creditincf  that  their  forces  coul.i 
have  been  so  utterly  destroyed.  When,  however,  they  wtr. 
convinced  of  it,  they  were  angry  with  those  of  tlie  orators  >*}i 
had  joined  iu  prouioting  the  ex|)edition  ;  (as  though  tlicy  ha.. 
not  voted  for  it  themselves;)  and  were  enraged  with  the  soot  I: 
sayers  and  reciters  of  oracles,  and  whoever  at  that  time  ly 
any  practice  of  divination  had  put  tliem  ou  hoping  that  th»  \ 
ehouid  subdue  Sicily.  Every  tiling,  indeed,  on  every  hide  di> 
tressed  them;  and  after  Λvhat  luul  hapjK»ned,  fear  and  tlu 
greatest  coiisteriiatioii  overwhelmed  them.  For  they  were  ιλ 
once  weighed  down  by  the  loss  which  every  man  individuall\. 
as  well  a*  tho  wholo  state  at  large,  had  experienced,  by  th 
destruction  of  so  many  heavy-armed,  and  horsemen,  ai..! 
troops  iu  the  llower  of  their  youth,  like  which  they  ya\> 
they  had  none  left;  and  at  tho  same  time  being  aware  tli. 
they  had  no  competent  niunbiT  of  ships  in  the  docks,  i;»  • 
money  in  tho  treasury,  nor  crews  for  their  vessels,  they  w.  li 
jit  present  without  hope  of  saving  themselves.  They  thouiilr 
too,  that  they  should  havo  tluir  enenues  in  Sicily  directly  sii! 
ing  with  their  lleet  against  tho  Pirams,  especially  after  lli»  \ 
had  gained  such  a  victory  ;  and  that  their  foes  at  home,  tlu  ι 
doubly  equipped  on  all  points,  would  surely  now  press  thtih 
with  all  their  might,  botli  by  land  and  by  sea,  and  their  owu 
allies  with  them  in  revolt.  Kut  nevertheless  it  was  deteimin»»!. 
that,  as  far  as  their  present  η  sources  allowed,  they  ought  in-t 
to  submit,  but  to  equip  a  tleet,  by  whatever  means  they  coui-: 
providing  by  contribution  both  timber  and  money  ;  and  to  pu 
matters  on  a  secure  footing  among  tho  allies,  esj)ecially  ii 
Eubcea:  aml^  moreover,  to  reform  every  thing  in  tho  city,  wii!» 


π.,  ΠΙ.]  THUCTDIDES.  VIIL  613 

Λ  view  to  prcater  economy,  and  elect  a  council  of  elders,  who 
should  deliberate  beforehand  on  their  present  measures,  as 
ilierc  might  bo  occasion.  And  throunrli  their  excessive  fear  at 
the  moment  they  were  ready  (as  is  the  people's  fashion),  to  bo 
orderly  in  every  thing.  Having  thus  determined,  they  acted 
accorJingly,  and  so  tlio  summer  ended. 

2,  The  tbllowing  winter,  all  the  Greeks  were  immediately  ex- 
cited by  the  great  misfortune  of  the  Athenians  in  Sicily.  Thoso 
who  >vcro  not  in  alliance  with  cither  side  thought,  that  even 
if  no  one  called  on  them  for  aid,  they  ought  not  any  longer  to 
keep  aloof  from  the  war,  but  should  volunteer  to  march  against 
the  Athenians,  when  they  reflected  severally  that  they  might 
have  attacked  them  also,  il*  they  had  succeeded  in  their  measures 
at  Syracuse;  and,  moreover,  that  the  renuiinder  of  the  war 
would  be  but  brief,  and  that  it  was  creditable  for  them  to  take 
tlieir  sharo  in  it.  The  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  on  the 
otlwr  hand  felt  to  a  greater  degree  than  before  a  common 
anxiety  to  have  done  six-edily  >vith  their  heavy  labors.  But, 
above  all,  the  subjects  of  the  Athenians  were  ready,  even  be- 
yond their  power,  to  revolt  from  them;  because  they  judged 
of  affairs  under  the  influence  of  strong  fueling,  and  did  not  so 
much  as  leave  them  a  chance  of  being  able  to  hold  out  the  fol- 
lowing summer.  The  Laced.'cmonian  state  was  encouraged 
by  all  these  things,  and  most  of  all,  because  their  allies  in 
Sicily,  since  their  navy  had  now  of  necessity  been  added  to 
their  resourc^is,  would  in  all  probability  bo  with  them  in  great 
force  with  the  spring.  And  thus  being  on  every  account  full 
of  hope,  they  determined  to  devote  themselves  unflinchingly  to 
the  war,  reckoning  that  by  its  successful  termination  they 
would  both  bo  released  in  future  from  all  dangers,  like  that 
Avhich  would  have  encompassed  them  from  the  Athenians,  if 
they  had  Avon  Sicily  in  addition  to  their  other  dominion  ;  and 
that,  after  subduing  them,  they  would  themselves  then  enjoy 
in  safety  tho  supremacy  over  the  whole  of  Greece. 

3.  Agis,  their  king,  set  out  therefore  immediately,  during 
this  winter,  with  some  troops  from  Decelea,  and  levied  from 
tho  allies  contributions  for  their  fleet;  and  having  turned  in 
tho  direction  of  the  Malian  gulf,  and  carried  oflf,  on  tho  ground 
of  their  long-standing  enmity,  the  greater  part  of  tho  exposed 
l)roperty  of  tho  (Etaens,  ho  exacted  money  for  tho  ransom  of 

I        it ;  and  also  compelled  tho  Achscans  of  Pthiotis,  and  tho  otbet 

I  •    Qcyy 

i         '  ■     ' 


δ14  THUCYDIDES.  Vlli  Ιιν.,τ, 

subjects  of  tho  Tbessaliaus  thoroabouts  ^though  tho  Thessa< 
liaiis  remonstrated  with  biin,  au(i  objected  to  it),  to  give  both 
hostages  and  money ;  tho  former  ot*  wluch  ho  deposited  at 
Corinth,  and  endeavored  to  bring  tlieir  countrymen  over  to 
tho  confederucy.  The  Lacediemonians  also  issued  to  the  statrs 
α  requisition  lor  building  a  liundred  sliips,  fixing  their  own 
quota  and  that  of  the  Boeotians  at  five  and  twerity  each;  that 
of  tho  Phocians  and  Locrians  together  at  fifteen ;  that  of  iL• 
Corinthians  at  fifteen;  that  of  the  ArcaiJians,  Pellenians,  an• I 
Sicyonians,  at  ten;  and  tliat  of  tho  Megarcans,  Treezenians, 
Epidaurians,  and  Ilermionians  at  ten.  They  were  als.» 
making  all  other  j)reparations,  >vith  tho  intention  of  proceediin^ 
immediately  to  war  at  tho  very  commencement  of  spring. 

4.  The  Athenians  too,  as  they  had  determined,  Λvere  prepar- 
ing during  this  same  winter  for  building  ships;  having  con- 
tributed toward  the  supply  of  timbers,  and  fortified  Suniuni. 
that  their  corn-ships  might  have  a  safo  passage  round ;  wliil. 
they  also  evacuated  the  fort  in  Liconia,  which  they  had  biiil: 
in  that  country  >vhen  they  were  sailing  by  it  for  Sicily;  an  1 
with  a  view  to  economy  retrenched  all  their  other  expens»^^ 
Avliatever  any  where  appeared  to  be  useless  expemliture ;  an.l. 
above  all  kept  their  eye  on  tho  allies,  to  prevent  their  revok- 
ing from  them. 

5.  While  b«)th  parties  were  carrying  out  these  measun-. 
and  engaged  in  prej)aration  for  tho  war,  just  as  when  tluy 
were  couunencing  it,  tho  EulxEans,  first  of  all,  84>nt  during  tliis 
Avinter  an  embassy  to  Agis,  to  treat  of  their  revolting  from  tl»• 
Athenians.  Ho  acceded  to  their  proposals,  and  sent  for  Alca- 
mencs  son  of  Sthenelaidas,  and  for  Melanthus,  to  come  from 
Sparta  and  take  tho  command  in  Euboea.  Accordingly  tluy 
camo  Avith  about  three  hundred  of  tho  Neodamodes,  and  li• 
began  to  j)reparo  for  their  crossing  over,  liut  in  tho  moah 
time  somo  Lesbians  also  camo  to  him  ;  for  they,  too,  wislul 
to  revolt.  And  as  tho  Boeotians  sup|>orted  their  application. 
Agis  was  persuaded  to  defer  acting  in  tho  cause  of  Eubaa. 
?ind  made  preparations  for  tho  revolt  of  the  Lesbians,  giving' 
them  Alcamenes  as  a  commander,  who  was  to  sail  to  Euboea ; 
while  tho  Boeotians  promised  them  ten  ships,  and  Agis  tli 
Bamo  number.  These  measures  Λvero  undertaken  Avithout  ΐΐκ 
authority  of  tho  Lacedaimonian  state ;  for  as  long  as  Agis  wa- 
nt Decelea,  and  his  forces  with  him,  ho  liad  power  both  to  send 


ι  VI.}  THUCYDIDES.  VUI.  515 

troops  to  whatever  quarter  he  pleased,  and  to  levjr  soldiers  and 
money.  And  at  tliis  time  the  allies  obeyed  him,  one  might 
say,  much  more  than  the  Lacedocinonians  in  the  city  :  for  ho 
was  feared,  because  he  Avent  every  "where  in  person  with  a 
force  at  his  command.  He,  then,  furthered  the  views  of  tho 
Lesbians.  The  Chians  and  Erythrjeans,  on  the  other  hand, 
who  were  also  ready  ta  revolt,  made  their  application,  not  to 
Airis,  but  at  Sparta.  There  went  Λ\'ύ\\  them  also  an  embassador 
from  Tissapherncs,  who  >vas  governor  of  tho  sea-coast  under 
kinnr  Darius,  son  of  Artaxerxes.  For  Tissapherncs  also  was 
inviting  tho  Lacedicmonians  to  co-oixjratc  Λvith  him,  and 
])romised  to  furnish  them  with  supplies.  For  ho  had  lately 
been  called  on  by  tho  king  for  the  tribute  duo  from  his  govern- 
ment, for  which  ho  was  in  arrears,  as  ho  could  not  raise  it 
from  the  Greek  cities  because  of  the  Athenians.  He  thought, 
therefore,  that  he  should  both  get  in  liis  tribute  more  effect' 
ually,  if  he  reduced  the  power  of  tho  Athenians ;  and  at  tho 
same  time  should  gain  for  the  king  the  alliance  of  tlie  Lacedaj•» 
monians ;  and  either  take  alive,  or  put  to  death,  as  the  king 
had  commanded  him  to  do,  Amorges,  tho  natural  son  of 
risuthnes,  who  was  in  rel)ellion  on  the  coast  of  Caria.  Tho 
Chians  and  Tissaj)hernes,  then,  Avero  negotiating  this  business 
ill  concert. 

0.  About  tho  sa?no  time  C.alligitus  son  of  Laophon,  a  Mc- 
garean,  and  Timagores  son  of  Athenagoras,  a  Cyzicene^  both 
of  them  exiles  from  their  country,  and  living  at  the  court  of 
Iharnabazus  son  of  riiarnaces,  arrived  at  Lacedicmon,  being 
sent  by  Phamabazus  to  bring  a  fleet  dispatched  to  the  Hel- 
lespont; and  that  ho  himself,  if  possible,  might  for  the  sake 
of  tho  tribute,  cause  tho  cities  in  his  government  to  revolt 
from  tho  Athenians — tho  same  obicct  as  Tissapherncs  had 
in  view — and  gain  for  tho  king  by  h\a  own  agency,  tho  al- 
liance of  tho  I^ccdt'vmonians.  While  these  negotiations  were 
severally  carried  on  by  each  piirty,  by  tho  emissaries  both  of 
riiamabaztis  and  of  Tissapherncs,  there  was  great  competition 
l>etwcen  them  at  Lacedaimon,  tho  ono  striving  to  prevail  on 
them  to  send  a  navy  and  army  to  Ionia  and  Chios  first,  tho 
other  to  tho  Hellespont.  Tlio  Lacedaimonians,  however,  nc- 
eodcd  with  a  very  decided  preference  to  the  application  of  tho 
vJhiane  and  Tissapherncs.  For  Alcibiades  was  also  co-oper- 
ating with  them,  being  th•  hereditary  and  very  intimate  friend 


51β  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  [vil.vui. 

of  Endiua,  ono  of  tho  epkors ;  for  which  reason  also  hie  family 
had  a  Lacedaemonian  name,  in  consequence  of  this  friendshii» ; 
for  Endius  was  called  "  tho  son  of  Alcibiades."  *  However, 
tlio  Lacedaimonians  first  sent  to  Chios  Phrynis,  ouo  of  tli.i 
Periocci^  to  ascerUiin  w  hether  they  liad  as  many  ships  as  they 
said,  and  whether  their  city  corresponded  with  the  represent- 
ations of  its  high  character :  and  when  he  brought  them  word 
back  that  what  they  heard  was  true,  they  straightway  took 
the  Chians  and  Erythrieans  into  alliance,  and  resolved  to  send 
them  forty  ships,  as  there  were  already  there  (according  to  tht 
statement  of  the  Chians)  not  less  than  sixty.  Of  these  they 
themselves  at  first  intended  to  send  ten,  with  Melancridas,  win» 
was  their  high  admiral ;  but  afterward,  an  earthquake  havinir 
occurred,  instead  of  Mdancridcis  they  determined  to  sen! 
Chalcideus,  and  instead  of  tho  ten  ships  to  equip  but  five  iu 
Laconia.  And  thus  the  winter  ended,  and  the  nineteenth  year 
of  this  war  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

The  following  summer  when  the  Chians  straightway  urg<M 
them  to  dispatch  tho  fleet,  and  Λvere  afraid  that  the  Athenians 
might  get  nitelligenca  of  their  measures  (for  all  parties  soiit 
their  embassies  without  their  knowledge),  tho  Lacedajmonians 
sent  three  Spartans  to  Coiinth,  to  liaul  the  ships  as  quicky  as 
possible  across  tho  Isthnms,  from  tho  op])osite  sea  to  that  on 
tho  side  of  Athens,  and  to  give  orders  for  them  all  to  ui\\  to 
Chios,  both  those  which  Agis  was  preparing  for  Lesbos,  an. I 
the  rest.  Now  the  total  number  of  tho  ships  belonging  to  tli< 
allied  states  that  were  there  was  thirty-nine. 

8.  Calligitus,  then,  and  Timagoras,  acting  in  behalf  ot' 
Pharnabazus,  did  not  join  tho  rest  in  tho  expedition  to  Chio-, 
or  give,  to  forward  tho  dispatch  of  the  fleet,  tho  money  whi( !i 
they  had  brought  with  them,  namely,  five  and  twenty  talents ; 
but  they  intended  to  sail  afterward  by  themselves  with  a  fresh 
armament.  Agis,  on  the  contrary,  seeing  that  tlio  Lace- 
dajinonians  were  determined  to  send  to  Chios  first,  did  nut 
himself  maintain  any  difl'erent  view,  but  tho  allies  asseuibled 
at  Corinth,  and  held  a  council,  when  they  resolved  to  sail  first 
to  Chio3,  with  Chalcideus  as  commander,  who  Λvas  equippin:,' 

>  "That  is,  Alcibiades  was  tho  distinjiulshing  family  naraooftl'- 
Endius,  borno  by  tho  inembors  of  his  house  in  every  altornato  genem- 
tioa ;  BO  that  Alcibiades  was  tho  surnamo  to  every  Endius,  and  Eadiu* 
tho  auruamo  to  every  Alcibiades." — AtmUi. 


IX.,  χ.]  THUCYDIDEa   VIII.  5 1 Τ 

(ho  five  vessels  ia  Laconia ;  then  to  Lesbos,  with  Alcamenes 
in  rommnnd  (the  same  person  as  Agis  intended  to  appoint): 
nmi,  lastly,  to  go  to  the  Hellespont,  >vherc  Clearchus,  son  of 
liHuiphias,  was  appointed  to  the  coinmaiid.  But  thoy  deter- 
niiuud  to  take  ofily  half  the  ships  across  the  Isthmus  first,  and 
let  these  sail  oil'  immediately ;  that  tho  Athenians  might  not 
attend  to  those  which  were  setting  out,  so  much  as  to  thoso 
which  were  being  conveyetl  across  after  them.  For  in  this 
(uso  they  were  making  their  expedition  openly,  as  they  im- 
puted to  tho  Athenians  a  want  of  power  to  oppose  them,  bo- 
<auso  no  numerous  fleet  iMjIonging  to  them  >vas  yet  visible. 
And  so,  according  to  their  resolution,  they  immediately  took 
across  one  and  twenty  ships. 

9.  But  when  they  were  urgent  for  setting  sail,  tho  Corinth- 
ians wore  not  disposed  to  accompany  thein  before  they  had 
kept  the  Isthmian  festival,  for  which  that  was  tho  time.  Agis 
expressed  to  them  his  willingness  that  they  (according  to  what 
they  urged)  should  not  break  the  Isthmian  truce,  but  that  ho 
should  make  tho  expedition  on  his  own  responsibility.  When, 
however,  tho  Corinthians  did  not  agree  to  this,  but  a  delay 
was  caused  in  tho  matter,  tho  Athenians  tho  more  easily 
gained  intelligence  of  the  designs  of  tho  Chians  ;  and  sending 
Aristocrates,  one  of  their  generals,  charged  them  with  tho 
fact,  and  on  their  denying  it,  commanded  them  to  send  with 
thom  some  ships,  as  a  pledge  of  good  faith  in  their  alliance. 
Accordingly  they  sent  seven.  Tho  reason  of  tho  ships  being 
sent  was,  that  tho  majority  of  tho  Chians  were  ignorant  of  tho 
negotiations:  while  tho  few  who  >vcro  privy  to  them  wero 
l»oth  unwilling  at  present  to  incur  tho  hostility  of  their  com- 
mons, before  they  had  gained  some  strength,  and  no  longer 
i'X|>octed  tho  Pelopounesians  to  come,  since  they  had  εο  long 
delayed. 

10.  In  the  mean  time  tho  Isthmian  games  wero  being  cele- 
brated, and  tho  Athenians  (the  sacred  truco  having  been  pro- 
claimed) went  to  attend  them ;  and  thus  tho  designs  of  tho  Chians 
lK»camo  more  evident  to  them.  When  they  returned,  they  im- 
mediately took  measures  that  tho  fleet  might  not  put  out  from 
i'enchrea  unobserved  by  them.  After  tho  festival  tho  Pelo- 
ponnesians  set  sail  for  Chios  with  ono  and  twenty  ships  under 
the  command  of  Alcamenes ;  and  tho  Athenians,  having  at 
first  advanced  against  them  with  an  equal  number,  then  be- 


518  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  (XL 

gan  to  retreat  toward  the  open  sea*  When  the  enemy 
did  not  follow  them  far,  but  drew  back,  the  Athenian»  liki^ 
wise  returned ;  for  they  had  the  seven  Chian  vessels  in  tho 
number  of  those  with  them,  and  did  not  consider  them  trust 
worthy.  Afterward,  having  manned  .others,  so  as  to  make  in 
all  thirty-seven,  while  the  enemy  were  coasting  along,  they 
chased  them  into  Piraeus  in  tlie  Corinthian  territory.  This 
is  a  desert  port  on  the  extreme  borders  of  Epidaurus.  The 
Peloponuesians  lost  one  ship  out  at  sea,  but  collected  the  rest, 
and  brought  them  to  anchor.  And  now,  when  the  Athenians 
both  attacked  them  by  Bc'a  with  their  ships,  and  had  landed 
on  the  shore,  there  was  a  great  disorder  and  confusion ;  and 
the  Athenians  severely  damaged  most  of  their  ships  on  the 
beach,  and  killed  Alcamenes  their  conmiander  ;  while  some  also 
fell  on  their  οΛνη  side. 

11.  After  parting,  they  posted  a  suiRcient  number  of  Bhijts 
to  keep  watch  over  those  of  the  enemy,  and  with  the  rest  came 
to  anchor  at  the  small  island  [o])posite  the  mt)Uth  of  the  har- 
bor] ;'  on  which,  iis  it  was  not  far  oif,  they  j>roceeded  to  en- 
camp, and  sent  to  Athens  for  a  reinforcement.  For  the 
Corinthi.'ms,  too,  had  joined  the  Peloponuesians  on  the  day 
after  the  battle,  coming  to  the  succor  of  the  hhij)» ;  and  not 
long  after,  the  rest  of  the  people  in  the  neighborhood  alj^o. 
IJut  when  they  saw  that  to  keep  guard  over  tliem  in  so  desert, 
a  spot  was  a  dillicult  service,  they  were  at  a  loss  what  to  do, 
ami  thought  of  burning  the  ships ;  but  afterward  they  deter- 
mined to  draw  them  uj)  on  shore,  and  station  themselves  by 
them  with  their  land  forces,  and  keep  guard  until  some  favor- 
able oj)portunity  of  escape  presented  itself.  Agis  also,  on 
receiving  intelligence  of  this,  sent  to  them  a  Spartan,  namely 
Thermon.  Now  news  had  tir.st  been  taken  to  the  Lacedaimou- 
ians  that  their  ships  had  put  to  sea  from  the  istlunus  (for 
Alcamenes  had  been  told  by  the  ephors  to  send  a  horseman 
when  that  took  place),  and  they  immediately  wished  to  dispatch 
their  five  ships,  with  Chalcideus  in  command,  and  Alcibiades 
with  him.  Afterward,  >vhen  they  had  resolved  on  this,  the 
news  of  their  fleet  taking  refuge  in  l^iraius  reached  them  ;  and 
being  disheartened,  because  they  had  failed  in  their  tirst  ογκτα- 
tions  iu  the  Ionian  war,  they  no  longer  th«)uglit  of  sending  the 

'  ίς  τύ  νησίόιον."]  This  oxplaaation  of  the  articlo  b  taken  from  CJol 
Leake,  u3  quoted  by  Arnold. 


xiL-xiv.]  THUCYDIDES.    VIII.  δ19 

sliips  from  their  own  country,  but  even  of  recalling  somo  that 
ha<i  previously  put  out  to  sea. 

.12.  When  Alcibiades  knew  this,  ho  n^ain  persuaded  Endius 
and  the  rest  of  the  ephors  not  to  shrink  from  the  expedition ; 
t'lliniLf  them  that  they  would  have  made  their  voyage  l)eforo 
t!ie  (Jhians  heard  of  the  disaster  Avhich  had  befallen  their 
tloet ;  and  that  ho  himself,  Λν1ΐ6η  ho  had  once  reached  Ionia, 
would  easily  persuade  the  cities  to  revolt,  by  acquainting  them 
both  with  tho  weakness  of  the  Athenians  and  the  forwardness 
of  the  Lacedajmonians ;  for  ho  should  be  thought  more  cred- 
iltlo  than  others.  To  Endius  Inmself  ho  also  represented  in 
private  tliat  it  would  bo  a  glorious  thing  to  Jiavo  caused  by 
\m  own  agency  tho  revolt  of  Ionia,  and  to  Jiavo  brought  tho 
king  into  alliance  with  the  Laceda;moiiians,  instead  of  that 
honor  being  earn'l  by  Agis  (for  with  Inm  ho  hnppened  to 
l>e  at  variance).  He,  then,  having  prevailed  on  tho  rest  of 
the  ephors  οά  >vell  as  Etidius,  put  out  to  sea  with  the  livo 
ships,  in  company  witli  Chalcideus  the  Lacedajmonians,  and 
they  proceeded  on  their  voyage  Avith  all  sjieed, 

13.  About  this  same  time  also,  tho  sixteen  rdoponnesian 
V  Nscis  in  Sicily  which  Λvith  (rylippus  had  assiste;l  in  bringing 
th(^  war  to  a  conclusion,  were  on  their  return ;  and  after  being 
irtorcppted  near  Leucadia,  and  roughly  liandlod  by  the  seven 
and  twenty  Athenian  ships  which  llippocles  son  of  Menippus 
commanded,  on  the  look-out  for  tho  ships  from  Sicily,  the  rest 
of  them,  >vith  tho  exception  of  one,  escaped  from  tho  Athen- 
i.ins,  and  sailed  into  harbor  at  Corinth. 

14.  AVith  regard  to  Chalcideus  and  Alcibiades,  whilo  they 
wore  on  their  voyage,  they  seized  all  they  met  with,  to  prevent 
any  tidings  of  their  approach  being  carried;  and  after  first 
touching  at  Corvcus,  and  leaving  them  there,  they  themselves 
having  previously  had  an  interview  with  some  of  tho  Chians 
who  were  in  co-operation  >vith  them,  and  being  urged  by  them 
to  sail  up  to  the  city  without  sending  any  notice  beforehand, 
they  thus  came  upon  tho  Chians  unexpectedly.  Accordingly 
tho  greater  part  of  them  were  astonislied  and  dismayed  ;  whilo 
it  had  been  arranged  by  tho  few  that  tho  council  should  bo 
v.^rcmbled  just  at  the  time.  And  when  speeches  were  mado 
'•y  Chalcideus  and  Alcibiades,  telling  them  that  many  moro 
v<Hisels  were  sailing  up,  and  not  acquainting  them  Λvith  tho  fact 
respecting  their  fleet  being  blockaded  in  Pikdus,  the  Chinns 


β20  THUOYDIDES.  VIIL  [xv^xvl 

rovoltcd  from  tho  Athenians,  and  immediately  after  them  the 
Erytliraeans,  After  this  tliey  sailed  with  three  vessels  an. I 
induced  Clazomenai  to  revolt  also.  Tho  Clazomeniaus  imni - 
diately  crossed  over  to  tho  continent,  and  began  to  fortitV 
Polichna,*  in  case  they  mit(ht  Avaiit  it  as  a  place  to  retreat  to 
from  the  island  on  which  they  lived.  They,  then,  having  i.  - 
volted,  were  all  engaged  in  raising  fortifications  and  preparin:: 
for  tho  war. 

15.  News  of  tho  revolt  of  Chios  f(uickly  reached  Athene, 
and  considering  that  the  danger  which  had  now  eucom|mss<'.| 
them  was  great  and  evident,  and  that  tho  rest  of  tho  allies 
would  not  remain  quiet  when  tho  most  important  stato  1ι:ι•1 
changed  sides ;  Avith  regard  to  tho  thousand  talents  Λνΐήι!» 
throughout  tho  Λνΐιοΐο  war  they  had  earnestly  desired  not  t*• 
meddlo  with,  they  immediately  rescinded,  in  consecjuencc  oi 
their  dismay,  the  jienalties  attaching  to  any  ono  who  propos»•.! 
to  use  them,  or  put  such  a  pro|>osal  to  the  vote ;  and  passed  a 
decree  for  taking  them,  and  manning  a  largo  number  of  ships;. 
Λvhile  of  tiiose  tliat  were  keeping  watch  at  Piraius  they  at  out•.' 
sent  olf  the  eiglit  which  had  left  tho  blockade,  and  after  ]>ur- 
Buing  those  with  Chidcideus  and  not  overtaking  them,  h.il 
returncid  (their  commander  was  Strombichides  son  of  Dioi!- 
nms),  and  resolved  that  twelve  more,  under  Thrasycles,  shouU 
also  leave  the  post  of  observation,  and  reinforce  them  shorily 
afterward.  Tliey  also  removed  tho  seven  Cliian  vessels,  which 
joined  them  in  tho  blockade  of  l*ira}us;  and  liberated  tlu• 
slaves  who  were  on  boanl  of  them,  while  the  freemen  they  ]»ul 
in  bonds.  In  tho  j»laco  of  all  the  ships  that  had  departed  tluv 
speedily  manned  otiiers,  and  sent  them  to  observe  tho  iVlo- 
])onnesians,  resolving  at  the  same  time  to  man  thirty  mor. . 
So  great  Avas  tlieir  ardor  ;  and  no  trivial  measure  was  und<  r 
taken  with  regard  to  tho  forces  they  sent  to  Chios. 

IG.  In  the  mean  time  Strombieiiides  with  his  eight  ships  ar- 
rived at  Samos,  and  having  added  one  Samian  vessel  to  li  s 
Siiuadron,  he  sailed  to  Teos,  and  begged  them  to  remain  quirt. 
Cliahadeus  also  was  advancing  with  three  and  twenty  shij•- 
from  Cliios  to  Teos ;  while  at  the  same  time  the  land  forces  <•!" 
'  T//i>  ΤΙο?,ίχνηι>.]  *'  Tliis  is  ft  poucral  name  which  has  bocomo  α  proin  r 
ono  by  usuj^e,  hko  llain,  Kirby,  etc.,  in  Knghsh ;  or  inoro  liko  *  Hor.  • 
in  Itahan,  tho  full  uanio  of  tho  place  bi'in^  prui)C'rly  τ/μ>  ΜυΆίχναί'  r>. . 
Κλαζομενίων,  Borj^o  dei  ClazoniL'ui ;  and  ihenco  in  common  s])ih••-, 
simply  r/jv  ΪΙυ/.ίχναι•,  iJorj^'o." — AriioUl. 


χνιι.,ιτιιι.]  TIIUCYDIDES.  VIII.  521 

(lio  Chazomenians  and  Erythraeana  moved  nlon^  the  shore. 
,Stroinl)iclndcs,  on  receivinjif  prior  intelligence  of  tliis,  weighed 
anchor  beforehand;  Imt  when  out  in  the  open  sea,  on  observing 
that  the  ships  coining  from  Chios  were  so  numerous,  ho  iled. 
toward  Sanios,  while  they  pursued  him.  With  rega-d  to  the 
land  forces,  although  tlic  Teians  were  not  at  first  disposed  to* 
n<linit  them,  yet  when  the  Athenians  liad  fled,  tliey  received 
thcin  into  the  city.  The  troops  then  waited  for  somo  time, 
expecting  Chalcideus  also  to  return  from  the  pursuit;  but 
when  Jio  was  long  in  coining,  they  began  themselves  to  de- 
molish tlic  fort  which  the  Athenians  had  built  on  the  land  side 
of  the  city  of  the  Teians ;  while  a  small  body  of  the  barbari- 
ans also,  who  had  joined  them  under  the  command  of  Stages, 
hcuienant  of  Tissaphernes,  assisted  them  in  the  demolition 
of  it. 

17.  Chalcideus  and  A^<^''l^»'«i^icj5,  after  chasing  Strom bicliides 
into  Samos,  armed  the  seamen  on  board  the  vessels  from  tho 
Peloponnese,  and  left  them  at  Chios;  and  liaving  manned 
these  Avith  substitutes  from  Chios,  and  twenty  besides,  they 
sailed  to  Miletus  to  etFoct  its  revolt.  For  Alcibiades,  being  on 
intimate  terms  >vith  the  leading  men  of  tho  Milesians,  wished 
to  anticipate  tho  ships  from  tho  Peloponneso  by  Avinning  them 
over,  and  so  to  secure  that  honor,  as  he  had  promised,  to  tho 
Chians,  himself,  Chalcideus,  and  Kndius  Λνΐιο  had  sent  them 
out,  by  causing  tho  revolt  of  as  many  cities  as  possible  in  con- 
cert with  the  Chian  forces  and  Chalcideus.  Having  mado 
therefore  tho  cliief  part  of  their  passage  unobser\'ed,  and  liav- 
iag  arrived  a  little  before  Strombichides  and  Thrasycles,  Λνΐιο 
had  just  corao  from  Athens  with  twelve  ships,  and  joined  in 
the  pursuit  of  them,  they  prevailed  on  Miletus  to  revolt.  Tho 
Atiienians  sailed  np  close  after  them  with  nineteen  ships,  and 
on  the  Milesians  not  admitting  them,  came  to  anchor  at  tho 
adjacent  island  of  Lade.  .  And  now  tho  first  al banco  made  be- 
tween tho  king  and  tho  L•αcedΓemonians  was  concluded  by 
Tissaphernes  and  Chalcideus,  immediately  after  Iho  revolt  of 
tho  Milesians,  to  tho  following  efiect : 

18.  **The  following  are  tlio  terms  on  winch  tho  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  confederates  concluded  an  aljianco  with  tho 
king  and  Tissaphernes.  All  tho  country  and  cities  which  tho 
king  holds,  or  the  forefathers  of  tho  king  lield,  ehall  belong  to 
the  king :  and  from  thcso  cities  whatever  money,  or  any  thing 


522  THUOYDIDES.  VIll.  (xel.xi. 

else,  camo  in  to  tho  Athenians,  shall  be  stopped  by  the  kiiiir, 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  confederates,  in  common ;  so  that 
tho  Athenians  may  receive  neither  money  nor  any  thing  els,•. 
— Moreover,  tho  war  with  tho  Athenians  sliall  bo  carried  on 
in  common  by  tho  kinijf,  tho  Lacedicmonians,  and  their  con 
federates ;  and  it  sliall  not  bo  lawful  to  bring  tho  war  with  tli,• 
Athenians  to  a  conclusion^  except  both  parties  shall  agree  t-» 
it,  the  king,  and  the  Lacedapmonians  with  their  confederatis. 
-—Should  any  revolt  from  the  king,  they  shall  bo  considers.  1 
OS  enemies  to  tho  Lacediemonians  and  their  confederates ;  anl 
if  any  revolt  from  the  Lacedaimonians  and  their  confederates 
they  shall  bo  considered  as  enemies  to  the  king,  in  lik  • 
manner." 

19.  This,  then,  was  tho  alliance  that  was  coniduded  ;  imin.  - 
diately  nftor  whiidi  the  Cliians  nianm*d  ten  more  ships,  an! 
sailed  to  Anu'a,  wishing  both  to  got  intelligence  of  those  ii: 
Miletus,  and  at  the  same  time  to  urge  the  cities  to  revolt.  Uir 
a  message  having  reached  them  from  Chalcideu•*,  tliat  th.  \ 
were  to  sail  back  again,  and  that  Amorges  wouhl  bo  uj»»•!, 
them  ΛΥ'ϊΐΙι  an  army  on  sliore,  they  sailed  to  the  templo  <•ι 
Jupiter,  and  then  descried  sixteen  ships,  Yvith  >vhich  Dioiu  - 
don  again,  subseipiently  to  the  arrival  of  Thrasicles,  was  sail- 
ing up  from  Athens.  C)u  seeing  them  they  lied  with  one  shi;- 
to  Ephesus,  while  tho  rest  proceeded  toward  Teos.  Tin 
Athenians,  then,  took  four  of  their  ships  empty,  the  men  Ικγ. 
ing  escaped  to  shore  beforehand ;  but  the  rest  took  refuge  in 
tho  city  of  the  Teians.  And  now  the  Athenians  sailed  away 
from  Samos ;  while  tho  t'hians  put  out  with  their  remaining 
vessels,  and  their  laiul  forces  witli  them,  and  prix'ured  the  n- 
volt  of  Lebedos,  and  then  again  of  Kne.  At\er  this  they  re- 
turned to  their  respective  homes,  both  tho  land  aud  tho  s• ;» 
forces. 

20.  About  tho  same  time,  the  twenty  sliips  of  tho  PelojM)n- 
nesians  that  wero  in  l*ineus,  which  had  been  chased  to  lani 
at  tho  time  wo  last  mentioned  them,  and  >vere  blockaded  by  tli«' 
Athenians  with  an  equal  number,  having  made  a  sudden  sally 
against  tho  Athenian  S(]uadron,  and  defeated  it  in  an  engai:<  - 
ment,  took  four  of  tho  ships,  and  after  sailing  ba(dv  to  Cenclnvi. 
]>roceeded  to  prepare  again  for  their  voyage  to  CI  ios  and  loiii.i. 
Astyochus  also  joined  tliem  from  Lacedaimon,  as  high  admiral,  t•» 
whom  now  belonged  tho  command  of  all  tho  naval  forces.   Mean- 


χχι.,χηπ•3  TIIUCYDIDES    VIII.  023 

uliilo,  after  tho  troops  had  returned  from  Teos,  Tissaphernes 
himself  also  repaired  tliither  with  an  army,  and  further  dc- 
jnoiished  tho  fort  at  Teos,  whatever  had  been  left  of  it,  and 
tlien  returned.  Not  lonijf  after  liis  departure,  Diomedon,  liaving 
arrived  >vith  ten  Atlienian  sliips,  concluded  a  treaty  >vitli 
tlie  Teians  for  admitting  Iiis  force,  as  they  did  the  enemy'n. 
And  after  coasting  alonj;^  to  Erae,  and  assaulting  the  city 
\vithout  ii{k\'n<r  it,  he  sailed  away. 

21.  Ahout  tho  sarao  time,  too,  occurred  at  Samos  the  insur- 
rection of  tho  commons  a'xainst  the  nobles,  in  conjunction  with 
stane  Athenians  who  hapjwned  to  be  there  on  board  thrco 
vessels.  Tlio  popular  party  of  tho  Samians,  then,  put  to 
death  some  two  hundred  of  tho  nobles,  in  all,  and  condemned 
four  lumdred  to  banishment;  and  havinc^  themselves  taken 
]»ossession  of  tlieir  land  and  liouses  (tho  Athenians,  moreover, 
havini^  after  this  passed  a  decree  for  their  independence,  consid- 
erini(  them  now  as  trusty  allies),  they  c^overned  the  city 
lienceforth,  and  neither  admitted  the  lan<lowners  to  any  other 
privileire,  nor  allowed  any  of  tho  commons  in  future  to  p^vo 
iiis  daughter  in  marriage  to  them,  nor  to  take  a  wifo  from 
them. 

^2.  After  theso  things,  in  tho  course  of  tho  Bamo  summer, 
the  Chians  went  on  as  they  liatl  begtm,  Avithout  any  falling 
oti'  in  their  zeal ;  and  as  they  found  tliemselves,  even  inde- 
pendently of  tho  Lacedicmonians,  with  η  large  forco  for  bring- 
ing over  tho  states,  and  at  tho  saino  time  were  desirous  that 
as  many  its  possible  should  share  tho  danger  Avith  them,  they 
made  an  expedition  by  themselves  with  tliirteen  ships  to  Les- 
bos, according  to  tho  arrangement  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to 
go  to  that  island  in  the  second  place,  and  thence  to  tho  Helles- 
pont, whilo  at  tho  sarao  time  tho  land  forces  of  tho  Pclopon- 
iiesians  who  were  there,  and  of  the  allies  from  tho  country 
itself,  moved  along  shoro  toward  Clazomenai  and  Cuma ;  tho 
commander  of  tho  troops  being  Evalas,  a  Spartan,  and  of  tho 
shif  8,  Diniadas,  ono  of  tho  Perictei,  Tho  fleet  having  Railed 
first  to  Methymna,  effected  tho  revolt  of  tho  place,  and  four 
vessels  were  left  thcro ;  whilo  tho  remainder,  again,  eiTcctcd 
that  of  Mytilcno  also,  , 

23.  Now  Astyochus,  tho  Lacodoemonian  admiral,  sot  sail,  as 
ho  had  intended,  with  ftnir  ships  from  Onchrea,  and  arrived 
at  Chios,    On  the  third  daj^  after  his  coming  there,  tho  Atho* 


524  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  [τχιχ, 

nian  βΐιίρβ^ίΐνο  and  twenty  in  number,  sailed  to  Lenboe  un<Kr 
the  coinniand  of  Leon  and  Diomcdon ;  for  Leon  had  eultN 
quentlj  brought  α  reinforcement  of  ten  ships  from  Atheii>. 
The  same  day,  at  a  late  hour,  Astyochus  also  put  out,  and 
taking  one  Chian  vessel  in  addition  to  his  own,  sailed  to  L<s. 
bos,  to  render  it  whatever  assistance  ho  could.  AccordiiiLrljr 
he  came  to  Pyrrlia,  and  thence  the  next  day  to  Eresus,  win  u 
he  heard  that  Mitylene  had  been  taken  by  the  Athenians  on 
the  first  assault.  For  the  Athenians,  immediately  on  Kailinir 
to  the  place,  unexpectedly  put  into  the  harbor,  and  defeat^•! 
the  Chian  ships;  and  having  landed,  and  conquered  in  a  battlr 
those  who  opposed  them,  they  took  jwssession  of  th(i  city. 
Keceiving  this  intelligence,  both  from  the  Eresians  and  from 
the  Chian  ships  coming  from  Methymna  with  Eubulus,  tlini 
of  which  fell  in  with  him  (tor  one  had  been  taken  by  tin 
Athenians),  after  being  left  behind  at  the  time,  and  so  cscajtiiii,' 
when  Mitylene  was  taken,  Astyochus  no  longer  advanced  i  > 
Mitylene,  but   liaving   persuaded   Eresus   to   revolt,  and  m\\.- 

})lied  it  with  amis,  ho  both  sent  the  heavy -armed  from  mi 
>oard  his  own  ships  to  Antissa  and  Methynma,  having  a|- 
pointed  Eteonicus  to  the  command,  and  himself  coasted  alouL' 
thither  w  ith  his  own  ships  and  the  three  Cliians ;  hoping  tli;i 
the  Methynuiieans  would  be  encouraged  by  the  sight  of  tluiu. 
and  persevere  in  their  revolt.  15ut  when  every  thing  at  Leshc- 
went  against  liim,  he  took  his  own  force  on  board,  and  saih  »l 
back  to  Chios ;  while  the  land  forces  also  that  had  been  dis- 
embarked from  the  vessels,  and  were  to  hare  proceeded  to  th 
Hellespont,  returned  again  to  their  several  cities.  After  tlii>, 
six  of  the  allied  ships  from  the  Pelo|)onnesu  that  were  μ 
Cenchrea  came  to  them  iit  Chios.  The  Athenians,  on  tlu 
other  hand,  arranged  matters  again  at  Tx'sbos,  and  sailin,^ 
thence,  took  roliclina,  belonging  to  the  Clazomenians,  whi<  !i 
wjis  being  fortitied  on  the  mainland,  and  carried  them  ovtr 
again  to  their  city  on  the  island,  excepting  the  authors  of  tli»' 
revolt,  who  had  departed  to  Daphuus.  And  thus  Clazomeua; 
came  over  again  to  the  Athenians. 

24.  The  same  summer  the  Athenians,  \vho  >vere  with  tlu  ir 
twenty  ships  at  Lade  for  the  observation  of  Miletus,  haviiiL' 
made  a  descent  at  Panormus  in  the  Milesian  territory,  hlew 
Chalcideus,  the   Lacedaimonian   comrajinder,  who   had   ct»iu 
against  them  with  a  few  men,  and  sailing  across  three  du\» 


τχΐΓ,Ι  THUCYDIDE3  VIII.  525 

after,  erected  a  tropliy ;  >vliich,  ns  it  had  boon  raised  without 
tht'ir  having  command  of  the  country,  the  Milesians  threw 
(iown.  And  now  Leon  and  Diomcdon,  witli  the  Athenian 
siiips  from  Lesbos,  advancing  from  the  Qinussoc,  the  islands 
oiV  Chio«,  and  from  Sidussa  and  Pteleum,  fortresses  which 
tlijy  held  in  the  Erythra;an  country,  as  well  as  from  Lesbos, 
cirrit'd  on  the  war  against  the  Chians  from  their  ships,  having 
aA  cpibatcr^  some  of  the  hoav'j'-armed  '  from  the  muster-roll, 
who  had  been  pressed  into  the  service.  Having  landed  at 
i'mlamylo  and  Bolissus,  after  defeating  in  battle  those  of  tho 
i'hians  who  had  come  out  agiiinst  them,  and  killing  many  of 
tliMn,  they  desolated  the  places  in  that  neighborhood.  ITiey 
d'feated  them  again  in  another  battle  at  Phana»,  and  in  a  third 
at  Leuconium,  after  which  tho  Chians  no  longer  went  out  to 
nio't  them;  vvhilo  they"  ravaged  their  country,  which  was 
liiioly  stoiiked,  and  liad  continued  unhurt  from  tho  Median 
\v:>.rs  down  to  that  time.  For  the  Chians  are  tho  only  people 
that  I  am  acquainted  with,  after  tho  LaccihTmonians,  who  wero 
;it  once  prosperous  and  prudent ;  and  tho  more  their  city  in- 
<  n*ased  in  greatness,  the  more  secure  vvere  their  arrangement^. 
Λη  I  even  their  present  revolt,  if  any  think  that  they  executed 
this  without  regard  for  tho  safer  course,  they  did  not  venture 
to  make,  before  they  were  likely  to  run  tlie  risk  in  concert  with 
iJinny  brave  allies,  and  perceived  that  even  the  Athenians  them- 
si'lves  no  longer  denied,  after  their  disaster  in  Sicily,  that  with- 
out doubt  their  circumstances  wero  utterly  bad.  r»ut  if  they 
wore  somewhat  disappointed  by  tho  unexpected  results  that 
ycMT  in  tho  lifo  of  man,  they  found  out  their  mistiko  in  com- 
]>nny  with  many  others,  who  had  in  tho  same  way  imagined 
that  tho  power  of  tho  Athenians  would  bo  quickly  destroyed. 
When  tliercforo  they  wero  excluded  from  tho  sea,  and  wero 
hoing  ravaged  by  land,  a  party  of  them  endeavored  to  bring 
over  the  city  to  tho  Athenians.  Though  tho  magistrates  de- 
tected them,  they  remained  quiet  themselves,  and  having 
brought  Astyochus  tho  admiral  from  ErythriO  with  four  ships, 
which  ho  had  with  liim,  considered  how  they  might  stop  tho 
'onspiracy  by  tho  mildest  measures,  whether  by  taking  host- 

*  "  Tho  iKifu'irai  wero  usually  drawn  from  tho  fourth  class,  or  Thctcs; 
ilthough  on  eomo  occasions  men  of  tho  higher,  classes  eccm  to  havo 
oluntcored  to  servo  Among  them.    Soo  III.  98.  3,  note.    Now,  how- 
ever, tho  citizens  of  tho  higher  classes  woro  actually  compollod  to  servo 
ai«  I  TiOfirse,  ftwing  to  the  peculiar  fttigcncy  of  tho  crisis."— ilmoid 


δ2β  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  [xxv.,xxtl 

ages,  or  in  any  other  way.  They,  then,  were  engaged  with 
this  business. 

25.  At  the  close  of  the  same  summer,  there  sailed  from 
Athens  a  thousand  Athenian  heavy-armed,  fifteen  hundred  of 
the  Argives  (for  five  hundred  of  the  Argives  who  were  light- 
armed,  were  provided  with  full  armor  by  the  Athenians),  and 
a  thousand  of  the  allies,  in  forty-eight  ships,  some  of  which 
were  transports,  under  the  command  of  Phrynichus,  Onomaclcs, 
and  Scirouides:  these  sailed  into  port  at  Samos,  and  after 
crossing  over  to  Miletus,  formed  their  camp  there.  The  Mi» 
lesians  marched  out  themselves  to  the  number  of  eight  hun- 
dred heavy-armed,  the  Pelopoiiiiesians  who  had  come  with 
Chalcideus,  and  a  body  of  foreign  mercenaries*  with  Tissa- 
phernes  himself,  who  was  at  pnseiit  with  his  eavalr)%  and  gave, 
battle  to  the  Athenians  and  their  allies.  The  Argives,  ad- 
vancing from  the  line  with  their  own  wing,  and  despising  the 
enemy,  while  tluy  pushed  forward  in  some  disorder,  as  against 
lonians  and  men  who  would  nut  receive  their  charge,  were, 
defeated  by  tiie  Milesians,  and  not  less  than  three  hundred  of 
them  shiin.  liut  the  Athenians  defeated  the  IVloponnesians 
first,•  then  beat  back  the  barbarians  and  the  rest  of  the  nmlti- 
tude,  and  without  engaging  the  Milesians  (for  they  retreated 
into  their  city  after  their  rout  of  the  Argives,  on  seeing  tho 
rest  of  their  army  worsted),  they  jjitched  their  camp,  as  bein•,' 
now  victorious,  close  to  tho  very  city  of  Miletus.  And  it  s<) 
happened,  that  in  this  battle  tho  lonians  on  both  sides  were 
superior  to  tho  Dorians;  fur  the  Athenians  conquered  tho 
Peloj)onnesians  opposed  to  them,  and  the  Milesians  the  Ar- 
gives. After  erecting  a  trophy,  tho  Athenians  prepared  to  in- 
vest the  place  (which  stood  on  an  isthmus),  thinking  that  if 
they  could  Λνΐη  Miletus,  the  other  towns  would  easily  conio 
over  to  them. 

20.  In  the  mean  time,  when  it  was  now  about  dusk  in  the 
evening,  intelligence  reached  them  that  the  five  and  fifty 
ships  from  the  iVloponneso  and  from  Sicily  were  all  but  there. 
For  from  the  Siceliots,  who  were  chiefly  urged  by  llernio- 
crates  tho  Syracusan  to  take  part  in  what  remained  for  tho 
destruction  of  the  Athenians,  there  came  twenty  ships  of  the 
Syracusans,  and  two  of  tho  Selinuntines;  and  those  from  tlie 
I*eloponnese,  whieh  they  Avero  preparing,  [when  wo  last  men- 

*  ξενικόν,'\  i.  i.,  foreigners  to  Tissaphernes,  not  Asiatics. 


xxvii.J  TnUCYDIDES.  VIII.  627 

tinned  them],  wcro   now  rcndy :   and   botli   equadrons   being  ^ 

(•«.niinittcd  to  Theramcues  the  Laccdiumonian  to  take  to  Asty-  \, 

(wlius  the  admiral,  put  in  to  Lorus  fii-st,  the  island  before  Mi- 
!.tus.  Then,  on  liudiug  that  the  Athenians  >vere  at  Miletus, 
ihoy  sailed  thenco  into  the  lasio  gulf  in  the  first  place, 
\\i«<hing  to  know  the  state  of  atiairs  with  reijjard  to  Miletus,  ' 
When  Alcibiades  therefore  had  gone  on  horseback  toTichiussa, 
in  tlic  Milesian  territory,  to  which  part  of  the  gulf  they  liad 
sailed  and  brought  to  for  the  night,  they  heard  tlic  particulars 

<  f  the  battle.  For  Alcibiades  was  present  at  it,  taking  part 
uitli  the  Milesi.'ins  and  Tissaphernes ;  and  ho  now  advised 
liicni,  if  they  did  not  Avish  to  sacrifice  Ionia  and  the  wholo 

<  ausc,  to  go  as  quickly  as  possible  to  tho  relief  of  Miletus,  and 
not  permit  it  to  be  invested. 

27.  They,  then,  intended  to  relievo  it  in  tho  morning. 
I'lirynichus,  tho  commander  of  tho  Athenians,  on  the  other 
hand,  when  lie  had  heard  from  Lorus  η  correct  account  of  their 
licet,  and  when  his  colleagues  wished  to  await  its  arrival  and 
','ίνο  it  battle,  said  that  ho  would  neither  do  so  himself,  nor, 
to  the  best  of  his  power,  allow  them  or  any  ono  else  to  do  it. 
i  or  when  they  might  meet  them  hereafter  with  an  accurate 
knowle<lgo  of  tho  number  of  ships  on  tho  enemy's  side,  and 
with  how  many  of  their  own  opposed  to  them  they  would,  after 
.KliNjuato  aud  calm  preparations,  bo  ablo  to  give  them  battle, 
lio  \\o\i\a  never  run  an  unreasonable  hazard  through  yielding 
lo  the  disgrace  of  reproach.  For  it  Avas  no  disgrace  for  tho 
Atlionians  to  retreat  with  a  navy  at  a  proper  time;  but  in  any 
Λ  ay  whatever,  the  result  would  bo  more  disgraceful  should 
liny  be  defe.ited,  and  for  tho  state  to  incur  not  only  disgrace, 
lilt  also  the  greatest  danger.  For  after  its  late  misfortunes, 
it  was  hardly  expedient  volutitarily  for  it  to  act  on  the  offcns% 
ivo  in  any  quarter,  even  with  a  force  that  could  be  relied  up- 
•n,  or  even  m  a  case  of  absolute  necessity  :  how  then  could  it 
Nvithout  any  such  comptilsion  rush  into  self-chosen  dangers  ? 
He  ordered  them  therefore  as  quickly  as  possible  to  take  up 
their  wounded,  and  their  land  forces,  with  such  stores  as  they 
iiad  brought  with  them;  Vmt  to  leave  behind  what  they  had 
ι aken  from  tho  enemy's  country,  that  (heir  ships  might  be  tho 
iicrhter,  and  to  sail  away  to  Samos,  and  thence,  when  they  had 
«ollected  all  their  ships,  to  niako  their  attacks  upon  thenif 
whenever  they  had  an   opportunity.     Having  given  this  ad- 


528  THUCYDIDEa  VIII.  [xxrnL.xxir. 

vice,  ho  acted  accordingly ;  and  bo  Phrynicbus,  not  on  tliat 
iinmcdiato  occasion  more  than  on  subsequent  ones,  nor  in  that 
business  only,  but  in  all  that  he  had  any  thing  to  do  with, 
proved  himself  to  bo  a  man  of  sound  judgment.  In  this  way, 
with  an  incomplete  victory,  the  Athenians  immediately  bn)kc 
up  their  camp,  and  retired  from  Miletus;  and  the  Argives, 
in  mortification  at  their  defeat,  sailed  otf  homo  from  Sainos  as 
«luickly  as  they  could. 

28.  As  soon  as  it  was  morning,  the  Peloponnesians  weigluvl 
anchor  from  Tichiussa,  and  put  into  Miletus  after  the  enemy's 
tieparture  ;  and  after  remaining  one  day,  they  took  witli  tluni 
on  the  niixt  the  Chian  vessels  which  had,  in  the  first  instance/ 
been  chased  in  company  with  Chalcideus,  and  were  disposed 
to  sail  back  again  for  the  stores  which  they  had  taken  out  of 
their  vessels  at  Tichiussa.  On  their  arrival,  Tissapheni.s 
came  to  them  with  his  land  forces,  and  persuaded  them  to  sail 
against  lasiis,  in  whicli  Amorges  their  enemy  maintaimd 
himself.  A'cordingly,  having  iissaulted  lasus  on  a  suddni, 
and  while  the  inhabitants  thought  nothing  but  that  the  fihij.s 
belonged  to  the  Athenians,  they  took  it ;  and  the  Syracusaiis 
were  most  distinguished  in  the  action.  Amorges,  Avho  w:i3  a 
natural  son  of  Pissuthnes,  and  had  revolted  from  the  king,  tli»• 
Peloponnesians  took  prisoner,  and  delivered  him  up  to  Tis^s.i- 

Idiernes  to  lead  away  to  the  king,  if  he  pleased,  according  to 
lis  orders.  They  then  backed  lasus;  and  the  army  g"t 
very  largo  treasures,  for  the  place  was  one  of  ancient 
wealth.  The  mercenaries  serving  with  Amorges  they  took  t<» 
themselves,  and  added  to  their  nmks,  without  doing  them  any 
harm,  as  most  of  them  were  from  the  IVloponnese:  whi!-• 
they  delivered  to  Tissaphernes  the  town  and  all  the  captives, 
both  bond  and  free,  for  each  one  of  whom  they  stipulated  t» 
receive  from  him  a  Daric  stater;  after  Avhich  they  returned  t» 
Miletus.  Pedaritus  the  son  of  Leon,  who  had  been  sent  hy 
the  Lacedicmonians  to  take  the  command  at  Chios,  thty 
dispatched  by  land  to  Erythrai,  Avith  the  mercenary  fun- 
taken  from  Amorges,  and  apjiointed  I*hilippus  to  remain  «n 
the  spot,  as  governor  of  Miletus.     And  so  the  summer  cnde«l. 

29.  The  following  winter,  when  Tissaphernes  had  put  Insu- 
itito  a  state  of  defense,  he  passed  on  to  Miletus,  and  distribute . I 
among  all  tho  ships  a  month's  pay,  as  h«  hud  undertaken  ai 

'  Tur — ζννκαταί^ωχθίΐσας.']  See  eli.  17.3. 


XXX.]  THUCYDIDES.  VUI.  529 

LaccdtTinon,  nt  the  rate  of  an  Attic  drachma  a  man  per  day ; 
Idit  wished  in  future  to  give  but  three  oboli,  until  he  had  ron- 
8ultcd  the  king ;  should  he,  liowever,  cotnniand  it,  he  said  ho 
would  give  them  the  full  drachma.  AVhcn  llormocrates,  llio 
Svracusan  commander,  objected  to  this  (for  Theramenes,  in- 
asmuch as  he  was  not  admiral,  but  only  sailing  with  them  to 
deliver  up  the  fleet  to  Astyochus,  was  easy  on  the  subject  of 
pay),  there  was  fixed,  notwithstanding,  a  sum  [for  the  wholo 
fleet]  larger  by  five  ships'  than  three  oboli  a  man  per  day.  For 
he  gave  three  talents  a  month  for  five  ships,  and  to  the  rest,  ac- 
cording as  they  liad  vessels  beyond  this  number,  was  given  in 
the  same  ])roportion. 

Λ0.  The  safue  winter,  more  sldps,  to  tlie  numlxir  of  thirty-five, 
having  come  from  home  to  join  the  Athenians  at  Samos,  with 
Charminus,  Strond)ichid«'s,'and  Euctemon  in  command,  after 
•  ollecting  those  from  Chios  and  all  the  rest,  they  determined, 
liaving  drawn  lots  for  their  respective  services,  to  blockade 
Miletus  %vith  their  navel  force,  and  to  send  against  Chios  both 
a  fleet  and  anny.     And   they  did   so.     For   Strombichides, 

'  irapa  mvre  νανς.]  If  thoao  words  could  really  bo  interpreted  "  for  every 
fivo  phipa,"  as  Gtillcr  and  Arnold  think,  I  should  then  agree  with  the  lat• 
tcr,  that  the  whole  passage  might  bo  allowed  to  remain  as  it  stands  at  prcs- 
f  nt.  But  neither  of  them  brings  forward  a  single  instance  of  παρά  being 
thus  used  with  the  distributive  force  commonly  expressed  by  κατά;  and  in 
ilio  absence  of  all  such  proof,  it  seems  safer  to  take  the  proposition,  as 
Hlwmflcld  has  done,  in  a  sense  which  is  recognized  by  the  grammarians. 
This  method  renders  necessary  one  of  the  two  corrections  which  have  been 
made  by  the  editors  in  the  following  sentence— either  the  omission  of  καΐ 
τητήκοντα,  or  the  insertion  of  τριάκοντα  instead  οΐ  τρία — and  though  it  is 
perhaps  of  little  importance  which  is  preferred,  I  have  adopted  the  former, 
ns  tho  mistake  of  the  copyists  in  that  case  seems  more  easily  accounted 
for  than  in  tho  other.  See  Gollcr's  or  Arnold's  note.  With  regard  to  tho 
qnc'Stion,  why  the  ships  should  bo  taken  in  divisions  of  five,  that  number 
might  perhaps  have  been  fixed  on  for  mere  convenience,  as  the  lowest 
which  gave  a  round  sum  in  talents,  withont  any  fraction.  Or  may  wo 
cf)njccturo  that  tho  Lacedfleraonian  government  had  sent  out  five  ships  on 
the  expedition,  and  that  their  quota  was  first  considered  by  Tissapherncs, 
a."'  a  compliment  to  tho  leading  state?  Arnold's  supposition  that  "it  was 
intended  to  exclude  any  state  from  tho  higher  rat©  of  pay,  whose  contin- 
pint  fell  short  of  five  ships,  in  order  to  encourage  the  allies  to  greater  ex- 
ertionSi"  does  not  seem  very  probable ;  and  the  idea  of  τοις  άλλοις  refer• 
riiig  •'  to  those  other  states  who  had  no  ships  at  the  present  moment 
afloat,  but  who  might  at  any  instant  be  supposed  ready  to  send  some,"  Is 
P'lrcly  inconsistent  with  tho  indicative  mood  of  tho  verb  ηααν^  which  can 
ouly  rcfir  to  such  aa  were  actually  afloat  at  the  time  of  tho  arrangement 

83 


630  THUOYDIDES.  VIII.  ["»•,"ί" 

Onomacles,  and  Euctemon,  having  with  them  thirty  shij*,  anl 
taking  in  transports  a  part  of  tlie  thousand  heavy-annod  that  hai 
conio  to  Miletus,  sailed,  according  to  their  lot,  against  Clii(.>. 
while  tlie  rest,  remaining  at  Samos  with  seventy-four  ships,  >, 
cured  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  advanced  upon  Miletus. 

31.  Astyochus,  happening  at  that  time  to  bo  collectintj  at 
Chios  tho  hostages  taken  in  consequence  of  the  conspirarv, 
ceased  from  that,  when  ho  found  that  tlie  sliips  with  Thera- 
inenes  were  come,  and  that  tho  atFairs  of  tho  confederacy  \V(  r. 
more  prosperous.     And  taking  a  squadron  consisting  of  tt :, 
Peloponnesian  and  as  many  Chian  ships,  he  put  out  to  s-  , 
and  after  attacking  Pteleum  without  taking  it,  coasted  al». η . 
to  Clazomena»,  and  commanded  those  of  them  who  favi-i.,; 
the  Athenian  cause  to  romovc  inland  to  Daphnus,  and  to  j•:. 
their   party.     Tamos   also,  who   was   lieutenant-governor  <: 
Ionia,  united  in  this  command.     AVhen  they  did  not  listen  t 
it,  he  made  an  attack  on   the  town,  which  was  unwalled,  an 
not  being  able  to  take  it,  sailed  away  before  a  strong  i:;'• 
liimself  to  riioca^a  and  Cuma,  while  the  rest  of  the  ships  ) 
into  tho  islands  adjacent  to  Clazomeme,  namely,  Marathu^- 
l*ele,  and  Drymussa.     Having  staid  there  on  account  of  il 
winds,  eight  days,  all  the  property  of  the  Clazomenians  that  ha 
been  secretly  stowed  away  there,'  they  j>artly  ravaged  and  «υΐ 
fiumcd,  and  j)artly  put  onboard  their  ships ;  and  then  sailed . : 
to  Phocasa  and  Cuma,  to  join  Astyochus. 

32.  While  he  was  there,  embassadors  from  the  Li'sbia' 
came  to  him,  >vishing  to  revolt  again.  And  as  far  as  he  w 
concerned,  they  gained  his  assent ;  but  when  the  Corinthia! 
and  other  allies  were  not  zealous  fur  it,  in  consequence  of  t!i< 
former  failure,  he  weighed  anchor  and  sailed  for  Chios;  . 
which  place,  after  his  ships  had  been  dispersed  in  a  stoii 
they  arrived  from  diiferent  directions.  After  this,  Pedaritu 
who  when  we  l/ist  mentioned  him  was  moving  along  the  co  - 
by  land  from  Miletus,  arrived  at  Krythric,  and  then  pa-^ 
over,  himself  and  his  forces,  to  Chios;  where   ho   had   a! 

•  νπεζέκειτο.]  Bloomfield  follows  llobbes  in  translating  this,  "layu. 
out  tho  city,"  altogether  omitting  tho  peculiar  force  of  tho  two  |)Π•ι•. 
tions  thus  meeting  in  composition,  whether  in  neuter  or  transitive  vt  •  • 
Compare  I.  137,  whero  the  word  occurs  in  exactly  the  same  sigiii: 
lion;  I.  89,  ύιεκημίζοντο  ^Ί(νς  utkv  unt^tihvTo  τταΐΛας  και  yvvalnur,  a 
λ.;  and  Eurip.  lice.  G,  oiina•;  /i'  ιτηξίηίμψε  Ύρωικί^ς  χβυΐ'ός. 


XXXIH.,  XXXIV.] 


THUCYDIDES.  VIII. 


631 


about  fivo  Imndred  soMicrs  vho  had  been  left  by  Chalcideus' 
from  tlieir  five  ships,  with  their  arms.  And  when  certain  Les- 
bians made  otibrs  of  revolt,  Astyochus  urcred  to  Pedaritus  and 
the  Chians,  that  they  ought  to  go  with  their  ships  and  effect 
the  revolt  of  Lesbos  ;  for  bo  they  woubl  either  themselves  gain 
an  addition  to  the  number  of  their  allies,  or,  in  case  of  failure, 
would  still  do  the  Athenians  mischief.  They,  however,  did  not 
listen  to  them,  and  IVdaritus  refused  to  give  up  to  him  tho 
ships  of  the  Chians. 

:58.  lie,  therefore,  talcing  tlio  five  of  tho  Corinthians,  a 
sixth  from  Megara,  one  from  Ilermione,  and  those  of  tho 
Laced.Tmonians  which  he  liad  come  with,  sailed  for  Miletus,  to 
take  the  command  as  admiral,  after  many  tlircats  to  tho 
Chians  that  assuredly  he  would  not  como  to  their  ai<l,  should 
tlu'y  be  in  any  need  of  it.  Having  touched  at  C«)rycus,  in 
tlie  Erythraian  coimlry,  he  staid  there  tho  night.  Tho 
Athcuians  also,  on  their  passage  from  Samos  to  Chios  with 
their  troops,  >vero  only  parted  from  them  by  being  on  tho 
other  side  of  a  Iiill ;  and  so  they  brought  to  for  the  night,  and 
««scaped  each  other's  notice.  On  tlio  arrival  of  a  letter  from 
PiMlaritus  in  the  night,  to  say  that  some  Erythrajan  prisoners 
after  being  set  at  liberty,  had  como  from  Samos  to  lirythraia 
for  tho  purpose  of  betraying  it,  Astyochus  immediately 
w«'ighed  anchor  again  for  Erythrnpa :  within  so  little  was  he  of 
falling  in  with  the  Athenians.  Pt-daritus  also  sailed  across  to 
join  him ;  and  having  investigated  tho  case  of  the  men  who 
were  thought  to  be  traitors,  Avhen  they  found  that  tho  wholo 
story  had  been  made  up  in  order  to  effect  the  escape  of  tho 
men  from  Samos,  they  acquitted  them  of  the  charge,  and  sailed 
rtway,  ono  to  Chios,  tho  other  to  Miletus,  as  he  had  intended. 

34.  In  the  mean  time  also  tho  army  of  tho  Athenians,  Λν^ΐο 
sailing  round  with  the  ships  from  Corycus,  iriet  with  thrco 
Chian  vessels  of  war  off  Arginus,  and  on  seeing  them  gave  them 
chase;  when  a  violent  stonn  came  on,  and  the  Chian  ships  with 
(JitBculty  took  refuge  in  tho  harbor.  Of  tho  Athenians,  tho 
three  which  had  pursued  most  vigorously  ΛνοΓο  wrecked,  and 
thrown  up  near  tho  city  of  Chios,  the.  men  Ixjing  either  taken 
lirisoners  or  slain  ;  while  tho  remainder  took  refuge  in  tho  har- 
uor  under  Mount  Mimas,  called  Phoonicus,  from  whence  they 


*  Scocliap.  Π.  1, 


582  THUOYDIDEa  VIIL  [χχχν,-χχχτιι. 

afterward  came  to  anchor  in  tlto  port  of  Lcsboe,  and  mado  prep- 
arations for  the  work  of  fortitication.' 

35.  The  eame  winter,  Hippocrates  the  Lacedaemonian, 
having  sailed  from  the  Peloponnese  with  ten  Thurian  ships, 
under  the  command  of  Dorieus  son  of  Diagoras,  and  two  col- 
leagues, one  Laconian  and  one  Syracusan,  sailed  into  port  at 
Cnidus,  which  had  now  revolted  at  the  instigation  of  Tissa- 
phernes.  AVhen  tlioso  at  Miletus  received  intelligence  of  them, 
they  gave  orders  for  half  of  the  vessels  to  keep  guard  at 
Cuidus,  and  the  other  half  to  cruise  around  Triopium,  an  I 
seize  the  merchantmen  that  were  approaching  from  Egypt. 
This  Triopium  is  a  promontory  running  out  from  the  Cuiiliaii 
territory,  and  is  consecrated  to  Apollo.  But  the  Athenians, 
having  had  notice  of  it,  and  having  sailed  out  from  Samos, 
seized  the  six  ships  that  were  keeping  guard  at  Triopiuni. 
thougli  the  crews  escaped  from  them.  After  this  they  j)ut  in 
at  Cuidus,  and  having  assaulted  the  city,  which  was  unforti- 
fied, were  within  a  little  of  taking  it.  The  next  day  tliey  nja.l.• 
a  second  assault  ou  it ;  but  as  they  did  not  now  do  it  so  nni•  1» 
damage,  sinee  the  inhabitants  had  proviiled  better  defens*- 
during  the  night,  and  the  crews  which  liad  esca|)ed  from  tli 
ships  at  Triopium  had  gone  in  to  join  them,  they  withdrew, 
and  after  ravaging  the  territory  of  the  Cnidians,  sailed  back  to 
Samos. 

36.  Astyochus  having  come  about  the  same  time  to  the  11»•.  t 
at  Miletus,  the  Pelopounesians  were  still  abundantly  supplit  1 
Avith  every  thing  in  their  camp.     For  j>ay  was  given  them  t 
a  sufficiently  large  amount,  and  the  great  sum  of  money  wlii. 
had  been  raised  from  the  plunder  of  lasus  Λvas  still  at  il; 
command  of  the  soldiers,  and  the  Milesians  carried  on  the  ua 
with  spirit.     Nevertheless  the  Pelopounesians  considered  tl.i 
the  first  convention  with  Tissapherues,  which  had  been  cc; 
eluded  by  (Jhaleideus,  was  defective,  and  not  so  much  for  tli< 
advantage  [as  for  his] ;  and,  consequently,  Λvhile  Theramei 
was  yet  there,  they  concluded  another,  >vhich  was  to  the  1 
lowing  effect : 

37.  "  The  convention  of  the  Lacedajmonians  and  the  alii 
with  king  Darius,  the  sons  of  the  king,  and  Tissaphernes,  tli 
there  should  be  a  treaty  and  friendship  between  them  on  lli• 
terms  :  Whatever  territory  and  cities  belong  to  King  Dariu>,  • 

'  Ις  τϋν  τειχισιών]  i.  e.,  for  tlio  fortification  of  Delphinium.   See  ch.  Γ•" 


XXX711I.]  THUCYDIDES,  VIII.  633 

(lid  bclonj^  to  liin  father,  or  liis  nncostors,  agafnst  these  neither 
the  L'lccdacmonians  nor  the  allies  of  the  Ijacedicmonians  shall 
l»o  permitted  to  proceed  for  the  purpose  of  war,  or  for  any  harm : 
neither  shall  the  LacedtTmonians,  nor  their  confederates,  ex- 
act tribute  from  these  cities.  Neither  shall  Kinc^  Darius,  or 
any  states  in  the  king*»  dominions,  be  allowed  to  proceed 
against  the  LaccdaDmonians,  or  their  allies,  for  the  purpose 
of  war  or  other  injury. — Should  tlio  Lacedaimonians,  or  their 
allies,  require  any  assistance  from  the  king,  or  the  king  stand 
in  need  of  any  from  the  Kicediemoniane,  or  their  allies ;  to 
whatever  they  may  gain  each  other's  assent,  that  shall  be  right 
for  them  to  do. — Both  parties  shall  carry  on  in  common  the 
war  against  the  Atlicnians  and  their  allies ;  and  should  they 
come  to  terms  of  peace,  they  shall  both  do  so  in  common. 
— Whatever  troops  shall  bo  in  the  king's  country  in  conso- 
nucncxi  of  the  king's  having  sent  for  them,  the  king  shall  pay 
tlieir  expenses. — Should  any  of  the  states  which  have  con- 
cluded this  convention  with  the  king  proceed  against  the  king's 
country,  the  rest  shall  prevent  it,  and  assist  the  king  to  iho 
utmost  of  their  power.  And  should  any  of  those  in  the  king's 
country,  or  in  all  his  dominions,  proceed  against  the  coun- 
try of  the  Lacedaimonians,  or  of  their  allies,  the  king  shall 
prevent  it,  and  assist  them  to  the  uttermost  of  his  power." 

38.  After  this  convention  Theramenes  gave  up  the  fleet  to 
Astyochus,  and  sailing  away  in  a  small  boat  was  lost  at  sea*. 
The  Athenians,  having  now  crossed  over  from  Losboe  to  Chios 
with  their  army,  and  commanding  both  land  and  sea,  pro- 
ceeded to  fortify  Delphinium,  a  place  that  was  both  naturally 
strong  on  the  land  side,  contained  several  harbors,  and  was 
not  far  from  the  city  of  Chios.  Now  the  Chians  having  been 
l)eaten  iu  several  previous  engagements,  and  not  being  on  very 
good  terms  among  themselves,  but  regarding  each  other  witn 
suspicion,  because  Tydeus,  son  of  Ion,  and  liia  party  had  al- 
reatly  been  executed  by  Pedaritus  on  the  charge  of  Atticism, 
and  the  reet  of  the  city  was  by  compulsion  reduced  to  an 
oligarchy ;  in  consequence  of  these  things  they  kept  quiet,  and 
thought  neither  themselves  nor  the  mercenaries  under  Pedari- 
tus to  bo  A  match  for  the  enemy.     Tliey  cent,  however,  to 

•  άφανίζηαι.]  Or,  as  others  render  it,  "  disappeared  from  the  iceno  of 
Action :"  but  Bishop  Thirlwoll'e  interpretation  of  the  word  leoini  un- 
doubtedly the  correct  one. 


53i  THUCTDIDES.  VIIL  [xxxix.xl 

Miletus,  urging  Astyochus  to  como  to  their  aid :  and  when  li•; 
<lid  not  listen  to  them,  Pcdaritus  sent  i\  letter  to  Laceda^iuon, 
representing  him  as  being  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  On  this 
footing  stood  the  atlairs  of  the  Athenians  at  Chios  :  while  from 
Sauios  their  ships  kept  sailing  out  against  ihoso  at  Miletus, 
and  when  they  did  not  advance  to  meet  them,  they  roturiud 
again  to  Samos,  and  remained  quiet. 

39.  The  samo   winter,  the   seven   and   thirty  ships  whi»  h 
had  been  equipj>ed  by  the  Lacediemonians  for  Phamabaziis, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  Calligitus  the  Megarean   an-i 
Timagoras  the  Cyzicene,  put  out  from  the  Peloponnese,  au  I 
sailed  for  Ionia,  about  the  period  of  the  solstice,  Antisthencs  ;i 
Spartan  being  on  board  in  command  of  them.      The  I^cnla 
monians    also   sent  elevtn    Spartans  as   assistant  counst'lur^ 
for  Astyochus,  one  of  whom  was  Lichas,  the  son  of  Areesilauv 
They  were  instructed  on  their  arrival  at  Miletus  to  co-opera• 
in  the  arrangement  of  all  other  atVairs,  as  should  bo  best,  an  I 
to   dispatch  these   vessels — either  just  the  number,  more,  •-: 
fewer — to  the   Hellespont,  to  join    Pharnabazus,  should   th.  \ 
think  proj)er,  appointing  to  the  command  of  them  Cleardiu 
the  son  of  Uamphias,  who  sailed  out  with  them ;  and  also,  ii 
the   eleven   commissioners   deemed   fit,  to   ilepose   Astyochr. 
from  the  office  of  admiral,  and  appoint  Antisthencs;  for  thr. 
Avere   8Usj)icious  of  him  in  consequence   of  the  letters   fr<•!; 
Pedaritus.     Sailing  therefore  from  Malea  across  the  open  ^' 
the  squadron  toucheil  at  Melos,  and  there  falling  in  with  t 
Athenian  ships  took  three  of  them  empty,  and  bume<l  th«  n. 
After  this,  being  afraid   that   those   of  the   Athenian  vess. 
Λvhich  had  esca})ed  from  Melos  might  (as  Avas  the  ciise)  ii'w 
information  of  their  approach  to  those  at  Samos,  they  sail. 
to  Crete,  and  having  made  their  voyage  longer  by  taking  th 
precaution,  they  nia<le    the  land   at   Caunus,   in    Asia;  fi' 
which  place,  considering  themselves  to  be  now  in  safety,  th• 
sent  a  message  to  the  ships  at  Miletus,  in  order  to  bo  convov. 
by  them  along  the  coast. 

40.  At  this  same  time  the  Chians  and  lY»daritus  si 
messengers  to  Astyochus,  notwithstanding  his  holding  b:k 
and  bogged  him  to  succor  them  in  their  siege  with  all  1 
lleet,  and  not  to  })ermit  the  largest  of  the  allied  cities  in  Γ>!! 
to  bo  both  excluded  from  the  use  of  the  sea,  and  wasted  : 
forays  on   the   land-      For  the   slaves  of  the   Chians  bci: 


XLi.]  THUCYDIDES    VIIL  635 

numerous,  and  indeed  formincr  tlio  largest  body  there  was  in 
anv  one  city,  except  that  of  the  Laceda;monians,  and  at  the 
same  time  being,  in  conscqncnco  of  their  great  numbers,  piui- 
islu'd  more  severely  than  usual  in  cases  of  offenso,  when  the 
Athenian  army  appeared  to  Ικϊ  iirnily  establislied,  λ\\ύ\  the 
ii'lvantage  of  a  fortified  position,  the  greater  part  deserted  to 
tlieni ;  and  these  did  the  most  mischief  to  the  country,  through 
tiieir  acquaintance  with  it.  The  Chians  therefore  represented, 
that  while  there  was  still- a  ho|)e  and  possibility  of  stopping 
them,  while  Delphinium  was  still  being  fortified,  and  not  yot 
completed,  and  a  higher  wall  was  being  erecteil  round  their 
«amp  and  the  ships,  it  was  incumbent  on  hiin  to  assist  them. 
And  although  Astyochus,  because  of  his  threat  on  the  occa- 
sion already  mentioned,  had  not  intended  to  do  it,  when  lio 
saw  that  the  allies  also  Svcrc  anxious  for  their  relief,  he  set  out 
to  succor  them. 

41.  In  the  mean  time  tidings  came  from  Caunus  that  the 
seven  and  twenty  ships,  with  tliC  Lacediomonian  counselons 
wore  come.  And  thinking  every  thing  else  of  secondary  im- 
]»ortanco,  compared  with  his  convoying  so  largo  a  number  of 
ships,  in  order  that  they  might  more  entirely  command  the  sea, 
and  with  the  safe  passage  of  the  Lacedajmonians  who  had  como 
to  observe  his  conduct,  he  immediately  gave  up  going  to  the 
relief  of  Chios,  and  sailed  to  Caunus.  Having  landed,  as  lie 
coasted  along,  at  Cos  Meropis,'  which  Avan  unfortified,  and  in 
ruins  in  consequence  of  an  earthquake  which  they  had  expe- 
rienced— the  most  violent  one  which  I  ever  remember — ho 
sa(;ked  the  town,  the  men  having  fled  to  the  mountains,  and 
by  incursions  made  spoil  of  the  country,  excepting  the  freo 
population,  whom  he  released.  Having  come  from  Cos  to  Cni- 
dus  by  night,  he  was  constrained  by  the  advice  of  the  Cnidians 
not  to  land  his  seamen,  but  to  sail,  just  as  lie  was,  straightway 
a^rainst  the  twenty  Athenian  ships  with  which  Channinus,  one 
of  the  generals  at  Samos,  was  on  the  look-out  for  tliose  seven 
and  twenty  ships  that  were  approaching  from  the  Peloponneso, 
and  to  join  Avhich  Astyochus  also  was  coasting  along.  Fi)r 
those  at  Samos  had  heard  from  Melos  of  their  approach,  and 

'  Κύν  τί)ν  Mfpon-tiJe.]  "  According  to  the  old  mythical  language,  •  Co«i 
ftr$t  settled  by  the  hero  Merops.'  Sco  Stephan.,  ByzanU,  llesychius,  etc. 
According  to  tho  interpretation  now  given  to  this  language,  *Coa  first 
eeltlod  by  tho  people  called  Mi^opos,' "— ^rnoict ' 


I 


536  THUOTDIDEa  VIII  (xuL,xuit 

Channinue  was  watching  for  them  about  Syme,  Chalco, 
Uhodes,  and  Lycia ;  aa  by  this  tiino  he  was  aware  of  their 
being  at  Caunus. 

42.  Astyochus  therefore  sailed  immediately  to  Syme,  Uforc 
he  was  heard  of,  on  the  chance  of  finding  the  ships  bomewhtre 
out  at  sea.  But  the  rain  and  the  cloudy  state  of  tlie  atmos- 
phere which  ho  encountered  caused  the  dispersion  of  his  ships 
during  the  dark,  and  threw  them  into  confusion.  In  the  moru- 
ing,  when  his  ileet  had  been  separated,  and  the  left  wing  was 
iiow  in  sight  of  the  Athenians,  while  the  rest  of  it  was  still 
dispersed  around  the  island,  Charminus  and  the  Athenians  put 
out  against  it  with  all  speed,  with  fewer  than  their  twenty 
nliips,  thinking  that  these  were  the  vessels  they  were  watcliiii•; 
for,  namely,  those  from  Caunus.  Having  attacked  them,  theii- 
fore,  immediately,  they  sank  three,  and  severely  damage<l  sdih• 
others,  and  had  the  advant-ige  in  the  action,  until  the  larger  tli 
vision  of  the  fleet  unexpectedly  came  in  sight,  and  they  wii» 
surrounded  on  every  side.  They  then  took  to  flight,  and  hav- 
ing lost  bix  ships,  fled  for  refuge  with  the  rest  to  the  island  «ί 
Teutlussa,  and  thence  to  llalicarnassus.  After  this  the  iVl•^ 
ponnesians  jmt  into  Cnidus,  and  the  seven  and  twenty  ships 
from  Caunus  having  efl'ected  a  junction  with  them,  they  saili-l 
with  the  whole  number,  and  erected  a  trophy  on  Syme,  ιιικί 
then  came  to  anchor  again  at  Cnidus. 

43.  The  Athenians,  on  hearing  the  particulars  of  the  en 
gagement,  having  sailed  with  all  their  ships  from  Samos  t" 
Syme,  made  no  atUick  on  the  fleet  at  Cnidus,  or  that  on  tlu  lu. 
but  took  their  naval  stores,'  whicli  Avere  at  Syme,  and  aft.  ι 
touching  at  Lory  mi  on  the  continent,  sailed  back  to  Sam•-. 
And  now  all  the  Peloponnesian  ships  at  Cnidus  were  retitt»  >1. 
ho  far  as  they  required  it ;  and  the  eleven  Lacedaimonian  coni- 
inissioners  held  a  conference  with  Tissaphernes  (for  he  hai 
come  to  meet  them),  both  respecting  Avhat  had  alrea<ly  Ικ^  ii 
done,  if  there  was  aught  that  did  not  please  them,  and  with 
reference  to  future  hostilities,  in  what  way  they  miglit  be  con 
ducted  most  to  the  benefit  and  advantage  of  both  parti^v 
Liclu:s,  more  especially,  kept  an  eye  on  the  transactions,  ani 

*  Tu  σκενη,  κ.  τ.  λ.]  "i.e.,  tho  masts  and  sails  of  Charminua'squaJri 
which,  according  to  custom,  had  hecu  left  on  shore  at  Symo,  when  ti  ' 
«liip»  put  to  sea  suddenly  to  attack  tho  ileet  of  Astyochus.    Soo  chai^ 
A2.  )l."—ArnolU. 


xLiv.,XLv.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII,  637 

said,  "that  neither  of  the  two  treaties  were  properly  drawn  up, 
nuitlier  that  of  Clialcideus,  nor  that  of  Theramenes,  but  it  was 
a  shameful  tiling  that  the  king  should  even  now  claim  to  bo 
master  of  all  the  country  over  whkh  he  and  liis  ancestors  had 
formerly  had  dominion.  For  in  that  was  involved  the  re-sub- 
jugatiou  of  all  the  islands,  with  Thessaly,  Locris,  and  as  far  as 
lioeotia;  and  so,  instead  of  freedom,  the  Lacedaemonians  >vould 
ho  putting  tho  Median  yoke  on  the  Greeks.  Ho  told  them, 
thiirofore,  to  conclude  another  and  a  better  treaty,  or  at  any 
rate  thcv  would  not  act  according  to  this ;  nor  did  they  want 
any  of  his  PU()plies  on  these  terms.  But  Tissaphernes,  being 
t)trended  at  this,  went  away  from  them  in  a  rage,  and  without 
settling  any  thing. 

44.  Thuy,  in  consequence  of  communications  from  some  of 
tho  most  powerful  men  there,  were  disposed  to  sail  to  Rhodes; 
hoping  to  bring  over  to  their  side  an  island  which  was  strong 
hcith  in  ita  numlwr  of  seamen  and  its  land  forcx»s ;  and  more- 
over thinking  that  they  should  themselves  be  able  to  maintain 
their  fleet  from  their  own  confederacy,  without  asking  Tissa- 
phernes for  money.  Having  sailed,  tlierefore,  immediately, 
that  same  Avinter,  from  Cnidus,  and  having  first  put  in  with 
ninety-four  ships  to  Camirus  in  the  Khodian  territory,  they 
frightened  away  most  of  tho  inhabitants,  Λνΐιο  were  not  awaro 
of  their  intentions,  and  therefore  fled,  especially  as  tho  town 
was  unfortified.  Then,  having  assembled  both  these  and  tho 
people  from  tho  two  other  towns,  Lindus  and  lalysus,  tho  L&- 
«tMlaiinonians  prevailed  on  the  Ilhodians  to  revolt  from  tho 
Athenians.  And  so  Khodes  joined  tho  Peloponnesian  confed- 
vnicy.  The  Athenians,  having  got  notice  of  it,  sailed  at  (his 
time  with  their  ships  from  Samos,  wishing  to  anticipate  them, 
and  camo  within  sight  of  tho  island  as  they  lay  out  at  sea ; 
but  being  a  little  too  lato,  they  sailed  back  in  tho  first  instance 
to  Chalce,  thence  to  Samos,  and  afterward  carried  on  the  war 
against  Rhodes  by  attacks  from  Chalce,  Cos,  and  Samos.  Tho 
l'elo|)onne8ian8  levied  money  from  tho  Rhodians  to  tho  amount 
of  two  and  thirty  talents;  but  in  other  respects  lay  still  for 
eighty  days,  having  drawn  up  tho  ships  on  shore. 

45.  In  the  mean  time,  and  at  even  a  still  earlier  period,  be- 
fore  they  removed  to  Rhodes,  the  following  negotiations  wero 
being  carried  on  :  Alcibiades  being  suspected  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  after  the  death  of  Chalcideus  and  tho  battle  of  Miletus, 

•23* 


638  THUOYDIDEa  VIII.  [xlti 

and  instructions  having  been  sent  by  them  from  Lacodsemon 
to  Astyochus  to  put  bim  to  death  (for  he  was  α  pei-sonal  euo- 
ray  of  Agis,  and  in  other  ways  appeared  to  bo  unworthy  uf 
trust),  lie  first  retired  in  ahirui.  to  tlio  court  of  Tissaphernes, 
and  then  did  the  greatest  liarni  }io  could  to  the  cause  of  the 
Peloponnesians  with  him.     Being  his  adviser  on  nil  points,  In- 
cut down  the  pay,  so  that  instead  of  an  Attic  drachma  thrt.• 
oboli  were  given,  and  that  not  regularly ;  telling  Tissaphern*  > 
to  represent  to  them  that  the  Athenians,  who  for  a  longer  tim. 
had  had  experience  in  naval  matters,  gave  their  men  but  thri.• 
oboli;  not  so  much  from  poverty,  as  that  their  seamen  iiih^la 
not  grow  insolent  from  abundance,  and  either  be  less  ahh 
bodied,  through  spending  money  on  such  things  as  produ* . 
weakness,  or  desert  their  ships  by  means  of  leaving  their  a: 
rears  of  pay  as  a  security  lor  them.*     He  also  g;wo  him  siu!i 
instructions,  that  by  giving  money  ho  j)ersuaded  the  triefaich- 
and  generals  of  the  diiierent  states  to  concede  these  points  i<* 
him,  excepting   tho   Syracusans;    but   of  these   llermocrat. - 
alone  opposed  him  on  behalf  of  tho  whole  confederacy.     ΊΊμ* 
states,  too,  which  applied  for  money,  he  dismissed  with  an  an- 
swer frum  himself,  on  the   part  of  Tissaphernes,  alleging  1} 
Λvay  of  refusal,  that  *'  tho  Chians  were  shameless,  λυΙιο,  thoiii:!i 
the   Avealthiest  of   the   ( ί reeks,  and    iKiing    protected  its  tli» ;. 
were  by  the  aid  they  were  receiving,  exjMcted  others  to  ri>iv 
both  their  j>ersons  and  their  j)urses  lor  their  liberty."     λ\\\\ 
regard  to  the  rest  of  the  states,  Avhich  used  before  their  revd 
to  lavish  their  money  on  tho  Athenians,  he  said  that   thr\ 
ΛνοΓο  wrong  if  they  would  not  now  also  contribute  as  mu. !; 
or  even  more,  for  their  own  interests.     He  also   re  present  <  i 
tliat  Tissaphernes  was  naturally  sparing  at  present,  inasimn  ii 
as  he  was  carrying  on  tho  war  with  his  own  resources;  l•'. 
that  if  supplies  should  ever  como  down  from  tho  king,  ho  won! : 
give  them  their  full  pay,  and  afford  tho  states  all  proper  relit 
40.  Ho  likewise  advised  Tissaphernes  '*  not  to  be  in  too  gn ; 
a  hurry  to  bring  the  war  to  a  conclusion  ;  nor  to  bo  anxiou 
by  either  bringing  the   l*haniician  fleet  which  he  was  0()uii 
j>iug,  or  giving  i)ay  to  a  larger  body  of  Greeks,  to  confer  • 

*  t'c  ΰμηΐ}ΐΐαν.'\  That  is,  that  the  larger  pay  wat*  considered  aa  asooui 
f  )Γ  tho  men's  returning  to  their  post,  when  summoned,  and  therefore  .i 
reason  for  greater  indulgences  in  granting  leave  of  absenco  than  ν 
proved  by  tho  result  to  be  consistent  with  tho  interests  of  tho  service. 


XLTii.]  TnUCTDIDES.  VIII.  539 

tho  same  party  tbo  command  both  of  land  and  sea ;  but  to  let 
them  each  hold  a  divided  sway,  and  so  leave  the  king  the 
])Ower  at  all  times  to  lead  the  one  party  or  the  other  against 
those  wlio  \vere  annoying  him.  If,  on  the  contrarj',  the  com- 
mand both  by  land  and  sea  were  united,  ho  ΛΥουΜ  be  at  a  loss 
for  any  party  to  assist  in  overthrowing  the  stronger ;  unless 
he  should  himself  ever  choose  to  arise  and  carry  out  the  con- 
test with  them  at  a  great  expense  and  hazard.  It  was  a 
cheaper  risk  to  wear  down  the  Greeks  against  each  other,  at  a 
trifling  share  of  tho  expense,  and  at  the  same  time  with  secu- 
rity to  himself.  And  the  Athenians,  he  said,  were  a  more  de- 
sirable people  to  share  tho  empire  with  him;  for  they  "wero 
less  desirous  of  possessions  on  shore,  and  carried  on  the  war 
with  both  a  profession  and  a  practice  most  advantageous  io 
liim,  as  they  would  unite  with  him  in  subjugating,  as  far  as 
the  sea  was  concerned,  to  themselves  and  to  bim  all  the  Greeks 
who  lived  in  the  king's  country  ;  while  the  other  paitv,  on  tho 
contrary,  had  come  to  liberate  them.  Nor  Avas  it  lilcely  that 
the  Laeedicmonians  should  at  tho  present  time  be  liberating 
tlie  Greeks  from  men  of  their  own  Grecian  race,  and  should 
omit  to  liberate  them  from  those  who  were  barbarians  ;  unless 
tliey  should  ever  fail  in  reducing  the  Athenians.'  He  urged 
tlieni,  therefore,  to  wear  them  both  out  at  first,  and  after  cut- 
ting οίΤ  as  much  as  possible  from  the  power  of  the  Atheni- 
ans, then  to  get  rid  of  the  Peloponnesians  from  liis  countr}\'* 
Tissaphernes  adopted  these  views  in  the  main,  so  far,  at  least, 
ns  might  be  conjectured  from  his  actions.  For  having  on  this 
account  placed  himself  in  the  confidence  of  Alcibiades,  as  of 
one  who  had  given  him  good  advice  on  tho  subject,  he  both 
scantily  supplied  the  Peloponnesians  Λvith  money,  and  would 
not  allow  them  to  fight  by  sea ;  but  by  telling  them  that  the 
rhoenician  fleet  should  come  to  them,  and  that  so  they  should 
contend  with  superabundant  strength,  ho  greatly  injured  their 
cause,  and  took  oft*  tho  vigor  of  their  navy,  which  had  been 
very  great ;  and  in  all  other  respects,  too  evidently  to  escape 
observation,  he  wanted  hearty  zeal  in  co-operating  with  them. 
•  47.  Alcibiades   gave  this  advico   to  Tissaphernes   and   tho 

'  i>  μη  rrore  ηντονς,  κ.  τ.  7..]  I  have  followed  Ilnack's  and  Poppo's  m* 
tfrpretation  of  this  passa^,  **  nisi  si  quando  oos  (Athcniensca)  non  feverte- 
rint,"  rather  than  llerman's,  who  supposes  that  tho  word  μη  only  in• 
«roascs  tho  force  of  the  nc^ive :  •• nisi  hi  barbari  Orsccoe,  quoa  sub 
ditione  sud  tcncrent,  ctiam  dclovissent." 


040  THUOYDIDES.  VIII.  [χιτπι. 

king^  wbild  ho  wat  with  them,  both  bccauso  ho  thought  it  best 
ior  tlioin,  and,  at  tho  naino  time,  lM»cmim)  ho  wuh  further  pro- 
viiliiig  tur  hin  own  ruKturatioii  tu  hi«  country ;  knowing  that 
if  ho  (lid  not  bnii;<  it  to  ruin,  ho  would  eotno  tiiuo  or  otht-r 
have  means  of  persuading  his  countrymen,  and  retumin»^  t*» 
it  But  tho  way  in  which  ho  thought  ho  should  persuade  thcni 
most  easily  was  this,  namely,  by  Tissaphernes*  appearing  to  be 
in  his  interest.  An<i  so  it  turned  out ;  for  when  tho  Athenian 
soldiers  at  Samos  found  that  ho  had  great  inUuenco  with  him, 
[the  plan  was  adopted]  to  a  certain  extimt,  in  consequence  of 
Alcibiades  havin<^  sent  word  to  tho  most  powerful  individuals 
among  them,  to  let  it  bo  mentioned  to  the  most  resjXictiibK! 
people,  that  ho  wished  to  return  homo  on  condition  of  thcTt' 
being  an  oligarchy,  and  not  that  unprinci|)lod  deujocracy  whitli 
had  banished  him  ;  and  after  making  Tissaphernes  their  frieixl, 
to  enjoy  his  privileges  as  a  citizen  wiih  them  ;  but,  at  the  sanit) 
time,  the  tiierarchs  and  the  most  inibiential  Athenians  at  Sanius. 
were  of  thi'mselves  still  more  eager  for  abolishing  the  dcm<x'ra«'\ . 
48.  Tliis  design,  therefore,  was  lirst  mooted  in  the  canii», 
and  thenco  spreal  to  the  city.  Accordingly,  certain  indivitlu- 
als  went  over  from  Samos,  and  l)ad  an  interview  witli  Aleil»i- 
ades ;  and  when  ho  held  out  that  lie  would  first  mako  Tissa- 
phernes  their  friend,  and  then  the  king,  in  case  they  Λvere  not 
under  a  democratical  government  (for  so  the  king  would  \t\iu-r 
greater  reliance  on  them),  tho  aristocratical  party  among  tlio 
citizens,  who  also  sutl'ered  most  at  present,  entertained  many 
hopes  of  getting  the  government  into  their  own  hands,  as  well 
as  of  gaining  tho  victory  over  tho  enemy.  Accordingly  they 
went  to  Samos,  and  united  in  a  club  such  men  as  favon*.! 
their  views,  openly  representing  to  the  people  at  largo  that  the 
king  would  bo  their  friend,  and  supply  them  with  money,  ii" 
Alcibiades  were  restored,  and  they  were  not  governed  hy  a 
democracy.  Tho  nmltitude,  though  annoyed  to  a  certain 
extent  by  these  negotiations,  remained  quiet  because  oi' 
their  abundant  hopes  of  pay  from  tho  king ;  while  those  wlu» 
were  for  establishing  tho  oligarchy,  after  they  had  commu- 
nicated their  designs  to  tho  mjiss  of  tho  people,  again  οίι 
sidered  the   proposals   of  Alcibiades  aniong  themselves'   an: 

1  καΐ  σ<^ίσιν  αύτυϊς,  κ.  τ.  λ.]  Dobreo,  Goller,  Poppo,  and  Arnold  npr. 
in  thinking  that  Iv  must  bo  inserted  beforo  οφίαιν,  without  whioli  t!: 
pojsaago  seems  to  them  not  tairly  intelligible.     But  may  not  this  bo  a 


XLViii.]  TnUCYDIDES.  Till.  541 

tho  pfrcator  part  of  tlieir  nssociatcs.  To  the  rest,  then,  tlicy 
n])pcarcd  aclvantafj^oua  and  worthy  of  their  oonfidencc;  hut 
I'lirynichus,  who  was  still  poneral,  was  not  at  all  pleased  with 
tlieni,  but  thought  that  Alcihiadcs  (as  was  really  the  case)  liad 
no  more  desire  for  an  olifxan-hy  than  for  a  democracy,  or  con- 
i^idercd  any  thinjQj  else  but  how,  by  brinfjinc:  tho  state  to  change 
its  present  constitution,  ho  miijht  obtain  his  recall  by  the  in- 
vitation of  liis  associates.  "  What  they  themselves,  however, 
sliouid  most  especially  look  to,  was,"  lie  said,  "  to  avoid  being 
Γ(  nt  by  factions.  That  it  was  not  for  tlie  kinjj's  advantage, 
when  the  IVloponnesians  were  now  on  an  equality  nt  sea,  and 
held  none  of  tho  lea4  cities  in  his  dominion,  to  mcur  trouble 
by  siding  with  tho  Athenians,  whom  ho  did  not  trust,  when 
lie  might  liave  made  the  IVloponnesians  liis  fiiends,  by  whom 
he  had  never  yet  been  injured.  As  for  the  allied  states,  again, 
to  whom,  forsooth,  they  had  promised  an  oligarchy,  because 
they  themselves  also  would  cease  to  be  under  a  democracy,  ho 
well  knew  that  neither  those  which  had  revolted  would  any 
tho  more  on  that  account  come  over  to  them,  nor  those  that 
were  left  be  more  stanch  to  them ;  for  they  would  not  wish 
to  be  slaves  with  either  an  oligardiy  or  a  democracy,  rather 
than  to  be  free,  under  whichever  of  those  two  forms  of  govern- 
ment they  might  obtain  their  lil)erty.     And  with  regard  to  the 

pardcd  as  a"dativu3  instrumcnti  ?"  which  is  certainly  used  sometimes 
with  rcfcTcnco  to  persons,  thotjgh  less  commonly  than  to  things.  One 
instance  of  it  is  given  by  Jelf,  Gr.  Or.  §  608,  Oba.  3,  from  Soph.  El.  226, 
Till  γαρ  ιτοτ'  Λν,  <,j  <1>ιλία  γενίθλα,  ιτρόσ<ρηρον  ηκονηαιμ^  ίττος  ;  and  perhaps 
a  second  might  havo  been  added  from  tho  samo  play,  v.  441,  tl  σοι 
Γί)ο^^/λώ(•  αντι)  όοκεϊ  Γέρα  τύό^  ονν  τύφοιηι  όέξασθαι  νέκνς.  Matthi.T,  fc^ 
:{;»Γ.,  brings  forward  another  undoubted  instance  from  Eur.  Ileracl.  392, 

ΰΐΊ^ρη  γαρ  χρεών -οίκ  ΰγγέ?,οισι  τους  εναντίους  υρΰν  and  another  less 

01  rtain  one  from  Xcn.  Cyrop.  One  instance  may  also,  I  think,  bo  quoted 
from  Thueydides  himself,  though  I  am  not  awaro  that  it  ever  has,  viz., 
VIII.  82. 3,  ξννέίϊαινε  όέ  τύ  'Α?.κι6ιάΑΐβ  τφ  μεν  Ύισσα<Ι>ίρνει  τους  'Αθηναίους 
on  hh\  Ικείνοις  ύέ  τον  Ύιασα^έρνην.  There  seems,  therefore,  to  bo  no 
sufficient  reason  why  tho  samo  construction  should  not  have  been  used 
hero.  If  this  bo  admitted,  I  would  apply  tho  samo  principle  to  two 
other  pa.ssnge8  of  our  author,  of  which  I  havo  beforo  taken  a  different 
view,  viz.,  I.  26,  οίτε  Κορινθίφ  ύνΛρι  ηροκαταρχήμενοι,  and  V.  38.  4, 
ηί'Χ  άλλα  ^1>η<ΙίΐεΙαθαι  »)  u  οφίοι  ηροόιαγί'όντες  παραινηϋσιν.  With  regard 
to  the  former,  when  I  wrote  tho  note  on  it,  I  hnd  not  seen  tho  quotation 
with  which  Poppo  corroborates  Bloomfleld's  interprt• tation,  and  which 
pnta  it  beyond  a  doubt,  I  think,  that  Arrian,  at  any  rate,  took  the  earn• 
view  of  it.  • 


642  THUCYDIDES.  νΠΙ.  [xux.i. 

reepectablo  classes,  as  thoy  wero  called,  they  considered  that 
the  oligarchs  would  not  cause  them  less  trouble  than  t!i. 
popular  government,  being  as  they  were  the  authors  and  in- 
troducers of  projects  which  wero  evil  for  the  people,  and  fn  in 
which  they  themselves  derived  the  most  benefit.  Indeed  as  far 
as  depended  on  iA^m,  they  would  be  put  to  death  without  tri.il, 
and  even  by  measures  of  violence ;  whereas  the  commons  wcr. 
their  refuge,  and  the  moderators  of  the  other  party.  And  as  tin 
states  had  learned  these  things  from  positive  facts,  he  vioW  kncv. 
that  such  was  their  opinion  on  the  subject.  For  himself,  tlu  n. 
he  was  pleased  Λvith  none  of  the  schemes  carried  on  by  Al»  i- 
biades  at  i)resent,  as  before." 

49.  But  thoKO  members  of  the  association  who  had  ;> 
sembled  accetled  to  the  present  ])ropoRals,  as  they  had  at  fir  : 
determined,  and  prepared  to  send  Pisander  and  some  others  <  i: 
an  embassy  to  Athens,  to  treat  for  the  return  of  Alcibiades  an 
the  abolition  of  the  democracy  in  that  city,  and  so  to  gain  tl . 
friendship  of  Tissapherne»  for  the  Athenians. 

50.  But  when  1/hryniehus  saw  that  there  would  be  a  j»r. 

posal   for   the    recall    of  Aleibiades,  and    that   the    Atheni.u. 

would  accede  to  it,  being  afraid,  on  considering  the   op]>o>  t 

tendency  of  Λvhat  had  been  maintained  by  himself,  that  if  1 

were  restored  he  would  do  him  some  mischief,  as  one  ΛνΙιο  1::, 

imyKided  his  plans,  he  had  recourse  to  the  following  device.   11 

siiUt  to  Astyoehus  the  Laeedicmonian  admiral,  who  Λva8  still  i 

the   neighborhood    of  Quietus,   with    secret    instructions   tl. 

Alcibiades  >vas  ruining  their  cause   by  bringing  Tissaphen  > 

into  friendship  with  the  Athenians;   expressly  mentioning  ; 

the  other  matters  also,  and  j)leading  that  it  was  pardon;»! 

in  him  to  devise  evil  against  a  man  who  was  an  enemy,  cn- 

though  it  were  to  the  detriment  of  the  staU•.     Now  Astyod;. 

did  not  so  nmch  as  think  of  nunishing  Alcibiades — cspeeia:! 

as  ho  no  longer  jmt  himself  in  his  power  as  he  used  to  do — I 

having  gone  up  to  him  and  Tissaphernes  at  Magnesia,  at  ci 

told  them  the  contents  of  the  letter  from  Samos,  acting  as  ; 

informer  to  them,  and  for  his  own  ])rivate  gain  devoting  lii; 

self,  as  Avas  said,  to  the  interest  of  Tissaphernes  both  on  lli< 

and  on  all  other  matters :  ί)Γ  which  reason  also  he  was  the  m 

gi'Utlo  in  remonstrating  with  hijn  respeeting  the  pay  not  Ik  - 

given  in  full.     Alcibiades  immediately  sent  a  letter  to  San 

giving  information  against  Phrynichus  to  the  authorities  the 


Li,ui.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  643 

telling  them  whtii  lie  Iiad  done,  and  requiring  that  he  should 
1)0  j»ut  to  death,  rhrynichus,  being  confounded  and  in  tho 
most  extreme  danger,  sent  again  to  Astyoehus,  reproaching 
him  because  his  former  information  had  not  been  duly  kept 
secret,  and  tolling  him  now  that  ho  was  prepared  to  give  them 
an  opportunity  of  destroying  the  wliole  Athenian  armament  at 
Sanios;  describing  the  particulars  of  tho  way  in  which  ho 
could  do  it,  as  Samos  wiis  uiifortified ;  and  pleading  that  it  was 
ni)t  now  culpable  in  him,  being,  as  he  was,  in  danger  of  his  lifo 
through  them,  to  do  this,  or  any  thing  else,  rather  than 
be  destroyed  by  his  bitterest  enemies,  Astyoehus  gavo  in- 
formation of  this  also  to  Alcibiades. 

51.  Now  when  IMirynichus  had  discovered  beforehand  that 
he  was  doing  him  injury,  and  that  a  letter  from  Alcibiades  on 
the  subject  was  on  tho  point  of  arriving,  lie  liimself  anticipated 
it  by  riunouncing  it  to  tho  army,  that  as  vSamos  was  unfortified, 
.••nd  all  tho  ships  wero  not  stationed  within  the  harbor,  tho 
enemy  intended  to  attack  tho  camp :  that  ho  had  certain  in- 
telligence of  this,  and  that  they  ought  as  quickly  as  possible  to 
fortify  Samos  and  put  every  thing  else  in  a  state  of  defense. 
Now  he  was  liimself  general,  and  so  had  full  authority  to  carry 
out  these  measures.  Accordingly  they  prepared  for  tho  ΛνοΓκ 
of  fortification ;  and  owing  to  this  Samos  was  tho  more, 
quickly  walled,  though  it  would  havo  been  so  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. Xot  long  after  came  the  letters  from  Alcibiades, 
saying  that  the  army  >vas  going  to  be  betrayed  by  I'hrynichus, 
iind  that  tho  enemy  wero  on  the  point  of  attacking  them.  As, 
however,  Alcibiades  was  not  thought  to  be  Avorthy  of  credit,  but 
to  havo  had  a  j)revious  acquaintance  vfkh.  the  plans  of  tho 
»*nemy,  and  through  personal  dislike  to  havo  attributed  them  to 
riirynichus,  as  though  ho  wero  privy  to  them,  ho  did  him  no 
iiarjn,  but  rather  boro  witness  to  his  statement  by  sending  this 
intelligence. 

52.  After  this,  Alcibiades  tried  to  bring  over  and  porsuado 
Tissaphernes  to  tho  friendship  of  tho  AtKenians;  and  he, 
though  afraid  of  tho. Peloponnesians,  because  they  were  there 
with  more  ships  than  tho  Athenians,  was  still  disposed  to  bo 
<  onvinced  by  him,  if  by  any  means  he  could  ;  especially  since 
lie  had  observed  tho  dissatisfaction  of  the  Peloponnesians 
^vliieh  had  been  expressed  at  Cnidus  about  tho  treaty  of 
Theramcncs  (for  ns  at  this  time  they  wero  at  Rhodes,  it  bad 


644  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  [un 

already  occurred  •),  in  the  course  of  which  Lichae  had  verified 
the  observation  which  Imd  before  been  made  by  Alcibiailo^ 
about  the  Lacediemouiaus  liberating  all  the  static's  when  li. 
said  that  it  was  an  intolerable  a^j^reement  that  the  king  shoul.j 
be  master  of  the  cities  over  which,  at  an  earlier  period,  eitln  r 
himself  or  his  fathers  hud  had  dominion.  Alcibiades  then,  in- 
asmuch as  ho  was  struggling  for  a  great  object,  was  earnestlv 
courting  and  soliciting  llssaphernes. 

53.  The  Athenian  embassadors,  on  the  other  hand,  who  lia.l 
been  sent  from  Samos  with  Pisander,  on  their  arrival  at  Atlu  n-, 
delivered  an  address  before  the  people,  giving  a  summary  ut 
many  arguments,  but  most  especially  urging,  that  by  recalliii:: 
Alcibiades,  and  not  being  under  a  democratical  government  ii. 
the  same  manner  as  hitherto,  they  might  both  have  the  kin,: 
for  an  ally,  and   gain   the  victory  over  the   Peloponne8iaii> 
AVhen  many  others  opposed  them  on  the  subject  of  the  •! 
mocracy,  and   the   enemies   of  Alcibiades   at  the  same  tim 
exclaimed  that  it  was  a  shameful  thing  if  ho  were  to  retuii 
by  doing  violence  to  the  laws ;  and  the  Eumolpida»  and  Cen »< 
adjured  them  with  regard  to  the  mysteries,  for  >vhieh  he  hn 
been  banished,  and  apiKJaled  to  the  gods  against  their  restorii;. 
him;  Pisander  came  forward  in  the  face  of  much  oppositi• 
and   indignant   protesting,  and  taking  aside  each  one   of  h 
opponents,  asked  him  wliether  he  had  any  hope  of  preser\.. 
tion  for  tlie  8tat<*,  sineo  the  Peloponnesians  had  no  fewer  slii| 
than  themselves  opposed  to  them  on  the  sea,  and  more  eiti. 
in  allianco   with  tliem,  while  the  king  and  Tissaphernes  !ί;| 
plied   them   w ith   moiuy ;    whereas   they  themselves   lia*l   i: 
longer  any,  unless  some  one  should   |)ersuade  the  king  to  eon. 
over  to  their  side.     When,  on   being  thus  (juestioned,  tlu'\  : 
lowed  that  they  had  nut,  he  then  said  to  tliem  plainly,  "11 
advantage,  then,  c^ui  not  be  attained  by  us,  if  we  do  not  inl- 
a  more  temperate  policy,  and  j)Ut  the  oifices  into  the  hand.^  « 
a  smaller  number,  that  the  king  may  i)lace  contidence  in  u> 

ϊ'()η  γάρ—έγεγίνητο.]  "That  is  to  say,  tho  quarrel  had  taken  \Ί 
at  Cnidus  (ch.  43.  2-4),  and  from  Cnidus  tho  Peloponnesians  had  nit^ 
to  Rhodes  (eh.  44.  1),  therefore  as  tho  PeloiKinnesiana  were  arrivi.i 
Rhodes  when  Alcibiadert  made  his  appUcation  to  Tissaphernes,  it  ν 
perfectly  pos.siblo  for  Ti.ssaphornes  to  be  influenced  in  his  reception  v( ' 
propo.sals  by  his  feelin;;  of  resentment  toward  tho  Pcloponno8iaii> 
that,  having  occurred  while  they  were  at  Cnidus,  must  have  been  j  : 
to  his  interview  with  Alcibiades." — Arnold. 


LiT.,LT.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  645 

(and  tlmt  wo  may  not  consult  so  much  nt  present  about  a  fonn 
of  irovemment  as  about  tlie  preservation  of  the  state:  for  wo 
shall  have  power  to  alter  hereafter  whatever  may  not  please 
us) — 111(1,  moreover,  if  we  do  not  restore  Alcibiades,  Λvho  is  the 
only  man  at  present  that  can  eifect  this." 

54.  The  |KOple  were  at  first  very  indignant  on  lienring  mention 
made  of  the  oligarchy ;  but  Λνΐιοα  plainly  infonned  by  l^sander 
that  there  were  no  other  means  of  prej^ervation,  being  afraid, 
and  at  the  same  time  having  hopes  of  clianging  it  agam,  *  they 
gave  way.  Accordingly  they  resolved  that  Pisander  and  ten 
commissioners  with  him  should  sail  and  conclude,  as  they  might 
think  would  be  l>est,  the  negotiations  both  with  Tissaplierncft 
and  Alcibiades.  At  tho  same  time,  on  I^isander's  falsely  ac- 
cusing I'hrynichus,  tho  ]>eoplo  deposed  liim  from  liis  command 
with  his  colleague  Scironides,  and  sent  Diomedon  and  Leon  to 
the  fleet  as  generals  in  their  stead.  For  Pisander  calumniated 
Phrynichus  by  saying  that  ho  had  betrayed  lasus  and  Amor- 
ges,  only  because  ho  did  not  think  liim  favorable  to  the  ne- 
gotiations carried  on  Avith  Alcibiades.  Pisander  likewise  visited 
Jill  tho  clubs,  which  had  previously  existed  in  tho  city  for  mu- 
tual support  in  law-suits  and  elections  to  offices,  and  exhorted 
them  to  unite  together  and  by  common  counsels  abolish  tho 
democracy ;  and  after  making  all  his  other  preparations  to 
suit  tho  present  state  of  affairs,  so  that  there  might  bo  no  moro 
«lelay,  lie  himself  with  the  ten  commissioners  proceeded  on  \m 
voyage  to  Tissaphernes. 

55.  In  tho  course  of  this  winter  I^eon  and  Diomedon,  having 
by  this  time  reached  tho  Athenian  fleet,  made  an  attack  upin 
lihodes.  Tho  ships  of  tho  Peloponnesians  they  found  hauled 
up :  and  having  made  a  descent  on  the  territory,  and  defeated 
in  an  engagement  those  of  the  Rhodians  who  went  out  against 
them,  they  withdrew  to  Chalce,  and  carried  on  (ho  war  from 

•  /?.7r/wwi'.l  'Effc^Tr/Cwv  ia  tho  reading  which  Bckkcr  adopts  from  nino 
oftlio  MSS.  in  tho  eensoof  "building  their  hop©  on  thie,"  But  as  this  use 
of  tho  word  appears  to  belong  to  later  writers  only,  it  would  perhaps  bo 
better  (supposing  tlio  compound  verb  to  bo  tho  genuine  reading)  to  givo 
tho  pioposition  its  very  common  force  of  addition,  *'  having,  besides  their 
conviction  of  present  helplcssnees,  tho  hope  of  changing  hereafter  what 
they  did  not  like."  Compare  tho  uso  of  έηιθεραπενων,  ch.  47.  3.  Or, 
again,  it  might  imply  tho  idea  of  a  hop©  in  reserve— an  after-hope,  as  in 
Irrivoia  and  eorao  other  words^  e,  y.,  Soph.  Antig.  38δ,  ^ιενόει  γάρ  if 
^ηίνοια  τήν  γνώμην. 


54G  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  [lyl 

that  place,  rather  than  from  Cos ;  for  it  waa  more  convenient 
for  their  observincj  whether  the  fleet  of  the  Peloponnesians  put 
out  in  any  direction.  Xenophautidas  the  Lacediemonian  also 
came  to  Rhodes  from  Pedaritus  at  Chios,  telling  them  that  the 
wall  of  the  Athenians  >va8  now  completed,  and  unless  thiy 
succored  them  with  all  their  ships  their  cause  would  Ιυ 
ruined  at  Chios.  Accordingly  they  detennined  to  relieve 
them.  In  the  mean  time  Pedaritus,  with  his  mercenaries  and 
the  Chians,  made  a  general  assault  on  the  fortification  round 
the  Athenian  ships,  and  took  a  part  of  it,  and  got  possession 
of  some  vessels  that  had  been  drawn  up  on  shore :  but  when 
the  Athenians  had  come  out  to  the  rescue,  and  had  routed  the 
Chians  first,  the  rest  of  the  force,  more  immediately  around 
Pedaritus,  was  defeated,  he  himself  kilknl,  with  many  of  the 
Chians,  and  a  great  number  of  arms  taken. 

50.  After  these  things  the  Chians  were  besieged  still  more 
closely  than  before,  both  by  land  and  sea,  and  the  famine  in 
the  place  was  great.  In  the  mean  time,  the  Athenian  emba>- 
sadors  with  Pisander  arrived  at  the  court  of  Tissaj)hern's, 
and  conferred  Λvith  him  respecting  the  convention.  But  iis 
Alcibiades  could  not  de]»end  on  the  views  of  Tissa]»herius, 
who  was  more  afraid  of  the  Peloponnesians,  and  Avishe<l  still 
(as  he  had  been  instructed  by  liim)  to  wear  both  j)arties  out, 
lie  had  recourse  to  the  following  plan,  in  order  that  Tissa- 
phernes,  by  demanding  the  greatest  possible  concessions  fr(»m 
the  Athenians,  might  avoid  coming  to  terms  with  them.  Tis- 
eaphernes  also,  in  my  opinion,  >vished  the  same  result,  beiin: 
liiraself  led  to  do  so  by  fear:  but  Alcibiades,  when  ho  s.i\v 
that  the  satrap  was  not,  under  any  circumstances,  desirous  i»i 
making  an  agreement,  wished  the  Athenians  to  think  that  li• 
was  not  incapable  of  j>ersuading  him,  but  that  when  Tis<;i- 
j)herne8  had  been  persuaded,  and  was  willing  to  join  them,  th• 
Athenians  did  not  concede  enough  to  him.  For  Alcibia*K  -, 
Hj)eaking  in  person  in  behalf  of  'i'issaphernes,  who  was  al^  • 
}>resent,  made  such  excessive  demands,  that  the  refusal  of  tin- 
Athenians,  although  for  a  long  time  they  conceded  >vhatev«  i 
ho  asked,  Avas  still  the  apparent  cause  of  their  failure.  Γ*' 
they  rcijuired  the  whole  of  Ionia  to  bo  given  up,  and  tlu  i 
again  the  adjacent  islands,  with  other  things;  and  when  th 
Athenians  did  not  object  to  these  demands,  at  last,  in  tlu  i 
tliird  interview,  being  afraid  that  ho  would  certainly  be  c^ti 


tvn.,Lviii.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  54Y 

victod  of  inability  to  koop  his  λυοπΙ,  lio  dcmanflod  tli.it  they 
should  permit  the  kinj;  to  build  ships,  and  eai!  nlonij  his  own 
coast,  wlierever  and  with  Ijow  fnany  soever  lio  inifjfht  ])lease, 
('[ton  that  the  Athenians  complied  no  longer,  but  eonsiderincf 
iliat  the  business  was  im practicable,  and  that  they  had  Ιχκ'Π 
ileceived  by  Alcibiades,  they  departed  in  a  rage,  and  went  to 
Samos. 

57,  Immediately  after  theso  things,  in  tho  very  same  winter, 
Tissaphenies  proceeded  to  Caunus,  wishing  to  bring  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  back  to  Miletus,  and  after  making  still  another 
convention  with  them,  to  give  them  pay,  and  not  have  them 
«Iriven  to  absolute  hostilities  with  him ;  l)eing  afraid  that  if 
tlu  V  Λνΐ'Γο  without  supplies  for  many  of  their  ships,  they  might 
cither  be  compelled  to  engage  the  Athenians  and  be  defeated, 
or  through  their  vessels  being  unmanned  the  Athenians  might 
without  Ins  assistance  attain  the  object  of  their  wishes.  And 
ngain,  he  was  most  of  all  afraid  that  they  might  ravage  tho 
continent  in  search  of  supplies.  From  calculating  and  forc- 
i'asting  all  theso  things,  in  accordanco  with  liis  wisli  to  roduco 
the  Greeks  to  ft  footing  of  eq\iality  with  one  another,  ho  con- 
scMpicntly  sent  for  the  Lacedacinonians,  and  gave  them  supplies, 
and  conclude<l  a  third  treaty  with  them,  to  the  following  ctfect : 

58.  "  In  tho  thirteenth  year  of  tho  reign  of  l)ariuR,  whilo 
Alcxippidas  was  ephor  at  Lacediemon,  λ  convention  was  con- 
cluded on  tho  plain  of  the  Maeander  by  tho  Licedajmonians 
and  their  allies,  with  Tissaphernes,  Ilieramencs,  and  tho  sons 
of  rharnaces,  res|>ccting  tho  interests  of  the  king,  tho  Lace- 
(la^mouians,  and  their  alli-es. — That  the  king's  country,  so  far 
ns  it  still  lies  in  Asia,  shall  belong  to  tho  king  still ;  and  that 
respecting  his  own  territory,  the  king  shall  H<Jopt  such  meas- 
ures  as  he  pleases. — That  tho  Lacxidaemonians  and  their  al- 
lies shall  not  invade  tho  king's  territory,  nor  tho  king  that 
<»f  tho  Lacedccmonians  or  their  allies,  to  do  it  any  hann. — 
That  if  any  of  tho  Laccdajmonians  invade  tho  king's  terri- 
tory to  do  it  harm,  tho  Lacedajmonians  and  their  allies  shall 
I»revcnt  it;  and  that  if  any  one  from  tho  king's  country 
nroix'cd  against  tho  Lacedamonians  or  their  allies  to  do  them 
iiarm,  tho  king  shall  prevent  it. — That  Tissajxlerncs  shall 
jirovido  tho  pay  for  tho  ships  now  present,  according  to  tho 
contract,  until  tho  king's  fleet  has  como ;  but  that  when  the 
king's  fleet  has  come,  thoijiaccdsemonians  and  their  allies 


548  THUCYDIDEa  Via  [ux.-lxi 

shall  be  at  liberty  to  maintain  their  own  ships,  if  they  wish  iu 
That  if,  liowever,  they  consent  to  receive  eupplies  from  I'issa- 
phcrnes,  he  shall  furnish  them,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
tlieir  allies  shall  refund  to  him,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war, 
whatever  sums  of  money  they  may  have  received. — That 
after  the  king^s  ships  have  arrived,  those  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  their  allies  and  those  of  the  king  shall  jointly  carry  on  tlu• 
war,  according  as  Tissaphernes  and  the  Lacedaimonians  nnd 
'jtheir  allies  may  think  fit.  And  if  they  wish  to  terminate  h(>>- 
tilities  with  the  Athenians,  they  shall  be  terminated  on  thu 
same  footing." 

59.  This  was  the  treaty  that  was  made.  And  after  this, 
Tissaphernes  prepared  to  bring  up  the  Phoenician  Ain't,  as  had 
been  agreed,  and  all  other  things  which  he  had  promised  ;  υΐ•, 
at  any  rate,  ho  wished  to  appear  to  bo  thus  preparing. 

00.  Λνΐιοη  the  winter  was  now  closing,  the  l^oeotians  to<»k 
Oropus  by  treachery,  while  an  Athenian  garrison  was  holdini: 
it.  There  co-ojMirated  with  them,  also,  some  of  the  Eretrian^ 
and  of  the  Oropians  themselves,  who  were  plotting  the  revolt 
of  EulKea.  For  as  the  place  was  just  opposite  to  Eretria,  >» 
long  as  the  Athenians  hell  it,  it  could  not  fail  to  do  much  «lam- 
age  both  to  Eretria  and  the  rest  of  Eubcea.  heing  now  tlu  r»  - 
fore  in  possession  of  Oropus,  the  Eretrians  came  to  UIkkK-, 
inviting  the  reloponnesians  into  Euba?a.  They,  howevti. 
were  more  disposed  to  relieve  Chios  in  its  distress,  and  f^o  ]»nt 
out  and  sailed  from  Rhodes  with  all  their  fleet.  When  tli<  \ 
were  off  Triopium,  they  descried  that  of  the  Athenians  out  >* 
sea,  sailing  from  Chalce  :  and  as  neither  side  advanced  agaiii 
the  other,  they  arrived,  the  Athenians  at  Samos,  the  Pelopoii 
nesians  at  Miletus,  finding  that  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  tr• 
to  the  relief  of  Chios  without  a  sea-fight.  And  so  the  wint<  r 
ended,  and  the  twentieth  year  of  this  war  of  which  Thueyilitl•  - 
wrote  the  history. 

01.  Immediately  at  the  commencement  of  the  spring  of  «1 
following  summer,  Dercyllidas,  a  Spartin,  Λvas  sent  >vitli 
small  force  by  land  to  the  Hellespont,  to  effect  the  revolt  vi 
Abydus,  which  is  a  colony  of  tho  Milesians ;  and  the  Chian 
while  Astyochus  was  at  u  loss  how  to  succor  them,  v• : 
compelled  by  the  pressure  of  the  siege  to  a  naval  cngageiiui 
They  happened,  while  Astyochus  was  still  at  Khodes,  to  lia\ 
received  from  Miletus,  as  their  commander  after  the  death  ι 


Lxn.,Lxm.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  540 

roJaritus,  η  Spartan  named  Leon,  λυΙιο  liad  come  out  as  a 
j);isscnger  with  Antisthenes,  and  twelve  sliips  which  had  been 
on  guard  at  Miletus,  five  of  Λvhich  were  Thurian,  four  Syra- 
rusan,  one  Ana;an,  one  Milesian,  and  one  Leon'e  own  ship. 
When  therefore  the  Chians  had  gone  out  against  them  in  full 
force,  and  had  occupied  a  strong  position,  while  their  ships  at 
the  same  time  to  the  numl)er  of  six  and  thirty  put  out  to  meet 
tlio  two  and  thirty  of  the  Athenians,  they  engaged  them  by 
s'a;  and  an  obstinate  battle  having  been  fought,  the  Chians 
an  I  their  allies,  who  liad  not  the  worst  in  the  action,  returned 
(for  it  was  now  laU^  into  their  city. 

02.  After  this,  immediately  that  Dercyllidas  had  proceeded 
thither  by  land  from  Miletus,  Abydus  on  the  Hellespont  re- 
volted to  him  and  IMiarnabazus,  as  also  did  Lampsacus  two 
days  later.  AVhen  Strombichides  heard  of  this,  ho  went  to 
the   rescue  from  Chios,  as  quickly  as  possible,  with  four  and 


twenty  Athenipn  ships,  some  of  which  also  were  transport» 
(I  troops ;  and  when  the  Lampsacenes 
•amo  out  against  Inm,  having  defeated  them  in  battle,  tiken 


at  the  first  a«isault  their  city,  >vhich  Λvas  unfortified,  and  miido 
spoil  of  implements  and  slaves  (though  ho  restored  the  free- 
int'n  to  their  dwellings),  he  proceeded  against  Abydus. 
When  they  did  jiot  capitulate,  and  he  wan  unable  to  tnko 
the  place  by  .assault,  ho  sailed  away  to  the  coast  opposite 
Abydus,  and  appointed  Sestus,  a  town  of  the  Chersonese  which 
the  Medes  had  held  at  the  time  so  well  known,'  as  a  post  for  tho 
garrison,  and  for  tho  defense  of  tho  whole  of  tho  Hellespont. 

G3.  In  tho  mean  time,  the  Chians  were  masters  of  tho  sea 
more  than  they  had  been ;  and  Astyochus  with  those  at  Mile- 
tus, on  hearing  tho  particulars  of  the  naval  engagement,  and 
the  departure  of  Strombichides  >vith  his  squadron,  took  fresh 
courage.  And  so  having  coasted  along  with  two  ships  to  Chios, 
he  took  the  fleet  from  that  place,  and  with  all  his  force  now 
united  advanced  against  Samos.  When  tho '  Athenians,  in 
consequence  of  thoir  being  suspicious  of  one  another,  did  not 
put  out  to  meet  him,  he  sailed  back  again  to  Miletus..  For 
about  this  time,  or  still  earlier,  democracy  had  been  abolished 

'  Tore.]  "Tho  Allusion  is  to  tho  circumstance  that  Sestus  was  almost 
the  lasi  spot  held  by  tho  Persians  in  Europe,  and  that  it  sustained  a  long 
nnd  obstinate  sicf^  beforo  it  could  bo  taken  fVom  them.  (Herod.  IX. 
U5,  and  eoq)."— ^raoid  •  * 


5δ0  THUOYDIDEa  VIII.  [lxit. 

at  Athens.  For  when  Pisandcr  and  the  emhassadors  canx' 
from  Tissaphernes  to  Sainos,  they  both  eccured  still  nior• 
strongly  their  interest  in  the  army  itself,  and  instigated  tlu? 
most  powerful  of  the  Samii^ns  also  to  try  with  them  to  set  up 
an  oligarchy  among  themselves,  although  they  had  been  risin.,' 
up  against  one  another  to  avoid  an  oligarchical  governnient. 
At  the  same  time  those  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos  determintHJ, 
after  comnmnicating  \vith  each  other,  to  give  up  Alcibiade>, 
sinco  he  would  not  join  them  (for  indeed  ho  was  not  a  proper 
person,  they  said,  to  become  a  member  of  an  oligarchy),  but  to 
consider  among  themselves,  since  they  were  now  actually 
imperiled,  by  what  means  their  cause  might  escape  abandon- 
ment ;  and  at  the  same  time  to  persevere  in  their  measures  for 
the  war,  and  themselves  to  contribute  with  alacrity  from  tluir 
own  private  resources,  both  money  and  Avhatever  else  might  \κ• 
required,  since  they  were  no  longer  bearing  the  burden  for  any 
but  themselves. 

04.  Having  thus  exhorted  one  another,  they  then  imnii - 
diately  sent  back  home  Pisander  and  half  the  embassadors,  lu 
manage  matters  there;  Avith  instructions  also  to  establish  oli 
garchy  in   such  of  the  subject  cities  as  thoy  touched  at:  tli 
other  half  they  sent  to  the  rest  of  the  places  subject  to  tlum, 
•some  in  one  direction  and  some  in  another.•    They  also  i\'>- 
missed  to  his  government  Diotrephes,  who  was  in  the  neiirl. 
borhood  of  Chios,  but  had  been  elected  to  take  the  commaii  I 
of  the  countries  Thraceward.     He,  on  his  arrival  at  Τ1κι<•'<, 
abolished  the  democratical  government;  but  Jibout  two  month- 
after  his  departure  the  Thasians    l)egan   to  fortify  their  city, 
as  wanting  no  more  aristocracy  in  conjunction  with  the  Aili' 
nians,  but  daily  looking  for  liberty  to  be  given  iliem  by  il 
Lacedaimonians.     For  indeed  there  was  a  party  of  them  witi 
the  Peloponnesians  which  had  been  expelled  by  the  Atlun; 
ans,  and  >vhich,  in  concert  with  their  friends  in  the  city,  u 
exerting  itself  with  all  its  might  to  bring  a  squadron,  and  etV. 
the  revolt  of  Thasos.     They  had   the   fortune,  then,  to  tin 
what  they  most  wished,  namely,  the  city  brought  to  the  riiil 
side  without  any  danger,  and  the  democratical  party  dojto^i 
vliich  had  been  likely  to  prove  an  obstacle.     Thus  then  in  il 
case  of  Thasos,  and,  I  imagine,  in  that  of  many  other  of  ti 
Kubjects,  the  result  was  the  contrary  of  what  was  expected  1 
those  of  the  Athenians  who  were  establishing  oligarchy  ;  t 


Lxv.,Lxvi.]  .  TnUCYDIDES.  VIII.  651 

when  the  sUitcs  bad  got  a  moderate  povernment,  and  security 
of  action,  they  went  on  to  absolute  liberty,  and  did  not  value 
the  ppecious  advantage  *  of  good  laws  which  they  received 
from  the  Athenians. 

05.  IMsander,  then,  and  liis  companions,  as  they  coasted 
along,  abolished  the  popular  governments  in  the  cities,  accord- 
itig  to  arrangement,  and,  moreover,  took  from  some  places 
lieavy-anned  troops  as  their  allies,  and  bo  camo  to  Athens, 
There  they  found  most  of  the  business  already  accomplished 
by  their  associates.  For  some  of  the  younger  men,  having 
conspired  together,  secretly  assassinated  one  Androcles,  the 
most  j)rominent  leador  of  the  commons,  and  λυΙιο  also  had 
mainly  procured  the  banishment  of  Alcibiades ;  and  for  both 
these  reasons,  on  account  of  his  being  a  popular  lender,  and ' 
because  they  thought  they  should  gratify  Alcibiadc^  who, 
they  concluded,  would  be  recalled,  and  would  make  Tissa- 
phernes  their  friend,  they  >vero  the  more  ready  to  kill  liim. 
There  were  some  otlier  obnoxious  individuals  also  Λvhom  they 
secretly  took  off  in  the  same  manner.  A  proposal  too  had 
already  been  openly  set  on  foot  by  them,  that  no  others  should 
receive  pay  but  such  as  served  in  the  Λvar  ;  and  that  not  moro 
than  five  thousand  should  have  a  share  in  the  government,  and 
those  such  as  were  most  competent  to  do  the  state  service  both 
with  their  property  and  their  persons. 

GO.  Now  this  was  but  a  specious  profession  for  the  people 
nt  large,  since  the  same  men  would  really  hold  the  govern- 
ment as  would  bring  about  the  revolution.  The  people,  how- 
ever, and  the  council  of  five  hundred'  still  met  notwithstanding, 
ihough  they  discusse<l  nothing  thfit  was  not  approved  of  by 
th('  conspirators,  but  both  the  speakers  Ixilonged  to  that  party, 
nnd  the  points  to  be  brought  forward  were  previously  discusssed 
by  them.  Indeed  no  one  else  any  longer  opposed  them,  through 
fear,  and  from  seeing  that  the  conspiracy  was  extensively 
spread ;  and  if  any  one  did  speak  against  them,  he  inimedi- 
aU^ly  camo  to  his  end  in  somo  convenient  way,  and  there  was 
neither  any  search  made  for  those  who  had  perpetrated  the 
(Iced,  nor  were  they  brought  to  justice  if  they  were  suspected  ; 

'  ίνΐΌμΐαν.]  Or  "  independence,"  according  to  the  reading  ηϋτονομίην, 
"«•hich  Bckkor  and  Poppo  adopt  from  tho  majority  of  MSS.  Seo  Arnold's 
jioio. 

5  /^ov?f>  //  Λπίϊ  τηϋ  κ'νύ/κη'.]  Literally,  "tho  council  of  tho  bean,"  so 
called  as  being  elected  by  ballot.• 


662  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  (lxvu. 

bat  the  commons  roinainod  etill,  and  in  bucU  consternation 
that  every  one  thought  himself  fortunate  who  did  not  meet 
with  some  violent  treatment,  even  though  he  held  his  tongue. 
From  supposing,  too,  that  the  conspiracy  was  much  more  general 
than  it  really  was,  they  were  the  more  faint-hearted,  and  were 
unable  to  ascertain  its  extent,  being  powerless  in  consequence  of 
the  size  of  the  city,  and  their  not  knowing  one  another's  views. 
And  on  this  same  ground  also  it  was  imjtossible  for  α  man  to 
bemoan  himself  to  another  in  his  indignation,  so  as  to  tq\ms\  ' 
one  who  Λvas  plotting  against  him  ;  since  he  would  either  have 
found  a  person  he  did  not  know,  to  whom  to  speak  his  mind, 
or  one  whom  he  knew  but  could  not  trust  For  all  the  member» 
of  the  popular  party  approached  each  other  >vith  suspicion, 
supposing  every  one  to  have  a  hand  in  what  was  going  on.  For 
there  were  among  them  some  whom  one  would  never  have  sup- 
posed likely  to  join  an  oligarchy ;  and  it  was  these  that  pro- 
duced the  greatest  distrust  in  the  many,  and  that  contributed 
most  to  tho  safety  of  the  few,  by  confirming  the  people's  want 
of  confidence  in  each  other. 

C7.  Pisander  and  his  colleagues  therefore  having  come  at 
this  critical  time,  immediately  addressed  themselves  to  the  re- 
mainder of  the  work.  In  the  first  place,  having  assembled 
the  peoj)le,  they  moved  a  resolution  for  electing  ten  commis- 
sioners  with  absolute  powers  for  compiling  laws,  and  that  after 
compiling  them  they  should  lay  before  the  people,  on  an  ap- 
pointed day,  their  opinion  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  state 
would  be  best  governed.  Afterward,  when  the  day  had  ar- 
rived, they  inclosed  the  assembly  in  the  Colonus  (a  temple  of 
Neptune  outside  the  city,  at  the  distance  of  about  ten  stades), 
and  the  compilers  brought  forward  no  other  motion,  but  simply 
this,  that  any  of  the  Athenians  should  be  at  liberty  to  express 
any  opinion  he  might  please ;  and  if  any  one  either  prosecutetl 
the  speaker  for  illegality,  or  othei'wise  injured  liim,  they  im- 
posed upon  him  severe  penalties.  Upon  that  it  was  at  length 
plainly  declared,  that  no  one  should  any  longer  either  hold 

*  άμύνααθαι  έπιδονλεύοαντα.]  Or,  as  others  havo  taken  it,  "to  defend 
himself  by  plotting  against  the  enemy."  But  Arnold  truly,  I  think,  ob- 
serves, that  if  that  had  been  tho  njeaning,  Thucydides  would  probably 
havo  written  ίΙντεπιΰον?.εύσαμτα.  In  addition  to  tho  passiigo  to  which 
lie  refers  (III.  12.  3),  compare  VI.  37,  where  φνλύσσεαυαι  is  used  in  just 
the  Hauno  «enso  as  u/ii'i'fCTt/ai  is  hero:  dvu  τνύ  ilti  ι;)υλύσσ€σΟαι  αντυκ^ 
kui  atfTtTTiCovAtvaai  noTC  in  τυύ  ομοίου  μεταλαΰιη. 


ΧΛΧίη.]  TnUCYDmia  VIII.  δ53 

r.fiioc,  or  receive  pay,  nccor^S|^;to  the  present  constitution ; 
tli.it  they  sliould  elect  five  niei|itji8  presidents,  Λνΐιο,  again,  slioiiKl 
«lect  a  hundred,  and  each  of  the  hundred  tlirec  for  himself,  and 
that  these,  amounting  to  four  hundred,  should  enter  the  coun- 
cil-chamber, and  govern  as  tliey  might  think  best,  with  full 
powers,  and  should  elect  the  five  thousand  also,  whenever  they 
might  please. 

G8.  Now  it  was  Pisander  who  moved  this  resolution,  an<l 
ill  other  respects  was  openly  the  most  forward  in  .issisting  to 
put  down   tlic  democracy.     I'ut  the  pei-son  v,\\o  devised  the 
whole  business,  and  tkc  means  by  which  it  was  brought  to 
this  issue,  an<l  who  for  the  longest  time  had  given  the  subject 
gretit  «attention,  \\λά  Antiphon,  a  man  second  to  none  of  tho 
Athenians  of  his  day  in  point  of  virtue,  and  who  had  proved 
himself  most  able  to  devise  measures,  an<l  to  express  his  views; 
who  also,  though  lie  did  not  come  forward  in  the  Assembly  of 
t!ie  |xOple,  nor  by  choice  in  any  other  scene  of  jmblic  debate, 
l>ut  was  viewed  with  suspicion  by  tho  people  through  his  rejv 
utation   for  cleverness,  yet  was  most  able  for  any  one  m;tii 
to  help  those  who  >vero  engnged  in  contest,  whether  in  a  court 
of  justice,  or  before   a   popular   assembly,  whoi'ver  of  them 
might  consult  him  on  any  point.     And  ho  himself,  too,  when 
the  party  of  the  Four  Hundred  had  subsequently  fallen,  and 
w.'is  severely  treated  by  the  commons,  appears  to  me  to  have 
.  made  the  best  defense  of  all  men  up  to  my  time,  when  tried 
Γ"Γ  his  life  on  the  subject  of  this  very  government,  on  a  charge 
"f  having  assisted  in  setting  it  up.     Phrynichus,  too,  showed 
liimself,  beyond   all   others,  most  zealous   for  tho   oligarchy, 
llirough   fear  of  Alcibiades,  and   the  certainty  that  ho  was 
:><'<iuainted  Avitli  tho  intrigues   lie   had  carried  on  at  Samos 
with  Astyochus;  for  he  thought  that,  in  .all  probability,  ho 
would  never  be  restored  by  an  olgairchical  government.     And 
lie  showed  himself,  when  once  ho  had  undertaken  their  busi- 
ness, by  far  tho  most  capable  of  facing  dangers.     Thcramenea, 
the  son  of  Ilagnon,  was  also  a  leader  among  those  who  joined 
in  abolishing  tho  democracy,  ft  man  of  no  small  power,  cither 
of  language  or  intellect.     So  that,  conducted  as  it  was  by  so 
many  clever  men,  it  was  not  unnatural  that  tho  business  should 
'  •«  ocil,  though  an  arduous  one.     For  it  was  a  difficult  mat- 
»'  r  Ιυ  deprive  tho  Atlicnian  )>eoj>lo  of  its  liberty,  about  α  liun- 
dre  1  ycara  niter  tho  deposition  τή'  tho  tyrants,  and  when  it  had 

24  •       .       . 


564  THUCYDIDBS.  VIII.  (ΐΛίχ,,υίχ. 

not  only  beon  subject  to  none,  but  accustomed  also,  for  moro 
than  half  of  that  period,  to  rule  over  otliere. 

09.  When  the  assembly  hail  been  dissolved,  without  contni- 
diction  from  any  one,  and  by  its  own  ratification  of  the  man^ 
ure,  tlien  they  afterward  introduced  the  Four  Hundred  into  thu 
council-chamber,  in  the  following  manner :  All  the  Athenians, 
in  consequence  of  the  enemy  established  at  Decelea,  were  con- 
stantly under  arms,  either  on  the  walls  or  in  the  ranks.  On 
that  day,  then,  they  permitted  those  who  were  not  privy  to  their 
design  to  go  home,'  iis  usual ;  while  to  those  who  were  in  the 
conspiracy  directions  were  given  to  wait  about  quietly,  not  just 
by  the  arms,  but  at  some  little  distance  ;  and  if  any  one  should 
opjwso  what  was  doing  to  seize  the  arms  and  not  sutler  it. 
JMoreover,  some  Andrians  and  Tenians,  and  three  liundred 
Carystians,  with  some  of  the  yEginetan  colonists,  whom  the 
Athenians  had  si-nt  to  occupy  that  island,  had  come  for  this 
very  purpose  with  their  own  arms ;  to  whom  directions  ha«l 
already  been  given  on  this  subject.  AVhen  these  things  had 
been  thus  arranged,  the  Four  Hundred,  each  with  a  dagger  con- 
cealed on  his  person,  and  the  hundred  and  twenty  Grecian 
youths,  of  whose  services  they  availed  themselves  wherever  any 
business  required  to  Ikj  dispatched,  cauje  and  presented  theni- 
selvi'S  to  tlio  couneil  of  Five  Hundred,  who  were  in  their  cham- 
ber, and  told  them  to  take  their  pay  and  go  out;  themsi^vcs 
bringing  it  for  the  >vlu)le  of  their  remaining  term  in  office,  an•! 
giving  it  to  them  when  they  went  out 

70.  AVhen  in  this  way  the  council  had  withdrawn  without 
lipeaking  a  word  against  it,  and  the  rest  of  the  citizens  made 
no  disturbance,  but  kept  «juiet,  the  Four  Hundred  then  en- 
tered the  coun'-il-chamber,  and  elected  their  prytanes  by  lot ; 
and  for  Avliat  concerned  the  gods,  otl'ered  prayers  and  sacri- 
fices on  installing  themselves  in  their  government.  After- 
ward, however,  they  departed  widely  from  the  popular  ad- 
ministration ^except  that  they  did  not  recall  the  exiles,  because 
of  Alcibiades),  and  in  other  res|x;cts  ruled  the  city  by  force. 
Some  men,  who  appeared  desirable  to  bo  taken  out  of  their 
way,  they  jmt  to  death,  though  not  many  ;  others  they  put  in 
prison,  and   others   they   banished.     They  also   entered   into 

'  απίλΟηΐ',]  i.  <'.,  "  after  a  sort  of  inorninij  parade,"  as  Arnold  oxpressc"*, 
''  leaving  their  anna  piled  in  soiiio  open  ppaco,  to  be  ready  iu  caso  of  any 
tUariu." 


LXiL,  Lxxn]  TnUCTDIDES.  VIII.         -  655 

rommunication  \vith  Agis,  the  Laccilncmonian  king,  who  was  at 
Dccelca,  telling  him  that  they  were  desirous  of  making  j)eace, 
and  that  it  was  but  roasonablo  that,  as  he  would  treat  with  them, 
and  no  longer  with  tho  faithless  multitude,  lie  should  more 
readily  oomo  to  terms. 

11.  lie,  however,  thought  that  the  city  was  not  in  a  settled 
state,  and  that  tho  people  would  not  so  immediately  give  up 
tiieir  ancient  liberty,  nor  remain  quiet,  if  they  should  see  a 
largo  force  of  Lacedicraoiiians ;  and  not  being  quite  sure  at 
present  that  they  were  no  longer  in  a  disturbed  condition,  ho 
made  no  conciliatory  answer  to  those  Λvho  had  come  from  tho 
lour  Hundred,  but  sent  for  a  large  additional  force  from  tho 
IVloponnese,  and  not  long  after  went  down  himself  with  tho 
garrison  from  Decclca,  in  conjunction  with  tho  troops  which 
had  joined  him,  to  the  very  walls  of  Athens ;  hoping  that 
cither  tho  people  there,  being  thrown  into  disorder,  would 
submit  on  liis  own  terms,  or  that  in  consequence  of  the  con- 
fiisiou  which  would  prol)ably  be  created  both  within  and  with- 
out, he  could  not  fail  to  carry  tho  long  walls  on  tho  first  assault^ 
owing  to  tho  absence  of  troops  along  them  for  their  defense. 
l>ut  when  he  approached  near  to  the  city,  and  the  Athenians 
made  not  the  slightest  stir  within,  while  they  sent  out  their  cav- 
alry, with  a  division  of  their  lieavy-arracd,  light-armed,  and 
archers,  and  shot  down  some  of  tho  enemy  in  consequence  of 
(ht'ir  near  advance,  and  got  possession  of  some  arms  and  dead 
I'odies,  then  indeed,  finding  this  to  be  the  case,  he  led  his  army 
l>a(k  again.  He  and  his  own  troops  still  remained  in  their  former 
position  at  Decelea,  but  the  newly  arrived  forces  he  sent  home, 
atVr  they  had  stayed  in  tho  country  some  few  days.  After  this, 
tho  Four  Hundred  sent  an  embassy  t/)  Agis,  nevertheless;  and 
λνΐιοη  ho  now  received  them  more  favorably,  and  advised  them 
to  that  eflfect,  they  sent  envoys  to  Laccdicmon  also  to  negotiato 
a  treaty,  being  desirous  of  peace. 

72.  They  likewise  sent  ten  men  to  Samos,  to  reassure  tho 
troops,  and  to  tell  them  that  the  oligarchy  had  not  been  csUil)- 
li^hed  for  the  injury  of  the  city  and  the  citizens,  but  for  tho 
{•reservation  of  the  whole  state ;  moreover,  that  there  were  five 
thousand,  and  not  four  hundred  only,  who  had  a  share  in  tho 
L'overnment ;  ^hough  never  yet,  in  conseqiience  of  their  expcdi-  . 
ti  »iis  and  their  foreign  occupations,  liad  tno  Athenians  come  io  .  • 
« onsult  on  a  business  of  eucii  in^orlanco  that  five  thousand  of 


55β  •         THUCYDIDEa  VIIL  [Lzxnt 

them  assembled  for  the  purpose.  They  fζ&YQ  them,  too,  all 
other  instructions  as  to  what  was  suitable  {οτ  them  to  say,  and 
dispatched  them  immediately  afler  their  own  establishment  in 
power,  beinff  afraid  that  a  mob  of  sailors  might  (as  was  really  the 
case)  both  Uiemselves  refuse  to  continue  under  the  government 
of  an  oligarchy,  and  through  the  evil  spreading  from  that  quar- 
ter be  the  means  of  deposing  them. 

73.  For  at  Samos  the  oligarchy  Avas  already  made  tlie  suIh 
ject  of  new  measures,  and  the  following  events  happened  at 
the  very  time  that  the  Four  Hundred  were  coii8j)iriiig.  Tlios(< 
of  the  Samians  λυΙιο  had  risen  up  against  the  aristotTatioal 
party,  and  constituted  tlic  commons,  turned  round  «gain,  and 
being  prevailed  upon  by  Fisundcr  on  his  arrival,  and  by  tho 
Athenians  who  were  in  the  conspiracy  at  Sanios,  both  bound 
themselves  by  oaths  to  the  nundHjr  of  three  hundred,  and  were 
prepared  to  attack  the  rest,  as  forming  the  domocratical  party. 
Tiiey  also  put  to  death  one  Ilypcrbolus,  an  Athenian,  a  base 
fellow,  who  had  boon  ostracised,  not  from  fear  of  his  influenco 
or  rank,  but  for  his  villainy,  and  for  being  a  disgrace  to  the  city; 
acting  in  the  matter  iii  concert  with  Charminus,  one  of  th« 
generals,  and  a  party  of  Athenians  who  were  with  them,  and 
to  whom  they  had  giveu  pledges  of  faith.     They  likewise  jKr- 

{Mitratcd  other  such  deeds  in  conjunction  with  that  party,  aii<i 
lad  determined  to  niake  an  attack  on  the  populace.  They, 
however,  having  notice  of  their  design,  revealed  what  was  goin»,' 
to  be  done  to  Leon  and  Diomedon,  two  of  tho  generals  (tVtr 
these  submitted  to  the  oligarchy  against  their  will,  from  ΙκΙπι,' 
honored  by  the  jKiople),  and  to  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyliu^, 
the  former  serving  as  a  trierarch,  tho  latter  in  the  heavy  in- 
fantry, as  well  as  some  others  who  had  always  been  thou«ilit 
to  be  most  opposed  to  the  conspirators ;  begging  them  not 
to  stand  still  and  j)ermit  them  to  be  ruined,  and  Samos  to  be  K'.-t 
to  the  Athenians,  through  whoso  help  alone  their  empire  ha.l 
held  together  up  to  this  time.  On  hearing  this,  they  went  t*> 
everyone  of  the  soldiers,  and  exhorted  them  not  to  put  iij• 
with  it,  and  esjKicially  the  crew  of  tho  Parahis,  as  all  on  Ix^arl 
of  that  vessel  were  Athenians  and  freemen,  and  had  al\va}> 
been  most  bitter  against  an  oligarchical  government,  even  1• 
fore  there  was  one  established.  I^on  and  liionicilon  al•  ' 
lift  them  some  8hi}>s  for  their  protection,  whenever  they  mi^l; 
themselves  sail  any  where.     So  that  when  the  three  hundr*•  i 


Lxxiv.,  Lxxv.]  THUCYDIDES,  VIII.  Cb-T 

mailc  nn  attack  on  them,  by  the  ai<l  of  nil  tliosc,  and  especially 
of  the  crew  of  the  Paralus,  the  popular  party  of  the  Samiaiis 
p'iined  the  upper  liand.  Of  the  three  hundred  they  put  to  death 
some  thirty,  and  banished  three  who  were  the  most  guilty ; 
while  with  the  rest  they  entered  into  an  amnesty,  and  lived  to- 
^'elher  for  the  future  under  η  democratical  government 

74.  The  ship  Paralus,  and  Clijereas,  son  of  Archestratua  on 
board  of  it — an  Athenian  who  had  been  forward  in  the  revolu- 
tion—were Bcnt  by  the  Samians  and  the  soldiers  v/\t\\  all  speed 
to  Athens,  to  carry  the  news  of  what  had  taken  place ;  for 
thoy  were  not  yet  aware  of  the  Four  Hundred  being  in  power. 
On  their  sailing  into  harbor,  the  Four  Hundred  immediately 
throw  some  two  or  three  of  the  crew  into  prison,  and  having 
l*iken  their  vessel  from  them,  and  removed  them  into  another 
employed  as  a  troop-ship,  they  set  them  to  keep  guard  round 
Eubopa.  ClhTreas,  by  some  means  or  other,  immediately  se- 
creted himself;  and  when  ho  saw  the  present  state  of  things, 
he  went  back  to  Samos,  and  took  the  soldiers  nn  exngcfernted 
report  of  affairs  at  Athens,  aggravating  every  thing,  and  telling 
them  that  "  they  were  punishing  all  with  stripes,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  spejik  a  word  against  those  who  held  the  govern- 
ment ;  moreover,  that  their  wives  and  children  were  outraged, 
and  that  they  intended  to  seize  and  confine  all  the  relatives  of 
such  as  were  in  the  army  at  Samos  and  not  on  their  own  side, 
in  order,  that,  if  they  would  not  submit  to  them,  the  prisoners 
might  be  put  to  death ;"  >vith  many  other  false  statements  >vhich 
h<.»  made  besides. 

7ΰ,  On  hearing  this,  they  were  at  first  strongly  inclined  to 
make•  an  attack  on  those  >vho  had  been  the  chief  authors  of 
tlio  oligarchv,  and  such  of  tlio  rest  as  had  taken  part  in  it. 
Afterward,  however,  being  prevented  by  the  men  of  moder- 
ate views,  and  warned  not  to  ruin  their  cause,  while  the  enemy 
^vcre  lying  so  near  them  with  their. ships  ready  for  action, 
they  desisted  from  it  After  this,  wishing  openly  now  to 
change  the  government  at  Samos  to  a  democracy,  Thrasv- 
I'ulus,  tho  son  of  Lycus,  and  Thrasylus  (for  these  were  the 
ihicf  leader»  in  the  revolution),  bound  all  tho  soldiers,  and,  most 
of  all,  the  oligarchical  party  themselves,  by  the  most  solemn 
oaths,  that  they  would  assuredly  be  governed  by  a  democracy, 
and  live  in  concord ;  and  also  that  they  would  zealously  prose- 
cute the  war  with  the  Pclogonnesians,  and  would  bo  foca  to 


568  TnUCYDIDES.  VIII.  [lxxvi. 

tho  Four  Hundred,  and  hold  no  intercourse  with  them.  AH 
the  Samiana  too,  wlio  were  of  full  ago,  took  the  same  oath  yi'nU 
them  ;  and  tho  soldiers  communicated  to  tho  Samiana  all  thi^ 
circumstances,  and  tho  probable  results  of  their  dangers,  think- 
ing• that  neitlier  for  them  nor  for  themselves  was  there  any 
resource  that  could  save  them,  but  that  if  either  tho  Four  Hun- 
dred or  the  enemy  at  Miletus  should  defeat  them,  they  would  bo 
destroyed. 

70.  Thus  they  wero  engaged  in  contention  at  this  time,  tlm 
one  party  wishing  to  force  the  city  to  a  democracy,  tho  other 
to  an  oligarchy.  And  tho  soldiers  immediately  held  an  as- 
sembly, in  which  they  deposcnl  their  former  generals,  and  any 
of  tho  trierarchs  whom  they  suspected,  and  chose  others  in 
their,  place,  both  trierarchs  and  generals ;  of  whom  Thrasy- 
bulus  and  Thrnsylus  were  two.  They  also  stood  up  aihl 
exhorted  one  another,  both  on  other  topics  and  on  this  :  "  tliaL 
tliey  ought  not  to  be  disheartened  because  tho  city  hin\  r• - 
volted  from  them  ;  for  it  was  but  tho  smaller  party  which  hal 
separated  from  them  >vho  were  the  larger,  and  better  j»rovidt«I 
in  all  respects.  For  sinco  they  held  tho  whole  fleeL  at  thtir 
command,  they  Λνου^  comjK*l  tho  other  citieg  under  their  ii<r 
minion  to  give  them  money,  just  the  same  as  though  the) 
wero  coming  from  Athens.  For  they  had  a  city  in  Sainos, 
and  no  weak  one  either,  but  such  as,  when  at  war  with 
them,  luid  been  within  a  very  little  of  taking  away  tho  com- 
mand of  the  sea  which  tho  Athenians  enjoyed.  And  as  f  »r 
tho  enemy  Λνΐιο  were  defending  themselves  against  them  from 
the  same  position  as  before.  Tliey,  then,  injismuch  as  they 
had  command  of  tho  ships,  Λvere  more  able  to  provide  them- 
selves with  necessaries  than  those  at  home.  Nay,  it  was 
through  their  being  stationed  in  advance  at  Saraos,  that  thoMi 
at  homo  had  before  conunanded  the  entrance  to  the  Pirajus; 
and  now  also  they  wouM  bo  brought  to  such  a  strait,  shouM 
they  not  consent  to  give  them  back  tho  government,  that  they 
themselves  would  bo  better  able  to  exclude  them  from  tli•' 
sea  than  to  be  excluded  from  it  by  them.  Indeed  it  was  but 
a  trifling  and  inconsiderable  degree  in  which  tho  city  was  οΓ 
use  to  them  toward  gaining  tho  victory  over  the  enemy  ;  an  1 
they  had  lost  nothing  in  losing  thoso  who  had  neither  any 
Uiore  money  to  send  them  (but  tho  soldiers  provided  it  them- 
selves), nor  yet  good  counsel  to  give  them,  for  the  sako  of 


Lxxvii.-Lxxix.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  659 

wliicli  Λ  Rtito  has  authoritv  over  nrmamenis.  On  the  con- 
(rar)*,  even  on  tlicse  points  tlio  other  party  had  done  wronj^  by 
nbolishini^  tlio  lawe  of  their  fathers ;  while  they  themselves 
maintained  those  laws,  and  wonld  endeavor  to  make  tkem  do 
it  also.  So  that  neither  had  they  the  inferiority  as  regarded 
those  who  shonld  pvc  pood  counsel.  Alcibiades,  too,  would 
i;la<lly  secure  them  the  alliance  of  the  king,  should  they  grjint 
lo  liim  security  of  person  and  a  restoration  to  his  country.  And 
what  was  most  important,  should  they  fail  on  all  points,  yet, 
having  so  largo  a  fleet  as  they  liad,  there  were  many  places 
lor  them  to  retire  to,  in  which  they  would  find  both  cities  and 
territory." 

77.  Having  thus  debated  the  matter  together,  and  cncour- 
age<l  otu3  another,  they  proceeded  to  make  preparations  for  the 
war  no  less  than  before ;  and  the  ten  embassadors  who  had 
U'en  sent  to  Samos  by  the  Four  Hundred,  hearing  of  this  Avhen 
they  were  now  at  Delos,  remained  quiet  there. 

78.  About  this  time  also  the  soldiers  in  the  Peloponncsian 
i]oct  at  Miletus  were  raising  a  clamor  among  themselves, 
alwut  their  cause  beirig  ruined  by  Astyoehus  and  Tissaphernes. 
For  Astyoehus,  they  said,  would  neither  fight  before,  Avhilc 
they  themselves  Λvere  still  the  stronger,  and  the  Athenian  fleet 
was  sn^all,  nor  Avould  lie  now,  when  the  enemy  were  said  to 
l»c  in  a  state  of  sedition,  and  tlieir  ships  Λvere  not  yet  brought 
together ;  but  they  would  run  the  risk  of  being  woni  out  by 
delay,  while  Avaiting  for  the  Phoenician  fleet — «in  idle  pretense, 
:ind  not  a  reality.  And  Tissaphernes,  on  the  other  liand,  did 
not  bring  up  this  fleet,  and  at  the  same  time  injured  their  own 
Tiavy  by  not  giving  them  supplies  regularly,  or  to  the  full 
amount.  They  ought  therefore  to  wait  no  longer,  but  to 
come  to  a  decisive  engagement  at  sea.  It  was  the  Syracusans 
that  most  especially  urged  this. 

79.  The  confederates,  and  particularly  Astyoehus,  hearing 
these  murmurs,  and  having  resolved  in  council  to  fight  a  de- 
cisive battle,  since  tho  disturbance's  at  Samos  >vere  also  re- 
ported to  tliem,  they  weighed  anchor  with  all  their  ships, 
nmounting  to  a  hundred  and  twelve,  and  having  given  orders 
for  tho  Milesians  to  march  by  land  toward  Mycale,  they  sailed 
to  the  same  place.  But  the. Athenians  with  their  eighty-two 
f'hips  which  were  lying  at  Glance  in  tho  territoir  of  Mycalo 
(Samos  being  but  a  short  di^ance  from  tho  mainland  at  this 


560  THUCYDIDEa  VIIL  [lxu. 

point,  opposite  Mycale),  when  they  eaw  the  Peloponneaian 
ilect  eaihng  again&t  them,  retired  to  Samoe,  not  thinking  them- 
selves Buiiicieutly  strong  in  numbers  to  risk  a  battle  for  their 
all.  liesidcs,  as  they  had  had  notice  from  Miletus  of  tbo 
enemy's  wish  for  an  engagemeut,  they  were  expecting  Strom- 
bichides  from  the  lIelle8|)ont,  to  reinforce  then»  witli  the  ships 
which  had  gone  from  Chios  to  Abydus ;  for  α  messenger  had 
previously  been  sent  to  him.  Thus  they  retired  to  Samos ; 
Avhile  the  Peloponnesians  put  in  at  Mycale,  and  formed  their 
encampment,  with  the  land  forces  of  the  Milesians  and  the 
pe(»ple  in  the  neighborhooil.  The  next  day,  when  they  were 
going  to  advance  against  Samos,  tidings  reached  them  of  the 
arrival  of  Strombicliides  with  the  squadron  from  the  Helles- 
pont, and  they  immeiliately  sailed  back  again  to  Miletus.  The 
Athenians,  when  their  squadron  had  joined  them,  advanced 
themselves  against  Miletus  >\ith  α  huiidnd  and  eight  8hi|'s, 
wishing  to  come  to  a  decisive  battle  ;  but  when  no  vim  came 
out  to  meet  them,  they  sailed  back  again  to  Samos. 

80.  The  same  summer,  and  inunediatfly  after  this,  since  the 
Peloponnesians  had  not  with  their  whole  united  Heet  otlered 
battle  to  the  enemy,  not  thinking  theuiselves  a  match  for 
them,  they  were  at  a  loss  from  what  quarter  to  get  money  for 
such  a  number  of  vessels,  especially  as  Tissapherncs  supplied  it 
ill ;  and  therefore  they  sent  Clearchus  the  son  of  Kamphias  with 
forty  shijis  to  Pharnabazus,  in  accordance  with  the  original 
orders  from  the  Peloiionnese.  For  I'hnrnabazus  invited  thoni 
to  his  aid,  and  was  prepared  to  furnish  them  with  8U|tj)lii  s ; 
and  at  the  same  time  intelligence  reached  them  that  Byzantium 
had  revolted.  Accordingly,  these  ships  of  the  Peloponnesians 
put  out  into  the  oj)en  sea,  in  order  to  escajie  the  observation 
of  the  Athenians  during  their  voyage  ;  but  were  overtaken  by 
a  storm,  and  the  greater  ])art  of  them  j)ul  into  Delos  with 
Clearchus,  and  subsequently  returned  to  Miletus  (Clearchus, 
however,  afterward  went  to  the  Hellespont  by  land,  and  en- 
tered on  his  command),  while  the  rest,  to  the  number  of  ten, 
arrived  safe  at  the  Hellespont  with  Helixns  the  Megarean, 
and  eifected  the  revolt  of  J^yzantium.  After  this,  when  the 
commanders  at  Samos  were  aware  of  it,  they  pent  rome  ΒΪιψ^ 
to  the  Hellespont  to  oppose  them  and  keep  guaid  against  them  ; 
and  a  trifling  battle  was  fought  at  sea  before  ]iyzantium.  be- 
tween eight  vessels  against  eight 


Lxxxi.,  Lxxxii.]  TnUCYDIDES.    VIII.  561 

81.  Now  tho  Iciiding  men  at  Samos,  and  especially  Tlirasy- 
l)ulua,  had  all  along  retained  tho  samo  purpose,  ever  sinco 
he  ha(!  effected  a  change  in  the  government,  namely,  to  re- 
store Alcibiades;  and  at  length,  in  an  assembly,  lio  persuaded 
tho  greater  part  of  tho  soldiers  to  the  same ;  and  when  they 
had  passed  a  decree  for  the  return  and  security  of  Alcibiades, 
he  sailed  to  Tissaphernes,  and  brought  Alcibiades  to  Samos, 
thinking  that  their  only  chanco  of  preservation  was  his  bring- 
ing Tissaphernes  over  from  tho  Peloponnesians  to  them.  An 
;i<Fv^mbiy  therefore  having  been  convened,  Alcibiades  both 
coniplaincd  of  and  deplored  his  own  calamity  in  having  been 
banished,  and  by  speaking  at  great  length  on  public  matters 
raised  them  to  no  slight  hope  for  tho  future  ;  and  extravagantly 
niiignified  his  own  influence  Λνίίΐι  Tissaphernes,  in  order  that 
both  tho  members  of  tho  oligarchy  at  home  might  be  afraid  of 
liim,  and  tho  clubs  bo  tho  more  quickly  broken  up ;  and  also 
tliat  thoso  at  Samoa  might  hold  him  in  tho  greater  honor, 
and  bo  'moro  encouraged  themselves;  and  that  tho  enemy, 
moreover,  might  bo  as  much  as  possible  set  against  Tissa- 
])hernes,  and  cast  down  from  their  present  hopes.  Accord- 
ingly Alcibiades,  in  tho  most  boastful  strain,  held  out  theso 
])roraises  to  them  :  "  that  Tissaphernes  had  pledged  himself  to 
him,  that  if  ho  could  but  trust  tho  Athenians,  assuredly  they 
should  not  want  for  supplies,  so  long  as  any  of  his  own  prop- 
<rty  remained,  even  though  ho  should  have  at  last  to  sell  his 
own  l)ed  ;  and  that  ho  ΛνοηΚΙ  bring  tho  Phoenician  ships  which 
More  now  at  Aspendus  to  join  the  Athenians,  instead  of  tho 
IVloponnesians ;  but  ho  could  only  place  confidence  in  tho 
Athenians,  if  Alcibiades  himself  were  recalled  to  bo  his  se- 
curity for  them." 

82.  On  hearing  these  and  many  other  representations,  thoy 
iinraediately  elected  him  general  m  .company  with  tho  former 
ones,  and  committed  to  him  tho  Λvholo  management  of  their 
afTairs.  And  now  for  nothing  would  they  have  exchanged 
their  several  hopes  at  tho  moment,  both  of  preservation  and 
«>f  vengeance  on  the  Four  Hundred.  Nay,  they  were  at  once 
ready  immediately  to  despise  their  enemies  on  the  spot,  on  the 
strength  of  what  had  been  eaid,  and  to  sail  to  the  Piroeue. 
Ho,  liowever,  most  positively  forbad  their  sailing  to  the  Pirajus, 
and  leaving  behind  them  their  enemies  who  were  so  much 
cluscr  at  hand,  though  many  were  urgent  for  it,  and  told  them 

<4* 


562  THUOYDIDES.  VIII.  [lxxxiii,  lxxxit. 

that  sinco  he  had  been  chosen  their  general,  ho  would  first  of 
nil  sail  to  Tissaphemes,  and  arrange  with  him  measures  for 
the  war.  And  bo,  on  leaving  this  assembly,  he  took  his  de- 
parture immediately,  that  he  might  be  thought  to  communicate 
every  thing  to  him ;  at  the  same  time  that  he  wished  to  be 
more  honored  by  him,  and  to  show  him  that  he  was  now 
elected  general,  an<l  was  able  to  do  him  either  good  or  harm. 
And  thus  it  was  the  good  fortune  of  Alcibiades  to  awe  the 
Athenians  by  means  of  Tissaphernes,  and  Tissapherues  by 
means  of  them. 

83.  AVhen  the  Peloponnesians  at  Miletus  heard  of  the  re- 
call of  Alcibiades,  though  they  were  before  distrustful  of  Tis- 
Baphernes,  they  were  now  far  more  disgusted  with  him  than 
ever.  For  the  truth'  wiis,  that  in  the  case  of  the  Athenians 
advancing  against  Miletus,  when  the  Pel()i)onnesians  would 
not  put  out  to  meet  them  and  give  them  battle,  Tissaphernes 
became  far  more  sick  of  giving  them  pay ;  and  indeed  that  he 
had  even  Ixjfore  this  made  some  [)rogres3  in  their  dislike,  on 
account  of  Alcibiades.  And  so  the  soldiers,  and  some  of  the 
other  men  of  consideration  also,  as  \vell  as  the  soldiery,  club- 
bing together  as  before,  began  to  reckon  up  their  grievances ; 
namely,  that  they  had  never  yet  received  their  full  i)ay ;  that 
what  >vas  now  given  them  Avas  deficient  in  amount,  and  not 
even  that  paid  regularly  ;  that  unless  they  either  fought  a  de- 
cisive battle,  or  removed  to  some  station'  where  they  might 
have  supplies,  the  men  y\o\i\d  desert  their  ships ;  and  that  for 
all  this  Astyochus  wjis  to  blame,  through  his  humoring  Tis- 
saphernes for  his  own  profit. 

'    84.  While  they  Λvere  thus  reckoning  up  their  grievances, 
the    following    disturbance   also   occurred    about    Astyochus. 

*  και  τον  ίττίπλονί'.]  If  καί  must  bo  chanp^ed,  as  most  of  tho  editors 
think,  into  either  κατά  or  μετά,  tho  former  would  certainly  appear  tho 
preferable  correction.  But  I  think  that  Poppo  is  quito  right  in  retainin^f 
tho  original  reading  of  all  tho  MSS. ;  though  I  sliould  rather  consider 
tho  accusative  τύν  ί^ίπλονν  as  an  instance  of  anacoluthon  (if  it  can  not 
bo  considered  as  an  *' accusativus  do  quo,")  than  connect  it  with  tho  in- 
ilnitivo  νανμαχηααι. 

*  ϋ^εν  τροφήν  {ξει.]  Bokker  appears  to  mo  to  bo  fully  justified  in  re- 
taining έζει,  which  has  so  largo  a  majority  of  tho  MSS.  in  its  favor,  iu 
preference  to  ίζειν,  which  Poppo,  Cuiller,  Arnold,  and  Bloomfield  havo 

.  adopted.  Would  not  tho  reason  alleged  by  Arnold  against  tho  use  of 
tho  indicative  hero  apply  with  equal  forco  to  ch.  86.  7,  and  tho  passage 
thoro  quoted  by  himself,  V.  103.  1  ? 


Lxxxv.]  TnUCYDIDES.  VIII.  563 

Tlio  Syracusan  and  Thurian  Rcamcn,  inasmuch  as  thev  were, 
iToncrally  ppcakinij,  most  froo,  applied  to  him  also  >vith  tho 
ixrcatcst  boldness,  and  demanded  their  pay.  He  answered  them 
somewhat  haun^htily,  an»!  threatened  them;  and  indeed  against 
l>orieus,  who  was  supporting  the  plea  of  his  own  seamen,  ho 
even  lifted  up  liis  biiton.  When  tho  mass  of  the  armament 
saw  this,  sailor-like,  they  rushed  in  a  rage'  upon  Astyochus 
to  strike  him  ;  but  lio  saw  them  in  time,  and  fled  for  refuge  to 
an  altar.  Notwithstanding  their  rage,  therefore,  ho  was  not 
struck,  but  they  Avero  parted  .again.  Tho  Milesians  also  took 
the  fort  belonging  to  Tissaphernes  Avhich  had  been  built  in 
Miletus,  liaving  attacked  it  when  unobserved,  and  drawn  out 
of  it  the  garrison  that  was  in  it.  And  the  rest  of  tho  con- 
federates also  approved  of  iheso  things,  and  especially  the 
Syracusans.  Lichas,  liowevor,  was  displenscd  with  them, 
and  sa' d  that  the  Milesians  and  the  rest  of  the  states  in  tho 
king's  country  ought  to  submit  to  Tissaphernes,  in  such  things 
as  were  reasonai)le,  and  to  pay  him  court,  until  they  had 
brought  the  war  to  a  hapjn'  conclusion.  ]^ut  tho  Milesians 
were  offended  with  him  for  this,  and  other  things  of  thcsamo 
kind ;  antl  afterward,  Λνΐιοη  ho  had  died  of  sickness,  they 
would  not  allow  them  to  bury  him  λυΙιογο  those  of  the  Lace• 
tht'monians  who  were  present  wished  to  do. 

85.  AVhen  their  affairs,  then,  were  involved  in  these  dis- 
sensions both  with  Astyochus  and  Tissaphernes,  Mindarus 
arrived  from  Laccda^mon  to  succeeil  Astyochus  as  admiral, 
and  assumed  tho  command,  Avhilo  Astyochus  sailed  away. 
With  liim  Tissaphenies  also  sent,  as  an  embassador,  one  of  hia 
rourtiers  named  Gaulitcs,  a  Carian  who  spoke  two  languages ;' 
Iw^h  to  lay  an  accusation  against  the  Milesians  on  the  subject 
of  tho  fort,  and  at  tho  same  time  to  make  an  apology  for  him• 
R'if ;  for  he  knew  that  tho  Milesians  were  going  thither  chiefly 
to  raise  a  clamor  against  him,  and  Ilermocratcs  along  with 
llicin,  who  inten<lcd  to  represent  Tissaphernes  as  niining  tho 
cause  of  the  Pcloponnesians  in  concert  with  Alcibiades,  and 

*  ίκραγήντες.]  Literally,  •' breaking  out  upon  him;"  an  excellent  in- 
Ptfinco  of  tho  etymological  meaning?  of  our  word  •'  rngo."  In  illustration 
of  «fa  tV)  vavrai,  compare  Eurip.  Hec.  604,  Iv  rot  μιψίφ  στρατεύματι 
'λκήλαατοΓ  όχλος,  νανηκή  τ\  «ra^»vta  Κρείσσων  τπ'ρός. 

'  Kii^)fi  Αίγλωσοον.]  "Οηο  of  those  Cartana  who  were  accustomed  from 
their  childhood  to  speak  two  languages;"  na  in  the  case  with  tho  people 
of  French  Flanders,  and  many  other  such  frontier  districts."— ^raoid 


^ 


664  THUCYDIDEa  VIII.  [lxxxtl 

pursuing  a  doublo  policy.  For  lio  had  always  been  at  enmity 
with  him  about  the  payment  of  the  money  to  tho  forces ;  and 
at  last,  Avhen  Ilormocrates  wjis  banished  from  Syracuse,  and 
some  others  of  the  Syracusans,  namely,  Potamis,  Myscon,  and 
Domarchus,  had  come  to  Miletus  to  take  command  of  tho 
Syracusan  ships,  Tissapheraes  pressed  far  more  severely  than 
ever  ou  Ilermocrates,  when  ho  was  now  an  exile ;  both  laying 
other  things  to  his  charge,  and  especially,  that  having  onco 
askod  liim  for  money  and  not  obtained  it,  ho  displayed  his 
enmity  to  him  in  consequence.  Astyochus,  then,  with  tho 
Milesians  and  Ilermocrates,  siiiled  away  to  Lacedaiinon ;  whilo 
Alcibiades  had  by  this  timo  crosseil  over  again  from  Tissii- 
j)hernes  to  Samos. 

80.  And  now  tho  C!nbassadoi*s  from  tho  Four  Hundred, 
whom  they  sent  at  the  tiino  wo  mentioned  to  appease  and  in- 
form those  at  Sumos,  arrived  from  Dclos,  after  Alcibiades  hiul 
come ;  and  when  an  assembly  had  been  called,  they  attempted 
to  make  a  speeeh.  But  the  soldiers  at  first  >vould  not  hear 
them,  but  cried  out,  that  they  should  put  to  death  those  Λνΐιυ 
Avere  abolishing  the  democracy ;  afterward,  however,  they 
were  with  diflitulty  calmed  down,  and  gave  them  a  hearing. 
They  then  delivered  to  them  this  message :  "  that  it  was 
neither  for  the  destruction  of  the  state  that  tho  recent  chango 
had  been  matle,  but  fur  its  preservation ;  nor  in  order  that  it 
might  bo  delivered  uj)  to  tho  enemy  (for  they  might  havo 
done  that  when  they  invaded  the  country  during  their  gov- 
ernment) :  that  all  in  their  turn  should  share  the  privileges 
of  the  Five  Thousand ;  and  that  their  relatives  were  neither 
being  outraged,  as  Cha?reas  had  slanderously  reported  to 
them,  nor  sutl'ering  any  harm,  but  reuuiined  as  they  were, 
each  in  tho  enjoyment  of  his  j)r()perty."  Though  they  made 
this  and  many  other  statements  beside,  they  listened  none 
the  more  favorably,  but  were  angry,  and  expressed  ditlerent 
opinions,  though  most  generally,  that  they  should  sail  to  tho 
I'iraius.  And  on  that  occasion  Alcibiades  appeared  to  havo 
benefited  tho  state  for  tho  first  time,  and  in  a  degree  inferior  to 
no  one  else.  For  when  tho  Athenians  at  Samos  were  bent  ou 
nailing  against  their  countrymen,  in  which  case  most  certainlv 
the  enemy  would  have  taken  possession  of  Ionia  and  tho  Ibl- 
lesj>ont,  ho  was  tho  man  ΛνΙιο  prevented  them.  Indeed  on  that 
emergency  no  ono  else  Avould  havo  been  ablo  to  restrain  tho 


Lxxxvii.]  TUUCYDIDES.  VIII.  605 

multitudo.  lie,  liowcvcr,  both  maile  them  desist  from  tho 
attack,  and  silenced  with  rebukes  those,  individuals  who  wcr(3 
on  their  own  account  most  angry  with  the  embassadors.  J  ίο 
then  dismissed  them  Λvitlι  an  aiiswer  from  liimself,  "  that  ho 
did  noi  object  to  the  Five  Thousand  being  in  jjower,  but  or- 
dered them  to  depose  the  Four  Hundred,  and  to  establish  tho 
(Ouncil  of  Five  Hundred  as  before.  That  if  any  retrenchment 
had  been  made  with  a  view  to  economy,  in  order  that  thoso 
who  Averc  on  8erΛ'ico  miglit  bo  better  provided  Avith  supplies, 
he  entirely  approved  of  it.  In  other  respects,  also,  he  urged 
them  to  stand  out,  and  not  at  all  to  submit  to  tho  enemy.  For 
if  only  the  sUite  >vero  preserved,  there  was  great  liopo  of  their 
l)eing  reconciled  to  one  another ;  but  if  either  of  the  two  par- 
ties were  once  destroyed,  either  that  at  Sanios,  or  that  at  home, 
there  would  no  longer  be  any  one  for  them  to  bo  reconciled  to." 
There  came,  also,  embassadors  from  the  Argives,  with  offers  of 
assistance  to  the  popular  party  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos ;  but 
Alcibiades  thanked  them,  and  desiring  them  to  como  when 
they  should  bo  called  upon,  thus  dismissed  them.  Now  tho 
Argives  camo  in  company  with  the  crew  of  tho  Paralus,  who, 
Nvhen  last  mentioned,  had  been  commanded  by  tho  Four  Hun- 
dred to  cruise  in  the  troop-ship  round  Eubcea  :  and  who,  whilo 
taking  to.  Laceda»mon  some  Athenians  that  had  been  sent  as 
embassadors  by  tho  Four  Hundred,  namely,  Laispodias,  Aristo- 
phon,  and  Melesias,  when  off  Argos  in  their  passage,  seized  tho 
( nibassadors,  and  delivered  them  up  to  the  Argives,  as  being 
some  of  those  who  liad  been  most  instrumental  in  aboHshing 
tho  democracy  ^  while  they  themselves  did  not  go  to  Athens 
ηΐίίύη,  but  taking  the  embassadors  from  Argos  to  Samos,  ar- 
rived there  with  the  triremo  they  were  in. 

87.  The  same  summer,  and  at  the  very  time  when  the  Pelo- 
Itonnesians  were  most  offended  with  Tissaphcrnes,  both  on  other 
.'locounts,  and  especially  because  of  the  return  of  Alcibiades, 
thinking  that  ho  was  now  evidently  Atticizing,  he,  >vishing,  as 
it  seemed,  to  clear  himself  to  them  of  these  charges,  prepared 
to  go  to  Aspendus  for  tho  Phoenician  ships,  and  desired  Lichas 
to  accompany  him  ;  saying,  that  witli  regard  to  the  armament^ 
1.0  Avould  appoint  Tamos  as  his  lieutenant,  to  furnish  the  sup- 
l»iir;s  whilo  ho  was  himself  absent.  The  same  nocount,  how- 
•  V4>r,  k  Qot  given  by  all ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  decide  with  \?hat 
motivu  bo  went  to  Aspcnduii  and  yet,  after  going,  did  not 


566  THUOYDIDES.  VIIL  [lzzxtul 

brin^  the  fleet    For  it  is  certain  that  the  Phoenician  ships,  a 
hundred  and  forty-seven  in  number,  came  as  far  as  Aspendus ; 
but  why  they  did  not  come  on,  is  a  subject  of  many  conjec- 
tures.   For  some  think  it  was,  that  by  going  away  he  might, 
in  accordance  with  his  plan,  wear  down  the  power  of  the  Pc- 
loponnesians  (at  any  rate  Tamos,  who  was  intrusted  with  the 
charge,  provided  them  with  suppHes  no  better,  but  even  worse, 
than  himself).    Others,  that  aiter  bringing  the  Phoenicians  to 
Aspendus,  he  might  exact  money  from  them  for  their  dischargi». 
(for  under  no  circumstances  did  he  intend  to  employ  them  ou 
any  service).    Others,  that  it  was  on  account  of  the  clamor 
against  him,  which  had  spread   to  Lacedaemon — to  have  it 
said  that  he  was  not  wronging  them,  but  was  certainly  gone 
for  the  ships,  which  were   undoubtiidly  manned  for  service. 
To  me,  however,  it  appears  most  evident  that  it  >vas  with  a 
view  to  wear  out  the  Greeks,  and  to  keep  them  in  suspense, 
that  lie  did  not  bring  the  fleet ;  to  >veaken  them,  during  all 
the  time  that  he  was  going  there  and  delaying ;  and  to  keep 
them  balanced,  in  order  that  ho  might  make  neither  party 
too  strong  by  joining  them.     For  had  he  wished  to  bring  the 
war  to  a  conclusion,  it  is  surely  evident  that  he  mif^ht  have 
done   it  without   any  doubt     For  by  bringing   the  fleet   he 
would,  in  all  probability,  have  given  the  victory  to  the  Lace- 
daimonians ;  since  even  at  present  they  maintained  their  opj»o- 
sition  with  their  navy,  on  terms  of  ei|uality  rather  than  of 
inferiority.     15ut  what  most  clearly  convicts  him  is  the  excuse 
which  he  alleged  for  not  brin<;inix  the  ships.     For  lie  said  that 
they  Avere  fewer  in  number  than  the  king  liad  commanded  to 
1)0  collected.     But  surely  ho  would   have  gained  still  greater 
thanks  by  that,  through  not  spending  so  much  of  the  king's 
money,  and  yet  eftecting  the  saiiio  object  at  a  less  cost.     At 
any  rate,'  with  whatever  intention  it  might  have  been,  Tissa- 
phernes  went  to  Aspendus,  and  had    an  interview  with  the 
Phcenicians ;  and  the  Peloponnesians,  by  liis  desire,  sent  l*hi- 
lippus,  a  man  of  Lacedajinon,  with  two  triremes  to  fetch  the  fleet. 
88.  Alcibiades,  on  flnding  that  Tissaphernes   had  gone  to 
Aspendus,  sailed  thither  himself,  also,  with  thirteen  ships,  jvroin- 

•  y  Tivl  δ//  yvufiyj.']  This  passaj^o  affords  a  very  good  instance  of  llio 
force  which  the  conjunctions  J'  υνν  most  commonly  have,  thougli  not  al- 
ways; tlio  doubtfulness  beini?  hero  expressed,  which  in  most  cases  is 
only  implied,  when  they  aro  thus  joined  together.    Seo  note,  p.  93. 


Lxxxiitj  yilUCYDIDES.  VIII.  507 

isincf  iho  force»  n4  ffamos  a  sure  and  prcnt  iKincfit ;  for  that  he 
would  either  himse?f  briiii»  tho  l*hocnician  fleet  to  tlio  Atheni- 
ans, or  at  any  rate  prevent  its  going  to  the  Peloponnesians, 
lv»r  in  all  probability  he  had  long  known  the  purpose  of  Tissa- 
jtluTnca,  that  he  did  not  intend  fetching  them,  nnd  wished  to 
jircjudico  him  aa  much  as  possible  with  tho  Peloponnesians, 
on  the  ground  of  his  friendsnip  for  himself  and  tho  Athenians, 
that  so  ho  might  be  the  more  compelled  to  join  tho  side  of 
Athens.  Accordingly  he  set  sail  and  pursued  his  voyage  up- 
ward,' straight  for  l*liaselis  and  Cannus, 

89.  When  the  embassadors  sent  from  tho  Four  Hundred 
arrived  at  Athens  from  Samos,  and  delivered  tho  message  from 
Aicibiades,  namely,  that  ho  begged  them  to  hold  out,  and  not 
>ubmit  at  all  to  tho  enemy ;  and  that  lie  had  great  hopes  of 
riTonciling  tho  army  to  those  at  home,  and  of  getting  tho 
better  of  tho  IVloponnesians ;  they  gave  him  much  more 
«ourage  to  tho  greater  part  of  those  implicated  in  the  oligai^ 
( hy,  who  had  even  before  been  discontented  Avith  it,  and  Avould 
i^ladly  have  been  quit  of  the  business  by  any  safe  means.  Ac- 
'  ordingly  they  now  united,  and  found  fault  with  the  present 
^tato  of  things,  having  as  their  leaders  some  of  the  most  in- 
lluential  generals  atul  men  in  oflice,  such  as  Theramenes  tho 
sdii  of  Ilagnon,  Aristocrates  tho  son  of  Scellias,  and  others ; 
who,  though  among  tho  first  members  of  the  government, 
were  yet  afraid,  as  tlrey  alleged,  of  tho  army  at  Samos,  and 
«tf  Aicibiades  most  especially,  as  also  of  those  Avhom  they  wero 
>e!iiling  as  embassadors  to  Lacedaimon,  lest  without  tho  au- 
t!iority  of  tho  greater  p.irt  of  them  they  might  do  tho  state 
some  harm;  and  so  they  declared,' not  that  they  wished  to 

'  tivu,]  i.  €.,  "  toward  tho  countries  on  tho  way  to  tho  Kast,  and  tho 
i'liicr  of  the  Peraiau  govcrnmont."— id  ΓηοΓ<ί. 

^  (φοβούμενοι  ό\  ώς  Ιφαοαν,  κ,  τ.  λ.]  This  passage,  as  it  stands  in  Ar- 
iK'M's  text,  boing  lUtcrly  untranslatable,  I  was  compelled  either  to  omit 
it  .iltofrcthpr,  or  to  adopt  such  corrections  as  would  at  any  rate  give  some 
t="t!8o  to  it,  whether  the  true  or  not.  •  I  have  therefore,  with  Goller, 
changed  τους  into  oif,  taken  away  tho  comma  after  πρεσβενομένονς,  and 
R"t'»lituted  άιταλληξείην  for  άιταλλύξειν.  With  regard  to  the  τό  before 
tliat  iaflnitive,.!  am  disposed  to  think  that  it  is  not  so  hopeless  a  reading 
f  has  been  considered ;  but  that  this  may  bo  added  to  those  instances 
elvcn  by  Jelf^  Gr.  Gr.  §  67(7,  in  which  the  article  shows  that  •'  especial 
t'liiphasis  is  laid  on  tho  notion  expressed  by  the  infinitive."  Comparo 
t-»i)ecially  II.  53.  4,  Kal  rd  μίν  προσταλαιηωρεΐν  τφ  όόξαντι  καλψ  οϋύείς 
■^ι>')Ονμος  jjv ;  Xen.  ΔροΙ  See  13,  τό  ηροειύέναι  τόν  θεόρ  τό  μέλλον  iruvref 


568  THUCYDIDES.  VIIL  (χα 

escape  from  tho  Administration  ialliui^  into  too  fow  hande,  but 
that  they  ought  to  establish  tho  Five  Thousand  in  reality,  not 
in  mere  name,  and  to  seltlo  the  government  on  a  more  equal 
basis.  This,  however,  was  but  a  pubUc  profession  made  l>y 
them  in  word ;  but  it  was  from  private  ambition  that  most 
of  them  pursued  that  very  method  by  which  an  oligarcliy 
formed  out  of  a  democracy  is  most  sure  to  bo  overturnetl. 
For  all  at  onco  not  only  claim  to  be  equal,  but  every  otic 
decidedly  tho  first  man.  [And  in  such  α  case  failure  is  in- 
tolerable :]  whereas,  when  an  election  is  made  under  a  dr- 
mocracy,  a  man  more  easily  submits  to  the  result,  as  ha 
does  not  think  liimself  beaten  on  equal  terms.*  But  wh:it 
most  evidejitly  encouraged  them  was  the  interest  of  Alcibiadcs 
being  so  strong  in  the  army,  and  their  not  thinking  that  tin: 
power  of  the  oligarchy  would  be  i)ermanent.  Ejich  oiw, 
therefore,  strove  to  be  himself  the  first  to  take  the  lead  of  du• 
commons. 

00.  But  those  of  the  Four  Hundred  who  were  most  opposed 
to  such  a  form  of  government,  and  who  now  took  the  load, 
namely,  rhryuichus  (who  when  general  at  Samoshad  quarreled, 
iis  already  mentioned,  with  Alcibiades),  and  Aristarchus,  a  man 
in  the  highest  degree,  and  fur  the  longest  time  opposed  to  the 
democracy ;  and  Pisander,  and  Autiphon,  and  others  who  wore 
most  influential,  liad  before — as  soon  as  they  were  established 
in  power,  and  afterward,  when  tho  forces  at  Samos  revolted 
from  them  for  a  democracy — sent  members  of  their  botly  ι 
embassadors  to  Lacedx'inon,  and  been  very  anxious  for  peace 
with  them,  and  been  engaged  in  building  the  fort  in  what  is 
called  Eetionia.'  And  far  more  than  ever  >vas  this  tho  case. 
after  their  embassadors   from  Samos  had  arrived ;  seeing,  a> 

/.ίγονσι.  Id.  Symp.  IIT.  3,  οΐόεις  σοι,  ίφη,  ύνηλίγει  τύ  μί)  ον  λίξηι. 
The  last  two  quotations  prove  that  this  construction  is  common  afti  r 
verbs  of  "saying;"  and  in  tho  present  instanco  I  8up{K)so  tho  infinitiv•.» 
to  depend  upon  such  a  verb  understood  from  ύς  ί(*>ασαι>  in  tho  preceding,' 
part  of  tho  paragraph.  There  seems  therefore  to  be  no  reason  for  chain;• 
ing  τύ  into  τοί,  as  I  was  onco  led  by  tho  various  reading  τώι  to  conji  e- 
turo,  beforo  I  know  that  Gollor  had  done  tho  same. 

*  ^iiov  τά  άποβαίνοντα — ι/ιφίτ]  Because,  as  Arnold  observes,  *'  thi'y 
know  that  tho  weight  of  tho  government  is  against  them,  and  are  thu- 
spared  tho  peculiar  pain  of  being  beaten  in  a  fair  race,  when  they  ai.  i 
their  competitors  start  with  equal  advantages,  and  there  is  nothing  thori- 
foro  to  lesson  tho  mortification  of  defeat." 

'  ^llenuvia.]  For  the  uature  ami  object  of  this  fort,  sco  Arnold's  uut^ 


IS 


xci.]  TnUCTDIDES.  VIIT.  609 

ihoy  did,  that  both  tlio  majority  of  tlie  pcoolc,  and  those  of 
tliL'ir  own  nioinbora,  who  before  nj)peared  trustworthy,  were  now 
rliiiiiiiin!;   their  viewa.     And   ro  thoy  dispatelicd  Antiphon, 
Jiirynichus,  and  ten  others  with  all  Rjieed  (tor  they  were  afraid 
of  what  was  goini»  on  both  at  home  and  at  Sanios),  with  in- 
structions to  make  terms  with  the  Lacedicmonians  in  any  way 
whatever  that  was   at   all  tolerable.     And  they  worked  Λvith 
still  jEfreater  earnestness  at  the  fort  in  Eetionia.     Now  the  ob- 
joet  of  the  fort,  as  Theramcnes  and  liis  party  maintained,  w  as 
this:  not  that  they  mi Gjht  avoid  admitting  the  army  at  Samos 
into  the  Piraius,  should  they  attempt  to  sail  in  by  force,  but 
rather  that   they  might   admit    the    enemy,  whenever   they 
pleased,  both  with  ships  and  troops.     For  Eetionia  is  a  molo 
of  the  l^iraius,  and  tlie  entrance  into  the  harbor  is  straight  by 
it.     It  was  being   fortified,  therefore,  in   sucli  a   mnnner,  in 
connection  with  the  wall  previously  existing  on  the  land  side, 
that,  with  only  n  few  men  posted  in  it,  it  would  command  tlio 
entrance.     For  in  the  very  tower  standing  on  one  of  the  two 
si<ies,  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  which  >vas  narrow,  Λva8  tlio 
termination  both  of  the  original  wall  on  the  land  side,  and  of 
the  new  and  inner  one  Avhich  Avas  being  built  on  the  side  of 
the  sea.     They  also  built  a  portico,  >vhich  was  very  large  and 
in  immediate  connection  with  this  wall  in  the  Piraius  ;  of  which 
tliey  themselves  had  the  command,  and  in  which  they  com- 
pelled all  to  deposit  both  what  corn  they  had  before  and  what 
was  now  brought  in,  and  to  take  it  out  thence  when  they  sold  it. 
91.  On   these   subjects,  then,  Theramenes   had   long  been 
nnirmuring;   and  ever  since  the  embassadors   had   returned 
from  Lacedajmon  without  effecting  any  general  arrangement 
for  them,  lie  did  so  still  more,  saying  that  there  would  bo 
danger  of  this  fort's  proving  the  ruin  of  the  city.    For  some 
ihips  from  the  Peloponnesc,  whose  aid  the  Euboeans  had  in- 
vited, to  the  number  of  two  and  forty,  including  some  Italian 
anl  Sicilian  vessels  from  Tarentum  and  Locri,  also  happened  to 
he  now  lying  off  Las,  in  Laconia,  and  preparing  for  their  pass- 
age to  Eubcea,  under  the  command  of  Agesandridas,  son  of 
Agesander,  a  Spartan.     These .  Theramenes  declared  to  be  sail- 
ing, not  so  much  to  the  aid  of  Eubcea,  as  of  those  who  were 
fortifying  Eetionia ;  and  that  if  they  were  not  on  their  guard 
now,  tliey  would  bo  lost  before  they  wore  aware  of  it     And 
Ihero  really  was  some  plan  o^  this  kind  entertained  by  thoso 


β70  THUCYDIDE&  VIII.  [χοιΐ 

who  were  charged  with  it,  and  it  was  not  merely  a  verbal  mis- 
representation. For  it  was  the  wish  of  that  party,  if  poesiUe, 
to  retain  their  dominion  over  the  allies  with  an  oligarchical 
government ;  if  not,  to  retain  their  independence,  with  the  pos- 
session of  their  shija  and  walls  ;  but  if  excluded  from  that  also, 
at  any  rato  not  to  jKirish  themselves  under  the  restored  democ- 
racy before  and  above  all  others,  but  even  to  call  in  the  enemy, 
and  without  walls  and  ships  to  make  peace  with  them,  and  re- 
tain the  government  of  the  city  on  any  terms  whatever,  if  they 
had  only  security  for  their  persons. 

92.  For  this  reason  they  were  also  diligently  raising  this 
fortification,  with  both  iK)stern3  and  entrances,  and  facilities 
for  introducing  tho  enemy,  and  were  desirous  to  have  it  com- 
pleted in  time.  Now  what  was  said  of  them  was  previously 
advanced  in  small  parties  only,  and  with  greater  secrecy  :  but 
when  Phrynichus,  on  his  return  from  the  embassy  to  Lace- 
daiinon,  had  been  designedly  stabbed  in  tho  full  market  by  a 
man  who  served  in  the  penpoli,^  and  after  ])roceeding  but  a 
short  distance  from  tho  council-chamber,  expired  inimediately, 
and  tho  assiissin  escaped ;  while  his  accomplice,  who  was  an 
Argive,  though  seized  and  tortured  by  tho  Four  llundreil, 
mentioned  ηυ  one's  name  iis  having  instigated  him  to  it,  nor 
any  thing  else,  but  that  ho  knew  many  men  assembled  in  dif- 
ferent houses,  both  that  of  tho  commander  of  tho  pcripoli  and 
others ;  then  indeed,  when  no  disturbance  arose  from  this, 
Theramenes  and  Aristoerates,  and  all  tho  rest  of  tho  Four 
Hundred,  as  well  as  of  those  out  of  doors  who  held  the  sanu» 
views,  proceeded  with  greater  confidenco  to  tho  execution  of 
their  measures.  For  at  this  same  time  tho  ships  had  now 
sailed  round  from  Las,  and  after  coming  to  anchor  at  Enidau- 
rus,  had  overrun  yEgina :  and  Theramenes  remarked,  that  it 
was  not  probable  that,  wnilo  on  their  passage  to  Euboea,  they 
should  have  run  into  the  bay,  and  bo  lying  again  at  Epidaurus, 
unless  they  had  been  invited,  and  come  for  tho  purposes  with 
which  he  had  all  along  been  charging  them  ;  and  therefore  it 
was  not  possible  any  longer  to  remain  quiet.  At  length,  aftor 
many  more  seditious  speeches  and  suspicions  had  been  uttered, 
they  now  proceeded  to  business  in  real  earnest.  For  the 
heavy-armed  who  were  in  tho  Pira;us,  building  tho  wall  in 
Eetonia,   among   whom,   also,   was   Aristocrates,   α    taxiarch, 

»  TUP  ιτεριηύλων.]  Sco  note,  p.  2GG. 


xcii.l  TnUCYDIDES.  VIII.  5Yl 

witli  his  company,  nrrestcd  Alcxiclca,  who  was  λ  p;enoral  on 

the  siJo  of  the  oligarchy,  and  very  favorably  inclined  to  tho 

.issociatca,  and  taking  him  into  a  houso  confined  him  tliere. 

There  wcro  others  who  assisted  them  in  this,  and  particnlarly 

one  llermon,  commander  of  tlie  ^>er//7o/i  stationed  in  Mnnychia; 

ajid,  what  was  of  most  importance,  tho  mass  of  tho  lieavy-armed 

wero  in  favour  of  these  measures.     When  this  news  reached 

the  Four  Hundred  (who  happened  to  bo  sitting  together  in 

their  council-chamber),   immediately,   with  tho  exception   of 

such  as  did  not  nnprovo  of  tho  present  government,  they  wcro 

]>reparod  forthwith  to  arm  themselves',  and  threatened  Tlicra- 

itienes  and  those  with  him.     Ho,  however,  said  in  his  defense 

iliiit  ho  was  ready  to  go  at  onco  and  assist  in  rescuing  Alexi- 

( los ;  and  taking  with  him  ono  of  tho  generals  who  held  tho 

s;inio  views  with  himself,  ho  proceeded  to  tho  Pirajus ;  Λνίπίο 

Aristarchns  and  sotnc  young  men  of  tho  cavalry  Avent  to  tho 

roscue.     Tho  tumult,  then,  was  great  and  alanning :  for  thoso 

in  tho  city  thought  that  tho  Pirajus  Avas  already  t«aken,  and  tho 

goneral  under  aiTest  put  to  death ;  wlnlo  thoso  in  tho  PiraBua 

I'clieved  that  tho  men  m  tho  city  >vcro  all  but  attacking  them, 

r»ut  when  tho  elder  men  stopped  those  in  tho  city  wlio  wcro 

running  about,  and  rushing  to  tho  stands  of  arms ;  while  Thu- 

( ydides  tho  Pharsalian,  tho  Proxenus  of  tho  state,  was  also 

])resent,   and    earnestly   opposed    tho   several    parties,  calling 

upon  tiiem  not  to  destroy  their  country  wldlo  tho  enemy  Λvero 

still  waiting  to  attick  tliem  ;  they  were  Λvith  difficulty  quieted 

;md  forbore  from  attacking  ono  another.  Now  wlien  Theramencs 

came  into  tho  Pirajus  (for  ho  too  was  ono  of  tho  generals),  as 

far  as  shouting  went,  ho  was  angry  with   tho  soldiers;  but 

Aristarchus  and  thoso  who  wero  opposed  to  tho  popular  party 

Avcre  in  a  violent  rage.    Most  of  tho  soldiers  however  joined  in 

tho  work,  without  changing  their  pur|»osc,  and  asked  Tliera- 

nioncs,  whether  bo  thought  that  tho  wall  was  being  built  for 

iiny  good,  or  would  bo  better  demolished.    Ho  said,  that  if 

iluy  thought  right  to  demolish  it,  ho  also  agreed  with  them. 

('l^on  that  both  tho  soldiers  and  many  of  tho  men  in  tho  Pi- 

Ki^us  immediately  mounted,  and  began  to  pull  down  tho  forti- 

'  ^f  tO  υπλα  Uvai.]  "  To  run  to  tho  epoars  and  shields"  (which  in  tho 
vri'scnt  circumstances  of  the  city  wore  always  kept  piled  in  the  open 
spaces  in  difTcront  parts  of  tho  town),  "and  so  to  arm  thomBclvos  for 
tattle    See  ch.  69.  1,  2 ;  VII.  28.  2.''— ilmoW. 


572  THUOYDIDEa   VUI.  (xcni 

fication.  And  the  cry  for  the  encouragement  of  iho  multitudo 
was  this:  "that  whoever  wished  the  Five  Thousand  to  rulo 
instead  of  the  Four  Hundred,  must  go  to  help  in  the  work." 
For  they  continued,  notwithstanding,  to  conceal  their  real 
views  under  the  name  of  the  Five  Thousand,  so  that  whoever 
wished  the  commons  to  hold  the  government  did  not  expressly 
mention  that  word;  fearing  that  the  Five  Thousand  might 
really  have  been  elected,  and  that  so  by  saying  something  to 
one  [who  belonged  to  that  body,]  ho  might,  through  his  1;^- 
noranco  of  the  ifact,  commit  himself.  And,  indeed,  for  tins 
reason  the  Four  Uundred  neither  wished  the  Five  Thousand 
to  bo  elected,  nor  to  have  it  known  that  they  were  not ; 
thinking,  on  tho  ono  hand,  that  to  install  so  many  partiu! ; 
with  them  would  amount  to  a  downright  democracy ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  uncertainty  on  tho  subject  would  strike 
them  Avith  fear  of  ono  another. 

93.   Tho    next   day   tho  Four  Hundred,  altliough  alarmed, 
assembled    nevertheless   in   their   couueil-ehamber ;  while  tho 
soldiers  in  the  Piraius,  after  releasing  Alexieles,  whom  they  liad 
arrested,  and  demolishing  the  fortitication,  camo  to  the  teinjiK; 
of  15aeclius  close  to  Munychia,  and  having  piled  their  aini^, 
held  au  assembly  there  out  of  tho  usual  place  ;'  and  in  accoiil- 
ance  with  a  resolution  made  by  them,  proceeded  straightway  to 
the  city,  and  piled  their  arms  in  tho  Anaceum.'    But  when  cer- 
tain chosen  dei)uties  from  the  Four  Hundred  camo  to  them,  they 
convei*sed  man  with  man,  and  such  as  they  saw  to  be  men  ol" 
moderate  views  they  persuiuled  both  to  remain  quiet  themselves, 
and  to  restrain  tho  rest;  telling  them  that  they  >vould  publish 
tho    names   of  the  Five   Thousand,  and   that  from  these  ih. 
Four  Hundred  should  be  elected  in  rotation,  in  such  a  manner 
as  tho  Five  Thousand  might  think  fit :  but,  in  tho  mean  time, 
,  they  begged  them  by  no  means  to  destroy  tho  city,  or  drive  it 
into  tho  hands  of  the  enemy.     So  tho  whole  body  of  tho  sol- 
diers, when  such  addresses  wero  made  by  many  and  to  many, 
wero  more  pacified  than  before,  and  most  alarmed  for  ih• 
whole  state ;  and  they  agreed  to  hold,  on  an  appointed  da\ . 
an  assembly  in  tho  temple  of  Bacchus,  with  a  view  to  restorini,^ 
concord. 

»  έξεκκλησίασαν.]  Or  simply,  "held  an  assembly,"  according  toBik- 
ker'a  reading,  έξεκ'/.ησίασαν. 

■i  έν  τφ  Άνακείφ,]  t.  e.,  tho  templo  of  Castor  and  Pollux,  to  whom  l! 
title  of  άΐ'ακοί  "tho  princes,"  was  given,  according  to  Kustathius. 


xciT.,  xcv]  TUUCYDIDE3.  VIII.  673 

94.  When  tho  day  for  1ιο1(1ίη«τ  tho  assembly  was  come,  and 
ihcy  had  all  but  met,  news  were  broiifjlit  that  tho  two  and 
forty  sliips  with  Airosandcr  were  advancincf  from  Megara 
{'.long  tho  co.ist  of  Salamis;  and  every  ono  of  the  soldiers  in 
trcneral  considered  this  to  bo  the  very  thing  which  had  eo  long 
hccn  asserted  by  Tlieramcncs  and  liis  party,  namely,  that  it  was 
to  the  fort  that  the  ships  were  sailing  ;  and  it  appeared  to  havo 
boon  thrown  down  to  good  puqiose.  And  it  mtpht,  perhaps, 
ill  some  measure  have  been  by  appointment  that  Agcsnndridas 
lingered  about  Epidaurus  and  that  neighborhood;  though  it 
is  also  prob.iblo  that  ho  staid  there  in  consequence  of  tho 
present  sedition  among  tho  Athenians,  in  liope  of  coming  up 
at  the  moment  favorable  for  action.  But  the  Athenians,  on 
tho  other  hand,  on  receiving  this  intelligence,  immediately  ran 
down  in  full  force  to  the  Piraeus,  considering  that  a  war  Λvith 
the  enemy,  of  greater  importance  than  that  among  them- 
selves, was  threatening  them  at  no  great  distance,  but  close  to 
(heir  harbor.  Some  of  thiin  therefore  >vent  on  board  tho 
ships  that  wero  already  afloat;  others  launched  additional 
ones ;  and  some  others  ran  to  tho  defense  of  tho  walls  and  tho 
mouth  of  tho  harbor. 

95.  But  tho  reloponnesian  ships,  after  sailing  by  and 
doubling  vSunium,  camo  to  anchor  between  Thoncus  and 
rrasiic,  and  subsequently  went  to  Oropus.  So  tho  Athenians 
wore  compelled  to  go  to  sea  in  a  hurry  and  with  untrained 
crows,'  inasmuch  as  tho  city  was  in  a  state  of  sedition,  and 
ihoy  wero  anxious  >vith  all  sjKed  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  what 
was  their  most  important  possession ;  (for  since  Attica  had 
lein  closed  against  them,  Euboea  was  every  thing  to  them ;) 
.nnd  accordingly  they  sent  Thymochares  in  command  of  somo 
ihips  to  Eretria.  AVhen  thoy  arrived  there,  they  amounted, 
with  those  that  >voro  in  Euboea  before,  to  six  and  thirty ;  and 
they  wero  immediately  forced  to  an  engagement  For  Agie- 
Mndridas,  after  his  men  had  dined,  put  out  from  Oropus; 
wiiich  is  distant  from  Eretria  about  sixty  etades  by  sea.  • 
When,  then,  ho  was  advancing  .igainst  them,  tho  Athenians 
straightway  prepared  to  man  their  ships,  supposing  that  their 

*  άξνγκ^οτητοις.]  Literally,  "not  hammered  togctliori"•.  «.,  not  blended 

into  ono  body,  liko  two  pieces  of  metal  welded  tof^ether  by  tho  hammer. 

To  tho  examples  of  thia  metaphorical  use  of  tho  verba  quoted  by  Arnold 

niay  bo  added  Demoeth.  23.  3  (Reiske),  θαυμαστοί  καΙ  σνγκεκρο  τημίνοι 

.  Tii  roO  ηολέμον  i  h20,  12,  tsvyKportlv  καΐ  6ιύάακιιν  Ην  χορόν. 


574  THUOYDIDBS.  YUl  [xon 

men  wero  near  their  vessels.  They,  however,  were  purchasiniv 
provisions  for  their  dinner,  not  fiOin  the  market-place  (for  by 
an  arrangement  of  the  £retrians  there  was  nothing  on  salo 
there),  but  froui  the  houses  in  the  outskirts  of  the  town,  in 
order  that  the  enemy,  while  the  Athenians  were  long  in  man- 
ning their  ships,  might  attack  tliem  by  surprise,  and  compel 
them  to  put  out  just  ixa  they  might  happen.  Moreover,  a 
signal  had  been  raised  at  Eretria  to  give  them  notice  at  Oro- 
pus  of  the  time  when  they  should  put  to  sea.  The  Athenians 
then,  having  put  out  with  such  scanty  preparations,  and  fought 
a  battle  ott*  the  harbor  of  Eretria,  held  out  against  them,  not- 
withstanding, for  some  little  time,  and  were  then  put  to  flight 
and  pursued  to  the  shore.  And  now  such  of  them  as  took 
refuge  in  the  city  of  the  Eretrians,  as  being  friendly  to  them, 
fared  worst  of  all,  for  they  were  butchered  by  them ;  but 
those  who  fled  to  the  fort  in  the  Eretrian  territory,  which 
the  Athenians  themselves  occupied,  were  saved ;  as  also  were 
all  the  ships  that  reached  Chalcis.  The  Peloponnesians,  having 
taken  two  and  twenty  of  the  Athenian  vessels,  and  either  killed 
or  made  prisoners  of  the  men,  erecited  a  trophy.  And  not 
long  after  they  eflected  the  revolt  of  the  whole  of  Euboea,  ex- 
cepting Orcus  (which  was  held  by  the  Athenians  themselves), 
and  arranged  all  other  matters  thereabout. 

ϋϋ.  Wiieu  tlie  news  of  what  had  hap])ened  at  Eukerv 
reached  the  Athenians,  a  greater  consternation  was  felt  by 
them  than  had  ever  been  bifore.  For  neither  had  the  disaster 
in  Sicily,  though  it  appeared  a  great  ono  at  the  time,  nor  any 
other  event,  ever  yet  alarmed  them  so  much.  For  Avhen,  after 
their  army  at  Samos  had  revolted  from  them,  and  they  liad 
no  more  ships  nor  men  to  go  on  board  them,  while  they  were 
in  a  state  of  sedition,  and  did  not  know  when  they  might 
break  out  into  conflict  v.  ith  ono  another  ;  [when,  I  say,  under 
buch  circumsUmces]  so  great  a  calamity  had  befallen  them — 
one  in  which  they  had  lost  their  fleet,  and,  Avhat  was  most  of 
all,  Eubcea,  from  which  they  derived  more  advantages  than 
from  Attica — how  could  their  dejection  be  unnatural  ί  lint 
what  especially  and  most  immediately  alarmed  them,  was  the 
thought  that  the  enemy  would  venture,  on  the  strength  of 
their  victory,  to  sail  straightway  to  the  attack  of  their  ])ort 
J'iraius,  while  it  had  no  ships  for  its  j)rotection  ;  and  they 
supposed  that  they  Avero  already  all  but  there.     And  indeo^l, 


xcvii.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  δ7Λ 

if  they  had  been  more  bold,  they  might  easily  have  done  that, 
and  so  have  either  divided  the  city  still  more  than  ever,  by 
lying  near  it,  or  if  they  liad  remained  and  blockaded  it,  have 
<'ompelled  the  fleet  in  Ionia,  though  opposed  to  the  oligiirchy, 
to  come  to  the  rescue  of  their  own  relatives  and  the  >vhole 
city ;  and  in  the  mean  time  the  Hellespont  would  have  been 
ihcirs,  >vith  Ionia,  the  islands,  every  thing  as  far  as  Euboea, 
in  a  word,  the  whole  empire  of  Athens.  I^ut  it  was  not  on 
this  occasion,  but  on  many  others  also,  that  the  Lacedaimoni- 
ans  proved  themselves  most  convenient  people  for  the  Athe- 
nians to  bo  at  war  with.  For  by  being  very  widely  diftcrent 
in  character — the  one  people  being  quick,  and  the  other  slow ; 
the  one  enterprising,  and  the  other  unadventurous — they  pre- 
sented very  many  advantages,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  naval 
empire.  Λ  proof  of  this  was  given  by  the  Syracusans ;  for 
they,  through  being  of  a  congenial  disposition,  were  also  most 
successful  in  carrying  on  war  with  them. 

97..  On  receiving  therefore  this  news,  the  Athenians,  not- 
withstanding, manned  twenty  ships,  and  called  an  assembly ; 
one  immediately,  Λvhich  was  summoned  to  meet  on  that  oc- 
casion for  the  first  time  in  what  was  called  the  Pnyx  (where 
tliey    had    been   accustomed   to  mei»t  in  other  days),  and  in 
which  they  deposed  the   Four  Hundred,  and  resolved  that  the 
;:<»vcrnment  should  bo  )>ut  into  the  hands  of  the  Five  Thou• 
^aud  ;  that  in   that  Wly  should  be  included  all  who  furnished 
themselves   with   heavy  annor ;'  and  that  no  one  should  rc- 
•  cive  pay  for  the  discharge  of  any  office ;  or  if  any  one  did, 
tluy  declared  him  to  bo  accursed.      Many    other    assemblies 
were  also  held  subsequently,  in  which  they  appointed  persons 
to  frame  a  code  of  laws,  and  every  thing  else  requisite  tor  tho 
LTovernment     And  during  tho  first  period  of  this  constitution 
the   Athenians  api>ear  to  have  enjoyed  tho  best  polity  they 
«ver  did,  at  least  in  my  time ;  for  tho  blending  together  of 
the  few  and  the  many  was  eflfectod  with  moderation  ;  and  this 
was  what  first  raised  the  state  up  again  after  the  disastrous  oc- 
currences which  bad  tiikcn  place.    They  also  passed  a  decree 
i>r  the  recall  of  Alcibiades,  and  some  others  with  him ;  and 
'  tivai  ^i  αυτών,  κ.  τ.  λ.]  *'  Wo  must  supposo  that  all  who  could  furnish 
licavy  arms  wero  eligible  into  tho  number  of  tlio  Fivo  Thousand ;  whctb- 
iTtho  members  wcro  fixed  on  by  lot,  by  election,  or  by  rotation;  αβ 
.'    it  had  been  proposed  to  appoint  the  Four  Hundred  by  rotation  out  of  the 
whole  numUT  of  tho  Fivo  Thousand.    Seo  ch.  9'J.  2." — Arnold. 


676  THUCYDlDEa  VIII.  [xcvm ,  xcix 

sending  to  him  and  to  the  army  at  Samos,  they  urged  them  to 
attend  diligently  to  their  interests. 

98.  On  this  change  being  made,  the  party  of  Pisander  and 
Alexicles,  and  all  who  were  niost  devoted  to  the  oligarchy, 
withdrew  privily  to  Decelea ;  while  Aristarchus  alone  of  thcni, 
hapi)ening  to  be  in  office  as  general,  took  with  all  haste  w  inc 
of  the  most  barbarous  among  the  archers,  and  proceeded  to 
iEnoo.  This  was  a  fortress  belonging  to  the  Athenians  on 
the  borders  of  Boeotia,  and  in  consequence  of  a  blow  that  h:id 
been  inflicted  on  them  by  the  garrison,  by  cutting  otf  a  party 
of  men  on  tht»ir  return  from  Decelea,  it  was  being  besieged  by 
the  Corinthians,  who  had  volunteered  for  the  service,  and  iiad 
called  the  Boeotians  also  to  their  aid.  After  comniunicatiii*,' 
therefore  with  these,  Aristarchus  deceived  those  in  Oinoe,  by 
telling  them  that  their  countrymen  in  the  city  had  made  a 
general  surrender  to  the  Uicedamonians,  and  they  must  give 
up  the  place  to  the  Boeotians ;  for  that  such  >vere  the  terms  of 
the  capitulation.  They  therefore,  beheving  him,  inasmuch  as 
he  was  one  of  tlio  generals,  and  knowing  nothing  that  had 
happened,  in  consequence  of  their  being  blockaded,  evacuateil 
the  fort  under  truce.  It  Avaa  in  this  manner  that  the  Boeo- 
tians took  and  occupied  Qilnoe,  and  that  the  oligarchy  and  se- 
dition at  Athens  came  to  an  end. 

1)9.  About  the  same  period  of  this  summer  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  at  Miletus  also  executed  the  following  measurts. 
When  none  of  those  who  \vero  intrusted  >vith  the  businofis  hy 
Tissaphernes,  at  the  time  that  he  went  to  Aspendus,  ailOriltHl 
them  supplies,  and  neither  the  rhoenician  ships  nor  Ύ\^^λ• 
])hernes  made  their  ap])earan('0  hitherto,  but  I'hilippus  who 
had  been  sent  with  him,  .-is  well  as  another  8j)artan  named 
lIip})Ocrates,  who  Wius  at  Bhaselis,  wrote  word  to  Mindarus 
tlie  admiral,  that  the  ships  would  not  join  them,  and  that  tluy 
were  being  wronged  by  Tissajdienies  in  every  respect ;  and 
when  again  Bharnabazus  Avas  calling  them  to  his  aid,  and  w.is 
desirous  to  get  the  ships  in  his  turn,  like  Tissaphernes,  aiul 
cause  the  remaining  cities  in  his  government  to  revolt  from 
the  iUhenians,  hoping  to  gain  some  advantage  thereby  ;  under 
these  circumstances,  1  say,  Mindarus,  with  great  regularity,  and 
with  orders  suddenly  given,  to  escape  the  observation  of  th<  >'' 
nt  Samos,  Aveirrhed  anchor  from  Miletus  with  three  and  sev(  n'} 
eliips,  and  rsailed  for  the  Hellespont.     (Sixteen  ^hips   had  a'.  :  i^ 


c.ci.J  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  677 

earlier  period  of  this  same  eiimmer  entered  that  sea,  and  over- 
run some  parts  of  the  Chersonese.)  But  being  ciiught  in  η 
storm,  and  compelled  to  do  bo,  ho  put  in  at  Icarus,  and  after 
remaining  there  througli  stress  of  weather  five  or  six  daya, 
arrived  subsequently  nt  Chios. 

100.  When  Thrasylus  heard   of  his  having  put  out  from 
Miletus,  he  himself  also  set  sail  straightway  from  Samos  with 
live  and  fifty  ships,  hurrying  on  to  prevent  his  sailing  into 
ill"•  Hellespont  before  him.     But  on  finding  that  lie  was  at 
1  hios,  and   expecting  that  ho  would   stay  there,  ho  posted 
srouts  both  in  licsbps  and*on  the  mainland  opposite,  that  in 
case  of  tlio  ships  stirring  in  .iny  direction  they  might  not  do 
<o  unobserved;  while  lie  himself  coasted  along  to  Methymna, 
and   gave   orders   for  preparing  meal  and  other  necessaries, 
with   a  view  of   advancing  from  Lesbos  to  attack  them  at 
Chios,  if  any  length  of  time  should  bq  spent  there.     At  tho. 
same  time,  since  Eresus  in  Lesbos  liad  revolted,  ho  wished  to 
'tail  against  and  tike  it,  if  he  could.     For  some  exiles  of  tho 
^ίethymnnβans,  and  those  tho  most  influential,  having  carried 
over  from  Cuma  about  fifty  heavy-armed  men  who  had  been 
a'>sociated  with  them,  and  hired  others  from  the  continent, 
with  three  hundred   in   all,  of  whom  Alexander,  a  Theban, 
took  tho  command   on  tho  strength  of  his  connection  with 
th<Mn,  made  an  attack  on  Methymna  first ;  and  when  beaten 
oji  from  tho   attempt  by  means  of  the  Athenian  garrison 
trwps  which   liad  advanced  from  Mytilenc,  and   again   re- 
y\\\sM  in  an  engagement  outside  of  tho  town,  made  tlieir  way 
"vor  the  mountain,  and  procured  tho  revolt  of  Eresus.    Thra- 
sylus therefore  sailed   against  it  with  all  his  ships,  intending 
t•»  assault  it.    Thrasybulus,  too,  had  arrived  there  before  hlni 
with  five  ships  from  Samoa,  on  receiving  tidings  of  the  exiles 
!)i(is  crossing  over;  but  being  too  late,  ho  went  to  Eresus, 
^nd  lay  at  anchor  before  it.    They  were  also  joined  by  two  vcs- 
'«•Is  on  their  return  home  from  tho  Hellespont,  and  by  those  of 
^iK»  Mothyninseans ;  and  so  there  >vere  pesent,  in  all,  seven  and 
f^ixty  ships,  with  tho  troops  of  which  they  made  their  prepara- 
tions for  taking  Eresus  by  storm,  if  they  could,  with  the  aid  of 
•^ngines,  or  in  any  way  whatever. 

101.  In  the  mean  time  Mindaurus  and  the  Peloponnesian 
sliips  at  Chios,  after  being  victualed  for  two  days,  and  receiv- 
ing from  the  Chians  threo  Chian  teesaracostes  a  man,  on  the 

i5 


678  THUOYDIDES.  VIII.  [on.,  cin. 

tliird  day  put  out  with  nil  B{)ecd  from  the  island,  not  into  the 
open  sea,  to  avoid  falling  in  >vith  the  fleet  at  £reeu8,  but  sail- 
ing to  the  continent  with  Lesbos  on  their  left  hand.  After 
touching  at  the  port  of  Carteria,  in  the  Phocaian  territory,  and 
dining,  they  proceeded  along  the  coast  of  Cuma,  and  supped 
at  Argennusa  on  the  mainland,  over  against  Mytilene.  Thence 
they  still  coasted  on,  though  it  Λvas  late  in  the  night,  and  ar- 
rived at  Ilarmatus  on  the  continent,  just  opposite  Methymna, 
and  after  dinner  passing  quickly  by  Lectum,  Larisa,  llamaxitus, 
and  the  towns  in  those  parts,  came  somewhat  before  midnij^ht 
to  Rhoeteum,  and  so  were  now  in  tlfe  Hellespont.  Some  of  the 
sliips  also  put  in  at  Sigeum,  and  other  places  in  that  neighbor- 
liood. 

102.  Now  the  Athenians  were  at  Sestos  \\'\t\\  eiiihteon 
Fhips ;  aiul  Λνΐιοη  their  friends  ^ro  them  notice  by  tiro  sig- 
nals, while  thoy  iilso  observed  the  fires  on  the  hostile  shoro 
sullenly  appear  numerous,  they  were  aware  that  the  l*eh>- 
|)onnesians  were  entering  the  Hellespont.  Accordingly  that 
i^aino  night,  sailing  as  quickly  as  they  could,  and  keeping' 
close  under  the  shore  of  the  Chersonese,  they  coasted  aloni; 
toward  Elaius,  wishing  to  escape  from  the  enemy's  fleet  into 
the  open  sea.  And  tliey  eluded  tlw  observation  of  the  sixteen 
ships  at  Abydus,  although  orders  for  keeping  guard  had  Ixvn 
before  given  by  their  friends  >vho  went  to  them,  that  they 
might  Ui  on  the  alert  against  the  Athenians  in  case  they  should 
Bail  out.  But  descrying  those  with  Mindarus  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  being  immediat<dy  chiised  by  them,  they  had  not  all 
time  to  escape,  but  the  greater  ])art  of  them  did,  to  Imbros  and 
Lemnus;  while  four  of  the  ships,  which  >vere  sailing  last, 
were  overtaken  otF  Ela'us.  One  of  these,  >vhich  was  strandtd 
o|>posite  the  temple  of  Protesilaus,  they  took  together  >vith 
its  crew,  and  two  others  without  their  crews ;  while  the  r»^ 
maining  one  they  burned,  after  it  had  been  deserted,  close  to 
Imbros. 

103.  After  this,  Avith  the  vessels  which  had  joined  tluin 
from  Abydus  and  the  rest,  amounting  in  all  to  eighty-six, 
they  besieged  Elicus  that  day,  and  when  it  did  not  surrender, 
sailed  back  to  Abydus.  As  for  the  Athenians,  they  had  been 
deceived  by  their  scouts,  and  did  not  imagine  that  the  ])a.*s- 
iige  of  the  enemy's  fleet  couhl  ever  escajK)  their  vigilance,  hut 
were  leisurely  assaulting  the  walls  of  Eresus.      When,  how- 


ciT.,  CT.]  THUCYDIDES.  VIII.  679 

ever,  tlicy  were  awaro  of  it,  they  immediately  left  Eresus,  and 
proceeded  with  all  haste  to  the  defense  of  the  Hellespont 
And  they  took  two  of  the  Peloponnesian  ships,  which  having 
on  that  occasion  jnit  out  into  the  open  sea  more  boldly  than 
the  rest,  fell  in  with  them.  The  next  day  they  arrived  and 
cast  anchor  at  Elaius,  and  bringing  in  from  Imbros  such  ships 
as  had  taken  refuge  there,  they  were  five  days  making  prepara- 
tions for  the  battle.  . 

104.  After  this  they  fought  in  the  following  manner.    The 

Athenians,  drawn  up  in  column,  were  sailing  close  along  shore 

toward  Sestos ;  wliile  the  IVloponnesians,  obser^'ing  this  from 

Abydus,  put  out  on  their  side  also  to  meet  them.     When  they 

found  that  they  were  on  the  ovo  of  an  ongagennMit,  they  cx- 

f«'n(led  their  flank,  the  Athenians  along  the  Chersonew»,  from 

i*iafus  to  Arrhiann,  with  seventy-six  ships ;  the  Peloponnesians, 

Oil  tlio  other  hand,  from  Abydus  to  Dardanus,  with  eighty -six. 

« >ri  trie  side  of  the  Peloponnesians,  the  right  wing  was  held 

by  tiio  vSyracusans,  the  other  by  Mindams    himself  and  the 

r;uitest  sailing  vessels ;  on  that  of  the  Athenians,  the  left  waa 

u'!ld  by  ThrA«iyius,  the  right  by  Thrasybulus;  >vhile  the  other 

<  ommandors  took  their  position  as  might  severally  happen.     It 

l>oing  the  object  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  strike  the  first  blow, 

.uid   by  outtlanking  the  Athenians'  right  with  their  own  left  , 

lo  «xclude  them,  if  they  could,  from  sailing  out  of  the  straits, 

.:^  wi'li  as  to  drive  their  center  on  to  the  shore,  Avhich  was  at 

;!o  great  distance;  the  Athenians,  awaro  of  this,  extended  their 

"wti  wing  also  λυΙιογο  the  enemy  Λvished  to  hem  them  in,  and 

liad  the  advant'jgo  over  them  in  sailing;  Avhilo  their  left  had 

I  V  this  time  passed  the  headland  calleil  Cynossema.     liut  in 

« nnsoquenco  of  this,  they  had  to  form  their  center  with  weak 

.iiid  scattered  ships,  csjMicially  as  they  had  the  smaller  number 

at  their  command,  and  the  coast  about  Cynossema  formed  a 

slmrp  and  angular  projection,  so  that  what  was  doing  on  tho 

«>tlier  side  of  it  was  not  visible. 

105.  The  Peloponnesians  therefore,  falling  on  their  center, 
dmve  the  Athenian  ships  ashore,  and  landed  to  follow  up  their 
nttack,  having  had  a  decided  advantage  in  the  action.  To 
?issist  their  center  was  neither  in  tho  power  of  Thrasybulus 
«>n  the  rights  owing  to  the  superior  number  of  ships  that  wero 
]>rossirig  on  him,  nor  of  Thrasylus  on  tho  left ;  for  it  was  con- 
< calo'l  from  him  by  the  headland  of  Cynossema,  and,  moreover. 


580  THUCYDIDES.  Vlll.  Icfi.cra. 

the  Syracusans  and  the  rest  who  were  opposed  to  him  with  uo 
inferior  numbers  prevented  his  doin^  it:  until  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  from  pursuing,  in  the  securHy  of  victory,  diti'ei-ent 
vessels  in  different  directions,  began  to  fall  into  greater  dis• 
order  in  one  part  of  their  force.  Thrasybulus  therefore,  ob- 
serving this,  ceased  now  from  extending  the  flank,  and  facing 
about  immediately  attacked  and  routed  the  ships  opposed  to 
him,  and  then  proceeding  to  those  on  the  victorious  part  of  the 
enemy's  line,  handled  them  Roughly  in  their  scattered  condi- 
tion, and  threw  most  of  them  into  a  panic  without  striking  a 
blow.  .  The  Syracusans  also  had  by  this  time  yielded  the  vic- 
tory to  Thrasylus,  and  taken  to  flight  more  decidedly,  when 
they  saw  the  rest  doing  so  likewise. 

100.  The  rout  having  thus  been  eflected,  and  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  having  most  of  them  tiken  refuge  at  the  mouth  uf 
the  river  Midius  in  the  first  instance,  and  then  at  Abydus, 
though  the  Athenians  took  but  few  ships  (for  the  narrow 
breadth  of  the  Hellespont  gave  their  opponents  places  of  ref- 
uge at  a  little  disUmce),  yet  the  victory  which  they  gained  in 
this  sea-fight  wiis  most  op|>ortunc  for  them.  For  whereas  they 
had  before  been  afraid  of  the  IVloponnesian  fleet,  in  conse- 
quence of  losses  in  detail,  as  Λvell  as  of  the  disaster  in  Sicily, 
they  now  ceased  to  think  disparagingly  of  theuiselves,  and  to 
consider  their  enemies  as  good  for  any  thing  at  sea.  However, 
they  took  from  their  opponents  eight  Chian  vessels,  five  Co- 
rinthian, two  Ambraciau,  two  Baotian,  and  one  Leucadian, 
Lacedajmonian,  Syracusan,  and  Pellenian,  respectively ;  wliilo 
they  themselves  lost  fifteen.  After  erecting  a  trophy  on  tho 
headland  of  Cynossema,  securing  tho  wrecks,  and  restoring 
tho  enemy  their  slain  under  a  truce,  they  then  dispatched  a 
trireme  to  Athens  with  tho  news  of  their  victory.  On  tlo 
arrival  of  tho  vessel,  and  on  Iiearing  of  their  unexpc»cted  good 
fortune,  after  tho  disaster^i  which  had  recently  befallen  them 
in  Eubcea,  and  through  their  own  sedition,  they  were  much 
encouraged,  and  thought  that  their  cause  might  still  possibly 
prevail,  if  they  supported  it  with  vigor. 

107.  On  the  fourth  day  after  the  engagement,  the  Athenians 
at  Sestos  havipg  hastily  refitted  their  ships,  sailed  against 
Cyzicus,  which  hiid  revolted.  And  descrying  the  eight  shiji;»' 
from  Byzantium  lying  at  anchor  oti  llarpagium  and  Priapus, 

'  οκτώ  ναϊς.]     See  ch,  80.  4. 


cviii.,  Cix.]  TirtJCYDIDES.  VIII  581 

(liey  attacked  them,  and  took  tlic  vessels,  after  defeating  in  a 
battle  those  who  came  to  help  them  on  shore.  On  their  ar- 
rival also  at  Oyziciis,  which  was  unfortified,  they  got  posscfe- 
sion  of  it  again,  and  levied  a  contribution  from  it.  In  the 
mean  time  the  Pcloponnesians  also  sailed  from  Abydus  to 
Klaius,  and  recovered  such  of  their  ships  as  were  in  sound 
condition  (the  rest  having  been  burned  by  the  iidiabitanta),  and 
then  sent  Hippocrates  and  Epicles  to  Euboea,  to  fetcii  the 
s'juadron  that  was  there. 

108.  About  this  samo  time,  too,  Alcibiades  returned  to 
S;imos  with  his  thirteen  ships  from  Caunus  and  Phaselis, 
brincfing  word  that  ho  had  prevented  the  Phoenician  ships 
from  joining  the  Peloponnesians,  and  had  made  Tissaphemes  a 
more  decided  friend  to  the  Athenians  than  before.  Having 
then  manned  nine  ships  in  addition  to  those  lie  liad  already, 
he  levied  large  sums  of  money  from  the  llalicarnassians,  and 
fortified  Cos.  After  executing  theeo  measures,  and  placing  a 
governor  in  Cos,  it  being  now  toward  autumn,  he  sailed  back 
to  Samos.  As  for  Tissaphernes,  Λ\^ιοη  ho  heard  that  the 
Peloponnesian  squadron  liad  sailed  from  Miletus  to  the  Helles- 
pont, he  set  out  again  from  Aspendus,  and  proceeded  to  Ionia. 
Now  Avhile  the  Peloponnesians  Avere  in  the  Hellespont,  tho 
Antandrians  (of  .^olian  extraction),  v>onvcyed  by  land  over. 
Mount  Ida  some  heavy-armed  troops  from  Abydus,  and  intro- 
<hicod  them  into  their  city,  in  consequence  of  being  ill- 
treated  by  Arsaces  tho  Persian,  Tissaphernes*  lieutenant. 
This  samo  man,  pretending  to  have  a  quarrel  Avhicli  he  had  not 
yot  avowed,  and  offering  service  to  tho  chief  men  among 
tlK'm,  had  induced  the  Delians,  λυΙιο  had  settled  at  Atramytr 
tium,  when  driven  from  their  liomes  by  tho  Athenians  for  tho 
puqx)se  of  purifying  Delos,  to  go  out  as  though  on  terms  of 
ti  icndship  and  alliance  with  him ;  and  then,  having  watched 
when  they  were  at  dinner,  had  surrounded  them  with  his  own 
troops,  and  shot  them  down.  Since  therefore  they  were  afraid, 
on  account  of  this  deed,  that  ho  might  some  timo  or  other 
<  oinmit  some  outrage  on  themselves  too,  and  since  ho  also  im- 
posed upon  them  burdens  which  they  could  not  bear,  they  ex- 
r«'lk'd  liis  garrison  from  their  citadel. 

!09.  When  Tissaphemes  licard  of  this  act  also  on  tho  part 
of  tho  Peloponnesians,  as  well  as  that  at  Miletus  and  that  at 
Cuidus  (for  there  too  hie  garrisons  had  been  driven  out),  con- 


β82  THUCYDIDES.  VIII  [cix 

sidering  that  he  must  have  incurred  their  violent  displeasure, 
and  fearing  that  they  might  do  him  still  further  mischief,  and, 
moreover,  being  vexed  to  think  that  Pharnabazua,  by  receiving 
them,  might  in  less  time  and  nt  less  ex|)cuse  be  more  successful 
in  his  measures  against  the  Atheuiaiuy,  he  determined  to  go  to 
them  at  the  Hellespont,  that  ho  might  both  complain  of  what 
had  been  done  at  Antandrus,  and  defend  himself  as  plausibly 
as  he  could  against  their  charges  respecting  the  Phoenician 
fleet,  and  all  other  matters.  Accordingly  he  went  first  to 
Ephesus,  and  oft'ered  sacrifice  to  Diana. 

[When  the  winter  following  this  summer  shall  have  terrain• 
ated,  the  twenty-first  year  ^vill  be  completed.] 


I 


INDEX. 


Abd£11A,  108,  153. 

Ahronychits,  55. 

Ahycliis.  548,  578. 

Acanthus,  27fi,  322, 

Acarn»n,  son  of  Alcmaeon,  158. 

Acarnantuns,  4.  excellent  siORCrs,  142. 
conquer  the  Ainbraciots,  133.  make 
peare  with  thcin,227. 

Accsincs.  the  river,  243. 

Acharna',  104,  106. 

Achclous,  the  river,  157,  222. 

Arhcron,  the  river,  29. 

Achcriisian  lake,  ift. 

Arhillcs,  3. 

Arra-,  380. 

Arragas,  379,  480. 

Acropolis,  the,  74,  102,  100. 

Acle,  292. 

Artium.  18,  19. 

Adincius,  king  of  the  Molos^ians,  80. 

..f^antrdas,  tyrant  of  Lampsacus,  415. 

^iialros.  Mount,  104. 

^liineia»,  formerly  of  great  power  pI 
f*ea,  10.  stir  up  the  war  against  the 
Athenians,  39  conquered  by  the  Athe- 
nians at  sea,  C2.  how  and  why  expelled 
yKi^ina  by  the  Athenians,  107.  arc  set- 
tled by  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Thy- 
roa,  108.  how  used  by  the  Athenians 
when  they  reduced  Thyrea,  201. 

^X'ltium,  217. 

.Kiirajans,  222. 

-Kiivptians,  which  of  them  most  warlike 
fit. 

^:rieas,  298, 

-Kncsias.  90. 

.Kr.ia.la;,  157,  227,  487. 

.Kohans,  tributary  to  Athens,  487. 

.KdIis.  219. 

-VNiniides,  29. 

.Km)m.  338. 

-.KixMns,  214. 

^^oiians,  4.  invaded  by  the  Athenians, 
215.  defeat  Ihcin,  217. 

iT'.tnA,228. 

Acamemnon,  5,  Λ. 
Asatharchidas,  143. 

Aunlharchus,  404.  497. 
Aupsander,  83.  57J. 

ARCsippidas,  349. 

Aris,  king  of  Sparta,  ?12,  528.  he  com- 
mands Against  the  Argives,  348.  lets 
them  go  without  a  battle,  350.  is  ac 
cused  for  It  at  Sparta,  351.  marches  a 
second  time  against  them.  tb.  gains 
the  victory  at  Mantinea,  358.  fortifies 
Decelea  in  Attica,  460.  makes  nn  un- 
«uccessful  ittempt  on  Athens,  553^ 


Agracans.  157,  225,  273. 

ARrianians,  153. 

AgriRcntincs,  31 1.  neutral  in  the  Sicilian 
war,  488. 

Alcajus,  archon  at  Athens,  323. 

Alcamenes,  514.  517 

Alcibiades,  son  of  Clinias.  340.  his  expe- 
dition into  Peloponnesus,  347.  and  W> 
Argos,  307.  named  for  one  of  the  com- 
manders in  Sicily.  382.  his  speech  on 
that  occasion.  38/ .  is  accused  about  tho 
Mercuries,  and  for  profaning  the  mys- 
teries. 395.  insists  on  a  trial.  396.  sets 
out  for  Sicily,  li».  his  opinion  at  η  coun- 
cil of  war,  409.  is  recalled  to  take  lii.s 
trial,  ill.  flies  and  is  outlawed,  411. 
takes  refiipo  at  Sparta,  418.  his  speech 
at  Sparta,  435.  advi.ses  the  Lnceilfeino- 
niaiis.  about  prosecuting  the  war,  515, 
519.  sent  to  Chios  with  Chalcideiis, 
519.  his  transactions  at  Miletu.s,  521. 
ROCS  to  Tissaphernes.  and  becomes  a 
favorite.  538.  contrives  his  own  recall 
to  Athens,  541.  his  quarrel  with  Phry- 
iiirhus,  542.  is  recalled,  501,  570.  his 
management  nt  Sainos,  561,  564.  goes 
to  Aspendus,  506. 

Alcidas,  the  Lacedjcmonian  admiral, 
sent  to  Lesbos,  107,  173.  he  flies,  17Θ. 
returns  to  Peloponnesus,  202.  sails  to 
Corey  ra,  205.  one  of  the  three  leaders 
of  the  colony  to  lleracloa,  214. 

Alcmulas.  32.1,  325. 

Alciphron,  351. 

Alcin.x'on.  158. 

Alcina-'onidjB,  410. 

Alexander,  a  Thoban,  577. 

Alexarchus,  401. 

Alexicles,  put  under  arrest,  570.  flics  to 
Dccelea,  570. 

Alexippidas.  547. 

Almopians,  155. 

Alope, 107. 

Alyzia,  469. 

Ambracia,  grilfof.  18, 34. 

Ambraciots,  aid  tho  Corinthians  against 
the  (;orcyi;n;nne,  16,  17,29. make  war• 
on  the  Amphilochians,  132.  and  tho 
Aearnanians.  140,  make  another  expe- 
dition against  Iwlh,  221.  take  Olpte.  ifr. 
are  tiefeated.  223.  make  peace,  227. 
send  aid  to  the  Syrucusans,  488. 

Amoiniiis.  307. 

Aininiades,  132. 

Aminocles,  9. 

Ammias.  son  of  Corcellus,  170. 

Amorges,  revolts  from  the  king  of  Per- 
sia, 519  Is  taken  prisoner  by  the  Pelo• 


6Θ4 


INDEX. 


ponnesians.  ftntl  delivereU  lo  TifM- 
phernes,  538. 

Ainpelidas,  3124. 

Ainphias,  39Θ. 

Ainphitochian  Argos,  230, 221. 

Aiupliiiuchians,  132,  157. 

Aiuphiloclius.  133. 

Ainphipohs,  59,  287,  310,  321,  266. 

Ainphissians,  218. 

Ainyclx,  333. 

Ainyiitas,  153,  156. 

Ainyrta'us,  64. 

AniiCturuiin.  IS,  34,  227,  257,  329,  469. 

AtiiL'ii,  271,532. 

Aiiiipus,  the,  142. 

Anuxilas,  380. 

Aiulociites,  son  of  Leogoras,  3S. 

Andnans,  253,  487,  654. 

Andmcles,  551.  * 

Androcrates,  172. 

Andruinedcs,  339. 

AndrusUienes,  345. 

Anilrus,  134. 

Ancristus,  131. 

Antuiidrus,  258,271,581. 

Anttictnus,  155. 

Aatlionc,  338. 

Anticles,  C8. 

Aiittiiienidas,  339. 

Aniioclius,  kin»  of  the  Orestians,  141. 

Aritiphemus,  379. 

Aiitiptioa,  553,  568. 

Anti|)pus,  333,  335. 

Aiiliusa,  1U8.  174. 

Anlihlliciics.  5.14,  548. 

Aphroilisia,  2C0. 

Aphvtis,  38. 

AiikIhiius,  274. 

A|K>dutl,  215. 

Apollo.  Dehan,  9, 220,  290,  temple•  of, 
18,  333.  344. 

Malotis,  100. 

" —  '•  Archegcles,  378. 

Apollonia,  16. 

Arcadia,  3,  338. 

Arcadians,  furnished  with  ships  by  Aga- 
ineianun  m  the  Trojan  expedition,  6. 
niercciiarif.s,  488. 

Archedice,  415. 

Archelaus,  156. 

Arclicstratus,  son  of  LycomeUes,  35. 

Archetimus,  18. 

Arciitas,  of  Caiuarina,  243. 

the  Corinthian,  founder  of  Syra- 
cuse, 379. 

Archidainus,  king  of  Sparta,  his  speech 
on  war  with  the  Athenians,  48.  coin- 
inaiul.sin  t  tic  invasion  of  Attica.  96.  his 
Hpci'ch,  97.  coininaiiih  in  another  in- 
vasion, 118.  and  agauibt  Piala:a,  131. 

ArclioMidas,  449. 

Argllus,  333. 

Arginiis,  531. 

Argues,  3.  have  thirty  years'  truces 
with  the  Laceda^inonian.s,  318.  arc  ir- 
ritated by  tlie  ConDthiaiiuagaiiiht  the 
Lacedzinumuiis,  337.  aim  at  being  a 


leading  state,  328.  make  war  u\nn 
the  fipidaurians,  347  are  turroundeil 
by  the  Lacedttmonians,  but  let  go, 
351.  are  defeated  at  Mantinea,  and 
make  peace,  358,  359. 

Argos  6,  260. 

in  Ainphilochia,  132. 

Argyllians,  a  colony  of  Andrians,  288. 

Arianthidas,  280. 

Aristagoras,  288. 

Aristarchus,  568,  571,  576. 

Aristeus,  sop  of  Pellichas,  18. 

son  of  AdiinanluB,  36—38,  131. 

— — the  Laceda'inonian,  307. 

Aristides,  son  of  Lysimachus,  55. 

son  of  Archippus,  257, 271. 

Arislo,  475. 

Aristocles,  330,  358. 

Aristocratcs,  333,  335,  567,  570. 

.Vristogiton,  13.  13,  413. 

Ari^tonυus,  379. 

of  Larissa,  100. 

.^risioiiymus»,  899. 

Aristophon,  565. 

.\risU)teles,  son  of  Tiinocratee,  822 

Arne,  8,  288. 

Arnissa,  304. 

.\rrhiana,  579. 

Arrhibaius,  king  of  the  Lyncestians, 274. 
warred  against  by  Urasidas  and  Per• 
diccas,  374,  300. 

Arsaces,  581. 

Artabazus,  70. 

Arlaphernes,  257. 

Artas,  470. 

Artaxerxcs  Longimanus,  61.  begini  to 
reign,  81.  dies,  257. 

Artcinisiuin,  the  month,  323. 

Asia,  athlelic  games  in,  5. 

Asine,  336,  259,  440. 

Asupius,  son  of  Phormio,  his  eiplolta 
and  death,  163. 

.\spendus,  561.  565. 

Astacus,  109,  157. 

Astyinachus,  190. 

Astyoclius,the  Laccdnemonian  admiral. 
533.  goes  to  Chios,  533.  in  great  dan* 
ger,  530.  refuses  to  succor  the  Chians, 
531.  betrays  Fhrynichus,  542.  is  muti- 
nied against  by  his  own  seamciit  and 
returns  to  Sparta,  562. 

Atalanta,  110,  156,212,322. 

Alhen;tMis,  398. 

Athciiagoras,  his  speech  at  Syracuse, 
403. 

Athenians,  gave  shelter  at  flrst  to  all 
v\ho  would  Kettle  among  them,  11. 
how  tliey  became  a  naval  power,  13. 
origin  of  their  great  war  with  the  Pe- 
lopoiinesians,  15.  rebuild  their  walls, 
51.  m.itle  war  against  the  king  of  Per 
Ma,  uiiiler  Pausanias,  57.  gradual 
growth  of  their  poMcr,  58.  gam  a  vie• 
tory  at  Euryinedon,  59.  reduce  the 
isle  of  Thasos,  60.  receive  the  Helots, 
and  settle  them  at  Naupactus,  6! .  then 
war  in  Egypt,  i(;.  w ilh  the  Cor iulhia»* 


INDEX. 


δθ5 


ih.  and  Epidaurinns,  nnd  iEpinetin,  Γ»2. 
w  ith  Ihe  Lacedaemonians,  63.  Boeoti• 
!ins,  lb.  Sicyonians,  65.  Cyprians,  ib. 
rrcover  Cha;ronca,  fi<>.  defeated  alCo- 
ronaia,  ib.  reduce  Eubcna.rft.  make  war 
niM)n  Sanios,  67.  make  alliance  with 
the  Corcyra'ans,  28.  assi-st  them  n• 
uainst  the  ('ormthians,  30.  they  take 
measures  to  repress  the  revolt  of  the 
rotidieans.  35.  speech  of  their  cmbas- 
^a(l()rs  nt  Laccda-mon  in  reply  to  the 
(oriiilhians,  44.  make  war  upon  Pcr- 
dircas,  35  fiRhtthe  Potida-ans  and  Co- 
rinthians, 37.  besicRe  PotidA'a,  po,  re- 
duce Samos,  67,  68.  deliberate  about 
the  Peloponnrsian  war,  83.  prepare 
far  defense,  94.  send  their  ftcct  to 
cDiise  upon  Peloponnesus',  106.  attack 
Milhonc,  lb  invade  Locris,  107.  eject 
the  ..^•]J»metaί  from  the  isle  of  Mgmn, 
1<>8  make  an  alliance  with  Sitalces,  ih. 
take  Solium  and  Astacus,  109.  invade 
111.•  Megaris,  i/i.  fortify  Atalante,  110. 
crl»  brate  the  public  funerals,  111.  are 
aOhcted  with  the  plapue,  119.  send 
tlieir  fleets tocruisc on  Peloponnesus, 
1'24.  are  anpry  with  Pericles,  125.  take 
lOfuia-a,  134.  war  upon  the  ChalcUli- 
:»iis.  139  fight  the  Poloponnesians  at 
if.i.  !44,  150.  send  a  fleet  to  Lesbos, 
IfO  besiege  Mytilene,  103.  i-educc  it, 
174  seize  the  island  of  Minoa,  189. 
send  a  fleet  to  Sicily,  21 1.  their  war  in 
Ararnania,  215.  are  defeated  by  the 
^Uolians,  217.  their  proceedings  in 
Sicily,  227.  they  seize  nnd  fortify  Py 
\\\<,  232.  fight  between  them  and  the 
l,ar«Mln'm<«iians,  236.  fight  the  Syra- 
« M'-aris,  240.  invade  the  ('orinthians, 
'J..:»,  take  Anactorium,  250,  conquer 
(  ythera,  259.  take  Thyrea,  261.  sur- 
prise Nis.Ta,  268.  invauc  Uocotia,  nnd 
.tre  defeated  at  Dcliiim,  2H3.  lose  Am- 
i.liipolis,  290,  make  a  truce  with  the 
Laceda-monians,  295.  take  Mcnde,  304. 
I'•  siege  Scione,  300.  eject  the  Dclians, 
3IHJ.  are  conquered  by  Brasidas  at  Am- 
phipolis,  316  make  a  peace,  321.  take 
Scione,  332.  want  to  break  the  peace, 
Π 10.  make  nn  alliance  with  the  Ar- 
uives,  343.  invade  and  reduce  Mcloe, 
3('.7.  determine  on  the  Sicilian  expedi- 
tion, 377.  their  preparations,  396.  they 
siul  for  Sicily,  398.  land  at  Syracu.se, 
4W.  fight,  422.  solicit  the  alliance  of 
(  amar.na,  426.  take  Epipolac,  445.  be- 
sirge  Syracuse,  443.  fight  with  Gylip- 
j'us,  453.  send  a  reinforcement  to  Sy- 
racuse, 4d8.  fight  the  Corinthians  at 
KrineuB.  471 .  defeated  in  the  attack  of 
Ι'ϊΜροΙίΒ,  478.  arc  raising  the  siege, 
'»"'4.  arc  stopped  by  an  cclinsc  of  tne 
iiK.on,  ih.  tight  a  battle  in  tne  harbor, 
i'i'.  march  away,  501.  forced  to  sur- 
render, 507,  508.  tho  consternation  al 
Athens,  5H.  their  measures,  513.  take 
Miiylene,  5S4.  tubdue  the  Clar.nment• 
25• 


ans,  ih.  besiege  the  Chians,  555  de- 
feat the  Milesians,  526  quit  Miletus 
for  fear  of  the  Pelononnesians,  527. 
fiqht  and  are  defeateti,  536  solicit  tho 
friendship  of  Tlssaphernes,  546.  fight 
with  the  Chians,  549  lose  their  de- 
mocracv.  ib.  lose  Eubcca,  574.  defeat 
the  I'eioponnesians  in  the  battle  of 
(^ynossema,  579. 

Athos.  Mount,  292,  310. 

AtinUinians,  141 

Atramytium,  309,  58L 

Atrcus,  6. 

Attica,  2,  6,  35,  66. 

Anion,  288. 

Autocharidas,  317. 

Autocles,  258,  298. 

Axius,  the  river,  155. 

Bacchus,  temples  of,  101,  907,  57f . 

Battus,  254. 

Beraia,  36. 

Bisallia,  155,  202. 

BoRotarchs,  280,  330 

BoOtia,  2. 

Boeotians,  7,  ejected  out  of  Arne,  8.  con- 
quered by  tne  Athenians  at  CEnophy- 
ta,  63  become  free,  66  win  the  battle 
of  Delium.  284.  besiege  Delium,  ift. 
take  Panactum,  310.  send  aid  to  the 
Syracusans,  460. 

Bo-um,  63. 

Bolbe,  Lake,  35,  288. 

Bolissiis,  525. 

Boriades,  218. 

Borniensians,  217. 

Bottiajans,  35,  139. 

Bottice,  39. 

Brasidas,  saves  Methone,  and  receive• 
the  public  commemlatlon  nt  Sparta, 
107  IS  of  the  council  to  Alcidas,  202, 
his  gallant  behavior  at  l*ylus,  235, 
saves  Megara,  2f»8.  marches  to  Thrace, 
274.  his  character,  275.  marches  a- 
gainst  the  Lyncestians,  ib.  harangues 
the  Acanthians,  276.  gets  possession 
of  Amphipolis,  289.  is  repulsed  at 
Eion.  290.  marches  into  Acte,  292. 
takes  Torone,  293  and  LccTthus,  294. 
crowned  by  the  Scioneans,  299,march• 
cs  a  iccond  time  against  the  Lynces- 
tians, 300.  his  brave  retreat,  303. 
makes  nn  unsuccessful  attempt  ofi- 
Potida»a,  808  opposes  Cleon  at  Am- 
phipolis, 3J2.  resolves  to  attack,  314. 
harangues,  ib.  sallies,  310  conquein 
and  dice,  817.  hi«i  funeral,  ib. 

Brauro.  wife  of  Pjltacus,  290. 

Bricinniic.  311. 

Brilessus,  106. 

Bromiscus,  288 

Bucolion,  308 

Budorum,  152,  IM. 

Byzantines,  revolt  from  Athenians,  87. 

Cacyparls.  the  river,  500. 
Cn^adas,  the,  79. 


566 


INDEX. 


Calet,  tho  river,  S71 . 

Calirrhoe,  the  spring  of,  181 . 

Cailias,  eon  of  CaUiaUet,  3β.  killed,  38. 

Callicrates,  18. 

Calliensians,  317. 

Calligilus,  513,  Mi 

Calydon,  219. 

Carnanneans,  twice  i'jecteU,  380.  their 
conduct  111  tliu  Sicilian  war,  201, 411 
420,  434,  470 

Cainbyses,  9. 

Camirus,  537. 

Carunus,  100. 

Carcinus,  C3. 

Cardainyle,  525. 

Cafians,  3,  5. 

Carneian  hoiydays,  348,  361. 

Caiteria,  578. 

Carthaginians,  U. 

Caryie,  34». 

Carystians,  58,  253,  487,  554. 

Casmcna:,  380. 

Calana,  311. 

CatanuL'ans,  dwell  under  Mount  iEtna, 
1228.  reduced  by  the  Athenians,  411 
488. 

Caunus,  534. 

Cccrops,  king  of  Athens,  100. 

Cccryphalca.  sea-fight  at,  61. 

Cunchrcii.',  254,  522. 

Centotnna,  441. 

Cc|>hullenia,  17,  05, 10»,  140,  215,  m. 

CtTcinc,  J54. 

Cerdyhum,  312. 

Ccryces,  544. 

Cestrinc,  2y. 

ChiL-reus,  557. 

Chajronea,  06,  272. 

Chiilitans,  218. 

Chalcidcans  of  Eiiboea,  make  war  with 
the  Kretrians,  10.  subject  to  the  Athe- 
nians, 487.  / 

Chalcitlcans  of  Thrace,  revolt  from  the 
Athcniiins,  35,  37.  defeat  thein,  140 
enter  into  league  with  the  Argives 
331. 

Chalcidcus,  the  Lacedaemonian  admi 
ral,  510.  his  exploits.  520,  521.  killed 
by  the  Athenians,  524. 

Chalcidice,  39,  274. 

Chaleis,  04,  574. 
«haonians,  133, 140. 
Chanidrus,  the  river,  352. 
Cllariclcs,  401, 

Charnitnus,  an  Athenian  commander, 

529.  defeated  by  the  Pelo()onnesians, 

535.  hcl|)s  the  oiigarclui:al  party  at 

Sainos,  550. 

Charceades,    son   of   Euphiletus,   211 

killed.  213. 
Charybdis,  242. 
Chersonese,  7,  253. 

Chians,  258.  allies  to  the  Athenians,  12, 

07.  suspected,  518.  revolt  from  the 

Athenians,  520.  their  war,  522. 

Chiinerium.  19,  29. 

Chiunis,  323 


Chroroon,  317. 

Chrysippus,  β. 

Chrysis,  90,  307. 

Cilicians,  05. 

Cimon,  son  of  Miltiades,  takes  Eion,  5ft 
beats  the  Persians  at  Eurymedon,  5tt. 
iiies  in  the  expedition  to  Cyprus,  65. 

Cina;um,  214. 

Cithajron,  137, 172. 

Citiniuin,63. 

Citium,  05.  • 

Ciarus,  170. 

Clazoinenas  530. 

Clcarchus,  517,  534.  500. 

Clearidas,  commands  in  Amphipotis. 
307,  312,  313,  conquer•  Cleon  with 
Urasidas,  317.  endeavors  to  break  the 
peace. 324. 

Clcippides,  160. 

Clcobulus,  335. 

Cieomcdes,  367. 

Cleoiaenes.  74,  173. 

Clcon,  his  .speech,  178.  command  at  Py• 
Itis,  245,  247.  his  command  in  Thrace. 
309,  315.  conquered  by  Urasidas,  and 
killed,  310. 

Cleona;,  292,  350,441. 

Clcoponipus,  107,  124. 

Cloidiyxus,  292. 

Cncinus,  the  Spartan,  commands  a 
squadron  against  Zacynthus,  131.  sent 
into  Acarnania,  140.  retires  from  Stra- 
tus, 144. 

Cnidos,  212,  532. 

Ca'cinus,  220. 

Colonie  m  the  Troad,  77. 

(^olophonians,  310. 

Conon,  469. 

Corcyra'ans,  9.  founders  of  Epidamnus, 
15.  were  themselves  a  Corinthian  col- 
ony, 10.  make  war  on  Epidamus,  17. 
beat  liie  Corinthians  at  sea,  19.  beg 
the  alliance  of  Athens,  20.  their  speecii 
at  Athens,  tb.  their  success,  28.  en- 
gage the  Corinthians  at  sea,  30.  their 
sedition,  202,  255.  aid  the  Athenians 
in  the  war  of  Sicily,  488. 


Corintiuuiis,  first  built  ships  of  war,  9. 
origin  of  tiioir  hatred  fur  the  Athe- 
nians, 01,  their  oiiarrel  with  the  Cor- 
cyra.-ans  about  Kpidamnus,  16.  their 
speech  at  Athens,  24.  continuation  of 
their  war  with  the  Corcyrseans.  29. 
send  aid  to  Polidiea,  36.  cry  out  a- 
gainst  the  Athenians,  39.  their  first 
fclMicch  at  Lareda^mon,  tb.  their  sec- 
ond, C9.  invatled  by  tho  Athenians, 
253.  excite  discimtent  in  Peloi>oniic- 
sus,  3-20,  327.  makes  alliances  with 
the  Eleans  and  Arrives,  331.  aid  th• 
Syracusans,  435,  459. 

Coronta,  157. 

Corlyla,  260. 

Corycus,  519,  531. 

Coryithasiiiin,  230,  290,  333. 

Cos  Aleropis,  535. 

Cranil,  109,  334,  349. 


INDEX. 


58t 


rrnnoniins,  ΙΟβ. 

('r:tt»?mcnc8,  a  foander  of  ZMcle,  3Θ0. 

(ΓΟΠΛί,  5221. 

rrrstotun,  155,303. 

frctiins,  •58«. 

rn<!sa>an  Rulf,  63, 133, 143. 

Cracylcum,  316. 

(ru'sus,  10. 

i'rointnyon,  354. 

Cropa;.•».  104. 

Crusjl,  140. 

Curn.i.  523,  530. 

(.;y<'!.iUcs,  3. 

<  'vi"li)pcs,  377. 
ί  Λ  (Ionia,  145. 
CvIUnc,  10,  144. 
(ylon,  his  history,  T3. 

c'vinr,  175.  ♦ 

Cyncs,  157. 

(  ynosscma,  579. 

Cynurm.  260.  318. 

(  vprus,  Gl,  65. 

<  vpsclii,  333. 
(  yrcnc,  64. 

(  yr'rhus,  156. 

Cyrus  the  elder,  9, 10. 

the  younRer,  131. 

«ylhcrn,  258,  206,  3IH,  383. 
Cylhernmns,  Ihp,  48«. 
(  ytiniuni,  216,  aitf. 
lyzicu.s,  580. 

Daithus.  323. 

^iam.iRCtus.  323. 
)}imat,'nn,  214. 
Darnoliinu.•!,  298. 
Danaans,  3. 
Daphnus,  524,  530. 
Darius,  king  of  Persia,  surceed.<?  Cam• 

byscs,  6.  reduces  the  Ionian  isles.  10. 
son  of  Artaxcrxes,  515.  his  leagues 

wtth  the  Laccda;inunians,  531,532,547. 
l>a«(on.  380. 
Hasrvlium,  76. 
Daulis,  108. 

Deccica,  438,  460.  554,  576. 
Dclians,  removed  out  of  Delos  by  the 

Atheniatis,309.  brought  thither  again, 

3.12. 
nolium,  2fiO. 

I)»"I.)S,  5,  58,  05,  174  220,581. 
Drlphi.  oracle  of,  15,  18,  69,  74,  79.  914, 

320,332. 

tempio  at,  65, 193,  30Θ,  831. 

Pemaratufi.  448. 
!)■  niarrhus,  504. 
Hrmndocus,  271. 
OMTi(»sthcncs,  213.  his  war  in  iEtolla 


Demotcles,  243. 

Dcrcylidns,  548. 

Derdas,  35,  30. 

Dcrs.x'i,  157. 

Deucalion,  3. 

Dians    take   Thyesus,  333.  dwelt   nn 

Mount  Alhos,  365.  revolt   from  the 

Athenians,  ib. 
Didymc,  212. 
Dicinporus,  90. 
Dil.  153. 
Diitrenhcs,  467. 
Diniadas,  523. 
Dioclotiis,  his  speech  against  putting  the 

Mytilcnajans  to  death,  183. 
Diomcdon,  besieges   the  Chians,  533, 

524.  favors  the  democracy,  556. 
Diomilus,  442. 

Diottmus,  son  of  Strombichus,  88. 
Diotrephcs.  550. 
Diphilus,  471. 
Di'im,274,  21»3,365. 
Dobcrus,  154. 
Dolopcs,  58. 
Didopia,  157. 
Dorcis,  57. 
Uorians,  in  Pcloponncsun,  8.  foundera 

of  Lacedaimon,  11,  63.  border  on  the 

c;arians,  90.  warred  upon  by  the  Pho• 

nans  63.  the  perpetual  cnemiee  of 

the  lonians,  429. 
Doricus  the  llhodian,  162. 

the  Thurian,  532,  563. 

Drabescus,  59,  288. 
Droi,  the,  of  Thrace,  157. 
Drymussa.  530. 
Dyme,  144. 

Ecrritus,  4G0. 

Echinades,  158. 

Edonrs,  59,  155,  288,  292,  313. 

Ectionia,  568. 

Egypt,  expedition  of  the  Athenians  to, 
61,64. 

Eion,  58.  231,  257,  268,  313. 

Eix'us,  578. 

Elapliebolion,  the  month,  297,  323. 

Elcans,  aid  the  Corinthians  against  the 
Corcyncans,  17, 19, 29.  defeated  by  the 
Athcniaus,  107.  in  alliance  with  the 
Corinthians  ami  Argivcs,  330.  with 
the  Athenians,  343. 

ElcmiotK,  155. 

Elousmians,  made  war  against  Erec• 
thcus,  101. 

Eleusis,  66,  267. 


Eliomcnus,  215. 

Elymi,  378. 
215,  223.  his  seizure  of.  and  exploits  at  Embatum,  174. 
.......  „««  «««  u:_  1. „.,  u:.  Empediae,  323,  325. 

Endius,  the  Spartan,  516.  embassador  to• 
Athens,  341.  his  enmity  with  Agia,  519. 

Enipeus,  273. 

Entimus,  the  Cretan,  founder  of  OcltL 
379. 

Eordians,  155. 


I'vltis,  230,  232.  his  harangue,  233.  his 
attempt  on  Megara,  265.  carries  up  a 
reinforcement  against  Syracuse,  458. 
arrives  at  Syracuse,  476.  repulsed  at 
Epipolae,  478.  is  for  raising  the  siege, 
480.  decamps,  501.  surrrndcrs  with 
the  troops  under  his  command,  8Q7• 
is  put  to  death,  509. 


Ephesus,  81, 178, 957,  588. 


588 


INDEX. 


Ephyre.tO. 

Epicles.  &81. 

Epicydidas,  S17. 

EnldHinniaiis,  harasecd  with  seditions, 

16.  beg  aid  of  Corcyra,  iL•.  at  Curmth, 

tb.  besieged  by  the  Corcyreuns,  17. 

reduced,  19. 
Epidaurians,  17.  βΟ.  ββ,  347. 
Epipola».  425,  441,477. 
Epirus,  227. 
Epttadits,  233,  24a 
Era),  522. 
Erarchus,  109. 
Erasinidcs,  453. 
Ercctheus,  101 
Eresus,  168,  177,  524. 
Eretrians,  at  war  w  ith  the  Chalcideans, 

10.  subject  and  tributary  to  Athen»,4i^• 
Erytiiroi,  172,  515,  520. 
Eteoiucus,  524 

Euba>a,  14,  53,  66, 100,  514,  574. 
Eubulus,  524. 
Eucles  the  Athenian,  289r 
the  Syracusan,  447. 


Glauco,  eon  of  Leager,  St. 

Goaxis,  390 

uoiigylus  the  Erctrian,  76. 

the  Corinthian,  450. 


Euc tides,  founder  of  ilimera,  380. 

Eucteutoi),  529. 

Euespenta;,  4b3. 

Eainachus,  110. 

Kuntolpulai,  544. 

Eumolups,  101. 

Eupaltuin,  216,  310. 

Euphamidas,  110,  298. 

Euphetnus,  his  speech  at  Camarina,  430, 

Eupouiidas,  169. 

Europus,  156. 

Eurybales,  29. 

Euryelus,  442,  478. 

Euryh)chus  the  Spartan,  318,  819,320. 

killed,  223. 
Eurytnachus,  90. 
Euryniedon,  sent  to  Corcyra,  806.  tolllelus,  259 


Gortynia,  150. 

Ciraaiaits,  153. 

Grecians,  account  of  the  old,  3.  how 
they  undertook  the  Trojan  expedi• 
tion,  7.  applied  themselves  to  .man* 
time  affairs,  11,  13. 

Gyhppus,  sent  to  command  at  Syracuse, 
447  arrives  there,  450.  hisbaltleit,453. 
takes  Plemmyrium. 461.  procures  »uc• 
cors,  483.  fights  the  Atiienians,  484. 
stops  their  decampment,  501.  takes 
Nicias  prisoner,  508.  brutgs  home  the 
fleet  from  Sicily,  5l9. 

Gyrlonians,  106. 

Hx>mus,  Mount,  153. 

liagnon,  68,  124,  153,888,  317,  333,  336. 

lialex,  the,  218. 

Halia;,61.  124,255. 

Ilalicarnassus,  530. 

Haly.s,  the.  10. 

llamaxUus,  5ΤΘ. 

ilarmatiis,  578. 

Hurmodius,  his  history,  13, 13,  418. 

Harpagium,  5bO 

Hebrus,  river,  153. 

Hegesander,  460. 

Hegesippidas,  347. 

Helen,  5. 

UqUxus,  560. 

Hellanicus,  58. 

Hellas,  2. 

liellen,  son  of  Deucalion,  8,  3. 

Helots,  their  revolt  from,  and  war  with, 
the  Lacediumonians.eo.ei.  are  feared, 
and  2000  of  them  made  away  with,  375. 


Sicily,  228.  229.  is  fined  for  returning 
265.  sent  thither  again.  458.  arrives  at 
Syracuse,  476.  killed,  484. 

Euryniedon,  the  river,  59. 

Eurystlieus,  king  of  MycensB,  0. 

Eurytauians,  215. 

Eustrophus,  338. 
hydt 


HeracUa,  in  Trachynia,  314,  818,  873, 

317,  347. 
Heraclida!  kill  Eurysthous,  0,  8. 
Ileraclides  the  Syracusan,  435,  447. 
Hc'r.X'ans,  356. 
Heratoclidas,  JS. 
Hercules,  15. 


Eulhydenms,  323,  325,  a  commander  at  Hcrinieondas,  161. 

Syracui'e, 458.  unsucccssfuUn  the  last  Hcrmione,  17,75,  134. 

bailie,  4U9. 
Evalas,  523. 
Evarchus,  tyrant  of  Astacus,  110. 

a  founder  of  Catana,  379. 


Eveims,  the.  143. 

Galepsus,  290,  311 

Gaulitcs,563. 

Gela,261,311,379. 

Gelo,  king  of  Syracuse,  370,  SAO. 

Geloans,  build  Agngentum,  379.  aid  the 

Syracusans,  488. 
Gerdistus,  160. 
Geranea,  62,03. 
Getic,  153. 
Gigonus,  36. 
Glauce,  559. 


llerniucratcs,  his  speech  to  the  SiciiiaAS, 
201 .  to  Ihe  Syracusans,  399.  his  charac- 
tcr,  424.  encourages  the  Syracusans, 
tb.  made  a  commander,  425.  his  speech 
at  Camarina,  426.  hi9  stratagem,  *0• 
banished,  564. 

Herinon,  571. 

Hesiod,  216. 

Hesiiians,  318. 

Hiera,  252. 

Hierainoncs,  547. 

Hiereans,  214. 

Hicrophon,  223. 

Himera,  227,  380,  418,  449. 

Hippagrelas,  351. 

Hipparchus,  his  hii^tory,  13,  13,  4I& 


INDEX. 


589 


Ilippias,  the  eldest  son  of  Pisi^tratus, 
his  history,  13,  4U. 

the  Arcadian,  1T7. 

Hippocles,  nor»  of  Menippus,  519. 

HippDclns,  tyrant  of  Lanipsacns,  520. 

Hippocratt?»  the  Athenian,  2β5.  his  at- 
tempt on  Mcgara,  20β.  his  harangue, 
'J'>3.  killed  at  the  battle  of  Delium, 
'280.  tyrant  of  Gela,  380. 

the  Lacedemonian,  533. 

Ilippolochidai»,  273. 

Ilipponicus,  213. 

iiipponoidas,  358. 

Ilisttaeans,  06.  , 

Histiodorus,  134. 

Mumer,  3.  0,7,221. 

Ilvjeans,  219. 

Hvblfians.  441. 

Hyblo,  379. 

Ilyccara,  418. 

Hyliiis,  the  river,  47J. 

nv|)orboliis,  550. 

HyMa;,  172,  300. 

ialysu»,  537. 

lajiVi^ia,  470. 

lisus,  528. 

(brrians,  377. 

Icarus.  174. 

Irthvs,  promontory  of,  107. 

l.'a,'45«i,  581. 

Macus,  579. 

Momenc.  150.  925. 

Illvrian?,  15,  17,301. 

iinbriaus,  101,240,  313,487. 

liiikrus.  a  Libyan  king,  revolts  from  the 
Persian  monarch,  61.  crucified,  04. 

Ines«;a,  220. 

InlatiJ»,  37. 

lolnus,  323,325. 
.  lo'iia,  2,  8. 

ionian.o,4.  had  a  great  fleet  in  the  reign 
of  Cyrus,  and  were  masters  at  sea»  9. 
subdued  by  Cyrus,  10.  revolt,  57.  ene- 
mies to  the  Dorians,  429.  Used  to  as• 
.<^omble  at  Delos,  220. 

'pnrans,  218. 

hiirchidas,  18. 

hchagoras,  300,  323,  325. 

I^ocrates,  143. 

hthmionicus,  323,  325. 

Istone,  211,255. 

Itahis,  378. 

Italy.  8,  23,  94. 

lUinencs,  177. 

Iihomf,  revolt  of  the  Helots  at,  CO. 

itonxans,  313. 

llys,  108. 

Jet»,  450. 

Juno,  temples  of,  15,  205,  207,  307. 

Jupiter,  temples  of,  on  Ithome,  00. 

Milichius,  festival  of,  74. 

Nemean,  210. 

Labdalum,  443. 

Lacedaemonians,  their  power  in  Ρ•Ιο• 


ponnesus,  0.  their  dress,  4.  were  th• 
first  who  .«tripped  in  the  public  games. 
4.  dcmolislHKl  tyrants,  11.  origin  of 
their  great  war  with  the  Athenians, 
15.  deluded  by  Thcmistocles,  54.  ac- 
cuse him,  45.  war  against  their  He- 
lots, 00.  at  war  with  the  Athenians, 
61.  and  the  Dorians,  ib.  beat  the  Ath- 
enians at  Tanagra,  03.  make  a  tnicc 
for  five  years,  65.  begin  the  holy  war, 
ib.  make  a  thirty  years'  truce  with 
the  Athenians,  CO.  consult  about  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  48.  determine  for 
it,  53.  send  embassies  to  Athens  to 
spin  out  time,  73.  invade  Attica,  98. 
assign  Thyrea  to  the  iEginetro,  108. 
invade  Attica,  118.  make  war  on 
Zacynthus,  131.  march  to  Plataia, 
and  besiege  it,  134.  invade  Acarna- 
nia,  140.  fight  at  sea,  143.  their  project 
to  seize  the  Piraeus,  151.  invade  .\t• 
lica,  159.  resolves  to  succor  the  Mity- 
lenaians.OO.bccome  masters  of  Plata;a, 
190.  put  the  Plat-cans  to  death,  201. 
beat  the  Corcyreans  at  sea,  205.  send 
a  colony  to  Heraclea,  214.  their  expe- 
dition against  the  Amphilochians,*219. 
invade  Attica,  229.  their  endeavors  to 
recover  Pylus,  231,  send  an  embassy 
to  Athens  to  solicit  a  peace,  238.  van- 
quished in  Sphacteria, 247.  make  away 
with  2000  llelots,  275.  take  Amnhipo- 
lis,  290.  make  peace  with  the  Athen- 
ians, 295,  321.  march  into  Arcadia, 
330.  forbid  to  assist  at  the  Olympic 
games,  345.  succor  the  Epidaurians, 
S48.  gain  a  victory  at  Mantinea,  358. 
determine  to  succor  the  Syracusans, 
440.  fortify  Decelca,  tb.  succor  tho 
Chians,  510.  enter  into  league  with 
the  Persian  monarch,  521,  532,  547. 
take  lasus,  528.  fight  with  and  beat 
the  Athenians,  530.  seize  Rhodes,  537. 
are  beaten  in  the  sea-fight  of  Cynos- 
sema,  579. 

Laccdiemonius,  son  of  Cimon,  28. 

Laches,  commander  of  the  Athenian 
fleet  in  Sicily,  211,  323,  325,  makes 
war  on  Mela;,  312.  defeats  the  Lo- 
crians,  220. 

Lacon  speaks  in  behalf  of  the  Ftateans, 
190. 

Laconia,  124, 102,  230,  258. 

Lade,  521. 

La;spodias,  448,  565. 

Lamachus,  loseth  a  squadron^  371.  on• 
of  the  three  commanders  m  Sicily, 
382.  his  opinion  at  a  council  of  wati 
409.  killed,  440. 

Lainis,  379. 

Lampon,  323.  325. 

Lampsacus,  83,  415,  543L 

Laodicium.  307. 

Laphilus,  323,  325. 

La'teans,  153. 

Lari8sa;ans,  100. 

Laurium,  123,  4Mi 


500 


INDEX. 


Learchus,  ISf. 

Lebedos.  Hi. 

Lecythu»,  294. 

Leiiiiuans,  246,    SIS.    accompany   the 

Athciuana  to  Sicily,  4b7. 
Lemnu8, 67,  Utt. 
Lcocuriuin,  13. 
Leocrutcu,  62. 
Leon  the  Lacedaemonian,  S14,  S41,  &4Θ. 

the  Athenian.  323,  325,  δ24,  545. 

Lcontincs  243.  at  war  with  the  Syracu• 

sans,  2n.m8editiun,  311. 
Leolychidcs,  53. 
Lcpreuin,  336,  345. 
Lerus,  527. 

Lesbians,  13,  67,  159,  161,  258,  514. 
Lcucadians  aid  the  Corinthians  against 

the  Corcyra'ans,  16,  17. 
Lcucas,  lu,  146,  215,  447. 
Lcuconium,  525. 
Leuctra  of  Arcadia,  348. 
Leuciiuna,  19, 29,  32. 
Lichas,anUlyiupicvictor,butscourG;cd 

346.  hisciubusMCS,324,362.  public  host 

of  the  Argives,  ib.  his  dispute  with 

Tissaphcnics,  536,  563,  his  death,  t^. 
Liguriiins,  377. 
Liinnau,  141,222. 
Lindii,  379,  537. 
Lipara,  212. 

Locri  Epizephyrii,  449. 
Uzolic,  4.  lose  Naupactus,  61 

confederate  willi  the  Athenians,  229. 
Loryuii,  536. 
Lycaiuiii,  329. 
Lycophroii,  144,  254. 
Lyncesta;,  155,  275. 
Lyncus,  pass  of,  275,  300. 
Lysicles,  169. 

Lysiineleia,  the  marsh,  485. 
Lysistratus,  292. 

Macarius,  218.  killed,  223.        / 

Maccdoiuu,  Athenian  expedition  to,  35 

Machaoii,  143. 

Mieauder,  169,  547. 

Mx'dians,  151. 

Maiitalia,  334. 

Magne.sia  of  Asia.  89,  543. 

Malea,  160,  25H,  534. 

Mantineans,  223.  224.  war  with  the  Te- 
geata;,  307,  make  alliance  with  the  Ar- 
gues, 328.  at  war  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians, 333.  renew  the  peace  with 
them,  3<>4.  mercenaries,  488. 

Marathon,  11,44,416. 

Maraea,  61. 

Marat hussa,  530. 

Mecyberna;ans,  322. 

Medeon,  222. 

Medes,  11,27. 

Megaba»es,  76. 

Megabazus  the  Persian,  64.  eon  of 
Zopyrus,  ib. 

Megiireans,  their  revolt  from  the  Co- 
rinthians, 61,  62.  from  the  Athenians 


66.  aid  the  Corinthians  against  Cor-lMyus,  83, 169, 


cyra,  17, 90.  prohibited  the  harbors  and 
markets  of  Athene,  S9,  83.  schem• 
to  betray  their  city  to  the  Athenians, 
265.  demolit'h  their  long  walls,  892. 

Melancridas,  516. 

Mclanthus,  514. 

Melcas,  161. 

Melesander,  133. 

Melesippus,  83,  oa 

Melians,  214.  their  conference  with  the 
Athemans,  367.  besieged,  370.  reduced, 
lb. 

Mclitia,  373. 

Mclos,  213,  534. 

.Memphis,  61,  64, 

.Meiiander,  an  Athenian  commaiiUer  in 
.Sicily,  458,  477,  496. 

Menas,  323,  325. 

Mende,  231,  299,  305. 

.Mcnecolus,  3Wt.  .     . 

.Mcnecratcs,  298. 

.Meneda^'us,  218,  223. 

•Mcnon,  106. 

.Messana,  229. 

Mcssanians  of  Sicily,  313,  313. 

Messapian;•,  218,  470. 

.Messenians  of  Peloponnesus,  ejected 
by  the  Lacedaemonians,  61.  settled  by 
the  Athenians  at  Naupactus,  ib.  take 
Pheia,  107. 

Melagtncs,  323. 

.Metaponlines,  470.489. 

Methone,  106,255.322. 

Milhydnuin,  350. 

Mithyinneuns,  159.  487,  523,  577. 

.Miciades,  29. 

.Milesians,  their  war  with  the  Samians, 
67.  beat  tiieArgivcs,  526.  demolish  the 
fort  built  by  Tissanliernes,  563. 

Mindarus,  the  LaceilaMuoman  admiral, 
503,  576.  defeated.  579, 

Minerva,  teiniiles  of,  79,  101,  395. 

.Minoa,  island  of,  189,  266,  296. 

Minos,  his  naval  power.  3,  5.' 

.Mily lenuians,  revolt  from  the  Athenians, 
159,  their  speech  at  Olympia,  162.  re- 
duced, 174.  ordered  to  be  massacred, 
178.  debate  on  its  execution,  ib.  coun• 
termanded,  188. 

Molossians,  141. 

.Molycrium,  144,  145. 

.Molyeniuin,  219. 

Morgantina,  265. 

Mycale,  53,  550. 

Mycalessians  massacred,  467. 

Myccnaj,  6. 

Myconus,  174. 

Mygdonia,  35,  155. 

Mylie,213. 

.Myoneans,  218. 
Myonnesus,  176. 
Myrcinians,  290,  312. 
Myronides,  62,  63,  283. 
Myrrhine,  413. 
.Myrtilus,  323,  325. 
My  scon,  564. 


».NDEX. 


601 


Nauclide?,  90. 

NiUipartus.CI,  HO,  144,218,257,  272,  409. 

Naxjaiis,  58,  213,  favor  the  Athenians, 
410,  4b7,  vanquish  tho  Mcssuniuns, 
213. 

Ncapolis,  483. 

Ν e Ilia,  ;<5(). 

Nrodainodrs,  332,  35fi,  4M,  480,  514. 

Ni'ptiinc,  temples  of,  75,  2'je,  553. 

Nericus,  162. 

Nesliis,  the  river,  153. 

Niranor,  141. 

Nicnsijs,  2iW. 

Nuiades,  297. 

Nirias,  son  of  Niccratus,  189,213,245, 
2:^3. 258, 298, 305, 319, 342, !»« .speeches, 
382,  391,  421.  491,  503.  named  for  the 
coininand  in  Sicily,  382.  his  opinion  at 
u  council  of  war,  408. dcfcatsthc  Syra- 
rusans,  423,  446.  his  strataeem,  440. 
left  in  the  .«^olc  command,  447.  hislct- 
tir  to  the  Athenians,  454.  refuses  to 
raise  tlic  Rcitre  of  Syracuse,  481.  raises 
tlie  su'Ke,  5(K).  surrenders  lo  Gylip- 
j.us.  508.  p»it  lo  death,  509. 

the  Cretan  of  Gortys,  145. 

Niro,  4Γ»0. 

Nifohius.  131. 

Nicomachus,  279. 

Nicomedes,  sou  of  Clcoinbrotue,  63. 

Niconidas,  273. 

Nicostratus,  aid  Ihc  popular  faction  nt 
Corcyra,  204.  takes  Cythera,  S58,  298, 
takes  Mcndc,  305.  besieges  Scionc, 
352. 

Nile,  the  river,  61. 

Nisa-a,  61,  66.  110,  Iftl,  3M,  390,  330. 

Notiuin,  177. 

isyinphodoru.s,  108. 

Oilomanti.  157. 

(Kirysa;,  108,287. 

(Kant  hians,  218. 

(Kneoii.  219. 

(Kiiir,  65. 103. 

(Kiiophyta.  63,  283. 

(Ksvinc,  290. 

(Ktieans,  513, 

(Klhieans,  60. 

niiKtans,  218, 

Ulympia,  70,  162,  S». 

Olympic  Games,  4, 73. 

Olvmpieum,  452,  474. 

Ulymnus,  274. 

Olynthians,  373. 

Olynthu.s,  35,  37, 139,  800,  321 

Onasiinus,  298. 

Oneimi,  Mount,  254. 

Onomacles,  5i0,  529. 

Onhioneans,  215. 

Opicaps,  378. 

Opus,  110. 

Orchomenos,  ββ,  512,  572,  352. 

Orestes,  son  of  Echecratidas,  βλ 

Orestheum,  354. 

Orestians,  141. 

ureus,  574. 


Orncans,  356,381. 
Orohiie,  212. 
Orfndus,  141. 
()rt>pian.s,  106,  284,  548. 
Oropus,  213,  284,  466. 
O.vcius,  the  river,  153. 

Paches,  sent  hy  the  Athenians  lo  reduc• 
Milylene,  168,  lakes  it,  174.  and  No- 
tium,  177.  and  I'yrrha  and  Ercsus,  tb. 

Pieonians,  153.  154. 

Pau'ondas.liis  harangue  to  the  Boeotians, 
2,Hi.  wins  the  battle  of  Dcliiun,  284. 

Palivrcans,  109. 

Pate.  17. 

Palcans,  109. 

I'alUno,  istlimus  of,  34,  88,  895. 

Painillus,  379. 

Pnmiihylia,  59. 

Panactun»,  310,  322,  335. 

Panaji,  157. 

Panierus,  273. 

Panalhenair  procession,  13, 414. 

Pandion,  108. 

Paiiptus.  155. 

Panornius  of  Achaia,  145.  of  Miletus,  524. 

Panlacyas,  the  river,  379. 

Paralians,  214. 

Paralus,  the  vessel,  550. 

"aravx'ans,  141. 

Parnassus,  216. 

Parnes,  Mount,  106,  284. 

Parrhasia,  333. 

Pasitelidas,  307,  310. 

I'atmos,  177. 

Palra',  143. 

Pausanias,  captain-Rcneral  of  Greece, 
50.  subdues  Cyprus,  57.  besieges  Hy. 
zantiiim,t6.  grows  a  tyrant,  ift.  recalled 
anil  tried  at  Sparta,  ift.  returns  to  tFTe 
Hellespont,  75.  his  letter  to  Xerxes, 76. 
driven  from  Byzantium,  77.  betrayed, 
78.  starved  to  death,  79. 

Pcdaritus,  528,  5.10,  .•>46. 

PeRas61,63,  65,  66,  205. 

P«  lasKi,  3. 

Pelasgium,  the,  102. 

Pella,  155,  156. 

Peloponncsians,  Ihcir  colonies,  β— 9. 
thrircharacter,84.  originally  Dorians, 
429.  their  war  with  the  Athenians,  see 
Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians. 

Pelops,  α 

Pelorus,  Cape.  242. 

Peparethus,  212. 

Pera;bians,  274• 

Perdiccas,  king  of  Macedonia,  his  po- 
litical turns,  34, 36, 37, 109.  invaded  by 
Sitalces,  152.  in  conjunction  with 
Brasidas  invades  Arrhibaeus.  275,  300. 
quarrels  with  Brasidas,  304.  makes- 
peace  with  the  Athenians,  300•  is  again 
their  enemy,  364. 

Pericles,  commands  the  Athenians,  05. 
conquers  Euboca,  60.  and  Samos,  67. 
his  speech  for  war,  83.  makes  the  fu• 
neral  oration,  111.  his  speech  in  de* 


IHDEX, 


5Θ2 

• 

feDM  of  hiRueir,  115.  hi•  death  and 

character,  130, 131. 
Perieres,  3bO. 
PerioBCi,  βυ,  314. 
Perseus,  6. 
Persians,   at  Thermopylae,  350.  their 

noble  custom,  15ϋ. 
Phacium,  274. 
Phxacians,  16. 
Pha^ax.Sll. 

Pltaemis,  priestess  of  Juno,  307. 
Phagres,  155. 
Phalerus,  the,  63. 
Phalms,  15. 
Phan»,  525. 
Phanomachus,  131. 
Phausteus,  279. 
Phanotis,  272. 

Pharnabazus,  515.  534,  500,  576. 
Pharnaces,  132,  30^. 
Pharsalians,  106. 
Pharsaius,  65. 
Phaselis,  133,  567. 
Pheia,  m  Elis,  107. 
Piieraians,  106. 

Philif),  brother  to  Perdiccai,  35,  SA,  153. 
Philippus,  the  Lacedemouian,  528,  566, 

576. 
Philucharidas,  208, 333, 341. 
Philoctetes,  7. 
Phliasians,  17.  448. 
Phoceans,  found  Massalia,  9.  beat  the 

Carthaginians  at  sea,  ib. 
Phocians,  ut  war  with  the  Dorians,  63. 

recover  the  temple  of  Uelphi,  66. 
Phoiuicians,  exercised    piracy.  5.   in• 


Pithias,  303, 103. 

Pitlacus,  2i)0. 

Plataians,  confederate  with  Athens,  00. 

beseiged,  134.  a  body  of  them  make 

their  escape,  170.  surrender,  170.  their 

speech  to  the  Lacedaimomaus,  100. 

are  put  to  death,  201. 
PleutarchU8,77. 
Plcistionax,  king  of  Sparta,  63, 66.  ban• 

ished,  104.  restored,  310,  323,  333,  361. 
Pleistolas,  323. 
I'lemyrium,  451, 463. 
I'leuron,  210. 
Polichna,  524. 
Polichnitae,  145. 
Polles,  312. 
Pollis,  131. 
Polyanthcs,  471. 
Polycratcs,  tyrant  of  Samos,  powerful 

at  sea,  9.  consecrates  llhenea  to  the 

Dehan  Apollo,  ιύ. 
Polydainidas,  300, 305. 
Polymedes,  lOG. 
Potumis,  5G4. 
Poiida;ans.  originally  from  Comith,  S4. 

revolt  from  the  Athenians,  35.  de• 

feuled.  37.  beseiged,  tit.  135.  surreu* 

dcr,  131. 
Potidaiica,  316. 
I'l  isiuj,  124,  448,  573. 
Priene,  67. 

Procles,  213,  318,  333. 
Prucne,  108. 
I'rouiuans,  109. 
Probchmm,  210,  222. 
Proi<o[)ts,  island  of,  64. 


habited  the  isles,  ib.  ha'd  settiementsjPruie,  island  of,  236. 

in  Sicily,  378.  Proteas,  son  of  Epicles,  SB,  100. 

Phoinippus,  297.  Pruxenus,  220. 

l*lkorinio,  an  Athenian  commander,  38,' Pteleuin,  3*22,  525,530. 

68,  109.  CDminands  their  fleet  at  Nau-iPtaodorus,  272. 

pacius,  133.  beats  the  Peloponnesians  Plyrhm,  island  of,  255. 
"   ^       epare  for  a  second  en•  Pydna,  36,  bl 


at  sea,  144.  prepare 

Sageinent,    145.    his   harangue,  147. 
eats  them  again,  150. 
Photys,  141. 
Phrynicus,  520.  his  intrigue  against  Alci 

biudcs,  512.  deprived  of  the  command 

545.  IS  of  the  oligarchical  faction,  553 

568.  is  assassinated,  570. 
Phrynis,  515. 
Phlhiotis,  3. 
Phyrcus.  315. 
Physca,  155. 
Phylia,  222. 
Pierians,  155. 
Pindus,  Mount,  157. 
Piraius,  62,  100,  151,  326,  570. 
Pisander,  overturns  the  democracy  at 

Athens,  545,  549,568.  flies  to  Decelea, 

570. 
Pisistratus.the  tyrant,  13,220.  412.  puri 

fics  Dolus,  220.  dius  an  old  man,  413. 
• the  son  of  Hippias,  413.  dedi 

catcd  altars,  ib. 
Pisuthnes,  67.  176,  177. 
Pitancnsian  Lochus,  13 


bl. 
Pygrasiuns,  106. 
Pylus,  230,  275,  818. 
Pyrrha,  1C8,  173, 177,  534. 
Pystilus,  379. 
Pylhangehis,  90. 
Pylhen,  447,  449,  497. 
Pylhia,  322. 
Pythodorus,  the  archon  at  Athens,  90l 

the  son  of  l.>olochus,  in  the  command, 

227,  323,  448.  banished,  365. 

Runiphia,  83.  317. 

Uhegiaiis,  21 1 .  attacked  by  the  Locriani, 
229.  neutral  in  the  Sicilian  war,  407. 
Rheiti,  104,  253. 
Rhcnca,  9,  220. 
Khium.  144.  145. 

Uhodians,  Doric  by  descent,  4881 
Illiodopc,  1.^3. 
UhtEleum.  258,  578. 
Uhypa,471. 

Sabylinthus,  141, 
Succo,  3bO. 


INDEX. 


593 


9.-i(l(>cas,  son  of  Sitalcce,  109.  made  a 
ntizcn  of  Athens,  lA. 

Paiethus,  sent  to  Mitylene,  173.  taken 
prisoner  and  puttodeathby  the  Alhe- 
nians,  178. 

Salaminia,  the  tirircme,  805,  411. 

^<alamιs,  44,  81, 152,  in  Cyprus,  05. 

8a1ynthus,  king  of  the  Agrseans,  335, 
«7,  273. 

Sam^ean»,  109,  322. 

iJamiuns,  9, 20.  conquered  by  the  Athe- 
nians, 67.  their  insurrection,  533. 

Saminthus,  351.  - 

Sand  ins,  169. 

Sane.  292. 

Sardis.  67. 

SarBcus,  461. 

Scaiidea,  259. 

Soioneans,  of  the  PcUene,  originally 
from  Peloponnestis,  29β,  revolt  tb. 
rrown  Brasidas,  299.  reduced  and  se- 
verely treated  by  the  Athenians,  332. 

Srironidcs,  526,  545. 

Scirphondas,  468. 

Srolus,  322. 

Scomius,  Mount,  153. 

ScyllKimi,  347. 

Srvro!V,58. 

Srjic.^iaos,  380,  408. 

^^clιnuntιncs.  489.  at  war  With  the  8e- 
Kostans,  380. 

Srlinus,  379,  408. 

Scrmylians.  39,  322. 

Scslos,  53,  549,  578. 

Scuihcs,  154,  pucceede  Sitalces  In  the 
kingdom  of  Odrysas,  287  marries  the 
sister  of  Pcrdiccas,  157. 

Ficanas,  425. 

Siranians,  377. 

Siccls,  378,  434. 

Sicilians,  213. 

Siciiy,  8,  9,  11,23,  94. 

Sirvonians,  18,  64,  05,  60,  8Θ7, 

Sidiissa,  525. 

SiRcum,  416,  578. 

Sirnus,  380. 

Smpt• ans,  332. 

Siniians,  154. 

Siphe,  272,  279. 

Sitalccs.  king  of  Thrace,  108.  ally  to  the 
Athenians,  109, 1 32.  invades  the  Mace- 
donians, 152.  his  power,  153.  con 
qnered  by  the  Tribal hans,  287. 

iocrales,  son  of  Antigencs,  106. 

iollnim,  109,  216,  329. 

Solygian  Hill,  253. 

Sophocles,  son  of  Sostratides,  338.  sent 
to  Sicily. 229.  hie  acts  at  Corcyra,355 
banished  from  Athens,  365. 

Sparta,  75. 

Spartolus,  139.  323. 

Sphacteria,  333. 

Sialics,  521. 
itanmis,  279.  312,  323. 
Stesasforas,  68. 

Vihenelaidas,  his  speeeh  at  Sparta  on 
war  with  the  Athenians,  93.      • 


Stratodcmus,  131. 

Stratonice,  157. 

Stratus,  141.  157,222. 

Strombichides,  520.  his  exploits,  521)1 

Strongyle,  212. 

Stropliactis,  273. 

Strymon,  the  nvcr,  58, 153,  357,  391. 

Styphon,  251. 

Styrians,  487. 

Stinuim,  514. 

SylKJla,  the  island.  29,  33. 

port  of  Thesprotis,  31,  33,  33, 

205. 
Syca,  443. 
Symc,  535. 
Syracusans,  at  war  with  the  Lcontincs, 

211.  arc  defeated  by  the  Athenians,  242. 

draw  up  against  the  Athenians,  429 

{ircpare  for  bailie,  ib.  are  defeated,  423. 
ortify  their  city,  425.  send  cmbassa• 
dors  to  Camarina,426.  to  Corinth  and 
Sparta,  435.  engage  and  are  defeated 
by  the  Athenians,  442,  445.  raise  their 
counterworks,  444.  arc  about  treating 
with  Nicias,  447.  prepare  their  fleet, 
402,  attack  the  Athenians  by  land  and 
sea,  403,  474.  erect  two  trophies,  480. 
prepare  again  for  an  engj\gcment,  484. 
defeat  flicm  again,  ib.  prepare  for  the 
last  battle.  490.  engage,  497.  arc  vic- 
torious, 499.  stop  the  Athenians  by  a 
stratagem,  501.  pursue  them  and  take 
them  all  prisoners,  507.  send  aid  to 
the  Peloponnesiani,  536,  579. 

Tfflnarus,  temple  of  Neptune  at,  75.    • 

Tamos,  530,565. 

Tantalus,  a  Lacedaemonian  command• 
CT,  261. 

Tarcnlum,  407,  447. 

Tanngra.  63,  213,  373,  467. 

Taulanlii,  15.  : 

Taurus,  298. 

Trgnans.  fight  with  the  Manlinean8,907. 

Tell las,  447. 

Telhs,  323,  325, 

Tcmenidm,  155.  ί 

Tenedians,  159,487. 

Tenians,  487,  520,  554. 

Teres,  father  of  Sitalccs,  108.  gets  th• 
kingdom  of  Odrysae,  ib.  enlarges  it,  t#. 

Tereus,  108. 

Terias,  the  river,  410, 441. 

Terinean  Gulf,  447. 

Teuliaplus,  175. 

TeuUussa,  536. 

Thapsus,  r9,  443,  483. 

Tharypus,  king  of  the  Moloesians,  ML 

Thasians,  revolt  from  Athens,  59.  de- 
feated, ib.  beg  aid  from  the  Laceda• 
monians,  ib.  surrender,  60. 

Thasos,  282,  550. 

ThcR-netu»,  169. 

Theagenes,  73. 

Thcbans,  17.  surprise  Ptatnea,  90.  thelf 
P{>eech  to  the  Liicedemonians,a(ainsl 


594 


INDEX. 


the  PlaUBAns,  193.  demolish  the  walls 
of  Thespiaj,  307. 

Thebes,  M. 

Thetnistocles,  10,  45.  by  his  advice  the 
battle  was  fought  in  the  strait  of  Sala- 
mis,  45.  is  sent  embassador  to  Sparta, 
54.  deludes  the  Laocdiemonians,  ib. 
gets  the  Long-walls  and  Pirxus  se- 
cured, 56.  banished  Athens  by  the  os- 
tracism, 80.  resides  at  Argos,  i6.  ac- 
cused by  the  Laceda;monians,  ib.  flies 
to  Corey  ra,  ib.  to  Admctus,  ib.  the  dan- 
ger he  escaped,  ib.  his  letter  to  the  kmg 
of  Persia,  «I.  tiis  character,  b2. 

Theogenes,  323,  325. 

Thcrainenes  the  Athenian,  553.  one  of 
those  whoovcrturnea  the  democracy, 
t^.  turns  to  the  other  side,  5C7,  570. 

the  Laccila^inonian,  carries 


Tichiussa,  5St7.  • 

Tilataians,  153. 

Timagoras  of  Cysicus,  515, 510,  U4 
of  Tegea,  131. 


the  fleet  to  Asia,  527,  533 
Therme,  36,  loy. 
Thermon,  51d. 
Therinopyla},  150,  214,  250. 
Theseus,  100. 
Thespians,  441. 
Thesprotis,  10.29,31. 
Thessalians,  drive  the  Doiotians  from 

Arnc.8.  confederates  with  the  Athen 

ians,  63.  send  tlieni  ai(l.s,  ώ.  105.  their 

form  of  government,  273.      * 
Tht'.ssalus,  brother  of  Ilipijias,  13. 
Tliessaly,  2. 
Tlioricus,  573. 
Thracians.overthrowthe  Atheniana,i»»,     iiii;  v/.iij>i.. 

290.  are  free,  108.  thoir  sordid  custom. ^rmacria,  377 

154.  fight  with  the  Tlicbans  after  the  Tnopium,  532. 

massacre  at  Mycalessus,  468.  Tripodii<cus,  ϊ68, 

Thrasybulus,  550.  supports  the  dcmoc-  TnUrans,  218. 

racy,  557.  made  a  commander,  558.  " 

briiiKS  back  Alcibiadcs,  501.  beats  the 

Pcloponnosians  at  sea,  579. 
Tlirasyclcs,  323,  325,  520. 
Thrasyllus  the  Armve,  351. 
Thra.sylus  the  Alheiuan,  556,  558,  577, 

579. 
Thrasymelidas,  235. 
Thruim,  (iO. 
Thucles,  378. 


Timanor,  18. 

Timocrates,  144,  kilU  himself,  150. 

Timoxenus,  110. 

Tisamenus,  214. 
isandcr,  218. 

Tisias,  367. 

Tis&apherncs,  lieutenant  of  Darius,  913. 
his  compacts  and  leagues  with  the 
Pjluponnc.«ians,  521,  532,  547.  is  con• 
qiiered  at  Miletus  by  the  Athenians, 
526.  fortifies  lasus,  528.  pays  the  Lace- 
daemonian ships,  ib.  lessens  their  pay 
by  the  advice  of  A Icibiades,  538.  wants 
to  be  reconciled  to  the  Lacedemon- 
ians, 547.  inveighed  against  by  the 
manners,  559,  563.  whV  he  did  Dot 
bring  up  the  Phenician  fleet,  566. 

Tiepolemus,  68, 

Tolmidas,  son  of  Tolmaeus,  64, 66. 

Tolophonians,  218. 

Tolophus  218. 

Tomiu.s,  th»?,  296. 

Torone,  292.  310. 

Torylan.s,  273. 

Trarlunian.«,  214. 

Tra'zeniiins,  17. 

Tragia,  isiaiid  of,  67. 

Trircs,  153. 

Triljiilli,  153.  conquer  Silalces,  king  of 
the  Oilrysjans,  267. 


Tropilus,  443. 

Trt>jaiis,  how  enabled  to  roiist  the 
Greeks  for  ten  years,  7,8.  some  of 
them  .settled  m  Sicily  after  the  taking 
of  Trov.  377. 

Troiilus,  379. 

Tydcus,  533. 

Tyndarus,  6. 

Tyrrhenes,  292. 


Thucydides,  son  of  Olorus,  whv 


he 
wrote  the  history  of  this  war,  1,  12, 
326.  had  the  plague,  119.  his  gold 
mines  and  great  credit  in  Thrace. 
2b9.  commands  in  Thraee,  ib.  arrives 
too  late  to  save  Ainphipolis,  ib.  secures 
Eion,  290.  was  an  exile  for  twenty 
years,  327. 

the  colleague  of  Agnnn  and 


Phormio,  69.  the  Pharsalian,  571. 
Thurians,  60,  470,  489. 
Thyamis,  the  river.  29. 
Thyamus,  Mount.  222. 
Thymocharis,  573. 
Thvrea,  108,  260.  338,  441. 
Thvssus,  292,  333. 
Tichiuin,216. 


Ulysses,  212. 

.Xenares,  Ephorus.  at  Sparta,  335,  342. 

ciimmauderoi  the  Heracleots, 

killed,  347. 
Xeno,  4C0. 
XenocIules,29,  227. 
Xeno|)haiitidas,  545. 
Xcnophon,  son  of  Euripides,  134,  130. 
Xei'xes,  10, 68.  his  letter  to  Paus&nias.Te 

Zac>'nthian8,aid  the  Corcyneans  against 
the  Corint  hians,  29.  a  colony  of  AchK* 
ans,  131,  215.  aid  the  Athenians  in  the 
Sicilian  war,  469,  4t:^. 

Zaucle,  379. 

Zcuxidas,  323,  323. 


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To  Librarians  and  others  connected  with  Colleges,  Schools,  &c., 
who  may  not  have  access  to  a  trustworthy  guide  in  forming  the  true 
estimate  of  literary  productions,  it  is  believed  this  Catalogue  will 
prove  especially  valuable  for  reference. 

To  prevent  disappointment,  it  is  suggested  that,  whenever  books 
can  not  be  obtained  through  any  bookseller  or  local  agent,  applica- 
tions with  remittance  should  be  addressed  direct  to  Harper  A 
Brothers,  which  will  receive  prompt  attention. 


Srni  by  mail  on  receipt  of  Six  Cents  in  postage  stamps. 

Address  HARPER  &  BROTHERS, 

Franklin  SquArk,  New  York. 


RETURN 


HUMANITIES  GRADL 

150  Main  I  ihrnry   mk 


HUMANITIES  GRADUATE  SERVICE 

642-448 


LOAN  PERIOD  1  ^^2                       ^ 

3 

4;^-^ 

c2-  /  Ιύ  ΙΛΤΓ3 

6 

RESERVE 


Books  are  OVERDUE  if  not  returned  or  renewed  by  the  HOUR  (where  indica 
2  HOUR  books  may  not  be  renewed  by  telephone.  Return  only  to  HGS. 

DUE   AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


JAN  10.1989 


«irooismijo4«8 
RL:Tϋ^j^vZD 


OCT    5  1988•!: 


HUM.  6RA0.  SERVir; 

iUN  1  4  195, 


FORM  NO.  DD17A,  15  m,  6'76 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKE 
BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


GENERAL  LIBRARY -U.C.  BERKELEY 


B0DD73Lni3 


ι 


